



Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review
of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)
at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

KE
6 Feb 09

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ACTION MEMO

FOR: Designated Civilian Official (U)

THRU: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U) *[Signature]*

FROM: Director, OARDEC (U) *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
 ICO ISN 263 (LIBYA)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 12 Nov 08 [redacted] based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: [redacted]
- Intelligence Value: [redacted]
- Other Factors: [redacted]

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:
 [redacted]

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:
 [redacted]

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO [redacted]

[Signature]
2-9-09

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC ASJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

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Classified By: Presiding Officer's Memorandum of Administrative Review Board Panel
 Source Marked: 25X1
 Source Dated: 20 Nov 08

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ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

26 Nov 08

From: Staff Judge Advocate, OARDEC (U)

To: Designated Civilian Official (U)

Via: Director, OARDEC (U) *AS 1/7/09*

Subj: (U) LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) FOR DETAINEE ISN 263


Ref: (a) (U) Section 1005(b) of Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

(b) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order OSD 06942-04 of 11 May 04

(c) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Revised Implementation Directive of 14 Jul 06

Encl: (1) (U) ARB Panel #157 Presiding Officer Memo of 20 Nov 08

1. (U) A legal sufficiency review has been completed on the subject ARB in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c). After reviewing Enclosure (1), I find that:



1
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ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

Classified By: Presiding Officer's Memorandum of Administrative Review Board Panel #157

Source Marked: 25X1

Source Dated: 20 Nov 08

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ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

Subj: (U) LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD FOR
DETAINEE ISN 263

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. (U) The detainee is a habeas petitioner in the case of Abdessalam v. Bush, 06-CV-1761 (D.D.C.). As of the date of this memorandum, there is a court order requiring the government to provide the detainee's counsel and the court 30-days notice prior to removing the detainee. The detainee is a DTA petitioner in the case of Achraf Salim Abdessalam v. Gates, 07-1245 (C.C.A.).

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Classified By: Presiding Officer's Memorandum of Administrative Review Board Panel #157
Source Marked: 25X1
Source Dated: 20 Nov 08

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ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

Subj: (U) LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD FOR
DETAINEE ISN 263

4. (U) The proceedings of the ARB are legally sufficient and no corrective action is required.



CAPT, JAGC, USAF
Assistant Staff Judge Advocate

3
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ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

Classified By: Presiding Officer's Memorandum of Administrative Review Board Panel #157
Source Marked: 25X1
Source Dated: 20 Nov 08

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Upon Removal of Attachments, This Document is (SECRET//NOFORN)



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF
THE DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANTS (OARDEC)
AT U.S. NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1010

20 November 2008

From: Presiding Officer of Administrative Review Board Panel #157 (U)

To: Designated Civilian Official (U)

Via: Director, OARDEC (U) *8/18/09*

Subj: (U) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW OF THE DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANT ISN 263 (U)

Ref: (a) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order OSD 06942-04 of 11 May 04 (U)
(b) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Revised Implementation Directive 14 Jul 06 (U)


Encl: (1) (U) Director, OARDEC, Memorandum for the Record of 04 November 2008 (S//NF)
(2) (U) Notification of the Decision of an Administrative Review Board (U)
(3) (U) Enemy Combatant Election Form (U)
(4) (U) Matters Submitted on Behalf of the Enemy Combatant dated 23 February 2007 (U)
(5) (U) OARDEC, Memorandum for Record dated 30 June 2006 (S//NF)
(6) (U) Classified Record of Proceedings and Basis for Administrative Review Board
Decision for ISN 263 (S//OC/NF)
(7) (U) Minority Assessment and Recommendation for ISN 263 (S//OC/NF)
(8) (U) Copies of Documented Evidence Presented to the Board (S//OC/NF)

1. (U) Per references (a) and (b), an Administrative Review Board was conducted on 12 November 2008 to determine whether subject Enemy Combatant continues to be a threat to the United States and its allies or whether there are reasons to further detain him in U.S. custody. Enclosures (1) through (8) pertain.

2. (S//NF) After review and deliberation, Administrative Review Board Panel #157 determined by a vote of 3 to 0 that Enemy Combatant ISN 263 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Board specifically determined the following:

Threat Assessment
Intelligence Value
Other Factors



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Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 25X1-Human

Jenner & Block

6187

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Upon Removal of Attachments, This Document is ~~(SECRET//NOFORN)~~



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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review
of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)
at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

04 November 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD # 157

Ref: (a) DCO Appointing Order of 22 Oct 08
(b) DCO Appointing Order of 3 Nov 08
(c) DCO Appointing Order of 1 Aug 08

1. By the authority established by references (a), (b), and (c), an Administrative Review Board (ARB) to review the detention of enemy combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is hereby convened. The following commissioned officers shall serve as members of ARB Panel # 157:

MEMBERS:

(b)(3):10
U.S.C. 120(b) Colonel, U.S. Army; Presiding Officer

(b)(3):10
U.S.C. 120(b) Major, U.S. Air Force; Member

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 1 Commander, U.S. Navy; Member (Experienced in the field of intelligence)


FRANK SWEIGART
Director

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Enclosure (1)
Page 1 of 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NOTIFICATION OF THE DECISION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ICO ISN 263 TO CONTINUE DETENTION

An Administrative Review Board has reviewed the information about you that was talked about at the meeting on 13 June 2007 and the deciding official in the United States has made a decision about what will happen to you.

You will continue to be detained. You will have another meeting in the future to decide if you are still a threat to the United States and its friends or if there is any other reason to keep you here. At the next meeting to review your case, the Board will consider all the information it has about you, including anything you tell them at the meeting, how you have been acting, if you are obeying the camp rules, if you are working with the United States government trying to help, and if you still want to wage jihad against Americans and their friends. The Board will also look at written statements, if any are provided, from you, your family, and your friends. We recommend that you write to your family and friends and ask them to send you written statements that will help show the Board that you are not dangerous to Americans and their friends. If the Board thinks you no longer pose a threat to the security of Americans and their friends, it will suggest to the deciding official in the United States that you be transferred or released from Guantanamo Bay. The deciding official in the United States makes the final decision.

Date: 31 August 2007

Signature of Officer Serving Notice: _____

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 130(b),
(b)(6)

Printed Name of Officer Serving Notice: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (2)
EC-A

UNCLASSIFIED

Enemy Combatant Election Form

Initial Interview Date/Time:
10 Nov 2008/1030

ISN#: 263

Assisting Military Officer: [REDACTED] Major, USAF

Translator Required? Yes (b)(2) Language: Arabic

- Verified the Enemy Combatant was notified of the DCO decision from his 2007 ARB Review
- Verified that Administrative Review Board (ARB) procedures were explained
- Linguist read the Unclassified Summary of Evidence to Enemy Combatant in the Detainee's native language or detainee read copy of Unclassified Summary of Evidence

Enemy Combatant Election:

- Wants to appear personally in ARB Proceedings
- Wants assistance of Assisting Military Officer (AMO)
- Affirmatively declines to appear personally in ARB Proceedings
- Uncooperative or unresponsive
- Wants to respond to each statement of information in Unclassified Summary after it is presented
- Wants to wait until entire Unclassified Summary has been presented before responding
- Other (see below)

Assisting Military Officer Comments:

The detainee's ARB interview was scheduled for 10 Nov 2008 however, upon learning the purpose of the meeting, the detainee refused to leave his cell for the interview. In accordance with Joint Detention Group Standard Operating Procedures, copies of both the English and Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence were hand carried to the detainee by the JDG liaison. The AMO received written confirmation from the JDG liaison stating the documents were accepted by the detainee.

ISN-263
Enclosure (3)
EC-B
Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Additional Comments:


None

Detainee Comments:

None

Signature of Officer Conducting Interview:

Typed Name of Officer Conducting Interview:



ISN-263
Enclosure (3)
EC-B
Page 2 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

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



Department of Defense
Designated Civilian Official
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention
of Enemy Combatants,
U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
1000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-1000

Date: 30JUN06

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

From: Special Agent [REDACTED] OARDEC Law Enforcement Liaison
To: CDR [REDACTED] Staff Judge Advocate, JTF-GTMO
Subject: Receipt of Allegation



Law Enforcement Liaison
Office for the Administrative Review of Enemy Combatants
OARDEC - Forward
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

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ISN 263
Enclosure (5)
Page 1 of 1

(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 263

1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee was uncooperative or unresponsive and refused to leave his cell to attend the interview.

d. (U) The ARB confirmed the Joint Detention Group (JDG) hand carried to the original English and Arabic Unclassified Summary of Evidence to the detainee. The AMO received a written confirmation of delivery of the documents to the detainee from the JDG.

f. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

g. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

Derived From: Multiple Sources
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
ISN 263
Enclosure (6)
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b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-25.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (8):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)




(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)



(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)



(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)



(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)



(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)



Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

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Enclosure (6)
Page 2 of 10

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(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)




4. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The detainee is a citizen of Libya. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material presented on behalf of ISN 263, herein enclosed as Enclosure (4). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 263.

5. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**



6. (U) **Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**


a. (S//NF) Threat Level. The detainee 
to the following factors:



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ISN 263
Enclosure (6)
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
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ISN 263
Enclosure (6)
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b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Value. The detainee [redacted]
[redacted]




c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.






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ISN 263
Enclosure (6)
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d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recommendation. ISN 263



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Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 263
Enclosure (6)
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


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Enclosure (6)
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


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ISN 263
Enclosure (6)
Page 8 of 10

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

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
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7. (U) Board Members' Voting Results



Colonel, USA
Presiding Officer

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ISN 263
Enclosure (6)
Page 10 of 10

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From: (U) Dissenting Officer of Administrative Review Board Panel #157

To: (U) Presiding Officer

Subj: (U) MINORITY ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR THE
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE DETENTION OF ISN 263

1. (U) Dissent for the Following Reasons

[REDACTED]

2. (U) Basis for Dissent

[REDACTED]

**3. (U) Primary Documents, Assessments, Testimony, and other Considerations by the
Dissenting Member**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

c. (U) The following assessments considered by the ARB are summarized as follows:

[REDACTED]

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human


ISN 263
Enclosure (7)
Page 1 of 4

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4. (U) Discussion of the Primary Factors




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
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Enclosure (7)
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
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
5. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration



6. (U) Conclusions and Recommendation of the Dissenting Member



Very respectfully submitted,



Commander, U.S. Navy
Administrative Review Board member

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 263
Enclosure (7)
Page 4 of 4

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

06 November 2008

COPIES OF DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD

ISN: [REDACTED] 263 [REDACTED] Name: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM Country: Libya

Aliases: AL ANTARI, JABAL // AL LIBI, ABU FARIS // AL LIBI, ABU MARIAM // AL LIBI, ABU SUHAYB // AL LIBI, SUHAIB // AL RAHMAN, SUHAIB ASHRAF SALIM ABD // FATTAH, ABDUL // LNU, HATIM // LNU, SUHAYB // MUSTAFA, KHALED BIN // MUSTAFA, KHALID BIN // SUHAIB, ABU

Variants: AL LIBI, SUHARIB // SALAM, ABD AL // SALEM, ABD AL // SOLTANE, ACHRAF SALEM // SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

Exhibit #	Date	Classification	Agency	Description
DMO 01	06 Nov 2008	UNCLASSIFIED	OARDEC	(U) Unclassified Summary
DMO 02	05 Nov 2008	UNCLASSIFIED	FBI	(U) Redaction Memo
DMO 03	30 Oct 2008	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO	CITF	(U) Redaction Memo
DMO 04	06 Nov 2008	SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN	OARDEC	(U) Classified Summary
DMO 05	15 Sep 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	DASD-DA	(U) DoD Assessment
DMO 06	15 May 2008	SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN	(b)(1)	(U) ARB Input
DMO 07	19 May 2008	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	FBI	(U) Administrative Review
DMO 08	03 Jun 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	CITF	(U) Assessment
DMO 09	18 Jun 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	USSOUTHCOM	(U) Assessment
DMO 10	19 May 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) Recommendation
DMO 11	24 Aug 2007	SECRET//NOFORN	OARDEC	(U) ARB 3 DCO Action Memo
DMO 12	10 Apr 2002	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	FBI	(U) FD-302
DMO 13	[REDACTED]	SECRET//NOFORN	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DMO 14	01 Jan 2004	UNCLASSIFIED	DHS	(U) Terrorist Org Ref Guide
DMO 15	[REDACTED]	SECRET	[REDACTED]	(U) IIR [REDACTED]
DMO 16	29 Sep 2004	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) Knowledgeability Brief
DMO 17	[REDACTED]	SECRET//NOFORN	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
DMO 18	23 Dec 2004	CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, GCTF	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR [REDACTED]
DMO 19	07 Jul 2004	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) SIR [REDACTED]
DMO 20	24 Sep 2003	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR [REDACTED]
DMO 21	24 Feb 2005	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	CITF	(U) FM 40
DMO 22	25 May 2005	CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, GCTF	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR [REDACTED]
DMO 23	02 Jul 2004	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	CITF	(U) FM 40
DMO 24	22 Nov 2002	UNCLASSIFIED	Treasury Dept	(U) Exec Order 13224
DMO 25	03 Nov 2008	UNCLASSIFIED	JTF-GTMO	(U) Redaction Memo

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1 (Per most stringent document)

Enclosure (8)
Page 1 of 1

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

06 November 2008

ISN: [REDACTED] 263 [REDACTED] Name: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM Country: Libya

Alias: AL ANTARI, JABAL // AL LIBI, ABU FARIS // AL LIBI, ABU MARIAM // AL LIBI, ABU SUHAYB //
AL LIBI, SUHAIB // AL RAHMAN, SUHAIB ASHRAF SALIM ABD // FATTAH, ABDUL // LNU, HATIM //
LNU, SUHAYB // MUSTAFA, KHALED BIN // MUSTAFA, KHALID BIN // SUHAIB, ABU

Variant: AL LIBI, SUHARIB // SALAM, ABD AL // SALEM, ABD AL // SOLTANE, ACHRAF SALEM //
SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

Summary:

(U) Recruitment

[REDACTED]

(U) Travel

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1 (Per most stringent document)

DMO Exhibit 04
Page 1 of 6

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ISN: (b)(2) 263 (b)

Name: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

Country: Libya

(b)(7)(A)

(U) Executive Order 13224 lists al Wafa as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity.
(DMO-24)

(b)(1)

(U) Training

(b)(1)

ISN: (b)(2) 263 (b)
Country: Libya

Name: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

(U) Operations, Combat and Capture

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

(U) ISN 493 called the Babi madafa in Pakistan, "another general guesthouse that was run by Sheikh Sayyaf, a commander of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. (DMO-15)

(b)(1)

(U) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group has pledged to overthrow Muammar Qadhafi's Libyan government. Some members are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network. (DMO-14)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(U) Organizational Affiliations

(b)(1)

ISN: ^{(b)(2)} [redacted] 263 ^{(b)(2)} [redacted]
Country: Libya

Name: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

(b)(1)

(U) Individual Affiliations

(U) No additional information.

(U) Other Relevant Information

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

(U) The following primary ^{(b)(5)} [redacted]

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

DASD-DA Recommendation (DMO Exhibit 5)

Threat Assessment Level ^(b) [redacted]

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Intel Assessment Level ^(b) [redacted]

CIA Assessment (DMO Exhibit 6)

ISN: (b)(2) 263 (b)
Country: Libya

Name: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM

Threat Assessment

Level (b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Intel Assessment

Level (b)(5)

FBI Assessment

(DMO Exhibit 7)

Threat Assessment

Level (b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

Intel Assessment

Level (b)(5)

CITF Assessment

(DMO Exhibit 8)

Threat Assessment

Level (b)(5)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

ISN: [REDACTED] 263 [REDACTED]
Country: Libya

Name: SULTAN, ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM



USSOUTHCOM

(DMO Exhibit 9)



JTF-GTMO

(DMO Exhibit 10)

Threat Assessment

Level [REDACTED]



Intel Assessment

Level [REDACTED]



Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review
of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)
at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

KE
31 Jan 09

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ACTION MEMO

FOR: Designated Civilian Official (U)

THRU: *[Signature]* Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (U)

FROM: Director, OARDEC (U) *1/6/09*

SUBJECT: (U) ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
 ICO ISN 839 (Yemen)

o (S//NF) Subject ARB was held on 20 November 2008 resulting [REDACTED] based on the following:

- Threat Assessment: [REDACTED]
- Intelligence Value: [REDACTED]
- Other Factors: [REDACTED]

o (S//NF) Intelligence inputs used in the ARB's determination of this EC's case include:
 [REDACTED]

o (S//NF) Agency assessments follow:
 [REDACTED]

o (U) The Legal Sufficiency Review (Tab A) and the Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation (Tab B) with enclosures are attached.

o (S//NF) RECOMMENDATION: That the DCO [REDACTED]

[Signature]
1-2-09
 [REDACTED]

o (U) Attachments:

- Tab A OARDEC SJA Legal Sufficiency Review
- Tab B Presiding Officer's Assessment and Recommendation

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Classified By: Presiding Officer's Memorandum of Administrative Review Board Panel #135
 Source Marked: 25X1
 Source Dated: 23 Dec 08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

23 December 2008

From: Staff Judge Advocate, OARDEC (U)
To: Designated Civilian Official (U)
Via: Director, OARDEC (U) XG/8/09

Subj: (U) LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD (ARB) FOR DETAINEE ISN 839

Ref: (a) (U) Section 1005(b) of Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(b) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order OSD 06942-04 of 11 May 04
(c) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Revised Implementation Directive of 14 Jul 06

Encl: (1) (U) ARB Panel #155 Presiding Officer memo of 3 Dec 08

1. (U) A legal sufficiency review has been completed on the subject ARB in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c). After reviewing Enclosure (1), I find that:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(5)

1
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

Classified By: Presiding Officer's Memorandum of Administrative Review Board Panel #155
Source Marked: 25X1
Source Dated: 23 Dec 08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

**Subj: (U) LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD FOR
DETAINEE ISN 839**

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

3. (U) The detainee is a habeas petitioner in the case of Anam v. Bush, 04-CV-1194 (D.D.C.). As of the date of this memorandum, there is a court order requiring the government to provide the detainee's counsel and the court notice 30 days prior to removing the detainee from United States Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As of the date of this memorandum, the detainee is a DTA petitioner in the case of Musa'ab Omar Al Mudwani v. Gates, 07-1116 (C.C.A.).

(b)(2)

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 130(b),(b)
(6)

CDR, JAGC, USN
Staff Judge Advocate

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

Classified By: Presiding Officer's Memorandum of Administrative Review Board Panel #155
Source Marked: 25X1
Source Dated: 23 Dec 08

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Upon Removal of Attachments, This Document is (SECRET//NOFORN)



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF
THE DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANTS (OARDEC)
AT U.S. NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1010

03 December 2008

From: Presiding Officer of Administrative Review Board Panel #155 (U)
To: Designated Civilian Official (U)
Via: Director, OARDEC (U) 10/16/09

Subj: (U) ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW OF THE DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANT ISN 839 (U)

Ref: (a) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Order OSD 06942-04 of 11 May 04 (U)
(b) (U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Revised Implementation Directive of 14 Jul 06 (U)

Encl: (1) (U) Director, OARDEC, Memorandum for the Record of 4 November 2008 (S//NF)
(2) (U) Notification of the Decision of an Administrative Review Board dated
07 February 2008 (U)
(3) (U) Enemy Combatant Election Form dated 23 October 2008 (U)
(4) (U) Correspondence Submitted on Behalf of Enemy Combatant dated
13 December 2005 (U)
(5) (U) Matters Submitted on Behalf of the Enemy Combatant dated 22 February 2006,
23 February 2007, 27 February 2007, 05 March 2007, 28 March 2007,
21 March 2008, and 07 April 2008 (S//NF)
(6) (U) OARDEC, Memorandum for Record dated 27 December 2005 (S//NF)
(7) (U) Classified Record of Proceedings and Basis for Administrative Review Board
Decision for ISN 839 (S//OC/NF)
(8) (U) Copies of Documented Evidence Presented to the Board (S//OC/NF)

1. (U) Per references (a) and (b), an Administrative Review Board was conducted on 20 November 2008 to determine whether subject Enemy Combatant continues to be a threat to the United States and its allies or whether there are reasons to further detain him in U.S. custody. Enclosures (1) through (8) pertain.

2. (S//NF) After review and deliberation, Administrative Review Board Panel #155 determined

(b)(5)

Threat Assessment
Intelligence Value
Other Factors

(b)(5)

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Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 839
Page 1 of 2

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Upon Removal of Attachments, This Document is (SECRET//NOFORN)

(b)(1)

(b)(3):10 U.S.C.
130(b),(b)(6)

CAPTAIN, USN
Presiding Officer

SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 839
Page 2 of 2



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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review
of the Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC)
at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
1010 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1010

4 November 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD # 155

Ref: (a) DCO Appointing Order of 31 Oct 08
(b) DCO Appointing Order of 3 Nov 08
(c) DCO Appointing Order of 1 Aug 08

1. By the authority established by references (a), (b), and (c), an Administrative Review Board (ARB) to review the detention of enemy combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is hereby convened. The following commissioned officers shall serve as members of ARB Panel # 155:

MEMBERS:

(b)(3):10 U.S. Captain, U.S. Navy; Presiding Officer

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. Major, U.S. Air Force; Member

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 1 Commander, U.S. Navy; Member (Experienced in the field of intelligence)


FRANK SWEIGART
Director

Enclosure (1)
Page 1 of 1

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NOTIFICATION OF THE DECISION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD ICO ISN 839 TO CONTINUE DETENTION

A Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) has previously determined that you are an enemy combatant. Your status as an enemy combatant has not changed.

An Administrative Review Board has reviewed the information about you that was talked about at the meeting on 27 December 2007 and the deciding official in the United States has made a decision about what will happen to you.

You will continue to be detained and you continue to be classified as an enemy combatant. You will have another meeting in the future to decide if you are still a threat to the United States and its friends or if there is any other reason to keep you here. At the next meeting to review your case, the Board will consider all the information it has about you, including anything you tell them at the meeting, how you have been acting, if you are obeying the camp rules, if you are working with the United States government trying to help, and if you still want to wage jihad against Americans and their friends. The Board will also look at written statements, if any are provided, from you, your family, and your friends. We recommend that you write to your family and friends and ask them to send you written statements that will help show the Board that you are not dangerous to Americans and their friends. If the Board thinks you no longer pose a threat to the security of Americans and their friends, it will suggest to the deciding official in the United States that you be transferred or released from Guantanamo Bay. The deciding official in the United States makes the final decision only with regard to whether or not you pose a threat to the United States. The deciding official does not review your status as an enemy combatant.

07 February 2008

Signature of Officer Serving Notice: _____

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 130(b),
(b)(6)

Printed Name of Officer Serving Notice: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (2)

EC-A

Page 1 of 1

UNCLASSIFIED

Enemy Combatant Election Form

Initial Interview Date/Time: 23OCT2008/1000

ISN#: 839

Assisting Military Officer: (b)(3):10 U. Major, USMC

Translator Required? Yes (b)(2)

Language: Arabic

- Verified the Enemy Combatant was notified of the DCO decision from his 2007 ARB Review
- Verified that Administrative Review Board (ARB) procedures were explained
- Linguist read the Unclassified Summary of Evidence to Enemy Combatant in the Detainee's native language or detainee read copy of Unclassified Summary of Evidence

Enemy Combatant Election:

- Wants to appear personally in ARB Proceedings
- Wants assistance of Assisting Military Officer (AMO)
- Affirmatively declines to appear personally in ARB Proceedings
- Uncooperative or unresponsive
- Wants to respond to each statement of information in Unclassified Summary after it is presented
- Wants to wait until entire Unclassified Summary has been presented before responding
- Other (see below)

Assisting Military Officer Comments:

The detainee's ARB interview was conducted on 23 October 2008. After reviewing the ARB's purpose and procedures, the Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read to the detainee. The Detainee confirmed the Unclassified summary was understood. When asked if he wanted to attend the ARB, present a written or oral statement, or have the AMO speak on his behalf, the detainee stated he would not attend the ARB, however, he stated he did want the AMO to present on his behalf documents previously submitted to the board two years ago. The detainee was polite and attentive throughout the interview. A copy of both the English and Arabic translated Unclassified Summary of Evidence, were handed to the detainee according to the JDG Standard Operating Procedures.

ISN-839
Enclosure (3)
EC-B
Page 1 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Additional Comments:

The detainee appeared at his interview wearing a white uniform.

The detainee stated that there are false statements throughout the Summary of Evidence. He stated that every detainee in the camps here at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is accused of doing the same things.

The detainee asked the AMO to speak specifically to charges in the Summary of Evidence in the category of Training and in the category of Other Relevant Data:

Under the category of Training:

1. The detainee stated he denies that he participated in explosives training and is knowledgeable about the al Qaida explosives training program. He alleges that interrogators faked this story.

