

**(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY RENDITION, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION  
PROGRAM INFORMATION**

**(U//FOUO) PURPOSE OF THE GUIDANCE**

(S// [ ] NF) This document is intended to provide classification guidance regarding information related to the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program ("the RDI Program" or "the Program"). Because the RDI Program was executed under CIA authorities, information related to the Program is controlled by the CIA. The CIA protects information about the RDI Program to ensure, among other things, that:

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- (S// [ ] NF) The foreign governments that assisted the CIA in executing the Program remain politically viable so that they can continue to assist the U.S. Government in executing counterterrorism operations;

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- (S// [ ] NF) The lives of the CIA and foreign [ ] officers who assisted the CIA in executing the Program are not threatened by terrorists at-large;

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- (S// [ ] NF) The identities of the human sources ("assets") who assisted the CIA in executing the Program are not revealed so that the assets can continue to assist the CIA in executing counterterrorism operations without fear of retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile foreign intelligence services; and

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- (S// [ ] NF) The identities of covert CIA officers who assisted the CIA in executing the Program are not revealed so that the officers can be posted outside of the U.S. where they can continue to conduct the CIA's foreign intelligence mission without fear of retribution by terrorists at-large or hostile foreign intelligence services.

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(S// [ ] NF) The CIA made promises to all persons and entities who participated in or assisted the CIA in executing the RDI Program that the CIA would keep their participation or assistance secret. If the CIA were unable to keep that promise, it would affect those persons' and entities' willingness to assist the CIA in the future. The CIA is highly dependent upon foreign governments, foreign intelligence officers, and assets to execute counterterrorism operations all over the world. Therefore, if the CIA were unable to recruit foreign governments, foreign intelligence officers, or assets to assist the CIA in conducting future counterterrorism operations, it would cause grave damage to national security.

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ Because the unauthorized release of information related to the RDI Program would cause grave damage to national security, such information can only be officially released or declassified by the President of the United States, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the CIA, or a CIA officer with original classification authority. Accordingly, leaked documents, statements by former intelligence officers, or reports by senior officials of other government agencies cannot declassify CIA information related to the RDI Program.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, reports in the media -- even those sourced to knowledgeable intelligence officials -- do not constitute an official declassification of CIA information related to the RDI Program.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Over time, certain information about the RDI Program has been officially declassified and released to the public. On 6 September 2006, President Bush acknowledged that fourteen named High Value Detainees (HVDs) who were previously in CIA custody were transferred to Department of Defense (DOD) custody at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). By 2008, President Bush had announced that two additional named HVDs who were previously in CIA custody had been transferred to DOD custody at GTMO. In January 2008, CIA Director Hayden released the names of three HVDs who had been waterboarded. On 16 April 2009, President Obama released redacted versions of four memos regarding the RDI Program, which were written by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). Those four memos were dated 1 August 2002, 10 May 2005 (two memos), and 30 May 2005. On 24 August 2009, President Obama released pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act litigation the CIA Inspector General's Special Review of the RDI Program ("OIG Special Review"), an OLC memo dated 31 August 2006, and an OLC memo dated 20 July 2007. Following the raid on Usama bin Laden's compound on 1 May 2011, the CIA released certain information about the RDI Program.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Apart from these limited releases, most of the information regarding the RDI Program remains classified. Determining whether certain RDI Program information remains classified and, if so at what level, often depends on subtle nuances and carefully parsed distinctions. The guidance provided in this document is intended to educate the user and help the user make informed decisions about whether certain information related to the RDI Program may be classified. The guidance does not constitute an exhaustive list of all categories of classified information related the RDI Program. Thus, if the user is uncertain whether a particular piece of information is classified or at what level a particular piece of information is classified, the user should handle the information at the highest classification level and seek guidance or a classification determination from a CIA officer who is an original classification authority. The guidance does not constitute a classification review by a CIA original classification authority of any particular piece of RDI information, and the guidance may not be used in lieu of submitting information for a classification review by a CIA original classification authority.

