Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report

Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Detention and interrogation operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) cover a three-year period and over 24,000 interrogations. This AR 15-6 investigation found only three interrogation acts in violation of interrogation techniques authorized by Army Field Manual 34-52 and DoD guidance. The AR 15-6 also found that the Commander of JTF-GTMO failed to monitor the interrogation of one high value detainee in late 2002. The AR 15-6 found that the interrogation of this same high value detainee resulted in degrading and abusive treatment but did not rise to the level of being inhumane treatment. Finally, the AR 15-6 found that the communication of a threat to another high value detainee was in violation of SECDEF guidance and the UCMJ. The AR 15-6 found no evidence of torture or inhumane treatment at JTF-GTMO.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an internal investigation to determine if any of its personnel had observed mistreatment or aggressive behavior towards detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). On 9 Jul 04, the FBI – Inspection Division (INSD), sent an e-mail message to all FBI personnel who had served in any capacity at GTMO. The e-mail stated in relevant part:

"You have been identified as having conducted an assignment at GTMO, Cuba since 9/11/2001. The Inspection Division has been tasked with contacting those employees who have served in any capacity at GTMO and obtain information regarding the treatment of detainees. Employees should immediately respond to the following:

1) Employees who observed aggressive treatment, which was not consistent with Bureau interview policy guidelines, should respond via e-mail for purposes of a follow-up interview.

2) Employees who worked at GTMO and observed no aggressive treatment of detainees should respond via an EC documenting a negative response…"

The above e-mail message was sent by INSD to 493 FBI personnel who had served in GTMO between 9 Sep 01 and 9 Jul 04. INSD received 434 total

responses, and 26 agents stated that they had observed aggressive treatment of detainees at GTMO.

In response to FBI agent allegations of aggressive interrogation techniques at Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) Cuba, that were disclosed in Dec 04 as a result of FOIA releases, General (GEN) Bantz J. Craddock, Commander United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), ordered an AR 15-6 investigation and appointed Brigadier General (BG) John T. Furlow, United States Army South Deputy Commander for Support, as the investigating officer. BG Furlow was directed to address the following allegations:

a. That military interrogators improperly used military working dogs during interrogation sessions to threaten detainees, or for some other purpose;

b. That military interrogators improperly used duct tape to cover a detainee's mouth and head;

c. That DoD interrogators improperly impersonated FBI agents and Department of State officers during the interrogation of detainees;

d. That, on several occasions, DoD interrogators improperly played loud music and yelled loudly at detainees;

e. That military personnel improperly interfered with FBI interrogators in the performance of their FBI duties;

f. That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation against detainees;

g. That military interrogators improperly chained detainees and placed them in a fetal position on the floor, and denied them food and water for long periods of time;

h. That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold during their interrogation of detainees.

Subsequent to the initial appointment, GEN Craddock directed BG Furlow to investigate two additional allegations concerning a female military interrogator performing a "lap dance" on a detainee and the use of faux "menstrual blood" during an interrogation. Finally, the appointment letter directed BG Furlow to not limit himself to the listed allegations.

On 28 Feb 05, after two months of investigation, BG Furlow advised GEN Craddock that he needed to interview officers senior in grade to himself. On 28 Feb 05 GEN Craddock appointed Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Randall M. Schmidt, United States Southern Command Air Forces Commander, Davis-

Monthan AFB, AZ, as the senior investigating officer. This report reflects the combined findings and conclusions of the initial investigative efforts and the combined investigative efforts of both BG Furlow and Lt Gen Schmidt.

After submission of the AR15-6 Report of Investigation on 1 Apr 05, CDR USSOUTHCOM directed on 5 May 2005 that the investigation be reopened to consider memos dated 11 Dec 04 and 24 Dec 04, that had recently been discovered, regarding the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan. Prior to completion of the follow-up, CDR USSOUTHCOM directed on 2 Jun 05 that the investigation should also address new allegations made by the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

This investigation was directed and accomplished under the "informal procedures" provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, dated 30 Sep 96, (AR 15-6). This AR 15-6 investigation centered on alleged abuses occurring during interrogation operations. This AR 15-6 found incidents of abuse during detention operations; all of which were appropriately addressed by the command. The investigation team conducted a comprehensive review of thousands of documents and statements pertaining to any allegations of abuse occurring at GTMO, to include the complete medical records of the subjects of the first and second Special Interrogation Plan. The team interviewed 30 FBI agents, conducted interviews of over 100 personnel from 6 Jan 05 to 24 Mar 05 and had access to hundreds of interviews conducted by several recent investigations. These interviews included personnel assigned to GTMO, USSOUTHCOM, and OSD during the tenure of JTFs 160, 170, and GTMO. It included nine DIA personnel, including every Joint Intelligence Group Chief and every Intelligence Control Element Chief. It included 76 DoD personnel, to include every General Officer who commanded Joint Task Force 160, Joint Task Force 170 and Joint Task Force GTMO. DoD personnel interviewed also included personnel who served as interrogators at GTMO and instructors at the US Army Intelligence School and Center. During the course of the investigation, the team visited Birmingham, AL; Chicago, IL; Ft Bragg, NC; Ft Devens, MA; Ft Huachuca, AZ; GTMO (twice); Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; and Washington D.C. (five times).

The investigation team attempted to determine if the allegations alleged by the FBI, in fact, occurred. During the course of the follow up investigation the AR15-6 also considered allegations raised specifically by detainees the subject of the first and second Special Interrogation Plans. The investigating team applied a preponderance standard of proof consistent with the guidance contained in AR15-6. The team also applied guidance contained in FM 34-52, CDR USSOUTHCOM, and SECDEF memorandums authorizing special interrogation techniques in deciding if a particular interrogation approach fell properly within an authorized technique. In those cases in which the team concluded that the

allegation had in fact occurred, the team then considered whether the incident was in compliance with interrogation techniques that were approved either at the time of the incident or subsequent to the incident. In those cases where it was determined the allegation occurred and to have not been an authorized technique, the team then reviewed whether disciplinary action had already been taken and the propriety of that action. On 28 Mar 05, GEN Craddock, as the investigation appointing authority, asked Lt Gen Schmidt to determine accountability for those substantiated violations that had no command action taken.

The team did not review the legal validity of the various interrogation techniques outlined in Army Field Manual 34-52, or those approved by the Secretary of Defense.

BACKGROUND

On 7 Mar 05 Vice Admiral A.T. Church, III submitted his final report of detention operations and detainee interrogation techniques in the Global War on Terror to the Secretary of Defense. (hereinafter "Church Report") That report included a thorough background discussion of detainee operations at GTMO. Our investigation independently researched the genesis and adjustments to policy and interrogation techniques from the origination of GTMO to the present. Our independently derived findings regarding the development and adjustments to policy and interrogation techniques are identical to the Church report. Therefore, I have adopted relevant portions of the Church report to show the development of permissible interrogation techniques.

Interrogation operations at GTMO began in January 2002. Initially interrogators relied upon the interrogation techniques contained in FM 34-52. These techniques were ineffective against detainees who had received interrogation resistance training. On 11 Oct 2002, Major General Michael E. Dunlavey, the Commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) 170, the intelligence task force at GTMO, requested that the CDR USSOUTHCOM, GEN James T. Hill, approve 19 counter resistance techniques that were not specifically listed in FM 34-52. The techniques were broken down into Categories I, II, and III, with the third category containing the most aggressive techniques. On 25 Oct 02 CDR USSOUTHCOM forwarded the request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers. On 2 Dec 02, the Secretary of Defense approved the use of all Category I and II techniques, but only one of the Category III techniques (which authorized mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with a finger, and light pushing). In the approval memorandum, the SECDEF approved the techniques for use by CDR USSOUTHCOM, who subsequently verbally delegated the authority to approve and apply these techniques to CDR JTF-GTMO.

On 15 Jan 03, SECDEF rescinded his approval of all Category II techniques and the one Category III technique leaving only Category I techniques in effect. The SECDEF memo permitted use of Category II and III techniques only with SECDEF approval. No approval was requested or granted.

On 16 Apr 03, the Secretary of Defense issued a new policy accepting 24 techniques, most of which were taken directly from or closely resembled those in FM 34-52. The Secretary's guidance remains in effect today. This policy memorandum placed several requirements on CDR USSOUTHCOM. First, it required all detainees to continue to be treated humanely. Second, it required SECDEF notification prior to the implementation of any of the following aggressive Interrogation techniques: Incentive/Removal of Incentive; Pride and Ego Down; Mutt and Jeff; and Isolation. Third, it specifically limited the use of these aggressive techniques to circumstances required by "military necessity." The memorandum did not attempt to define the parameters of "humane treatment" or "military necessity."

The CDR USSOUTHCOM issued a memorandum on 2 Jun 03 providing further guidance on the implementation of the 16 Apr 03 SECDEF approved techniques. This guidance provided that prior to the use of any of the specified aggressive techniques, the JTF Commander would submit the request in writing to CDR USSOUTHCOM for submission to SECDEF. The guidance also stated that "specific implementation guidance with respect to techniques A-Q is provided in Army Field Manual 34-52. Further implementation guidance with respect to techniques R-X will need to be developed by the appropriate authority." GTMO standard operating procedure on interrogations provides guidance for interrogations.

In addition, the CDR USSOUTHCOM guidance provided the following clarification to the SECDEF's 16 Apr 03 memorandum: **(quoting)**

(a) Reference Technique B, the Working Group was most concerned about removal of the Koran from a detainee—something we no longer do. Because providing incentives (e.g., McDonald's Fish Sandwiches or cigarettes) is an integral part of interrogations, you will notify me in writing when the provided incentive would exceed that contemplated by interrogation doctrine contained in Army FM 34-52, or when the interrogators intend to remove an incentive from a detainee;

(b) Reference Techniques I and O, you will notify me in writing when use of these standard interrogation techniques goes beyond the doctrinal application described in Army FM 34-52. When use of the technique is consistent with FM 34-52, you do not need to notify me;

(c) I define "sleep deprivation", referenced in Technique V, as keeping a detainee awake for more that 16 hrs, or allowing a detainee to rest

briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession;

(d) Reference Technique X, I do not consider the use of maximum-security units as isolation. A detainee placed in a maximum-security unit is segregated, but not truly isolated;

(e) I define the "least intrusive method" as the technique that has the least impact on a detainee's standard of treatment, while evoking the desired response from the detainee during interrogations;

(f) Except in the case of Techniques B, I, O, and X, I have determined that the first 0-6/GG-15 in the chain of command or supervision, is the "appropriate specified senior approval authority," unless approval authority is withheld from that individual by higher authority.

Lastly, I have told the Secretary of Defense his 16 April guidance applies to all interagency elements assigned or attached to JTF GTMO. **(end quote)**

There have been over 24,000 interrogation sessions at GTMO since the beginning of interrogation operations.

FINDINGS

GENERAL DETAINEE POPULATION

Allegation: That DoD interrogators improperly impersonated FBI agents or Department of State officers during the interrogation of detainees.

Finding #1: On several occasions in 2003 various DoD interrogators impersonated agents of the FBI and the Department of State.

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 (p. 3-13); Category I technique approved by SECDEF – Deceiving interrogator identity

Discussion: The Chief of the Special Interrogation Team directed two interrogators to pose as US State Department representatives during an interrogation. In addition another interrogator posed as an FBI agent on one occasion. This impersonation came to the attention of the Senior Supervisory Agent (SSA) of the FBI at Guantanamo Bay when several other agents advised him that detainees were complaining during interviews that the FBI had already asked them the same questions. The SSA approached the Joint Interrogation Group (JIG) Chief, with his agents' concerns. According to the SSA, the JIG Chief did not contest the FBI agents' accusations. In fact, the JIG Chief knew of at least one military interrogator who had impersonated an FBI agent. After the

meeting, the JIG Chief agreed to stop the practice of DoD interrogators impersonating FBI agents without prior FBI approval. The SSA made it clear to the investigation team that he did not believe the impersonation interfered with FBI operations and was pleased with the JIG Chief's rapid and thorough response to the situation.

Organizational response: Immediately stopped the practice.

Recommendation #1: The allegation should be closed. The technique, while authorized, was undermining the inter-agency working relationship. No additional corrective action is necessary or appropriate.

Allegation: That a female military interrogator performed a "lap dance" on a detainee during an interrogation. I have expanded this allegation to "That female military interrogators performed acts designed to take advantage of their gender in relation to Muslim males."

Finding #2a: On one occasion between October 2002 and January 2003, a female interrogator put perfume on a detainee by touching the detainee on his arm with her hand;

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 (p. 3-11); Category III technique approved by SECDEF – Mild, non-injurious physical touching

Discussion: a. On at least one occasion in late 2002, a female interrogator rubbed perfume on a detainee. The Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief stated that he specifically directed the interrogator to go to the PX and purchase rose oil with the intent of rubbing a portion of the perfume on the detainee's arm to distract the detainee. The interrogator admitted to using this approach with a detainee. At the time of the event the detainee responded by attempting to bite the interrogator and lost his balance, fell out of his chair, and chipped his tooth. He received immediate and appropriate medical attention and did not suffer permanent injury.

Organizational response: a. The interrogator was not disciplined for rubbing perfume on a detainee since this was an authorized technique.

Finding #2b: During the month of March 2003, a female interrogator approached a detainee from behind, rubbed against his back, leaned over the detainee touching him on his knee and shoulder and whispered in his ear that his situation was futile, and ran her fingers through his hair.

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – Act used to highlight futility of the detainee's situation.

Discussion: b. On 17 Apr 03, An interrogation supervisor supervised a female interrogator as she interrogated a detainee with her BDU top off[1], and subsequently the interrogator ran her fingers through the detainee's hair. The interrogator also approached the detainee from behind, touched him on his knee and shoulder, leaned over him, and placed her face near the side of his in an effort to create stress and break his concentration during interrogation.

Organizational response: b. The interrogation supervisor was given a written letter of admonishment for failure to document the techniques to be implemented by the interrogator prior to the interrogation. There is no evidence that either activity ever occurred again.

Recommendation #2: Command action was effective and sufficient with respect to the individual interrogators. AR 15-6 recommends that the approval authority for the use of gender coercion as futility technique be withheld to the JTF GTMO-CG.

Allegation: That a female military interrogator wiped "menstrual blood" on a detainee during an interrogation.

Finding #3: In March 2003, a female interrogator told a detainee that red ink on her hand was menstrual blood and then wiped her hand on the detainee's arm.

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – act used to highlight futility of the detainee's situation

Discussion: The female interrogator is no longer in military service and has declined to be interviewed. According to a former ICE Deputy the incident occurred when a detainee spat in the interrogator's face. According to the former ICE Deputy, the interrogator left the interrogation room and was crying outside the booth. She developed a plan to psychologically get back at him. She touched the detainee on his shoulder, showed him the red ink on her hand and said; by the way, I am menstruating. The detainee threw himself on the floor and started banging his head. This technique was not in an approved interrogation plan.

Organizational response: The ICE Deputy verbally reprimanded the interrogator for this incident. No formal disciplinary action was taken. There is no evidence that this happened again.

Recommendation #3: Command action was inadequate with respect to the individual interrogator. The interrogator should have been formally admonished or reprimanded for using a technique that was not approved in advance. Advance approval ensures that retaliatory techniques are not

[1] It was common practice at GTMO to conduct interrogations in a t-shirt with the BDU top removed because of the heat and humidity.

employed on impulse. Considering the lapse in time, recommend this allegation be closed.

Allegation: That DoD interrogators improperly played loud music and yelled loudly at detainees.

Finding #4: On numerous occasions between July 2002 and October 2004, detainees were yelled at or subjected to loud music during interrogation.

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Incentive and Futility – acts used as reward for cooperating or to create futility if not cooperating.

Discussion: Almost every interviewee stated that yelling and the use of loud music were used for interrogations at GTMO. On a few occasions, detainees were left alone in the interrogation booth for an indefinite period of time while loud music played and strobe lights flashed. The vast majority of yelling and music was accomplished with interrogators in the room. The volume of the music was never loud enough to cause any physical injury. Interrogators stated that cultural music would be played as an incentive. Futility technique included the playing of Metallica, Britney Spears, and Rap music.

Organizational response: None.

Recommendation #4: The allegation should be closed. Recommend JTF-GTMO develop specific guidance on the length of time that a detainee may be subjected to futility music. Placement of a detainee in the interrogation booth and subjecting him to loud music and strobe lights should be limited and conducted within clearly prescribed limits.

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold during their interrogation of detainees.

Finding #5: On several occasions during 2002 and 2003, interrogators would adjust the air conditioner to make the detainee uncomfortable.

Technique: Unauthorized prior to 16 Apr 03: SECDEF did not approve exposure to cold in his 2 Dec 02 list of approved techniques

Technique: Authorized after 16 Apr 03: SECDEF approved technique. This technique was officially permitted under 16 Apr 03 SECDEF Memorandum – Environmental Manipulation

Discussion: Two FBI agents indicated that they were aware of DoD interrogators using temperature adjustment as an interrogation technique. Many interviewees, FBI agents and military interrogators, believed the hot climate at GTMO and the detainee's comfort in a hot climate caused a differing in opinions

regarding the use of the air conditioning units in the interrogation booths. There were several individuals who were interviewed who acknowledged that certain military interrogators would adjust the air conditioning down (cool) in an attempt to make the detainee uncomfortable for the interrogation. Several witnesses indicated that the practice of adjusting the temperature ceased when CDR JTF-GTMO directed that the practice no longer be employed. The current GTMO SOP still permits interrogators to adjust the temperature. In addition, one interrogator supervisor stated that detainees were interrogated at Camp X-Ray, where the "booths" were not air-conditioned, to make the detainees uncomfortable.

Organizational response: No disciplinary action required.

Recommendation #5: The allegation should be closed.

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation against detainees.

Finding #6: During 2003 and 2004 some detainees were subjected to cell moves every few hours to disrupt sleep patterns and lower the ability to resist interrogation. Each case differed as to length and frequency of the cell moves.

Technique: Unauthorized prior to 2 Dec 02 and between 15 Jan 03 and 16 Apr 03: Neither sleep disruption or deprivation is an authorized FM 34-52 technique

Technique: Authorized between 2 Dec 02 and 15 Jan 03 and after 16 Apr 03: The exact parameters of this technique remained undefined until 2 Jun 03 when CDR USSOUTHCOM established clear guidance on the use of sleep adjustment. His guidance prohibited the practice of keeping a detainee awake for "more than 16 hours or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession."

Discussion: Only one FBI agent alleged sleep deprivation; his complaint was that an individual was subjected to 16 hours of interrogation followed by four-hour breaks. He says he was told about these sessions by DoD interrogators and they implied that these 16 hour interrogations were repeated on a 20 hour cycle, but he did not know for certain what in fact occurred. The FBI agent was at GTMO from 2 Jun 03 to 17 Jul 03. Under CDR USSOUTHCOM's 2 Jun 03 guidance, 16 hour interrogations were permitted and do not constitute sleep deprivation if done on a 24 hour cycle. During the course of the investigation of the FBI allegation, the AR 15-6 did conduct a review of the interrogation records to see if there was any evidence that corroborated this allegation. While not directly supporting the FBI's allegation, records indicated that some interrogators recommended detainees for the "frequent flyer program." A current GTMO interrogation analyst indicated that this was a program in effect throughout 2003

and until March 2004 to move detainees every few hours from one cell to another to disrupt their sleep. Documentation on one detainee indicated that he was subjected to this practice as recently as March 2004.

Organizational response: None. Current JTF-GTMO Commander terminated the frequent flyer cell movement program upon his arrival in March 04.

Recommendation #6: The allegation should be closed. Recommend USSOUTHCOM clarify policy on sleep deprivation.

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used duct tape to cover a detainee's mouth and head.

Finding #7: Sometime in October 2002 duct tape was used to "quiet" a detainee.

Technique: Unauthorized

Discussion: In his testimony, the ICE Chief testified that he had a situation in which a detainee was screaming resistance messages and potentially provoking a riot. At the time of the incident there were 10 detainees in the interrogation section and the ICE Chief was concerned about losing control of the situation. He directed the MPs to quiet the detainee down. The MP mentioned that he had duct tape. The ICE Chief says he ultimately approved the use of duct tape to quiet the detainee. The MP then placed a single strand of duct tape around the detainee's mouth. The single strand proved ineffective because the detainee was soon yelling again. This time the MPs wrapped a single strand of duct tape around the mouth and head of the detainee. The detainee removed the duct tape again. Fed up and concerned that the detainee's yelling might cause a riot in the interrogation trailer, The ICE Chief ordered the MPs to wrap the duct tape twice around the head and mouth and three times under the chin and around the top of the detainee's head. According to an FBI agent, he and another FBI agent were approached by the ICE Chief who was laughing and told the agents that they needed to see something. When the first agent went to the interrogation room he saw that the detainee's head had been wrapped in duct tape over his beard and his hair. An interrogator testified that another interrogator admitted to him that he had duct taped the head of a detainee. According to the first agent, the ICE Chief said the interrogator wrapped the detainee's head with duct tape because the detainee refused to stop "chanting" passages from the Koran.

Organizational response: The JTF-170 JAG testified that she became aware of the incident and personally counseled the ICE Chief. The counseling session consisted of a verbal admonishment.[2] The ICE Chief did not receive any formal

[2] While the ICE Chief testified that he was counseled by the JTF-GTMO Commander this is not possible. The Commander in question did not arrive until the month following the event. The previous Commander has no recollection of the event.

discipline action. We have no evidence that duct tape was ever used again on a detainee.

Recommendation #7: Command action was inadequate with respect to the ICE Chief. He should be formally admonished or reprimanded for directing an inappropriate restraint to be used on a detainee.

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly chained detainees and placed them in a fetal position on the floor

Finding #8: On at least two occasions between February 2002 and February 2003, two detainees were "short shackled" to the eye-bolt on the floor in the interrogation room.

Technique: Unauthorized.

Discussion: Two FBI agents each stated that they witnessed a detainee in an interrogation room that had been "short shackled" to the floor. Short shackling is the process by which the detainee's hand restraints are connected directly to an eyebolt in the floor requiring the detainee to either crouch very low or lay in a fetal position on the floor. The FBI agents indicated that each of the detainees was clothed. Another FBI agent stated she witnessed a detainee short shackled and lying in his own excrement. The AR 15-6 was unable to find any documentation, testimony, or other evidence corroborating the third agent's recollection, to this allegation or her email allegation that one of the detainees had pulled his hair out while short shackled. We also found that 'short shackling' was initially authorized as a force protection measure during the in processing of detainees.[3]

Organizational response: None. JTF-GTMO has implemented SOPs that prohibit short shackling.

Recommendation #8: The allegation should be closed. The AR 15-6 was not able to find any evidence to adequately assign responsibility for these actions. This practice is now specifically prohibited by current GTMO interrogation policy.

Allegation: That military personnel improperly interfered with FBI interrogators in the performance of their FBI duties.

Finding #9: We discovered no evidence to support this allegation.

[3] During the course of a site visit to GTMO several detention operations personnel indicated that they understood that short shackling was permitted in the early days of GTMO as a force protection measure. They all stated that it was no longer authorized as either a detention measure or during interrogations.

Discussion: This allegation stems from an FBI agent objections to a proposed Special Interrogation Plan. The dispute resulted in a DoD official being rude to the FBI agent. The team did not find any evidence of "interference" with FBI interrogations that extended beyond the dispute over which techniques worked best in interrogation. During the infancy of interrogation operations at GTMO, it was obvious that the different investigative agencies had different interrogation objectives. Law enforcement agencies were primarily interested in interviews that would produce voluntary confessions that would be admissible in U.S. Federal District Courts. Conversely, DoD interrogators were interested in actionable intelligence and thus had greater latitude on the techniques used during the interrogations. These different goals created friction.

Recommendation #9: The allegation should be closed.

Allegation: That military interrogators denied detainees food and water for long periods of time.

Finding #10: We discovered no evidence to support the allegation that the detainees were denied food and water.

Discussion: This allegation stems from the statement of an FBI Agent. She reports two incidents of observing two detainees in "the fetal position and lying on the floor of interview rooms." And that there were was no "evidence of any food or water." The Agent admits in her statement that she made an assumption that the detainees were denied food and water based solely upon their appearance. The Agent was unable to provide any specific information as to the day she made these observations to permit additional proof or assignment of responsibility.

Recommendation #10: The allegation should be closed.