Under the category of Other Relevant Data.:

2. The detainee stated he denies that a letter containing instructions on attacks to specific targets and financial support was found in his apartment. He alleges that interrogators faked this story.
3. He denies stating he wanted the opportunity to train in Afghanistan because it was his duty as a Muslim to be trained. He alleges that interrogators faked this story.

Detainee Comments:

(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 130(b),(b)(6)

Signature of Officer Conducting Interview:
Typed Name of Officer Conducting Interview:

ISN-839
Enclosure (3)
EC-B
Page 2 of 2

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of Defense
Designated Civilian Official
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention
of Enemy Combatants,
U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
1000 Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-1000

27 Dec 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

From: Special Agent (b)(3):10 U. OARDEC Liaison Division
To: LTC (b)(3):10 U. Staff Judge Advocate, JTF GTMO
Subject: Receipt of Allegation

- 1. (b)(1),(b)(5)
- 2.
- 3.
- 4. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 U.S.C. 130(b),(b)(5),(b)(6)

Law Enforcement Liaison
Office for the Administrative Review of Enemy Combatants
OARDEC – Forward
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

**(U) CLASSIFIED RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AND BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD DECISION FOR ISN 839**

1. (U) Introduction

a. (U) An Administrative Review Board (ARB) was held pertaining to the subject Enemy Combatant (EC). In reaching the ARB's conclusions and recommendations, the ARB considered both classified and unclassified information. The following record of the proceedings presents the factors the ARB used in making its recommendation.

2. (U) Synopsis of Proceedings

a. (U) The detainee declined to attend the ARB, and consequently the Board convened without the detainee being present.

b. (U) The Designated Military Officer (DMO) presented the Unclassified Summary in both written and oral form.

c. (U) The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) presented the Notification of the Decision of an ARB as Exhibit EC-A, identified herein as enclosure (2). The AMO then presented the Enemy Combatant Election Form as Exhibit EC-B, identified herein as enclosure (3). Exhibit EC-B indicated the detainee affirmatively declined to appear personally in the ARB proceedings. The AMO verbally summarized comments the detainee made during the AMO's interview, and provided an oral statement made by the detainee to the AMO during the interview. This statement is documented in Exhibit EC-B. The AMO further presented correspondence from the detainee as Exhibit EC-C, identified herein as enclosure (4).

d. (U) The ARB confirmed a translator who spoke the same language as the detainee was present during the AMO's interview. Additionally, the ARB confirmed the Unclassified Summary of Evidence was read and translated to the detainee, and the detainee understood the process.

e. (U) The AMO responded verbally, on behalf of the detainee, to an allegation under the category of Training and two allegations under the category of Other Relevant Data in the Unclassified Summary.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

g. (U) The unclassified portion of the proceedings was adjourned. The ARB convened the classified session and the DMO presented the Classified Summary. The ARB panel members reviewed the classified exhibits and closed the session for deliberation.

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 839
Enclosure (7)
Page 1 of 6

h. (U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee was considered.

3. (U) Summary of Information Considered

a. (U) The ARB reviewed the ARB 3 package.

b. (U) The ARB reviewed and considered information contained in DMO-01 through DMO-39.

c. (U) The following government agency and command assessments were considered by the ARB and are summarized below. The specific agency and command assessments are included in enclosure (8):

(1) (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs (DASD-DA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(2) (U) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(3) (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(b)(5),(b)(7)(A)

(4) (U) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources
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ISN 839
Enclosure (7)
Page 2 of 6

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(5) (U) Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(6) (U) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(7) (U) Office of Military Commissions (OMC)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

4. (U) **Third Party / Home Country Statements**

a. (U) The detainee is a citizen of Yemen. The ARB considered the habeas counsel's ARB submission material presented on behalf of ISN 839, herein enclosed as Enclosure (5). There were no other matters submitted on behalf of ISN 839.

5. (U) **Consultations with the Administrative Review Board Legal Advisor**

(b)(2)

6. (U) **Conclusions and Recommendation of the Administrative Review Board**


a. (S//NF) **Threat Level.** The detainee (b)(1),(b)(5) the following factors:

(b)(1),(b)(5)

Derived From: Multiple Sources
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ISN 839
Enclosure (7)
Page 3 of 6

(b)(1)



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Enclosure (7)
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(b)(1)

b. (S//NF) Intelligence Value. The detainee (b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

(b)(1)

c. (U) Detainee Treatment Act Consideration.

(b)(1)

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 839
Enclosure (7)
Page 5 of 6

d. (U) Recommendation.

(b)(1),(b)(5)

7. (U) **Board Members' Voting Results**

a. (U) The Board reached a unanimous decision.

(b)(3):10 U.S.C.
130(b),(b)(6)

CAPTAIN, USN
Presiding Officer

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1-Human

ISN 839
Enclosure (7)
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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 November 2008

COPIES OF DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE BOARD

ISN: (b)(2) [redacted] 839 (b) [redacted] Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI Country: Yemen

Aliases: ABU ANAS // ABU MUSAB AL YEMENI // AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Variants: AL MADOONEE, MUSAB OMAR ALI // AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI // AL MUDWANI,
MUSAD UMAR ALI // MADHWANI, MUSAAB OMAR ALI

Exhibit #	Date	Classification	Agency	Description
DMO 01	21 Oct 2008	UNCLASSIFIED	OARDEC	(U) Unclassified Summary
DMO 02	29 Sep 2008	UNCLASSIFIED	FBI	(U) Redaction Memo
DMO 03	06 Oct 2008	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO	CITF	(U) Redaction Memo
DMO 04	19 Nov 2008	SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN	OARDEC	(U) Classified Summary
DMO 05	17 Aug 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	DASD-DA	(U) DoD Assessment
DMO 06	23 May 2008	SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN	(b)(1)	(U) ARB Input
DMO 07	09 Jun 2008	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	FBI	(U) Administrative Review
DMO 08	10 Jun 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	CITF	(U) Assessment
DMO 09	10 Jul 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	USSOUTHCOM	(U) Assessment
DMO 10	20 Jun 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) Recommendation
DMO 11	18 Jan 2008	SECRET//NOFORN	OARDEC	(U) ARB 3 DCO Action Memo
DMO 12	01 Nov 2002	SECRET	JTF-GTMO	(U) Knowledgeability Brief
DMO 13	05 Feb 2004	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR (b)(2)
DMO 14	24 Feb 1998	SECRET//NOFORN	CITF	(U) Intelligence Report
DMO 15	21 Feb 2003	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	FBI	(U) FD-302
DMO 16	02 Jul 2003	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR (b)(2)
DMO 17	14 Apr 2004	SECRET//REL TO GCTF	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR [redacted]
DMO 18	12 May 2005	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) SIR
DMO 19	14 Sep 2002	SECRET//NOFORN	(b)(1)	(b)(1)
DMO 20	10 Nov 2002	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	FBI	(U) FD-302
DMO 21	20 Oct 2008	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO	OARDEC	(U) Deleted Doc Placeholder
DMO 22	11 Sep 2007	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	CITF	(U) FM 40
DMO 23	03 Mar 2003	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) SIR
DMO 24	13 May 2003	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO-LES	FBI	(U) FD-302
DMO 25	22 Sep 2002	SECRET//NOFORN	(b)(1)	(b)(1)
DMO 26	07 Mar 2003	SECRET//NOFORN	[redacted]	[redacted]
DMO 27	15 Sep 2002	SECRET//NOFORN	[redacted]	[redacted]
DMO 28	22 Sep 2002	SECRET//NOFORN	[redacted]	[redacted]
DMO 29	08 Jul 2004	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) SIR
DMO 30	19 Apr 2004	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR (b)(2)
DMO 31	04 Sep 2008	SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR [redacted]
DMO 32	05 Nov 2007	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) SIR
DMO 33	06 Apr 2006	CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR/RELIDO	JTF-GTMO	(U) IIR (b)(2)

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Enclosure (8)

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SECRET//NOFORN

DMO 34	08 Jun 2004	SECRET//NOFORN	JTF-GTMO	(U) SIR
DMO 35	05 Nov 2002	SECRET	JTF-GTMO	(U) IR <input type="checkbox"/> (2)
DMO 36	15 Aug 2003	UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO	CITF	(U) FM 40
DMO 37	19 Nov 2002	SECRET	JTF-GTMO	(U) IR <input type="checkbox"/> (2)
DMO 38	25 Apr 2006	CONFIDENTIAL	INSCOM	(U) IR
DMO 39	20 Oct 2008	UNCLASSIFIED	JTF-GTMO	(U) Redaction Memo

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 November 2008

ISN: (b)(2) 0839 (b) Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI Country: Yemen

Alias: ABU ANAS // ABU MUSAB AL YEMENI // AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Variant: AL MADOONEE, MUSAB OMAR ALI // AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI // AL MUDWANI,
MUSAD UMAR ALI // MADHWANI, MUSAAB OMAR ALI

Summary:

(U) Recruitment

(b)(1)

(U) Travel

(b)(1)

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 25X1 (Per most stringent document)

DMO Exhibit 04
Page 1 of 7

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

ISN: (b)(2) 1839 (b)

Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Country: Yemen

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(U) Training

(b)(1)

(U) Operations, Combat and Capture


(b)(1)

ISN: (b)(2) 839 (b)

Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Country: Yemen

(b)(1)




(U) Organizational Affiliations

(U) Nothing Significant to Report [NSTR].

(U) Individual Affiliations

(b)(7)(A)



ISN: (b)(2) 839 (b)

Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Country: Yemen

(b)(7)(A)

(U) ISN 039 [Ali Hamza Ismail] stated al Zawahiri was al Qaida's general director and dealt directly with Usama bin Laden. (DMO-37)

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(U) Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was one of the masterminds behind the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. (DMO-38)

(b)(7)(A)

(b)(1)

(U) Other Information

(b)(1)


ISN: (b)(2) 3839 (b)(1)

Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Country: Yemen

(U) Factors Favoring Release or Transfer

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)



ISN: (b)(2) 1839 (b)(2)

Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Country: Yemen

(b)(1), (b)(7)(A)

DASD-DA Recommendation (DMO Exhibit 5)

Threat Assessment Level (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

Intel Assessment Level (b)(5)

CIA Assessment (DMO Exhibit 6)

Threat Assessment Level (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

Intel Assessment Level (b)(5)

FBI Assessment (DMO Exhibit 7)

Threat Assessment Level (b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

ISN: (b)(2) 839 (b)

Name: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Country: Yemen

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

Intel Assessment

Level (b)(5)

CITF Assessment

(DMO Exhibit 8)

Threat Assessment

Level (b)(5)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

USSOUTHCOM

(DMO Exhibit 9)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

JTF-GTMO

(DMO Exhibit 10)

Threat Assessment

Level (b)(5)

(b)(1), (b)(5)

Intel Assessment

Level (b)(5)

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28 October 2008

This cover sheet addresses the enclosed, truncated document titled:

Terrorist Organization Reference Guide

This document has been truncated to include only the pages that were found to be of value as an ARB 4 exhibit for the case file of ISN 263.

The pages attached to this cover sheet (as referenced from the original document) include:

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ii
2
57

All other pages were excised from the original document for the purposes of this exhibit because they were found to be either redundant or irrelevant in regard to the nature of this case.

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**U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Border Patrol**

Terrorist Organization Reference Guide

January 2004

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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations¹

The following descriptive list constitutes the 36 terrorist groups that currently (as of 30 January 2003) are designated by the Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The designations carry legal consequences:

- It is unlawful to provide funds or other material support to a designated FTO.
- Representatives and certain members of a designated FTO can be denied visas or excluded from the United States.
- US financial institutions must block funds of designated FTOs and their agents and must report the blockage to the US Department of the Treasury.

1. Abu Nidal organization (ANO)

a.k.a. Fatah - the Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description

Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength

Few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

Location/Area of Operation

Elements relocated to Iraq in December 1998, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Authorities shut down the ANO's operations in Libya and Egypt in 1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Financial problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group's activities and capabilities.

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including US citizens. Several of the arrested militants have reportedly undergone military training in Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahidin during the war against the former Soviet Union. Others are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Strength

Malaysian police assess the KMM to have 70 to 80 members. The Malaysian police continued to investigate more than 200 suspected Muslim militants throughout 2002.

Location/Area of Operation

The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. They also operate in Wilayah Persukutuan, the federal territory comprising Kuala Lumpur. According to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical Indonesian Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia, to fight against Christians.

External Aid

Largely unknown, probably self-financing.

59. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

a.k.a. Al-Jam'a al-isiamiyyah al-Muqatilah, Fighting Islamic Group, Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group

Description

Emerg^{ed} in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qaeda organization or are active in the international mujahidin network. The group was designated for asset freeze under E.O.13224 and UNSCR 1333 in September 2001.

Activities

Claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996 and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the mid-to-late 1990s. Continues to target Libyan interests and may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces.

Strength

Not known but probably has several hundred active members or supporters.

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(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)
~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)
(b)(2)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

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PAGE 05 (b)(2) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (b)(2)

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SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)
(b)(2) (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//RELEASABLE TO USA (b)(2)
(b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20000500.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

SOURCE: (C//REL USA (b)(2) /ISN (b)(2) 000200DP//SAUDI ARABIAN CITIZEN BORN IN 1978 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

SUMMARY: (C//REL USA (b)(2) SAUDI DETAINEE ATTENDED TRAINING AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP NEAR KHOST, AFGHANISTAN FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN WEEKS BETWEEN MAY AND JULY 2000. SPECIFIC TRAINING AT KHALDEN INCLUDED BASIC WEAPONS, ARTILLERY, MILITARY TACTICS AND TOPOGRAPHY. KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS CLOSED IN JULY OR AUGUST 2000 BY THE TALIBAN.

TEXT: TEXT: 1. (C//REL USA (b)(2) TRAINING CAMP LOCATION. THE DETAINEE ATTENDED MILITARY TRAINING AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP //GEOCOORD: 583354E/3690583N//, AFGHANISTAN (AF). THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS APPROXIMATELY THREE TO FIVE KILOMETERS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~//REL TO USA (b)(2)

NORTH OF KHOST//GEOCOORD: 332507N/0701716E//, AF. (FIELD COMMENT -
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

2. ~~(C//REL-USA (b)(2))~~ TRAINING CAMP DETAILS. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER NAME THAT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS KNOWN BY. THERE WAS A STREAM RUNNING THROUGH THE CAMP THAT ONE CAN DRINK OUT OF, BUT THE TRAINEES DID NOT CONDUCT ANY TRAINING IN THE STREAM. THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS THE SECOND CAMP WITH THE KHALDEN NAME. THERE WAS ANOTHER KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WITH THE SAME NAME SEVERAL YEARS PRIOR TO DETAINEE ARRIVING IN AF AND WAS ALSO LOCATED NEAR THE CITY OF KHOST. THE DETAINEE HAD NEVER BEEN TO THE ORIGINAL KHALDEN CAMP, NOR DID HE KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THE DETAINEE BELIEVED THAT THE LEADER OF THE CURRENT KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP MAY HAVE BEEN A VETERAN FROM THE ORIGINAL CAMP. THE DETAINEE BELIEVED THAT ABDUL ((AZZAM)) ESTABLISHED THE ORIGINAL KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP. DETAINEE ARRIVED AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP ALONE. NO OTHER JIHADISTS ACCOMPANIED DETAINEE.

3. ~~(C//REL-USA (b)(2))~~ TRAINING PERIOD. DETAINEE ARRIVED AT KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP DURING MAY 2000, AND TRAINED FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN WEEKS. THE FULL COURSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPROXIMATELY THREE MONTHS, BUT KHALDEN WAS CLOSED EARLY. THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS CLOSED BY THE TALIBAN SHORTLY AFTER DETAINEE'S DEPARTURE. DETAINEE BELIEVED THE TALIBAN CLOSED KHALDEN CAMP AND OTHER TRAINING CAMPS BECAUSE OF A FEAR THAT HAVING THE CAMPS MAY DISQUALIFY AFGHANISTAN FROM BECOMING MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE TRAINING COURSES AT KHALDEN WERE ACCELERATED TO MEET THE SCHEDULED CLOSING DATE. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5) DETAINEE MAY HAVE STAYED AT THE COURSE FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF TIME, BUT HE OPTED NOT TO ATTEND THE TOPOGRAPHY CLASSES, WHICH HE ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY ONE TO TWO WEEKS LONG.

4. ~~(C//REL-USA (b)(2))~~ NUMBER OF TRAINEES AT THE CAMP. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY TEN TO FIFTEEN TRAINEES IN EACH OF THE FOUR CLASSES THAT WERE CONDUCTED AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP. DETAINEE BELIEVED THERE TO BE APPROXIMATELY 30 TO 40 TRAINEES AT THE CAMP UPON HIS ARRIVAL AND ABOUT THE SAME NUMBER UPON HIS DEPARTURE FROM KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF NEW JIHADISTS ARRIVED AT THE CAMP EVERY WEEK. THE CAMP AND FACILITIES AT KHALDEN APPEARED TO BE LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT UP TO APPROXIMATELY 100 TRAINEES AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

5. (C//REL USA (b)(2)) TRAINING CAMP CURRICULUM. DETAINEE WAS ONLY AWARE OF FOUR COURSES OF INSTRUCTION AT KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP. THESE INCLUDED BASIC WEAPONS TRAINING FOR TWO WEEKS, ARTILLERY TRAINING FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK, TOPOGRAPHY TRAINING FOR ONE TO TWO WEEKS, AND MILITARY TACTICS TRAINING FOR APPROXIMATELY FOUR WEEKS. DETAINEE ATTENDED THE TRAINING IN THAT ORDER, EXCEPT HE DID NOT ATTEND THE TOPOGRAPHY TRAINING. THE TRAINEES CYCLED THROUGH EACH PHASE OF TRAINING. DURING THE PERIOD OF THE TOPOGRAPHY TRAINING, THE DETAINEE REMAINED AT THE CAMP, BUT DID NOT TRAIN. THE DETAINEE SPENT HIS TIME OBSERVING VARIOUS TRAINING AND RESTING. THE DETAINEE WAS TRAINED IN TOPOGRAPHY DURING EARLIER TRAINING AT CAMP QUBA IN KASHMIR, PAKISTAN. THE TRAINEES ALSO CONDUCTED PHYSICAL EXERCISES EACH MORNING. FOLLOWING EXERCISES, THEY ATTENDED CLASSROOM-TYPE TRAINING OR PRACTICAL EXERCISES FOR A FEW HOURS EACH MORNING AND AGAIN IN THE AFTERNOON. DETAINEE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY ADDITIONAL TRAINING SUBJECTS AVAILABLE AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP. THE TRAINEES WERE SHOWN GRENADES THAT RESEMBLED THE RGD-5 AND THE F-1. THERE WERE NO LIVE GRENADES USED IN TRAINING. TRAINING ON THROWING GRENADES WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THROWING ROCKS. THERE WAS NO EXPLOSIVES TRAINING. THERE WAS NO TRAINING ON KIDNAPPINGS OR TERRORIST ATTACKS. ALL TRAINING AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS CONDUCTED IN ARABIC. THE DETAINEE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY TRAINING FILMS USED, NOR WAS ANY TRAINING VIDEOTAPED.

5A. (C//REL USA (b)(2)) BASIC WEAPONS TRAINING CONSISTED OF ASSEMBLING AND DISASSEMBLING THE AK-47, THE 7.62 MM RPK RIFLE, THE 7.62 MM PK RIFLE WITHOUT THE TRIPOD, THE RPG-7 AND THE 9MM MAKAROV PISTOL. TRAINING ON THE RPG-7 INCLUDED IDENTIFYING BOTH ANTITANK AND ANTIPERSONNEL ROUNDS. TRAINING OCCURRED DURING THE DAY, THOUGH THERE WAS SOME NIGHT TRAINING IN ASSEMBLY AND DISASSEMBLY OF WEAPONS. LIVE FIRE EXERCISES WERE CONDUCTED AT THE FIRING RANGE AT THE CAMP. WOODEN TARGETS WITH PAPER OVERLAYS WERE PROVIDED EVEN THOUGH THE INSTRUCTION WAS FOCUSED MORE ON HOW TO OPERATE THE WEAPON THAN HOW TO FIRE ACCURATELY. MOST WEAPONS TRAINING WAS HANDS-ON. STUDENTS WERE ONLY GIVEN A FEW ROUNDS TO PRACTICE WITH. IF STUDENTS WANTED TO SHOOT MORE, THEY COULD PURCHASE ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FROM THE INSTRUCTOR. THE DETAINEE WAS ABLE TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL BULLETS AT AN APPROXIMATE COST OF ONE UNITED STATES DOLLAR OR 53.85 RUPEES FOR 15-20 BULLETS.

5B. (C//REL USA (b)(2)) ARTILLERY TRAINING CONSISTED OF HOW TO OPERATE THE RUSSIAN MADE DSHK-38 12.5MM GUN, AND THE 38 AGS-17.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

TRAINING WAS ALSO CONDUCTED ON A WEAPON THAT RESEMBLED THE ZPU-2 14.5MM GUN, BUT IT ONLY HAD ONE GUN BARREL. THE DETAINEE DESCRIBED TRAINING ON A LARGE GUN THAT LOOKED VERY SIMILAR TO THE B-10 88MM MORTAR, BUT DETAINEE CLAIMED IT FIRED 82MM MORTARS. ALSO, TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED ON THE SPG-9 73 MM GUN, THOUGH THE DETAINEE COMMENTED THAT THE ONE HE HAD SEEN DID NOT HAVE WHEELS ON IT. THE DETAINEE WAS UNSURE OF THE ORIGIN OF THE WEAPONS AND HE GUESSED THEY WERE OF CHINESE, RUSSIAN AND EGYPTIAN ORIGINS. THE TRAINEES DIDN'T USE TARGETS. INSTRUCTION WAS ONLY TO AIM IN A GENERAL AREA, AND THE STUDENTS FIRED THE GUNS INTO THE MOUNTAINS. THE TRAINEES WERE ONLY GIVEN A FEW ROUNDS TO PRACTICE WITH. IF STUDENTS WANTED TO SHOOT MORE, THEY COULD PURCHASE ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FROM THE INSTRUCTOR. DETAINEE PURCHASED ADDITIONAL RPG ROUNDS AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY 300 RUPEES OR 5.57 UNITED STATES DOLLARS FOR THREE OR FOUR ROUNDS. DURING THE CLASS, TRAINEES USED MAPS TO HELP THEM DETERMINE TARGETING DISTANCES AND LOCATIONS. MOST TRAINING WITH ARTILLERY WAS HANDS-ON TRAINING.

5C. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) TACTICS TRAINING CONSISTED OF SIMULATED ATTACKS, REGROUPING, PATROL, HAND SIGNALS AND AMBUSH TRAINING. TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED TO EXPLAIN AND PRACTICE HOW TO GAIN ACCESS TO AN AREA TO BE ATTACKED, HOW TO RETREAT, AND HOW TO RETRIEVE AN INJURED PERSON. SEVENTY-FIVE TO EIGHTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED IN A CLASSROOM ENVIRONMENT.

5D. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) TOPOGRAPHY TRAINING CONSISTED OF HOW TO READ DIFFERENT TYPES OF MAPS AND HOW TO BUILD IMPROMPTU MAPS OUT OF TREE LEAVES, ROCKS AND DIRT. THE TRAINEES USED FLIP-OPEN COMPASSES. THE MAPS USED HAD RUSSIAN WRITING ON THEM. THE MAPS DID NOT APPEAR TO SHOW ELEVATION AND SINCE DIFFERENT TYPES OF MAPS WERE USED, SOME WERE MORE DETAILED THAN OTHERS. THE DETAINEE DID NOT ATTEND THIS PORTION OF TRAINING, BUT REPORTED WHAT HE HAD WITNESSED. THE DETAINEE DID NOT TAKE THE TOPOGRAPHY CLASS BECAUSE HE HAD ALREADY LEARNED THIS AT THE QUBA CAMP IN KASHMIR, PAKISTAN.

6. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) TRAINING COURSE REQUIREMENTS. ALL TRAINEES AT KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WERE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ALL FOUR OF THE CORE COURSES. THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT TO TAKE ALL COURSES IF THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED SIMILAR TRAINING. TRAINEES WERE GROUPED TOGETHER FOR EACH CLASS. THE DETAINEE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY SEPARATE OR PRIVATE TRAINING. UPON COMPLETION OF TRAINING IN ONE SUBJECT, THE TRAINEES WOULD IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TRAINING ON THE NEXT

SUBJECT THE NEXT DAY. THERE WAS NO BREAK IN BETWEEN CLASSES. THERE WERE NO FINAL TESTS AFTER EACH PHASE OF INSTRUCTION.

7. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ EARLY DEPARTURE OF TRAINEES. ONE TRAINEE, AN UNIDENTIFIED SYRIAN, WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN TOLD TO LEAVE THE TRAINING CAMP EARLY, DUE TO AN ARGUMENT WITH THE CHIEF INSTRUCTOR. THE DETAINEE COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF THIS INCIDENT.

8. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ TRAINING CAMP INSTRUCTORS. THERE WERE FOUR TRAINERS AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP.

8A. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ THE CHIEF INSTRUCTOR WAS AN ALGERIAN NAMED ABU MOHAMMED ((AL-GAZAIRI)). GAZAIRI WAS ALSO THE INSTRUCTOR FOR THE MILITARY TACTICS TRAINING. HE SPOKE ARABIC, FRENCH AND POSSIBLY ENGLISH. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

8B. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ ABDULLAH ((GHARIB)) WAS BELIEVED TO BE A TURKISTAN. GHARIB WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING APPROXIMATELY 1.62 METERS TALL, MEDIUM BUILD, HE HAD A SQUARE-SHAPED HEAD, WAS APPROXIMATELY 26 TO 30 YEARS OLD, AND HAD LONG HAIR AND A SHORT BEARD. GHARIB SPOKE ARABIC AND TURKISTANIAN.

8C. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ ADUL ((ADJID)) WAS BELIEVED TO BE FROM TAJIKISTAN AND MAY HAVE BEEN A VETERAN OF CHECHNYA. ADJID WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 1.67 METERS TALL, 64 KILOGRAMS, THIN BUILD, MEDIUM BROWN SKIN, AND WORE A LONG BEARD THAT WAS SHORTER ON THE SIDES. THE DETAINEE APPROXIMATED ADJID TO BE OVER 30 YEARS OLD. ADJID MAY HAVE BEEN IN AFGHANISTAN FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN YEARS.

8D. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ ABU YAHLA ADUL ((BARI)) WAS BELIEVED TO BE A PALESTINIAN OR JORDANIAN AND DETAINEE BELIEVED HE HAD THE MOST EXTENSIVE MILITARY TRAINING. BARI TAUGHT THE WEAPONS AND ARTILLERY TRAINING COURSES. BARI WAS DESCRIBED AS BEING 1.72 TO 1.77 KILOGRAMS, HEAVY BUILD, BROWNISH-COLORED HAIR, SMALL, TRIMMED BEARD, AND WAS ABOUT 30 YEARS OLD. THE DETAINEE BELIEVED THAT BARI SPOKE ARABIC BETTER THAN THE OTHER

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

9. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ CAMP AFFILIATIONS WITH TALIBAN AND AL QAIDA. DETAINEE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS CONTROLLED OR OPERATED BY EITHER AL QAIDA OR THE TALIBAN. THE DETAINEE HAD NO INFORMATION CONCERNING HOW THE CAMP WAS FUNDED.

10. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(1))~~ IDENTIFICATION OF TRAINEES. ONE OF THE TRAINEES THAT DETAINEE RECALLED FROM KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP

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SEEMED TO BE AN UNIDENTIFIED AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALE BETWEEN TWENTY AND THIRTY YEARS OLD, PERHAPS OF SOMALI DESCENT. DETAINEE BELIEVED HE SPOKE FRENCH, AND MAY HAVE CONVERTED TO ISLAM WITHIN THREE TO FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO HIS ATTENDING KHALDEN. THIS MAN WAS DESCRIBED AS 1.82 TO 1.87 METERS TALL, MEDIUM DARK SKIN, MEDIUM BUILD, SHORT BLACK HAIR, BEARD AND MUSTACHE. THE DETAINEE COULD NOT RECALL THE NAME USED BY THE MAN. THE DETAINEE BELIEVED THAT THIS MAN APPEARED TO HAVE SOME BACKGROUND IN MILITARY TRAINING. THE DETAINEE AND OTHER TRAINEES AT KHALDEN THOUGHT THAT THE MAN MIGHT HAVE WORKED FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THE DETAINEE BELIEVED THIS MAN HAD A BAD ATTITUDE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5) THE MAN ONLY ATTENDED TRAINING FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS, AND UPON HIS DEPARTURE, THE DETAINEE NEVER SAW HIM AGAIN. THE DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC TRAINING THIS MAN RECEIVED PRIOR TO KHALDEN, DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG HE HAD BEEN IN AFGHANISTAN PRIOR TO TRAINING, OR WHY HE ATTENDED TRAINING FOR ONLY THREE TO FOUR WEEKS.

11. ~~(C//REL USA~~ (b)(2) ANOTHER TRAINEE THAT ATTENDED THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP AT THE SAME TIME AS THE DETAINEE WAS A TUNISIAN NAMED ((SUHAIL)), NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. AFTER THE ATTACKS ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, THE DETAINEE RECALLED SEEING SUHAIL'S PICTURE IN A MAGAZINE AS ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF ((MASOUD)), THE LEADER OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE BELIEVED THAT SUHAIL HAD SPENT TIME IN EUROPE, BUT DID NOT KNOW MORE INFORMATION BECAUSE THEY DID NOT ASK OR TELL PERSONAL DETAILS TO OTHER JIHADISTS WHILE IN AF. THE DETAINEE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SUHAIL HAD AN EXTENSIVE AMOUNT OF TRAINING. SUHAIL ARRIVED AT KHALDEN A WEEK AFTER THE DETAINEE, IN MAY OR JUNE 2000. THE DETAINEE BELIEVED THAT SUHAIL WAS NOT AN EXTREMIST, AND DESCRIBED HIM AS QUIET AND RESPECTFUL.

12. ~~(C//REL USA AND~~ (b)(2) THE DETAINEE HAD NO INFORMATION INDICATING THAT ANY OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER HIJACKERS OR ANY OTHER TERRORIST RECEIVED TRAINING AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP.

13. ~~(C//REL USA~~ (b)(2) STRUCTURES. THERE WERE NO PERMANENT STRUCTURES ON THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP. THE LIVING SPACES, MOSQUE, HEADQUARTERS, LATRINES AND KITCHEN AREAS WERE WITHIN SHALLOW CAVES DUG INTO THE SIDES OF THE HILLS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE CAMP. WEAPONS WERE STORED IN A SMALL CAVE OFF TO ONE SIDE OF THE CAMP. THE CAVE HAD A CLAY WALL SET UP IN THE FRONT AS A BARRIER. THERE WERE NO GUARDS SECURING ANY OF THE WEAPONS. THE DETAINEE BELIEVED THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT FIFTY AK-47S AND

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FIVE OR SIX PISTOLS. THE WEAPONS WERE HAPHAZARDLY PLACED IN THIS CAVE. AMMUNITION WAS ALSO STORED IN THE SAME CAVE. ONE OF THE MORE EXPERIENCED TRAINEES WOULD BE TASKED TO RECOVER AND REPLACE THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION INTO THE CAVE.

14. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2))~~ MOCK-UPS. THERE WERE NO MOCK-UPS USED DURING ANY TRAINING AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP. THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC MISSIONS DISCUSSED OR PLANNED. NO PAST TERRORIST ATTACKS OR COMBAT BATTLES WERE DISCUSSED OR USED AS TEACHING POINTS. DURING TRAINING OF MILITARY TACTICS, ROCKS OR OTHER ITEMS WOULD BE USED TO REPRESENT BUILDINGS, TARGETS ETC. THERE WAS NO URBAN WARFARE TYPE TRAINING CONDUCTED.

15. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(1))~~ THE DETAINEE WAS NOT AN INSTRUCTOR AT ANY TIME WHILE AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP.

16. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(1) Sec)~~ CAMP VISITORS. THERE WERE NO VISITORS TO THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP DURING DETAINEE'S ATTENDANCE. THE DETAINEE HEARD FROM UNRECALLED SOURCES THAT USAMA BIN ((LADEN)) (UBL) HAD CAME TO THE CAMP A YEAR OR TWO PREVIOUSLY, ATTEMPTING TO CONVINCING SOME OF THE INSTRUCTORS TO TEACH AT HIS OWN CAMPS.

17. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(1))~~ THE DETAINEE DID NOT RECOGNIZE ANY TRAINEES FROM THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP AT ANY OTHER TIME IN AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN OR AT GUANTANAMO BAY.

COMMENTS: 1. (U) (FIELD COMMENTS) - (b)(2)
(b)(2)

2. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

3. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

4. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

5. (U) THE DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONTACT.

6. (U) REQUEST THE ORIGINATOR OF (b)(1) Sec 1 4 C. (b)(2)
(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. YES 5.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD -- NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA (b)(2)

DRV FROM: (b)(2)

DECL: 25X1-HUMAN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Summary Interrogation Report: 000200 SIR 18-NOV-2003

(S//NF) SUBJECT: ISN (b)(2) 000200DP, ((QAHTANI)) SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN IS A 25-YR-OLD WHO CLAIMS SAUDI ARABIA CITIZENSHIP.

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: (b)(2) INTERROGATED ((QAHTANI)) SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) INTERROGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN ARABIC - MODERN STANDARD USING (b)(1) Sec 1.4 AS AN INTERPRETER.

2. (S//NF) APPROACH USED: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3. (S//NF) EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

4. (S//NF) COOPERATION/KNOWLEDGEABILITY/TRUTHFULNESS: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

5. (S//NF) RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

6. (S//NF) SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (ENSURE ANY INTELLIGENCE RESULTS IN AN IIR): DETAINEE PROVIDED (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) ABOUT HIS RECRUITMENT BY ABU ZUBAYDA IN PAKISTAN. DETAINEE PROVIDED INFORMATION ABOUT HIS SEVEN TO TEN DAY STAY AT A SAFEHOUSE WITH ABU ZUBAYDA. DETAINEE THEN PROCEEDED TO AFGANISTAN AND TRAINED AT CAMP KHALDEN NEAR KHOWST, AF FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO AND A HALF WEEKS BETWEEN MAY AND JULY 2000. DETAINEE THEN TRAINED AT A TALIBAN ARMORY IN KHOWST, AFGANISTAN TO OPERATE T-54 AND T-55 SOVIET TANKS. DETAINEE THEN WENT TO THE FRONT LINES NORTH OF KABUL AND STAYED FOR FIVE MONTHS. NEW INFORMATION GATHERED WILL BE EVALUATED FOR POTENTIAL REPORTABLE INFORMATION.

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

7. (S//NF) COLLECTORS COMMENTS: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) ABU ZUBAYDA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(5)

8. (U) POC FOR THIS MEMORANDUM (b)(2)

(b)(2) JTF GTMO.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

(b)(2)

R 061319Z AUG 04

FM CJTF GTMO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(2) (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NONE//X1~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE USA~~, (b)(2)

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

COUNTRY: (U) SAUDI ARABIA (SA).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

PAGE 05 (b)(2) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: (b)(2)

(b)(2) (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA~~, (b)(2)

(b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20010000.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

SOURCE: ~~(C//REL USA)~~, (b)(2) //TSN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

PAGE 06 (b)(2) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY: ~~(C//REL USA)~~, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

TEXT: 1. ~~(C//REL USA)~~, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. ~~(C//REL USA)~~, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C USAMA ((BIN LADEN)) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

3. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) SHEIKH ABDEL AZIZ ((BIN BAZZ)) - DECEASED.
BIN BAZZ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) SHEIKH ((BIN UTHEMIN))- DECEASED. BIN
UTHEMIN WAS A SAUDI MUFTI WHO ENCOURAGED JIHAD IN AFGHANISTAN RATHER
PAGE 07 (b)(2) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THAN PALESTINE.

5. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6) USAMA BIN LADEN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4
ALL BIN LADEN'S (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

COMMENTS: 1. (U) FIELD COMMENTS. (b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. (U) (b)(2)

3. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

PAGE 08 (b)(2) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL USA~~ (b)(2)

DRV FROM: (U) (b)(2)

DECL: (U) X1.

(b)(2)

DeClassBy: (b)(2)

DeClassReason:

DeClassDate: X-1

(b)(2)

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)

R 271628Z JUL 06
FM JTF GTMO

(b)(2)



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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PAGE 03 (b)(2) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//25X1~~

~~SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF); EGYPT (EG); PAKISTAN (PK);
PHILIPPINES
(RP).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2) (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY
EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOT~~
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20010900.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

SOURCE: ~~(S//NF)~~ //ISN (b)(2) 000200DP//SAUDI ARABIAN CITIZEN BORN

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PAGE 05 (b)(2) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

----- TEAR LINE -----

SUMMARY: (C//REL USA (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

TEXT: 1. (C//REL USA (b)(1) A GROUP OF JIHADISTS WHO DISAGREED WITH THE VIEWS OF THE LEADER OF THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD (EIJ), AYMAN ((AL-ZAWAHIRI)), BRANCHED OFF TO CREATE THE --EIJ GROUP NUMBER TWO--. THE EIJ GROUP NUMBER TWO RAN AND FINANCED AN AL-QAIDA (AQ) TRAINING CAMP LOCATED IN SHAKARDARAH//GEOCOORDS:343059N/0691059E//, AF. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) THE EIJ GROUP NUMBER TWO CAMP IN AFGHANISTAN OFFERED SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN URBAN WARFARE, TO INCLUDE TRAINING IN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE. DETAINEE VISITED THE EGYPTIAN TRAINING CAMP WITH HIS FRIEND ATTA (LNU) IN 2001. DETAINEE AND ATTA WERE HOUSED AND GIVEN A TOUR OVER A PERIOD OF THREE TO FOUR DAYS. ATTA WAS GIVEN A TOUR BECAUSE HE WAS VERY WEALTHY AND THE EIJ GROUP NUMBER TWO LEADERS WERE TRYING TO SOLICIT MONEY FROM HIM. DETAINEE WAS ALLOWED TO GO WITH HIM BECAUSE THE DETAINEE AND ATTA WERE FRIENDS. ATTA DROVE A GRAY TOYOTA PICK-UP OR A WHITE TOYOTA COROLLA. DURING THIS VISIT TO THE CAMP THE DETAINEE SAW THE LEADERS OF THE EIJ GROUP NUMBER TWO SEND MESSAGES TO TALIBAN AND AQ VIA MOTOROLA RADIOS (NFI). THERE WERE AT LEAST 60 PEOPLE TRAINING AT THE CAMP WHILE THE DETAINEE WAS THERE, INCLUDING SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS.

2. (C//REL USA (b)(2) THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE CAMP LEADERS WAS TO CREATE AN ISLAMIC STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ISLAMIC CALIPH, OUSTING THE EXISTING GOVERNMENTS (NFI). TRAINING CONDUCTED AT THIS CAMP WAS DESIGNED TO REACH THAT GOAL.

3. (C//REL USA (b)(2) ALL CAMP LEADERS PARTICIPATED IN URBAN WARFARE TRAINING. EACH LEADER SPECIALIZED IN A DIFFERENT ASPECT OF URBAN WARFARE, BUT ALL LEADERS CONTRIBUTED TO THE TRAINING OF THE CAMP ATTENDEES.

4. (C//REL USA (b)(2) DETAINEE OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING TRAINERS AT THE CAMP, ABU-HAMZA (LNU) AL-MASRI, ABU-AYMAN (LNU) AL-MASRI, AND A THIRD TRAINER WHOSE NAME THE DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

4A. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ ABU-HAMZA TAUGHT WEAPONS FIRING, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE. ABU-HAMZA WAS IN HIS MID-THIRTIES. ~~(b)(1)~~

~~(b)(1) Sec~~ ABU-HAMZA ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4~~ HE WAS APPROXIMATELY 1.95 METERS (77 INCHES) TALL AND WAS THIN WITH A NARROW FACE AND LIGHT BROWN SKIN. ABU-HAMZA HAD BLACK HAIR AND BEARD, AND WORE GLASSES.

4B. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ ABU-AYMAN WAS APPROXIMATELY 40 YEARS OLD.

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4~~ ABU-AYMAN ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C~~ HE WAS APPROXIMATELY 1.7 METERS (67 INCHES) TALL WITH A LARGE STOCKY BUILD, ROUND FACE, BLACK HAIR AND BEARD, AND LIGHT BROWN SKIN. (DETAINEE COMMENT - ABU-AYMAN WAS PROBABLY THE LEAD TRAINER AT THE CAMP.)

4C. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ THE THIRD TRAINER, NAME UNKNOWN, WAS APPROXIMATELY 1.82 METERS (72 INCHES) TALL WITH A SCAR ON ONE CHEEK. HE WAS VERY BIG AND MUSCULAR WITH REDDISH HAIR, A LARGE BEARD, AND LIGHT, ALMOST WHITE, SKIN.

5. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ A VILLAGE BUILT FOR TRAINING PURPOSES WAS LOCATED IN NORTHERN KABUL (CNA). THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 20 TO 40 BUILDINGS FOR URBAN WARFARE TRAINING IN THE VILLAGE.

6. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ URBAN WARFARE TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED EVERY FOUR TO FIVE MONTHS. TRAINING IN EACH TASK LASTED FOR FOUR TO FIVE HOURS DAILY.

6A. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ IDENTIFICATION OF SURPRISE TARGETS. THE SHOOTER SAW THE TARGET AND HAD APPROXIMATELY FOUR SECONDS TO SHOOT BEFORE THE TARGET WAS REMOVED.

6B. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ ENTERING A BUILDING. TRAINING WAS GIVEN ON HOW TO ENTER A BUILDING AND USE SMOKE AS WELL AS SIMULATED EXPLOSIVE HAND GRENADES. THIS TRAINING LASTED FOR FOUR HOURS A DAY FOR FOUR MONTHS. TRAINING INCLUDED HOW TO KICK OPEN A DOOR, THROW A HAND GRENADE INSIDE THE ROOM OR BUILDING, AND HAVE YOUR PARTNER COVER YOUR BACK WHILE ENTERING.

6C. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES. AT THIS TRAINING, JIHADISTS APPROACHED A FENCE OR A BOX APPROXIMATELY 1.2 METERS (FOUR FEET) TALL AND JUMPED OVER THE OBSTACLE HEAD-FIRST WHILE MAINTAINING POSSESSION OF AN AK-47. THE TRAINEES THEN ROLLED FORWARD AND FIRED AN AK-47 OR A RUSSIAN- OR CHINESE-MADE PISTOL.

7. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ THE CAMP LEADERS ESTABLISHED TRANSPORTATION, MOVEMENT, AND EVACUATION PLANS FOR THE URBAN WARFARE TRAINING (NFI). THE CAMP LEADERS COLLECTIVELY SPECIFIED PLANS AND EVALUATED THE PERFORMANCE OF EACH INDIVIDUAL. IF AN INDIVIDUAL EXCELLED, THE INDIVIDUAL MOVED ON TO OTHER, MORE COMPLICATED TRAINING.

8. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ CAMP LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDED--
- FINANCIAL
- PLANNING

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- DIRECTIVE
- COMMUNICATIONS
- FIELD.

9. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ THE EU GROUP NUMBER TWO TRAINEES AND CAMP LEADERS HAD TO READ AND MEMORIZE ONE OF TWO BOOKS, -- LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION-- OR --LEADERSHIP AND WORK--. A SECTION IN ONE OF THE BOOKS SPECIFIED THE ROLES OF THE FIELD LEADERS, COMMUNICATIONS LEADERS, AND SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE. (DETAINEE COMMENT -- CAMP LEADERS SHOWED THE BOOKS TO ATTA TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CAMP WAS RUN BY THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN THEM.)

10. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ FIELD LEADERS SUPERVISED THE ACTIONS OF PERSONNEL WHEN CARRYING OUT ASSIGNMENTS SUCH AS SURVEILLANCE, FALSIFICATION OF PASSPORTS AND DOCUMENTS, DETECTION AVOIDANCE DURING AIRPORT TRAVEL, AND MOVEMENT IN BIG OR SMALL CITIES WITHOUT BEING DETECTED (NFI).

11. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ FIELD LEADERS, LED BY AQ WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS. AQ OVERSAW THE IDENTIFICATION OF LOCATIONS AND EVALUATION OPERATIONS. THE COMMANDING GENERAL IN THE FIELD EVALUATED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTELLIGENCE. (FIELD COMMENT - FOR THE EU GROUP NUMBER TWO THESE AQ LEADERS ARE THE EQUIVALENTS OF GENERALS OR COLONELS IN THE ARMY.)

12. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SECTION ENFORCED OPERATIONAL SECURITY. ~~((b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(5))~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(5)~~

FOR EXAMPLE, AT AN AIRPORT, THE JIHADIST OR AQ MEMBER WOULD FIRST PURCHASE A TICKET AT A TRAVEL AGENCY INSTEAD OF AT THE AIRPORT. THE JIHADIST WOULD CARRY TWO OR THREE TICKETS FOR DIFFERENT DESTINATIONS. IF THE JIHADIST PERCEIVED SOMEONE WAS WATCHING OR THERE WAS A PROBLEM, THE JIHADIST WOULD CHANGE DESTINATIONS AND LATER TRAVEL TO THE ORIGINAL DESTINATION.

13. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ TRAINING INCLUDED INFORMATION ON OBTAINING AND USING FORGED DOCUMENTS. PASSPORTS, VISAS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS WERE FORGED DIFFERENTLY DEPENDING ON THE COUNTRY. FOR A THIRD WORLD COUNTRY THE FORGER WOULD USE AN ORIGINAL PASSPORT BUT REPLACE THE PICTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL. (DETAINEE COMMENT -- FOR EXAMPLE, DETAINEE KHALID SULAYMANJAYDH ((AL HUBAYSHI)), WHO IS NOW GONE, USED A PASSPORT BELONGING TO HIS BROTHER. HE REPLACED THE PICTURE OF HIS BROTHER WITH HIS OWN AND TRAVELED TO KASHMIR, THE PHILIPPINES, CHECHNYA AND AFGHANISTAN.) IN PAKISTAN, IT WAS EASY TO USE A PASSPORT WITH A PICTURE OF SOMEONE ELSE. JIHADISTS WOULD PUT THE APPROXIMATE EQUIVALENT OF 20 UNITED STATES

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DOLLARS (USD) OR MORE IN THEIR PASSPORT AND HAND THE PASSPORT TO THE IMMIGRATION PERSON. (DETAINEE COMMENT - THAT PERSON WOULD TAKE THE MONEY, STAMP THE PASSPORT AND EVERYBODY WAS HAPPY.) TO FALSIFY PASSPORTS AND COUNTERFEIT MONEY THE CAMP LEADERS WOULD GO TO THE BORDER CITY OF PESHAWAR//GEOCOORD:340029N/0713422E//, PK, AND PAY BETWEEN 100 AND 2,000 USD TO GET AN AMERICAN PASSPORT OR EUROPEAN PASSPORT WITH VISAS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.

14. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ SURVEILLANCE TRAINING AT THE CAMP PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CHANGING APPEARANCES. THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL ALWAYS CARRIED REVERSIBLE CLOTHING, EYE GLASSES AND SOMETHING TO COVER THEIR HEADS. TRAINEES CHANGED ROUTES, CHANGED CARS, AND WOULD HAVE SOMEONE WAITING AS A DECOY. THEY ALSO STUDIED THE -INS AND OUTS- OF CITIES, STORES, AND RESTAURANTS. WHEN NECESSARY THEY SHAVED THEIR BEARDS AND TRIED TO BLEND IN WITH THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT. THEY WERE AWARE OF THE FACT THAT HISPANICS AND ARABS LOOK ALIKE, AND THAT MOROCCANS ALREADY SPEAK SPANISH. CAMP ATTENDEES WERE TRAINED TO CARRY OUT SURVEILLANCE, COLLECTION, AND RECRUITMENT MISSIONS.

15. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTORS IDENTIFIED GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS THAT WOULD COUNTER THE GROUPS MISSION. THEY ALSO DISSEMINATED INFORMATION BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE GROUP AND CAMP LEADERS.

16. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ LEADERS IN CHARGE OF PREPARATION WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR LIAISON BETWEEN CAMP LEADERS AND THOSE EXECUTING THE OBJECTIVE.

17. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ CAMP ATTENDEES WHO WERE SLATED TO EXECUTE OPERATIONS TOOK SPECIAL COURSES AND WERE TRAINED FOR THOSE OPERATIONS. THEY HAD NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CAMP LEADERS, SECURITY, OR PREPARATION, EXCEPT DURING TRAINING WITH THE TRAINERS. (FIELD COMMENT - THOSE EXECUTING THE ACTUAL OPERATIONS VARIED IN RANK.)

