

MULE CREEK STATE PRISON

Staff Safety Evaluation

July 5 - 8 , 2005

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

Corrections Standards Authority

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA — DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

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July 19, 2005

Secretary Roderick Q. Hickman
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
1515 S Street, Suite 205 South
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Secretary Hickman:

The Staff Safety Evaluation Team, created by the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) in response to your concern about institutional safety, conducted its evaluation of Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) July 5-8, 2005. The enclosed report, which will be presented to the CSA at the next scheduled meeting in September, lists a number of findings for your consideration.

On behalf of the CSA Staff Safety Evaluation Team (Team), I would like to express our sincere appreciation to MCSP Warden Rosanne Campbell and her staff, who provided all written materials requested and gave the Team full access to all areas of the institution. Staff members were open and candid during the evaluation, and it was clear that they understood their role and the mission of the institution, which was very clean and well maintained. There is a very positive working atmosphere at MCSP, and I believe this translates into a safer work environment. The Team reported observing Warden Campbell in the prison yard talking to inmates. MCSP staff indicated that this is a common occurrence and expressed an appreciation that she takes the time to do so.

This first evaluation allowed the Team to pilot test the staff safety criteria developed by the panel of subject matter experts. Based on this experience, the Team made several modifications to the original criteria. The following "lessons learned" from the staff safety evaluation of MCSP will be incorporated into future evaluations.

- Staff assault trend data alone are insufficient for conducting an adequate evaluation. The Team will collect information before arriving that will be helpful in the evaluation and increase the efficiency of the team when it is on-site. Most of the needed data can be obtained from the CDCR Adult Operations Data Analysis Unit.
- Half of the first day was consumed by a facility tour. The Team learned that four days was too little time to conduct the evaluation. Future evaluations are scheduled for five days and will not include a tour.
- The Team added an assessment of the physical plant, staffing, training, and inmate population (e.g., classification, housing), all of which were deemed critical to a thorough evaluation of staff safety.
- The Team also recognized that it is imperative to interview staff on safety related issues. A structured set of interview questions was developed and pilot tested. Based on this experience,

Secretary Hickman

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
July 19, 2005

the list of questions will be reduced and perhaps modified to facilitate the summarization of responses.

- The panel criteria focused exclusively on custody staff. However, it became apparent after the first day at MCSP that this approach was shortsighted. As a result, the Team's evaluation also included interviews with non-custody staff.

In closing, I want to again extend our thanks and appreciation to Warden Campbell and her staff for their professionalism and the cooperation they extended to the Team. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,



Karen L. Stoll, Executive Officer (A)
Corrections Standards Authority

Enclosure

cc: Warden Rosanne Campbell, Mule Creek State Prison
Joe McGrath, Chief Deputy Secretary, Adult Operations

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BACKGROUND

In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hickman requested that the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA), develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the state's adult and youth detention facilities. At the May 19, 2005 meeting of the BOC, the proposal was presented and accepted. On May 24-25, 2005, a panel of state and national subject matter experts was convened to establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted. Based on those criteria, a team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established.

On July 5-8, 2005, a team comprised of staff from The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice staff conducted the first Staff Safety Evaluation at Mule Creek State Prison. The evaluation protocol consisted of a request for advance data on staff assaults including victim and perpetrator data, a preliminary site visit of the physical plant, random interviews with various custody and non-custody staff, a review of applicable written policies and procedures governing the operation of the institution and a review of documentation including incidents of staff assaults, staffing levels, inmate population and safety equipment.

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Mule Creek State Prison was selected as the initial adult facility for review and an entrance letter was sent to Warden Roseanne Campbell informing her of the July 5-8, 2005 site visit dates and the proposed operational plan (Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a data matrix to record information from incident reports (CDC 837) of inmate assaults on staff to determine if any trends could be identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete the matrix before the site visit. (See attachment B). The evaluation team asked that all incident reports and related documentation be made available during the site visit. As the evaluation progressed, the team identified other information appropriate for review and staff at the institution provided copies of existing documents or researched their records for information.

The Facilities Standards and Operations Division of the CSA led the evaluation team. The team was divided into three teams, each comprised of staff from the CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice (each team had a member from each discipline - see Attachment E for a roster of team members and assignment).

The evaluation began on July 5, 2005, at the institution, with an entrance conference with Warden Campbell, appropriate institutional administrative staff and evaluation team members. The conference included an operational overview of the institution by Warden Campbell as well as an overview of the evaluation process by CSA Deputy Director Jerry Read. Following the entrance conference, the evaluation team members were provided a tour of the facilities.

Using a conference room in the Administrative Building as the base of operation, the team broke into workgroups and began the review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their observations. Available documentation was reviewed relative to the physical plant configuration, policies, safety equipment, staffing levels, staff assaults and inmate population. The group looked for any trends or related issues.

The physical plant team reviewed the institution design as it related to staffing, and the inmate population. The purpose was to identify any issues that would affect staff safety such as inmate crowding, limited visibility, insufficient supervision or lack of communication.

Institutional managers as well as staff and supervisors on each of the three watches were interviewed to provide an opportunity identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A questionnaire was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the interviews, and is included as an attachment to this report (see Attachment D). The responses were categorized and a summary of the responses is included in the Staff Interview section of this report (page 13-14). Conflicts between the documentation, the staffs' perception of the practice and staffs' concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included in this report. The review team also made their own observations and those are noted.

An exit conference was conducted with Associate Director Darrel Adams, Warden Campbell and the institution management staff to provide a summary of the results the evaluation. The exit conference included a presentation of the team's perceptions and observations as well as a summary of comments made by staff.

FACILITY PROFILE

Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) is located 40 miles southeast of Sacramento in Ione, California. It was first opened in June 1987 as a general population institution with vocational training programs, educational programs and Prison Industries Authority programs. Using a 270-degree design, the institution was originally constructed to house 1500 Level III inmates in three facilities and up to 200 inmate workers in the minimum-security support unit housing for a total institutional capacity of 1700.