SPECIAL INTERROGATION PLANS

During the course of interrogations certain detainees exhibited refined resistance techniques to interrogations. These detainees were suspected to possess significant current intelligence regarding planned future terrorist attacks against the United States. For these reasons Special Interrogation Plans were proposed and approved for the detainees. A total of two Special Interrogation Plans were carried out. They are referred to herein as the "First Special Interrogation Plan" and the "Second Special Interrogation Plan".

THE FIRST SPECIAL INTERROGATION PLAN

On 23 Nov 02 interrogators initiated the first Special Interrogation Plan. The interrogation plan was designed to counter resistance techniques of the subject

of the first Special Interrogation Plan. The memo authorizing the techniques for this interrogation was signed by SECDEF on 2 Dec 02. These techniques supplemented techniques already permitted under the provisions of FM 34-52.

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used military working dogs (MWD) during interrogation sessions to threaten detainees, or for some other purpose.

Finding #11a: On one occasion in October 2002 a military working dog was brought into the interrogation room and directed to growl, bark, and show his teeth at the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan.

Technique: Unauthorized prior to 12 Nov 02.

Discussion: a. October 2002 incident: GTMO records indicate that on 01 Oct 02, the Commander of JTF-170 requested Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG) support for interrogation operations to interrogate the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. The dog was requested to assist in the movement of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan between Camp X-ray and the GTMO Naval Brig to "discourage the detainee from attempting to escape." The interrogation plan (IP) indicates that the interrogation would begin on the 2nd or 3rd of October 2002. One FBI agent in his statement recalls the MWD being used on or about 05 Oct 02. He indicated that the events were notable for several reasons. He had recently purchased a German Shepard and wanted to get some "tips" from the dog handlers. The FBI agent noticed that there were two working dog teams (one Navy and one Army) present for the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. Finally, the FBI agent recalled that he and his partner left the observation room when the MWD was introduced into the interrogation room. The FBI agent's partner corroborates this statement.

In addition an interrogator indicated that she recalled a MWD being brought into the interrogation room during interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan at Camp X-ray, between 02-10 Oct 02. She stated that the dogs were used only "briefly." She stated that the use of the dog was documented on the IP and approved by the ICE Chief and CDR, JTF-GTMO

Finding #11b: In November 2002 a military working dog was brought into the interrogation room and directed to growl, bark, and show his teeth at the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan.

Technique: Authorized: SECDEF approved the use of Category I and II techniques for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. Category II technique permits the use of dogs to exploit "individual phobias" during interrogations.

Discussion: b. An interrogator testified that the MWD was in the booth on one occasion for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. He testified that he was approached by another interrogator and discussed the use of a MWD in an interrogation session. Specifically, the first interrogator stated that the second interrogator told him that a MWD was brought into the doorway of the interrogation room and ordered by the dog handler to growl, show teeth and bark at the detainee. In addition a psychologist assigned to the Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) for JTF-170/JTF-GTMO witnessed the use of a MWD named "Zeus" during a military interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan during the November 2002 time period. In his interview, the ICE Chief acknowledged that an MWD had entered the interrogation room of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan under the authority of a "special IP" for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. The unsigned but approved interrogation plan for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan is from 12 Nov 02. (Church p. 115) It indicates dogs will only be used in interrogation if approved in writing, in advance. Both JTF-GTMO Commanders who were in charge during the execution of the special interrogation plan deny that they authorized the use of MWDs in the interrogation room.

Organizational response: a. and b. None. Current SOPs expressly prohibit the use of MWDs in the interrogation room. There is no evidence that this has ever happened again.

Recommendation #11: The allegation should be closed. While the ICE Chief was aware of and condoned the first use of the MWD, additional corrective action is not necessary. The event occurred on two occasions and was expressly approved after the first occasion for this detainee. This practice is now specifically prohibited by current GTMO interrogation policy.

<u>Allegation</u>: That a female military interrogator performed a "lap dance" on a detainee during an interrogation. I have expanded this allegation to "That female military interrogators performed acts designed to take advantage of their gender in relation to Muslim males."

Finding #12a: On 21 and 23 Dec 02, MPs held down a detainee while a female interrogator straddled the detainee without placing weight on the detainee;

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – Act used to highlight futility of the detainee's situation.

Finding #12b: On 04 Dec 02, a female interrogator massaged the detainee's back and neck over his clothing;

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – Act used to highlight futility of the detainee's situation.

Finding #12c: On various occasions between October 2002 and January 2003, a female interrogator invaded the private space of a detainee to disrupt his concentration during interrogation;

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – act used to highlight futility of the detainee's situation.

Discussion: Interrogation logs and MFRs for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan document that on both 21 and 23 Dec 02, a female interrogator straddled, without putting any weight on the detainee, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan while he was being held down by MPs. During these incidents a female interrogator would tell the detainee about the deaths of fellow Al-Qaeda members. During the straddling, the detainee would attempt to raise and bend his legs to prevent the interrogator from straddling him and prayed loudly. Interrogation MFRs also indicate that on 04 Dec 02, a female interrogator began to enter the personal space of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan, touch him, and ultimately massage his back while whispering or speaking near his ear. Throughout this event, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan prayed, swore at the interrogator that she was going to Hell, and attempted to get away from her. The female interrogator admitted in her interview that she personally prepared portions of the MFRs of the the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan interrogations. She asserts that she had permission to employ all these techniques. We have found no evidence of a lap dance ever occurring.

Organizational response: No disciplinary action taken. The ICE Chief approved these techniques at the time.

Recommendation #12: The allegation should be closed. No command action is necessary with respect to the individual interrogators. Their supervisor acknowledged that he approved the approaches at the time of the interrogation. AR 15-6 recommends that the approval authority for the use of gender coercion as futility technique be withheld to the JTF GTMO-CG.

<u>Allegation</u>: That DoD interrogators improperly played loud music and yelled loudly at detainees.

Finding #13: On numerous occasions between November 2002 and 15 Jan 03, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was yelled at or subjected to loud music during interrogation.

Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Incentive and Futility – acts used as reward for cooperating or to create futility in not cooperating.

Discussion: See above discussion for Finding #4.

Organizational response: No disciplinary action required; technique authorized.

Recommendation #13: The allegation should be closed. Recommend JTF-GTMO develop specific guidance on the length of time that a detainee may be subjected to futility music. Placement of a detainee in the interrogation booth and subjecting him to loud music and strobe lights should be limited and conducted within clearly prescribed limits.

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold during their interrogation of detainees.

Finding #14: On several occasions between November 2002 and January 2003 interrogators would adjust the air conditioner to make the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan uncomfortable.

Technique: Unauthorized prior to 16 Apr 03: SECDEF did not approve exposure to cold in his 2 Dec 02 list of approved techniques

Discussion. There are no medical entries indicating the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan ever experienced medical problems related to low body temperature. The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan's medical records do indicate that he did have a body temperature between 95 and 97 degrees twice. The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan's medical records do indicate that from 7-9 Dec 02 he was hospitalized for observation after an episode of bradycardia. He was released within forty-eight hours, after the bradycardia resolved without intervention and he maintained stable hemodynamics.[4] He experienced a second episode of bradycardia in Feb 03.

Organizational response: None

Recommendation #14: The allegation should be closed.

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation against detainees.

Finding #15: From 23 Nov 02 to 16 Jan 03, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was interrogated for 18-20 hours per day for 48 of the 54 days, with the opportunity for a minimum of four hours rest per day.

Technique: Authorized: SECDEF approved technique. This technique was officially permitted under 2 Dec 02 SECDEF Memorandum – The use of 20-hour interrogations

[4] Bradycardia is a relatively slow heart; hemo dynamics are mechanics of blood circulation.

Discussion: SECDEF approved 20 hour interrogations for every 24-hour cycle for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan on 12 Nov 02. Later, CDR USSOUTHCOM formalized the definition of sleep deprivation in his 02 Jun 03 memorandum "promulgating" SECDEF's interrogation techniques of 16 Apr 03. He defined sleep deprivation as keeping a detainee awake for more than 16 hours, or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession.

Organizational response: None. This was an authorized interrogation technique approved by SECDEF.

Recommendation #15: The allegation should be closed. Recommend USSOUTHCOM clarify policy on sleep deprivation.

Additional Allegations, Re: The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan: In addition to the FBI allegations addressed above, the following additional interrogation techniques (not all inclusive) were used in the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. Each act is documented in the interrogation MFRs maintained on the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan.

Finding #16a: That the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was separated from the general population from 8 Aug 02 to 15 Jan 03.

Technique: Unauthorized prior to 12 Nov 02: SECDEF did not approve movement of detainee to an "isolation facility" for interrogation purposes prior to approval of Category II techniques for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan on 12 Nov 02.

Technique: Authorized after 12 Nov 02:

Discussion: The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was never isolated from human contact. The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was however placed in an "isolation facility" where he was separated from the general detainee population from 8 Aug 02 to 15 Jan 03. The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan routinely had contact with interrogators and MPs while in the "isolation facility." The SECDEF did not define "isolation facility" when he approved the use of an "isolation facility" for up to 30 days with additional isolation beyond 30 days requiring CDR JTF-GTMO approval on 12 Nov 02. Prior to the SECDEF's approval, placement in an "isolation facility" was not an authorized interrogation technique.

Organizational response to Additional Allegations, Re: The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan: None taken.

Eight Techniques Below: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Ego down and Futility.

Finding #16b: On 06 Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was forced to wear a woman's bra and had a thong placed on his head during the course of the interrogation.

Finding #16c: On 17 Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was told that his mother and sister were whores.

Finding #16d: On 17 Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was told that he was a homosexual, had homosexual tendencies, and that other detainees had found out about these tendencies

Finding #16e: On 20 Dec 02, an interrogator tied a leash to the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan's chains, led him around the room, and forced him to perform a series of dog tricks.

Finding #16f: On 20 Dec 02, an interrogator forced the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan to dance with a male interrogator.

Finding #16g: On several occasions in Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was subject to strip searches.[5] These searches, conducted by the prison guards during interrogation, were done as a control measure on direction of the interrogators.

Finding #16h: On one occasion in Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was forced to stand naked for five minutes with females present. This incident occurred during the course of a strip search.

Finding #16i: On three occasions in Nov 02 and Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was prevented from praying during interrogation

Finding #16j: Once in Nov 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan became upset when two Korans were put on a TV, as a control measure during interrogation, and in Dec 02 when an interrogator got up on the desk in front of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and squatted down in front of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan in an aggressive manner and unintentionally squatted over the detainee's Koran.

Finding #16k: On seventeen occasions, between 13 Dec 02 and 14 Jan 03, interrogators, during interrogations, poured water over the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan head.

[5] The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan alleges that he was subject to "cavity searches." During the course of interrogation, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was strip searched. The AR 15-6 was unable to determine the scope of these strip searches.

Discussion: the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was a high value detainee that ultimately provided extremely valuable intelligence. His ability to resist months of standard interrogation in the summer of 2002 was the genesis for the request to have authority to employ additional counter resistance interrogation techniques. The techniques used against the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan were done in an effort to establish complete control and create the perception of futility and reduce his resistance to interrogation. For example, this included the use of strip searches, the control of prayer, the forced wearing of a woman's bra, and other techniques noted above. It is clear based upon the completeness of the interrogation logs that the interrogation team believed that they were acting within existing guidance. Despite the fact that the AR 15-6 concluded that every technique employed against the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was legally permissible under the existing guidance, the AR 15-6 finds that the creative, aggressive, and persistent interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan resulted in the cumulative effect being degrading and abusive treatment. Particularly troubling is the combined impact of the 160 days of segregation from other detainees, 48 of 54 consecutive days of 18 to 20-hour interrogations, and the creative application of authorized interrogation techniques. Requiring the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan to be led around by a leash tied to his chains, placing a thong on his head, wearing a bra, insulting his mother and sister, being forced to stand naked in front of a female interrogator for five minutes, and using strip searches as an interrogation technique the AR 15-6 found to be abusive and degrading, particularly when done in the context of the 48 days of intense and long interrogations.[6] While this treatment did not rise to the level of prohibited inhumane treatment the JTF-GTMO CDR was responsible for the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and had a responsibility to provide strategic guidance to the interrogation team. He failed to monitor the interrogation and exercise commander discretion by placing limits on the application of otherwise authorized techniques and approaches used in that interrogation. The Commander stated he was unaware of the specific details or impacts of the techniques on the detainee for this important interrogation. His failure to supervise the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan allowed subordinates to make creative decisions in an environment requiring extremely tight controls[7].

Recommendation #16: The Commander JTF-GTMO should be held accountable for failing to supervise the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and should be admonished for that failure.

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[6] The AR 15-6 found no evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was ever physically assaulted. His medical records show no evidence of any physical assaults. A medical examination completed on the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan on 16 Jan 03 found no medical conditions of note.

[7] The JTF-GTMO Commander's testimony that he was unaware of the creative approaches taken in the interrogation is inconsistent with his 21 Jan 03 letter to CDR USSOUTHCOM in which he asserts that the CJTF approved the interrogation plan in place and it was followed "relentlessly by the command."

Allegation: In addition to the allegations above, the AR 15-6 also considered additional allegations raised specifically by the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan.

Finding #17: The AR 15-6 was unable to corroborate the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan's allegations to the point of concluding that they had occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. Specific findings include:

The AR 15-6 did find that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was required to stand for periods of time which he may have interpreted as forced positions.

There is evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan regularly had water poured on his head. The interrogation logs indicate that this was done as a control measure only.

There is no evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was subjected to humiliation intentionally directed at his religion. It is however possible that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan interpreted many of the interrogation techniques employed to be religious humiliation.

The AR 15-6 found no evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was threatened with homosexual rape. He was told on 17 Dec 02 that he was a homosexual but not threatened in any manner.

There is no evidence, to include entries in his medical records, that either occurred regarding the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan or any other detainee.

Discussion: In reaching conclusions on the treatment of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan the AR 15-6 relied heavily on the interrogations logs. The level of specificity of the logs strongly supports their credibility regarding the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and thus they carried considerable weight on the findings.

Recommendation #17: The allegation should be closed

THE SECOND SPECIAL INTERROGATION PLAN

In July 03 interrogators initiated a request for approval of a Special Interrogation Plan for a detainee. This plan was approved by SECDEF on 13 Aug 03. Interrogation logs indicate that the techniques were never implemented because the subject of the second special interrogation plan began to cooperate prior to the approval.

In addition to the interrogation logs, the AR 15-6 also considered allegations of abuse raised by the subject of the second special interrogation, himself. Specifically, after months of cooperation with interrogators, on 11 Dec 04, the subject of the second special interrogation notified his interrogator that he had been "subject to torture" by past interrogators during the months of July to October 2003.[8]

Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold during their interrogation of detainees.

Finding #18: During the summer of 2003, interrogators would adjust the air conditioner to make the subject of the second special interrogation uncomfortable.

Technique: Authorized: SECDEF approved technique. This technique was officially permitted under 16 Apr 03 SECDEF Memorandum – Environmental Manipulation.

Discussion: The interrogation logs of the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan indicate that on at least two occasions on 10 and 11 Jul 03 the air conditioner was turned off to heat up the room. In addition the subject of the second special interrogation alleges that on repeated occasions from Jul 03 to Oct 03, he was subjected to placement in a room referred to as the "freezer."

Organizational response: No disciplinary action required. Environmental manipulation was expressly permitted in the 16 Apr 03 SECDEF Memorandum. There is no evidence in the medical records of the subject of the second special interrogation being treated for hypothermia or any other condition related to extreme exposure.

Recommendation #18: The allegation should be closed.

Allegation: The subject of the second special interrogation alleges that female military interrogators removed their BDU tops and rubbed themselves against the detainee, fondled his genitalia, and made lewd sexual comments, noises, and gestures.

[8] He reported these allegations to an interrogator. The interrogator was a member of the interrogation team at the time of the report. The interrogator reported the allegations to her supervisor. Shortly after being advised of the alleged abuse, the supervisor interviewed the subject of the second special interrogation, with the interrogator present, regarding the allegations. Based upon this interview, and notes taken by the interrogator, the supervisor prepared an 11 Dec 04 MFR addressed to JTF – GTMO JIG & ICE. The supervisor forwarded his MFR to the JTF – GTMO JIG. The JIG then forwarded the complaint to the JAG for processing IAW normal GTMO procedures for investigating allegations of abuse. The JAG by email on 22 Dec 04 tasked the JDOG, the JIG, and the JMG with a review of the complaint summarized in the 11 Dec 04 MFR and directed them to provide any relevant information. The internal GTMO investigation was never completed.

Finding #19: The AR 15-6 was unable to corroborate the allegations to the point of concluding that they had occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.

Discussion: The interrogation logs for the subject of the second special interrogation indicate that on a number of occasions female interrogators used their status as females to distract the subject of the second special interrogation during the interrogation but there is nothing to corroborate the allegation of the subject of the second special interrogation.

Organizational response: No disciplinary action taken.

Recommendation #19: The allegation should be closed.

Allegation: The subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan alleges that in late summer of 2003 he was hit by guards and an interrogator "very hard" and "with all their strength" he was hit "all over."

Finding #20: The AR 15-6 was unable to corroborate the allegations to the point of concluding that they had occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.

Discussion: The interrogation logs contain no reference to any physical violence against the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan. His medical records indicate that in August 2003 the subject of the second special interrogation reported "rib contusions" from an altercation with MPs when moved between camps. During this examination the physician also noted an "edema of the lower lip" and a "small laceration" on his head. There are no other medical entries of any other physical injuries. There are no indications of swelling or contusions to support a conclusion that the subject of the second special interrogation was hit "very hard all over."

Organizational response: No disciplinary action taken. The allegation was not substantiated.

Recommendation #20: The allegation should be closed. There is no evidence to support the subject of the second special interrogation's allegation of physical abuse.

Allegation: A DoD interrogator improperly impersonated a Navy Captain assigned to the White House.

Finding #21: The Special Team Chief impersonated a USN Captain assigned to the White House during interrogation of the subject of the second special interrogation.

Technique: Authorized: This technique is permitted under FM 34-52 – Deception.

Discussion: On 2 Aug 03 the Special Team Chief presented himself to the subject of the second special interrogation dressed as a Captain in the USN and indicated he was from the White House in an effort to convince the subject of the second special interrogation that he needed to cooperate with his interrogators. The Special Team Chief presented a letter to the subject of the second special interrogation, which indicated that because of the subject of the second special interrogation's lack of cooperation, U.S. authorities in conjunction with authorities from the country of origin of the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan would interrogate the mother of the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan. The letter further indicated that if his mother was uncooperative she would be detained and transferred to U.S. custody at GTMO for long term detention. While the JTF-GTMO Commander acknowledges that he was aware of the intent by the interrogator to wear Captain's rank and purport to be from the White House, he stated that he was not aware of the intention to convey a threat or the plan to use a fictitious letter.

Organizational response: None taken.

Recommendation #21: The allegation should be closed. No further action necessary.

<u>Allegation</u>: That Military interrogators threatened the subject of the second special interrogation and his family.

Finding #22: The Special Team Chief threatened the subject of the second special interrogation and his family in July, August and September 2003.

Technique: Unauthorized: This technique was rejected by SECDEF on 2 Dec 2002

Discussion: During the interrogation of the subject of the second special interrogation, a masked interrogator was used to interrogate the subject of the second special interrogation [9]. On 17 Jul 03 the masked interrogator told that he had a dream about the subject of the second special interrogation dying. Specifically he told the subject of the second special interrogation that in the dream he "saw four detainees that were chained together at the feet. They dug a hole that was six-feet long, six-feet deep, and four-feet wide. Then he observed the detainees throw a plain, pine casket with the detainee's identification number painted in orange lowered into the ground." The masked interrogator told the detainee that his dream meant that he was never going to leave GTMO unless he started to talk, that he would indeed die here from old age and be buried on "Christian… sovereign American soil." On 20 Jul 03 the masked interrogator, "Mr.

[9] The interrogator was a DoD interrogator who was masked so as to preserve the identity of the interrogator. This was done in case the interrogation team wanted to use that interrogator later in another role.

X", told the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan that his family was "incarcerated." On 2 Aug 03, the Special Team Chief, while impersonating a USN Captain from the White House, told the subject of the second special interrogation that he had a letter indicating that the subject of the second special interrogation's family had been captured by the United States and that they were in danger.[10] He went on to tell the subject of the second special interrogation that if he wanted to help his family he should tell them everything they wanted to know. The MFR dated 02 Aug 03 indicates that the subject of the second special interrogation had a messenger that day there to "deliver a message to him". The MFR goes on to state:

> "That message was simple: Interrogator's colleagues are sick of hearing the same lies over and over and are seriously considering washing their hands of him. Once they do so, he will disappear and never be heard from again. Interrogator assured detainee again to use his imagination to think of the worst possible scenario he could end up in. He told Detainee that beatings and physical pain are not the worst thing in the world. After all, after being beaten for a while, humans tend to disconnect the mind from the body and make it through. However, there are worse things than physical pain. Interrogator assured Detainee that, eventually, he will talk, because everyone does. But until then, he will very soon disappear down a very dark hole. His very existence will become erased. His electronic files will be deleted from the computer, his paper files will be packed up and filed away, and his existence will be forgotten by all. No one will know what happened to him and, eventually, no one will care."

Finally, interrogator MFRs dated 08 Sep 03 indicate that the subject of the second special interrogation wanted to see "Captain Collins" and that they "understood that detainee had made an important decision and that the interrogator was anxious to hear what Detainee had to say. Detainee stated he understood and will wait for interrogator's [Captain Collins] return and that the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan "…was not willing to continue to protect others to the detriment of himself and his family."

In investigating the actions above, the AR 15-6 focused on the threat made by the Special Team Chief.[11] When questioned about the threats to the subject of the second special interrogation, the Special Team Chief indicated that prior to the "threat" to detainee the subject of the second special interrogation he cleared the proposal and the letter with the senior judge advocate who approved the technique as a "deception." As written the letter does contain a threat to detain the subject of the second special interrogation's mother but does not contain any threat on her life or that of her family. The SJA indicated in his initial interview

[10] The actual content of the letter simply indicates that his mother will be taken into custody and questioned.

[11] Mr. X's dream story does not rise to the level of a threat. It appears to be a staged prelude to the direct threat made by the Special Team Chief.

that he did not recall the letter. He subsequently elected to exercise his Article 31 rights and declined to answer direct questions about the letter and the threats. The Special Team Chief also indicated that both JIG Chiefs in charge during the promulgation of the Special Interrogation Plan[12] were also aware of the threat letter. The first JIG Chief has retired and was unwilling to cooperate with this investigation. The second JIG Chief indicated under oath that he was unaware of the interrogation events discussed above. He recognizes, that read in conjunction with each other, they indicate a threat. He believes that the Commander of JTF-GTMO was not aware of the threat since the second JIG Chief was not aware of the threat. The second JIG Chief stated that they had weekly meetings with the Commander to discuss interrogations but they would not have covered this level of detail in that meeting. Neither he nor the Commander read interrogation MFRs on a regular basis. Finally, the Commander denies any knowledge of the existence of the threat or the letter. He does not recall ever discussing the issue of threats with the interrogators. He is aware that this is a prohibited practice and would not have permitted it if he had been aware of the plan.

Taken as a whole, it appears that the decision to threaten the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan was made by the Special Team Chief. He claims that he cleared the plan with the senior judge advocate but not with his supervisors. Considering the actual content of the letter, it is reasonable to conclude that the JAG advised that the letter was a proper deception and therefore additional approval was not required. The Special Team Chief knew that under FM 34-52 deception did not require additional approval.

Despite the fact that the letter may be a proper deception technique under FM 34-52, the interrogation logs clearly indicate that the interrogation went well beyond the "threat to detain" made in the letter, and in fact was a threat to the subject of the second special interrogation and his family that violated the UCMJ, Article 134 Communicating a threat.

Organizational Response: None taken.

Recommendation #22: While the threats do not rise to the level of torture as defined under U.S. law, the facts support a conclusion that the Special Team Chief violated the UCMJ, Article 134, by communicating a threat. Recommend his current commander discipline the Special Team Chief.

[12] The first JIG Chief was in charge during the approval process for the second Special Interrogation Plan and then rotated out of JTF-GTMO. The second JIG Chief was in charge during the execution of the second Special Interrogation Plan

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The findings above fall into three categories: Techniques that were authorized throughout the interrogation periods; techniques that were never authorized and finally, techniques that were originally unauthorized, and then subsequently authorized. The summary below only outlines the latter two categories of techniques to address whether the findings violated the UCMJ, international law, U.S. Law, regulations or directives.