18. ~~(C//REL USA, (b)(2))~~ FINANCIAL LEADERS SECURED FUNDING TO RUN THE CAMP AND SUPPORT THOSE ATTENDING THE CAMP. THESE LEADERS MONITORED BANK TRANSACTIONS AND USED ESTABLISHED SECURITY PRECAUTIONS (NFI). TO SECURE FUNDS, THE FINANCIAL LEADERS CREATED SMALL PROJECTS. THE FIELD LEADERS CHOSE THE LOCATION, THE KIND OF WORK OR PROJECT, AND THE SECURITY MEASURES WHICH THE PROJECTS MIGHT REQUIRE. FINANCIAL GAINS WERE ATTAINED FROM GOVERNMENT JOBS. THE EU GROUP NUMBER TWO HAD INFILTRATED THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH MOLES AND SPIES. THE MISSION OF THE EU GROUP NUMBER TWO WAS TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE IN THE GOVERNMENT SO THEY COULD KEEP THE JIHAD

DMO Exhibit 28

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FIGHTERS INFORMED OF ALL THE INTELLIGENCE, LOGISTICS, AND FINANCIAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND HOW THESE PLANS AND STRATEGIES WOULD AFFECT THE EU GROUP NUMBER TWO. THE DETAINEE GAVE THE EXAMPLE OF KHALID ((AL-ISTANBULI)). KHALID WAS A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE AND ALSO A RADICAL JIHADIST. KHALID AND OTHER TERRORISTS AND JIHADISTS WITHIN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT THE ASSASSINATION OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT, ANWAR SADAT. (DETAINEE COMMENT - AL-ISLAMBULI WAS A MILITARY OFFICER ATTEMPTING TO CONDUCT MONEY LAUNDERING OPERATIONS.)

19. ~~(C//REL-USA (b)(2))~~ THE CAMP LEADERS IN CHARGE OF PLANNING CREATED POLICY AND PASSED POLICY TO THE FIELD LEADERS.

20. ~~(C//REL-USA (b)(2))~~ THE DIRECTIVE LEADERS DELEGATED TASKS ONCE THE OTHER LEADERS AGREED ON THE PLANS.

21. ~~(C//REL-USA (b)(2))~~ THE COMMUNICATIONS LEADERS MONITORED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS OF THE GROUP. THE COMMUNICATIONS LEADERS HAD SPECIAL PROCEDURES TO CONTACT THE GROUP (NFI).

22. ~~(C//REL-USA (b)(2))~~ CAMP SECURITY. TWO GUARDS WERE LOCATED AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE CAMP AND TWO GUARDS WERE LOCATED IN THE REAR OF THE CAMP. AT NIGHT, THE CAMP HAD APPROXIMATELY EIGHT OR MORE ROVING GUARDS ARMED WITH PISTOLS, AK-47S, AND HAND GRENADES. THE CAMP LEADERS CHECKED THE GUARDS EVERY TWO HOURS BY PICKUP TRUCK.

COMMENTS: (U) (FIELD COMMENTS) 1. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. (U) (b)(2)

3. (U) (b)(2)

CJTF

GTMO (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

CJTF GTMO.

(b)(2)

4. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

5. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

6. (U) (b)(2)

TO CJTF GTMO (b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)	CJTF GTMO (b)(2)
(b)(2)	
7. (U) (b)(2)	
(b)(2)	

----- TEAR LINE -----

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD -- NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

DRV FROM: (b)(2)

DECL: 25X1-HUMAN

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09380

10 October 2008

JTF-GTMO-SJA

MEMORANDUM FOR Office for Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants

SUBJECT: Annual Review Board (ARB) Exhibit Redaction Certification

1. The JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) received two documents from the Office for Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC). These documents have been used as exhibits for the ARB for Detainee ISN 200.

2. The SJA hereby certifies that the documents listed below were redacted by JTF-GTMO personnel. Redaction of any information other than what is described in paragraph 3 below was not done by JTF-GTMO personnel. The following documents relative to the referenced Detainee have been reviewed and redacted by JTF-GTMO and provided to OARDEC:

- a. JTF-GTMO (b)(2)
- b. JTF-GTMO

3. Unauthorized or inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of the redacted information or data could damage the national security of the United States. JTF-GTMO certifies that only names and codenames of U.S. personnel and sensitive sources were redacted by JTF-GTMO personnel. The substance of these documents remains the same.

4. If you have any further questions or comments, please contact the undersigned at (b)(2)

(b)(2), (b)(3): 10 USC
§130b, (b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~/(b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09380



JTF-GTMO-CDR

(19 May 2008)

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. ~~(S)~~ Personal Information:

- (b)(2) Reference Name: Ashraf Salim Abd al-Salam Sultan
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Ashraf Salim Abd al-Salam Sultan, Abdul Fattah, Abu Faris al-Libi, Abu Mariam al-Libi, Abu Suhaib, Jabal al-Antari, Hatim, Khaled Bin Mustafa, Suhaib Ashraf Salim Abd al-Rahman
- Place of Birth: Darnah, Libya (LY)
- Date of Birth: 5 July 1971
- Citizenship: Libya
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): (b)(2) 000263DP

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. ~~(S)~~ Recommendation: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Executive Summary: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(2)

DMO Exhibit 10
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~/(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) D00263DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

[Redacted]

• (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

•
•

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

• (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

•
•

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee graduated from high school in Darnah, LY in 1991. From 1991 to 1994, detainee attended the Qar Yunis College in Benghazi, LY where he majored in Social Science, but did not graduate. He claims he was an Islamic fundamentalist during this time, promoting religion by handing out pamphlets and audiotapes on the subject and engaging in religious discussions. Detainee admitted being wanted by the Libyan Government for these activities. During his senior year, detainee's Islamic activity at the college brought him unwanted attention from Libyan Security. Libyan security personnel brought him in for questioning concerning his religious practices, activities, and family

(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (S)

members. Detainee stated he was surprised he was being questioned about his family members, friends, and his devout Islamic practices. Detainee openly discussed his family and friends with the security personnel. Detainee claimed Libyan intelligence arrested extremists in Darnah and he became concerned about his family's well being, which prompted him to leave the country. An unidentified family member provided detainee with a passport and visa, and detainee's father provided him with \$500 US. []

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Recruitment and Travel: On 5 February 1995, detainee departed Libya alone, taking his university transcripts and identification. [] Detainee left Libya, via Cairo, Egypt by taxi to the port of Yenbu. Detainee then took a boat to Jordan, a bus to the Saudi Arabia (SA) border, and a taxi to Halet Ammar. Detainee then stayed at the al-Harem al-Nabawi Mosque during the week of Ramadan. Upon arrival in Medina, SA detainee applied for admission to the University of Medina, but was not accepted. Detainee also contemplated obtaining asylum in the United Kingdom (UK), but found the process too cumbersome. Detainee remained at the al-Harem Mosque for three weeks during Ramadan, and then traveled to Damascus, Syria (SY), via Jordan, because a visa was not required. He rented a room for less than a month in the Dummar area while he applied to the University of Damascus Islamic Law Department. Detainee claimed the application was denied because he could not provide the proper documentation. During this period detainee frequently visited the Ummaid Mosque to pray. Detainee visited various European embassies in Damascus, including the UK Embassy, to inquire about a visa to Europe, but received only negative responses and was forced to travel to Sudan (SU). []

~~(S//NF)~~ In 1995, detainee flew from Damascus to Khartoum, SU and contacted (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

Detainee lived at (b)(1) Sec 1.4 [] and then stayed with other Libyans named Tawfiq

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (S)

August 1995 and he remained there until June or August 1996. Detainee flew from Damascus to Khartoum and once again moved (b)(1) Sec for one year. Towards the end of 1997, a Sudanese agent threatened to deport detainee to Libya if he did not leave the country. The agent gave detainee a false Yemeni passport with a visa to Pakistan (PK) and airline tickets. Concerned that he would be searched when he arrived in Pakistan, detainee gave his real papers (b)(1) who advised detainee he might be able to find employment at the Islamic Institute in Peshawar, PK. Detainee flew from Sudan to Karachi, PK, via Doha, Qatar (QA), and then proceeded to Peshawar during the last two days of Eid al-Fitr.

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Training and Activities:** Detainee stayed at the White Mosque, aka (Spin Jumat), in Peshawar for three days, where he claims his Yemeni passport was stolen. Detainee did not feel comfortable at the White Mosque because he is of the Maliki School of Islamic thought and the mosque was affiliated with the Hanafi sect. He subsequently moved to the Atharia Mosque. Detainee became a self-employed merchant, trading mainly in diapers, honey, and other household goods. Detainee lived alone until the arrival (b)(1) Sec who had also left Sudan under pressure from the Sudanese government. Detainee moved in (b)(1) and his family to share living expenses. Detainee met a neighbor, Abu Atikah aka (Abdul Fatah), who was a veteran of the Afghan War. Detainee married Fatah's (b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6) and detainee decided to go to Islamabad, PK to apply to the United Nations (UN) for political asylum.⁹ However, detainee did not return to check on his application fearing the Pakistani authorities would turn him over to the Libyans, as they had allegedly done to four other Libyans.¹⁰ Soon afterwards, the Pakistanis began pressuring Arabs to leave their country and detainee found an Afghan guide to take his wife and child to Jalalabad, AF in 2000. (b)(1) had previously told detainee if things went bad in Pakistan he should travel to Kabul, AF, via Jalalabad, which detainee did. Upon arrival in Kabul, detainee stayed at the home of Abu Bilal al-Jazairi. Abu Bilal told detainee about a Kabul school where they needed teachers. By this time, detainee was using the name Abu Miriam. In 2001, detainee submitted an application to become a teacher at the Abu Bakr al-Sadiq School, located in the Shar-i-Nau neighborhood of Kabul. Detainee was hired to teach history, Arabic language, Islamic studies, and geography to fourth through ninth grade students. Detainee taught at the school for one and a half years. Detainee stated (b)(1) children attended the school and (b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6) also taught there.¹¹

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) D00263DP (S)

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ After the US bombing began in Kabul in 2001, detainee stated he sent his wife, child, and wife's family to Pakistan with Salah al-Maghrebi and Sulavman al-Jazairi.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 Detainee went to Jalalabad and hired an Afghan guide to take him to Pakistan. Detainee met (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) in the region of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border near Tora Bora on approximately 18 December 2001. Detainee claimed he told the Pakistanis and Americans he was Moroccan. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

b. ~~(S)~~ Property Held:

- Money: (b)
 - 4,545 Pakistani rupees
 - 1,000 Saudi riyals
 - 5 coins, various currencies

c. ~~(S)~~ Transferred to JTF-GTMO: (b)(2)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- LJFG

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (S)

- Al-Qaida
- False passports and documents

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ Evaluation of Detainee's Account: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. ~~(S)~~ Assessment: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is a former LIFG member who served on the LIFG Military Council responsible for militant operations. Detainee occupied LIFG facilities as early as 1996 and traveled internationally on fake documents. Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in UBL's Tora Bora Mountain complex under the command (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) other fighters following their escape from Afghanistan. Detainee received training at al-Qaida affiliated camps in Afghanistan and was previously was employed in a UBL owned company in Sudan.

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee is a former senior member of the LIFG and an al-Qaida associate. Detainee has longstanding associations and familial ties with members of the LIFG and its support infrastructure including networks facilitating foreign travel.
 - ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C identified detainee as a former member of the LIFG. Detainee left Libya in 1994 or 1995 and traveled to Sudan, where he joined the LIFG and was assigned to the Military Council. (h) The Military Council was responsible for the conduct of the LIFG's militant activities including the assassination attempts against Libyan president Muammar Qadhafi. (h) (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(2)

JIF-GTMO, CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP(S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

o (S//NF) Detainee has been identified as a former LIFG member (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

▪ (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

▪ (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

▪ (S//NF) (b)(1) stated detainee left the LIFG in approximately 1998. (b) Several reports contradict detainee's affiliation with the LIFG. Reporting from detained LIFG member (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 identify detainee was an independent militant. (b)

▪ (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP(S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) Detainee married the daughter of a deceased LIFG leader, who was executed in Libya.³⁰ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted his in-laws are LIFG supporters, noting his mother-in-law's second husband was a LIFG member named Muhammad al-Libi, aka (Abderrahman al-Hattab), who was killed in Libya.^{(b)(1)}
- (S//NF) Detainee claimed the LIFG supported his mother-in-law financially, providing her with a house and living expenses until she married a third time.^{(b)(1)}

o (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 B.(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 B.(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

- (S//NF) The Babi Guesthouse served as a common LIFG waypoint and recruiting center in which extremists stayed either prior to receiving training, after receiving training, or before engaging in combat between the late 1980s through 2003.^{(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)}

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

o (S//NF) LIFG and al-Qaida facilitator (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) commander (b)(1) photo-identified detainee by his (b)(1) Sec 1.4 whom they both met in Peshawar. LIFG member Abd al-Karim al-Libi also photo-identified detainee by the alias of Abu Suhaib, whom he had met in 1998-1999 at the Babi Guesthouse.^{(b)(1)}

o (S//NF) Although under qualified, detainee claimed he taught various subjects including Islamic studies at the Abu Bakr al-Sadiq School which was established by the LIFG's financial support network through the Sanabil NGO in Kabul.^{(b)(1)}

- (S//NF) (b)(1) Libyan extremist (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) confirmed detainee taught at the school founded

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ The Abu Bakr al-Sadiq School was associated with the LIFG, and was supported by an al-Qaida network associate in the United Kingdom. Detainee stated the school was financed by funds from the UK. ^(h) Abu Rasmi, an LIFG member in the UK financed the building of the school, which further served as a fundraising mechanism. ^(h) Additionally, Abdallah al-Misrati, aka (Abdallah al-Mudir), ran the school on behalf of the LIFG due to his experience on the LIFG's Commerce Committee. ^(h)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The Sanabil NGO constructed an elementary school ^{(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)} near the Wazir Akbar Khan section of Kabul, a stronghold for al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other extremist elements operating within the city. Deceased senior al-Qaida and LIFG member Abu Layth al-Libi, aka (Ali Ammar Ashur al-Raqiai), helped to establish the school. ^(h)
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in UBL's Tora Bora Mountain complex under the command of ^{(b)(1)} and was subsequently captured with ^{(b)(1)} and other fighters following their escape from Afghanistan. ^(h)

o ~~(S//NF)~~ ^{(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5)}

^{(b)(1)} photo-identified detainee as a fighter in Tora Bora. ^(h)

- ~~(S//NF)~~ ^{(b)(1)} added detainee's family, who were with detainee in Jalalabad, took a plane provided by Qadhafi from Pakistan to Libya in 2002. ^(h)

^{(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5)}

o ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee admitted ^{(b)(1) Sec 1.4} captured him with ^{(b)(1)}

^{(b)(1)}

- ~~(S//NF)~~ ^{(b)(1)} reported the last time he saw ^{(b)(1)} was when they were incarcerated together after their capture in Tora Bora in December 2001. ^(b)

(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) D00263DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

- (S//NF) LIFG member Abu Hazim al-Libi, aka (Muhammad Dawud), aka (Ali Abdullah Sharif al-Din), photo-identified detainee and reported he saw detainee in Peshawar and last heard detainee was captured after fleeing Tora Bora. (h)
- (S//NF) Detainee received training at al-Qaida affiliated camps in Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) According to a (b)(1) Sec 1.4 detainee attended the Khaldan and Jihad Wahl camps in Afghanistan in 1996. (b)(1) Sec 1.4
 - (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
 - (S//NF) Khaldan Camp's six-month program included training in light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography and tactical courses. (b)(1)
 - (b)(1) Sec operated the Khaldan Training Camp. (b)
 - (S//NF) Al-Qaida, Taliban, and other fighting forces used the Jihad Wahl camp, located near Khowst, AF. (h)
 - (S//NF) (b)(2), (b)(6) reported detainee attended the Khowst camp which belonged to al-Qaida. (b)(2), (b)(6) reported detainee received weapons training. (h)
- (S//NF) Detainee was employed by an organization in Sudan owned by UBL.
 - (S//NF) The Wadi al-Aqiq Company employed detainee as an electrician in Sudan. The Wadi al-Aqiq Company is a subsidiary of the al-Qaida organization in Sudan.⁵⁹ Wadi al-Aqiq was the headquarters for UBL's businesses in Sudan prior to the expulsion of al-Qaida from the country. The Sudanese Government closed Wadi al-Aqiq in 1996 in response to international pressure for Sudan to stop supporting terrorism.⁶⁰
 - (S//NF) (b)(1) reported detainee was a supervisor with an unidentified Syrian company in Sudan in 1996. Detainee informed (b)(1) Sec 1.4 worked as a

(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (S)

truck driver for the same Syrian company. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)
-
-
-
-
-
-

9. ~~(S)~~ EC Status: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

(b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

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FM CJTF 170 J2CMD

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PAGE 02 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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PAGE 04 (b)(2) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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SUBJ: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF ISN (b)(2) 000263DP
(FORMERLY GTMO 0187) DRAGON FIRE (S//NF)

SECRET//NOFORN//X1
SERIAL: (U) ISN (b)(2) 000263DP.

SUBJ: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF ISN
(b)(2) 000263DP (b)(2) (S//NF)

REF: (U) JTF GTMO KNICKER KB (b)(2) DTG 122044ZFEB02.
TEXT: (U)

1. (S//NF) GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEE ISN (b)(2) 000263DP (FORMERLY GTMO
0187), DURING THE COURSE OF RECENT INTERVIEWS, ISN (b)(2) 000263DP
EXPOUNDED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. INTERROGATORS AT THE
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, DETENTION FACILITY. NOTE THE FOLLOWING
CHANGES TO ISN (b)(2) 000263DP FILES.

2. (U) EDUCATION:

2A. (S//NF) C. 91-95, BENGHAZI UNIVERSITY, SOCIAL STUDIES, GEOCOORD:
PAGE 05 (b)(2) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
320700N/0200400E, BENGHAZI, LY, NO DEGREE.

2B. (S//NF) C. 77-91, IBRAHIM AL AUSTA OMAR SCHOOL, GEOCOORD:
324603N/0223900E, DARNA, LY, HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA.

3. (U) EMPLOYMENT:

3A. (S//NF) 00-01, ABU BAKR AL SIDDIQ SCHOOL, XX, KARUL, AF, TEACHER.

3B. (S//NF) 97-00, SELF-EMPLOYED, XX, PESHAWAR, PK, MERCHANT.

3C. (S//NF) 95-96, VARIOUS COMPANIES, XX, DAMASCUS, SY, CONSTRUCTION
LABORER.

5. (U) SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGEABILITY:

5A. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

5B. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIVITIES. (DETAINEE COMMENT - I WAS AFRAID THAT SECURITY WOULD HURT MY FAMILY TO GET TO ME.) AN UNIDENTIFIED FAMILY MEMBER PROVIDED DETAINEE WITH A PASSPORT AND VISA TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY LEGALLY AND DETAINEE'S FATHER PROVIDED HIM WITH 500.00 USD. DETAINEE LEFT LIBYA ALONE, TAKING HIS UNIVERSITY TRANSCRIPTS, AND TRAVELED BY TAXI TO PORT OF CALL YENBU (CNA), EGYPT VIA CAIRO, EGYPT. FROM PORT OF CALL YENBU, DETAINEE TOOK A BOAT TO JORDAN, A BUS TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN BORDER, AND A TAXI TO HAMLET AMMAR (CNA), SA. DETAINEE APPLIED FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF EL MEDINA, BUT WAS NOT ACCEPTED DUE TO THE FACT THAT HIS ORIGINAL APPLICATION IN 1991 WAS REJECTED. UNIVERSITY POLICY PREVENTED PREVIOUSLY REJECTED APPLICANTS FROM REAPPLYING. DETAINEE MOVED FROM THE EL HAREM AL NABAWI MOSQUE IN HAMLET AMMAR, AND STAYED AT AN UNIDENTIFIED HOTEL IN MEDINA FOR THE REMAINDER OF RAMADAN. DETAINEE CONTINUED TO ATTEND THE EL HAREM AL NABAWI MOSQUE, WHERE HE RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM OTHER MUSLIMS TOTALING APPROXIMATELY 7,000 RIYALS (1,868.00 USD). DETAINEE CONSIDERED APPLYING TO GREAT BRITAIN FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, BUT SINCE HIS DOCUMENTS HAD EXPIRED, HE DECIDED TO GO TO SYRIA. SYRIA DID NOT REQUIRE A VISA TO ENTER FROM SAUDI ARABIA. DETAINEE TRAVELED FROM SAUDI ARABIA, THROUGH JORDAN, AND INTO DAMASCUS, SYRIA. THE TRIP TOOK ABOUT 24 HRS, AND DETAINEE TRAVELED ALONE. IN DAMASCUS, DETAINEE LIVED AT THE AL-MARJAH SQUARE IN THE DUMMAR AREA. HE RENTED A ROOM FOR LESS THAN A MONTH WHILE HE APPLIED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DAMASCUS ISLAMIC LAW DEPARTMENT. THE APPLICATION WAS DENIED BECAUSE DETAINEE COULD NOT PROVIDE PROPER DOCUMENTATION. DURING HIS STAY IN SYRIA, DETAINEE ATTENDED THE UMMAID MOSQUE. DETAINEE AGAIN ATTEMPTED TO APPLY FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN GREAT BRITAIN BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. IN LATE 1995, DETAINEE FLEW FROM DAMASCUS, SYRIA TO KHARTOUM, SUDAN. IN KHARTOUM, DETAINEE FOUND (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6) WHO WAS FROM THE DETAINEE'S HOME TOWN.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

LIVED AT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 IN KHARTOUM; HOWEVER, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6) WORKING AS A TRUCK DRIVER FOR AN UNIDENTIFIED SUDANESE COMPANY. DETAINEE FELT UNCOMFORTABLE IN THE HOUSE ALONE WITH (b)(1) Sec 1.4 WHILE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6) AND THEREFORE STAYED WITH OTHER LIBYANS NAMED (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6) WHOM DETAINEE MET WHEN HE VISITED A TRAVEL AGENCY IN KHARTOUM. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6) FLEEING FROM THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT AND WERE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C THAT THEY RECEIVED FROM ANOTHER UNIDENTIFIED PERSON. DETAINEE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C BECAUSE THEY COST TOO MUCH (APPROXIMATELY 1,000 USD). DETAINEE ALSO DID NOT WANT TO BE IN MORE TROUBLE WITH THE AUTHORITIES. DETAINEE STATED THAT HIS APPEARANCE BROUGHT TOO MUCH ATTENTION IN THE SUDAN, BECAUSE HE LOOKED LIKE AN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 B, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

LEFT KHARTOUM, SUDAN, AROUND JUNE OF 1995. DETAINEE FLEW TO JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA. DETAINEE WENT FROM JEDDAH TO MEDINA, WHERE HE STAYED A FEW DAYS IN A HOTEL. DETAINEE THEN TRAVELED TO MECCAH, WHERE HE STAYED ABOUT 4 TO 5 WEEKS AT THE HALMA MOSQUE (THE GRAND MOSQUE). DETAINEE RETURNED TO JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE DETAINEE'S VISA WAS EXPIRED AND THE SAUDI AUTHORITIES ARRESTED HIM. DETAINEE ASKED THE SAUDI AUTHORITIES TO SEND HIM BACK TO SYRIA, BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO GO BACK TO LIBYA. DETAINEE FEARED FOR HIS LIFE AND THE WELL BEING OF HIS FAMILY MEMBERS IF HE WAS RETURNED TO LIBYA. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT SENT DETAINEE BACK TO SYRIA. DETAINEE ARRIVED IN SYRIA FOR THE SECOND TIME AROUND JULY OR AUGUST 1995, AND REMAINED UNTIL JUNE OR AUGUST 1996. DETAINEE LIVED AND WORKED IN