Facility Description

There are three facilities within a secure perimeter, Facilities A, B, and C. Each facility is essentially a mirror of the others, containing five buildings, located in a semi-circular fashion creating a perimeter on one side of the exercise yard of each facility. The buildings each contain 100 individually secured cells; originally designed to be single occupancy cells that were equipped with two beds. Each cell also contains a toilet/washbasin combination unit. Additionally, each facility has a gymnasium that has been converted to an inmate dormitory, each containing 160 beds. An administrative complex comprised of various staff office space, inmate vocational, academic and PIA programs, inmate chapels, inmate medical, dental and mental health, canteen, clothing and plant operations are located within each facility.

Located outside of the secure perimeter are the two dormitories that comprise the minimum support facility (MSF). Each dormitory was designed to hold 100 beds but currently contain 200 open bunk beds. Additionally, the MSF has an exercise yard area, medical clinic, visiting room, library, inmate canteen and clothing, education and chapel area, kitchen/dining facility, and various offices that make up the facility.

Current Usage

MCSP is currently used as a medium to high security institution housing general population inmates up to a Level IV. It is a mental health hub institution for Enhanced Out Patient Program (EOP) and CCCMS inmates and houses inmates with sensitive needs (Sensitive Needs Yard or SNY). EOP inmates are those inmates with acute mental health needs. SNY inmates require special housing because of the high profile nature of their crimes, threats from other inmates or because they have "dropped out" from some previous gang affiliation and are now targets for assaults. The designation of being a "hub" institution means the prison has the capability of providing the enhanced services needed for the appropriate care of inmates with more acute needs within these classifications. MCSP is the only institution in the state designated to house inmates classified as being both, EOP and SNY. The institution continues to provide inmate programs including vocational training for several trades and professions (e.g., graphic arts, cabinet, grounds-keeping, meat cutting, geographic information systems, etc.), educational study for high school diploma/GED, Prison Industries, and other various programs to either support the community or otherwise better prepare the inmate for reentry into the community.

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION

The Data/Documentation Review Team reviewed available documentation, records and policy manuals to identify any trends or common themes among the incidents. The items reviewed included:

- Incident reports for staff assaults or attempted assaults (CDC 837).
- Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes.
- State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for assaults on staff.
- Inmate appeals (602).
- Inventories of authorized safety equipment.
- Use of Force Executive Review Committee (ERC) findings.
- Facility training records.
- Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections.
- Employee safety grievances.
- Daily chronological/watch commander's report.
- Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records.
- Staffing information.
- Classification records.
- Inmate files.
- Department Operations Manual (DOM) – Relevant sections only.
- Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) – Relevant sections only.

Staff Assault Incident Reports

FINDING: After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff battery. Other than inmate classification (see discussion below), no issues were identified as being significantly consistent among the various incidents.

DISCUSSION: Thirty-nine incidents of battery and attempted battery on staff were reported during the time period, July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005 at Mule Creek State Prison. The institution reports that over 40 staff members were victims of battery or were injured during incidents:

- Twenty-eight victims were from the ranks of correctional officers and two were sergeants. The remaining ten victims included five MTAs and five health care workers.
- The average age of the victims was approximately 38 years with 9.5 years of service.
- Twenty-nine of the victims were male and ten were female.
- Twenty-six of victims were white, six were black, six were hispanic, and two were reported as "other".

The team was unable to confirm whether the victim demographics were consistent with those of the institutions as those statistics were not readily available.

FINDING: Additional training is needed for staff responding to emergencies.

DISCUSSION: In the reports reviewed, no serious injuries¹ were initially reported by the victims and few required medical attention following the initial treatment at the institution's infirmary. In all but three incidents, no staff workdays were lost. In the most serious case, no initial serious injuries were reported; however, two staff members have been off duty for over 40 days as a result of their injuries and have not returned to work.

Three additional officers were injured, although not reported to be serious, during the process of responding to the incident. The Return to Work Coordinator provided statistics from the same time period showing a category described as "Responding to alarms" as being the third leading category of frequencies of staff injury, with 15 reported injuries during the last fiscal year. These statistics would support the need for training ways to safely respond to incidents.

FINDING: Race and age do not appear to be significant assault factors.

DISCUSSION: No significant variances were noted when comparing the race, age or county of commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. Hispanic and white inmates were responsible for 29 incidents with the remaining 10 being dispersed among the other races. The inmates had been committed from twelve counties with none being unusually represented.

The average age of involved inmates was 36, consistent with the prison population's average age of 38 and they had been incarcerated for an average of 1357 days including 725 days at Mule Creek. The average classification score of the involved inmates was 95 which would qualify as a Level IV. The documentation reflected only three incidents that involved inmates on a modified program.

FINDING: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff.

DISCUSSION: As in any facility, an inmate's housing location is largely determined by his or her classification score. Twenty-three of the incidents involved inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues. Ten of the incidents occurred in the administrative segregation unit, which houses as many as 175 inmates already identified as being the most disruptive or assaultive in the prison. Another 10 incidents occurred in areas located within Facility "A" which houses almost 1000 Level IV General Population (GP/SNY) inmates, the highest security level within the prison and an additional 160 Level III inmates housed in the gymnasium. Three incidents occurred in Facility B, Building 6, the Enhanced Out Patient (EOP) inmate housing unit. EOP inmates, while generally described as mental health patients because of their diagnosis, require a significantly higher level of clinical care. Facility B, Building 6 has

¹ A serious injury is defined by Title 15, Section 3000 as a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring suturing; and disfigurement.

been housing approximately fifty Level VI EOP/SNY inmates. The institution has just activated an EOP unit in a Level IV building in Facility A, housing 6 inmates as of this review date.

FINDING: Inmate manufactured weapons were not a factor in assaults on staff.

DISCUSSION: Inmate manufactured weapons were not involved in any of the incidents reviewed. Inmates threw or attempted to throw an unknown liquid substance on staff in 6 of the incidents. In the remainder of the cases reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to batter staff by head-butting, kicking or unlawfully touching with their hands. In the incident resulting in the most serious injury to staff, the inmate was able to head butt the officer, knock him off balance, kick him several times and finally bite him on the leg. Six incidents occurred during escorts and three during meal service when officers opened food ports.

