




TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Mac Stringfellow
Chairman
San Antonio

February 13, 2001

Ms. Yolanda M. Torres
American Civil Liberties Union
North Texas Region, Dallas Chapter
4000 Republic Center, Tower II
325 N. St. Paul
Dallas, Texas 75201



Dear Ms. Torres:

In response to your Open Records Request, dated February 8, 2001, enclosed are the following documents:

1. Internal Review on Connally Unit escape (provided to the legislature on February 7, 2001): At the February 7 hearing Mr. Vasquez, a former TDCJ Captain, provided a draft version of the agency's Administrative Incident Review on the Connally Unit escape. A copy of that draft report, as well as, the agency's final report are provided (enclosures one and two). Note: Both reports are minus their last attachment – wanted posters of escaped offenders.
2. Formal Report on the escape: A copy of the Serious Incident Review on the Connally Unit escape, distributed January 11, 2001 is provided (enclosure three).

Regarding a February 2001 Death Row Plan, I understand Carl Reynolds has addressed the non-existence of this document with you via the Internet.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Susan McHenry".

Susan McHenry
Executive Assistant

spm
attachments (three)

**TEXAS DEPARTMENT
of
CRIMINAL JUSTICE**

Institutional Division



SERIOUS INCIDENT REVIEW

Connally Unit

Date of Incident: December 13, 2000

Date of Review: December 19, 2000

Date of Distribution: January 11, 2001

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Institutional Division

SERIOUS INCIDENT REVIEW

TO: Gary Johnson *[Signature]* DATE: December 19, 2000
Director, TDCJ-ID. 11/10/01

THRU: Janie Cockrell *[Signature]*
Deputy Director for Security 09/18/01

FROM: Gary Gomez *[Signature]* SUBJECT: Serious Incident
Region III Director Connally Unit
December 13, 2000

BACKGROUND

On December 13, 2000, at approximately 1120 hours, seven offenders assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, overpowered and restrained nine maintenance supervisors, four correctional officers and three uninvolved offenders, and escaped from the facility. An Incident Review Team was formed at the request of Gary Johnson, Director, TDCJ-Institutional Division. The team was comprised of the following members:

- ◆ Gary Gomez, Director, Region III
- ◆ R. C. Thaler, Senior Warden, Estelle Unit
- ◆ David Doughty, Senior Warden, Stiles Unit
- ◆ Elizabeth Burns, Assistant Warden, Ramsey III
- ◆ Patrick O'Shaughnessy, Division Director, Office of the Inspector General
- ◆ Micky Price, Area Director, Facilities Operations & Maintenance
- ◆ Karen Hall, Administrative Technician, Executive Services
- ◆ William H. Moody, Member of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice, served as the liaison on the review team for the Board.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

The scope of the review was to examine the unit security operations and procedures, maintenance procedures, emergency response plan, unit staffing, and the unit classification process. The objectives of the team were to identify procedures that may prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future, and to offer recommendations and corrective actions to the Connally Unit Warden. The team used visual inspections of the incident scene, interviews with staff, and a review of all applicable documents and procedures pertinent to the escape.

INCIDENT REVIEW

PARTICIPANT SUMMARY

Victims

Employees

Patrick Moczygemba, Maintenance Supervisor V
Mark Burgess, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Alan Camber, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Mark Garza, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Martin Gilley, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Ronny Haun, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Lester Moczygemba, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Terry Schmidt, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Manuel Segura, Maintenance Supervisor IV
Randy Albert, Correctional Officer III, Field Force
Lou Gips, Correctional Officer IV, Backgate Picket
Vernon Janssen, Correctional Officer IV, Backgate
Alejandro Marroquin, Correctional Officer III, Maintenance Paint Squad

Offenders

David Cook, #435179, W/M, Door Closer Mechanic
Roger Fishwick, #604792, W/M, Door Closer Mechanic
Ambrosio Martinez, #648556, H/M, Plumber

Assailants / Escapees

Joseph Garcia, # 774391, Maintenance Department Material Handler, H/M, serving a 50 year sentence for Murder out of Bexar County.

Randy Halprin, #786259, Maintenance Department Material Handler, W/M, serving a 30 year sentence for Injury to a Child out of Tarrant County.

Larry Harper, #861910, Maintenance Department Material Handler, W/M, serving a 30 year sentence and a 50 year sentence for multiple counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault out of El Paso County.

Patrick Murphy, #386888, Maintenance Department Carpenter, W/M, serving a 6 year sentence for Burglary of a Building and a 50 year sentence for Aggravated Sexual Assault out of Dallas County.

Donald Newbury, #824631, Maintenance Department Door Closer Mechanic, W/M, serving a 99 year sentence for counts of Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon out of Travis County.

George Rivas, #702267, Maintenance Department Support Service Inmate - Clerk, H/M, serving a life sentence for multiple counts of Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery and Burglary out of El Paso County.

Michael Rodriguez, #698074, Inside Yard Squad, H/M, serving a life sentence for Capital Murder out of Bexar County.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

On December 13, 2000, at approximately 1120, the employees of the Connally Unit Maintenance Department returned 20 offenders that were assigned to the Maintenance Department to their housing areas and went to lunch. Patrick Moczygamba, Maintenance Supervisor V, arranged for a group of five offenders, Joseph Garcia #774391, Randy Halprin #786259, Larry Harper #861910, Donald Newbury #824631, and George Rivas #702267, to stay in the Maintenance Department to seal the floor in the warehouse. It was not uncommon for these offenders to be assigned to special projects in the Maintenance Department. Mark Burgess, Maintenance Supervisor IV also gave permission for one of his offenders, Patrick Murphy #386888, to stay in for lunch to complete an ongoing project. Mr. P. Moczygamba agreed to stay and supervise the offenders.

At approximately 1130, Mr. P. Moczygamba was working in the office when Offender Rivas asked him to come back into the warehouse. Offender Harper asked him to look at a motor that was under a table. The offenders were clearing the floor to begin sealing and claimed that they were unsure of what they should do with the motor. As Mr. P. Moczygamba leaned down to look at the motor, one of the offenders struck him in the head with what was later discovered to be an axe handle, and he was rendered unconscious. When he regained consciousness he began to struggle with the offenders. Offender Garcia held a hand-made knife to Mr. P. Moczygamba's neck and told him that a few more years wouldn't mean anything to their sentences and they would kill one of the employees if they needed to. The offenders removed Mr. P. Moczygamba's pants and shirt, tied his hands and legs, and placed a gag in his mouth. A pillowcase was placed over his head and he was carried to the electrical room at the back of the warehouse where he was forced to lie face down on the floor.