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DAMASCUS, SYRIA, IN THE AL-SAYIDAH (AL-SIT ZEINAB) (CNA) AREA. DETAINEE LIVED BY HIMSELF AND WORKED AS A CONSTRUCTION LABORER ON PROJECTS FOR MANY COMPANIES IN DAMASCUS. DETAINEE FLEW FROM DAMASCUS TO KHARTOUM, SUDAN. IN KHARTOUM, DETAINEE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) FOR ONE YEAR. HOWEVER, TOWARDS THE END OF 1997, A (b)(1) Sec 1.4 B.(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. DETAINEE FOR HIS PAPERS. THE AGENT ADVISED HIM TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY DUE TO PRESSURE ON THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT FROM THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT TO PUSH THE LIBYAN OPPOSITION OUT OF SUDAN. THE AGENT TOLD DETAINEE THAT HE HAD NO CHOICE, AND IF HE DECLINED, HE WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT. DETAINEE TOLD THE AGENT THAT HE HAD NO MEANS TO LEAVE, SO THE SUDANESE AGENT GAVE DETAINEE A FALSE YEMENI PASSPORT WITH A VISA TO PAKISTAN AND AIRLINES TICKETS. THE NAME ON THE PASSPORT WAS (b)(1) Sec 1.4 DETAINEE WAS CONCERNED THAT HE WOULD BE SEACHED WHEN HE ARRIVED IN PAKISTAN, SO HE GAVE HIS REAL PAPERS, I.E. EXPIRED LIBYAN PASSPORT, ID CARD, AND SCHOOL PAPERS, TO (b)(1) Sec 1.4 DETAINEE FLEW FROM SUDAN VIA DOHA, QATAR TO KARACHI, PAKISTAN, DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS OF EID (b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5) DETAINEE SPENT 24 HOURS IN KARACHI, PAKISTAN, AND TOOK A TAXI TO PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN, ON THE ADVICE OF (b)(1) (b)(1) WHO TOLD DETAINEE THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND EMPLOYMENT AT THE ISLAMIC INSTITUTE IN PESHAWAR. DETAINEE STAYED AT THE WHITE MOSQUE IN PESHAWAR, APPROXIMATELY THREE DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME AN UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL STOLE DETAINEE'S YEMENI PASSPORT. DETAINEE DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE AT THE WHITE MOSQUE DUE TO THE FACT THAT HE IS OF THE MALIKI SECT OF ISLAM, AND THE MOSQUE WAS HANAFI. AN UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL SUGGESTED DETAINEE GO TO THE ATHARIA MOSQUE, WHICH PRACTICES DETAINEE'S TYPE OF ISLAM. DETAINEE MOVED INTO THE ATHARIA MOSQUE IN THE PESHTU SBEEN JAMAAT (CNA) SUBURB OF PESHAWAR, WHICH WAS PREDOMINATELY POPULATED BY AFGHANI AND PAKISTANI STUDENTS. DETAINEE BECAME A SELF-EMPLOYED MERCHANT, TRADING MAINLY IN DIAPERS, HONEY, AND OTHER HOUSEHOLD GOODS, WHICH HE PURCHASED AT THE KAARKHANDULAH MARKET IN PESHAWAR, AND SOLD AT THE SADR BAZAARE IN PESHAWAR. DETAINEE LIVED ALONE UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF (b)(1) Sec 1.4 WHO HAD ALSO LEFT THE SUDAN UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT. DETAINEE MOVED IN WITH (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) TO SHARE LIVING EXPENSES. DETAINEE MET A NEIGHBOR (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) PESHAWAR HOME. ON JANUARY 21, 2000, DETAINEE'S (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) DETAINEE DECIDED TO GO TO ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN, TO APPLY TO THE UNITED NATIONS (U.N.) FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM. HOWEVER, DETAINEE HAD NO VALID ID, AND THE U.N. WOULD NOT GRANT HIM ASYLUM. SOON THEREAFTER, THE PAKISTANIS BEGAN PRESSURING ARABS TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY AND DETAINEE DECIDED TO MOVE TO JALALABAD //GEOCOORDS: 364553N/0655243E//, AFGHANISTAN, TO STAY WITH AN ALGERIAN NAMED ABU BILAL. IN JALALABAD, DETAINEE HEARD THAT TEACHERS WERE NEEDED. DETAINEE SUBMITTED AN APPLICATION TO BECOME A TEACHER AT THE ABU BAKR AL SIDDIQ SCHOOL, WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE SHARI NAO NEIGHBORHOOD OF KABUL, AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE WAS HIRED AS A HISTORY, ARABIC, ISLAMIC STUDIES, AND GEOGRAPHY TEACHER FOR FOURTH THROUGH NINTH GRADE STUDENTS. DETAINEE TAUGHT AT THE SCHOOL FOR 1.5 SCHOOL YEARS. SC. (SANE) ROUTE OF EGRESS FROM AFGHANISTAN: AFTER THE U.S. BOMBING BEGAN IN KABUL IN 2001, DETAINEE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) HAD BEEN TOLD THAT HIS PRESENCE WOULD HAVE INCREASED THE DANGER TO HIS FAMILY. INSTEAD, DETAINEE WENT TO (b)(1) Sec 1.4 WHERE HE ONCE AGAIN STAYED WITH ABU BILAL THE ALGERIAN. DETAINEE HIRED AN AFGHANI GUIDE TO TAKE HIM TO (b)(1) AND MET (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)/(b)(6) EN ROUTE. HOWEVER, UPON ARRIVAL IN (b)(1)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DETAINEE AND (b)(1) Sec WERE ARRESTED AND DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO A SCHOOL THAT HAD BEEN CONVERTED TO A TEMPORARY PRISON. DETAINEE WAS TURNED OVER TO THE AMERICANS AND INITIALLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF TO THE AMERICANS AS A MOROCCAN. HE DID THIS IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING TURNED OVER TO LIBYA.

5E. (S//NF) ALIASES USED: DETAINEE HAS PRIMARILY USED THE ALIAS (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)

5F. (S//NF) MOSQUE AFFILIATIONS: EL HAREM AL NABAWI MOSQUE, HAMLET AMMAR, SA, STAYED HERE DURING RAMADAN 1995. IMAN WAS ABDUL RAHMAN AL HUDEIFI; UMMAID MOSQUE, DAMASCUS, SY, ATTENDED IN 1995; HALMA PAGE 08 (b)(2) SECRET NOFORN

MOSQUE (GRAN D MOSQUE), MECCAH, SA, STAYED HERE FOR 4-5 WEEKS IN 1995; WHITE MOSQUE (HANAFI SECT), PESHAWAR, PK, STAYED FOR THREE DAYS IN 1997; ATHARIA MOSQUE (MALIKI SECT), PESHAWAR, PK, STAYED HERE IN 1997.

6D. (S//NF) DETAINEE FAMILY: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)

7. (U) GUID: ADDRESS QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF THIS KB AND FORWARD REQUIRMENTS THROUGH SECRET CLASSIFICATION LEVEL AS FOLLOWS:

(b)(2)

PAGE 09 (b)(2) ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DRV FROM: (U) (b)(2)

DECL: (U) X1.

DeClassBy: (b)(2)

DeClassReason:

DeClassDate: X-1

(b)(2)


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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

R 231832Z DEC 04
FM CJTF GTMO

(b)(2)



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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

SECTION 1 OF 5

(b)(2)
SUBJ: (b)(2) KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO DSA (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA (b)(2)~~

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)
/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY
COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF).
IPSP: (U) (b)(2)
SUBJ: (b)(2) DETAINEE ATTENDANCE AT KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP, AFGHANISTAN, AS A SAUDI JIHADIST (U)
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA AND~~

(b)(1)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20000500.
REQS: (U) (b)(2)
SOURCE: (C//REL-USA (b)(2) //ISN (b)(2) 000200DP/(b)(1) Sec
CITIZEN BORN IN 1978, WHO TRAINED AT QUBA TRAINING CAMP, KASHMIR, PAKISTAN AND AT KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP NEAR KHOST, AFGHANISTAN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

SUMMARY: (C//REL-USA (b)(2) A SAUDI DETAINEE ATTENDED TRAINING AT THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP NEAR KHOST, AFGHANISTAN FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN WEEKS BETWEEN MAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

AND JULY 2000. SPECIFIC TRAINING AT KHALDEN INCLUDED BASIC WEAPONS, ARTILLERY, MILITARY TACTICS AND TOPOGRAPHY. KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS CLOSED IN JULY OR AUGUST 2000 BY THE TALIBAN.

TEXT: TEXT: 1. ~~(C//REL USA//1.4 C, (b)(1), (b)(2))~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP
//GEOCOORD: 583354E/3690583N//, AFGHANISTAN (AF). THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP WAS APPROXIMATELY THREE TO FIVE KILOMETERS NORTH OF KHOST
//GEOCOORD: 332507N/0701716E//, AF. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

2. ~~(C//REL USA//1.4 C, (b)(1), (b)(2))~~
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

[Redacted]

KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3. ~~(C//REL USA//1.4 C, (b)(1))~~ TRAINING PERIOD. DETAINEE ARRIVED AT KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
[Redacted]

AT KHALDEN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 2 *****/

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
[Redacted]

4. ~~(C//REL USA//1.4 C, (b)(1), (b)(2))~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
[Redacted]

5. ~~(C//REL USA//1.4 C, (b)(1), (b)(2))~~ TRAINING CAMP CURRICULUM (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
[Redacted]

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

SA. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

SB. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 3 *****/

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

SC. ~~(C//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

5D. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

6. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

7. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

8. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

8A. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6) ABU

MOHAMMED ((AL-GAZAIRI)). GAZAIRI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

8B. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

8C. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ ADUL ((ADJID)) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

8D. ~~(//REL USA (b)(2)~~ ABU YAHYA ADUL ((BARI)) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

9. ~~(//REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

10. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 4 *****

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(h)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

THE

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

11. ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

THE KHALDEN TRAINING

CAMP (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

11 SEPTEMBER 2001. (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. ASSASSINATION OF (MASOUDI), THE LEADER OF THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE IN AFGHANISTAN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(2), (b)(6)

12. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

OF THE 11 SEPTEMBER (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

13. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

14. ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

15. (U//REL USA) (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP.

16. (U//REL USA) (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C USAMA BIN ((LADEN)) (UBL) (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

17. (U//REL USA) (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C THE KHALDEN TRAINING CAMP (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec GUANTANAMO BAY.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 5 *****/

COMMENTS: 1. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

3. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

4. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

5. (U) THE DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONTACT.

6. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

ADMIN COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. YES 5

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO

USA AND

(b)(2)

DRV FROM: (b)(2)

DECL: 25X1-HUMAN

(b)(2)

JIF-GTMO SIR 7Jul04:

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT:

(S//NF) SUBJECT: ISN (b)(7)(D) 00263DP, ((SULTAN)) ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM IS A 33-YR-OLD WHO CLAIMS LIBYAN CITIZENSHIP.

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY (b)(7)(C) INTERROGATED ((SULTAN)) ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) THE INTERROGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN ARABIC. MODERN STANDARD USING (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. (S//NF) APPROACH (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3. (S//NF) EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

4. (S//NF) COOPERATION/KNOWLEDGEABILITY/TRUTHFULNESS/EXPLOITED: (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

5. (S//NF) RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

6. (S//NF) SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (ENSURE ANY INTELLIGENCE RESULTS IN AN IIR): IN 1996, DETAINEE LEFT DAMASCUS BY PLANE TO KHARTOUM SUDAN. THIS WAS HIS SECOND VISIT TO KHARTOUM AND HE DID NOT NEED A VISA. RETURNED TO LIVE WITH ABU FARIS FOR 2 MONTHS OR SO, BUT ACTUALLY ENDED UP STAYING 1 YEAR. DETAINEE WAS ASKED ABOUT ABU FARIS' BROTHER RADWAN (SUPPOSEDLY A UBL MECHANIC IN REPORTING) BUT DETAINEE STATES HE HAS NO INFORMATION. DETAINEE THEN LIVED WITH THE ABOVE-MENTIONED AHMED AL LIBY IN THE SAME NEIGHBORHOOD. ABU FARIS WAS VERY PROTECTIVE OF HIS WIFE AND DETAINEE FELT UNCOMFORTABLE BEING ALONE WITH HER WHILE HE WORKED AS A TRUCK DRIVER. TOWARDS THE END OF 1997, DETAINEE FELT PRESSURED TO LEAVE SUDAN. DURING RAMADAN, HE WAS VISITING LIBYAN FRIENDS WHO WORKED AT A TRAVEL AGENCY (AHMAD AND TAWFIQ WORKED AT A TRAVEL AGENCY) AND WAS CONFRONTED BY A SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHO ASKED FOR HIS PAPERS. THE AGENT ADVISED HIM TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY DUE TO LIBYAN GOV'T PRESSURE. THE AGENT TOLD HIM HE HAD NO CHOICE AND IF HE DECLINED, HE WOULD BE HAND-DELIVERED TO LIBYA. HE TOLD THE AGENT HE HAD NO MEANS TO LEAVE, SO THE SUDANESE AGENT GAVE HIM A FAKE PASSPORT. THIS WAS THE YEMENI PASSPORT PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED. INSIDE WAS A VISA TO PAKISTAN. DETAINEE'S LIBYAN PASSPORT WAS ALREADY EXPIRED. DETAINEE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO GO TO JORDAN OR SYRIA, BUT HE HEARD PAKISTAN WASN'T SO BAD TO LIVE AND WORK. THE AGENT TOOK HIM TO THE AIRPORT WHERE HE WAS GIVEN AIRLINES TICKETS AND HAD HIS PHOTO TAKEN TO PUT IN THE FAKE YEMENI PASSPORT. THE NAME ON THE PASSPORT WAS JABAL AL 'ANTARI. THERE WERE TWO ADDITIONAL NAMES.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

POSSIBLY MIDDLE, BUT THE DETAINEE DOESN'T RECALL. HE ALSO CANNOT RECALL THE ADDITIONAL NATIONALITY STAMPS IN THE FAKE PASSPORT. PRIOR TO LEAVING, DETAINEE TOLD AHMED WHAT HAPPENED. DETAINEE GAVE HIS REAL PAPERS, LIBYAN PASSPORT, ID AND SCHOOL PAPERS TO AHMED. DETAINEE WAS SCARED HE WOULD BE SEARCHED IN PAKISTAN AND HE DIDN'T WANT THEM KNOWING HE WAS LIBYAN. DETAINEE LEFT SUDAN BY PLANE VIA DOHA, QATAR TO KARACHI, PK DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS OF THE HJ. 1416-1417 WOULD BE THE ARABIC YEAR. DETAINEE SPENT 24 HRS IN KARACHI AND TOOK A TAXI TO PESHAWAR, PK. AHMED HAD PREVIOUSLY ADVISED HIM TO TAKE THIS PK ROUTE TO AN ISLAMIC INSTITUTE IN PESHAWAR WHO WOULD EMPLOY HIM. DETAINEE STAYED AT THE WHITE MOSQUE IN PESHAWAR APPROXIMATELY 3 DAYS AND CLAIMS HIS YEMENI PASSPORT WAS STOLEN HERE. HE BELIEVES HE HAD PROBLEMS BECAUSE HE WAS MALIKI SECT AND THE MOSQUE WAS HANAFI. A UNK MUSLIM BROTHER AT THE WHITE MOSQUE TOLD HIM TO GO TO ATHARIA MOSQUE, WHICH IS CLOSE TO HOW HE PRACTICES ISLAM. DETAINEE MOVED INTO THE ATHARIA MOSQUE IN THE PESHTU SBEEN JAMAAT SUBURB OF PESHAWAR. THE SUBURB AND THE UNIVERSITY HAD PRIMARILY AF AND PK STUDENTS. DETAINEE BECAME SELF EMPLOYED TRADING DIAPERS, HONEY AND HOUSE-HOLD GOODS WHICH HE PURCHASED AT THE KAARKHANULAH MARKET IN PESHAWAR. HE SOLD THE ITEMS AT THE SADR BAZAARE IN PESHAWAR. HE DID THIS ON AND OFF FOR MONEY UNTIL HE LEFT PAKISTAN. ABU FARIS SOON MOVED INTO THE ATHARIA MOSQUE WITH HIS WHOLE FAMILY, AND THIS IS WHERE THEY FIRST MET. ABU FARIS HAD TO LEAVE SUDAN UNDER THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES AS THE DETAINEE. DETAINEE AND ABU FARIS (AND HIS FAMILY) DECIDED TO SHARE COSTS FOR AN APARTMENT TOGETHER. ABU FARIS PRAYED AT HOME, WHILE DETAINEE PRAYED AT THE ATHARIA MOSQUE. DETAINEE MET A NEIGHBOR, ABU ATIKAH AKA ABDUL FATAH, WHO WAS A VETERAN RUSSIAN MUJAHEDIN. ABDUL FATAH HAD A STEP DAUGHTER, WHOSE REAL FATHER WAS WAJDI EMMAIMAN. RUSSIAN DIED IN JIHAD. DETAINEE MARRIED THE 18 YEAR OLD GIRL, WHOSE NAME IS KHAIRIYA. DETAINEE AND KHAIRIYA MOVED INTO THEIR OWN PESHAWAR HOME.

ON JANUARY 21, 2000, DETAINEE'S DAUGHTER WAS BORN. HE DECIDED TO GO TO ISLAMABAD UN FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM. IT WAS HARD BECAUSE HE HAD NO ID. DETAINEE'S WIFE'S FAMILY WERE LIFG SUPPORTERS. DETAINEE'S MOTHER-IN-LAW ACTUALLY 3 HUSBANDS, THE ONE NOT MENTIONED YET BEING MOHAMMED AL LIBI (2ND HUSBAND), WHO WAS A DECEASED LIFG MEMBER. PK BEGAN CRACKING DOWN ON ARABS AND DETAINEE FOUND AN AFGHANI GUIDE TO TAKE HIS WIFE AND CHILD TO JALALABAD IN 2000. AHMED AL LIBI HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD HIM IF THINGS WENT BAD IN PK, GO TO KABUL VIA JALALABAD. DETAINEE PROCEEDED TO KABUL AND STAYED AT ABU BILAL THE ALGERIAN'S HOME FOR RENT MONEY. ABU BILAL TOLD HIM ABOUT A KABUL SCHOOL WHERE THEY NEEDED TEACHERS. DETAINEE WAS GOING BY THE NAME OF ABU MIRIAM.

2001

DURING THIS TIME THE DETAINEE SUBMITTED HIS APPLICATION TO BECOME A TEACHER AT THE ABU BAKR AL SIDDIQ SCHOOL. THE SCHOOL ACCEPTED HIS APPLICATION AND HE WAS HIRED TO THE STAFF AND HIRED AS A TEACHER OF HISTORY, ARABIC, ISLAMIC STUDIES, GEOGRAPHY FOR 1 1/2 SCHOOL YEARS. THE DETAINEE CLAIMED THAT HE WAS A TEACHER FOR STUDENTS FROM 4ST TO 9TH GRADERS. DURING THIS TIME THE DETAINEE LIVED WITH HIS FAMILY NEAR THE SCHOOL IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF TAMANI AND SHARINAO AT KABUL, AFGHANISTAN.

THE DETAINEE CLAIMED THAT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(6) WAS A TEACHER AND ABU FARIS CHILDREN ATTENDED THE SCHOOL. THE SCHOOL TAUGHT FROM 1ST TO 9TH GRADES AND THEY HAD OVER 100 STUDENTS. THE STUDENTS WERE ARABS AND AFGHANIS. THE DETAINEE STATED THAT THE SCHOOL WAS FINANCED BY BRITISH FUNDS FROM BRITAIN.

THE DETAINEE STATED THAT THE STUDENTS WERE PICKED UP BY THE SCHOOL BUS FROM THE SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD AND THAT THE STUDENTS DID NOT LIVE AT THE SCHOOL. THE HEAD MASTER OF THE SCHOOL NAME WAS ABDULLAH IN KABUL. AROUND 9/11, THERE WAS

DMO Exhibit 19

Page 2 of 3

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

UNKNOWN BLAST (LIKELY BOMBINGS) AND DETAINEE TOOK HIS FAMILY TO JALALABAD. HE NOTIFIED THE SCHOOL HE WAS LEAVING AND THEY UNDERSTOOD. THEY STAYED IN ABU BILAL'S HOUSE IN JALALABAD AGAIN (HIGHLY LIKELY TO BE ISN 168). DETAINEE PLANNED ON ESCAPING TO HIS IN-LAWS IN PESHAWAR (ABDUL FATAH AL LIBI AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED).

DETAINEE WAS VAGUE ON DESCRIPTION ON HOW HE SPLIT WITH HIS WIFE. WAS SIMPLY TOLD SALAH THE MOROCCAN, SULIMAN THE ALGERIAN AND A "REY-ALL" TOOK HIS WIFE, HIS MOTHER IN LAW AND THE BABY. THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO COME BACK FOR HIM.

DETAINEE HIRED AN AFGHAN GUIDE AND MET (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

7. ISSUING COLLECTORS COMMENTS (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

DETAINEE CLAIMS HE IS NOT LIFG, AL QAIDA OR TALIBAN. DETAINEE RECEIVED TRAINING ONLY WHILE HE WAS IN HIGH SCHOOL AS PART OF A NATIONAL LIBYAN REQUIREMENT

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

8. (U) POC FOR THIS MEMORANDUM (b)(2) JIF
GTMO.

SIR#7358

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(b)(2)

R 242103Z SEP 03
FM CJTF GTMOJ2CMD

(b)(2)

PAGE 2 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

PAGE 3 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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(b)(2)

PAGE 4 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

PAGE 5 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

(b)(1)
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(2)
FBI PASS TO (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6) GTMO TASK FORCE
PAGE 6 RUMIATMI 595 ~~SECRET~~
ICC PASS TO (b)(1) Sec 1.4

DMO Exhibit 20
Page 2 of 4

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SUBJ: (b)(2) - AL QAIDA LEADERS AND PERSONALITIES IN TORA BORA AFGHANISTAN (U)

SECRET//NOFORN

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF); SAUDI ARABIA (SA); LIBYA (LY); YEMEN (YM).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2) - AL QAIDA LEADERS AND PERSONALITIES IN TORA BORA AFGHANISTAN (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET//NOFORN

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PAGE 7 (b)(2) SECRET

DOI: (U) 20011000.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

SOURCE: (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

SUMMARY: (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

TEXT: 1. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

FOR USAMA ((BIN

LADEN)) (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

PAGE 8 SECRET

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

- FNU

((SUHAIB)), A LIBYAN, WAS IN TORA BORA AS A FIGHTER; HIS FAMILY WAS WITH HIM IN JALALABAAD BUT THEY TOOK A PLANE FROM PAKISTAN TO LIBYA IN 2002. IN 2002,

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

ISN: 000263DP, I IDENTIFIED AS ASHRAF SALIM ABD AL SALAM ((SULTAN)) WITHIN GUANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER.

3. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

PAGE 9 SECRET

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

ISN

DMO Exhibit 20

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(2), (b)(6)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. 1. (U)

(b)(2), (b)(5)

2. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

2. (U) (b)(2)
3. (U) (b)(2)

PAGE (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~
(b)(2)

4. (U) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(2)
(b)(2)


COLL: (U) (b)(2)
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.
PREP: (U) (b)(2)
ENCL: (U) (b)(2)
1. (S/NF) (b)(2)
(b)(2) (S/NF) (b)(2) (S/NF)
2. (S/NF) (b)(2) (S/NF) (b)(2)
(b)(2) (S/NF)
ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)
DISSEM: (U) (U) FIELD: (b)(2)
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS.
DERIVED FROM: (b)(2)
DECLASSIFY ON: XI

(b)(
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FM CJTF GTMO

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Page 1 of 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO~~

~~USA (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO~~

~~USA (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

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//25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA (b)(2)~~

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

(U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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(b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 19970000.

REOS: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

SOURCE: (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) (b)(6) BORN IN

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

SUMMARY: (C//REL-USA) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) ABU

ATTA AL TUNISI AND HAMZA ZUBAIR AL MASRI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

TEXT: I. (C//REL-USA) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C WAHL/ GEOCOORD: 332012N/0695505E//

AFGHANISTAN (AF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C GEOCOORD: 342508N/0673247E// AF (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

ABU ATTA ((AL

DMO Exhibit 22

Page 2 of 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL/REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

TUNISI) AND HAMZA ZUBAIR ((AL MASRI)) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C HAMZA ZUBAIR WAS
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA.) ABU ATTA AL TUNISI DIED
IN THE 1998 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 A (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

GULBUDDIN

(HEKMATYAR) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. (C) REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3. (C) REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4. (C) REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

5. (C) REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

6. (C) REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

ABU ATTA AL TUNISI IS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL/REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, GCTF~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

7. (C//REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU LAYTH ((AL LIBI) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA AL TUNISI AND HAMZA ZUBAIR AL MASRI

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

COMMENTS: 1. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

3. (C//REL USA (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA AL TUNISI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4. (C//REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA AL TUNISI IS

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

5. (C//REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA AL TUNISI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

6. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ENCL: (U) (b)(2)

1. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (C//REL USA (b)(2)

2. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6) INSTRUCTING (C//REL USA (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (C//REL USA (b)(2)

3. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (C//REL USA (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (C//REL USA (b)(2)

4. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ABU ATTA AL TUNISI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (C//REL USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (C//REL USA (b)(2)

5. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (C//REL USA (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (C//REL USA (b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, GCTF~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO
USA (b)(2)

DRV FROM: (b)(2)

DECL: 25X1-HUMAN

(b)(2)

DMO Exhibit 22

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09380


3 November 2008

JTF-GTMO-SJA

MEMORANDUM FOR Office for Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants

SUBJECT: Annual Review Board (ARB) Exhibit Redaction Certification

1. The JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) received three documents from the Office for Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC). These documents have been used as exhibits for the ARB for Detainee ISN 263.
2. The SJA hereby certifies that the documents listed below were redacted by JTF-GTMO personnel. Redaction of any information other than what is described in paragraph 3 below was not done by JTF-GTMO personnel. The following documents relative to the referenced Detainee have been reviewed and redacted by JTF-GTMO and provided to OARDEC:


- a. (b)(2)
 - b.
 - c.
- 

3. Unauthorized or inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of the redacted information or date could damage the national security of the United States. JTF-GTMO certifies that only names and codenames of U.S. personnel and sensitive sources were redacted by JTF-GTMO personnel. The substance of these documents remains the same.