Techniques that were never authorized: AR 15-6 determined the following acts were NEVER authorized under any interrogation guidance:

a) On at least two occasions between February 2002 and February 2003, two detainees were "short shackled" to the eye-bolt on the floor in the interrogation room;

b) Sometime in October 2002 duct tape was used to "quiet" a detainee.

c) Military interrogators threatened the subject of the second special interrogation and his family;

Techniques that became authorized after the fact: AR 15-6 determined the following acts were initially not authorized under existing interrogation guidance but later authorized as an approved technique.

a) On several occasions during 2002 and 2003, interrogators would adjust the air conditioner to make the detainees, to include the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan, uncomfortable. This technique is now permitted under the SECDEF 16 Apr 03 guidance.

b) On several occasions prior to 2 Dec 02 and between 15 Jan 03 and 16 Apr 03 interrogators had detainees moved from one cell to another every few hours to disrupt sleep patterns and lower the ability to resist interrogation. This technique is now permitted under the SECDEF 16 Apr 03 guidance.

c) In October 2002 a Military Working Dog was brought into the interrogation room during the course of interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and directed to growl, bark, and show his teeth at the detainee. This technique is subsequently approved for the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan by SECDEF on 12 Nov 02.

d) The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was separated from other detainees in an isolation facility away from the general population from 8 Aug 02 to 12 Nov 02. This technique was subsequently approved

for the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan by SECDEF on 12 Nov 02.

In each of the incidents above the violations can best be characterized as violations of policy. The SECDEF's subsequent approval of each of the techniques clearly establishes the ultimate legitimacy of that technique and thus additional corrective action is not necessary.

Additional Matters: In addition to findings outlined above it is important to document some additional findings:

a) The team found no evidence that any detainee at GTMO was improperly documented or unaccounted for at any time. Every agency interviewee clearly indicated that they never knew of any "ghost detainees" at GTMO;

b) Several past interrogators at GTMO declined to be interviewed. In the case of personnel who are currently in a civilian status we had extremely limited authority to compel the individuals to cooperate with this investigation; of particular note was former SGT Erik Saar who has written a book into "activities" at GTMO. Despite repeated requests he declined to be interviewed;

c) During the course of this investigation, JTF-GTMO CG investigated and took action for personal misconduct of senior DoD personnel on GTMO. These allegations were reviewed and it was determined that they were not relevant to this investigation, and did not rise to a level to suggest a leadership environment with any impact on interrogation or detainee operations.

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

This AR15-6 recommends consideration of the following:

a) ***Recommendation #23*** Recommend a policy-level review and determination of the status and treatment of all detainees, when not classified as EPWs. This review needs to particularly focus on the definitions of humane treatment, military necessity, and proper employment of interrogation techniques. (e.g. boundaries or extremes);

b) ***Recommendation #24*** Recommend study of the DoD authorized interrogation techniques to establish a framework for evaluating their cumulative impact in relation to the obligation to treat detainees humanely;

c) ***Recommendation #25*** Recommend a reevaluation of the DoD and Inter-agency interrogation training consistent with the new realities of the requirements of the global war on terror;

d) ***Recommendation #26*** Recommend a policy-level determination on role of Military Police in "setting the conditions" for intelligence gathering and interrogation of detainees at both the tactical level and strategic level facilities;

e) ***Recommendation #27*** Recommend an Inter-Agency policy review to establish "standards" for interrogations when multiple agencies and interrogation objectives are involved. Particular emphasis should be placed on setting policy for who has priority as the lead agency, the specific boundaries for the authorized techniques in cases with multiple agencies involved, a central "data-base" for all intelligence gathered at a detention facility, and procedures for record keeping to include historical, litigation support, lessons learned, and successful/unsuccessful intelligence gathering techniques.

AR 15-6 REPORT
GTMO Investigation – FBI allegations of Abuse

1. (U) FBI e-mail dtd 9 Jul 04
2. (U) Appointment letter – BG Furlow dtd 29 Dec 04
3. (U) Appointment Letter – Lt Gen Schmidt dtd 28 Feb 05
4. (U) CDR SOUTHCOM Supplemental Instructions letter dtd 05 May 05
5. ~~(S//NF)~~ Allegations of Torture Letter 11 Dec 04
6. ~~(S//NF)~~ Allegations of Torture Letter 24 Dec 04
7. ~~(U – S//NODIS w/encls)~~ CDR SOUTHCOM Supplemental Instructions letter #2 dtd 02 Jun 05
8. ~~(S//NODIS)~~ Extract ICRC Report 11 May 05
9. (U) Cover of AR 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers* w/ Table of Contents
10. (U) Definition - Preponderance of the Evidence for AR 15-6
11. (U) FM 34-52, *Intelligence Interrogations*, Cover and Table of Contents
12. ~~(S//NF)~~ MG Dunlavey Summarized Witness Statement
13. (U) MG Dunlavey Request dtd 11 October 2002
14. (U) GEN Hill Forward to CJCS dtd 25 October 2002
15. (U) SECDEF Approval Letter dtd 02 Dec 02
16. (U) SECDEF Rescission dtd 15 Jan 03
17. (U) SECDEF Memorandum dtd 16 Apr 03 New Policy
18. ~~(S//NF//X1)~~ CDR USSOUTHCOM Memorandum dtd 2 Jun 03
19. ~~(S//NF)~~ Current Standard Operating Procedure for GTMO
20. ~~(S//NF)~~ LCDR [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
21. ~~(S//NF)~~ Mr. [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
22. (FOUO) SAC [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
23. ~~(S//NF)~~ Mr. [redacted] Summarized Witness Statements (x2)
24. ~~(S//NF)~~ SGT [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
25. ~~(S//NF)~~ 2LT [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
26. (FOUO) 2LT [redacted] Letter of Admonishment, 19 May 03
27. (FOUO) MAJ [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
28. ~~(S//NF)~~ LTC [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
29. ~~(S//NF)~~ SGT [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
30. ~~(S//NF)~~ SSGT [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
31. (FOUO) SA [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
32. ~~(S//NF)~~ SA [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
33. ~~(S//NF)~~ ENS [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
34. ~~(S//NF)~~ SA [redacted] FD 302 from FBI dtd 14 July 04
35. ~~(S//NF)~~ MFR dtd 26 Mar 02 w/attached cell transfer schedule/frequent flier program
36. ~~(S//NF)~~ SSA [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
37. ~~(S//NF)~~ SGT [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
38. (FOUO) LTC [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
39. (SBU//FOUO) SA [redacted] FD 302 from FBI dtd 9 Sep 04
40. ~~(S//NF)~~ Request of Interrogation Plan for ISN 063
41. ~~(S//NF)~~ SA [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement
42. ~~(S//NF)~~ Interrogation Level Timeline
43. ~~(S//NF)~~ MAJ [redacted] Summarized Witness Statement

AR 15-6 REPORT
GTMO Investigation – FBI allegations of Abuse

44. (~~S//ORCON/CIMDIS/NF~~) Unsigned Interrogation Plan for ISN [redacted]
45. (~~S//NF~~) MG Miller Summarized Witness Statement
46. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log-21 Dec 02
47. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) MFR dtd 21 Dec 02
48. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log-23 Dec 02
49. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) MFR dtd 23 Dec 02
50. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log-4 Dec 02
51. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) MFR dtd 4 Dec 02
52. (~~S~~) Excerpts of Medical Records for ISN [redacted]
53. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log-6 Dec 02
54. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log-17 Dec 02
55. (~~S//ORCON~~) Interrogation Log-17 Dec 02
56. (~~S//ORCON~~) Interrogation Log 27 Dec 02
57. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log-20 Dec 02
58. (~~S//ORCON~~) Interrogation Log- 20 Dec 02
59. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log – 23 Nov 02
60. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log – 01 Dec 02
61. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log – 14 Dec 02
62. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Shift Log – 28 Nov 02
63. (~~S//NF~~) Maj [redacted] Sworn Statement
64. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) Extracts from Shift logs 13 Dec 02 – 14 Jan 03
65. (~~S~~) ISN [redacted] Medical Exam dtd 16 Jan 03
66. (~~S//NF/ORCON~~) MG Miller letter dtd 21 Jan 03
67. (~~S~~) Special Interrogation Plan 13 Aug 03
68. (~~S~~) MFR dtd 10 Jul 03
69. (~~S~~) MFR dtd 11 Jul 03
70. (~~S~~) LTC [redacted] email 22 Dec 04 containing ISN [redacted] Allegations
71. (~~S~~) ISN [redacted] Medical Report 08 Sep 02
72. (~~S//NF~~) Apprehension of Mother Deception Memo
73. (~~S~~) MFR dtd 17 Jul 03
74. (~~S~~) MFR dtd 20 July 03
75. (~~S~~) MFR dtd 2 Aug 03
76. (~~S~~) MFR dtd 8 Sep 03

Enclosure 1

Deferred pending completion of review

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

SCCC

29 December 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR BG John T. Furlow, US Army, USARSO, Fort Sam Houston, TX

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

1. You are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an Army Regulation 15-6 (AR 15-6) investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of detainee abuse at JTF-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), Cuba. Specifically, your investigation is to concentrate on, but is not limited to, allegations raised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in e-mails and memoranda. You are not to investigate allegations that are the subject of ongoing criminal investigations by the Army Criminal Investigative Division. Your investigation should address itself to the following allegations:

a. That military interrogators improperly used military working dogs during interrogation sessions to threaten detainees, or for some other purpose.

b. That military interrogators improperly used duct tape to cover a detainee's mouth and head.

c. That DoD interrogators improperly impersonated FBI agents and Department of State officers during the interrogation of detainees.

d. That, on several occasions, DoD interrogators improperly played loud music and yelled loudly at detainees.

e. That military personnel improperly interfered with FBI interrogators in the performance of their FBI duties.

f. That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation against detainees.

g. That military interrogators improperly chained detainees and placed them in a fetal position on the floor, and denied them food and water for long periods of time.

h. That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold during their interrogation of detainees.

2. If you substantiate any allegation, you are to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the substantiated allegation were in compliance with the interrogation techniques that were approved and in place at the time of the incident being investigated. Where allegations have previously been investigated by JTF-GTMO or any of its subordinate units, you are to analyze the investigation and subsequent corrective action, if any.

SCCC
SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

3. Use the informal procedures under AR 15-6 in your inquiry. Include in your report specific findings as well as any opinions and recommendations you consider appropriate. You are authorized to administer oaths. During your investigation, if you suspect a member of the US Armed Forces of committing an offense, you must inform that person of his or her rights under Article 31, UCMJ, before taking a statement. If you suspect a civilian employee of the US Government of committing an offense, that person must also be informed of his or her rights as established by Federal law. You must consult with the judge advocate identified below before interviewing any civilian employees.

4. Determine whether there has been a violation of any article of the UCMJ or a violation of International law, U.S. law, regulation or other directive. Also, determine whether established policies and procedures provide the means for preventing such violations in the future and, if appropriate, provide recommendations on preventive measures that should be taken.

5. I have directed that a field grade officer be appointed to assist you in this investigation. This officer will take his direction and guidance from you and is available to assist you for the entire duration of this investigation.

6. (b)(5) USN, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, USSOUTHCOM, is available to assist you as your legal advisor. You may contact (b)(5) for a procedural brief at (305) 437-1304. Submit your findings and recommendations in written form on DA FORM 1547 by 1 February 2005. Any request for extension to complete this investigation must be submitted in writing to the USSOUTHCOM Chief of Staff.

BANTZ J. CRADDOCK
General, US Army
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

SCCC

28 February 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Lt Gen Randall M. Schmidt, USAF, Commander, US Southern Command Air Forces, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 85707-4100

SUBJECT: Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer

1. You are hereby appointed as the senior investigating officer for the Army Regulation 15-6 (AR 15-6) investigation currently being conducted by BG John T. Furlow into the facts and circumstances surrounding the FBI's allegations of detainee abuse at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, Cuba.

2. I take this action because BG Furlow reported to me on 28 February 2005 that he now has information that indicates the scope of the investigation will require that an officer senior in rank to him be interviewed. Accordingly, you are to assume authority and control over BG Furlow's investigation and continue it until its conclusion. BG Furlow and his investigative team are to work directly for you for the duration, and will fold their existing work product into your investigation. The scope of the investigation, and rules under which it is to be conducted, remain the same as my original appointment memorandum for BG Furlow (Enclosure).

3. (b)(5) USAF, Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, USSOUTHCOM, is available to assist you as your legal advisor. You may contact (b)(5) for a procedural brief at (b)(5) Submit your findings and recommendations in written form on DA FORM 1574 by 31 March 2005. Any request for extension to complete this investigation must be submitted in writing to me.

Encl
as

BANTZ J. CRADDOCK
General, US Army
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

SCCC

5 May 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Lt Gen Randall M. Schmidt, USAF, Commander, US Southern Command Air Forces, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 85707-4100

SUBJECT: Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer – Supplemental Instructions

1. References:

a. Memorandum, USSOUTHCOM, SCCC, 29 Dec 04, Appointment of Investigating Officer
b. Memorandum, USSOUTHCOM, SCCC, 28 Feb 05, Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer

2. In addition to those matters in the referenced memos, you are directed to further investigate the facts and circumstances concerning allegations of detainee abuse contained in two memos dated 11 Dec 04 and 24 Dec 04 and provided to BG Furlow. You are directed to make additional findings and recommendations as necessary in your report and submit your report to me as soon as possible.

BANTZ J. CRADDOCK
General, US Army
Commander

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL BASE, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO(b)(2) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Allegations of Torture regarding(b)(6)

1. (b)(6) has been one of the most, if not the most, cooperative and influential detainees at JTF-GTMO. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) . He turned himself in to the Mauritanian authorities in November 2001. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) In July 2002, he was turned over to the US in Bagram, AF and arrived in GTMO (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

2. (b)(6) reported to (b)(1) Sec on (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) the following story of torture that occured here at GTMO during the months of August through October of 2003. According to the detainee, approximately a year after his arrival here he was subjected to torture by personnel at Guantanamo. He has named some of the personnel involved. Some names are consistent with personnel who were present in GTMO during that time period. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) Specifically, he mentioned (b)(6)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

7. (b)(6) states that as a result of this torture he was coerced into signing a statement that implicated him (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) The detainee has since recanted that statement. Within the time that he has been completely compliant, he has denied ever being involved in or knowing about (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

8. Recommendation. Pass this information up the chain of command to facilitate an investigation into the detainee's allegation of torture.

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

Received by (b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Time: _____

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Joint Task Force GTMO
APO AE 09360

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Torture Allegations (b)(2),(b)(6)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the testimony and allegation of abuse from (b)(2),(b)(6). The following is the detainee's statement and other background information regarding his allegations.

2. On 23 May 2003, (b)(6),(b)(3) 50 USC turned over hold status of the detainee to DOD (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(2),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c). Three days later, three personnel appeared at (b)(1) Sec with the detainee. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec. These three personnel stated that they had been working on his case for a long time behind the scenes (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. On 17 June 2003, two guards appeared at the detainee's cell and informed him that he was moving. One of the guards had (b)(2) written plainly on his gloves, so the detainee informed his block-mates that he was moving to (b)(2). The detainee was taken to an isolation block where one other detainee (b)(6) was kept. Later, (b)(6) was moved to the block and all three together were living on (b)(2) (b)(2),(b)(6)

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(b)(2),(b)(6 was left alone. At this point, all the detainee's personal items with the exception of his clothes were confiscated. The detainee describes the room he was in as built of steel from floor to ceiling with a very cold temperature setting on the air conditioner. Other detainee described this room as the "freezer". (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

detainee always had a break at noon for lunch. Every morning the detainee was scared

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

were placed all around. The room had normal lighting and (b)(6) gave the detainee food but he refused to eat it. The detainee stated that he refused to eat food when he was humiliated.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

16. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) there was three days without (b)(1) Sec conducted by (b)(2) (b)(6) the detainee was transferred to (b)(2) block in the general populace for one night and he told his brothers there what had happened to him. On Sunday they returned the detainee back to his previous cell. (b)(2) the guards took the detainee to (b)(2) Block, (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) The detainee stayed Friday through Monday, which was his weekend of rest mentioned earlier.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

18.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

The detainee claims that he went without food sometimes for 24 hours and when he was fed the portions were very little and always served cold. The detainee was awaken every hour or two and only and forced to drink one liter of water. The detainee was either drinking water or on the toilet all night. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

21. The detainee stated that Evidence to support his allegations corroborated by looking into the following things

- (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
- Medical reports from the incident could be found showing that he received medical care, but he was never taken to the hospital
- (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)
- (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)
- The International Community of the Red Cross had no contact with the detainee for more than a year
- (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

SCCC

2 June 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Lt Gen Randall M. Schmidt, USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command Air Forces, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 85707-4100

SUBJECT: Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer - Supplemental Instruction #2

1. (U) References:

a. Memorandum, USSOUTHCOM, SCCC, 29 Dec 04, Appointment of Investigating Officer

b. Memorandum, USSOUTHCOM, SCCC, 28 Feb 05, Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer

c. Memorandum, USSOUTHCOM, SCCC, 5 May 05, Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer - Supplemental Instructions

2. (U) In addition to those matters in the referenced memoranda, you are hereby directed to make specific findings and recommendations with respect to the allegations of ill treatment made by a particular detainee that are new to me and not addressed in your draft Report of Investigation. The specific allegations are contained in the Enclosure. Submit your report to me as soon as possible.

Encl
as

BANTZ J. CRADDOCK
General, U.S. Army
Commander

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
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Enclosure 8

Denied in full
Exemption 3
10USC130c

Enclosure 9

Is a public document

Enclosure 10

Is a public document

Enclosure 11

Is a public document

Enclosure 12

Deferred pending completion of review

Enclosure 13

Is a public document

Enclosure 14

Is a public document

Enclosure 15

Is a public document

Enclosure 16

Is a public document

Enclosure 17

Is a public document

Enclosure 18

Deferred pending completion of review

(b)(2)

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

for the

JTF GTMO
Joint Intelligence Group (JIG)

(b)(2) (U)

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 January 2003
REVISED
12 JUNE 2003
REVISED
26 JULY 2004

DERIVED FROM: DIA DO HUMINT SCG, March 2002
DECLASSIFY ON: X-1

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
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APPENDIX

INTRODUCTION

(U) History is being made with the Interrogations Operations taking place at Guantanamo Bay (b)(2) [redacted] (b)(2) [redacted] Operationally, it breaks new ground. The Command, (b)(2) [redacted] Analysts, Service and Support elements, and Military Police are daily being asked not just to do the jobs they were trained for, but to radically create new methods and methodologies that are needed to complete this mission in defense of our nation. Reserve and Active components of all service branches are working this mission, along with numerous civilian and federal law enforcement agencies. This is a unique opportunity to work with other agencies, to enhance your (b)(2) [redacted] and most importantly, to serve in defense of your country. There is much you will be asked to do which is not in any of your prior training. There are legal, political, strategic and moral issues that influence and affect how operations are conducted in this vital part of Operation Enduring Freedom. You must be aware that your activities and actions are often directed by or reported to the highest levels of government. Also, agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), foreign delegations, and the world media keenly watch how this operation is conducted and how (b)(2) [redacted] are handled. It is vital to JTF-GTMO that all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians conduct themselves in a manner that reflects well on the legal principles America is founded upon.

(b)(2) **CODE OF CONDUCT**

1. Treat detainees humanely.

a. President Bush determined that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to members of al Qaida or the Taliban and that they are not prisoners of war but are unlawful combatants.

b. President Bush does require the Department of Defense to treat detainees humanely, and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions (POTUS memorandum (C), 7 February 2002, Subj: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees).

c. Humane treatment consists of providing detainees adequate food, drinking water, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, and the free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of detention. President's Military Order (U), 13 November 2001.

d. Humane treatment during (b)(2) operations means no severe physical or mental pain or suffering.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

c. **TORTURE is not authorized under any circumstances.**

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. Ensure that competent authority has approved your interrogation plan. Any interrogation technique not approved in this SOP or contained in the SECDEF guidance must be forwarded through the chain of command for appropriate command approval for use with any specific detainee.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

6. Contact the Staff Judge Advocate for further information concerning the legal basis of detention or (b)(2) operations.

JOINT TASK FORCE-GTMO

JOINT INTERROGATION GROUP

(b)(2)

(b)(2) **SOP**

1. (U) **Purpose.** To provide the unique information needed to succeed in the challenging and vital (b)(2) Operations taking place at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in support of the International War on Terrorism.

2. (U) **Scope.** These procedures and responsibilities apply to (b)(2) serving within the (b)(2) Joint (b)(2) Group (JIG) of Joint Task Force (JTF) GTMO.

3. (U) **References.**

   A. (U) DIAM 58-11, The DoD HUMINT Policies (U) SECRET/NOFORN, 3 AUG 1998

   B. (U) DIAM 58-12, DoD HUMINT Management System, 30 June 1997

   C. (U) FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, 8 March 1994

   D. (U) FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, 15 March 1990

   E. (U) FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 8 May 1987

   F. (U) Understanding Islam, Yahiya Emerick; 2002

4. (U) (b)(**Personnel.**

   A. ~~A.~~ (U) ~~Officer In Charge~~Chief. Responsible for success of (b)(mission, provides overall guidance and control of (b)(element.

   B. (U) Deputy Chief. Responsible for assisting Chief in success of (b)(mission, guidance and control of (b) element, and ensures military awards and evaluations are completed on time.

   C. ~~B.~~ (U) Operations Officer. Responsible for all issues relating to the needs and operation of (b)(2) teams, facilities, and personnel.

   D. ~~C.~~ (U) Operations NCO. Controls scheduling of linguist support for (b)(2) Publishes Daily Highlights (DH). Acts as Security Manager for the (b)(2

   E. ~~D.~~ (U) JIG Operations Officer. Deals with all issues within the detainee camp (b)(2) Also coordinates interrogator contact with the Field Hospital (located next to (b)(2) and Brig, as necessary. Provides liaison with (b)(3):S(1)

   F. ~~E.~~ (U) Reports Officer. Reviews and transmits IIRs, KBs, disseminates 302s, updates collection binders, and archives all documents mentioned to the J2 (b)(2) Drive.

G. (b)(2)

H. ~~G.~~ (U) Regional Team Chief. Provides leadership and manages (b)(2) planning execution of (b)(2) and report writing. Responsible for developing and reporting (b)(2) (b)(2) Daily Highlights to leadership.

I. ~~H.~~ (C) Collection Management Technician (CMT). Works within the Regional (b)(2) to develop and process intelligence requirements (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) Helps maintain the (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) database.

J. ~~I.~~ (U) Analyst. Works within a (b)(2) (b)(2) Produces the Analyst Support Package (ASP) (b)(2) (b)(2) Helps (b)(2) and ensure quality in reporting.

K. (U) (b)(2) Works within a (b)(2) Conducts (b)(2) and reports on intelligence collected. Helps determine the proper order of (b)(2) Develops a personal relationship with detainee and writes the (b)(2) detailing how a particular (b)(2)

L. (U) Linguist.— Works within a (b)(2) Translates (b)(2) questions and detainees answers in an accurate and timely manner.

5. (U) (b)(2) (b)(2)

6. (U) (b)(2) (b)(2)

7. (U) (b)(2)

A. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

B. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

8. (U) (b)(2) **Schedules.**

A. (U) Once a (b)(2) has selected specific detainees (b)(2) a tentative schedule of (b)(2) is developed for the next week. (b)(2) schedules identify (b)(2) detainee ISNs, requested date and time, estimated number of hours required for an (b)(2) booth and linguist, and specific language needed.

B. (S) (b)(2) ; schedule (b)(2) for each week (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

C. (S) Regardless of a shift, (b)(2) can be scheduled at any time of the day if necessary.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

9. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

NOTE: (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2) Above all, flexibility to change (b)(2) schedules is necessary

(b)(2) at GTMO.