Offender Michael Rodriguez #698074, was assigned to the inside yard squad on the day of the incident. Due to inclement weather conditions, the inside yard squad offenders did not turn out for work. Possibly in anticipation of the weather related work restriction, Offender Rodriguez had an appointment to visit the unit law library on the morning of the incident. The law library check-in log confirmed that Offender Rodriguez attended his appointment and checked out at 0940. Although we cannot verify the exact time Offender Rodriguez gained access to the maintenance area, it is the opinion of the review team that Offender Rodriguez was inadvertently allowed through the gate at A Turnout. Several employees report seeing Offender Rodriguez sitting on a bench in front of the Maintenance Department at various times that morning. After Mr. P. Moczygamba was subdued, Offender Rodriguez entered the Maintenance Department where he became an active participant in the escape.

At approximately 1145, Alan Camber, Maintenance Supervisor IV, and Alejandro Marroquin, Correctional Officer III, entered the maintenance office and each sat down at a

desk in the office as they began talking. Offenders Rivas, Halprin, Harper, Murphy, and Newbury came into the office and began talking with them. Offender Rivas walked behind Officer Marroquin and grabbed him in a bear hug from behind. Officer Marroquin began struggling as Offenders Halprin, Harper and Newbury helped Offender Rivas force Officer Marroquin to the floor. The offenders bound Officer Marroquin's hands and legs with plastic ties and duct tape and attempted to place a gag in his mouth. Officer Marroquin refused to open his mouth to be gagged and Offender Newbury struck him in the nose with a closed fist forcing Officer Marroquin to allow the offenders to gag him. Officer Marroquin was then carried to the electrical room where he was placed on the floor next to Mr. P. Moczygemba.

Simultaneously, Offender Murphy was asking Mr. Camber about a part for a vacuum cleaner, when Offender Garcia attacked him from behind. After subduing Officer Marroquin, Offender Rivas assisted Offender Garcia in forcing Mr. Camber to the floor. Offender Garcia placed a pointed object in Mr. Camber's left ear, threatening to apply force. Mr. Camber, in fear of his life, stopped struggling. The offenders bound Mr. Camber's hands with plastic ties and duct tape and removed his boots and jeans. He was then dragged into the electrical room where the offenders struck his head against the electrical conduit on the wall causing him to lose consciousness. The offenders then placed a gag in his mouth, a pillowcase over his head and wrapped duct tape around his eyes outside of the pillowcase.

At approximately 1200, Mr. Manuel Segura, Maintenance Supervisor IV, and Mr. Mr. Mark Burgess, Maintenance Supervisor IV returned to the Maintenance Department. Offender Rivas came into the office and told Mr. Burgess that Mr. P. Moczygemba was in the warehouse. Mr. Burgess entered the warehouse but did not see Mr. P. Moczygemba. Offender Halprin followed Mr. Burgess into the warehouse and knelt down beside a box and asked Mr. Burgess to come look at a motor. As Mr. Burgess approached Offender Halprin, he was struck in the back of the head by one of the offenders. As he regained consciousness, Mr. Burgess felt a sharp point at the back of his neck, another in his back, and one below his right armpit. Offender Rivas stated "This is no joke, we go home and you go home, or not, it's up to you." Offender Halprin removed Mr. Burgess' clothing, bound his feet and hands with tie straps and duct tape, placed a gag in his mouth, and placed duct tape over his eyes. Offenders Rivas and Halprin then carried him to the electrical room and forced him to the floor. Offender Garcia then placed a sharp object in Mr. Burgess' left ear and threatened to apply force. A pillowcase was then placed over Mr. Burgess' head and secured with duct tape.

Immediately after Mr. Burgess was subdued, Offender Rivas called Mr. Segura into the warehouse and told him that Mr. P. Moczygemba needed him at the back dock. As he walked into the warehouse, Offenders Newbury and Rivas grabbed him from behind and forced him to the floor. The offenders bound his wrists with plastic ties and placed a gag in his mouth. Offender Newbury then removed Mr. Segura's boots and jeans and then taped his ankles together with duct tape. He was carried to the electrical room where a pillowcase was placed over his head. Offender Rivas told him that if he calmed down and stayed quiet, nothing would happen to him.

At approximately 1220, Mr. Jerry McDowell, Recreational Program Specialist IV, entered the Maintenance Department. Offenders Rivas, Halprin and Murphy were sitting in the office. Mr. McDowell asked the offenders why they were alone. Offender Rivas told him that Mr. P. Moczygemba went to 18 Dorm. Mr. McDowell then requested to check-out the 3 Gym toolbox. Offender Murphy went into the warehouse and brought

back the toolbox and the check-out log. Offender Murphy handed the tool box and the log to Offender Halprin, who in turn handed it to Mr. McDowell. After signing the check-out log, Mr. McDowell turned and walked out of the Maintenance Department. Offender Rivas followed him and asked him to come back into the shop, but Mr. McDowell refused and left the area.

At approximately 1225, Mr. Mark Garza, Maintenance Supervisor IV, Mr. Martin Gilley, Maintenance Supervisor IV, and Mr. Ronny Haun, Maintenance Supervisor IV returned to the Maintenance Department. Mr. Gilley went into the electrical shop and Mr. Garza sat down at a desk in the office. Mr. Haun walked into the warehouse where Offender Newbury asked him to come and look at something on the shelf. As Mr. Haun approached the shelf, Offender Newbury grabbed him and placed him in a headlock. Offender Rivas assisted Offender Newbury in forcing Mr. Haun to the floor and attempted to place a gag in his mouth. As Mr. Haun struggled with the offenders, Rivas struck him in the nose twice with a closed fist and forced the gag into his mouth. An unknown offender approached them and put a plexiglas knife to the back of Mr. Haun's left ear. The offenders secured Mr. Haun's legs and arms with duct tape and placed a pillowcase over his head and wrapped it with duct tape. Mr. Haun was dragged to the electrical room where the offenders unbound his legs, removed his boots and jeans, and then rebound his legs using plastic zip ties.

As this was occurring, Mr. Garza was sitting in the maintenance office. Offender Harper came into the office and asked Mr. Garza to come into the warehouse to look at a motor. Offender Rivas approached Mr. Garza from behind and put a sharp object to the front of his neck. Mr. Garza pushed the object away from his neck as Offenders Halprin and Harper attacked him forcing him to the floor. The offenders placed plastic ties around Mr. Garza's arms and legs and dragged him to the electrical room. A gag was placed in Mr. Garza's mouth and a pillowcase was placed over his head and taped.