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<sup>1</sup> ~~(U//FOUO)~~ One example is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report, which was leaked to the New York Review of Books in early 2009.

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(U//FOUO) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE(U//FOUO) Declassified Information Relating to the RDI Program

- (U//FOUO) The 1 August 2002 OLC memo listed ten Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) that could be applied to HVD Zayn al Abidin Muhammad Husayn (aka: Abu Zubaydah).
- (U//FOUO) The May 2005 OLC memos released the names and descriptions of the thirteen EITs that were approved for use at that time, and specified the parameters within which the EITs must be applied.
- (U//FOUO) The 10 May 2005 "Combined Techniques" OLC memo released the fact that dietary manipulation and sleep deprivation were used in combination with waterboarding.
- (U//FOUO) The 10 May 2005 and 30 May 2005 OLC memos released the fact that detainees were watched via closed-circuit television.
- (U//FOUO) The 30 May 2005 OLC memo and the OIG Special Review released the fact that Abu Zubaydah had been waterboarded 83 times during August 2002, and that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) had been waterboarded 183 times during March 2003.
- (U//FOUO) The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released certain intelligence that was gleaned from HVD interrogations. Such information is also detailed in two Directorate of Intelligence papers on detainee reporting, which were released in August 2009. Both releases provide that Abu Zubaydah and KSM supplied information about numerous plots and that their information led to the capture of other HVDs. The releases also provide that information from detainee interrogations was analyzed and cross-checked with other intelligence information, and that this process enabled the CIA to confirm certain intelligence information and uncover plots in which other HVDs or terrorists at-large were involved.
- (U//FOUO) The 30 May 2005 memo noted that, as of 2004, over 6,000 intelligence reports had been issued based upon information provided by HVDs.
- (U//FOUO) The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that, as of the writing of that memo, 94 detainees had been in the RDI Program and that 28 had experienced EITs.

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- (U//~~FOUO~~) The 30 May 2005 OLC memo released the fact that the waterboarding interrogation technique was used only against three HVDs: Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. The memo also released that waterboarding has not been used since March 2003.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The 30 May 2005 and the 31 August 2006 OLC memos described other "standard techniques" such as shaving, solitary confinement, white noise, shackling, etc. that would be employed in an attempt to get a detainee to cooperate, prior to employing any EITs.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The 31 August 2006 OLC memo released the fact that detainees were held in solitary confinement.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA released pursuant to a FOIA litigation that the CIA destroyed 92 videotapes on 9 November 2005. The CIA also released that the videotapes were of Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah. The OIG Special Report released that twelve of the videotapes showed EIT applications.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The July 2007 OLC memo describes six EITs that are minimally necessary to maintain an effective interrogation program. The memo also released the fact that, as of the writing of that memo, the CIA had a total of 98 detainees in the RDI Program and that the CIA had only used EITs with a total of 30 detainees.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Various OLC memos have stated that CIA Office of Medical Service doctors and psychologists monitored detainees' health during the application of EITs, but that medical personnel did not participate in any interrogations themselves.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The OIG Special Review released the fact that Nashiri underwent unauthorized interrogation techniques.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA released the fact that Abu Faraj al-Libi received EITs. However, specific EITs applied to Abu Faraj remain classified.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA released the fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true name of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, the courier/facilitator who the CIA tracked to uncover the location of Usama bin Laden.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA released the fact that no CIA detainee revealed the true location of Usama bin Laden.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) The CIA released the fact that KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libi provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. However, all specific information provided regarding Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti remains classified.