The days of the week with the least frequent incidents were Wednesday and Thursday and the remainder of the incidents was divided among the other days of the week. The number of incidents was evenly distributed between second and third watch and none occurred during first watch.

Training

FINDING: Custody staff appear to be receiving training in safety related issues. Non-custody staff; however, receive fewer hours of training and are less compliant in attending training.

DISCUSSION: The training manager provided documentation of mandated training and institutional orientation training for both custody and non-custody staff. MCSP provides 40 hours of orientation training all new employees including approximately 10 hours on safety related issues.

Mandated training topics are specified by both California law and the DOM. Each institution may add training that would be considered as being site-specific. Depending on the institution's mission and construction, site-specific training topics are determined by the Warden.

Sergeants and Lieutenants are scheduled to receive approximately 57 hours of annual training, 10 of which are related to staff safety. Twelve of the hours are optional and based on monthly training bulletins provided from headquarters. MCSP tracks the supervisors' annual training based on the employee's birthday. Each employee's training year begins on their birthday, not a calendar or fiscal year, therefore, using the current IST tracking program, we were unable to confirm that all of the training mandates were being met. The training files reviewed indicated that regular, ongoing training was being performed. The training manager reported that all of the supervisors, with exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the training mandates.

The remaining custody personnel are scheduled to receive approximately 40 hours of annual training including approximately 21 hours related to staff safety. Again, we were unable to confirm that all of the training mandates were being met. The training manager reported that all

of the custody officers, with exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the training mandates.

The non-custody personnel are scheduled to receive 8 hours of annual training, 6 of which are related to staff safety. The training manager reported that 80% of the non-custody personnel were compliant with the training mandates. The sample files reviewed supported that percentage.

FINDING: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training (cell extraction, mental health intervention, etc.). In fact, the majority of staff interviewed identified the need for more meaningful training.

DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that correctional staff needed hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with EOP and CCCMS inmates.

Safety Equipment

The Department Operations Manual, Section 55050 addresses equipment involving weapons, chemical agents and the armory. This section, in part identifies departmentally approved chemical agents and munitions. MCSP issues chemical agents to correctional officers during each shift. Additional chemical agents, impact munitions and less-lethal devices are maintained in the control booths and armory and at designated areas within the institution. The equipment inventory records did not make any deficiencies apparent.

FINDING: Officers in some positions are not provided sufficient communications equipment.

DISCUSSION: The Correctional Officer assigned to Body Cavity Surveillance cells was not equipped with a personal alarm, intercom capabilities or radio (although post orders reflect a person alarm is to be worn). Additionally, the camera did not monitor the hall where the staff person is stationed but was positioned to monitor the inmate.

Only one radio is issued to the two correctional officers working inside the housing unit as floor officers. Typically the position designated as "floor one" is assigned to maintain the radio. This position is also designated as the primary respondent, during Code I and II emergencies. This process results in the second correctional officer remaining in the unit without radio communication. A radio was assigned to the Facility A Gym. In an effort to maximize the use of a single radio, staff had secured the radio to the podium as a point of centralized use. The evaluation team agreed that the institution should consider providing all floor officers with a radio.

FINDING: There are 87 officers and many MTAs and CC that have not been issued a stab-resistant vest.

DISCUSSION: The soft body armor stab resistant vest inventory records were reviewed. The armory Sergeant informed us that 651 officers have been designated to be issued a stab resistant

vest. The records reflect that 54 officers within the ranks of correctional officers, sergeants and lieutenants have been fitted for vests; however, the vests have yet to be issued. Thirty-three officers have not been fitted for or issued a vest at the time of the evaluation. Sufficient vests are available at the facility for those officers to check out for use during their shift until their personal vests are available. Officers reported a reluctance to wear these vests, saying that the vests were not cleaned appropriately. The records reflect that the remaining 564 officers, have been fitted and have been issued a vest.

The MTAs and Correctional Counselors (CC), who are custody staff, are not included in the above numbers. The team was informed that many of these personnel have been fitted for vests but have not received vests. The team was further informed that the bargaining unit representing MTAs and CCs has filed a grievance (with the agency not the institution) over this matter.

PHYSICAL PLANT & STAFFING

Activated in 1987, Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) was originally designed to house male adult Level I-III inmates. The institution currently operates as a Level I, II, III, and IV general population facility. The Level III and IV housing is constructed on a 270 design, celled housing criteria. There are three facilities maintained within a secure perimeter (Facilities A, B and C each containing five buildings) and a Level I housing facility is located outside of the secure perimeter. The Institution was originally designed to house 1700 inmates. At the time of this staff safety evaluation, the institution was housing 3517 inmates within the secure perimeter and 330 inmates within the Level I facility. See the Facility Profile section of this report for further information.

During the second and third watches, each building was staffed with two correctional officers designated as floor one and floor two, and an armed correctional officer posted in a secure location above the dayroom designated as the control booth officer. First watch has one correctional officer assigned floor duties and one control booth officer. The gymnasiums were staffed with two floor officers and only the gymnasium in Facility A had an armed observation booth officer, which was assigned during all three watches.

Facility A houses level IV inmates. Building 5 in Facility A is currently coming online to house the Level IV EOP inmates that were previously housed in Facility B, Building 6. An additional floor officer is assigned to this unit due to the increased supervision needs of EOP inmates.

Facility B, Building 6 houses the EOP inmates. An additional floor officer is assigned to this unit due to the increased supervision needs of EOP inmates. Buildings 7, 8, 9, 10 each have 60 additional E-beds located in the dayroom area. Only 40 of the 60 beds are currently utilized. Buildings containing E-beds are provided one additional correctional officer assigned as a floor officer during the first and third watch.

Facility C, Building 12 contains administrative segregation housing, and Building 13 (Facility C) serves as overflow administrative segregation housing. Buildings 11, 14 and 15 contain 60 E-beds in the dayroom area and again, only forty of these beds are used. As with other buildings containing E-beds, an extra floor officer is posted on the first and third watches.