A. (U) Time Sensitive Collection Requirement (TSCR). A TSCR is a short-term requirement to support crisis or contingency planning and operations such as military deployment. The consumer activates a TSCR when he or she requires collection and initial reporting within 48 hours. During contingency operations, periods of heightened tensions, or open hostilities, the TSCR is the primary HUMINT requirement that a Unified Command or Joint Task Force (JTF) uses to task time-critical, high priority information needs directly to DoD HUMINT collectors in the primary command's area of responsibility (AOR). A theater commander can also use it to request tasking of collectors globally to focus on that Unified Commander's needs. During contingency operations or crisis situations theater commands may directly task in-theater collectors (b)(2)

B. (U) (b)(2) is for a definite time period not to exceed 120 days. It identifies new short- to intermediate-term information needs in response to unforeseen situations, emerging crises or contingencies. It can be used to register additional or refined requirements in connection with a unique collection opportunity. (Or it may be used to raise the priority of an existing requirement.) (b)(2) will not be used as a substitute for submitting standing (b)(2) nominations or revisions to current (b)(2) The (b)(2) must include a justification explaining the time urgency, the priority of information needed and/or criticality to the consumers' mission/task accomplishment.

C. (U) (b)(2) is an expansion on one or more of the broad requirements contained in National HUMINT Collection Directives (NHCDs). An (b)(2) may support one or more NHCDs. Within DoD, Commands, Services, and production elements assigned primary production responsibility under the DoD Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP) generate (b)(2) support DoD operational planning, policy and decision-making, intelligence production, and intelligence databases. The (b)(2) provides the collector sufficient detail to focus and target collection efforts against the stated information needs.

D. (C) (b)(2) is a document that provides tailored requirements to levy on a specific source (b)(2) normally based on a KB. While standing (b)(2) generally contain sufficient collection guidance, (b)(2) augment them (b)(2) provide additional details tailored to the specific (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec They refine a collector's focus and improve the capability to fully exploit the opportunity. The (b)(2) is not a means to submit new requirements, or levy additional requirements unrelated to the collection element's stated target or opportunity, (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) -

10. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

11. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

12. **(U) Initial (b)(2) Products.**

A. (U) Analyst Support Package (ASP).

(1) (U) The analyst's goal as a member of the (b)(2) is to provide timely, thorough and useful intelligence to help guide the (b)(2) process. In order to reach this goal, the Analyst works hand-in-hand with other (b)(2) members to ensure research is done exactly as needed.

(2) (U) The first step in the process that requires analyst involvement is the selection of the detainee to be (b)(2) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(3) (U) There are also Ad Hoc requirements that are addressed by the (b)(2). These are handled as received and as time allows. Names of detainees developed through investigations are discussed by members of the (b)(2) and introduced to the (b)(2) list in an order agreed upon by the team.

(4) (U) Next in the (b)(2) preparation process that the analyst creates the Analyst Support Package (ASP) (Appendix D). This is the most critical contribution the analyst will make and will require the largest amount of the analyst's time. The time involved in preparing this package varies greatly depending on the amount of information available on the detainee.

(a) (C) The analyst begins with the ASP template and gleans as much information as possible (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) Then using all of the research tools available, the analyst creates the ASP, which enables the (b)(2) to create a solid (b)(2) - critical for the success of any (b)(2)

(b) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(c) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(d) (U) ASP Format:

1 (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

2 (U) Photo. The most current photo of the detainee.

3 (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

4 (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

5 (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

6 (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

7 (S/NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

8 (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

9 (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

10 (C) Collection Requirements. Identifies collection (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec Will help the (b)(2) develop the (b)(based on these requirements, especially (b)(2)

11 (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

12 (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

13 (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

14 (U) (b)(2)

(5) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

B. (U) (b)(2)

(1) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(2) (U) Review pertinent sources of information to include when updating your (b)(2) Use both the hard copy detainee file as well as the soft copy (b)(2)

(a) (U) **Detainee Files.** (b)(2) Detainee folders are filed numerically by Internee Serial Number (ISN). When a detainee folder is removed (b)(2) it must be signed out first using the sign-out sheet found in every hanging file folder.

(b) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(c) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(d) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(e) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(f) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(g) (U) **Intelligence Information Reports.** Extracted from previously answered (b)(2)

(h) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(i) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) S

(j) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

(k) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(l) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

(m) (U) (b)(2) **Communication/Leadership Matrix.**

(3) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(4) (b)(2)

(5) (U) (b)(2) /Linguist Meeting. This meeting **must** take place at least fifteen minutes prior to the (b)(2) (b)(2)
(b)(2) No later than the day prior to the (b)(2) should confirm with the linguist scheduled time and language of the linguist supporting the (b)(2)

(6) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(a) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(c) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

(d) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

1 (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

2 (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

3 (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4 (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

13. (U) (b)(2) The objective of any (b)(2) is to obtain the maximum amount of usable information in the timeliest manner. A successful (b)(2) produces needed information that is timely, complete, clear, and accurate. (b)(2)

(b)(2)

A. (U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

B. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

C. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(1) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(2) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(3) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

(4) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(5) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

D. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

E. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

F. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

G. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

H. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

I. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(1) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(2) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(3) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(4) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(5) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(6) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(7) (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1

14. (U) **REPORT WRITING.**

A. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(1) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(2) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(3) (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

B. (U) Post (b)(2) Meeting. Following every (b)(2) have a post (b)(2) meeting. (b)(2) (b)(2) During this meeting the (b)(2) determine which (b)(2) have been answered. At that point the determination is made concerning the need for another (b)(2) to answer the (b)(2) If the determination is made for another (b)(2) of this detainee the whole process should go back to the ASP preparation step and proceed from there. If (b)(2) information is obtained, the (b)(2) writes an Intelligence Information Report (IIR) (Annex K). (b)(2) (b)(2) If the analyst was present (b)(2) then he/she should assist in drafting the IIR (b)(2)

C. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

15. **(U) Detainee Requests** (b)(2)

A. (C) Periodically detainees make requests through the MPs to see an (b)(2) (b)(2) normally work him into the (b)(2) schedule. A "visit" is conducted with the detainee in the booth to see what he wants (b)(2) (b)(2) Usual detainee requests involve questions concerning status of their "case," cell transfers, or guard or medical-related issues.

B. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

C. (U) The J3 Operations Officer posts detainee requests on the (b)(2) Detainee Request Board each day. Once a team has taken care of the request, the detainee's ISN is highlighted in yellow to indicate the request has been filled. Team Chiefs ensure that (b)(2) respond in an efficient manner to detainee requests.

16. (S) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

17. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

18. (U) Chain of Command. The Chain of Command for all personnel, civilian and military assigned to the (b)(2) is as follows: the immediate supervisor (the Section Chief), followed by the Officer in Charge of the (b)(2), followed by the Joint Interrogation Group Director, followed by the JTF Commanding General. In the absence of the (b)(2) OIC, the Operations Officer will have command authority. In the absence of both the (b)(2) OIC and the (b)(2) Operations Officer, the senior Section Chief will exercise command authority within the organization. All personnel are responsible for (b)(2) oversight and properly reporting incidents through the proper Chain of Command.

19. (C) Use Military Police During (b)(2) The Military Police (MP) may not participate in (b)(2) process. Their role is strictly for security and safety of all individuals associated with the (b)(2) process.

20. Appendix A

Battle Rhythm



Appendix B

(b)(2) Scheduling Request

Sunday, 12 JANUARY 2003

Team	Start Time	Duration	ISN	Language	Linguist 1st	Linguist 2nd	POC
b)(3) 10 USC §130B							

Monday, 13 JANUARY 2003

Team	Start Time	Duration	ISN	Language	Linguist 1st	Linguist 2nd	POC

Tuesday, 14 JANUARY 2003

Team	Start Time	Duration	ISN	Language	Linguist 1st	Linguist 2nd	POC

Wednesday, 15 JANUARY 2003

Team	Start Time	Duration	ISN	Language	Linguist 1st	Linguist 2nd	POC

Thursday, 16 JANUARY 2003

Team	Start Time	Duration	ISN	Language	Linguist 1st	Linguist 2nd	POC

Friday, 17 JANUARY 2003

Team	Start Time	Duration	ISN	Language	Linguist 1st	Linguist 2nd	POC

Saturday, 18 JANUARY 2003

Team	Start Time	Duration	ISN	Language	Linguist 1st	Linguist 2nd	POC

Appendix C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)



Appendix D

ANALYST SUPPORT SUMMARY

JTF-GTMO JIG

REFERENCE INFORMATION

(S//NF)	CURRENT AS OF DATE	
(S//NF)	ISN#	
(S//NF)	NAME-	
(S//NF)	GTMO#	
(S//NF)	MP#	
(S//NF)	SOURCE#	
(S//NF)	LANGUAGE	
(S//NF)	CITIZENSHIP	
(S//NF)	ETHNICITY	
(S//NF)	CURRENT CELL	
(S//NF)	ANALYST	
(S//NF)	INTERROGATOR	

DETAINEE PHOTO

SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS (b)(2) **AND REPORTING**

(S//NF)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S//NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCES

Class **Source**

Appendix E

(b)(2) **Format**

ISN:
Source Name:
Languages Spoken:

Team:
DoD Team Chief:
DoD Team Chief Phone #:

(b)(2)
Analyst:
CMT:

Language Requested:
Linguist Requested:

Date/Time of (b)(2)
Estimated Duration:
Date of Last (b)(2)

Previous Reports:

Report Number	Subject

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Purpose of (b)(2) /Requirements:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Translation Method:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Sequential Questioning Plan:

Topic	Controllable Material	Questioner

Control Questions:

Termination Phase:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Appendix F

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(2)

(U)

(U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

1. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

2. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

3. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

4. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

5. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

6. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

7. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

A. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
B. (S)

8. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

9. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

10. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

11. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

12. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

A. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

B. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

C. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

13. (S) **OTHER REPORTS TO BE GENERATED:**

A. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)

B. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

14. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

A. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

B. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b

15. (U)
(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b

Appendix G

Intelligence Information Report (IIR) Guide (U)

(U) QUESTIONS REGARDING IIR WRITING REFER TO THE DIAM 58-12 SECTION 6 OF THE REGIONAL COLLECTION BINDER OR ASK AN RO FOR ASSISTANCE.

(U) EVERYTHING BELOW IN BLUE IS FOR REFERENCE AND SHOULD BE DELETED BEFORE SENDING THE FINAL IIR TO THE REPORTS OFFICER.

(U) In the text REMOVE #, $, ", :, AND ANY OTHER SYMBOLS. COLONS (:) AND QUOTES (") SHOULD BE CHANGED TO DOUBLE DASHES (--), DOLLAR SIGNS ($) TO USD AND NUMBER SIGNS (#) TO NO. (SHORT FOR NUMBER) OR JUST COMPLETELY REMOVE. THERE CAN BE NO "TABS" IN THE REPORT. THE FIRST TIME A PERSON'S LAST NAME IS INTRODUCED, IT IS IN (( )). Do not remove colons (:) after pro-words.

S E C R E T
SERIAL: (U) (b)(2)
-
COUNTRY: (U) COUNTRY [IES] (COUNTRY CODES). SEPARATE BY SEMI-COLONS (;).
-
(b)(2)
-
SUBJ: (b)(2) - TITLE (MENTION COUNTRY IN HERE) (NO PERIOD AT END) ; CLASSIFY TITLE IF APPROPRIATE (U)
-
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED S E C R E T.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) (b)(2)
EVENT(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
-
REQS: (U) HCRs; SDRs(PARTIAL-COMPLETE) REQUIREMENTS IN THIS ORDER; D-4J2-2410-002-02; DHCDs,

SOURCE: (S) (b)(2) FULL MIDDLE NAME ((LAST NAME)) SOURCE NAME AS IT APPEARS ON THE KB. THIS PART OUTLINES THE BACKGROUND, ACCESS, AND RELIABILITY. LIST CITIZENSHIP/ NATIONALITY, OCCUPATION/EMPLOYMENT, AND ALIASES. LIMIT TO 5 LINES.
-
SUMMARY: (S) **CAPTURE KEY HIGHLIGHTS.** SUCCINCTLY DESCRIBE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION IN THE IIR. LIMIT TO 5 LINES. IF ENCLOSURE, --ADD THE WORD --ENCLOSURE-- AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH.
-
TEXT: (S)
1. (S) **USE ACTIVE VOICE**. STATE WHAT THE SOURCE SAID, NOT YOUR QUESTIONS, OR 'SOURCE SAID……' WHAT YOU ARE WRITING IS WHAT THE SOURCE SAID. USE 'FIELD COMMENTS' -- DO NOT USE COLONS(:) WHEN THERE IS INFORMATION YOU NEED TO ADD THAT WILL AMPLIFY WHAT THE SOURCE STATED E.G., 'AT THIS TIME SOURCE BEGAN FIDGETING AND ACTING EVASIVE' OR 'THE ZSU-23/4 HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY IN AFGHANISTAN.' USE 'SOURCE COMMENT'-- WHEN THE SOURCE PARENTHETICALLY ADDS INFORMATION E.G. 'BY THE WAY, THE HOUSE I STAYED IN DID NOT HAVE ANY RUNNING WATER.' (b)(2)
(b)(2) FOR CITY AND FEATURE LOCATIONS. (b)(2)
(b)(2)

2. (S) **CLASSIFY INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS**. USE A, B, C, ETC. FOR SUB-PARAGRAPHS AND CLASSIFY APPROPRIATELY, DO NOT INDENT.

3. (S) **IN MULTIPLE SOURCE IIRS, USE AN EXPRESSION SUCH AS "SOURCE (NUMBER) STATED" PRECEDING THE PORTION OF THE TEXT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THAT SOURCE**. LIST THE ADDITIONAL SOURCES IN THE SOURCE PARAGRAPH, NO MORE THAN FIVE LINES A PIECE.

COMMENTS: (S)

1. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

2. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4

3. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

5. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

6. (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

7. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4

COLL: (U) (b)(2)

INSTR: (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

INSTR: (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

PREP: (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

ENCL: (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

ENCL: (U) (b)(2)
TITLE (U),

ACQ: (U) (b)(2)
(b)(2)

DISSEM: (U) (b)(2)
ENCLOSURES.

WARNING: (U) REPORT CLASSIFIED S E C R E T.
(b)(2)
DECL: X1

Appendix H

(b)(2)

(b)(2) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(U) (b)(2)

(U) (b)(2)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

OR

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

OR

(b)(2)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Appendix I

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(U) (b)(2)

(U) (b)(2)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

EX:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(U) (b)(2)

(U) (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Appendix J

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (S)

(U) (b)(2)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(U) (b)(2)

(U) (b)(2)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

☐ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Appendix K

(b)(2) **Brief** (b)(2) **Writing Guide**

DATE:

ISN:

NAME: (AS GIVEN FROM BAGRAM IN SOURCE FILE)

DOD LEAD (b)(2)

LINGUIST:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(2) **START TIME:**

(b)(2) **END TIME:**

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

1 A. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

2. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

3. BIRTCITY-- XXX. *(IF BORN IN DIFFERENT COUNTRY WHEN/WHY DID HE MOVE THERE?)*

4. BIRTCTRY-- XX. *(COUNTRY WHERE HE WAS BORN.)*

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

HIJREE (ISLAMIC CALENDAR): MONTH, DAY, YEAR

GREGORIAN (CHRISTIAN/WESTERN CALENDAR): MONTH, DAY, YEAR

6. LANGUAGES SPOKEN-- **XXX; XXX; XXX.** *(LIST LANGUAGES SOURCE KNOWS TO INCLUDE VARIOUS DIALECTS OF ARABIC)*

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Appendix L

SECRET//NOFORN

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(2)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN COMMAND

(b)(2) (S)

(S/NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S/NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(U) a. (b)(2)

(U) b. (b)(2)
(b)(2)

(S) c. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(S) d. (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S/NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S/NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1

(b)(2)

Attachments:
As stated

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS

Classified By: Secretary of Defense
Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify On: 2 April 2013

SECRET//NOFORN

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

~~SECRET//X-1~~

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Enclosure 20

Deferred pending completion of review

Enclosure 21

Deferred pending completion of review

Enclosure 22

Deferred pending completion of review

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF (b)(6) who was interviewed on 10 January 2005 at a Conference room in the Commissions Building, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). His statement was substantially as follows:

I am the current Joint Interrogation Group (JIG) Chief. I work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. I was deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) for a two year assignment. I took over the JIG in late summer 2003.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I am not aware of any military working dogs being used in an interrogation. (b)(1)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6) When the FBI complained about military interrogators impersonating FBI, we discussed the issue and the practice was stopped. I do not believe it violates any laws but the practice was stopped.

(b)(6)

I am aware that (b)(6) was given a Letter of Reprimand by LTC (b)(6) for her involvement, as the NCOIC, of the "lap dance" incident. She was one of the best interrogators. In fact, I believe that Major General Miller sponsored her so she could obtain a commission.

The interrogation teams and the individual interrogators draft the interrogation plans and the approaches to be used for the interrogation. If the plan doesn't involve techniques requiring additional approval, as detailed in the 16 April 2003 SECDEF Memo, it is approved by the ICE Chief. If the approaches require additional approval, the interrogation plan is forwarded to me for review and if necessary, notification is sent to SECDEF. If a response is not received within 7 days, I instruct the interrogation team to proceed with the implementation of the approach.

The atmosphere at JTF-GTMO has gradually improved during my tenure. The pressure in the beginning was tremendous because of the need to get information. The atmosphere was tense and the agencies didn't always get along. That is not the case now.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, (b)(5) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

(b)(6) Chief, JIG, GTMO, was interviewed and made the following statement on or about 1600 hours, PST, 15 April 2005, via telephone from GTMO to Davis-Monthan AFB. This statement is a summary of that interview only:

This interview was conducted for the sole purpose of clarifying facts and circumstances surrounding the interrogation of ISN (b)(

Mr. (b)(6) was sworn in as a witness and advised of his rights under the 5th Amendment. He was told that he was suspected of being a co-conspirator in communicating a threat to detainee ISN (b)(He said he understood his rights, did not want a lawyer, and was prepared to answer questions.

He stated that he arrived and began work at GTMO on 14 Jul 03. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

He commented that FM 34-52 permits fear up during the course of interrogation and that it is a proper and authorized interrogation technique. He stated that under the SECDEF 16 Apr 03 guidance that fear up can be approved by the interrogator and that it would not have required higher-level approval.

(b)(1)

He stated that MG Miller would have weekly staff meetings in which they would specifically discuss interrogations but he would not have briefed or discussed this level of detail with MG Miller. He cannot recall any specific guidance that MG Miller had in place that had to do with threats to detainees in interrogation.

Exhibit 23

SECRET

He cannot be certain if LCDR (b)(6) ran this by the JAG prior to acting or in what level of detail he would have briefed the JAG. He does not doubt LCDR (b)(6) testimony, he just cannot confirm it.

(b)(1)
(b)(1) He was not aware that it occurred and did not approve this approach.

I swear that the above statement is a fair and accurate summary of the testimony of Mr. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF SGT (b)(6) was interviewed on 8 February 2005 at a conference room at the 250th MI Battalion Headquarters, Long Beach, California. The Alpha Company Commander for the 250th Military Intelligence Battalion was also present for the interview. Her statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 07 August 2002 to 15 February 2003. At the time I was stationed at GTMO I was assigned as an interrogator on the Saudi Arabian Team and Special Projects Team.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I graduated from Fort Huachuca Interrogator Course, 97E, seven months prior to my deployment.

I was aware of the use of loud music and yelling in interrogations. The only music I heard in the booth was classical music and the volume wasn't too loud. I know yelling occurred during interrogations. I even yelled during interrogations. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

It was my understanding that detainee's were to be allowed four hours of uninterrupted sleep and that Mr. (b)(6) had to approve the use of the extended interrogations. Based on that criteria I never witnessed sleep deprivation being used in interrogations.

I heard that the manipulation of the air conditioners to make the detainees uncomfortable was a permissible technique during the October/November 2002 timeframe, but I never saw it used.

I never performed a "lap dance" on a detainee. (b)(6)
(b)(6) Both times the technique was authorized and/or suggested by (b)(6) the Interrogation Control (ICE) Chief. The first incident occurred when my partner and I were interrogating a detainee who refused to stop praying. The translator mentioned that he couldn't pray if he were "unclean." Mr. (b)(6) instructed me to purchase some perfumed lotion and rub it on the detainee. I only rubbed the detainee's arms. Mr. (b)(6) verbally approved the technique. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, SGT (b)(6) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

(b)(6)

Investigating Officer

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF 2LT (b)(6) who was interviewed on 23 March 2005 at Moon Hall, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. MAJ (b)(6) 2LT (b)(6) counsel, was also present for this interview. Her statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 14 February 2003 to 22 November 2003. At the time I was assigned to/working for the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) as the NCOIC of the Gulf States Team and later an interrogator for the Special Projects Team.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I graduated from the 97E course at Fort Huachuca in 1992. Prior to deploying to JTF-GTMO, I completed a three-week "refresher course" at Fort Huachuca called "Tiger Team University." Tiger Team University was split into two phases. The first phase, which was one week long, provided an overview of the Arabic culture and the Islamic terrorist network. The second phase, which lasted two weeks, was intended to provided the interrogators with specific scenarios and reinforce the approaches that were both approved and successful JTF-GTMO. Several of the instructors at Tiger Team University had personal experience interrogating detainees at JTF-GTMO.

I heard about the use of female interrogators encroaching on a detainee's personal space while attending Tiger Team University. A former JTF-GTMO instructor described how a "SGT (b)(6) used her gender, being a female, as an asset during interrogation sessions with a high value detainee. The instructor described how (b)(6) touched a detainee on the shoulder and knee, leaned in close to the detainee's face, and whispered comments or questions in his ear.

I am aware of an interrogator impersonating an FBI agent. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Yelling and loud music were both utilized in interrogations. (b)(1)
(b)(1) I wouldn't characterize the music as "loud." There was a policy that music used in interrogations couldn't hurt the detainee's ears. Yelling was a technique used in implementing the "Fear Up Harsh" approach. The use of yelling was taught during the basic 97E course at Fort Huachuca.

I did not observe sleep deprivation used by interrogators. When I first arrived in GTMO, the standing rule was a detainee couldn't be interrogated for "more than 20 hours in a row." MG

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

JTF GTMO (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) JTF Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, APO AE 09360

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Admonishment

1. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
Techniques were used in the interrogation that were not annotated or approved on the Interrogation Plan (IP). As the (b)(6) on duty that evening it was your responsibility to ensure that all (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) were completed as to the approved IP's.

2. You are hereby admonished for your failure to accomplish supervisory duties. As an (b)(6) I have to be able to rely on you to ensure that the mission is accomplished correctly. If I lose that faith in your abilities, you lose any value to the mission. I sincerely hope that you use this incident as a learning tool and that this is a small blip in an otherwise fine career. While I remain confident in your ability, rest assured, any repeated failures will be dealt with severely.

3. This admonishment is imposed as an administrative measure and not punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. This memorandum is referred to you for acknowledgment and rebuttal, if any, to be provided within 72 hours of your receipt to myself. It is my intention to file this admonishment in your local file where it will remain for six months from the date of this notification or until you depart, whichever is sooner.

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 26 of 76 Exhibits

DOD JUNE

JTF GTMO(b)(2)
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Admonishment

1. I hereby acknowledge receipt of this admonishment on (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

2. I have read and understood the unfavorable information contained therein and:

a. X Elect to submit a response.

b. ____ Elect not to submit a response.

3. I understand that if I wish to submit a response, I have 72 hours from the date of receipt in which to do so.

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MAJ (b)(6), Former Operations Officer, who was interviewed on 7 March 2005 at the US Army South LNO Office, USSOUTHCOM Headquarters, Miami, Florida. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from February 2003 to January 2004.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I am not aware of any military working dogs that were used in an interrogation. We had a dog outside the pumpkin patch, the area where new detainees are held. It was outside the reception area.

I was aware of SFC (b)(6) impersonating a Department of State representative. He was part of the special projects team and would have been approved at the JIG level, that would have to be approved.

I did witness the use of music and strobe lights in interrogations. The civilian contractor interrogators would use this technique as part of a "Fear Up" approach in April or May 2003. We told them to stop it after Abu Ghraib came out.

I am not aware of short shackling being used in an interrogation. The detainee might be left in the booth for an extended period of time after interrogations awaiting MPs. The short chain was done as a control measure. The chain was close to the floor. The detainee was chained with his wrist close to the floor. The interrogator would ask the MPs to put the detainee in that position. Where I saw that, I can't remember if a chair was in the room. As far as I know, everything was in the boundaries.