After Mr. Garza was subdued, Offender Garcia walked into the electrical shop and asked Mr. Gilley if he wanted something to eat. Mr. Gilley declined the offer and Offender Garcia left the shop. Offender Murphy entered the electrical shop and told Mr. Gilley that Mr. P. Moczygamba wanted to see him in the warehouse. Mr. Gilley entered the warehouse where he was attacked by Offenders Garcia, Halprin, Newbury and Rodriguez. Offender Halprin told Mr. Gilley not to resist and that he would not be hurt. Offenders Newbury and Garcia held hand-made knives behind each of Mr. Gilley's ears. The offenders removed his pants and bound his legs using plastic straps. A pillowcase was placed over Mr. Gilley's head and taped. The offenders forced Mr. Gilley into the electrical room where they placed a gag in his mouth and tied his hands behind his back using plastic ties.

At approximately 1240, Mr. Terry Schmidt, Maintenance Supervisor IV, returned from lunch escorting two offenders, David Cook #435179 and Roger Fishwick #604792, from 18 Dorm to the Maintenance Department. Mr. Schmidt was leaving maintenance with Offenders Fishwick and Cook, when Offender Rivas told him that Mr. P. Moczygamba wanted to talk to him in the shop. Mr. Schmidt went into the maintenance warehouse where several offenders attacked him from behind. One of the offenders held a hand-made knife to Mr. Schmidt's head and told him to shut up. The offenders pushed Mr. Schmidt to the floor and tied his hands and feet with plastic straps. They placed a gag in his mouth and a pillowcase over his head and dragged him to the electrical room.

Offenders Fishwick and Cook entered the maintenance office where Offender Murphy approached them. Offender Murphy told them that they were having a food

spread in the back and to fix themselves a plate. Offender Cook immediately went to the back of the warehouse. Offender Cook was struck in the face by Offender Rivas as he approached the back of the warehouse. Offender Cook swung back at Offender Rivas striking him in the face. An unknown offender approached Offender Cook from behind and struck him in the back of the head with an axe handle. The offenders then bound Offender Cook's arms and legs and dragged him into the electrical room.

Offender Fishwick at first declined the offer to eat with the other offenders, but Offender Rivas insisted that he join them. As he was walking toward the warehouse door, Offender Murphy began pushing him inside the warehouse. Offender Rivas grabbed Offender Fishwick and pulled him into the warehouse. Offender Fishwick was struck in the back of the head with an axe handle. Offender Fishwick was forced to the floor where he saw Offender Cook lying on the floor at the back of the warehouse. The offenders bound Offender Fishwick's hands and feet with plastic ties and covered his face with duct tape. A pillowcase was placed over his head and he was taken to the electrical room.

At approximately 1245, Randy Albert, Correctional Officer III, entered the maintenance office to get a hitch for the unit's utility vehicle (Gator). He was assigned to the field force and was supervising the trash crew that day, and wanted to use the Gator to haul some lumber. Officer Albert entered the office and saw only offenders. He asked where Mr. P. Moczygemba was and was told that he was in the warehouse. Officer Albert walked into the warehouse where he again saw only offenders. He noticed a handheld radio and a set of keys on the floor and knew something was wrong, but was then attacked from behind by three offenders and forced to the floor. One of the offenders placed a knife to Officer Albert's face and told him not to move. Officer Albert grabbed the knife with his left hand and was able to bend the blade. One of the offenders then struck him in the head with an axe handle. The offenders handcuffed him with the handcuffs he was carrying and bound his legs with rope and tape and dragged him to the electrical room.

At approximately 1300, Mr. Lester Moczygemba, Maintenance Supervisor IV, returned from the boiler room with Offender Ambrosio Martinez #648556, to dispose of a piece of metal. Mr. L. Moczygemba noticed that the maintenance truck was pulled into the shop and the overhead door was closed behind it and locked. Offender Newbury approached Mr. L. Moczygemba and brandished a flat piece of metal, approximately 10-12 inches in length, and sharpened on both sides. Mr. L. Moczygemba pushed Offender Newbury's hand away and told him to stop. Mr. L. Moczygemba turned toward Offender Martinez. As he turned, Offender Newbury came up behind him and put the hand-made knife to his throat. Offender Newbury told him that he was serious and he did not want to hurt him, but he would if he did not lie down. Mr. L. Moczygemba laid down on the floor and Offender Halprin and Offender Newbury tied his hands and feet with plastic ties and duct tape and placed a sheet over his head. The offenders then took Mr. L. Moczygemba to the electrical room.

As this was occurring, Offender Martinez was attacked by Offender Murphy, who stabbed him on his left ring finger. Offenders Rivas and Garcia placed Offender Martinez's hands behind his back and bound his arms and legs with plastic straps and duct tape. One of the assailants then dragged Offender Martinez to the electrical room.

After the last victim was taken to the electrical room, the offenders secured the door from the outside. Mr. Schmidt was able to free himself of his restraints and began helping the others. Mr. Garza carried a pocketknife that was not discovered by the assailants. Mr. Schmidt was able to use the pocketknife to free the hostages' arms and legs from the

restraints, except for Officer Albert who was handcuffed. The victims began to prepare themselves in case their assailants returned. They began tearing electrical conduit from the walls using it to barricade the door and potentially for their own defense. When the assailants realized that the victims had removed their restraints, one of the offenders attempted to regain entry into the room. When his attempt was unsuccessful, he tried to seal the door so that the victims could not exit. He secured the door using a hand-operated winch (come-a-long) to winch the door closed.

At approximately 1305, Officer Perez who was assigned to Central Control, telephoned the Maintenance Department and asked to speak with a supervisor. Offender Rivas, who answered the call, instructed another offender to come to the phone and impersonate Mr. P. Moczygamba. Officer Perez informed them that it was count time. The offender impersonating Mr. P. Moczygamba returned the phone call to Lieutenant Carr and advised that there were ten offenders in the Maintenance Department. To ensure that the count would balance, the offenders were careful to include the three offenders who were subdued in the electrical room and Offender Rodríguez who did not work in the department. Lieutenant Carr had no reason to believe that the person providing the count was an inmate and believed that the count he was given was accurate. Earlier during the incident, an offender, now believed to be Offender Rivas, impersonated a supervisor and called the A Turnout officer, the 3 Building desk officer, and the 18-19 Turnout officer. He notified them that only a skeleton crew of offenders would return to their job assignments after lunch.