Each facility contains a large inmate exercise yard. Facility A has three correctional officers assigned to supervise the exercise yard while Facilities B and C each have two officers assigned to the exercise yard.

Located outside of the secure perimeter are the two dormitories that comprise the Minimum Support Facility (MSF). Each dormitory contains 200 open bunk beds. Additionally, an exercise yard, visiting space, inmate canteen, combination education/chapel area, classrooms and various offices are included in the facility. One correctional officer is posted in each dormitory during each watch.

Additional correctional officers were posted in other locations in the institution (i.e.: central services, vocational/educational areas, towers, infirmary, etc.).

The evaluation team toured the institution, reviewed institutional procedures and interviewed staff at various classification levels. The evaluation team looked specifically at the overall conditions of the physical plant, the staffing levels within each area of the institution, and the number of inmates and their classification within each building of the institution. The evaluation revealed the following concerns within each facility:

Findings Common To Facilities A, B, & C

- The gymnasium was being utilized for the housing of inmates. Inmates housed in the gymnasium were observed draping towels, blankets and clothing from their bunks. This practice obscured the already limited visibility within this area. Staff stated that this issue has been reported to facility management and some managers allow this practice while others do not.
- Each of the buildings had a pad lock that was applied to each cell during the sleeping hours. The locks became necessary when it was discovered that inmates could lift the sliding door off of the track providing a means of exiting the cell. Team members are concerned about inmate and officer safety during emergency situations requiring immediate removal of an inmate from a cell, as the padlocks are located at the top of the cell doors. During a fire situation, lock removal could be hampered by the collection of smoke in these areas (as opposed to being able to maintain a low position to mitigate the effects of smoke) and shorter staff having a difficult time reaching locks. Team members recommend consulting the State Fire Marshal for an opinion on this practice of pad locking the doors during sleeping hours.
- The team recommends the institution consider placement of convex security mirrors at the end of the dayroom of each building, to enable correctional officers at the control desk to see blind spots near inmate telephone areas.

Findings Specific To Facility A

- The inmate exercise yard in this facility is very large; particularly considering it is used by Level IV inmates. Three correctional officers were assigned to the Facility A yard. These officers were not assigned specific sections of the yard for supervision responsibilities. Additionally, yard officers were observed leaving the yard without notifying their fellow officers. Sergeants were unable to locate yard officers when asked to do so. While the team felt three correctional officers were sufficient, the practice of not having specific areas of coverage responsibility within the yard and leaving the yard without notifying other officers could possibly compromise staff safety. Due to the classification of the inmate population in this facility, the team recommends dividing the yard with fencing or masonry to aid in the supervision of inmates.
- Inconsistencies were noted in the responses provided by correctional officers within several buildings regarding incident response procedures. Post orders and practice were not consistent. When interviewed, staff gave inconsistent information regarding incident response responsibilities.
- Building 5 has office furniture and equipment being moved into the dayroom for EOP staff. This furniture and equipment may pose a staff safety issue, as it could be used a

weapon or used to make weapons. The team recommends that the office furniture be replaced with detention grade furnishings.

Findings Specific To Facility B

- Only two officers were assigned to this exercise yard. The team agreed this was an insufficient number of yard officers. The evaluation team suggests that the institution consider assigning an additional officer to this yard as well as in the exercise yard of Facility C. The issue of yard officers not having specific areas of supervision responsibility was also observed in these exercise yards.
- E-beds contained in Buildings 7, 8, 9 and 10 (as well as Buildings 11, 14 and 15 in Facility C) present a staff safety risk. Poor visibility due to inmates draping items between the bunks and inability to secure these inmates contribute to this concern. Additional staff are provided on third watch, but not second. Logic is that inmates, during the second watch, are on the yard or attending vocational programs. Each building containing E-beds was observed with inmates in the dayroom area during the second watch. These inmates were not assigned to a vocational program and chose not to be on the yard. As a result, these inmates were either on their bunk, or in the dayroom area. The team recommends a third correctional officer be assigned to these units to provide supervision of these additional inmates.

Findings Specific To Facility C

- Officers in Building 14 stated that the inmates have the ability to control the TV volume and the volume becomes loud enough to hinder verbal communications between officers.
- Officers in Buildings 11, 14 and 15 reported that work orders are not addressed consistently. Team members observed lights that were burned out and doors located near the showers with locks that were sticking.
- Staff in Buildings 11, 14 & 15 reported concerns about not having adequate coverage during the AM feeding release and recall.

Findings Specific to Central Services

- The institutional fire identification system alarm was not working properly. Staff reported that the system has historically not functioned correctly and that during the rainy season, the problems with the system are exacerbated.
- The Correctional Officer assigned to the Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) did not have a personal alarm.
- In the CTC, an electrical room has been converted into a staff break room/inmate clerk office. The room contained cleaning supplies and a staff refrigerator. The inmate clerk was not being directly supervised and had access to officer food.

STAFF INTERVIEWS

Random interviews were conducted with custody and non-custody staff from Wednesday, July 6 through Friday, July 8, using a questionnaire (questionnaire included as Attachment D) developed by the Corrections Standards Authority. Due to limited staff resources and time constraints, the interviewing team chose to conduct random interviews with custody staff assigned to facility A, B, C (e.g. ad seg, ad seg overflow, gymnasiums, EOP, SNY, central services, and CTC), Minimum Security, and selected support functions (ISU, and transportation).

For purposes of this report, responses from custody managers, supervisors, and line staff are grouped and perceptions concerning staff safety are detailed. Staff safety interviews were conducted on Friday with non-custody staff (managers and/or supervisors in each program area); however, their responses have not been grouped together for this report out due to a lack of time for preparation. However, the review team did find that the supervisors and managers (non-custody) shared many of the custody concerns.

Interviews with Managers

We meet with the captains on Wednesday, July 8, and we asked them to comment on their staff safety concerns. They unanimously agreed that the two major issues affecting staff safety were crowding and the increase in SNY program inmates.