I am familiar with an incident when SSG (b)(6) and SGT (b)(6) used sexual contact to distract a detainee. Both were told not to use the technique again and I believe SSG (b)(6) received a written letter of admonishment. Additionally I am familiar with the "magic marker" incident. The detainee spat in SGT (b)(6) face. She was crying outside the booth and she developed a plan to psychologically get back at him. This technique was not in an approved interrogation plan. She touched the detainee on his shoulder, showed him the red ink on her hand and said by the way, I am menstruating. The guy threw himself on the floor and started to bang his head because he was so freaked out by the ink.

I am not aware of sleep deprivation being used against detainees. Interrogators had to get approval for up to 15 hours a day. The rules General Miller set were 14 hours with five hours of uninterrupted sleep. Sleep interruption was done by the interrogators at night, was quite labor-intensive, and was not practical. It was something in the toolbox.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, MAJ (b)(6) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW

Ex 27

UNCLASSIFIED

DOD JUNE

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Lt Col (b)(6) former Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief, who was interviewed on 22 March 2005 at his home in Alabama.

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) on or about the first week of December 2002 and re-deployed at the end of June 2003. I was the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme technique, to include the use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

It was my understanding that prior to SECDEF approval of the Special Interrogation Plan for ISN (b)((in early December 2002), the guidance for interrogation procedures was Field Manual 34-52.

(b)(6)

When I arrived at GTMO, (b)(6) my predecessor, arranged for SERE instructors to teach their techniques to the interrogators at GTMO. The instructors did give some briefings to the Joint Interrogation Group (JIG) interrogators. MG Miller and I didn't believe the techniques were appropriate for the JTF-GTMO mission.

I never heard of any interrogators on my watch impersonating FBI agents. I do know that an interrogator, "LT (b)(6) on the Middle Eastern Team, impersonated a Department of State agent prior to my arrival at GTMO. I would not have had a problem with an interrogator impersonating any federal agency.

Loud music was used during selected interrogations. The rule on volume was that it should not be so loud that it would blow the detainee's ears out.

Yelling was also used on occasion during interrogations. Like music, the volume was never too loud, just a raised voice.

There were times that interrogators adjusted the air conditioner in an attempt to make the interrogation booth cold. It wasn't like the booth was a "snow storm" but it was cool. The temperature depended on the cooperation of the detainee. It was a technique used to make the detainee uncomfortable. I don't believe this would be in an interrogation plan.

It is my understanding that a "lap dance" or something close occurred during my tenure at JTF-GTMO. I believe SGT (b)(6) performed the "lap dance" and her supervisor was (b)(6) SSG (b)(6) and SGT (b)(6) got together prior to an interrogation and decided to use sexual tension in an attempt to break a detainee. SGT (b)(6) rubbed up against the detainee and was told not to use the technique again. SSG Scarpato received a written admonishment from (b)(6) for this event.

In my opinion, ISN (b)(was never physically abused during the execution of the special interrogation plan. He may have been subjected to some mental anguish (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Lt Col (b)(6) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

(b)(6)

Investigating Officer

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF SGT (b)(6) who was interviewed on 09 February 2005 at a Conference room at the 250th Military Intelligence Battalion Headquarters, Long Beach, California. Her statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 7 August 2002 to 15 February 2003. While I was stationed at GTMO, I was assigned as an interrogator to the Gulf States Team. I was on loan during late November or early 2002 to the Special Projects Team.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I am not aware of any interrogators being suspended or disciplined for interrogation misconduct.

I was never asked to use sexual tension in my interrogations. I never touched a detainee in a sexual manner. I may have touched a detainee or put my hand close to a detainee's face so the detainee had to acknowledge my existence, but never in a forceful or sexual manner. I would get close to a detainee to ensure he was paying attention to me and make sure that he was focused on the interrogation

I would yell at detainee's occasionally to emphasis a point.

Music was used in interrogations. SGT (b)(6) and I would use music to soothe the detainee's. The music was Arabic, not heavy metal, rap or anything like that.

I am not aware of sleep deprivation being used against any detainees (b)(6)
(b)(6)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, SGT (b)(6) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 20 of 70 Exhibits

DOD JUNE

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF SSG (b)(6) who was interviewed on 09 February 2005 at a Conference room at the 250th MI Battalion Headquarters, Long Beach, California. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from August 2002 to February 2003. At the time I was stationed at GTMO I was assigned as an interrogator for the Special Projects Team from October 2002 to November 2002 and the rest of the time I was assigned to the Central Asia Team.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

(b)(6)

I never impersonated an FBI agent or heard of any other interrogators impersonating FBI agents. However, I would try anything except impersonating clergy, medical or Red Cross. If you can use it and sell it to the detainee I say try it. A lot of interrogators used different "roles."

I am aware of yelling and loud music being used in interrogations. I yelled and used loud music during interrogations. (b)(6) (b)(6)
I don't recall music being used outside of Camp X-Ray. We would use "female artist/music" like Brittney Spears or Christina Aguilera. Yelling was part of Fear Up Harsh.

We never denied a detainee food or water. ISN (b)(refused food and water all the time. He was fasting.

I never witnessed or heard of an interrogator performing a "lap dance" on a detainee. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, SSG (b)(6) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 30 of 76 Exhibits

BG JOHN FURLOW

DOD JUNE

Enclosure 31

Deferred pending completion of review

Enclosure 32

Deferred pending completion of review

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF ENS (b)(6) Interrogator, who was interviewed on 23 February 2005 at a conference room at the RFTA, Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Her statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from July 2002 to October 2002. I was a Team leader for Interrogators.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

(b)(6)

Yes I am aware of interrogators yelling at detainees or playing loud music (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6) Yelling, screaming, or talking directly in the detainee's ear were techniques used in implementing the Fear Up Approach.

Sleep Deprivation – No. Most of the interrogations I conducted while at GTMO didn't last longer than 2 or 3 hours. We would alter the times we interrogated detainees. For example, waking the detainee up at 3 a.m. to conduct the interrogation; rather than conducting the interrogation at 3 p.m. (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(6)

I heard that some interrogators manipulated the air conditioners to make the detainees uncomfortable, but were told to stop. (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)

We were under a lot of pressure to obtain information from the detainees (especially ISN (b)(6)

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, ENS (b)(6) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

Enclosure 34

Deferred pending completion of review

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

1. Request Detainee (b)(2),(b)(6) (b)(6) be moved according to the Cell Transfer Schedule within (b)(2) (b)(2) Attached is a proposed schedule of movement/interrogation times (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

2. All comfort and nonessential items must be removed from the Detainee's possession, except those required by official policy.

3. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. (b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 35 of 76 Exhibits

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure 35

Attachment Denied in Full Exemption 1

Enclosure 36

Deferred pending completion of review

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF SGT (b)(6) who was interviewed on 09 February 2005 at a conference room at the 250th MI Battalion Headquarters, Long Beach, California. Those present besides the witness was the Alpha Company Commander, 250th Military Intelligence Battalion. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from August 2002 to February 2003. At the time I was stationed at GTMO, I was assigned as an interrogator. However, most of my time was spent reviewing Memorandums for Record and draft interrogation plans with the military analysts.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

(b)(6)

I believe sleep deprivation was used during interrogations. (b)(6)
(b)(6)

SGT (b)(6) described how she used either perfume or Vaseline during interrogations. According to SGT (b)(6) she would put the lotion/perfume in her hand and then rub the detainee's hand and arms. (In fact, SGT (b)(6) stated that she used Victoria Secret perfume so the detainee's would smell like a woman).

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, SGT (b)(6) Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

Enclosure 38

Deferred pending completion of review

Enclosure 39

Deferred pending completion of review

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE 170
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

JTF-170(b)(

(b)(1) Sec

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Joint Task Force 160

SUBJECT: Interrogation Plan(b)(2)

1. (S/NF) This memorandum requests Joint Detention Operations Group support for an (b)(1) Sec pperation(b)(6) (b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

DERIVED FROM: DHS SCG MAR 02
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 40 of 76 Exhibits

~~SECRET~~

JTF-170-(b)(
SUBJECT: Interrogation Plan for (b)(6)

6. (U) This request has been reviewed by my Staff Judge Advocate and determined to be legally sufficient.

7. (U) Commander, JDOG may direct any questions about this matter to (b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B (b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

DERIVED FROM: DHS SCG MAR 02
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

Enclosure 41

Deferred pending completion of review

Enclosure 42

Denied in full
Exemption 1

Enclosure 43

Deferred pending completion of review

Enclosure 44

Denied in full
Exemption 1

Enclosure 45

Deferred pending completion of review

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DETAINEE ATE A COMPLETE MEAL AND DRANK AN ENTIRE BOTTLE OF WATER AT THE ORDER OF (b)(6)

THE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

THE MEDIC TOOK THE VITAL SIGNS OF THE DETAINEE WHILE HE WAS STANDING AND LATER SITTING. THE VITALS WERE ALL NORMAL. ALTHOUGH THE MEDIC STATED THAT THE DETAINEE'S VITALS WERE NORMAL HE STILL NEEDED TO DRINK WATER.

THE DETAINEE ATE A COMPLETE MEAL AND DRANK AN ENTIRE BOTTLE OF WATER (b)(6)

THE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

THE DETAINEE WAS SEEN BY THE MEDIC AT 2130 HOURS. SHE STATED THAT HIS VITALS WERE NORMAL. DETAINEE WAS ALSO TAKEN TO THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED A COUPLE OF TIMES DURING THE NIGHT.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DETAINEE WAS SEEN BY THE MEDIC (b)(1) Sec SHE STATED THAT HIS VITALS WERE NORMAL. DETAINEE WAS ALSO TAKEN TO THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE WAS GIVEN A HEAD BREAK AND TAKEN FOR A 10 MINUTE WALK. SOURCE WAS SEEN BY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND GIVEN THE "ALL-CLEAR."

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE WAS GIVEN A HEAD BREAK AND TAKEN FOR A 10 MINUTE WALK. SOURCE WAS SEEN BY A DOCTOR AND GIVEN THE "ALL-CLEAR." SOURCE WAS OFFERED WATER BUT REFUSED.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DOCTOR AGAIN SAW SOURCE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HE NEEDED TO BE HYDRATED AND WAS GIVEN AN IV. THE DOCTOR DREW BLOOD TO CHECK KIDNEY FUNCTION. TEST RESULTS SHOWED THAT THE DETAINEE'S KIDNEY FUNCTION WAS NORMAL.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

MEDICAL REPRESENTATIVE FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GIVE THE SOURCE AN IV BECAUSE THE LAST MEDICAL CHECK SHOWED THE SOURCE WAS BECOMING DEHYDRATED (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE SOURCE WAS OFFERED FOOD AND WATER BUT HE REFUSED. AFTER ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES THE MEDICAL REPRESENTATIVE REMOVED THE FIRST IV AND REPLACED IT WITH A SECOND. THE SECOND IV WAS REMOVED AT APPROXIMATELY 1920 HOURS.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

Enclosure 52

Denied in full
Exemption 1

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

THE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE COURSE OF THE (b)(2) HE WAS ALSO OFFERED WATER AND FOOD BUT EVERY TIME HE WOULD REFUSE TO EAT OR DRINK WATER.

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DETAINEE HAD BEEN SEEN BY THE MEDICAL REPRESENTATIVE ON TWO OCCASIONS. THE REASON FOR THE FIRST WAS TO CHECK THE DETAINEE'S BLOOD PRESSURE AND HIS WEIGHT. THE SECOND WAS TO CHECK THE DETAINEE'S OVERALL WELLNESS (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DETAINEE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SPEAK BECAUSE EVERYTHING HE STATED WAS WHAT WAS STATED IN THE PAST.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) SOURCE SENT ON BATHROOM BREAK. HE RECEIVED 30 MINUTES OF EXERCISE (WALKING). (b)(1) CORPSMAN CHECKED SOURCE'S VITAL SIGNS. SOURCE COMPLAINED TO CORPSMAN OF DIZZINESS AND HEADACHES. CORPSMAN TOLD SOURCE THAT THOSE SYMPTOMS WERE A RESULT OF DEHYDRATION. AFTER CONFERRING WITH THE DOCTOR ON DUTY, CORPSMAN GAVE SOURCE THREE BAGS OF IV SOLUTION.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

CONDOLENCE TO THE FAMILIES. THIS HE AGREED TO DO. THE SOURCE WROTE LETTERS TO TWO FAMILIES WISHING THEM HIS BEST.

THE SOURCE WAS TAKEN TO THE HEAD AND EXERCISED FOR 10 MINUTES. HE WAS CHECKED BY MEDICAL AND WAS FOUND TO BE DEHYDRATED. THE SOURCE WAS OFFERED AND ATE ONE MRE AND DRANK ONE BOTTLE OF WATER. THE IV WAS DELAYED BY MEDICAL SINCE HE DRANK THE WATER.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DETAINEE WAS CONSISTENTLY OFFERED WATER THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. HE DRANK APPROXIMATELY SIX OUNCES OF WATER (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) HE WAS EXERCISED AFTER EACH VISIT TO THE LATRINE (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) DETAINEE WAS EXERCISED TAKEN TO BATHROOM. HE REFUSED WATER.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) DETAINEE WAS EXERCISED, TAKEN TO BATHROOM. HE REFUSED WATER AND FOOD.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Detainee offered food and water – refused. Corpsman changed ankle bandages.
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(2) egan to restated the facts presented throughout the day.

(b)(1) Detainee offered water – refused.

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee was sent to the latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He was offered water but he refused to drink it. His vitals were normal.

(b)(1) Detainee was sent to the latrine. He was offered water but he refused it.

(b)(1) Detainee was sent to latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He was offered food and water. He ate all of his meal except the applesauce and drank water mixed with tea powder. The medic weighed the detainee. He weighed 116 pounds.

(b)(1) Detainee offered water. He refused the water. He was taken to the latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He would discuss the Koran but nothing of value. He denies being involved with Al Qaeda.

(b)(1) Detainee was exercised, sent to the latrine and offered water which he refused to drink. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) S

(b)(1) Sec Detainee was exercised, sent to the latrine and offered water which he has been refusing to drink all night.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Corpsman checks vitals – O.K. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) Detainee offered food and water. Ate one MRE and took two sips of water.
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Refused water. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Refused water. Detainee drank ¾ cup of coffee.

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Refused water.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee was put to bed.

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee checked by corpsman – O.K. Water offered to detainee – refused.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes.

(b)(1) Corpsman checked vitals – detainee beginning to get dehydrated.

(b)(1) Detainee offered food and water – ate one MRE and drank two bottles of water.

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Detainee sat and listened to music for remainder of session.

(b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Detainee refused water and food. He was sent to the latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He refused food but he drank approximately six ounces of water. (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He refuses to drink water again.

(b)(1) Detainee was take to the latrine and exercised. He did not desire water. He

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee does not want water. He was taken to the latrine and exercised.

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised. He was given a meal ready to eat and a bottle of water. He ate all of the meal and drank all of the water.

(b)(1) Detainee was given a latrine break and exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He does not desire water.

(b)(1) Sec Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) (b)(2) entered the booth and offered water to detainee – refused. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee was taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. The detainee was told that

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

following information:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Detainee was offered water – refused. Detainee was told to go to sleep.

(b)(1) Detainee awakened, taken to bathroom, and walked 10 minutes. Corpsman checked vitals – O.K. Detainee offered food and water – ate one MRE and drank two bottles of water.

(b)(1) Detainee taken to sleep cell for sleep period.

(b)(1) Sec Detainee awakened, taken to bathroom, and exercised 10 minutes. Detainee offered water – refused. (b)(6) began by asking the detainee why he wanted to write a will. Detainee was evasive and finally stated that he didn't want to answer that question. When asked if he was going to try to commit suicide, the detainee stated "no", but death had been entering his mind lately. The detainee was allowed to rewrite his will (it was essentially the same as that written the previous day). (b)(6) began discussing the condemnation of UBL by Islamic leaders.

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes.

(b)(1) Detainee offered food and water – refused. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) began talking about detainee's youth.

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Detainee offered water – refused. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Corpsman took vitals – O.K.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee offered water – took one sip.

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes.

(b)(1) Detainee ate an MRE and drank a bottle of water.

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Detainee exercised and given a latrine break. Detainee tripped stepping out of latrine. Corpsman looked detainee over and everything was O.K. (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Detainee offered water – took one sip.

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 15 minutes.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and exercised 10 minutes. Detainee offered water – refused.

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee was instructed to go to sleep.

(b)(1) Detainee was woken up, taken to bathroom and exercised.

(b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) DETAINEE VITALS WERE TAKEN, AND WERE WITHIN NORMAL RANGE. DETAINEE WALKED TO CELL AND TOLD TO GO TO SLEEP.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE WAS OFFERED WATER BUT REFUSED INDICATING WITH THE WAVE OF A HAND.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec [redacted] THE DETAINEE WAS EXERCISED, TAKEN TO THE BATHROOM, SEARCHED UPON RETURN (b)(1) HE REFUSED WATER OR FOOD.

(b)(1) Sec [redacted] THE DETAINEE REFUSED WATER AND STATED THAT HE WAS ON STRIKE FROM FOOD AND WATER. HE MADE HIS STRIKE STATEMENT IN ENGLISH. HE WAS EXERCISED AND TAKEN TO BATHROOM.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) DETAINEE WAS EXERCISED AND TAKEN TO BATHROOM. HE REFUSED WATER.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

AFTER A HEAD BREAK THE SOURCE WAS OFFERED FOOD AND WATER WHICH HE REJECTED.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

DETAINEE WAS AWAKEN FROM HIS NAP. HIS VITAL SIGNS WERE CHECKED BY THE MEDICAL REPRESENTATIVE. HIS BLOOD PRESSURE (100/58) AND PULSE RATE (62) WERE NORMAL. HE WAS GIVEN A MEAL WITH AN EXTRA MAIN MEAL INSIDE. DETAINEE WAS ALSO GIVEN A BOTTLE OF WATER. HE COMPLETED IIIS ENTIRE MEAL AND THE BOTTLE WATER.

THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT THE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED FOR IMPROVED CIRCULATION AND OVER ALL GOOD HEALTH. HE WAS

ALSO GIVEN WATER A COUPLE OF TIMES THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. HE REFUSED TO DRINK WATER AT EVERY REQUEST (b)(6)

THE DOCTOR SPOKE WITH THE DETAINEE. HE WAS GIVEN AN 800MG MOTRIN FOR CHEST PAINS. THE DETAINEE WAS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN THE SYMPATHY OF THE DOCTOR. THE DETAINEE COMPLAINED OF HAVING A HARD TIME BREATHING BUT AFTER ~~THE DOCTOR~~ EXAMINED THE DETAINEE HE DETERMINED THAT THE DETAINEE COULD AND WAS BREATHING JUST FINE. THE DETAINEE ALSO TOLD THE DOCTOR THAT HE WAS TIRED AND NEEDED TO GET SOME SLEEP. THE DOCTOR INFORMED THE DETAINEE THAT HE WAS GETTING AMPLE SLEEP.

(b)(ENTERED THE (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) AND GAVE DETAINEE AN EVEN SHAVE. THE DETAINEE DID NOT RESIST.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT THE DETAINEE'S VITAL SIGNS FLUCTUATED. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) (b)(1) HIS VITAL SIGNS WERE NORMAL. BY THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT THE DETAINEE'S PULSE RATE WAS SLIGHTLY HIGH AT 93. AT THE CLOSE OF THE NIGHT THE DETAINEE'S PULSE RATE WAS NORMAL AT 61 AND SO WAS HIS BLOOD PRESSURE AT 96/43.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

[redacted]

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee was exercised (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec Medical representative observed the detainee's vital signs. They were normal. The detainee was sent to the latrine and exercised. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Detainee stated that the Saudi government could prove that his passport was obtained legally. The detainee was sent to the latrine and exercised.

(b)(1) Detainee's vital signs were checked by the medical representative. His vital signs were normal. The detainee was given a complete meal and bottled water to consume. He finished all of his meal and the entire bottle of water.

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised.

(b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) he was taken outside for some fresh air and exercise. He was offered water but he refused.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b) (1) (b)(1),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee taken to bathroom and walked. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Offered food and water – refused.

(b)(1) Detainee offered water – refused. Detainee states in English he is on strike from food and water. Detainee taken to bathroom and walked. Detainee was

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee taken to bathroom and walked. Offered water – refused.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes.

(b)(1) Corpsman checked detainee's vitals – O.K. Detainee was taken to (b)(2) and put to bed.

(b)(1) Sec Detainee awakened, taken to bathroom and walked (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Corpsman checked vitals – O.K.

(b)(1) Detainee offered water – refused. Corpsman changed ankle bandages to prevent chafing. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 30 minutes.

(b)(1) Detainee offered food and water – refused. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) Detainee offered water – refused. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee taken to bathroom. Corpsman checked vitals – O.K. Conversation continued about topics such as music, dancing, history of the Koran, history of the Bible, and Arabian history. Detainee was ignorant of historical events outside of the geographic region of the Arabian Peninsula. Detainee gave names of Islamic scholars that said music was forbidden and the (b)(6) agreed to review their

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom.

(b)(1) Detainee allowed to take a nap for one hour.

(b)(1) Sec Detainee was awaken from his nap. His vital signs were checked by the medical representative. His blood pressure (100/58) and pulse rate (62) were normal.

(b)(1) Detainee was taken to the latrine. He was allowed to exercise. He was given a meal with an extra main meal inside. Detainee was also given a bottle of water. He completed his entire meal and the bottle of water.

(b)(1) The doctor spoke with the detainee. He was given an 800mg motrin for chest pains.

(b)(1) Sec (b)(entered the (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) and gave detainee an even shave. The detainee did not resist.

(b)(1) Sec (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised. His vitals were taken again. His blood pressure was normal but his pulse rate was high at 93. The medical representative will be monitoring the detainee's vitals closely until his pulse rate is lower.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

DURING A LULL IN THE CONVERSATION HE WAS ASKED IF HE NEEDED TO USE THE RESTROOM. AT FIRST HE SAID "NO" BUT AFTER ABOUT 30 SECONDS HE RECONSIDERED AND ASKED TO USE IT. HE SAID THAT IT MIGHT TAKE HIM A LITTLE EXTRA TIME AS HE WAS HAVING STOMACH PROBLEMS. HE WAS ALLOWED TO GO TO THE RESTROOM. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE CORPSMAN CHECKED SOURCE'S SWOLLEN FEET. SOURCE WALKED AROUND FOR 10 MINUTES DOING AN OCCASIONAL KNEE BEND. UPON SOURCE'S RETURN TO THE BOOTH, THE CORPSMAN WRAPPED SOURCE'S FEET TO AVOID IRRITATION FROM THE CUFFS. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) CORPSMAN TOLD (b)(6) THAT SOURCE NEEDED TO DRINK WATER, OR ELSE HE WOULD NEED AN I.V.

WHEN (b)(6) SAT DOWN TO BEGIN (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS NO LONGER ON STRIKE, AND THAT HE WANTED TO EAT AND DRINK. WHEN (b)(6) ASKED SOURCE TO CLARIFY WHAT HE SAID, SOURCE SAID IN ENGLISH, "PLEASE, PLEASE, I WANT TO EAT." (b)(6) SAID, "SINCE IT IS MY BIRTHDAY, WE WILL HAVE A BIRTHDAY BREAKFAST." BOTH (b)(6) AND SOURCE ATE AN MRE.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

AT (b)(, CORPSMAN TOLD SOURCE TO DRINK WATER, OR HE WOULD GET AN I.V. SOURCE STATED THAT HE WASN'T ON STRIKE, BUT WOULD DRINK WHEN HE DECIDED. (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

GAVE SOURCE A CHECK-UP. EVERYTHING WAS OK.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) SOURCE WAS TAKEN TO THE HEAD THEN WALKED FOR 10 MINUTES TO MAINTAIN CIRCULATION IN HIS LEGS. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE WAS GIVEN ANOTHER HEAD BREAK AND EXERCISED FOR 10 MINUTES. HE WAS THEN OFFERED WATER. HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE BOTTLE OF WATER AND DRANK JUST A FEW OUNCES. HE THEN PUT THE BOTTLE DOWN AND ASKED FOR SALAT. (b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) THE SOURCE DRANK THE WHOLE BOTTLE AND WAS ALLOWED SALAT.