At approximately 1315, Lou Gips, Correctional Officer IV, was working the backgate picket (B-Radio Tower). Officer Gips received a call from a person claiming to be from the Maintenance Department, informing him that maintenance employees were coming to install monitors in the picket. The telephone call and the description of the work order seemed legitimate to Officer Gips, because a similar installation was recently made on one of the other pickets. At approximately 1320, Vernon Janssen, Correctional Officer IV, who was working the backgate sallyport, received a similar call. He was also informed that a crew of maintenance employees would be installing monitors at the back gate.

Meanwhile, in attempt to call for help, Mr. Camber was able to set off the fire alarm from within the electrical room. At approximately 1335, Central Control was alerted by a flashing light on the control panel that the fire alarms were activated in the Maintenance Department. Officer Pérez attempted to contact the department by telephone, but there was no answer.

At approximately 1340, two males wearing civilian clothing and two males in offender clothing approached the backgate in the Gator. The two males in offender clothing got out of the vehicle and walked to the pedestrian gate. The offenders knew that they were not allowed to exit through the vehicle gate and complied to keep the situation from seeming suspicious. Officer Gips, convinced by the earlier telephone call and expecting maintenance workers, opened the walk-through gate allowing the offenders into the fenced area behind the gatehouse. Officer Gips then opened the vehicle gate to allow the Gator into the vehicle area. Officer Janssen was inside the gatehouse and not aware that Officer Gips had opened the gate allowing the offenders into the vehicle area. The males dressed as civilians carried monitors and electrical wire with them as they exited the vehicle and walked into the gatehouse. They opened the back door of the gatehouse allowing the two dressed in prison whites to enter. Before Officer Janssen could ask for identification, a civilian dressed offender began examining an electrical outlet that was near the desk in the office area. The telephone that was on the desk rang and the civilian

dressed offender answered it. The caller, impersonating an employee, was one of the offenders who remained in the Maintenance Department, calling to verify that the offenders had arrived to their destination at the back gate. The offender that answered the telephone, then handed the telephone receiver to Officer Janssen telling him that the call was for him. As Officer Janssen leaned over to take the receiver, one of the civilian dressed offenders grabbed him from behind putting his arm around Officer Janssen's throat and forcing him to the floor. The offenders removed Janssen's uniform pants and shoes, bound his arms and legs, and taped his mouth with duct tape. They placed Officer Janssen in the restroom in the gatehouse and secured the door.

At approximately 1345, one of the offenders, dressed in civilian clothing, exited the gatehouse, walked up to the exterior gate, and identified himself as "Maintenance." Officer Gips remembered seeing the maintenance supervisor earlier that day, wearing the clothes and the hat that were now worn by the offender, and from his vantage point, thought that it was the same person. Officer Gips looked around to make sure that there were no offenders in the area and opened the outside gate allowing this person to exit the compound. He subsequently opened the picket door allowing him to enter the tower. As the offender was coming up the stairs, the picket telephone rang. The caller identified himself as a maintenance supervisor and asked if Area Maintenance staff had arrived. The offender reached the top of the stairs and took the telephone call. He then removed his jacket and placed it on the chair in the picket, grabbing a .357 revolver that was lying on the desk. The offender, who was later identified to be Offender Halprin, held Officer Gips at gunpoint and told him that it was an escape. One of the offenders, still in offender clothing, later discovered to be Offender Murphy, yelled from the ground to open the gate. Offender Halprin, not familiar with the picket controls, threatened Officer Gips' life and forced him to provide instructions on how to open the picket door and the vehicle gate. Offender Halprin asked Officer Gips what kind of guns were in the picket and their whereabouts. The field force's guns and the transportation officer's guns were stored in the bottom of the picket. This was not the unit armory. After collecting the guns, Offender Murphy instructed Officer Gips to go downstairs. When they got to the bottom of the stairs, Offender Halprin used Gips' belt and one of his shoestrings to bind his hands and tie him to a structure within the picket. The offenders then exited the tower with the guns.

Immediately after the offenders exited the picket, Officer Gips freed himself and ran up the stairs to the top of the picket. The three offenders that had remained in the Maintenance Department drove the maintenance truck through the open vehicle gate where they picked up the weapons and their four accomplices and exited the compound. The maintenance truck had been brought inside the compound earlier that day in anticipation of an afternoon trip for supplies. At approximately 1358, Officer Gips used his handheld radio to request assistance. Officer Gips reported at that time that he could see the maintenance truck driving past 19 Building outside of the compound.

Warden Keith was in the company of a local law enforcement officer on the compound, when he heard the distress call. The officer immediately notified other local law enforcement to be on the lookout for a white TDCJ truck. While returning to the unit at approximately 1400, Officer Barton Olsen, assigned to the community work squad, reported seeing the white maintenance truck in the downtown area of Kenedy, in the vicinity of City Hall. Immediately after seeing the vehicle, Officer Olsen heard a call on the hand held radio and responded with directions to where he had seen the vehicle.

As an intensive search continued, at approximately 1600, a white TDCJ pickup was found abandoned behind the Wal-Mart in Kenedy. Based on film footage recorded by

an automated teller machine camera in the Wal-Mart parking lot, it is believed that the escapees left the area in one or possibly two vehicles that were left in the parking lot by an unknown accomplice on the morning of the incident. A task force formed by the Office of the Inspector General, with the assistance of state and local law enforcement agencies has been investigating leads to the whereabouts of the fugitives. As of the date of this review, the escapees still remain at large.

DISCOVERY

Security Operations and Procedures

The Connally Unit security procedures were evaluated through a review of all applicable documents, on-site inspections, and interviews with unit security staff.