FINDING: Level IV inmates with mental health issues and sensitive needs are being housed in inappropriate facilities (270 versus 180 design).

DISCUSSION: Staff shared with us that Mule Creek State Prison is considered the "hub" for EOP/SNY inmates, designating it as the only institution that houses EOP and SNY inmates. Compounding the situation, many of the SNY inmates have Level IV classification points requiring 180 design housing; however this institution was designed as Level III with 270 design housing. As a result, staff safety becomes a concern when SNY inmates, with assaultive histories, are housed in these facilities. The team was informed that the department has no 180 design facilities to house these Level IV SNY inmates.

FINDING: Crowding leads to a potentially unsafe environment.

DISCUSSION: A second concern is the overcrowding in the facilities, which result in E beds (extra beds), or triple bunk beds placed in housing unit dayrooms, and double and triple bunking of the gymnasiums. Designated housing units have up to 40 inmates sleeping in E beds. While an additional floor officer is assigned to supervise these inmates, it is difficult for the officer to supervise these inmates due to obstructed sightlines. Gymnasium A uses triple bunks, and Gymnasiums B and C use double bunks to house up to 160 inmates. Gymnasium A has two floor officers and one gunner, and Gymnasium B and C have two floor officers but no gunner, because the inmates are classified as Level 1-2. These gymnasiums are perceived as staff safety issues, as it is difficult to supervise the inmates due to the large number of beds and diminished sightlines.

FINDING: Post and bid prevents managers from filling posts with the best-qualified staff.

DISCUSSION: Additionally, the captains believe that "post and bid" (a process in which lieutenant, sergeants and COs request to work a specific post based on their seniority) restricts their ability to ensure a high level of institutional and staff safety. The best-qualified individual is not always placed in a position, based solely on seniority.

Interviews with Supervisors

FINDING: Supervisor concerns mirrored those of the managers in the following:

- Crowding with E-beds and the using gymnasiums as dormitories.
- Post and bid - supervisors were restricted from diverting an officer from one position to another based on operational needs.

FINDING: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training.

DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that correctional staff needed hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with EOP and CCCMS inmates.

Interviews with Line Staff

FINDING: Staff reported that safety equipment is adequate for performing their duties and rated the equipment as "good" to "okay".

DISCUSSION: Line staff said the type of safety equipment issued to them includes personal alarms, radios in designated positions, handcuffs, side-handle batons, and OC spray. They indicated that equipment could be obtained at the sergeant's office, control booths, or from the person being relieved at shift change.

FINDING: Not all custody staff have been issued stab-resistant vest and are reluctant to wear vests from the "vest pool".

DISCUSSION: Of the staff interviewed, all had been fitted for stab-resistant vests, but not all had been issued a vest. The evaluation team reviewed the body armor report, and noted that 567 custody staff had been issued vests and 87 custody staff had not. Staff indicated that if they were assigned to a position which required a vest, they would not wear a vest from the "vest pool" as they believed that these vests are not maintained in a sanitary condition, and they were concerned with the integrity of the material to withstand an attack by an inmate. Staff were familiar with department policy which requires that a vest be worn by staff in specified positions, but did not always comply.

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

This was the first of forty-one Staff Safety Evaluations which will be conducted at California's state prisons and youth detention facilities. The initial evaluation pilot tested the criteria that was developed by a panel of subject matter experts. The evaluation team made a number of modifications to the process as a result of the pilot test; nevertheless, several observations and recommendations are contained in this report.

The majority of observations were the result of crowding at the institution, classification issues (EOP, SNY, and Level IV inmates) including classification overrides, safety equipment issues (stab-resistant vests, communications, etc.), training issues, labor issues (management limitations due to post and bid), physical plant issues and staffing concerns. Institution management cannot address many of the issues identified in this report, as they require a funding source or changes in overarching policy and/or labor agreements.

As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority, the findings from this evaluation will be presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to CSA members, CDCR administration and Warden Campbell. It is outside the scope of this project for the CSA to receive and monitor a corrective action plan; appropriate action will be the responsibility of CDCR Adult Operations.

ATTACHMENT A
ENTRANCE LETTER

Attachment A

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR



BOARD OF CORRECTIONS
600 BERCUT DRIVE, SACRAMENTO, CA 95814

916/445-5073
WWW.BDCORR.CA.GOV

June 20, 2005

Rosanne Campbell, Warden
Mule Creek State Prison
P.O. Box 409099
Ione, CA 95640

Dear Warden Campbell:

The Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) asked the Board of Corrections (BOC) to develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at Department of Corrections (CDC) and Department of the Youth Authority (CYA) detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the Board unanimously approved a proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting staff safety evaluations.

The panel met on May 24-25, 2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted. As a result, a team comprised of BOC, CDC and CYA staff will be conducting the evaluations over the next 28 months beginning with the Mule Creek State Prison on July 5-8, 2005. We expect to be on site for four days and plan to observe operations during all shifts if possible.

We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and/or appropriate administrative staff on July 5, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be conducted and to get a general overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have.

In order to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team's use while at Mule Creek State Prison:

- A contact person with whom the team may coordinate their activities (please call or e-mail this information when the contact is identified).
- An office or conference room equipped with a table, chairs and a telephone in which a team of nine may work.
- Access to all levels of staff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their assigned work areas and we will avoid interrupting their schedules as much as possible.
- Incident Reports for Assaults on Staff - CDC 837:
 - A data collection form was sent to Chief Deputy Bill Des Voignes, asking that facility staff code staff assault incident reports for the past year in the identified format, addressing incident information, inmate information and victim(s) information (please provide an electronic copy of this data as soon as practical).

Warden Campbell

Attachment A

Page 2

June 20, 2005

- Staff Assault Committee Minutes
- State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for assaults on staff
Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator
- A copy of the Confidential and Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM)

The evaluation team may ask for additional resources, depending on the initial assessment. Please keep in mind that Mule Creek State Prison is the first facility for which staff safety evaluations will be conducted, so all needed information is still being determined.