4. If you have any further questions or comments, please contact the undersigned at (b)(2)

(b)(1)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10
USC §130b,(b)(6)



DMO Exhibit 25
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09380



JTF-GTMO-CDR

20 June 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
Guantanamo Detainee, (ISN) (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- (b)(2) Reference Name: Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani, Abu Anas, Abu Musab al-Yemeni
- Place of Birth: Al-Hudaydah, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1 January 1979
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): (b)(2) 000839DP

(b)(2)

2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) Hamza al-Zubayr was
killed (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: (b)(2)

DMO Exhibit 10
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5), (b)(6)

- (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)
-
-

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Summary of Changes: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

a. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Prior History:** Detainee graduated from high school in al-Hudaydah in July 1999 and then took a free two-month course at the University of Iman in Sanaa, YM which covered different aspects of Islam. From 1999 through 2001, detainee worked at his father's pharmacies.

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ **Recruitment and Travel:** Two former extremists living in al-Hudaydah, Ibrahim Abdu Said Ghanim al-Muqtari, aka (Abu Fayruz), and Muatasim al-Tihama recruited detainee for militant training in Afghanistan (AF). Al-Tihama paid for all of detainee's transportation needs. In late July 2001, detainee departed Sanaa with three

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

JTF-GTMO CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

traveling companions named Malik al-Ibbi, al-Waleed al-Hadrami, and Huthaifa al-Ibbi. (b) The group traveled to Karachi via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. (b) Abu Malik al-Pakistani met detainee's group at the Dubai Hotel in Karachi and took them to the Madafat Riyad Guesthouse. (b) Detainee stayed at the Madafat Riyad Guesthouse for one night before traveling to Quetta, PK where he stayed at the Daftar Taliban Guesthouse for four hours and then continued on to Kandahar, AF. (b) In Kandahar, detainee stayed at the al-Nibras Guesthouse for seven days before traveling to the al-Faruq Training Camp. (b)

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Because of US air strikes, detainee received only 25 days of training on the AK-47 assault rifle, pistol, PK machine gun, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) at al-Faruq. (b) Detainee departed al-Faruq with 25 other students for Kabul, AF. Upon arrival in Kabul, al-Faruq Camp commander Abd al-Qadus immediately sent detainee's group on to Khowst, AF. (b) Detainee spent two and a half months in Khowst before returning to Kabul. Three days after detainee returned to Kabul, the city fell to US forces and he fled to Zurmat, AF. (b) Detainee received his passport from Abu al-Faraj, who was possibly from Morocco or Libya, and spent 15 days in Zurmat before crossing the border into Pakistan en route to Lahore, PK. (b) Once they reached Lahore, Ismael al-Jazaree was responsible for detainee and 12 others. (b) Twelve days later, detainee left Lahore and went to Karachi. Detainee then traveled to Chah Bahar, Iran (IR) but returned to Lahore because the Iranian government started arresting all the Arabs. Approximately one month later, detainee returned to Karachi. (b)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 B, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 B, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 B, (b)(1) Detainee, along with several other Arabs who were in the apartment with him, resisted and fought (b)(1) Sec 1.4 D

(b)(1) that left two of the Arabs dead and five captured, along with several of the Pakistani officials injured. One of those killed during the firefight was the al-Qaida member and Karachi-cell leader Hamza al-Zubayr. The Arabs in the apartments were reportedly members of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, including hotels frequented by US soldiers. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 B, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

b. (S) Property Held:

- Sweatpants and sweatshirt

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: (b)(1) Sec 1.4

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(2),(b)(5)

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(5)

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of an al-Qaida cell that was preparing to conduct terrorist attacks on US forces in Karachi. He was captured after a fire at a safe house in Karachi. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C He attended training at an al-Qaida training camp, where he reportedly received explosives training and associated with key al-Qaida operators.

- (S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-Qaida who was captured in an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi. Detainee was identified as an al-Qaida cell member and a participant in planned terrorist attacks against US interests in Pakistan and possibly in the United States.

o (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 Hamza al-Zubayr in the Karachi safe house were al-Qaida members. (b)(2) said Hamza al-Zubayr was the group's al-Qaida operational leader and that al-Zubayr formerly served as a senior military trainer at the al-Faruq Training Camp. Al-Zubayr was killed in the fire (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(1) Sec 1.4 D,(b)(2),(b)(6)

▪ (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida operative (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 1000839DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(6)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5),(b)(6)

• (S//NF) According to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), ISN (b)(2) 010024DP (b)(1) 10024, Hamza al-Zubayr had identified two Yemeni operatives, Ammar al-Dalib and Hassan, aka (Mansur), who would serve as "martyrs" in the planned Karachi operation. (b)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(6)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2) -10024,

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(6)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

- (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

- (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C Hamza al-Zubayr (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Mukh. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C al-Zubayr's death, (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5)

- ♦ (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) 10024, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2) 10024 to Hamza al-Zubayr,

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C al-Zubayr (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2) al-Zubayr

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

- (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C Al-Zubayr and

(b)(1) 10024 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(1) Sec 1.4 D

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C al-Zubayr's (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2),(b)(5) 10024 is

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C al-Zubayr's death (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)

(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(2)

• (S//NF) Detained al-Qaida bomb maker Ahmad Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim, aka (Abu al-Bari al-Filistini), discussed the production of remote control firing devices (RCFDS) and timers for use in improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Al-Qasim (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(2) Abu Hamza al-Zubayr, (b)(2)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 A, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

• (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

o ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C UBL's (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

• ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee admitted attending basic militant training at the al-Faruq Training Camp and reportedly receiving explosives training.

o ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee admitted attending basic militant training at the al-Faruq Training Camp in July and August 2000 where he received weapons training on the AK-47, PK machine gun, and RPGs.⁴⁵

o ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6) Abu Musab al-Yemeni.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

• ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

• ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee was associated with high-level al-Qaida operatives.

o ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

o ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee was possibly associated with other JTF-GTMO detainees while in Afghanistan.

• ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

• ~~(S//NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)
traveled from the al-Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar to the al-Faruq Training Camp. According to detainee, in August 2001, detainee and his three traveling companions arrived by taxi at the al-Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar, where they stayed for seven days.⁵⁰ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Detainee's Conduct: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. ~~(S)~~ Assessment: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

b. ~~(S//NF)~~ Placement and Access: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ Intelligence Assessment: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

d. ~~(S//NF)~~ Areas of Potential Exploitation:

• (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(2)

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(5)

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (S)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

9. (S) EC Status: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(2) (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. (b)(2) (b)(5)



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

(b)(2)

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PAGE 02 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~

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(b)
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(b)(2)
SUBJ: KNICKER KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF - (b)(2) ISN839(U)

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SERIAL: (U) ISN (b)(2) -00839DP.

SUMMARY: (S) //ISN (b)(2) -00839DP// SOURCE IS A YOUNG YEMENI RECRUITED BY A JIHAD RECRUITER TO GO AND TRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN (AF). SOURCE RECEIVED TRAINING AT AL-FAROOQ BUT FLED TO PAKISTAN (PK), WHEN THE U.S. STARTED BOMBING AF. A NETWORK OF PEOPLE HID SOURCE UNTIL HIS CAPTURE BY PAKISTANI POLICE. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

TEXT: (U)

1. (S) PERSONAL DATA--

1A. NAME-- MUSAB OMAR ALI ((AL-MADOONEE)).

1B. SRCNO-- (b)(2) 00839DP.

1C. SRCNO1--

1D. SRCNO2--

1E. SRCNO3--

1F. CITIZEN-- YM;

1G. BIRTCITY-- AL-HUDAIDA

1H. BIRTCTRY-- YM

1I. BIRTDY-- 1980XXXX

1J. PCO-- (b)(2)

1K. LEFTDT-- (b)(2)

1L. INITCTDT-- (b)(2)

1M. LASTCTDT-- (b)(2)

1N. LASTCTRY-- (b)(2)

1O. LANGCOMP-AD4; AU4.

2. (S) EDUCATION--

2A. (S) C; 96-99; THOWRA HIGH SCHOOL; XX; SANAA STREET, AL-HUDAIDA; YM; GRADUATED; TOOK BUSINESS TRACK AND STUDIED ACCOUNTING, SECRETARY, TYPING, FINANCIAL MATH, ARABIC, AND ISLAM.

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2B. (S) C; 93-96; SAAD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL; XX; SANAA STREET, AL-HUDAIDA; YM; GRADUATED; TOOK COURSES IN KORAN, RELIGION, MATH, ARABIC, SOCIAL SCIENCE.

2C. (S) C; 87-93; AL-THAGAR PRIMARY SCHOOL; XX; TAHREER STREET, AL-HUDAIDA; YM; GRADUATED; TOOK COURSES IN SCIENCE, MATH, KORAN, ISLAM, HISTORY, AND ARABIC.

3. (S) EMPLOYMENT-

3A. (S) 01-01; FATHER'S NEW PHARMACY STORE; XX; AL-HUDAIDA; YM; ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; 0;

3B. (S) 99-00; FATHER'S PHARMACY STORE; XX; OUTSIDE OF AL-HUDAIDA; YM; ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; 0;

4. (S) MIL SERVICE- SOURCE HAD NO FORMAL MILITARY SERVICE. SEE PARAGRAPH 5E.

5. (S) SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGEABILITY-

5A. (S) (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

5B. (S) (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

5C. (S) (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

5D. (S) EDUCATION (PARAGRAPH 2) CONTINUED. AFTER SOURCE GRADUATED FROM HIGH SCHOOL IN JULY OF 1999, HE TOOK A FREE, TWO-MONTH COURSE OF STUDY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF IMAN IN SANAA, YEMEN. THIS WAS A FREE COURSE COVERING DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF ISLAM.

5E. (S) MIL SERVICE (PARAGRAPH 4) CONTINUED. SOURCE HAD NO OFFICIAL MILITARY SERVICE, HOWEVER HE TRAINED FOR 25 DAYS AT CAMP AL-FAROOQ. HE RECEIVED TRAINING ON THE KLASHNIKOFF, PISTOL, BEKA, RPG, AND THE MAGNOONA.

5F. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(2) SOURCE WAS RECRUITED BY ABU FAIYROOZ WHOSE TRUE NAME IS IBRAHIM ABDOO SAEED ((AL-MAQTARI)). THIS INDIVIDUAL IS YEMENI, AND HE LIVES RIGHT BETWEEN THE MASJID ABASA AND THE ARWA STREET IN AL-HUDAIDA. HE IS AROUND 30 YEARS OLD AND A FORMER MUJAHID. THE SECOND PERSON WHO WAS WITH AL-MAQTARI RECRUITING FOR THE JIHAD IN AFGHANISTAN WAS MUATASIM ((AL-TIHAMA)), WHICH IS HIS ALIAS NAME. MUATASIM SPOKE A SAUDI DIALECT AND HAD LOTS OF MONEY AND WAS THE ONE WHO PAID FOR EVERYTHING TO GET SOURCE TO AFGHANISTAN. MUATASIM ALSO PAID FOR OTHER PEOPLE TO GO TO AFGHANISTAN AND IS A FORMER MUJAHID HIMSELF. THESE TWO RECRUITERS ENCOURAGED THE SOURCE TO GO AND SEE WHAT AFGHANISTAN IS LIKE AND IF HE LIKED IT TO STAY AND TRAIN. SOURCE GAVE HIS PASSPORT TO MUATASIM TO GET HIM HIS VISA TO TRAVEL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. AFTER TEN DAYS, MUATASIM CALLED HIM AND TOLD HIM TO COME TO (b)(1) AND TO MEET HIM AT THE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. SOURCE LEFT HUDAIDA WITH TWO OF HIS FRIENDS. ONE WAS HAKBEM ((AL-YEMENI)), WHO FOLLOWED HIM TO (b)(1) TWO WEEKS AFTER THE SOURCE LEFT (b)(1) AND AHMAD AL-THAMAREE WHO CAME ALONG JUST TO SAY GOODBYE TO THE SOURCE. SOURCE LEFT FOR (b)(1) AT THE END OF JULY 2001; HE REMEMBERS LEAVING ON A SUNDAY. SOURCE FLEW ON (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.

(b)(1) WHEN THE SOURCE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.

WITH THREE OTHER ARABS, WHO HAD TRAVELED WITH HIM FROM YEMEN. THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE TRAVELED WITH THE SOURCE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. MALIK ((AL-IBEE)), A YEMENI IN HIS EARLY TWENTIES, AL-WALEED ((AL-HADRAMEE)), A YEMENI IN HIS EARLY TWENTIES, AND HUTHAJFA, A YEMENI IN HIS EARLY TWENTIES. THEY ALL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. FOR A DAY. ABU MALIK ((AL-PAKISTANI)) MET THEM THE NEXT DAY AND TOOK THEM TO THE MADAFAT RIYAD GUESTHOUSE IN KARACHI WHICH WAS RUN BY A YEMENI WHO IS AROUND 29 YEARS OLD. THE GROUP STAYED ONE NIGHT AT THE GUESTHOUSE AND THE SOURCE AND AL-WALEED AL-HADRAMEE AND ONE UNIDENTIFIED ARAB WENT ON TO (b)(1) VIA BUS. THE MADAFAT PAID FOR THE TRIP. IN (b)(1) THEY STAYED AT THE DAFTAR AL-TALIBAN GUEST HOUSE FOR FOUR HOURS. AFTER FOUR HOURS, A DRIVER FROM THE GUEST HOUSE DROVE THE SOURCE AND AL-HADRAMEE ACROSS THE BORDER. THE UNIDENTIFIED ARAB DID NOT GO WITH THEM. WHEN THEY REACHED (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. THEY STAYED AT THE MADAFAT AL-NIBRAS. HERE THEY WERE FED AND GIVEN NEW CLOTHES. AFTER SEVEN DAYS AT THE GUEST HOUSE, SOURCE TRAVELED TO CAMP AL-FAROOQ. SOURCE STAYED AT A RECEPTION TENT FOR FIVE DAYS, ABOUT 50 METERS FROM THE ACTUAL CAMP, BEFORE STARTING THE TRAINING WITH HIS GROUP. SOURCE WAS GIVEN THE OPTION TO TRAIN FOR ONE OR TWO MONTHS, AND HE CHOSE TO TRAIN FOR

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ONE MONTH. HE RECEIVED TRAINING ON THE KLASHNIKOFF, PISTOL, BEKA, RPG, AND THE MAGNOONA. THE SOURCE ONLY TRAINED FOR 25 DAYS BECAUSE THE CAMP CLOSED DUE TO U.S. BOMBING.

5G. (S)(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. SOURCE WENT TO (b)(1) WITH A GROUP OF 25 OTHER AL-FAROOQ STUDENTS. WHEN THEY ARRIVED (b)(1) ABDUL ((QADOOS)), THE CAMP COMMANDER OF AL-FAROOQ CAMP SENT THEM TO (b)(1) BECAUSE IT WAS SAFER THERE, AND OTHER ARAB FAMILIES WERE THERE AND IT WAS NOT BEING BOMBED. SOURCE SPENT TWO AND A HALF MONTHS THERE. AFTER THAT, HE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C AND THREE DAYS LATER, THE CITY FELL FROM (b)(1) HE FLED TO (b)(1) AND SPENT 15 DAYS THERE. JUST OUTSIDE OF (b)(1) HE RECEIVED HIS PASSPORT FROM ABU AL-FARAJ, WHO WAS AN OLDER MAN, POSSIBLY FROM MOROCCO OR LIBYA. THE PASSPORTS FOR ALL OF THE ARABS HAD BEEN KEPT AT THE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. SOURCE THEN CROSSED OVER THE BORDER AND (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) HE SPENT 12 DAYS AT THE HOUSE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C WITH 12 OTHER FINAL SECTION OF D2

SUBJ: KNICKER KNOWLEDGEABILITY BRIEF (b)(2) ISNR39(1)

ARABS. THE MAN WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ARABS (b)(1) WAS ISMAEL ((AL-JAZAREE)), WHO IS AROUND AGE 38 AND HAS THREE OR FOUR THAT WERE WITH HIM. SOURCE THEN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) WHERE HE WAS HIDDEN IN SEVERAL PLACES. WHEN THINGS GOT DANGEROUS IN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C TOLD TO GO WITH A GROUP OF PEOPLE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C BECAUSE IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A SAFE PLACE TO HIDE. HE WENT TO (b)(1) WITH HABIB ((AL-SOMALI)), WHO IS AROUND 21 YEARS OLD. AN IRANIAN BY THE NAME OF IDRIS WATCHED OVER THEM WHILE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C SOURCE STAYED FOR TWO WEEKS IN

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C AND THEN HE LEFT BECAUSE THE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C STARTED ARRESTING ALL OF THE ARABS. SOURCE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C WITH THE FOLLOWING EIGHT OTHER ARABS- AKRIMAH, HUTHAIFA, ABU MALIK, ABU AL-FADL, SALMAN, ABU UMAR AND ABD AL-RAHMAN. SOURCE AND THE GROUP STAYED WITH A BALUCHI/PAKISTANI MAN (b)(1) NAMED ABU ATA'ALLAH. THEN SIX OF THEM, NOT SALMAN AND ABU UMAR, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C THEY STAYED ONE MONTH (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C AND MUHAMED'S HOUSE; THEY ARE BOTH PAKISTANI. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

AT THE HOUSE OF DR. ABU ((AHMAD)), A PAKISTANI. SINCE THIS WAS THE DOCTOR'S FAMILY HOME, THEY MOVED TO THE HOME OF ABU RAHMA, A PAKISTANI, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

THEN THE PAKISTANI POLICE ARRESTED THEM AND TOOK THEM AWAY FOR FIVE DAYS OF QUESTIONING.

THEN THEY WERE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

AFTER ONE MONTH, THEY WERE TAKEN TO BAGRAM, WHERE THEY STAYED FOR 5 DAYS UNTIL SOURCE WAS TRANSPORTED TO GUANTANAMO BAY.

5H. (S) UNTIL JUNE 2001, SOURCE LIVED WITH (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

5I. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

//MILEQUIP: NONE//

5J. (S) TRIBE AND MOSQUE AFFILIATIONS. SOURCE IS A MEMBER OF THE AL-MADOONEE TRIBE. //IPSP: (b)(2)

6. (S) COLLECTOR'S COMMENTS-

6A. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

6B. (S) SOURCE DENIED HAVING ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACKS IN THE U.S. PRIOR TO THEIR EXECUTION ON SEPTEMBER 11TH.

7. (S) GUID- REQUIREMENTS THROUGH SECRET FOR ISN (b)(2) D0839DP SHOULD BE PROCESSED AS FOLLOWS-

7A. (S) ADDRESS ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED REQUIREMENTS TO (b)(2)

(b)(2)

7B. (S) INTERAGENCY REFS WHO NEED TO SUBMIT SOURCE DIRECTED

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(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

7C. (U) (b)(2)

7D. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2) 0839DP.

8. (U) FILE-- ISN (b)(2) 0839DP.

DERIVED FROM: (b)(2)

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

(b)(2)

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PREC: R DTG: 051357Z FEB04

FROM: CJTF GTMO

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SECTION 1 OF 2

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

SERIAL: (U)(b)(2)

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF); PAKISTAN (PK); UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (TC); YEMEN (YM).

IPSP: (U)(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2) - DETAINEE DESCRIBES HIS RECRUITMENT FOR TRAINING IN AFGHANISTAN (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20010730.

REQS: (U)(b)(2)

(b)(2)

SOURCE: (S//NF) //SN (b)(2) 000839DP//A 23-YR-OLD YEMENI RECRUITED BY A JIHAD RECRUITER TO TRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE RECEIVED TRAINING AT AL-FAROUQ AND FLED TO PAKISTAN WHEN THE U.S. STARTED BOMBING AFGHANISTAN. A NETWORK OF PEOPLE HID DETAINEE UNTIL HIS CAPTURE BY PAKISTANI POLICE IN KARACHI. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

SUMMARY: (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

TEXT: 1. (S//NF) RECRUITERS MUATAZEM ((AL TIHAMA)) AND IBRAHIM ABDUL ((MUKTARI)), AKA ABU FAYRUZ RECRUITED DETAINEE TO GO TO AFGHANISTAN (FIELD COMMENT. THEY ARE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED IN (b)(2) (b)(2) DETAINEE MET AL TIHAMA IN THE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(3):10 USC §455

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(3):10 USC §455

AL TIHAMA CAME TO THE CAFE TO PREACH TO THE PEOPLE IN THE CAFE; THERE WERE 20-30 PEOPLE IN THE CAFE LISTENING TO AL TIHAMA TALK ABOUT AFGHANISTAN AND THE NEED TO HELP THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. AL TIHAMA URGED THE CAFE PATRONS TO BE GOOD MUSLIMS AND PROVIDE MONEY, MEDICINE, AND TEACHING. AL TIHAMA SPOKE FOR 30 MINUTES. DETAINEE COULD NOT SAY FOR CERTAIN WHAT AL TIHAMA'S PROFESSION WAS, BUT SPECULATED THAT HE WAS A TEACHER. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW IF AL TIHAMA HAD EVER TRAVELED TO AFGHANISTAN. AL TIHAMA WAS A MAN IN HIS THIRTIES THAT SPOKE A DIALECT THAT WAS PROBABLY SAUDI. DETAINEE CLAIMED THAT HE RARELY SAW AL TIHAMA AND SPOKE WITH ABU FAYRUZ REGARDING HIS TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN.

2. (S//NF) ABU FAYRUZ ACCOMPANIED AL TIHAMA ON HIS CAFE LECTURE AND ACTUALLY COORDINATED WITH DETAINEE TO GET HIM TO AFGHANISTAN. ABU FAYRUZ LIVED ON THE SAME STREET AS DETAINEE, ATTENDED THE SAME MOSQUES AND WAS THE BROTHER OF ASHURA ABDUL SAED ((MUKTARI)), AKA HAKEEM AL YEMENI. HAKEEM WAS A FRIEND OF SIMILAR AGE AS DETAINEE BUT WENT TO A DIFFERENT SCHOOL. HAKEEM EVENTUALLY TRAVELLED TO AFGHANISTAN TO TRAIN AT AL FAROUQ WITH DETAINEE. ABU FAYRUZ SPENT TWO MONTHS IN AFGHANISTAN AND WAS WELL KNOWN IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD DETAINEE LIVED IN. DETAINEE COULD NOT SPECIFY WHEN OR WHERE ABU FAYRUZ TRAINED OR WORKED IN AFGHANISTAN. ABU FAYRUZ CONVINCED DETAINEE TO GO TO AFGHANISTAN BY ENCOURAGING HIM TO GET WEAPONS TRAINING. EVERYTHING WOULD BE FREE AND IF DETAINEE DID NOT LIKE AFGHANISTAN HE COULD COME HOME. ABU FAYRUZ ALSO SPOKE ABOUT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND THE

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND HOW THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE WERE INFIDELS. DETAINEE DEPARTED FOR AFGHANISTAN APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS AFTER AL TIHAMA AND ABU FAYRUZ FIRST SOLICITED HIM IN
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3. (S//NF) DETAINEES DESIRE TO GO TO AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE HAD NO DESIRE TO SEEK HIGHER EDUCATION IN YEMEN. HE WANTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN BECAUSE IT WAS HIS DUTY AS A MUSLIM TO BE TRAINED. HE CITED EXAMPLES OF THE YEMENI CIVIL WAR AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN YEMEN AS REASONS FOR NEEDING MILITARY TRAINING. DETAINEE HAD NO INTENTIONS OF FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN; HE JUST WANTED TO BE TRAINED. DETAINEE COULD NOT RECEIVE TRAINING IN YEMEN BECAUSE HIS FATHER WOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO JOIN THE MILITARY OR GO TO A TRAINING CAMP. DETAINEES FATHER ARRANGED A MEDICAL DEFERMENT TO AVOID MILITARY CONSCRIPTION. ALL OF DETAINEES BROTHERS AVOIDED MILITARY SERVICE IN YEMEN AS WELL. DETAINEE WAS NOT PROMISED ANY PAY OR COMPENSATION FOR GOING TO AFGHANISTAN.