Findings

- ◆ A review was conducted of all post orders and other policies relating to staffed positions involved in this incident: Backgate Officer Post Order 07.054; Backgate Picket Post Order 07.048; Perimeter Picket Post Order 07.046; Turnout Door Officer Post Order 07.103; Maintenance Officer Post Order 07.053; and Administrative Directive 03.28. The team found that the above post orders were in place, current, and available for staff review at each identified post.
- ◆ Post Order 07.048 provides guidelines for backgate picket procedures. The post order states that the backgate picket officer shall ensure all persons entering or exiting the unit through the backgate are properly identified and must present their photo identification card. Additionally, Administrative Directive 03.28 instructs that all uniformed and non-uniformed personnel will be required to show their TDCJ identification card prior to admission to or exit from the facility.
- ◆ The backgate picket officer allowed an individual to pass through the exterior gate of the backgate sallyport without properly and positively identifying the person. This is in violation of Post Order 7.048. The backgate picket officer then allowed this unidentified person to enter the picket where weapons are stored and gate controls are secured. The Building Major had been on this picket with this officer, within the previous month of this incident, providing him specific training on proper procedures for the backgate picket.
- ◆ A review of the Agency's post orders indicates that there are no specific instructions or procedures that outline identification or authorization requirements prior to allowing individuals into a perimeter picket.
- ◆ Offender Rodriguez was able to gain access to Maintenance Department and become an active participant in this incident.

- ◆ The maintenance truck had been moved inside the compound on the morning of the incident, at approximately 1037, to be utilized by a staff member for a parts pickup in the afternoon. There was no need for this vehicle to be inside the compound.
- ◆ Mr. McDowell went to the Maintenance Department to check-out the 3 Gym toolbox. Offender Rivas told Mr. McDowell that Mr. P. Moczygamba was in 18 Dorm and that there were no other supervisors in the department. Mr. McDowell retrieved his tools, left the area and did not report to security staff that he had encountered offenders that were not under supervision.
- ◆ An offender that was not assigned to the tool room issued Mr. McDowell his toolbox. Although the contents of the toolbox did not include sensitive tools (bolt cutters, cutting torches, etc.), Administrative Directive 03.19 states that only offenders assigned to a tool room and authorized personnel shall be permitted access to tools.
- ◆ Having taken Mr. P. Moczygamba's keys, the offenders were able to gain access to the Maintenance Department's sensitive tools that are kept in the tool room. Sensitive tools include any tools or equipment likely to be used in an escape attempt or that poses a threat to unit security. See Attachment G for a list of tools that were taken from the tool room.
- ◆ The victims set off the fire alarm from within the Maintenance Department at approximately 1335. The Control Picket officer was alerted by the activated alarm and called the Maintenance Department. When there was no answer, she silenced the alarm on her control panel.
- ◆ Two officers are normally assigned to the Central Control Picket and were on this date. However, one of the officers had left her post for a period of time and was not in the Central Control Picket when the fire alarm went off. (This remains under review.)
- ◆ The pillowcases that were placed over the heads of the victims, were the containers that were used by the laundry department to deliver rags to the departments.

Recommendations

- ◆ Although routine practice is for the backgate officer to assist the backgate picket officer in the identification of persons entering and exiting the backgate, Post Orders 07.048 and 07.054 should have specific guidelines requiring these actions at units that have both a backgate picket officer and a backgate officer.
- ◆ All current perimeter picket post orders should be revised to include basic requirements of perimeter picket officers to only allow authorized personnel into the picket and only after such personnel has been properly identified by the picket officer. With the exception of the relieving officer upon shift change, anyone needing access to a perimeter picket must be given authorization by a security supervisor.

- ◆ The unit administration should review turnout door procedures and ensure only authorized offenders are allowed passage through this area.
- ◆ All departments should adhere to the unit administration's instruction and the guidelines outlined in Administrative Directive 03.28, which requires that vehicles remain outside the compound unless vehicle entry is necessary to perform a specific function. In such cases that vehicle should be inside the compound only so long as is necessary to perform that service and only while an employee attends it and then immediately removed from the compound.
- ◆ Mr. McDowell should have reported immediately to security staff that the offenders in the Maintenance Department were unsupervised. Unit administration should ensure that all employees are aware of their responsibility to alert security staff upon detection of this type of situation.
- ◆ Unit Administration should ensure that all employees are aware of the guidelines outlined in Administrative Directive 03.19. Only employees and offenders that are assigned to a tool room should have access. Additionally, employees should not accept tools from unauthorized personnel or offenders, but should immediately report the violation to a supervisor.
- ◆ In accordance with the Connally Unit Fire Plan, the Control Picket officer should have immediately notified a security supervisor.

Maintenance Procedures

Information concerning Operation and Maintenance procedures was obtained through on-site inspections, interviews with staff members and a review of all applicable documents.

Findings

- ◆ Through an on site inspection of the Maintenance Department, it was discovered that the telephone in the Maintenance Supervisor's Office had outside calling capabilities. The office remained locked at all times; however, when the offenders subdued Mr. P. Moczygamba they acquired the key to the office. Although there is no evidence to support this theory, it was the observation of the review team that the assailants could have used this access to make contact with their accomplices to give instruction on the time and place to leave the drop car.
- ◆ An offender impersonating a maintenance employee notified the picket officers, that Area Maintenance was coming to install monitors in the sallyport and backgate pickets.

Recommendation

- ♦ The Agency should review the feasibility of discontinuing outside calling capabilities to telephones in areas frequented by offenders. If the discontinuation is not feasible, the Agency should review the availability of technology for limiting access to those lines.
- ♦ All current perimeter picket post orders should be revised to include basic requirements of perimeter picket officers to only allow authorized personnel into the picket and only after such personnel has been properly identified by the picket officer.

Emergency Response

Findings

- ♦ The implementation of the facility's emergency response plan was reviewed and it showed that the escape plan was current, complete, and extremely well coordinated. The unit administration responded immediately and decisively in initiating and implementing the unit's escape plan, deploying appropriate staff, and establishing search areas and perimeters. The coordinated effort by the unit administration with law enforcement entities and support staff from surrounding facilities and within the agency was exceptional.

Recommendation

- ♦ None.

Staffing

The Connally Unit operates under the staffing document of the TDCJ Security Administration and Security Staffing Plan as provided by Security Operations.

Findings

- ♦ The Connally Unit Staffing Plan allocates 526 Correctional Officer positions. Of the 526 positions, 77 were vacant on the day of the incident. Additionally, 16 Correctional Officers were on extended sick leave on the day of the incident.
- ♦ The Connally Unit 1st shift is allocated 127 Correctional Officer positions. On the date of the incident, according to card schedules, there were 106 Correctional Officer Positions assigned to 1st shift. Of those 106, 96 were actually on duty at the time of the incident.
- ♦ There were 16 maintenance employees assigned to the Maintenance Department on the day of the incident. 3 maintenance employees failed to report for duty due to severe weather conditions, 1 employee did not report for duty due to illness, and 1 employee was assigned to in-service training.