Supplemental Data Sources – to be accessed as needed

- Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes*
 - Grievances, Recommendations, Actions
- Inmate Appeals (CDC) *
- Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOU) at certain facilities*
- Authorized Equipment and Functionality
- Use of Force Committee Minutes and responses to recommendations*
- Employee Training records for selected areas*
- Corrective Action Plans for previous audits*
- Men's Advisory Counsel (MAC) minutes*

Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit conference with you and/or appropriate members of your staff (on or about July 8, 2005). The results of the evaluation will be reported to the BOC at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be forwarded to YACA with a courtesy copy sent to you.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or jread@bdcort.ca.gov.

Sincerely,

Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A)

*= 2004 and 2005 to date

cc: J. S. Woodford, Director
Department of Corrections

ATTACHMENT B
STAFF ASSAULT DATA

Mule Creek State Prison
Staff Assault Data FY 2004/05
Page 1 of 2

Attachment B

INCIDENT INFORMATION									INMATE/WARD INFORMATION										VICTIM INFORMATION				
IRIS#	Date	Time	Day of Week	Site and Location	Type of Assault	Serious Injury	Inmate Weapon	INMATE#	Ethnicity	Classification	Rec'd CDC CYA	Rec'd last	Anticipated Rot Date/PBD	Age	Housing Loc	Special Program/MH Status	Genq	Work Assign	Gender	Classification (CDC/CCV/Conk, etc)	Age	Yrs of Svc	Race
MCP-A01-04/11-0261	11/27/2004	925	SAT	BLDG 1	BATTERY	NO	NO	T08357	BLK	93	3/1/2001	1/13/2004	2/17/2006	22	A1-216L	N/A	BARRIO	UNK	M	CO	23	21.56	WHT
MCP-A03-04/09-0189	9/14/2004	1915	TUES	BLDG 3	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	K15838	HISP		10/22/1996	6/10/2002	7/12/2005	47	A3-117	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	M	MTA	29	2.17	BLK
MCP-A04-04/09-0194	9/19/2004	845	SUN	BLDG 4	GASSING	NO	NO	P12614	WHT	53	7/19/2000	8/22/2003	LIFE	42	A4-137L	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	F	MTA	30	2.59	WHT
MCP-ACL-04/06-0126	8/15/2004	715	TUES	A CLINIC	BATTERY	NO	NO	J29542	WHT	212	10/12/1995	12/18/2003	3/29/2013	35	A03-210U	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	F	MTA	40	3.3	WHT
MCP-ACL-04/07-0146	7/6/2004	910	TUES	EDUCATION	BATTERY	NO	NO	P40243	HISP	57	5/24/1999	4/6/2000	11/20/2023	54	A2-117L	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	CO	52		WHT
MCP-ADH-04/10-0265	10/22/2004	808	SAT	DINING	BATTERY	NO	NO	D22084	AM	171	2/5/1986	8/30/2000	LIFE	42	A	N/A	DRPT	UNK	M	CO	43	18.25	WHT
MCP-ADH-04/10-0265	10/22/2004	808	SAT	DINING	GASSING	NO	NO	D22084	AM	171	2/5/1986	8/30/2000	LIFE	42	A	N/A	DRPT	UNK	M	CO	53	18.58	WHT
MCP-ADH-04/10-0225	10/17/2004	735	SUN	DINING	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	T88523	HISP	56	7/7/2003	3/24/2003	02/18/07	48	C13-112L	CCCMS	FLOREN	UNK	M	CO	56	8.08	WHT
MCP-ADH-04/11-0254	11/19/2004	1730	WED	DINING	BATTERY	NO	NO	V18821	HISP	21	12/2/2003	4/28/2004	1/2/2006	42	AG-095	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	SCI	38	10.60	HISP
MCP-AED-04/06-0134	6/24/2004	850	THUR	EDUCATION	BATTERY	NO	NO	K22133	WHT	79	10/22/1999	4/23/2003	1/17/2005	44	A03-241L	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	F	TEACHER	54	9.5	WHT
MCP-AED-04/06-0146	7/4/2004	1835	SUN	A CLINIC	GASSING	NO	NO	K40038	BLK	107	2/10/1997	2/2/2003	LIFE	42	A3-215L	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	F	MTA	26	1.33	WHT
MCP-ASU-04/09-0194	9/14/2004	1600	TUES	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	J28873	HISP	143	8/10/1994	12/23/2003	LIFE	35	C12-121L	N/A	N STRC	UNK	F	MTA	37	2	WHT
MCP-ASU-04/10-0241	10/28/2004	1145	THURS	ASU	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	J85140	WHT	61	6/11/2003	10/21/2003	11/4/2005	38	12-127L	EOP	N/A	UNK	M	CD	31	5	WHT
MCP-ASU-04/11-0255	11/24/2005	1730	TUES	ASU	GASSING	NO	NO	J93046	WHT	259	3/8/1998	8/30/2004	3/25/2013	41	12-128L	EOP	N/A	UNK	M	MTA	37		BLK
MCP-ASU-05/01-014	1/24/2005	1320	MON	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	P48936	HISP	181	8/5/1999	12/18/2004	9/7/2005	28	12-133L	EOP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	31	8.42	WHT
MCP-ASU-05/01-014	1/24/2005	1320	MON	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	P48936	HISP	181	8/5/1999	12/18/2004	9/7/2005	28	12-133L	EOP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	36	5.62	WHT
MCP-ASU-05/05/078	5/19/2005	1715	WED	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	T82818	WHT	49	11/2/2004	12/7/2004	1/10/2008	35	12-129L	EOP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	47	2.17	WHT
MCP-ASU-05/06-072	5/6/2005	730	FRI	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	T45595	BLK	48	3/4/2002	4/28/2005	8/8/2005	24	12-123L	EOP	N/A	N/A	M	CO	39	17	WHT
MCP-ASU-05/06-081	5/13/2005	1350	FRI	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	K37748	WHT	315	1/31/1997	2/2/2004	3/2/2012	32	12-129L	CCCMS	WHT	N/A	M	CO	23	3.08	HISP
MCP-ASU-05/06-081	5/13/2005	1350	FRI	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	K37748	WHT	315	1/31/1997	2/2/2004	3/2/2012	32	12-129L	CCCMS	WHT	N/A	M	CO	23	3.08	HISP
MCP-ASU-05/06-081	5/13/2005	1350	FRI	ASU	BATTERY	NO	NO	K37748	WHT	315	1/31/1997	2/2/2004	3/2/2012	32	12-129L	CCCMS	WHT	N/A	M	CO	23	3.08	HISP
MCP-AYD-04/10-0215	10/7/2004	1119	THURS	A YARD	BATTERY	NO	NO	J02657	BLK	57	8/9/1994	1/8/1999	10/23/2009	34	A4-215U	N/A	N/A	UNK	F	CO	40	8.58	HISP
MCP-B04-04/09-0181	8/30/2004	1745	MON	BLDG 6	BATTERY	NO	NO	T48713	OTH	51	1/11/2002	6/19/2002	4/10/2006	28	B06-140U	EOP	N/A	UNK	F	LPT	29	1	WHT
MCP-B05-04/11-0258	11/22/2004	1815	MON	BLDG 6	BATTERY	NO	NO	D06631	WHT	163	10/19/2003	8/31/2003	12/14/1933	44	A6-244U	EOP	N/A	UNK	M	CO	42	2.58	HISP
MCP-B06-04/11-0263	11/30/2004	1510	TUES	BLDG 6	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	P32899	HISP	15	3/24/1989	1/15/2000	6/24/2007	36	B6-240U	EOP	N/A	UNK	F	RN	63	20.42	WHT
MCP-B08-04/07-0169	7/30/2004	1415	FRI	BLDG 8	GASSING	NO	NO	P78299	WHT		5/11/2005	8/4/2003	1/119/2004	29	B8-151L	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	CO	37	4.83	OTH
MCP-B08-04/09-0201	9/23/2004	1435	THURS	BLDG 8	BATTERY	NO	NO	P48305	HISP	33	12/23/1999	5/10/2002	8/9/2005	31	B8-142U	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	SGT	32	6.50	HISP