SOURCE WAS TOLD TO EAT AND WAS OFFERED 1 MRE. HE ATE THE MRE AND DRANK AN ADDITIONAL ½ BOTTLE OF WATER. ON COMPLETION OF THE MRE HE SAID THAT HE WAS GOING ON ANOTHER HUNGER STRIKE. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE SOURCE STILL HAS NOT AGAIN REFERRED TO THE STRIKE AS FASTING.

SOURCE WAS OFFERED A TOOTH BRUSH BUT DECLINED TO USE IT. (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DOCTOR VISITED THE SOURCE. THE CHECK WAS OK. SOURCE BEGAN COMPLAINING ABOUT HIS EMOTIONS AND THE DOCTOR LEFT. HE HAD NO MEDICAL COMPLAINTS.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec

Detainee's vital signs were taken again by the medical representative. All of his vital signs were normal. His blood pressure was 96/43 and his pulse rate was 61. He was taken to the latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Detainee is offered water – refused.

(b)(1) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec Detainee was taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Detainee was offered food and water – refused.(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) Detainee taken to bathroom, walked 10 minutes, and corpsman checked vitals – O.K.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

NOTED THAT HISTORICALLY THE DETAINEE'S PULSE RATE IS LOW, ESPECIALLY IN THE EVENINGS.

DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. HE WAS ALSO OFFERED FOOD AND WATER BUT HE CONTINUOUSLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEM. HE WAS EXERCISED SEVERAL TIMES FOR CIRCULATION AND TO HELP IMPROVE OVERALL HEALTH.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) TAKEN TO RESTROOM AND EXERCISED OUTDOORS.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(DOCTOR CHECKS SOURCE; SAID THAT IF HE IS UNABLE TO DEFECATE, SOURCE WILL REQUIRE AN ENEMA. DOCTOR STATED THAT SOURCE'S FEET LOOK BETTER.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec SOURCE TO GO TO BATHROOM AND WALK FOR TWENTY MINUTES. CORPSMAN CHECKED HIS VITAL SIGNS AND STATED HE WAS FINE. (b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c))(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

NOTED THAT HISTORICALLY THE DETAINEE'S PULSE RATE IS LOW, ESPECIALLY IN THE EVENINGS.

DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. HE WAS ALSO OFFERED FOOD AND WATER BUT HE CONTINUOUSLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEM. HE WAS EXERCISED SEVERAL TIMES FOR CIRCULATION AND TO HELP IMPROVE OVERALL HEALTH.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) ATE THE MRE. HE ALSO CONSUMED TWO 24OZ BOTTLES OF WATER.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE WAS OFFERED FOOD AND TOOK IT. HE THEN SAID THAT AFTER THIS MEAL HE WOULD BE GOING ON HUNGER STRIKE.(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DOCTOR SPOKE WITH THE DETAINEE. HE WAS GIVEN AN 800MG MOTRIN FOR CHEST PAINS. THE DETAINEE WAS ATTEMPTING TO GAIN THE SYMPATHY OF THE DOCTOR. THE DETAINEE COMPLAINED OF HAVING A HARD TIME BREATHING BUT AFTER THE DOCTOR EXAMINED THE DETAINEE HE DETERMINED THAT THE DETAINEE COULD AND WAS BREATHING JUST FINE. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) AND GAVE DETAINEE AN EVEN SHAVE. THE DETAINEE DID NOT RESIST.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a) - [illegible]

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) SOURCE WENT TO THE BATHROOM AND EXERCISED. SOURCE REFUSED WATER.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),(b)(1) SENT SOURCE TO BATHROOM. SOURCE EXERCISED FOR 15 MINUTES.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) THE CORPSMAN CHECKED SOURCE'S VITAL SIGNS. THEY WERE WITHIN NORMAL RANGE. (b)(6) ORDERED SOURCE TO GO TO THE BATHROOM. HE ALSO EXERCISED FOR 15 MINUTES.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

1. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

2. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

3. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) SOURCE EXERCISED FOR THIRTY MINUTES, AND USED THE BATHROOM.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED SEVERAL TIMES THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. HIS VITAL SIGNS WERE CHECKED TWICE AND THEY WERE NORMAL. HE WEIGHED IN AT 141 POUNDS(b)(1) Sec

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

THE DETAINEE WAS CHECKED BY THE DOCTOR AND THE DOCTOR EXPLAINED THAT HE NEEDED TO DRINK WATER SO THAT IVS WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO HIM. THE DETAINEE THEN TOLD THE DOCTOR THAT HE WAS ON HUNGER STRIKE AND ON DRINKING STRIKE. THE DETAINEE ATE AN MRE AND DRANK A BOTTLE OF WATER AT 2100.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED EVERY ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE WAS ALLOWED TO WALK AND GO TO THE BATHROOM. SOURCE (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) WAS GIVEN A MRE PACKET. SOURCE ATE THE MRE AND A SECOND ONE AS WELL, SOURCE WAS ALSO GIVEN A BANANA, TWO PEARS, FOUR COOKIES, AND TWO BOTTLES OF WATER. SOURCE WAS VERY RESPONSIVE TODAY. SOURCE WAS CHECKED OVER BY THE MEDIC ON SCENE, AND ALL WRAPPINGS WERE CHANGED.

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

AUTHORIZED FOR LOCAL REPRODUCTION

MEDICAL RECORD	CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE
DATE	SYMPTOMS, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT TREATING ORGANIZATION *(Sign each entry)*
16JAN03 2000	MD Note (b)(6)

(b)(6)

HOSPITAL OR MEDICAL FAC

SPONSOR'S NAME	SSN/ID NO.	RELATIONSHIP TO SPONSOR

PATIENT'S IDENTIFICATION: *(For typed or written entries, give: Name - last, first, middle; ID No.or SSN; Sex; Date of Birth; Rank/Grade.)*	REGISTER NO.	WARD NO.

(b)(2),(b)(6)

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE
Medical Record
STANDARD FORM 600 (REV. 6-97)
Prescribed by GSA/ICMR
FIRMR 141 CFR 201-9.202-1

SECRET

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 65 of 76 Exhibits

DOD JUNE

DATE	SYMPTOMS, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT- TREATING ORGANIZATION (Sign each entry)
6 JAN 03 2000	Assessment: Normal physical exam. NO injuries or trauma.
	Plan: Follow-up with medical prn. (b)(6),(b)(3) 10 USC §130b

SECRET

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON//X-1~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GTMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

JTF GTMO b)(

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

(b)(6),(b)(3) 18 USC §798(a)

SUBJECT: Effectiveness of the Use of Certain Category II Counter-Resistance Strategies (U)

1. (U) This memorandum responds to the Director's (DJS) request for information concerning the effectiveness of interrogation techniques previously approved by the Secretary of Defense. Included with this memorandum is a timeline of the interrogation techniques employed, the information obtained as a result of using these techniques, as well as the justifications for implementing certain techniques.

2. ~~(S//NF)~~ JTF Guantanamo's mission is to conduct detention and interrogation operations to collect and exploit intelligence in support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In executing this mission, numerous detainees (b)(5),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) demonstrated counter-resistance techniques. Consequently, (b)(2) Commander, JTF-170 requested authorization to employ specific interrogation techniques that were in addition to doctrinal techniques contained in Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations. These techniques were approved by Secretary of Defense (b)(2)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

DERIVED FROM: DIA DO HUMINT SCG, March 2012
DECLASSIFY ON: X-1

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON//X-1~~

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 66 of 76 Exhibits

JTF GTMO b)(3
SUBJECT: Effectiveness of the Use of Certain Category II Counter-Resistance Strategies

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

JTF GTMO(b)(

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

9. (S) These techniques are humane, whether employed singly or in combination over a period time and are within the spirit and intent of humane detention. After consultation with the Staff Judge Advocate I believe that they are not in violation of the 8th Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment; or Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 2340 et.seq. (the Federal Torture Statute). These techniques are not intended to cause gratuitous, severe, physical pain or suffering or prolonged mental harm, but are instead intended to induce cooperation over a period of time by weakening the detainee's mental and physical ability to resist. The President's Military Order dated 7 November 2001 states that the detainees must be treated humanely and this humane treatment includes shelter, food, medical

~~TF GTMO EYES~~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

cars, and clothing. This standard has been met (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) and will continue to be met in future operations (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

Enclosure 67

Denied in full
Exemption 1

(b)(1) Sec

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (S) //(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(6) who was arrested at his mother's house in Nouakchott, Mauritania in the fall of 2001. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) eventually handed over to the Americans and sent to Bagram, Afghanistan. Detainee is the (b)(6)

1. (S) SUMMARY:

a. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

b. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

c. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 69 of 76 Exhibits

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

d. At 21:00 hours detainee was asked (b)(6) if he was hungry. He said yes. Detainee was told to sit down. (b)(6) had detainee's cuffs taken off and was handed an MRE and a cup of water. Detainee ate only a few bites of the MRE, and drank water. Interrogator sat across from detainee and

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

3. (S)
a. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. (S)
a (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

5. (S) SUMMARY (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

a. (S) None.

(b)(1)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (S) // (b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(6) who was arrested at his mother's house in Nouakchott, Mauritania in the fall of 2001. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) eventually handed over to the Americans and sent to Bagram, Afghanistan. Detainee is the (b)(6)

1. (S) SUMMARY:
   a. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
   b. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

2. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

3. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
   a. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
   (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
   a. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
   (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 69 of 76 Exhibits

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

Subject: FW: DETAINEE ALLEGATIONS INQUIRY REPORT

(b)(2)(
ummary.doc (24 KB

Classification: S E C R E T
Caveats: NONE

Sirs,

Another allegation to look at.

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

Attention: This electronic transmission may contain attorney work-product or information protected from disclosure under FOIA, 5 USC 552. Do not release outside of DoD channels without proper authorization from the sender.

> <(b)(2)(b) Summary.doc>>
> Classification: S E C R E T
> Caveats: NO FORN
>
Classification: S E C R E T
Caveats: NONE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 70 of 76 Exhibits

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

DETAINEE ALLEGATIONS INQUIRY REPORT

(b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

SJA - Summary of Allegation: During (b)(2),(b)(6) alleged that during the months of August through October 2003: (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) that he was coerced in signing a false statement implicating himself in the Millennium Bomb Plot at LAX airport. (b)(2),(specifically named or described (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) as being involved in the above described activities.

JDOG Findings:

1. ____ DIMS Records
2. ____ SIR/IR Records
3. ____ FCE/IRF Records
4. ____ Other (Specify)

Summary and Analysis:

JIG Findings:

1. ____ Documents (Specify)
2. ____ SIR/IR Records
3. ____ JDIMS Records
4. ____ Other (Specify)

Summary and Analysis:

JMG Findings:

SJA ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT

DETAINEE ALLEGATIONS INQUIRY REPORT

(b)(2),(b)(6) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

1. ____ Medical Records

2. ____ Other (Specify)

Summarized Medical History (If Applicable)

Summary and Analysis:

Enclosure 71

Denied in full
Exemption 1

Enclosure 72

Denied in full
Exemption 1

(b)(1) Sec

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (S) (b)(2),(b)(6)
(b)(6) is a
arrested at his mother's house in Nouakchott, M[illegible] n the
fall of 2001. Detainee (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) [illegible] of interrogations and
eventually handed over to the Americans and sent to Bagram, Afghanistan. Detainee is the
(b)(6)

1. (S) SUMMARY:
   a. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

2. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec

3. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
   a. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

5. (S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

   a. (S) None.

6. (S) ADDITIONAL COLLECTORS COMMENTS:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

   a. (S/NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

   b. (S/NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

c. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

d. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

e. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

f. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

g. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

h. ~~(S/NF)~~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

up and running.

b6-1
b7C-1 [redacted] CTD / Fly Team

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

You have been identified as having conducted an assignment at GTMO, Cuba since 9/11/01. The Inspection Division has been tasked with contacting those employees who have served in any capacity at GTMO and obtain information regarding the treatment of detainees. Employees should immediately respond to the following :

1) Employees who observed aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques on GTMO detainees which was not consistent with Bureau interview policy/guidelines, should respond via email for the purpose of a follow-up interview. Positive email responses should be directed to:

[redacted] b6-1
Inspection Division b7C-1

2) Employees who served at GTMO and observed no aggressive treatment of detainees, should respond via an EC documenting a negative response. The EC should include the employee's official Bureau name, title, and tenure of assignment at GTMO.

The EC should be titled "Counterterrorism DIvision, GTMO, Inspection Special Inquiry",
file # 297-HQ-A1327668-A. The EC should not be uploaded, but only serialized, with a hard copy forwarded to:

Inspection Division
Office of Inspections
[redacted] b6-1
Room 7837 b7C-1

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/15/06 BY 65175 DMH/RS/JAC

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

FBI E-Mail – Employees Identified as Having an Assignment to GTMO – 8 Jul 04

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 1 of 75 Exhibits

F3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/06 BY 63179 DMH/PLB/JAC

b6-1
b7C-1

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2004 2:38 PM
To: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)
Cc: [redacted] (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: GTMO

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

b6-1
b7C-1

[redacted] I was the Case Agent for the first 14 months of GTMO. I spoke with Valerie Caproni two months ago when I was in Iraq and the Abu Gharib fallout was just breaking. At that time, it seemed the Bureau's focus was identifying any liability in the form of direct involvement. I would be happy to sit down with you and walk you through what I saw as the predictable onset of aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques. In short, the Bureau personnel there had no direct participation. But I think I may be able to assist in describing the landscape for you and giving you the details about where some things went off the tracks. I just [redacted] and am phone-less, but I have this e-mail

UNCLASSIFIED

7/14/2004

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

SCCC

2 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Geoffery Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

SUBJECT: ~~(S//NF)~~ Letter of Promulgation Regarding Secretary of Defense Guidance On Interrogation Techniques

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ This memorandum provides amplification on the 16 April 2003 guidance from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) regarding Joint Task Force Guantanamo's implementation of interrogation techniques.

2. (S//NF) The SECDEF's memorandum directs that Techniques B, I, O, and X be used only when required by military necessity, and that the SECDEF be notified in advance. Prior to applying these techniques against a specific detainee, I direct you to submit a memorandum for approval pursuant to the detainee's initial interrogation strategy (or when that strategy changes).

[redacted]

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ To clarify other matters raised by the SECDEF's memorandum:

(a) Reference Technique B, the Working Group was most concerned about removal of the Koran from a detainee--something we no longer do. Because providing incentives (e.g., McDonald's Fish Sandwiches or cigarettes) is an integral part of interrogations, you will notify me in writing when the provided incentive would exceed that contemplated by interrogation doctrine contained in Army FM 34-52, or when the interrogators intend to remove an incentive from a detainee.

(b) Reference Techniques I and O, you will notify me in writing when use of these standard interrogation techniques goes beyond the doctrinal application described in Army FM 34-52. When use of the technique is consistent with FM 34-52, you do not need to notify me.

(c) I define "sleep deprivation," referenced in Technique V, as keeping a detainee awake for more than 16 hrs or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession.

(d) Reference Technique X, I do not consider the use of maximum security units as isolation. A detainee placed in a maximum security unit is segregated, but not truly isolated.

(e) I define the "least intrusive method" as the technique that has the least impact on a detainee's standard of treatment, while evoking the desired response from the detainee during interrogations.

Memo to CDR JTF-GTMO Ref Letter of Promulgation Re SECDEF Guidance on Interrogation Tech

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 18 of 76 Exhibits

DOD JUNE

3736

SCCC
SUBJECT: ~~(S//NF)~~ Letter of Promulgation Regarding SECDEF Guidance On Interrogation Techniques

(f) Except in the case of Techniques B, I, O, and X, I have determined that the first O-6/GG-15 in the chain of command or supervision, is the "appropriate specified senior approval authority," unless approval authority is withheld from that individual by higher authority.

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ Lastly, I have told the Secretary of Defense his 16 April guidance applies to all interagency elements assigned or attached to JTF GTMO.

JAMES T. HILL
General, USA
Commander

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Reason: 1-5(c)
Decl on: X1

DOD JUNE

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MG (RETIRED) MIKE DUNLAVEY

MG Mike Dunlavey, FORMER COMMANDER, JTF-170, was interviewed and made the following statement on or about 1007 hours, 17 March 2005, at WFO, Arlington, VA:

Appointment memos were shown to this witness. The witness went over the allegations.

Witness sworn by LtGen Schmidt. The witness provided the following testimony:

BACKGROUND:

How I became the JTF-170 Commander? I was working at the National Security Agency. On 14 February 2002, I was contacted to meet with the SECDEF. I received a joint service billet description. I met with the SECDEF on the 20th or 21st of February 2002, along with the Deputy SECDEF, Wolferwitz and a number of other personnel.

The SECDEF told me that DoD had accumulated a number of bad guys. He wanted to set up interrogation operations and to identify the senior Taliban and senior operatives and to obtain information on what they were going to do regarding their operations and structure.

The SECDEF said he wanted a product and he wanted intelligence now. He told me what he wanted; not how to do it.

Initially, I was told that I would answer to the SECDEF and USSOUTHCOM. I did not have to deal with USCENTCOM. Their mission had nothing to do with my mission. Everything had to go up to USSOUTHCOM then to JCS. The directions changed and I got my marching orders from the President of the United States. I was told by the SECDEF that he wanted me back in Washington DC every week to brief him.

I have 35 years of Intelligence experience. I am a trial lawyer and between interrogations in Vietnam, being a CI Commander, and as a trial lawyer, I have done over 3,000 interrogations. The SECDEF needed a common sense way on how to do business.

The mission was to get intelligence to prevent another 9/11.

GTMO Situation:

Mike Lehnert did a miraculous job of getting Camp X-ray set up.

When I got to GTMO the facility consisted of literally a dangling fence. Detainees were right next to one another. In the Seabee hut for example, everyone saw who was being interrogated.

DoD photographers were taking pictures for historical purposes. They published them with no regard for security. My job was to establish it.

B6 [redacted] was the Assistant J2. He worked up the JMD and tried to fill it with bodies to accomplish the interrogation mission.

We have not fought a real war since Vietnam. Except for DHS, our interrogators were virtually inexperienced. It was an OJT situation on the ground at GTMO.

When I arrived, I met the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) for the FBI. He was a SAC out of Miami. Interrogations had started but there was no system. For example, the interrogators thought [redacted] was the big dog. He made a lot of noise in the prison grounds but he was not the big guy. There simply was no process in place to assess who the real leaders were. B 6

JTF-160 was losing control of detainees. There was a major riot with the detainees. They were shaking out their blankets and throwing food.

I tried to set up a process that would work for the FBI. [redacted] worked the U.S.S. Cole incident. He was the best interrogator. He was a native speaker and was very, very good. B 6

The military linguists were worthless. They came out of school and could order coffee, but they were getting smoked by the detainees.

The guards were living no better than the detainees.

The standard was to treat them humanely.

Frankly, the 1992 version of FM 34-52 had a problem with it. It was 18 years old and it was how interrogations were done for POWs. [redacted] B1

[redacted] B1

My people, the interrogators, got briefed on what my task force rules were.

The Geneva Conventions applied. I treated them as human beings, but not like soldiers. They had a significant culture. The rugs and beads were significant to me. I let them practice religion, [redacted] B1

The detainees do not control the environment.

Everyday we had undercover FBI agents o[redacted]interrogating. We did want to protect the identity of the people. We had news media almost continuously on the island. B1 B3

[redacted]

We eventually got good information on who the leaders were and then we surprised them with a response team. We grabbed them and took them out to the Brig where the ICRC could see them, but they could not talk to them.

We had detainees that jumped the guards. There was a guy that took the MRE spoon, shaved it down and made a scalpel. We changed their sheets to the sheets in the federal prison system so they can't be torn or tied. They took magnets, welding rods, and fashion them into weapons. We collected a footlocker full of weapons.

INTERROGATIONS:

We built Tiger Teams[redacted] B1

The Combined Investigative Task Force (CITF) brought to the staff and the Joint Commander, a capability to collect evidence to criminally prosecute cases.

Our mission was to stop Americans from being killed. We were trying to work through the[redacted]I moved out smartly and met with the CINC. B1

CITF[redacted]They had good investigative skills and had experience dealing with these people. We had mass murderers.

The FBI SAC came every two weeks. They could not decide what to do. They never built up any type of rapport. We had problems from the get go with the FBI. They had the best interrogators. Interrogations were done in my facilities. Any intelligence they got they would share with us.

We had an SOP on how we did business. We knew from the Manchester document that they would accuse us of torture and inhumane treatmen[redacted] B1 B5

Exhibit 12

Page 4

Denied in full

Exemption 1

31 B6 33



ABUSE ALLEGATIONS:

I would show up unannounced to see what was going on in the interrogations. Someone being out of line is very possible. I won't equate it to NYPD Blue. There were situations where a guy would urinate or jack off on a female interrogator. He did it to offend her. I would not allow them to use religion as a shield. The detainees threw feces at the guards.

An Article 15 was given to a guard for hosing down a detainee. The detainee threw a bucket of urine on him.

If something was going wrong, the climate in the command was comfortable for self - reporting.

We all knew the rules; and we followed them period.

I fell on my sword for the guy that was 100 years old. He was 90 to 105 years old and in his 4th lifetime. He had no real good information. If he died we could not do a forensic study. I would violate Sharia. He was not an American soldier that would not come out in one piece. There were two other guys in their 70s to 80s. One was a cab driver that took Al Qaeda to the border. We got him out of there in October. We released 211 detainees. Only Al Qaeda reported abuses. None were abused. If a guy had information, we would focus on him.

The duct tape incident, I remember that. It was in June or July 2002. I did an internal investigation. They sat and screamed at us. I think the MPs helped the interrogators. I don't know if the guard was directed to restrain the detainee from doing something As a judge if they screamed in court, I would tape them to a chair and tape their mouths. In a legitimate detainee facility, you would do it. If we did not, they would do it.

The detainees were treated humanely. They had a high status of care. They were not EPWs. They refused to identify themselves. On the postcards they gave us the wrong name.

Humane is who we are as the American military.

My first lesson was in Vietnam. I went out in the field and the South Vietnamese had two POWs. They got screamed at and kicked around. I watched what was going on. I was a graduate of DLA. There was a big plate of boiled rice with flies on it. I asked one of POWs when he had last eaten. He said, "four days ago and water two days ago". They chained him to a .50 cal and said he would kill him if he ran away. I had a canteen. I drank and gave him a drink. It worked. I got his name.

I employed what worked and did not work.

[redacted]

b6 [redacted] B6

B1

Regarding the use of dogs. The dogs would be used to escort movement of personnel from detention to interrogation facilities. Dogs were there to intimidate. There were only four dogs in the whole facility. They were there to prevent riots and for security

The dogs were under control of the MP handler. They would have the dogs look at the detainees. On the other side of the coin, we do use the dogs as prisoner control in the federal system. We did not let the dogs bark or bite detainees. I[redacted]rought dogs to my attention, I probably would have approved it. We did not use the dogs on the prisoners. B6

Keep in mind, they don't like dogs. Unless the dogs are on patrol, they would be in an interrogation room. Using dogs is equal to the Fear Up technique. It breaks their concentration in their response to the interrogation techniques. They would be thinking about that dog. Is the dog a real threat? Absolutely not.

[redacted] B1

We physically removed an FBI agent when he went across the desk at a detainee. It happened in my first three months. He was a big kind of guy. The detainee said something like he knows his family and that he was going to kill them. I think it happened during my tenure.

FBI impersonation? No, not on a normal course of business. We did not identify who people where. The names and rank were covered. The FBI wore polo shirts and their badge. The CITF did the same thing. It was part of the deception technique. Maybe there was a complaint. I never knew or heard about it. Would CITF and FBI act as DoD? It could have been a technique.

Interfering with FBI; we had a significant difference of opinion. There was a management issue wher[redacted]ould come in and did not coordinate for a detainee because they wanted to talk to the detainee right away. FBI had interrogation plans.

~~SECRET~~

They did not brief DoD. CITF was going in without telling us. Every IP had to coordinated for facilities and linguists.

Loud music and yelling was part of a sequence of events to disrupt the detainees thought process.

Chaining the detainee in a fetal position is not a normal procedure to be used in interrogation. If the detainee leaped at an interrogator, it might have been used for security. It is not a normal procedure. The interrogators were instructed not to touch the detainees. They were to leave it to the guards.

If short shackled, the detainee had done an offensive action.

Food and water deprivation I find incredibly hard to believe. BG Baccus would not have tolerated that. Short rations were a disciplinary process. ICRC was there everyday. The Chaplain was there everyday. The average detainee gained 16 pounds. They got medical attention everyday.