- ◆ Prior to the incident, in the morning hours, there were 11 maintenance supervisors and 26 offenders working in the Maintenance Department. This offender to employee ratio was more than sufficient. When the incident began there was 1 supervisor and 6 offenders working in the Maintenance Department which is considered adequate.
- ◆ The back gate and the backgate picket were staffed appropriately on the day of the incident.
- ◆ Unit staffing was not found to be a contributing factor in this incident.

Recommendation

- ◆ None.

Classification

The Serious Incident Review team conducted a thorough review of the classification records of the offenders involved in the incident.

Findings

- ◆ Offender Garcia, Joseph C., TDCJ #774391, was received February 10, 1997, on a 50 year sentence for Murder with a Deadly Weapon from Bexar County. He is a 29 year old Hispanic male. Due to the nature of his offense and the length of his sentence, he was assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, on January 27, 1998. Offender Garcia had no history of assaultive or violent behavior while incarcerated in the TDCJ – Institutional Division. At the time of the incident, Offender Garcia was classified as a Minimum-In, State Approved Trustee III offender and was assigned to the Connally Maintenance Department on May 26, 2000 as a Material Handler.
- ◆ Offender Rivas, George, TDCJ #702267, was received April 20, 1995, on a life sentence for Aggravated Kidnapping with a Deadly Weapon (8), Aggravated Kidnapping (5), Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon (1), Aggravated Robbery (2), and Burglary of a Habitation (1) from El Paso County. He is a 30 year old Hispanic male. Due to the nature of his offense and the length of his sentence, he was assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, on July 13, 1998. Offender Rivas had no history of assaultive or violent behavior while incarcerated in the TDCJ – Institutional Division. At the time of the incident, Offender Rivas was classified as a Minimum-In, State Approved Trustee III offender and was assigned to the Connally Maintenance Department on October 19, 1999 as a Support Service Inmate.
- ◆ Offender Rodriguez, Michael Anthony, TDCJ #698074, was received March 16, 1995, on a life sentence for Capital Murder with a Deadly Weapon from Bexar County. He is a 38 year old Hispanic male. Due to the nature of his offense and the length of his sentence, he was assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, on July 8, 1999. Offender Rodriguez had no history of assaultive or violent behavior while incarcerated in the TDCJ – Institutional Division. However, he was charged with an

attempted escape on June 10, 1995 while assigned to the Coffield Unit. He was placed in Administrative Segregation from July 7, 1995 until September 5, 1996 when he was released as a close custody offender to general population on the Coffield Unit. Offender Rodriguez was reclassified to medium custody on December 12, 1996 and to minimum on March 31, 1997. At the time of the incident Offender Rodriguez was classified as a Minimum-In, State Approved Trustee III offender and was assigned to the Connally Unit inside yard squad on April 19, 2000.

- ◆ Offender Halprin, Randy Ethan, TDCJ #786259, was received May 30, 1997, on a 30 year sentence for Injury to a Child / Serious Bodily Injury with a Deadly Weapon from Tarrant County. He is a 23 year old white male. Due to the nature of his offense and the length of his sentence, he was assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, on June 1, 1999. Offender Halprin had no history of assaultive or violent behavior while incarcerated in the TDCJ – Institutional Division. At the time of the incident, Offender Halprin was classified as a Minimum-In, State Approved Trustee III offender and was assigned to the Connally Unit Maintenance Department on February 9, 2000 as a Material Handler.
- ◆ Offender Harper, Larry James, TDCJ #861910, was received March 9, 1999, on a 50 year sentence for Aggravated Sexual Assault (6) and Aggravated Sexual Assault with a Deadly Weapon (3) from El Paso County. He is a 37 year old white male. Due to the nature of his offense and the length of his sentence, he was assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, on April 8, 1999. Offender Harper had no history of assaultive or violent behavior while incarcerated in the TDCJ – Institutional Division. At the time of the incident, Offender Harper was classified as a Minimum-In, State Approved Trustee III offender and was assigned to the Connally Unit Maintenance Department on April 10, 2000 as a Material Handler.
- ◆ Offender Murphy, Patrick Henry Jr., TDCJ #386888, was received November 13, 1984, on a 50 year sentence for Aggravated Sexual Assault with a Deadly Weapon and Burglary of a Building from Dallas County. He is a 39 year old white male. Due to the nature of his offense and the length of his sentence, he was assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, on July 28, 1995. Offender Murphy had no history of assaultive or violent behavior while incarcerated in the TDCJ – Institutional Division. At the time of the incident, Offender Murphy was classified as a Minimum-In, State Approved Trustee III and was assigned to the Connally Unit Maintenance Department on July 23, 1997 as a Carpenter.
- ◆ Offender Newbury, Donald, TDCJ #824631, was received May 15, 1998, on a 99 year sentence for Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon from Travis County. He is a 38 year old white male. Due to the nature of his offense and the length of his sentence, he was assigned to the Connally Unit, a maximum-security facility, on July 1, 1998. He had no history of assaultive or violent behavior while incarcerated in the TDCJ – Institutional Division. However, in 1987 Offender Newbury and two fellow offenders attempted to escape from the Travis County Jail. They overpowered two correctional officers and took them hostage. The escape failed. At the time of the incident Offender Newbury was classified as a Minimum-In, State Approved Trustee III

offender and was assigned to the Connally Unit Maintenance Department on August 5, 1998 as a Door Closer Mechanic.

- ♦ The Connally Unit is a maximum-security unit with a capacity of 2,848, which is an appropriate unit of assignment for the above named offenders. The offenders were assigned to housing and jobs within the Connally Unit compound. In accordance with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division Classification Plan, the above named offenders were appropriately reviewed and classified as Minimum-In offenders. Offenders assigned to minimum-in custody live and work under supervision inside a secure perimeter. All seven of the offenders who escaped lived inside the unit's secure perimeter and were assigned to jobs that required them to work inside the unit's secure perimeter.

Recommendation

- ♦ None.

CONCLUSION

Upon review of the circumstances and events that contributed to the escape, it became evident to the review team members that the escape was well planned. Moreover, non-compliance with Agency policy contributed to the successful escape from the compound.

A thorough review of the Classification Plan disclosed that the offenders were properly assigned to the unit, were classified appropriately, and were assigned to appropriate work assignments. It should be noted, that although the offenders were classified as Minimum-in, the Connally Unit is a maximum-security facility.