**Mule Creek State Prison
Staff Assault Data FY 2004/05
Page 2 of 2**

Attachment B

MCP-BCS-0506-0105	6/18/2005	1145	SUN	BCS	BATTERY	NO	NO	J41093	WHT	91	11/28/1994	1/9/2003	3/12/2012	35	BCS#1	MHC8	N/A	N/A	M	CO	44	18.66	WHT
MCP-BDH-0606-104	6/18/2005	1650	SAT	B DHWG	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	V53714	WHT	27	10/12/2004	2/5/2005	9/22/2006	27	BS-203U	EOP	WHT PR	UNK	M	CO	45	8.6	WHT
MCP-BPG-0408-0174	8/23/2004	1030	MON	PROGRAM	BATTERY	NO	NO	T87033	WHT	44	3/28/2003	7/2/2003	9/28/2004	35	BS-139L	EOP	N/A	UNK	M	CO	40	2.42	HSP
MCP-C15-0407-0153	7/23/2004	1020	FRI	BLDG 15	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	K73570	OTH	24	11/13/1997	8/1/1998	09/09/2009		C15-177L	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	CO	35	8	BLK
MCP-C15-0410-0237	10/23/2004	1585	SAT	BLDG 15	BATTERY	NO	NO	T03715	BLK	35	12/22/2000	7/1/2004	10/23/2017	29	C15-114U	N/A	N/A	UNK	F	CO	43	17	WHT
MCP-CCL-0406-0136	6/18/2004	1810	MON	C CLINIC	GASSING	NO	NO	V01965	WHT	44	10/8/2003	12/2/2003	1/11/2017	47	C14-103L	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	F	MTA	35	0.51	ASIN
MCP-CDH-0408-0136	8/29/2004	830	TUES	C DINING	BATTERY	NO	PROJ	D83188	WHT	34	7/14/1987	1/23/2004	1/14/1852	38	C11-202U	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	CO	38	14.17	BLK
MCP-CPG-0504-0067	4/30/2005	1950	SAT	CPRGM	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	V52255	HSP	48	9/28/2004	1/18/2005	4/23/2011	23	C15-239U	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	M	CO	44	9.42	WHT
MCP-CTC-0412-0284	12/27/2004	1140	MON	CTC	BATTERY	NO	NO	C15411	WHT	201	12/20/1983	2/1/2002	LIFE	58	12-127L	CCCMS	N/A	UNK	M	CO	53	18.42	WHT
MCP-CTC-0505-092	5/25/2005	1250	WED	CTC	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	V24120	HSP	38	3/2/2004	3/8/2005	9/17/2008	34	CTC09	CCCMS	N/A	N/A	F	CO	41	19.25	BLK
MCP-CTC-0506-101	5/31/2005		TUES	CTC	BATTERY	NO	NO	J43040	OTH	23	5/24/1995	8/11/1995	1/20/2035	66	CTC09	N/A	N/A	N/A	F	FIN	45	2.9	WHT
MCP-CYD-0407-0155	7/25/2004	1625	SUN	C YARD	GASSING	NO	NO	D18748	HSP	178	3/19/1986	3/27/2001	10/14/2010	42	A2-121U	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	CO	35	1	WHT
MCP-CYD-0501-007	1/14/2006	1445	SAT	C YARD	BATTERY	NO	NO	K24288	HSP	24	10/9/1998	1/10/1998	11/13/2318	34	C13-107L	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	CO	32	9.5	WHT
MCP-CYD-0501-007	1/14/2006	1445	SAT	C YARD	BATTERY	NO	NO	T98286	HSP	25	6/10/2003	3/12/2004	12/7/2012	25	UNK	N/A	N/A	UNK	M	CO	33	9.5	WHT
MCP-R&R-0505-085	5/17/2005	1820	TUES	R&R	ATTEMPT	NO	NO	V24520	HSP	50	2/17/2004	5/17/2004	2/21/2006	37	12-119L	EOP	SUREK	N/A	M	CO	48	20.56	BLK
MCP-R&R-0505-086	5/18/2005	1800	WED	R&R	BATTERY	NO	NO	V24520	HSP	50	2/17/2004	5/17/2004	2/21/2006	37	12-126L	EOP	SUREK	N/A	M	CO	42	17	BLK