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(U//FOUO) Other information that is Unclassified:

- (U//FOUO) General allegations of torture by HVDs unless such allegations reveal specific details about EITs as applied to the HVD; the identities (e.g., names, physical descriptions) of CIA personnel or contractors; the locations of detention sites (including the name of any country in which the detention site was allegedly located); or any foreign [ ] involvement in HVDs' [ ] detention, [ ] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(U//FOUO) Information Relating to the RDI Program that Remains Classified

- (S// [ ] NF) The names of or identifying information regarding any HVD – other than Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Nashiri, and Abu Faraj al-Libi – against whom EITs were applied. (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (S// [ ] NF) Any information about EITs as applied to individual detainees, except the fact that Abu Zubaydah, KSM, and Nashiri were waterboarded. The 1 August 2002 OLC memo was written in anticipation of using EITs against Abu Zubaydah if he did not cooperate after using less coercive means of questioning. The 1 August 2002 OLC memo did not affirm that EITs would be applied to Abu Zubaydah, if he did not cooperate. (b)(3) NatSecAct
- Any information regarding the specific application of a particular EIT (e.g., sequencing, duration, etc.), as applied to named detainees; including Abu Zubaydah, KSM, Nashiri, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.
- (S// [ ] NF) Names of or identifying information about any detainees held in CIA custody, other than the 16 HVDs publicly identified by President Bush. (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (S// [ ] NF) Any information about the operation or location of any overseas detention facilities, including the name of any country in which the detention facility was allegedly located. (b)(3) NatSecAct
- [ ] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (S// [ ] NF) Any information regarding CIA personnel or contractors involved in the RDI Program; including names, pseudonyms, physical descriptions, or any identifying information. (b)(3) NatSecAct
- Any information regarding CIA assets; including names, [ ] physical descriptions, or any identifying information. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct



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- ~~(S/ [ ] /NF)~~ Any information regarding any foreign [ ] cooperation with CIA in administering or hosting any aspect of the RDI Program, including the names of or identifying information about foreign [ ]; the names of or identifying information about individual members of foreign [ ] or any other details regarding foreign [ ]

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- ~~(S/ [ ] /NF)~~ Any information regarding the capture of individual detainees, [ ]

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- ~~(S/ [ ] /NF)~~ Any information regarding the transfer ("rendition") of a detainee, [ ] the length of the trip; and arrival, departure, layover, and final destination locations involved in the transfer. [ ]

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- ~~(S/ [ ] /NF)~~ Any information regarding the conditions of confinement of a detainee, while he was in CIA [ ] custody. [ ]

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- ~~(S/ [ ] /NF)~~ Any information regarding the treatment of a detainee, while he was in CIA [ ] custody. [ ]

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- ~~(S/ [ ] /NF)~~ Information regarding questions asked to detainees in CIA debriefing or interrogation sessions and the answers the detainee provided. Information about gaps in intelligence that the CIA had and was trying to fill by questioning the detainees. [ ]

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**(U//FOUO) Other Classified Information Not Relating to the RDI Program**

- (U//FOUO) All information that is not specific to the RDI Program, but is otherwise classifiable under applicable law and Executive Orders including intelligence sources, methods, and activities.

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
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~~(U//FOUO)~~ **CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S FORMER RENDITION, DETENTION,  
AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM**




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
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**~~(U//FOUO)~~ Information Relating to the Former RDI Program That No Longer Is Classified**

- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The fact that the former RDI Program was a covert action program authorized by the President. The fact that the former RDI Program was authorized by the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON).
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ General allegations of torture by HVDs unless such allegations reveal the identities (*e.g.*, names, physical descriptions, or other identifying information) of CIA personnel or contractors; the locations of detention sites (including the name of any country in which the detention site was allegedly located); or any foreign intelligence service involvement in the HVDs' capture, rendition, detention, or interrogation.
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The names and descriptions of the thirteen Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) that were approved for use, and the specified parameters within which the EITs could be applied.

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- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ EITs as applied to the 119 individuals mentioned in Appendix 2 of the SSCI Executive Summary acknowledged to have been in CIA custody.
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Information regarding the conditions of confinement as applied to the 119 individuals mentioned in Appendix 2 of the SSCI Executive Summary acknowledged to have been in CIA custody.
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Information regarding the treatment of the 119 individuals mentioned in Appendix 2 of the SSCI Executive Summary acknowledged to have been in CIA custody, including the application of standard interrogation techniques.
- ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Information regarding the conditions of confinement or treatment during the transfer ("rendition") of the 119 individuals mentioned in Appendix 2 of the SSCI Executive Summary acknowledged to have been in CIA custody.

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