The unit staffing rosters for the day of the incident were reviewed thoroughly by the team members. It was determined that the escape was not a result of lack of security staff and that all posts in the area were manned that day in accordance with the guidelines established by the Security Staffing Plan.

It appears that approximately two and half-hours lapsed between the time the incident began and the time the incident was reported. The incident began at approximately 1120 when staff and offenders assigned to the Maintenance Department went to lunch. It was normal procedure to close the Maintenance Department for an hour for lunch; believing that maintenance was closed, there would be no reason to check on the department during this time period. At approximately 1230, it would be common practice for the offenders assigned to the Maintenance Department to return to their work assignments; however, an offender impersonated a maintenance employee and made a call to the A Turnout Officer, to notify them that only a skeleton crew should return after lunch. The unit began their count at 1300 and a count was called in from the Maintenance Department, leaving no reason to physically check on the department at this time. During the time period of the escape, there was no need for any staff, other than maintenance employees, to be in the area. Also, due to weather conditions, some routine activities had been cancelled causing even less activity in the area. The escape occurred during the slowest period of the day, during lunch and at count time.

Upon notification of the escape, the unit administration responded in a timely manner and in accordance with the Emergency Response Plan. The assistance of local law enforcement was requested immediately, the appropriate staff was deployed, and search areas and perimeters were established.

The Unit Administration initiated an investigation immediately after the incident occurred. Pursuant to the findings of the Serious Incident Review and the Unit Incident Review of the escape, the unit Warden will initiate appropriate corrective action to include administrative disciplinary action.

Attachment A

Executive Summary

On December 13, 2000, at approximately 1120, the employees of the Connally Unit Maintenance Department returned 20 offenders that were assigned to the Maintenance Department to their housing areas and went to lunch. Patrick Moczygamba, Maintenance Supervisor V, arranged for a group of five offenders, Joseph Garcia #774391, Randy Halprin #786259, Larry Harper #861910, Donald Newbury #824631, and George Rivas #702267, to stay in the Maintenance Department to seal the floor in the warehouse. It was not uncommon for these offenders to be assigned to special projects in the Maintenance Department. Mark Burgess, Maintenance Supervisor IV also gave permission for one of his offenders, Patrick Murphy #386888, to stay in for lunch to complete an ongoing project. Mr. P. Moczygamba agreed to stay and supervise the offenders.

At approximately 1130, Mr. P. Moczygamba was working in the office when Offender Rivas asked him to come back into the warehouse. Offender Harper asked him to look at a motor that was under a table. The offenders were clearing the floor to begin sealing and claimed that they were unsure of what they should do with the motor. As Mr. P. Moczygamba leaned down to look at the motor, one of the offenders struck him in the head with what was later discovered to be an axe handle, and he was rendered unconscious. When he regained consciousness he began to struggle with the offenders. Offender Garcia held a hand-made knife to Mr. P. Moczygamba's neck and told him that a few more years wouldn't mean anything to their sentences and they would kill one of the employees if they needed to. The offenders removed Mr. P. Moczygamba's pants and shirt, tied his hands and legs, and placed a gag in his mouth. A pillowcase was placed over his head and he was carried to the electrical room at the back of the warehouse where he was forced to lie face down on the floor.

Offender Michael Rodriguez #698074, was assigned to the inside yard squad on the day of the incident. Due to inclement weather conditions, the inside yard squad offenders did not turn out for work. Possibly in anticipation of the weather related work restriction, Offender Rodriguez had an appointment to visit the unit law library on the morning of the incident. The law library check-in log confirmed that Offender Rodriguez attended his appointment and checked out at 0940. Although we cannot verify the exact time Offender Rodriguez gained access to the maintenance area, it is the opinion of the review team that Offender Rodriguez was inadvertently allowed through the gate at A Turnout. Several employees report seeing Offender Rodriguez sitting on a bench in front of the Maintenance Department at various times that morning. After Mr. P. Moczygamba was subdued, Offender Rodriguez entered the Maintenance Department where he became an active participant in the escape.

At approximately 1145, Alan Camber, Maintenance Supervisor IV, and Alejandro Marroquin, Correctional Officer III, entered the maintenance office and each sat down at a desk in the office as they began talking. Offenders Rivas, Halprin, Harper, Murphy, and Newbury came into the office and began talking with them. Offender Rivas walked behind Officer Marroquin and grabbed him in a bear hug from behind. Officer Marroquin began struggling as Offenders Halprin, Harper and Newbury helped Offender Rivas force Officer Marroquin to

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the floor. The offenders bound Officer Marroquin's hands and legs with plastic ties and duct tape and attempted to place a gag in his mouth. Officer Marroquin refused to open his mouth to be gagged and Offender Newbury struck him in the nose with a closed fist forcing Officer Marroquin to allow the offenders to gag him. Officer Marroquin was then carried to the electrical room where he was placed on the floor next to Mr. P. Moczygemba.

Simultaneously, Offender Murphy was asking Mr. Camber about a part for a vacuum cleaner, when Offender Garcia attacked him from behind. After subduing Officer Marroquin, Offender Rivas assisted Offender Garcia in forcing Mr. Camber to the floor. Offender Garcia placed a pointed object in Mr. Camber's left ear, threatening to apply force. Mr. Camber, in fear of his life, stopped struggling. The offenders bound Mr. Camber's hands with plastic ties and duct tape and removed his boots and jeans. He was then dragged into the electrical room where the offenders struck his head against the electrical conduit on the wall causing him to lose consciousness. The offenders then placed a gag in his mouth, a pillowcase over his head and wrapped duct tape around his eyes outside of the pillowcase.

At approximately 1200, Mr. Manuel Segura, Maintenance Supervisor IV, and Mr. Mr. Mark Burgess, Maintenance Supervisor IV returned to the Maintenance Department. Offender Rivas came into the office and told Mr. Burgess that Mr. P. Moczygemba was in the warehouse. Mr. Burgess entered the warehouse but did not see Mr. P. Moczygemba. Offender Halprin followed Mr. Burgess into the warehouse and knelt down beside a box and asked Mr. Burgess to come look at a motor. As Mr. Burgess approached Offender Halprin, he was struck in the back of the head by one of the offenders. As he regained consciousness, Mr. Burgess felt a sharp point at the back of his neck, another in his back, and one below his right armpit. Offender Rivas stated "This is no joke, we go home and you go home, or not, it's up to you." Offender Halprin removed Mr. Burgess' clothing, bound his feet and hands with tie straps and duct tape, placed a gag in his mouth, and placed duct tape over his eyes. Offenders Rivas and Halprin then carried him to the electrical room and forced him to the floor. Offender Garcia then placed a sharp object in Mr. Burgess' left ear and threatened to apply force. A pillowcase was then placed over Mr. Burgess' head and secured with duct tape.