The detainees went on a hunger strike. When weight metabolism decreased they went down to the medical facility. They had to give the detainees forcible IVs. They wanted Ensure. We made a joke about it.

There was no lap dance or rubbing up on detainees. There is no doubt the interrogators took off their BDU tops. They wanted to be comfortable. The hardcore detainees did not respond to women. They would not look at women. I did not approve it under any circumstances. It was stupid and offensive under the Geneva Conventions. It does not serve any useful purpose. If that occurred, I want to see the FBI report.

Red ink used as menstrual fluid? I've never heard of that technique. It would disrupt the intelligence and prosecution gathering operations.

Ghost detainees...every person that landed on the island was processed through the MP cycle.

JTF-160 was in disarray when I took over. They had 60 outstanding Inspector General complaints. We tried to clean up as much as we could before MG Miller came.

JTF-170 served two Article 15s to two individuals for personal misconduct. It was not detainee related.

[redacted]

[redacted] B6

Other than the incident with FBI contractor that physically went after the detainee, I don't recall any other problems with FBI agents and detainees. LTC [redacted] and LTC [redacted] might have counseled someone for wrong or inappropriate behavior. B6

I counseled people on the lack of preparation. I did it as a group. I counseled FBI. I never had information from the IG or JAG that we had a problem. It would stick out.

[redacted] FBI did separate interviews. I have faith that the [redacted] was not abusing detainees. I had a high degree of faith. I had access to anything I wanted.

I also had high faith that the FBI was conducting proper interviews. Physical abuse just does not work. Successful prosecution was their goal. They did not want to jeopardize that.

We had four to six guys in Camp X-Ray. To put a detainee in X-Ray required that we notify USSOUTHCOM and JCS and we would have done a report in writing.

I was interviewed for the Church report.

Virtually no one had a degree of expertise to deal with these people. They do not subscribe to our values legally and morally. We did benefit from some great young people. We had a native Pakistani that was fluent in Arabic.

[redacted] B3

FBI's approach was that you would stay in jail if you did not talk to us.

56 Was [redacted] tortured? No. B6

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, MG (ret) Mike Dunlavey. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

RANDALL M. SCHMIDT
Lieutenant General, USAF
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT LT CDR [redacted]

LCDR [redacted] who was interviewed on 24 March 2005 at a conference room in the Hilton Hotel located at the O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois. Also present was [redacted] legal representative (Navy Lieutenant). The follow-on interview took place telephonically on 14 April 16, 2005 at 1254 hours. His combined statement was substantially as follows:

I arrived at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) on or about 13 December 2002. I was deployed from European Command (EUCOM) on temporary duty status to act as the Liaison Officer for EUCOM. While acting as the LNO for EUCOM I observed some interrogations and even reviewed documents concerning [redacted] however I did not actively participate in interrogations or conversations concerning interrogation procedures. On or about 28 June 2003, I was released from my obligations to EUCOM and placed in the capacity of Special Projects Team Chief for Joint Task Force GTMO (JTF-GTMO). I held that position until I re-deployed on 24 September 2003.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

The only time I recall a military working dog (MWD) near a detainee was in the movement operations for [redacted] At no time was a MWD used during any interrogations of [redacted]

I can say with certainty that none of my interrogators impersonated FBI agents during their interrogations because to do so would have been counterproductive. The mission for the JTF-GTMO interrogators was obtaining actionable intelligence from the detainee. Most of the detainees assigned to the Special Project Team were very intelligent, English-speaking men who were educated (at least partially) in the United States of America and understood our criminal justice operation. The detainees knew the FBI represented the law enforcement community. As a branch of law enforcement, the detainee's knew that the FBI had the power to incarcerate them for years. With the above being said, it wasn't shocking to learn that the detainees did not like opening up to the FBI. Therefore, it would have been stupid for me to encourage my interrogators to impersonate FBI agents.

I did authorize a couple of my interrogators [redacted] to impersonate Department of State agents during a few interrogations of ISN 760. The impersonation approach implemented by the interrogators was approved.

My team never used "music" as an interrogation technique. However I know that music was used as a technique by some of the other teams (however even the other teams started to use the technique less and less over time).

Yelling was a common tool used during interrogations. Why not! My interrogators (on the Special Projects Team) didn't yell to the point of losing their cool, but they would raise their voice if the detainee was being an obstinate ass. Yelling was never used to obtain information – it was a means to make a point.

One of the key components of the new parameters was the restriction of interrogation sessions to 15 hours. The detainee was allowed 5 hours of uninterrupted sleep. Therefore, interrogations of [redacted] were limited to no more than 15 hours. I can't remember any interrogator setting up a 15-hour interrogation.

I never witnessed a detainee being "short shackled." However I do recall reading MFRs that described the practice (I can't recall the detainee, but it was sometime in December 2002). I made a mental note of the practice for two reasons: First, the use of stress positions, in an interrogation, isn't an effective approach for obtaining reliable information. Second, the MFRs were blunt and I feared that if "folks" not on the "team" read the reports that the contents could either be misconstrued or make the interrogators look bad (if taken in context). In fact, I even asked the interrogators about the practice and counseled him about stress positions and drafting MFRs.

As head of the Special Projects Team I was the supervisor for the implementation of the Special Interrogation Plan for [redacted] (the plan was submitted sometime in May 2003 and approved in late August 2003). The lead interrogator on the IP was [redacted]

[redacted]

hooded during the movement) have conversations in Arabic to further confuse the detainee.

I also posed as a White House representative (counsel to the President). I was a "Navy Captain Collins." I presented 760 with an "official" letter (a five paragraph document) detailing how his family had been captured by the Coalition Forces and was in danger if he [redacted] didn't cooperate. I vetted the letter through the JTF-GTMO SJA. [redacted] when he told his guard "he wanted to speak to CAPT [redacted] because he was unwilling to protect others at the detriment of himself and his family").

I don't know anything about someone describing a dream to a detainee about seeing a coffin with the detainee's ISN on it, or the description of the detainee being buried in Christian soil.

The approval process for a Special IP: Team produces the product, team chief presents to ICE Chief, who forwards to the JIG Chief, who forwards it to CDR JTF-GTMO. The CDR then submitted it to SOUTHCOM and SECDEF for approval. The chain of command when they executed the second Special IP was ICE Chief [redacted] JIG Chief [redacted] and JTF-GTMO CDR MG Miller

[redacted]

[redacted]

I did not approve (i.e. review) all of the MFRs. [redacted] had approval authority, as did [redacted] Both had approved MFRs, most especially when I was on leave.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statements given by the witness, [redacted] Executed at Miami, Florida on 16 April 2005

LTC GLENN CROWTHER
Investigating Officer

B7

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [redacted] who was interviewed on 03 March 2005 at a conference room in the National War College Building, Fort McNair, [redacted] Department of National Security Strategy, accompanied [redacted] during the interview. [redacted] was interviewed a second time on or about 17 March 2005 at the Washington Field Office for US Southern Command in Arlington, Virginia. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from the end of July 2002 to December 2002. At the time I was the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief for Joint Task Force 170th (JTF-170th)/JTF-GTMO. I was working for [redacted] when I was deployed to GTMO.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

A military working dog (MWD) was brought into the interrogation booth of a high value detainee [redacted] on or about October 2002. The MWD was brought to the entrance of the interrogation booth by the dog's handler and directed to bark and growl at the detainee. The use of a MWD in an interrogation was unusual; and therefore, was mentioned in the interrogation plan submitted to the JTF-170th Commander. Once approved, the interrogation plan for [redacted] was implemented. The use of a MWD was one of many techniques approved and executed during the interrogation cycle. It is important to note that the MWD was not ordered to attack or harm the detainee. The MWD was only used as a means to intimidate the detainee. [redacted]

When I read the redacted Federal Bureau of Investigation documents on the ACLU website (the documents provided to the ACLU as part of a Freedom of Information Act request), I remember coming across the statements regarding "duct tape" and thinking the statements were about me. I recall, very vividly an incident involving duct tape that occurred during November 2002 and I am glad I have the opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the incident.

There was one time when I directed a couple of MPs to keep a detainee quite in the interrogation booth. I did not direct the MPs to use duct tape as an interrogation technique nor would I ever direct a guard or an interrogator to use duct tape as part of a formal interrogation. I authorized the use of duct tape as a control measure - to prevent a detainee from inciting a riot. After an interrogation session was complete (I was not involved in the session), the detainee began to yell (in Arabic): "Resist, Resist with all your might..." I stepped out of my office when I heard the commotion and walked to the interrogation booth where the yelling was coming from. When I arrived at the booth, I saw a detainee screaming and an interrogator, translator and a couple of

guards standing there frozen. The soldiers didn't know what to do so I directed the MPs to keep the detainee quite. One of the MPs mentioned he had duct tape. After a consultation with the Joint Interrogation Group (JIG) Chief, I approved the MP's use of duct as a means to keep the detainee quite. The MPs placed a single strand of duct tape across the detainee's mouth. The single strand proved ineffective because the detainee was soon yelling the same resistance slogan again. This time the MPs wrapped a single strand of duct tape around the mouth ~~and head~~ of the detainee. The detainee removed the duct tape again. Feed up and concerned that the detainee's yelling might cause a riot in the interrogation trailer (there were at least eight other interrogations occurring at this time), I ordered the MPs to wrap the duct tap twice around the head and mouth and three times under the chin and around the top of the detainee's head. Just as the MPs were finished wrapping the duct tape around the detainee's head, an FBI special agent appeared in the hallway. Without inquiring why the detainee's head was wrapped in duct tape, the special agent exclaimed that he wasn't going to stand by and witness this type of abuse and stormed out of the trailer. Later that day I received a call from Major General (MG) Miller asking for my presence in his office. When I arrived, MG Miller "chewed me out." I never received a formal reprimand or any other type of punishment, but it wasn't necessary. MG Miller's conversation with me was sufficient to get the point across: even if the reason for using the duct tape was valid, it was not the interrogation section's jurisdiction to direct the guards to act. The guards were not under my control and I was not to order them to act again.

A formal investigation was never conducted regarding the "duct tape" incident and an investigation wasn't necessary. I admitted that I directed the use of duct tape and MG Miller told me not to do it again.

I never instructed or authorized the impersonation of FBI agents as part of an approved interrogation plan. However I do remember when an interrogator (I believe the interrogator was [redacted] told me he impersonated an FBI agent during an interrogation. I immediately told [redacted] that the impersonation of any government agent was authorized and that he was to stop using the approach. In fact, I even held a "town hall" meeting and told the interrogators that impersonation of non military US governmental officials was prohibited (this "town hall" meeting occurred before MG Miller took over command of JTF-GTMO). For the record, I don't believe the impersonation of FBI agents is against the law or violates any other standing interrogation policy.

B6

The use of loud music and yelling was used during the interrogation of certain high value detainees. However the techniques were not "stand alone" techniques. The techniques were always wrapped up in other approaches (i.e. Fear Up Harsh) and would be enumerated in the interrogation plans sent to MG Dunlavey or Miller for approval.

I define "sleep deprivation" as keeping a detainee awake continuously for five or six day's straight. Based on my definition of sleep deprivation, I never authorized or witnessed the use of "sleep deprivation" in an interrogation session or approved interrogation plan. I recall having a meeting with the JIG Chief [redacted] the JTF-170th SJA [redacted] and myself regarding the maximum length an interrogation session could last. After some discussion and research, we determined that it was acceptable to interrogate detainees for a maximum of twenty hours in a twenty-four hour period. However the detainee was required to have four hours of uninterrupted sleep between interrogation sessions. We came to that number after reading about the United

B6

States Army Ranger Course. During the Ranger Course, our soldiers are subjected to twenty-hour days and are apparently only required to have four hours of sleep. If it was okay to subject our soldiers to twenty-hour days, then in our mind's it was okay to subject the terrorist to twenty-hour interrogations. If a detainee were kept awake for 5 days straight – that would be sleep deprivation.

As the ICE Chief I was never part of any interrogations. However it was my responsibility to monitor the interrogators and interrogation sessions. I would periodically monitor interrogations to watch my interrogators in action. During one of my monitoring sessions, I noticed that an interrogator had left the air conditioner "cranked down" to 60 degrees and left the detainee alone in the interrogation booth.

I can only remember directing a female interrogator to touch a detainee one time. The interrogator, I believe her name was [redacted] was having difficulty interrogating a detainee. Specifically, the detainee refused to stop praying during the interrogation session (i.e. the detainee would stare at the floor and softly chant passages from the Koran). After an especially difficult and frustrating session, [redacted] and a native translator approached me with a suggestion to break the detainee's concentration. The plan was simple. According to the native translator, devote Muslims cannot continue to pray if they are "unclean." Therefore, if the detainee were made "unclean" he would have to stop praying. One way to make a Muslim male unclean is to be touched by a female. Based on this plan, I instructed [redacted] to purchase cheap perfume at the PX (rose oil). When [redacted] returned with the rose oil, I instructed her to put the perfume on her hands and rub her hands over the detainee's arms. The plan worked just as anticipated. The detainee stopped praying. However the detainee became violent and attempted to attack [redacted] In the process, the detainee hit his mouth on the chair and chipped his tooth. Detainee was immediately taken to the hospital for treatment.

Many of the "aggressive" interrogation techniques we [redacted] myself) requested during October 2002 was a direct result of the pressure we felt from Washington to obtain intelligence and the lack of policy guidance being issued by Washington.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

[redacted]
Investigating Officer

SECRET

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Supervisory Special Agent In-Charge [redacted] who was interviewed on 11 January 2005 at a conference room in the Commissions Building, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). Mr. [redacted], an attorney for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), was also present for the interview. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was originally assigned to GTMO from 25 June 2002 to August 2002. I was then re-deployed to GTMO for a two-year tour from August 2003 to May 2005. During my first deployment I was working as a Special Agent for the FBI and I am currently the Supervisory Special Agent in Charge for FBI operations at GTMO.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

The FBI conducts separate interviews from the Joint Interrogation Element (JIG) interrogators at GTMO. There are times when we will conduct interviews with the Criminal Investigation Task Force since we have similar law enforcement missions.

I know that [redacted], a member of the Special Projects Team, posed as an FBI agent during an interrogation. Other agents mentioned that interrogators from other agencies also posed as FBI agents. I discussed the "impersonation issue" with [redacted] and he said it wouldn't happen again without FBI approval. It was not an aggravated event and it was handled on the ground level. You could ask 500 agents and 400 would tell you that they posed as other people during interviews. It just requires prior coordination. The handling of this situation was an example of proper inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

It is my understanding that short shackling was authorized. I have never personally seen it done. [redacted] told me that he witnessed this.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 22 of 76 Exhibits

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/06 BY 65175 DMH/LB/JAC

B6

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [redacted] who was interviewed on 21 January 2005 at a conference room at a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) facility, Tyson's Corner, Virginia. Mr. [redacted] was also present for the interview. His statement was substantially as follows:

66-1
67C-1

B6

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from February 2002 to February 2003. I left the island periodically during the year to conduct other FBI business. At the time I was working as a Special Agent for the FBI.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I heard about military interrogators impersonating FBI agents but the allegation didn't alarm me. Interrogators are in the business of lying to individuals that we are interviewing in an attempt to accumulate information and intelligence.

[redacted]

B2

I can confirm that short shackling did occur. I witnessed a detainee placed in a "catcher's stance" during an interrogation. I confronted the two military interrogators. The detainee may have also been on his knees. I reported this to Capt [redacted] the CITF JAG, and we reported the incident to LTC [redacted] the SJA for JTF-70.

66-2
67C-2

B6

There were times that the air conditioner would be turned down to make the detainee uncomfortable. The Commander later said "knock it off" and I believe the practice was stopped.

66-2
67C-2

I did see "SGT [redacted] touching and holding a detainee's hand during an interrogation session. She was invading his space. It was clearly upsetting the detainee.

B6

66-1
67C-1

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

B6

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit R-1 of 76 Exhibits

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/19/06 BY 65179 DMH/PEB/STK

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [redacted] was interviewed telephonically on 20 Jan 05 at a conference room at the NACAVC, Tyson's Corner, Virginia. Those present besides the witness were BG Furlow, LTC(P) [redacted] CPT [redacted] SGM [redacted] and [redacted]. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 21 October 2002 to 07 January 2002. At the time I was working as a Behavioral Specialist for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. My partner was [redacted].

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I did not see the use of military working dogs (MWD) in interrogations; [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Use of heat/cold – Yes. Detainees would mention the cold interrogation booths when they were interrogated by the military. In fact, [redacted] stated that if the Torture Statute stated "80 degrees was bad, we will set the thermostat at 79 degrees or 79.9 degrees" (Mr. [redacted] attributed the quite to MG Miller)

I witnessed "SGT [redacted] placing lotion in her hand and touching a detainee. She was -- whispering in the detainee's ear as her hand traveled to the detainee's lap. I didn't see her hands (because her body obstructed my view) touch the detainee's groin, but the detainee started to grimace in pain. Later, a Marine told me that SGT [redacted] bent the detainee's thumbs back." He went on to say that "if you think that is bad, she has done worse." I believe this incident occurred during the last week of November 2002 or the first week of December 2002.

[redacted] During the conversation [redacted] became enraged (he perceived the FBI as obstructing the military's mission) and stated "lead, follow, or get the fuck out of the way." Then he proceeded to get in my face, moments later he took the plan and stormed out of the room.

[redacted]

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit B2 of 76 Exhibits

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

b6-1
b7C-1

B6

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

b6-1
b7C-1

From: [redacted] (CV) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2004 2:17 PM
To: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)
Subject: GTMO

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

I was TDY to GTMO from the dates of June 2, 2003 to July 17, 2004. During that time I did not observe aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques on GTMO detainees which was not consistent with Bureau interview policy/guidelines by any FBI personnel or the interrogators from FT. Belvoir consisting of Air Force OSI, Naval Investigative Service and possibly a few other services although I can't recall which ones. However, I do recall seeing some techniques utilized by other interrogators not associated with the FBI or the Ft. Belvoir interrogators. I occasionally saw sleep depravation interviews with strobe lights and two different kinds of loud music. I asked the one of the interrogators what they were doing they said that it would take approximately four days to break someone doing an interrogation 16 hours on with the lights and music and four hours off. The sleep depravation and the lights and alternating beats of the music would wear the detainee down There was a time period where the interrogations were obtrusive enough that the interview rooms for an entire trailer were not available if one of these techniques were being utilized.

I heard many rumors about things that I did not observe. I spoke with one interrogator (not sure if military or contractor or other) that bragged about doing a lap dance on one Detainee (possibly #114). Another interrogator (not sure if military or contractor or other) bragged about making Detainee #114 listen to satanic black metal music for hour and hours. Then the interrogator dressed as a Catholic Priest and baptized the detainee in order t save him.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/06 BY 63/76 DH#/PLB/JAC

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 34 of 76 Exhibits

DETAINEE ABUSE

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 6/19/2006
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179 DMH/PLB/STK
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 6/19/2031

Date of transcription 09/17/2004

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Cleveland Division, EOD 12/06/1998, was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information in regard to his temporary duty (TDY) assignment to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO):

66-1 b7C-1

[redacted] was assigned to GTMO in the position of interviewer/interrogator for 45 days from 06/02/2003 to 07/17/2003, as part of a "Special Projects" team which consisted of FBI SA [redacted] (Charlotte Division) and a task force officer whose name he could not recall.

66-1 b7C-1

[redacted] did not witness or observe aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques utilized on GTMO detainees conducted by FBI or other law enforcement personnel which were not consistent with FBI or DOJ policy/guidelines, but did observe such behavior by non-law enforcement Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on at least two occasions. On these occasions the DOD personnel utilized sleep depravation by playing load music for 16 hours at a time with four hours between sessions. [redacted] and others brought these instances to attention of SSA [redacted] who was his Acting Supervisor (Atlanta Division) at GTMO.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

66-1 b7C-1

[redacted] was not familiar with DOD policy/guidance regarding what interview interrogation techniques were authorized. During conversations with unidentified DOD employees regarding interview techniques, [redacted] recalled being asked if he used "fear up" or "family compassion" techniques. [redacted] did not know the identities of the DOD interviewers or detainees involved in the activity. The aggressive interviews [redacted] witnessed occurred at Camp Delta in either the Yellow, Brown or Gold areas. Most interviews conducted by law enforcement and DOD personnel occurred in interview rooms located in trailers in these areas. Often DOD personnel would reserve an entire trailer when employing aggressive interview techniques. [redacted]

b1 [redacted] (S)

66-1 b7C-1

[redacted] had no substantive contact with DOD personnel regarding the condition or treatment or detainee's other than regularly held briefings by the DOD Command which provided general updates of activity and the number of detainees at GTMO. [redacted]

Investigation on 09/15/2004 at Washington, D.C. (telephonically)

File # 282 - NEW Date dictated 09/17/2004

by SSA [redacted] 66-1 b7C-1

SECRET

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XBH

~~SECRET~~

282 - NEW

66-1
67C-1

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 09/15/2004, Page 2

and others were provided a tour of the cell area at GTMO and he characterized the cells as small but acceptable. He recalled that the detainees were switched from Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to regular food because the detainee's were becoming overweight due to the calories contained in the MREs.

66-1
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[redacted] could not recall any allegation of mistreatment brought to his attention by detainees, other than the detainees referring to techniques employed by DOD personnel as "games." [redacted] indicated most of the interviews conducted by the his Special Projects team were negative. Special Projects was tasked with interviewing the most hardened detainees.

66-1
67C-1

[redacted] was not in possession of pictures, video, audio, notes or other documentation which depicted or described aggressive treatment. He indicated the interviewers were searched for contraband each time they entered or exited the compound.

66-1
67C-1

[redacted] heard many rumors about aggressive or inappropriate interrogation techniques by DOD which were unsubstantiated. Among the rumors he heard were that a female DOD interrogator did a lap dance on a detainee, that a DOD interrogator forced a detainee to listen to satanic black metal music for hours, and that a DOD interrogator dressed as a Catholic Priest and baptized a detainee in order to save him. [redacted] had no first hand knowledge of these events and was unsure as to if they actually occurred.

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Agent [redacted] He was interviewed on or about 1030 hours, 20 January 2005, at Conference Room, NACAVC. [redacted] was also present during Agent [redacted] interview.

His statement was substantially as follow:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from mid September 2002 until the end of October 2002. I was deployed to GTMO as part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Behavioral Science Division. During my time at GTMO I was partnered with Agent [redacted]

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

When I first arrived at GTMO, I was asked to participate in the planning and implementation of an interrogation plan for a high value detainee – ISN [redacted] ISN [redacted] was being housed at the Navy Brig and interrogated at Camp X-Ray. Agent [redacted] and I were asked to observe interrogations of ISN [redacted] and offer guidance to the military interrogators, based on ISN [redacted] behavior, on the best approaches to use in obtain reliable information. After observing a few interrogation sessions, it became clear to me that the military interrogators were using more aggressive interrogation approaches than the FBI. In fact, during one interrogation session, Agent [redacted] and I witnessed a dog inside the room where ISN [redacted] was being interrogated. Once inside the room, the dog was ordered to growl and show teeth at the detainee.

Agent [redacted] and I were watching an FBI interrogation in one of the interrogation trailers when [redacted] came into the observation booth. He was excited and stated that he had something to show us. I was curious, so I followed [redacted] down the hallway to an interrogation room. When I arrived at the interrogation room, I observed six or seven soldiers (or persons I believed were soldiers) laughing and pointing at something inside the room. When I looked inside the room I noticed a detainee with his entire head covered in duct tape (except for his eyes and maybe mouth). I asked [redacted] why the detainee's head was covered with duct tape? [redacted] stated because he (the detainee) refused to stop "chanting the Koran" during an interrogation session. When I asked [redacted] how he planned to take the tape off without hurting the detainee (the detainee had a beard and longer hair), [redacted] just laughed. I immediately informed Agent [redacted] and proceeded to notify the Criminal Investigation task Force attorney (either [redacted] I don't think [redacted] personally put the duct tape on the detainee's head, but I believe from his actions he directed the soldiers to do it.