ATTACHMENT C
DESIGN VERSUS CURRENT CAPACITY

Attachment C

Design Capacity Versus Current Capacity

Area	Designed Capacity	Designed Bed Count	Current Capacity	Current Bed Count
Facility A				
Building 1	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	100 Double Occupancy Cells	200
Building 2	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	100 Double Occupancy Cells	200
Building 3	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	100 Double Occupancy Cells	200
Building 4	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	100 Double Occupancy Cells	200
Building 5	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	100 Double Occupancy Cells	200
Gymnasium A		0	160 Bed Open Dorm	160
Exercise Yard				
Facility B				
Building 6	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	94 Double Occupancy Cells + 6 single Occupancy Level IV EOP Beds	194
Building 7	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	98 Double Occupancy Cells* + 40 E-beds	236
Building 8	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	98 Double Occupancy Cells* + 40 E-beds	236
Building 9	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	98 Double Occupancy Cells* + 40 E-beds	236
Building 10	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	98 Double Occupancy Cells* + 40 E-beds	236
Gymnasium B		0	160 Bed Open Dorm	160
Exercise Yard				
Facility C				
Building 11	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	98 Double Occupancy Cells* + 40 E-beds	236
Building 12	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	100 Double Occupancy Cells	200
Building 13	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	100 Double Occupancy Cells	200
Building 14	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	98 Double Occupancy Cells* + 40 E-beds	236
Building 15	100 Single Occupancy Cells	100	98 Double Occupancy Cells* + 40 E-beds	236
Gymnasium C			160 Bed Open Dorm	160
Minimum Security				
Dorm 1	100 Bed Open Dorm	100	200 Bed Open Dorm	200
Dorm 2	100 Bed Open Dorm	100	200 Bed Open Dorm	200
Total		1700		4126

* Two cells in these buildings were converted to restroom facilities for the E-bed inmates.

ATTACHMENT D
STAFF INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

**Mule Creek State Prison
July 5 - 8, 2005**

Line Staff:

1. What is your current job title?
2. What is your assignment? What are your primary duties (Post Orders)?
3. When did you start working for the department as...?
4. How long have you been assigned to this facility?
5. How many inmates do you supervise? What is their general classification (EOP)?
6. What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at all times, otherwise have access to, or have to check out from a central location?
7. Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?
8. What is the general condition of your safety equipment?
9. Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for your job duties?
10. If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary?

11. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility? Why do you feel that way?
12. Where do you feel the least safe? Can you describe why that is? Where and when do you feel the most safe? How do other staff feel about this?
13. What staff safety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the most as you are performing your duties?
14. Do you have any general suggestions or comments relating to staff safety?
15. What most would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety?
16. How often do you see and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor's supervisor? The warden?
17. Are protocols in place for emergency responses?
18. (Policy?) What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Supervisors:

1. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a supervisor?
2. How many years do you have as a supervisor?
3. Have you worked as a supervisor at any other CDC institution?
4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.
5. How many officers do you directly supervise?
6. How many do you indirectly supervise?
7. What is the percentage of time (shift) do you spend personally observing your subordinates?
8. Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff?
9. What safety equipment is issued and carried by your staff?
10. Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use?

11. If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?
12. Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?
13. Does your staff have stab vests? Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure that they wear it at all times?
14. How often do you see your supervisors?
15. How many of your available officers are on overtime? Ordered over? Voluntary?
16. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility?
17. What is your greatest concern about staff safety for your subordinates?
18. What kind of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge? How do you handle them?
19. What do you do to ensure a safe working environment for your staff?

20. What would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety and reduce staff assaults?
21. What protocols in place for emergency responses?
22. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Managers:

1. How long have you been assigned to this facility as a manager?
2. How many years experience do you have as a manager?
3. Have you been a manager at any other CDC institution?
4. Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.
5. Have often do you walk through the facility to talk with staff and observe general staff safety practices?
6. Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? What is available for them to use?
7. Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use?
8. If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?

9. How many of your staff have been issued stab vests? How many have been fitted? What is the timeline for issuing vests? Who has been identified to receive them?
10. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel working at this facility?
11. When considering staff safety, what types of concerns do you have?
12. From your perspective, what carries the greatest potential for staff injury?
13. What might mitigate or reduce staff assaults?
14. What kinds of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge?
15. Do you have any long range plans to ensure staff safety and to reduce staff assaults?
16. Do you have anyone assigned to monitor staff assaults or track occurrences to identify trends?

17. If you had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would you make to your operation to reduce staff assaults or the potential for assaults? Physical plant, service and supply, operational changes and/or staff changes?
18. Have the number of vacancies, 4850's, other leave of absences affected staff safety? Do you have mandated overtime for staff and supervisors?
19. Do you have any staff off duty as a result of an assault? How long? Have you had contact with them while they were off duty?
20. What level of repair is your facility? Have you made requests for service or special projects that affect the level of staff safety? Have those requests been approved?
21. What protocols in place for emergency responses?
22. What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

ATTACHMENT E
EVALUATION TEAM ROSTER AND
ASSIGNMENTS

Attachment E

**Evaluation Team Members
Mule Creek State Prison****Team 1****Staff Interviews:**

Robert Takeshta, CSA Field Representative
John McAuliffe, Adult Operations, Correctional Counselor II
Jeff Plunkett, Juvenile Justice, Captain

Team 2

Physical Plant, Staffing and Population:
Gary Wion, CSA Field Representative
Mark Perkins, Adult Operations, Facility Captain
Gerry Garcia, Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant

Team 3

Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis:
Don Allen, CSA Field Representative
Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieutenant
Bob Moore, Juvenile Justice, Major

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