4. (S//NF) TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION. DETAINEE ACQUIRED A PASSPORT APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AND A HALF BEFORE HE ACTUALLY TRAVELED TO AFGHANISTAN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)
IN APPROXIMATELY MARCH 2000 DETAINEE'S FAMILY WAS STAYING IN SANAA FOR A WEEK OR TEN DAYS TO ATTEND A WEDDING. DURING THIS WEEK, DETAINEE USED THE TIME IN SANAA TO GET HIS PASSPORT ISSUED. DETAINEE CITED HIS DESIRE TO GO TO THE HAJJ OR UMSRAH AS JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUIRING A PASSPORT. IT TOOK THREE DAYS TO GET HIS PASSPORT AND IT COST HIM 2000 YEMENI RIYAL (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)
TO OBTAIN A PAKISTANI VISA DETAINEE GAVE HIS PASSPORT TO ABU FAYRUZ APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AND A HALF BEFORE DEPARTING FOR AFGHANISTAN. THE PAKISTANI VISA WAS ONLY FOR ONE MONTH (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

5. (S//NF) TRAVEL TO SANAA. DETAINEE STAYED IN SANNA FOR TWO DAYS BEFORE DEPARTING FOR KARACHI. TO JUSTIFY LEAVING HOME, DETAINEE INFORMED HIS PARENTS THAT HE WAS GOING TO THE WEDDING OF ONE OF HIS FRIENDS THAT HE MET WHILE HE WAS ENROLLED IN THE ALIMAN RELIGIOUS SCHOOL IN SANAA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5)
DETAINEE, HAKEEM, AND A FRIEND NAMED MOHAMED ((AL HAMIRI)) DEPARTED HUDAYDAH FOR SANAA APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AND A HALF BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11TH 2001. AL HAMIRI WAS ALSO A FRIEND FROM DETAINEE'S NEIGHBORHOOD THAT TRAVELED TO SANAA WITH DETAINEE TO SAY GOODBYE; HE DID NOT TRAVEL TO AFGHANISTAN. ABU FAYRUZ GAVE HIS BROTHER, HAKEEM, 2000 YEMENI RIYAL FOR THE TRIP TO SANAA. DETAINEE AND AL HAMIRI CHECKED INTO (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C HAKEEM STAYED WITH RELATIVES IN SANAA. WHILE AT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C DETAINEE WAS VISITED BY A MAN NAMED MOATH ((AL MUWETTI)). MOATH DELIVERED DETAINEE'S PASSPORT WITH THE PAKISTANI VISA AND AIRLINE TICKETS TO KARACHI. MOATH ALSO LECTURED DETAINEE AGAINST NOT FULFILLING A REASONABLE COMMITMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (DETAINEE COMMENT. MOATH TOLD ME NOT TO PLAY GAMES, NOT TO GO FOR FIVE DAYS AND COME HOME). MOATH ALSO WARNED DETAINEE NOT TO ASK TOO MANY QUESTIONS WHEN HE WAS IN AFGHANISTAN AND GAVE HIM INSTRUCTIONS TO SIT AND WAIT ONCE HE ARRIVED IN KARACHI AIRPORT; HE WOULD BE CONTACTED. MOATH GAVE 50 USD TO DETAINEE FOR TRAVELING CASH. DETAINEE WAS NOT PROVIDED WITH ANY WRITTEN RECOMMENDATIONS OR GIVEN ANY CONTACT INFORMATION TO USE ONCE HE ARRIVED IN AFGHANISTAN.

6. (S//NF) FLIGHT FROM SANAA TO KARACHI. IN THE END OF JULY 2001 DETAINEE TOOK A TAXI BY HIMSELF FROM THE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C TO THE SANAA AIRPORT TO CATCH HIS FLIGHT TO KARACHI. HAKEEM INTENDED TO TRAVEL WITH DETAINEE, BUT HE HAD ISSUES HE HAD TO WORK OUT WITH HIS FATHER AND WAS DELAYED FOR TWO WEEKS. DETAINEE HAD ONE PIECE OF CHECKED LUGGAGE AND ONE CARRY-ON FOR THE FLIGHT TO KARACHI. THE CARRY-ON CONSISTED OF FOOD AND THE CHECKED LUGGAGE CONTAINED TWO CHANGES OF CLOTHES, UNDERWEAR, AND HYGIENE ITEMS. THREE INDIVIDUALS ON THE FLIGHT WITH DETAINEE WERE HUTHAIFA ((AL IBBY)), MALIK ((AL IBBY)), AND WALID ((HADRAMI)) (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(DETAINEE COMMENT. HUTHAIFA, MALIK, AND WALID ARE
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C THE FLIGHT STOPPED FOR THIRTY MINUTES IN DUBAI, UAE; DETAINEE DID NOT LEAVE THE PLANE. UPON ARRIVAL IN KARACHI, HUTHAIFA, MALIK, AND WALID INTRODUCED THEMSELVES TO DETAINEE; THEY KNEW HIS NAME BECAUSE MOATH HAD GIVEN THEM INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT DETAINEE ONCE THEY ARRIVED IN KARACHI. COMMENTS: 1. (C) (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

2. (S) THE DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONTACT CONCERNING THIS IIR.
3. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

4. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

5. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

6. TS EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO (b)(2)

(b)(2)

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - NONE.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN~~

~~NATIONALS.~~

DeClassBy: (b)(2)

DeClassReason:

DeClassDate: X-1

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//REL TO~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

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(b)(2)

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Page 1 of 4

~~SECRET//REL TO~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

SEC REF: NONE //X1

~~SECRET~~ //REL (b)(2)

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2) ISN (b)(2) 000839DP (b)(2)

(b)(2) S//REL (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT

CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ //REL (b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20010913.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2) (S//REL (b)(2) / ISN (b)(2) 000839DP // A 23-YR-OLD YEMENI RECRUITED BY A JIHAD RECRUITER TO TRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE RECEIVED TRAINING AT AL-FAROUQ AND FLED TO PAKISTAN WHEN THE U.S. STARTED BOMBING AFGHANISTAN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4.C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4.C (b)(5)

SUMMARY: (S//REL (b)(2) / ISN (b)(2) 000839DP // A 23-YR-OLD YEMENI RECRUITED BY A JIHAD RECRUITER TO TRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE RECEIVED TRAINING AT AL-FAROUQ AND FLED TO PAKISTAN WHEN THE U.S. STARTED BOMBING AFGHANISTAN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4.C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4.C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4.C 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACKS IN THE US (b)(1) Sec

TEXT: 1. (S//REL (b)(2) / ISN (b)(2) 000839DP // A 23-YR-OLD YEMENI RECRUITED BY A JIHAD RECRUITER TO TRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE RECEIVED TRAINING AT AL-FAROUQ AND FLED TO PAKISTAN WHEN THE U.S. STARTED BOMBING AFGHANISTAN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4.C (b)(5) TRAVEL TO AL FAROUQ. IN AUGUST 2001 DETAINEE WAS MOVED FROM THE AL NEBRAS GUESTHOUSE IN KANDAHAR, AF TO AL FAROUQ ALONG WITH APPROXIMATELY EIGHTEEN OTHER ARAB TRAINEES THAT HE STAYED WITH IN AL NEBRAS GUESTHOUSE. TO GET TO AL FAROUQ FROM THE NEBRAS GUESTHOUSE A TWENTY PASSENGER BUS PICKED HIM AND HIS FELLOW TRAINEES UP AND DROVE THEM THE TWO OR THREE HOURS TO AL FAROUQ. ABU WAHEED ((LNU)), ONE OF THE LEADERS AT THE AL NEBRAS GUESTHOUSE, ACCOMPANIED HIS GROUP TO AL FAROUQ.

2. (S//REL (b)(2) / ISN (b)(2) 000839DP // A 23-YR-OLD YEMENI RECRUITED BY A JIHAD RECRUITER TO TRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE RECEIVED TRAINING AT AL-FAROUQ AND FLED TO PAKISTAN WHEN THE U.S. STARTED BOMBING AFGHANISTAN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4.C (b)(5) IN PROCESSING. WHEN THE BUS ARRIVED AT AL FAROUQ THE GROUP WAS TAKEN TO A SMALL IN PROCESSING CAMP TH AT CONSISTED OF FIVE OR SIX TENTS LOCATED ABOUT 30 METERS AWAY FROM THE MAIN TRAINING CAMP. DETAINEE STAYED IN THIS SMALL CAMP FOR FIVE DAYS. THE GROUP WAS SEARCHED BY THE CAMP CADRE AND ASKED MANY QUESTIONS SUCH AS - WHERE ARE YOU FROM?; WHAT RELIGIOUS SECT ARE YOU?; HOW DID YOU GET TO AFGHANISTAN?; AND WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO AT AL FAROUQ? ON ONE OCCASION THE CAMP CADRE SNUCK INTO THE IN PROCESSING CAMP AT NIGHT AND SPRAYED GUNFIRE INTO THE AIR WHILE ALL OF THE TRAINEES WERE SLEEPING. THE FIRST FIVE DAYS IN THE IN PROCESSING CAMP OUTSIDE AL FAROUQ WERE DIFFICULT, BUT NOBODY QUIT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO TRANSPORTATION TO GET BACK TO KANDAHAR, AF.

3. (S//b1) CAMP LAYOUT AND FACILITIES. THERE WAS NO ELECTRICITY AT AL FAROUQ; OIL LAMPS WERE USED FOR LIGHT; THERE WERE NO GENERATORS THAT DETAINEE WAS AWARE OF. THERE WERE SOME ADMINISTRATION BUILDINGS BUT THE TRAINEES WEREN'T ALLOWED TO GO INSIDE. THERE WAS A MOSQUE IN THE CENTER OF THE CAMP. DETAINEE KNEW OF NO CAVES, STORAGE AREAS, OBSTACLE COURSE OR WRITING ON THE MOUNTAINSIDE AROUND AL FAROUQ. DETAINEE KNEW OF NO WELLS; THERE WERE WATER TANKS ABOVE THE BATHROOM AREA WITH A PIPE THAT CAME DOWN TO A FAUCET. DETAINEE OFFERED THAT THERE WERE PROBABLY OTHER CAMPS AROUND AL FAROUQ BECAUSE HE HEARD SHOOTING IN THE DISTANCE OCCASIONALLY. SEE ENCLOSURE FOR AN ADAPTED COPY OF DETAINEE'S SKETCH OF AL FAROUQ.

4. (S//b1) TRAINING PROGRAM. MOST OF THE TRAINEES AT AL FAROUQ WERE SAUDI OR YEMENI; THERE WERE TWO OR THREE PAKISTANI TRAINEES. THERE WERE NO AFGHAN TRAINEES, AFGHANS AT AL FAROUQ WORKED AS COOKS. DETAINEE DOES NOT RECALL ANY ASIAN, BLACK, EUROPEAN, OR NORTH AMERICAN TRAINEES. THERE WERE ABOUT 18 INDIVIDUALS IN DETAINEE'S TRAINING GROUP; DETAINEE ONLY INTERACTED WITH THE FOUR OR FIVE WHOM HE SHARED A TENT WITH. ONCE THE TRAINING GROUP MOVED OVER TO THE MAIN CAMP, PEOPLE STARTING QUITTING THE TRAINING. TRAINING AT AL FAROUQ CONSISTED OF THREE WEEKS OF INSTRUCTION ON THE KALASHNIKOV; ASSEMBLE, DISASSEMBLE, LOAD, AND CLEAN; MARKSMANSHIP WAS NOT EMPHASIZED. DETAINEE'S TRAINER WOULD BRING TWO RIFLES TO THE COVERED TRAINING AREA IN THE CENTER OF THE CAMP AND TRAINEES WOULD TAKE TURNS WITH THE WEAPONS. DETAINEE WENT TO THE FIRING RANGE TWICE TO FIRE THE KALASHNIKOV. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHERE THE WEAPONS WERE STORED IN AL FAROUQ. THE FOURTH WEEK OF TRAINING SHIFTED TO THE RPG. NEITHER DETAINEE NOR ANYONE FROM HIS TRAINING GROUP WAS PERMITTED TO FIRE AN RPG. DETAINEE RECEIVED ONE DAY OF TRAINING ON THE PK MACHINE GUN, AND ONE DAY OF TRAINING ON CAMOUFLAGE. AFTER A MONTH AT AL FAROUQ THE TRAINING GOT EASIER AND THERE WAS MORE TIME TO RELAX.

5. (S//b1) CAMP LEADERSHIP. THE COMMANDER OF AL FAROUQ WAS ABDUL ((QADOOS)). DETAINEE'S PRINCIPLE TRAINER WAS SABAA ((LNU)) AL LAYL. OTHER CADRE AT AL FAROUQ INCLUDED ASEM ((LNU)), A YEMENI TRAINER; MUJAHID ((LNU)), A DARK SKINNED TRAINER FROM SOUTHERN YEMEN; HURAYRA ((LNU)), A YEMENI GROUP LEADER AND PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINER; SUHAIB ((LNU)), A SYRIAN WHO ORGANIZED FORMATIONS FOR MEALTIME. SUHAIB WAS KNOWN TO USE THE BULLHORN TO ADDRESS FORMATIONS.

6. (S//b1) EVACUATION. DETAINEE SPENT A MONTH AND FIVE DAYS AT AL FAROUQ UNTIL HE WAS EVACUATED ON OR AROUND 11 SEPTEMBER 2001. ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001, ALL TRAINEES IN THE CAMP WERE INFORMED ABOUT THE ATTACKS IN THE US AND THAT THE CAMP WOULD PROBABLY BE BOMBED. ON APPROXIMATELY 13 SEPTEMBER 2001, LARGE TRUCKS ARRIVED AT THE AL FAROUQ TO TRANSPORT TRAINEES TO THE AL NEBRAS GUESTHOUSE IN KANDAHAR, AF. TRAINEES WERE TOLD TO GO HOME. THERE WAS NO TEMPORARY EVACUATION OF AL FAROUQ BETWEEN THE 11 AND 13 SEPTEMBER 2001; ALL TRAINEES STAYED IN AL FAROUQ AFTER THEY WERE INFORMED THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AMERICAN ATTACK ON THE CAMP (DETAINEE COMMENT. WHERE WAS I SUPPOSED TO GO? I COULD NOT WALK OUT OF THE CAMP).

COMMENTS: 1. (S//REL (b)(1)) FIELD COMMENTS. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 11 SEPTEMBER 2001.

2. (S//REL (b)(2)) THE DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONTACT.

3. (S//REL (b)(2)) REQUEST EVALUATION OF THIS IIR TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION FROM THIS DETAINEE SO THAT WE CAN ASSESS HIM, AND TO OBTAIN FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS TO FOCUS FURTHER INTERROGATION EFFORTS.

4. (S//REL (b)(2))

(b)(2)

COLL: (U) (b)(2)
INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(2)

PREP: (U)(b)(2)
ENCL: (U)

(b)(2)

000839DP (S//NF)(b)(2) (S//REL)(b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//RELEASABLE~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

DeClassBy: (b)(2)

DeClassReason:

DeClassDate: X-1

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//REL~~ (b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT:

(S//NF) SUBJECT: ISN (b)(2) 000839DP, ((AL MUDWANI)) MUSAB OMAR ALI WAS BORN ON JANUARY 01, 1980 AND CLAIMS YEMEN CITIZENSHIP.

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: (b)(2) INTERROGATED ((AL MUDWANI)) MUSAB OMAR ALI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) WAS CONDUCTED IN ARABIC - MODERN STANDARD USING (b)(1) Sec 1.4 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

2. (S//NF) APPROACH USED: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

3. (S//NF) EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

4. (S//NF) COOPERATION/KNOWLEDGEABILITY/TRUTHFULNESS/EXPLOITED: (b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

5. (S//NF) RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 (b)(1) Sec

6. (S//NF) SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (ENSURE ANY INTELLIGENCE RESULTS IN AN IIR): (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

7. (S//NF) COLLECTORS COMMENTS: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

8. (U) POC FOR THIS MEMORANDUM (b)(2)

(b)(2) JTF GTMO.

SIR#11107

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

R 061345Z APR 06
FM JTF GTMO

(b)(2)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF YEMEN-BASED TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST GROUP MEMBERS

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2) //25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA~~ (b)(2)

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

PASS: (U) (b)(2), (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF); SAUDI ARABIA (SA); YEMEN (YM).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF YEMEN-BASED TERRORIST AND EXTREMIST GROUP MEMBERS (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO USA~~ (b)(2).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20011000.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

SOURCE: ~~(C//REL USA)~~ (b)(2) //ISN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

DMO Exhibit 33
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~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2)

SUMMARY: (C//REL USA, (b)(2) BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION (b)(1) Sec 1.4 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

TEXT: 1. (C//REL USA, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) UBL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C UBL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) UBL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(3): 10 USC §455 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) UBL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C OF (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5), (b)(6) GU

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C A YOUNGER BROTHER OF BIN ATTASH, MUAD ((BIN ATTASH)), WAS KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN CIRCA 2001.

2. (C//REL USA, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 WHO WORKED IN A GUESTHOUSE AT KARACHI//GEOCOORD:245200N/0670 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

3. (C//REL USA, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

3A. (C//REL USA, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) USAMA BIN LADEN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6) CAMP//GEOCOORD:342508N/673247E// (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

3B. (C//REL USA, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

FOREIGN FIGHTERS (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

3C. (C//REL-USA, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3D. (C//REL-USA, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) UBL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3E. (C//REL-USA, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(FIELD COMMENT - (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

4. (C//REL-USA, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

TORA BORA

//GEOCOORD:3336N/07015E//, AF (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

UBL (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

UBL (NFD), (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

UBL FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE

YEARS BEFORE 11 SEP 2001 AS (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

UBL).

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

UBL (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

FIELD COMMENT - (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

5. (C//REL-USA, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5), (b)(6)

(FIELD

COMMENT - (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5), (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA,~~

(b)(2)

FROM AL TAIE//GEOCOORD:211613N/0404257E//, SA.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5), (b)(6) (FIELD

COMMENT - (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

6. (C//REL USA, (b)(2), (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(FIELD COMMENT -

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

MECCA//GEOCOORD:212532N/0395016E//, SA. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

7. (C//REL USA, (b)(2), (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(FIELD COMMENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

8. (C//REL USA, (b)(2), (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA,~~

(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

9. ~~TC//REL USA~~, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 D, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

UBL.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

10. ~~TC//REL USA~~, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

ACCENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

11. ~~TC//REL USA~~, (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

SCARS ON HIS FACE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

ALYAFIAAI WORKED WITH MUAD ((AL-SANANI)), ANOTHER YEMENI FACILITATOR AND FINANCIER.

12. ~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA~~ (b)(2) MUAD AL-SANANI. AL-SANANI WAS A JIHADIST FACILITATOR AND FINANCIER. AL-SANANI WOULD ACQUIRE DOCUMENTS FOR JIHADISTS BY BRIBING YEMENI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. S OME TIMES AL-SANANI BRIBED THESE INDIVIDUALS TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESSING OF THESE DOCUMENTS AND OTHER TIMES HE WOULD BRIBE THESE OFFICIALS TO FABRICATE INFORMATION OR CREATE FAKE DOCUMENTS.

COMMENTS: 1. (U) FIELD COMMENTS (b)(2) (b)(5)

(b)(2), (b)(5)

2. (U) PLEASE REFER (b)(2) FOR ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON SAMIR ABDUL AL-MUAAEN ((AL-WAFI)).

3. (U) PLEASE REFER (b)(2) FOR ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON MUHAMMAD HUMEED ((AL-SAAD)).

4. (U) PLEASE REFER (b)(2) FOR ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON MUAD ((AL-SANANI)).

5. (U) PLEASE REFER (b)(2) FOR ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON FAHD MUHAMMAD ((AL-ZAHARANI)).

6. (U) THE DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONTACT.

7. (U) (b)(2), (b)(5)

(b)(2), (b)(5)

8. (U) (b)(2)

9. (U)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

REQUEST

EVALUATION TO CONFIRM OR REFUTE THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT TO ALLOW FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF THIS DETAINEE BY CJTF GTMO. FOLLOW-ON QUESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL FOCUSED INTERROGATION ARE HIGHLY ENCOURAGED.

10. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

11. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

13. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ENCL: (U)

(b)(2), (b)(6)

(U)

(b)(2), (b)(6)

(U)

2. (b)(2), (b)(6)

(U)

(b)(2), (b)(6)

(U)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY. CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD - NONE. (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL//RELEASABLE TO~~

~~USA~~ (b)(2)

DRV FROM: (b)(2)

DECL: 25X1-HUMAN

(b)(2)

)

~~CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT:

(S//NF) SUBJECT: ISN (b)(2) 000839DP, ((AL-MUDWANI)) MUSAB OMAR ALI, AKA ABU ANAS, IS A 23-YR-OLD WHO CLAIMS YEMEN CITIZENSHIP. DETAINEE WORKED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT FOR HIS FATHERS PHARMACY IN YEMEN. DETAINEE WAS RECRUITED IN JULY 2001 BY A SAUDI AND A YEMENI TO TRAIN FOR AND FIGHT THE JIHAD IN AFGHANISTAN.

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: (b)(2) [redacted] INTERROGATED ((AL MUDWANI)) MUSAB OMAR ALI

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2) [redacted] THE INTERROGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN ARABIC - MODERN STANDARD USING (b)(1) Sec 1.4 [redacted] TOPICS OF THIS INTERROGATION INCLUDED (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [redacted]

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [redacted]

2. (S//NF) APPROACH USED: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [redacted]

3. (S//NF) EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH: (b)(1) Sec [redacted]

4. (S//NF) COOPERATION/KNOWLEDGEABILITY/TRUTHFULNESS/EXPLOITED:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5) [redacted]

5. (S//NF) RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 [redacted]

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5) [redacted]

6. (S//NF) SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (ENSURE ANY INTELLIGENCE RESULTS IN AN IIR):

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [redacted]

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B 5

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

A. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [REDACTED] DURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FRONT LINES AROUND KABUL A CAR LOADED WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ARRIVED AT THE AZZAM GUESTHOUSE. MUDWANI HELPED HIMSELF TO A KALASHNIKOV AND THREE OR FOUR FULL MAGAZINES. MUDWANI CLAIMED HE WAS NOT DIRECTED TO GET A WEAPON BY ANYONE. MUDWANI CLAIMED THAT HE NEVER HAD ANY INTENTION OF FIGHTING IN KABUL AND THERE WERE PLANS TO DEFEND THE CITY (DETAINEE COMMENT. THERE WAS TOO MUCH SHELLING).

B. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [REDACTED] AFTER DEPARTING THE AZZAM GUESTHOUSE IN KABUL, MUDWANI AND THE GROUP HE WAS TRAVELING WITH DROVE SOUTH FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR TO A CITY IN THE LOGAR PROVINCE THAT WAS BEING USED AS AN ASSEMBLY AREA FOR FOREIGN FIGHTERS FLEEING KABUL. MUDWANI COULD NOT PROVIDE A SPECIFIC LOCATION FOR THE ASSEMBLY AREA IN LOGAR (DETAINEE COMMENT. THE CITY WE WERE IN WAS CALLED LOGAR) (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

[REDACTED] MUDWANI ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE ONE THOUSAND ARABS, AFGHANS, TAJIKS, UZBEKS, PAKISTANIS, AND MANY TALIBAN FIGHTERS ASSEMBLED AT A CITY IN LOGAR. MUDWANI STAYED IN A MOSQUE IN THE CITY FOR APPROXIMATELY TWELVE HOURS BEFORE CONTINUING SOUTH IN A LARGE CONVOY TOWARDS THE PAKTIA PROVINCE. MUDWANI DID NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE MOSQUE OR WHO OPERATED IT. MUDWANI COULD NOT IDENTIFY A SENIOR PERSON ASSOCIATED WITH THE MASS OF

PEOPLE FLEEING KABUL, OR WHO WAS DIRECTING THE FLOW OF PEOPLE. THE CONVOY THAT MUDWANI WAS WITH DEPARTED IN THE EVENING AND DROVE UNTIL THE FOLLOWING AFTERNOON. MUDWANI CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS GREAT FEAR AT BEING ATTACKED FROM THE AIR, VEHICLES DROVE WITH THEIR LIGHTS OUT OR WITH ONLY PARKING LIGHTS. THERE WAS NO COORDINATED SECURITY, DEFENSIVE PLAN, OR RALLY POINT SHOULD THE CONVOY BE ATTACKED

C. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec MUDWANI

STAYED IN AFTER FLEEING KABUL. MUDWANI DEPARTED THE VALLEY IN PAKTIA WITH THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS: OSAMA ((LNU)) AL-YEMENI, HAKEEM ((LNU)) AL YEMENI, ABU LALIM ((LNU)), ABU HAPS ((LNU)), ABU AYUB ((LNU)) AL-ANSARI, AND ABU JOMAH

((LNU)). IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT ABU AYUB WAS THE OLDEST PERSON AMONG THE

GROUP, HE WAS NOT THE LEADER. ABU AYUB BROUGHT HIS FAMILY TO AFGHANISTAN AFTER

THE 9/11 ATTACKS TO SUPPORT THE TALIBAN. ABU AYUB WAS NOT A TRAINED FIGHTER AND

DID NOT EVEN KNOW HOW TO CARRY A WEAPON. ABU AYUB'S FAMILY WAS NOT WITH HIM

BECAUSE ONLY MEN WERE TRAVELING WITH THE GROUP THAT MUDWANI WAS IN (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 MUDWANI DOES NOT KNOW WHERE OR HOW ABU AYUB'S FAMILY WAS

BEING CARED FOR IN AFGHANISTAN.

D. THE MOUNTAINS OF AL-ESTIKANDU. WHEN MUDWANI TRAVELED TO ZURMAT HE FIRST

ARRIVED AT A PLACE HE REFERRED TO AS THE AL-ESTIKANDU MOUNTAINS.