I recall observing two interrogations when the detainee appeared to be short shackled. The first incident caught my attention because I heard loud yelling emanating from an interrogation room. The voice I heard was speaking English and was yelling in an abusive manner. As I approached the interrogation room, I heard a thump. I observed a detainee short shackled (hands shackled to

the eyebolt) to the floor when I looked inside the room. I do not remember the interrogators name or the exact date of the interrogation.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

SECRET

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [redacted] former Staff Judge Advocate, 170TH JTF and JTF-GTMO. She was interviewed on two separate occasions: the first interview occurred on or about 1350 hours, 21 January 2005, at the Pentagon and the second interview occurred on or about 1500 hours, 17 March 2005. [redacted] was also present during [redacted] interview, at the interviewee's request.

I was stationed at GTMO from June 2002 to June 2003.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I would like to say at the outset of this interview that I am proud of the soldiers of Joint Task Force GTMO (JTF-GTMO) and the job we did under the most trying of circumstances.

I never reviewed a plan authorizing the use of military working dogs (MWD) during interrogations. I personally observed between three and four hundred interrogations and I never witnessed the use of a MWD. The MWDs are controlled and used by the Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG). Therefore, authorization for the use of MWDs during an interrogation session would need the JTF-GTMO Commander's approval (or Major General Dunlavey's approval during the brief time period in October 2002 when he was in command of both JTF-170th and JTF-160th

I am aware of one incident when duct tape was used during an interrogation. However the duct tape was not used as an interrogation technique; instead the tape was used as a force protection measure. According to [redacted] he directed the guards present at one of the interrogation rooms to duct tape a detainee's mouth shut when the detainee started yelling resistance messages. [redacted] was afraid that if the detainee weren't shut up his actions would incite a riot in the interrogation trailer. I first heard about the incident from [redacted] the Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) attorney. Shortly after my conversation with [redacted] was ordered by MG Miller to look into the incident and take care off it. I immediately called [redacted] When I spoke with [redacted] he admitted to duct taping of the detainee's mouth (or ordering the guards to duct tape the detainee's mouth shut). I never got into the details of the incident (i.e. whether the detainee suffered any pain when the tape was removed or exactly how much duct tape was used). After our conversation, I told [redacted] that the use of duct tape was not an approved technique and never do it (duct tape a detainee's mouth) again. That was the extent of the "investigation" and the command response - [redacted] don't do that again."

I understand that an alleged "lap dance" occurred during the early months of 2003. [redacted] the Joint Interrogation (JIG) Chief, conducted an investigation into the incident and determined that something inappropriate occurred. I don't recall if the report was committed to writing, but if it was, a copy should be retained at the office of the Staff Judge Advocate at GTMO. After the investigation, I believe the female interrogator involved was removed from conducting interrogations for thirty days, re-trained and returned to the fight (purely an administrative action and punishment). It is important to note: the female interrogator's actions/technique was not approved prior to implementation.

I am unaware of any instances of "short shackling." When we first spoke I stated I was unaware of the practice being used in interrogation and I am still unaware that the practice was used (other than hearing about the practice in this investigation and the Church investigation).

The SECDEF approved twenty-hour interrogations with four hours of sleep for certain high value detainees. I was involved in submitting the request for additional techniques in October 2002. Within that request: [redacted] Once proposed, MG Dunlavey forwarded the request to GEN Hill and ultimately to the SECDEF. [redacted]

Yelling was a valid interrogation technique that was used by our interrogators to obtain information.

Initially I believe interrogators would adjust the air conditioner in the interrogation rooms. MG Miller found out about this practice and directed the interrogators to stop the practice. I am not sure when this was exactly.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

LTC GLENN A. CROWTHER
Investigating Officer

SECRET

b6-1
b7C-1

[redacted] (INSD) (FBI)

To: [redacted] (BS) (FBI)

Subject: RE: GTMO

Thank you. I will print out your response and once the responses are completed, a determination will be made reference the interviews.

-----Original Message-----
From: [redacted] (BS) (FBI)
b6-1 Sent: Monday, July 12, 2004 10:10 AM
b7C-1 To: [redacted] (INSD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: GTMO

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

b6-1
b7C-1 Mr. [redacted]

I am responding to your request for feedback on aggressive treatment and improper interview techniques used on detainees at GTMO. I did observe treatment that was not only aggressive, but personally very upsetting, although I can't say that this treatment was perpetrated by Bureau employees. It seemed that these techniques were being employed by the military, government contract

b1- employees [redacted] (S)

b2-1 My name is SA [redacted] Boston Division, EOD [redacted] currently assigned to Squad C-8,
b6-1 telephone (781) [redacted]
b7C-1

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: 6/19/2006
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179 DMH/PLB/JAC
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 6/19/2031

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SECRET

7/12/2004

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 39 of 76 Exhibits

SECRET

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

-1-

DATE: 6/19/2006
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179 DMH/PLB/SAK
REASON: 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 6/19/2031

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/09/2004

[redacted], Boston Division, SOD: [redacted] was telephonically contacted concerning her knowledge of any aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview techniques at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). After being advised as to the identity of the interviewing Agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information to thirteen specific special inquiry questions:

66-1
67C-1

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[redacted] described her two month TDY assignment at GTMO as an interrogator of detainees. During February and March 2003, [redacted] was teamed with two different Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Agents and several contract translators for detainee interviews. [redacted] initially worked with one NCIS Agent for roughly the first three weeks of her assignment, then a second Agent the last five weeks of the TDY. [redacted] noted a slight work overlap between the two NCIS Agents during their training transition. The primary questioning responsibility for the interrogations was alternated each interview between the Agents. [redacted] also noted the interview assignment for the translators varied daily based on the spoken language of the detainee.

66-1
67C-1

[redacted] never witnessed or was aware of any aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview techniques employed on detainees at GTMO inconsistent with FBI or DOJ policy/guidelines. [redacted] had no knowledge or understanding of Department of Defense (DOD) authorization for the permitted use of harsh/aggressive interrogation techniques. Furthermore, [redacted] was unaware of DOD authorized interview techniques.

66-1
67C-1
(S)
61

[redacted] had no substantive contact with Military Police [redacted] at GTMO regarding detainee conditions or treatment and was unaware of any specific allegations of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel alleged by interviewees or others. [redacted] stated she had no pictures, video, audio, notes, or other documentation which depicted or described aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques employed at GTMO or knowledge of anyone else who was in possession of such items.

66-1
67C-1

Investigation on 09/09/2004 at Washington, D. C. (telephonically)

File # 297-HQ-A1327669-A Date dictated N/A

by SSA [redacted] 66-1 67C-1

SECRET

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EXHIBIT 39

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

297-HQ-A1327669-A

b6-1
b7C-1

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 09/09/2004, Page 2

[redacted] witnessed the consequences of perhaps questionable treatment of detainees on two different occasions. The two separate incidents occurred at the interrogation trailers named "Delta Camp." However, [redacted] was unable to recall the specific dates or provide any knowledge of the two detainees' identities. In both incidents, the detainees were chained hand and foot in the fetal position and laying on the floor of the interview rooms. The rooms were without furnishings, to include any chairs. [redacted] also recalled the rooms were without evidence of any food or water. Furthermore, the temperature control of the rooms was regulated to be either extremely cold or hot. [redacted] noted one occasion where excessively loud rap music played in the detainee's interview room. [redacted] believed the detainees were kept in such conditions for periods of time more than 18-24 hours, and longer. The detainees had urinated and/or defecated on themselves.

b6-1
b7C-1

SECRET

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FBI00062

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Supervisory Special Agent In-Charge [redacted] b6 b7C

b6-1 & b7C-1 [redacted] who was interviewed on 11 January 2005 at a conference room in the Commissions Building, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). Mr. [redacted], an attorney for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), was also present for the interview. His statement was substantially as follows: b6 b7C

I was originally assigned to GTMO from 25 June 2002 to August 2002. I was then re-deployed to GTMO for a two-year tour from August 2003 to May 2005. During my first deployment I was working as a Special Agent for the FBI and I am currently the Supervisory Special Agent in Charge for FBI operations at GTMO.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

The FBI conducts separate interviews from the Joint Interrogation Element (JIG) interrogators at GTMO. There are times when we will conduct interviews with the Criminal Investigation Task Force since we have similar law enforcement missions.

b6-2 b6 b7C-2 I know that [redacted], a member of the Special Projects Team, posed as an FBI agent during an interrogation. Other agents mentioned that interrogators from other agencies also posed as FBI agents. I discussed the "impersonation issue" with [redacted] and he said it wouldn't happen again without FBI approval. It was not an aggravated event and it was handled on the ground level. You could ask 500 agents and 400 would tell you that they posed as other people during interviews. It just requires prior coordination. The handling of this situation was an example of proper inter-agency coordination and cooperation. b6 b6

b6-1 & b7C-1 It is my understanding that short shackling was authorized. I have never personally seen it done. [redacted] told me that he witnessed this. b6

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005. b6 b6 b7C

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

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DATE 6/19/06 BY 65179 DMH/KCB/JAL

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 22 of 76 Exhibits

b6-1
b7C-1

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Agent [redacted] He was interviewed on or about 0930 hours, 20 January 2005, at Conference Room, NACAVC. [redacted] was also present during Agent [redacted]s interview. His statement was substantially as follow:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 13 Sept 02 to 29 Oct 02. I was deployed to GTMO as part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Behavioral Science Division.

b6-1
b7C-1

During my time at GTMO I was partnered with Agent [redacted]

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

b6-1,2
b7C-1,2

On or about 05 Oct 02, Agent [redacted] and I witnessed a military working dog being used during an interrogation of ISN 063 at Camp X-Ray. The dog was brought into the interrogation room. After witnessing this unorthodox interrogation technique, Agent [redacted] and I left the observation room. When we discussed the event with [redacted], he just stated the technique was approved and he didn't see anything inappropriate about the use of a dog in an interrogation.

b6-2
b7C-2 >
b6-1 >
b7C-1 >

I remember the interrogation vividly for two reasons. First, I had never seen a dog used in an interrogation and I believed it was inappropriate. Second, earlier in the evening, I had a conversation with two military dog handlers (one of the handlers was an Army soldier and the other was a Navy sailor) about the best methods for training a German Shepard. I was interested because I had just recently acquired a German Shepard puppy and thought the handlers could provide valuable information. We talked to him (Mr. [redacted] several different times to let him know that we objected to the use of dogs and that we did not do business that way. It was an inappropriate measure. He told us that we [redacted] and I) were guests and we should act accordingly.

b6-1,2
b7C-1,2

There was one occasion when [redacted] approached [redacted] and me. [redacted] was laughing and asked us to follow him to another interrogation booth to "see something funny." I didn't go, but [redacted] did. [redacted] returned and told me that he had observed a detainee's head and face completely wrapped in duct tape.

b6-1
b7C-1

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

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DATE 6/19/06 BY 65179 DMH/DLB/JAL

~~SECRET~~

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 41 of 76 Exhibits

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MA[redacted] Former Psychiatrist with the Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT), sent in an e-mail response on 28 February 2005. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from July to December 2002.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I witnessed military working dogs being used in interrogation of a detainee [redacted] The intensive interrogation of this detainee lasted for the better part of a month in November/December timeframe of 2002. We were told the use of dogs was an approved part o the interrogation plan. Dogs were used to intimidate the detainee by getting the dogs close to him and then having the dogs bark or act aggressively on command. I never saw a dog allowed to bite or otherwise injure a detainee. I never saw dogs used except in the interrogation of this sole detainee. One dog that was used regularly for this was a dog named, "Zeus". I do not recall the name of the handler.

It was common to observe and hear about military interrogators "yelling" at detainee's during interrogations. However I only saw loud music used in the interrogation sessions o[redacted] During those interrogations, loud music was commonly employed and was used within the framework of the interrogation plan designed to confuse, disorient, and overwhelm the defenses of this detainee.

[redacted]

Sexual tension was one of many interrogation procedures approved for use in interrogations of detainees (if approved in the interrogation plan). One example of sexual tension: an interrogator rubbing against a detainee. It was felt that this sort of shocking behavior and might "rattle" the detainee. It would be culturally taboo, disrespectful, humiliating, and potentially unexpected. I did see female interrogators use scented perfumes or oils on their fingertips so that when the interrogator touched a detainee that the oil or scent would be hard to wash off. It was hoped, would be frustrating, disconcerting, embarrassing to the detainee. It was done again to enforce a commonly used "futility approach".

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 43 of 76 Exhibits

1.4(c)

[redacted]

All things considered, I am proud as hell at the restraint demonstrated by the interrogators I worked with.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, MA[redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

B6

BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY D. MILLER

MG Miller was interviewed on 18 March 2005 at WFO, Arlington, Virginia. The witness was sworn by LtGen Schmidt. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was the Commanding General for the Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 4 November 2002 to 26 March 2004.

My overall responsibility was interrogation and detention at Guatanamo Bay, Cuba. JTF-160 was set up for detention and JTF-170 was set up for interrogation. My task was to integrate them so that they were in synchronization. USSOUTHCOM wanted to improve intelligence and detention. I was told to fix it. It was broken. I did not perceive that I worked for the SECDEF. General Dunlavey and I had four days of overlap. We had a change over from 4-9 November 2002. We did not have a conversation about whether he had authority beyond GTMO. JTF-180 in Afghanistan was not in my command relationship. It was a coordination and information relationship. The detainees did come from JTF-180. Detainees and interrogators all came through JTF-180. There were no detainees that came from IRAQ or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when I was there.

The command climate at GTMO was dysfunctional when I arrived. There were two separate organizations with senior leadership that was at odds with each other regarding how they would integrate their missions. My first job was putting that together. The leadership had a single mission focus that was separate. Single unit disparity did not allow the units to be successful. There was no abuse or torture going on. The organization was not working together efficiently. It did not affect the detainees. SOPs needed to be updated. The basic standard was going on. The detainees were treated in a humane manner.

I did receive FM 34-52. The additional techniques that were requested went up to GEN Hill. I was uncomfortable with Category III. I was not comfortable using Category III techniques in interrogations. We were going towards incentives. Category III would not help develop intelligence rapidly and effectively from the detainees there. I did not intend to use them. They were approved, but not directed. I had the latitude to use them. It was an order that came down through the SECDEF. I did not question them about not using the techniques in interrogation. They wanted to do aggressive techniques. Special Interrogation Plans (IPs) had to be done in detail and sent to a higher authority. The purpose of the techniques was to support the nation's effort. There were two Special IPs; they were enormous documents. The IPs were the way to set standards. Everyone understood where the limits were.

How controlling was I? I'll be frank with you, when you put an organization together you say here are the new standards. Some thought they were more aggressive. I would state how to do and what to do. It is part of team building for success. You win the battle one day at a time. Senior leadership got on board right away. That is why GEN Hill asked me to come down to GTMO.

~~SECRET~~

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 45 of 76 Exhibits

We had incidences of good faith mistakes. We stopped them. I would do a Commander's Inquiry and corrective action was done on an interrogator. Retraining was done. The interrogator would go back under the supervisor and then interrogate again. A junior interrogator needed oversight. It was a handful of occurrences. The occurrences did not rise to torture, maltreatment, or inhumane treatment. I had an interrogator that exceeded the bounds. It was a female interrogator who took off her BDU shirt and inappropriately rubbed on the detainee. The female rubbing was brought to my attention by a contract interrogator. We pulled her out. We found she did cross boundaries. She was given an administrative Letter of Reprimand and retained her. One incident, the interrogator asked the MP to help in an interrogation and the MP was actively involved. I got it fixed. We continued to refine the policy. We built the SOPs. It was a continuously evolving operation. We had a weekly meeting that had enormous leadership involvement about staying within standards. Whoever violated the standards received appropriate action. In another incident an MP could not control his temper. He struck a detainee. He was a pretty good soldier. It occurred in the cell block. The standards were well known. If any standards were violated, appropriate action would be taken. When a mistake was made we took appropriate action.

The detainees are ruthless, murderous people. We had to teach interrogators and MPs not to hate. I spent a lot of time with the chain of command and how to control them professionally. We had to talk about this to all interrogators.

There was a high leader touch. We had to lead the led. I was down there engaged at the Camp. I spent enormous amount of time going through the cell block. It was difficult keeping that balance. We had weekly meetings. The lawyer went over the standards. The lawyer would tell the interrogators that if you cross the line call me. It got to be a joke sometimes. I said call [redacted] Do not cross those standards. (B6)

General Hill told me that you are the Commander. Here are the basic guidelines, go ahead, and go forward.

We had numerous actions routed through the J2 [redacted] I worked for General Hill. (B6) A direct line to him would interrupt his command authority. I was very clear of my chain of command. I talked to OSD almost every day. There was lots of talk. I understood for whom I worked for. I had informal conversations with OSD. I sent a report to DEPSECDEF through USSOUTHCOM.

I have known General Hill for 20 years. If I had a problem, I would call him. We talked once or twice a week. I got guidance and all the support I needed.

The contractors probably made up roughly 50% of the personnel. There were a higher number of contract analysts that supported the interrogation mission. I gave the same talk to the contract analyst, their supervisor, and contract interrogators. I told them they were soldiers without the uniform.

The FBI was at the established weekly meeting. I had an FBI agent come down. They had opportunity to come to the meeting every week. We had a meeting and I gave the FBI Special Agent (SA) an hour. I told him it was anything he wanted to talk about. They had a different perspective. They had a law enforcement perspective. There was significant friction between the FBI, CITF and JTF on how interrogations were done. It was the first one and then SSA [redacted] came later. I said here are the standards. No FBI SA questioned interrogation methodology. For segregation, we had to go to General Hill for 30 days. No one from the FBI came to talk to me about that. One of the Doctor's of CITF came to talk to me about interrogations. B6

I am not an expert on detention or interrogation. I spent an enormous amount of time to help me understand how I can do this business better. I had a talk with every leader, CITF, FBI and the JTF and told them that they would follow the standards. We would come in on occasion and look at interrogations.

[redacted]

Nothing placed me in a compromising situation.

There was an interrogation SOP in place when I got there. I split the JIG, ICE, and J2. They were counterproductive. It was the most dysfunctional I've ever seen. I could not believe it. It was senior leader's squabbling on personal matters. It was debilitating to the organization. The JIG did normal 2 stuff.

Military working dogs- No, not in interrogations. They were [redacted] They were used for detention, not interrogation. B6

Duct tape – Not that I knew of. After I left I was told that a senior interrogator duct taped someone's mouth. I was told it was [redacted] but that is only speculation. I was surprised. I don't know when it happened or the dates. B6/B7

I knew about the false flag. I don't know any instance. It was an authorized technique in the IP.

Impersonating FBI- No.

Yelling at detainee and loud music – [redacted] It was an approved technique. The interrogator was authorized to do that.

Interference with FBI – There was an FBI and CITF focus on law enforcement on DoD guidance to develop intelligence. Their focus was on evidence. We were developing intelligence. They had a different focus. We followed DoD. FBI followed public law.

Sleep deprivation – [redacted] B6/B1

SECRET

Short shackling. While I was there the detainees were chained to the eye-bolt for security. Every interrogator saw the detainee's legs and feet. I saw hundreds of interrogations. There were no stress positions. I gave guidance.

Food and water we do not use as a weapon. [redacted] gained 30 pounds. b6

Hot and cold temperature – Not to my knowledge.

Inappropriate touching is not authorized. It was brought to my attention and we took care of it. The touching was done by a [redacted] b6

SGT [redacted] ever came to my attention. b6

Ink and menstrual fluid – No.

There were no ghost detainees that were under the control of JTF-GTMO.

What humane treatment means to me are adequate food, shelter, medical care, and an environment that would not cause physical or mental abuse.

Some interrogation techniques that SECDEF granted authority for was beyond what I was comfortable with.

I never saw a memo or received a memo from the FBI that commented on SIPs.

It was clear to all the standards. The boundaries were for all. FBI and CITF had the same boundaries for all DoD included. In our discussions, everybody understood the standards. We have the same guidance. Everybody was formally notified that the superior commander made the guidance for interrogations.

I recognize the CITF memo objecting to the Special IP. I sent the interim plan up and it was approved by higher headquarters.

My focus was on the relationship between the CITF and the JTF. My focus was to improve it. They were at odds professionally and personally to the detriment of the mission. I called the CITF commander personally. We discussed that they were trying to develop evidence and the JTF position is not to develop evidence, but intelligence. The meeting was attended by General Ryder (the CID Commander), the CITF commander, and myself. We talked about an effective relationship about doing the mission. Subordinates are to work together effectively. An interrogation plan was approved and we followed the plan.

I directed the Director of the JIG to conduct an investigation into the lap dance allegation. I agreed with his recommendations and findings. The Director of the JIG was [redacted] was an effective leader and did a good over watch. He was a senior leader down there that would execute the mission. b6

SECRET

The standards were known across the mission. I found out about the duct ta later. It never came to my level. I believe it came t attention took appropriate action.

I had several counseling sessions with He is very fine man. He did o manner that demonstrated what the standards are.

I am a standards guy. If you don't follow the standards, I'll take the appropriate action. When honest mistakes are made, you counsel, coach, and mentor.

I came to a dysfunctional organization not with mission success. I spent a large amount of time fixing it.

1.4(c) [redacted] B 6

I am aware of the 2 May 2003 memo I signed. It was in response to the up and down incident. The letter was signed in response to an AR 15-6. It was a Fear up. The MPs were told not to do it anymore. This particular incident was a single incident. There were some cases of the MPs being actively involved in interrogation; that was not my guidance.

The ICRC brought several general statements for review [redacted] B3

The guidance every week revalidated the guidance. It was very important.

The FBI and CIA representative came every 30 days.

Interrogations require that we would restate the standards every time. I knew the contract interrogators. I gave them the same speech for standards.

There was fairly large friction between JTF and ICRC. One of my focuses was to make it effective. It was producing unnecessary friction.

1.4(c) [redacted] B 6/ B1

SECRET

B1/
B6

1.4(c)

[redacted]

I have not been through SERE. I don't believe to my knowledge that the interrogators went through SERE. The Psychologist, Forensic Psychologist, and Clinical Psychologist were trained through SERE.

Most interrogators were school trained on tactical interrogation. Tactical debriefing in strategic interrogation, some were trained. It was a small number. Some picked up training while there at GTMO.

1.4(a)(c)

We established the Tiger Team [redacted]

I have seen several hundred interrogations now. When I showed up at GTMO I had never before witnessed one.

I believe one of the things we found out holistically. Unity of command for success and standards demonstrated success on a regular basis.

JTF-160 and JTF-170 was an ad hoc organization that started from a cold start that we normally would have in our institution. There were a lot of developmental operations and procedures for strategic interrogation on how things should be done.

Abuse problems are simply about discipline setting, standards and developing these standards. You need leadership involvement that clarifies and focuses on the importance of the mission.

GTMO and Iraq are different. I have had a year and a half to look at GTMO. GTMO used standards, how to treat detainee that are not combatants, how to interrogate, and incentive based interrogations. GTMO was successful.

1.4(a)(c)

[redacted]

Those interrogations did not involve torture.

GTMOize inappropriately reads bad information. I have heard of it. If you apply a leader and standard there is adherence to the standards. In another context, it brings discredit to all the leaders.

~~SECRET~~

On 26 March 2004, I departed the island and went to Iraq three days later.

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MG Geoffrey Miller was interviewed, via secure telephone, a second time on 31 March 2005 at 1843 EST. At that time Lieutenant General Schmidt advised MG Miller of his rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Lt Gen Schmidt asked MG Miller several questions regarding events that have been documented in the interrogation logs obtained from GTMO. Lt Gen Schmidt asked MG Miller if he had ever read the interrogation logs and MG Miller responded that he had not. MG Miller responded that he was unaware of the following events:

- on 21 and 23 Dec 02, MPs held down a detainee while [redacted] straddled the detainee without placing weight on the detainee

- on 4 Dec 02, SGT [redacted] massaged the detainee's back and neck over his clothing

[redacted]

SECRET

B6/B1/B7

that [redacted] showed [redacted] fake letter from the White House that spelled out his authorization to make [redacted] disappear

B1

MG Miller stated that had he known of the threats t[redacted] his family, he would never have allowed it.

B7/B6 B7

1.4(a) (c)

MG Miller stated that he was aware of the following:

- that detainees were yelled at and that music was used in interrogations

B6/B1

- that [redacted] was interrogated for 20 hours a day with 4 hours of sleep from 23 November 2002 until 15 January 2003

- that [redacted] was separated from the detainee population from 8 August 2002 until 15 January 2003

B6/B7

- that [redacted] impersonated a Navy Captain from the White House

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, MG Geoffrey Miller. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 31 March 2005.

RANDALL M. SCHMIDT
Lieutenant General, USAF
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

SECRET