MUDWANI AND

HIS GROUP ARRIVED AFTER EVENING PRAYER. THE PLACE HE STAYED IN THE AL ESTIKANDU

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

MOUNTAINS CONSISTED OF MUD HUTS USED BY AFGHANI SHEPPARD'S. MUDWANI'S GROUP ALL STAYED IN THE SAME HUT. OTHER GROUPS OF ARABS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS WERE ALSO STAYING IN THE AREA AT OTHER HUTS. HUTS WERE NOT CO-LOCATED, HOWEVER, AND WERE APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES BY CAR FROM EACH OTHER. MUDWANI COULD NOT ESTIMATE HOW MANY FOREIGN FIGHTERS WERE OCCUPYING THIS POSITION IN THE AL-ESTIKANDU MOUNTAINS. MUDWANI'S GROUP CONSISTED OF THE SAME INDIVIDUALS HE WAS IN (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [REDACTED] TO GET TO THE POSITION HE STAYED IN THE AL-ESTIKANDU

MOUNTAINS, A VERY DIFFICULT, ROCKY ROAD HAD TO BE USED; THE DRIVE WAS VERY SLOW.

E. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C [REDACTED]

(b)(3):10 USC §455 [REDACTED] THERE WERE NO WOMEN OR CHILDREN AT THIS LOCATION.

THERE WERE OVERFLIGHTS OF THE FACILITY BY AIRCRAFT. WHEN THIS OCCURRED PEOPLE WOULD SEEK CONCEALMENT; LIGHT DISCIPLINE WAS ENFORCED AT NIGHT. MUDWANI NAMED MUNEEB ((LNU)) AL-JAZIRI AND BILAL ((LNU)) AL-PAKISTANI AS INDIVIDUALS WHO TRAVELED WITH MUDWANI'S GROUP FROM ZURMAT TO PAKISTAN. MUDWANI CLAIMED THAT AN ORGANIZATION CALLED ULAMA AL-ISLAM ASSISTED HE AND THE REST OF HIS GROUP TRAVEL FROM ZURMAT TO BARMAL, AF //GEOCOORDS: 324350N/691704E//. ACCORDING TO MUDWANI, ULAMA AL-ISLAM IS A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION BASED IN PAKISTAN THAT WAS HELPING FOREIGN FIGHTERS FLEE AFGHANISTAN. MUDWANI ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE JT WAS ALSO ASSISTING ARABS FLEE AFGHANISTAN. JT ASSISTED MUDWANI AND HIS GROUP DURING THEIR TRAVEL FROM BANNU, PK //GEOCOORDS:325913N/703625E// TO LAHORE, PK //GEOCOORD: 31.3259N/742037E//. MUDWANI ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE SEVEN INDIVIDUALS FROM JT ASSISTING THE PROCESS OF MOVING FOREIGN FIGHTERS OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. F. AL-AMANAT. MUDWANI DESCRIBED AL-AMANAT AS A SECURE LOCATION WHERE HIS

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PASSPORT, RETURN PLANE TICKETS, AND OTHER PERSONAL BELONGINGS WERE KEPT IN KANDAHAR. WHEN MUDWANI ARRIVED AT THE AL-NEBRAS GUESTHOUSE IN KANDAHAR ABU JIHAD ((LNU)) AL-SAUDI INFORMED MUDWANI AND OTHERS THAT THEIR BELONGINGS WOULD BE TAKEN TO THE AL-AMANAT. MUDWANI ASSUMED IT WAS IN A DIFFERENT LOCATION, BUT NEVER ACTUALLY WENT TO THE AL-AMANAT. G. BARMAL. MUDWANI NAMED JULAIBEEB ((LNU)), KHATTAB ((LNU)) AL-YEMENI, AND AS MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HE WAS TRAVELING WITH IN BARMAL. THE SENIOR PERSON ASSOCIATED WITH THE SCHOOL HE STAYED IN WHILE IN BARMAL WAS TARIQ OR TALLI. MUDWANI COULD NOT REMEMBER WHICH NAME WAS CORRECT (DETAINEE COMMENT. I NEVER MET HIM).

7. (S//NF) COLLECTORS COMMENTS: (b)(2)

8. (U) POC FOR THIS MEMORANDUM (b)(2)

(b)(2) JTF GTMO.

SIR#5551

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

R 051219Z NOV 02
FM CJTF 170 J2CMD

(b)(2)

PAGE 02 (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

PAGE 03 (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

PAGE 04 (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

PAGE 05 (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

PAGE 06 (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2) THREE ARAB GUESTHOUSES IN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN (U)

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

PAGE 07 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~
COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20011230.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

SOURCE: (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

PAGE 08 (b)(2) ~~SECRET~~
DETERMINED.

SUMMARY: (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

TEXT: (S)

1. (S) ABDUL ((HADI)) AL-IRAQI, A SENIOR AL-QAIDA MEMEBR, CONTROLLED
THREE ARAB GUESTHOUSES IN KABUL. THESE GUESTHOUSES WERE FINANCED BY
BOTH TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA SOURCES. HADI RECEIVED FUNDING FOR THE
HOUSES FROM AMIR ((AL-FATAH)), FINANCE CHIEF AT THE AL-QAIDA
HEADQUARTERS IN KANDAHAR. AL-FATAH ALSO PROVIDED FUNDING FOR MEDICAL
SUPPLIES FOR THE TROOPS TRANSITIONING THROUGH THE GUESTHOUSES TO

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FRONTLINE AREAS. HADI RECEIVED FUNDING FROM TALIBAN DEFENSE

SECRETARY MULLAH ((ABADULLAH)) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(FIELD COMMENT - (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

PAGE 09 (b)(2) SECRET

(b)(1) Sec ABU ((HAFS)) AL-MAURITANIA, AN AL-QAIDA OPERATIONAL PLANNER, WAS AT THE CENTER AT THAT TIME. THIS OCCURRED SOMETIME IN 1999).

2. (S) THE ASHARA GUESTHOUSE WAS LOCATED IN THE KARTA PAR WAN AREA OF

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C. ABDUL HADI PERSONALLY RAN THIS GUESTHOUSE. THIS HOUSE ACTED AS A TRANSITION POINT FOR ARABS GOING TO AND COMING FROM EITHER THE TRAINING CAMPS OR FRONTLINE AREAS. THE HOUSE COULD HOLD BETWEEN 20-50 PERSONNEL AT ANY ONE TIME. A GUARD WAS REQUIRED TO KEEP A LOG OF ALL VISITORS TO THE HOUSE. MOST OF THE ARABS REFUSED TO SIGN IT. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL WORKED AT THE HOUSE -

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)

PAGE 10 (b)(2) SECRET

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

COMMENTS: (S)

1. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. (S) SOURCE IS AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER CONTACT CONCERNING THE

CONTENTS OF THIS IIR.

3. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

4. (S) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

PAGE 11 (b)(2) SECRET

(b)(2)

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)
DISSEM: (U) FIELD -- NONE
WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~
DERIVED FROM: (b)(2)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

(b)(2)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PREC: R DTG: 181440ZAPR04

FROM: CJTF GTMO

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SUBJ: (b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF); ALGERIA (AG); GERMANY (GM); KUWAIT (KU); MOROCCO (MO); PAKISTAN (PK); SAUDI ARABIA (SA); TUNISIA (TS); UNITED KINGDOM (UK).

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2) (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20031000

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

SOURCE: TS (b)(2) / ISN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

SUMMARY: TS (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

TEXT: 1. (U) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. TS (b)(2) 'ADEL AL TUNESI' (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(FIELD

COMMENT: (U) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(FIELD COMMENT. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

3. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6) (FIELD COMMENT. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C ATTACK OF SEPTEMBER 11 (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C BIN ((LADEN)) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C BIN LADEN. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C BIN LADEN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C USSAMA BIN LADEN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (FIELD COMMENT. (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

4. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (FIELD COMMENT. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (FIELD COMMENT. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

5. (S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

IMPORTANT THAT THEY PARTICIPATE IN DELIVERING INFORMATION. (FIELD COMMENT) (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

6. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6) (FIELD COMMENT) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C MULLAH OMAR (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

AHMED SHAH MESSAOUD (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

AHMED SHAH MESSAOUD (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

7. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6) (FIELD COMMENT)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

8. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6) (FIELD COMMENT. DETAINEE

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

ABU HAES AL MLIRITANI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

9. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6)~~ (FIELD COMMENT. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~)

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6)~~ ~~(b)(1)~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~ ~~BIN LADEN.~~ ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~ ~~BIN LADEN'S~~ ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6)~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)~~ (FIELD COMMENT. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)~~)

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~ ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C~~

10. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4~~ (FIELD COMMENT. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)~~)

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6)~~ ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6)~~

11. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4~~ (FIELD COMMENT. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)~~)

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5).(b)(6)~~ ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C~~

12. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4~~ (FIELD COMMENT. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)~~)

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5).(b)(6)~~

13. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4~~ (FIELD COMMENT. ~~(b)(1)~~)

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(5)~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2).(b)(6)~~ ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.~~

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)~~

14. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(2)~~ (FIELD COMMENT. ~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(5)~~)

~~(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C.(b)(6)~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(6)

15. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 (FIELD COMMENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(2)

16. (b)(2) (b)(6)

(FIELD COMMENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

17. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(FIELD COMMENT

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

18. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6) (FIELD COMMENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(2),(b)(6)

19. (b)(2) DAVID ((HICKS)) (FIELD COMMENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

20. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 (FIELD COMMENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

DETAINEE FROM A PHOTO AS ISN (b)(2) 000839DP, MUSAB OMAR ALI ((AL MADOONEE)). HE TOOK PART IN THE EXPLOSIVE TRAINING LED BY ADEL AL TUNESI, ACCORDING TO ADEL HIMSELF, ABU MUSAB, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, IS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE EXPLOSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM OF AL QAIDA.

21. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

22. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(FIELD COMMENT (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C,(b)(6)

23. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

USSAMA BIN LADEN.

COMMENTS: 1. (S//~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C. ~~(b)(2)~~)

~~(b)(1)~~

2. (S//~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C. ~~(b)(2)~~)

3. (S//~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C. ~~(b)(2)~~)

~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C

4. (S//~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C. ~~(b)(2)~~)

~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C

5. (S//~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C. ~~(b)(2)~~)

~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C, ~~(b)(5)~~

6. (S//~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C. ~~(b)(2)~~)

~~(b)(1)~~ Sec 1.4 C, ~~(b)(2)~~

COLL: (U//~~(b)(2)~~)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U//~~(b)(2)~~)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU ~~(b)(2)~~

DISSEM: (U//~~(b)(2)~~)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

DeClassBy: ~~(b)(2)~~

DeClassReason:

DeClassDate: X-1

~~(b)(2)~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

R 041739Z SEP 08

FM JTF GTMO

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//RELEASABLE TO USA, (b)(2)~~

(b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(U)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, (b)(2) //X1~~

~~SECRET//RELEASABLE TO USA, (b)(2)~~

SERIAL: (U)(b)(2)

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

DMO Exhibit 31
Page 1 of 7

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

PASS: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2), (b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(5), (b)(6)

COUNTRY: (U) (b)(2)

IPSP: (U) (b)(2)

SUBJ: (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//RELEASABLE TO USA~~, (b)(2)

(b)(2)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20010700.

REQS: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

SOURCE: (C//REL TO USA, (b)(2) /TSN (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

SUMMARY: (C//REL TO USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

-----TEAR LINE-----

TEXT: 1. (C//REL TO USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(U) GEOCOORD: 144659N/0440159E//, YEMEN (YM) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. (C//REL TO USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

3. (C//REL TO USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

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~~SECRET//REL TO USA~~, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

~~4. TC//REL TO USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)~~
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

~~A. TC//REL TO USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)~~
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

~~B. (C//REL TO USA (b)(2)~~
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

~~5. TC//REL TO USA (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)~~
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

6. ~~TC//REL TO USA~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

A. ~~TC//REL TO USA~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

C. ~~TC//REL TO USA~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

D. ~~TC//REL TO USA~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

7. ~~(C//REL TO USA)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

[Redacted content]

-----TEAR LINE-----

COMMENTS: ~~(S//REL TO USA)~~, (b)(2)

1. (U)

(b)(2)

AND IS AVAILABLE

FOR FURTHER CONTACT (b)(2)

(b)(2)

2. ~~(S//REL TO USA)~~, (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

3. ~~(C//REL TO USA)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

4. ~~(C//REL TO USA)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(6)

5. ~~(S//REL TO USA)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

6. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

7. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

8. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

9. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

10. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

11. (U) RELEASABLE (REL) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) U.S. NO.

PREP: (U) (b)(2)

ENCL: (U) (b)(2)

1. (b)(2)

(b)(2) (S//REL TO USA, (b)(2)

(b)(2) (S//REL TO USA, (b)(2)

2. (b)(2)

(b)(2) (S//REL TO USA, (b)(1), Sec 1.4.C (b)(2)

(b)(1) (S//REL TO USA, (b)(2)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, (b)(2)~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA,~~ (b)(2)

ACQ: (U) GUANTANAMO BAY, CU (b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) FIELD -- NONE. (b)(2)

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET//RELEASABLE TO USA,~~ (b)(2)

(b)(2)

DRV FROM: (b)(2)

DECL: 25X1-HUMAN

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//REL TO USA,~~ (b)(2)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT:

~~(S//NF)~~ SUBJECT: ISN (b)(2) 000839DP, ((AL MUDWANI)) MUSAB OMAR ALI WAS BORN ON JANUARY 01, 1980 AND CLAIMS YEMEN CITIZENSHIP.

REASON(S) FOR VISIT:

(b)(2)

REQUIREMENTS ADDRESSED:

(b)(2)

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ SUMMARY:

(b)(2) INTERROGATED ((AL MUDWANI)) MUSAB OMAR ALI (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) CONDUCTED IN ARABIC - MODERN STANDARD

(b)(4) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

ISN-839 (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ APPROACH USED: (b)(1) Sec 1.4

A. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

B.

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH: (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ COOPERATION/KNOWLEDGEABILITY/TRUTHFULNESS/EXPLOITED: (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

5. ~~(S//NF)~~ RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ SUMMARY OF INFORMATION (ENSURE ANY INTELLIGENCE RESULTS IN AN IR):

A. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

B. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

MENTIONED A RUMOR DETAINEE HEARD WHICH WAS SUPPOSEDLY INITIATED BY A GUARD. DETAINEE STATED THAT THREE TO FIVE DAYS AGO DETAINEE HEARD SOME DETAINEE WILL BE MOVED FROM (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) WILL BE USED FOR THE -- TROUBLE MAKERS -- (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

C. DETAINEE STATED HE HEARD THROUGH LAWYERS OR OTHER SOURCES THAT THE (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4

WILL BE ARRIVING IN TWO WEEKS. (b)(1) Sec 1.4

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 D

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

D. DETAINEE STATED HE HEARD YEMEN NOW HAS THE ATOMIC BOMB.

E. [REDACTED] TALKED WITH DETAINEE ABOUT THE RECENT VOLCANIC ERUPTION IN YEMEN. DETAINEE STATED THAT NONE OF THE YEMENIS IN CAMP KNEW THE LOCATION OF THE ISLAND. [REDACTED] SPECULATED ON THE LOCATION OF THE ISLAND.

F. [REDACTED] DETAINEE TALKED ABOUT THE RECENT STORM. DETAINEE STATED HE HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED INTENSE WINDS. DETAINEE STATED HE WAS AFRAID DURING THE STORM BECAUSE OF THE WIND GUSTS.

G. DETAINEE SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT HIS FATHER. DETAINEE STATED HIS FATHER IS APPROXIMATELY 65 YEARS OLD AND CAN NO LONGER DRIVE DUE TO DETERIORATING EYES; OTHERWISE, DETAINEE'S FATHER IS PERFECTLY HEALTHY. DETAINEE COMMENTED ON HIS FATHER'S DIET AS A FACTOR FOR KEEPING HIS FATHER STRONG. DETAINEE STATED HIS FATHER EATS FRESH FOODS WITHOUT PRESERVATIVES. DETAINEE ALSO STATED HIS FATHER DRINKS FOUR TO FIVE GLASSES OF CAMEL OR COW MILK FOR DINNER.

H. [REDACTED] Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

[REDACTED] Sec 1.4 C, (b)(5)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sec 1.4 C DETAINEE RESPONDED WITH A LENGTHY ANSWER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

[REDACTED] Sec 1.4 C, (b)(2), (b)(5)

[REDACTED] Sec 1.4 C, (b)(6)

I. DETAINEE STATED HE WAS A NORMAL YOUNG MAN, ABOUT 18 OR 19 YEARS OLD, WHO DID NOT HAVE A BROAD MIND. DETAINEE HAD HEARD THE TALIBAN HAD OPENED THE DOOR TO ANY FOREIGNER. DETAINEE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE FOR ARABS BEING THERE [AFGHANISTAN]. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT AL QAIDA PROBLEMS. DETAINEE WAS VERY YOUNG AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO BEING FOOLED. DURING THAT TIME DETAINEE'S FAMILY WAS EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS; DETAINEE'S FATHER WAS BANKRUPT. DETAINEE WAS AT THE CAFE AND HEARD THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS LIKE AN OPEN COUNTRY. DETAINEE HEARD THEY COULD ASSIST HIM IN OPENING A HOME AND GETTING MARRIED. DETAINEE HEARD THAT IT IS AN ISLAMIC NATION LIKE THE DAYS OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMED. IN THE CAFE THEY SAID WHOEVER WANTS TO GET OUT, WE WILL HELP HIM. DETAINEE WAS TOLD IT IS A NEW COUNTRY THAT NEED DOCTORS, ENGINEERS, ETC. DETAINEE STATED THEY DID NOT MENTION AL QAIDA OR PROBLEMS WITH AMERICANS. DETAINEE STATED HE WAS CURIOUS AND WANTED TO ESCAPE PROBLEMS AND HOME. DETAINEE WAS FIRST HESITANT [TO LEAVE]; IT WAS SUMMER VACATION BUT SINCE THEY OFFERED TO PAY, DETAINEE DECIDED TO GO AND THEN COME BACK [TO YEMEN]. DETAINEE STATED THERE WAS NO FIGHTING, LIKE ANY COUNTRY.

J. DETAINEE STATED HE WAS SHOCKED WHEN HE GOT TO AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE STATED THEY TOOK HIS PASSPORT AND TRAVEL TICKET. DETAINEE DID NOT HAVE ANY SAY IN THIS MATTER. DETAINEE COULD NOT DO ANYTHING BUT TO FOLLOW THEM. DETAINEE STATED IT WAS A TOTALLY DIFFERENT PICTURE; PEOPLE HAD WEAPONS; DETAINEE COULD LOSE HIS LIFE IF HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO GO. DETAINEE STATED HE WANTED TO SEE THIS MUSLIM NATION. AFTER THEY TOOK EVERYTHING FROM HIM, THEY PUT HIM IN A REST HOUSE. DETAINEE STATED IF HE REFUSED THEY WOULD ACCUSE HIM OF BEING A SPY. DETAINEE STATED PEOPLE WERE BEAT AND TORTURED IF SUSPECTED.

K. DETAINEE STATED HIS VISA WAS FOR ONE MONTH; THE CAMP [AL FAROUQ] WAS TWO MONTHS LONG. DETAINEE COMMENTED THEY SAID THE MINIMUM IS ONE MONTH [REFERRING TO AL FAROUQ]. DETAINEE STATED THAT AFTER ONE WEEK A BUS TOOK HIM TO THE CAMP. DETAINEE STATED HE WAS FORCED TO GO. DETAINEE THOUGHT HE WOULD GO FOR ONE MONTH, THEN LEAVE. DETAINEE SAID 20 DAYS LATER 9/11 HAPPENED AND EVERYTHING GOT MIXED UP. DETAINEE REMARKED WHEN HE WENT TO PAKISTAN BEFORE 9/11 EVERYTHING WAS DIFFERENT. DETAINEE HAD LOST HIS TICKET AND HIS VISA HAD EXPIRED. DETAINEE COULD NOT GO TO THE YEMENI EMBASSY BECAUSE HE WOULD BE ARRESTED. DETAINEE

STATED THAT NO MATTER WHAT HE DID, IF CAPTURED DETAINEE WAS GOING TO CUBA [GTMO].

L. DETAINEE STATED HE IS NOW HARVESTING THE FRUITS OF WHAT HE DID. DETAINEE STATED HE WAS TRICKED INTO THIS. DETAINEE STATED HIS CASE IS NOW MORE THAN HE CAN HANDLE. DETAINEE STATED THAT AFTER RELEASE HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TRAVEL BECAUSE HE WILL BE UNDER WATCH. DETAINEE COMMENTED THAT HIS LIFE IS NOW MORE THAN WHAT HE IS. DETAINEE STATED HE FELL INTO A HOLE. DETAINEE ALSO STATED HE DOES NOT KNOW HOW THINGS WILL END UP.

M. DETAINEE STATED HE IS NOT FROM AL QAIDA NOR IS HE A JIHADIST. DETAINEE STATED HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO. DETAINEE QUESTIONED HOW ONE WOULD FEEL IF ALL HIS LIFE IS WATCHED. DETAINEE ANSWERED BY SAYING NO ONE WOULD LIKE THIS. DETAINEE STATED IF HE HAD BAD IDEAS OR IF HE WAS A FANATIC, DETAINEE WOULD NOT BE SITTING AND LAUGHING WITH [REDACTED] DETAINEE STATED THAT AFTER 9/11 AMERICANS SHOULD HAVE MADE AN ADVERTISEMENT TO THOSE IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE STATED AMERICA SHOULD HAVE SAID IF YOU WANT TO FIGHT, STAY IN AFGHANISTAN; IF YOU WANT TO LEAVE THEN LEAVE. DETAINEE SAID AMERICA SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THOSE WHO WANTED TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN THREE MONTHS TO GET ALL PAPERWORK IN ORDER TO RETURN HOME. DETAINEE STATED AL QAIDA AND THE TALIBAN MIXED UP EVERYONE. DETAINEE STATED A LOT OF PEOPLE HATED AL QAIDA OR THE TALIBAN.

N. (b)(2) BRIEFLY REMARKED THAT OSAMA BIN LADEN DID NOT STAY TO FIGHT. DETAINEE SPECULATED THAT MAYBE BIN LADEN WAS NOT PRESENT IN THE AREA WHERE FIGHTING OCCURRED.

O. DETAINEE STATED WHEN HE WAS CAPTURED IN PAKISTAN, DETAINEE FELT INNOCENT. DETAINEE STATED HE SPOKE TRUTHFULLY AND THAT AMERICANS NEVER HIT DETAINEE. DETAINEE STATED HE TOLD THE WHOLE STORY. DETAINEE COMMENTED THAT HE COULD HAVE LIED ABOUT BEING IN AFGHANISTAN. DETAINEE CLAIMED NO ONE COULD IDENTIFY DETAINEE AS PARTICIPATING AT CAMP [AL FAROUQ]. DETAINEE STATED HIS HONESTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPRECIATED. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(5) DETAINEE STATED HE THOUGHT HE WAS DOING NOTHING WRONG, SO DETAINEE TALKED TRUTHFULLY. DETAINEE STATED THE TRUTH DID NOT BENEFIT DETAINEE. DETAINEE THEN STATED THE 14 FROM AL QAIDA HERE ARE PROOF OF DETAINEE'S INNOCENCE. DETAINEE STATED HE WANTS A JUST MAN TO GO TO THE 14 AND ASK WHAT DOES THIS PERSON [DETAINEE] HAVE TO DO WITH YOU. DETAINEE STATED THE MOST ANY OF THE 14 COULD SAY WAS THAT DETAINEE WAS JUST A POOR YEMENI WHO WANTS TO GO HOME (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 (SM)

P. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

7. (S//NF) COLLECTORS COMMENTS: A. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec

B. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2)

8. (S//NF) ANALYSTS COMMENTS: (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(2) (b)(5)

(b)(1)

9. (S//NF) TEAM CHIEFS COMMENTS: (b)(1) Sec

10. (U) POC FOR THIS MEMORANDUM (b)(2)

SIR#19442

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATOIN, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 96386

20 October 2008

JTF-GTMO-SJA

MEMORANDUM FOR Office for Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants

SUBJECT: Annual Review Board (ARB) Exhibit Redaction Certification

1. The JTF-GTMO Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) received three documents from the Office for Administrative Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants (OARDEC). These documents have been used as exhibits for the ARB for Detainee ISN 839.

2. The SJA hereby certifies that the documents listed below were redacted by JTF-GTMO personnel. Redaction of any information other than what is described in paragraph 3 below was not done by JTF-GTMO personnel. The following documents relative to the referenced Detainee have been reviewed and redacted by JTF-GTMO and provided to OARDEC:

- a. JTF-GTMO (b)(2)
- b. JTF-GTMO
- c. JTF-GTMO

3. Unauthorized or inappropriate dissemination or disclosure of the redacted information or date could damage the national security of the United States. JTF-GTMO certifies that only names and codenames of U.S. personnel and sensitive sources were redacted by JTF-GTMO personnel. The substance of these documents remains the same.

4. If you have any further questions or comments, please contact the undersigned at DSN 660-9911.

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC
§130b,(b)(6)

UNCLASSIFIED