Immediately after Mr. Burgess was subdued, Offender Rivas called Mr. Segura into the warehouse and told him that Mr. P. Moczygemba needed him at the back dock. As he walked into the warehouse, Offenders Newbury and Rivas grabbed him from behind and forced him to the floor. The offenders bound his wrists with plastic ties and placed a gag in his mouth. Offender Newbury then removed Mr. Segura's boots and jeans and then taped his ankles together with duct tape. He was carried to the electrical room where a pillowcase was placed over his head. Offender Rivas told him that if he calmed down and stayed quiet, nothing would happen to him.

At approximately 1220, Mr. Jerry McDowell, Recreational Program Specialist IV, entered the Maintenance Department. Offenders Rivas, Halprin and Murphy were sitting in the office. Mr. McDowell asked the offenders why

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they were alone. Offender Rivas told him that Mr. P. Moczygamba went to 18 Dorm. Mr. McDowell then requested to check-out the 3 Gym toolbox. Offender Murphy went into the warehouse and brought back the toolbox and the check-out log. Offender Murphy handed the tool box and the log to Offender Halprin, who in turn handed it to Mr. McDowell. After signing the check-out log, Mr. McDowell turned and walked out of the Maintenance Department. Offender Rivas followed him and asked him to come back into the shop, but Mr. McDowell refused and left the area.

At approximately 1225, Mr. Mark Garza, Maintenance Supervisor IV, Mr. Martin Gilley, Maintenance Supervisor IV, and Mr. Ronny Haun, Maintenance Supervisor IV returned to the Maintenance Department. Mr. Gilley went into the electrical shop and Mr. Garza sat down at a desk in the office. Mr. Haun walked into the warehouse where Offender Newbury asked him to come and look at something on the shelf. As Mr. Haun approached the shelf, Offender Newbury grabbed him and placed him in a headlock. Offender Rivas assisted Offender Newbury in forcing Mr. Haun to the floor and attempted to place a gag in his mouth. As Mr. Haun struggled with the offenders, Rivas struck him in the nose twice with a closed fist and forced the gag into his mouth. An unknown offender approached them and put a plexiglas knife to the back of Mr. Haun's left ear. The offenders secured Mr. Haun's legs and arms with duct tape and placed a pillowcase over his head and wrapped it with duct tape. Mr. Haun was dragged to the electrical room where the offenders unbound his legs, removed his boots and jeans, and then rebound his legs using plastic zip ties.

As this was occurring, Mr. Garza was sitting in the maintenance office. Offender Harper came into the office and asked Mr. Garza to come into the warehouse to look at a motor. Offender Rivas approached Mr. Garza from behind and put a sharp object to the front of his neck. Mr. Garza pushed the object away from his neck as Offenders Halprin and Harper attacked him forcing him to the floor. The offenders placed plastic ties around Mr. Garza's arms and legs and dragged him to the electrical room. A gag was placed in Mr. Garza's mouth and a pillowcase was placed over his head and taped.

After Mr. Garza was subdued, Offender Garcia walked into the electrical shop and asked Mr. Gilley if he wanted something to eat. Mr. Gilley declined the offer and Offender Garcia left the shop. Offender Murphy entered the electrical shop and told Mr. Gilley that Mr. P. Moczygamba wanted to see him in the warehouse. Mr. Gilley entered the warehouse where he was attacked by Offenders Garcia, Halprin, Newbury and Rodriguez. Offender Halprin told Mr. Gilley not to resist and that he would not be hurt. Offenders Newbury and Garcia held hand-made knives behind each of Mr. Gilley's ears. The offenders removed his pants and bound his legs using plastic straps. A pillowcase was placed over Mr. Gilley's head and taped. The offenders forced Mr. Gilley into the electrical room where they placed a gag in his mouth and tied his hands behind his back using plastic ties.

At approximately 1240, Mr. Terry Schmidt, Maintenance Supervisor IV, returned from lunch escorting two offenders, David Cook #435179 and Roger Fishwick #604792, from 18 Dorm to the Maintenance Department. Mr. Schmidt

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was leaving maintenance with Offenders Fishwick and Cook, when Offender Rivas told him that Mr. P. Moczygamba wanted to talk to him in the shop. Mr. Schmidt went into the maintenance warehouse where several offenders attacked him from behind. One of the offenders held a hand-made knife to Mr. Schmidt's head and told him to shut up. The offenders pushed Mr. Schmidt to the floor and tied his hands and feet with plastic straps. They placed a gag in his mouth and a pillowcase over his head and dragged him to the electrical room.

Offenders Fishwick and Cook entered the maintenance office where Offender Murphy approached them. Offender Murphy told them that they were having a food spread in the back and to fix themselves a plate. Offender Cook immediately went to the back of the warehouse. Offender Cook was struck in the face by Offender Rivas as he approached the back of the warehouse. Offender Cook swung back at Offender Rivas striking him in the face. An unknown offender approached Offender Cook from behind and struck him in the back of the head with an axe handle. The offenders then bound Offender Cook's arms and legs and dragged him into the electrical room.

Offender Fishwick at first declined the offer to eat with the other offenders, but Offender Rivas insisted that he join them. As he was walking toward the warehouse door, Offender Murphy began pushing him inside the warehouse. Offender Rivas grabbed Offender Fishwick and pulled him into the warehouse. Offender Fishwick was struck in the back of the head with an axe handle. Offender Fishwick was forced to the floor where he saw Offender Cook lying on the floor at the back of the warehouse. The offenders bound Offender Fishwick's hands and feet with plastic ties and covered his face with duct tape. A pillowcase was placed over his head and he was taken to the electrical room.

At approximately 1245, Randy Albert, Correctional Officer III, entered the maintenance office to get a hitch for the unit's utility vehicle (Gator). He was assigned to the field force and was supervising the trash crew that day, and wanted to use the Gator to haul some lumber. Officer Albert entered the office and saw only offenders. He asked where Mr. P. Moczygamba was and was told that he was in the warehouse. Officer Albert walked into the warehouse where he again saw only offenders. He noticed a handheld radio and a set of keys on the floor and knew something was wrong, but was then attacked from behind by three offenders and forced to the floor. One of the offenders placed a knife to Officer Albert's face and told him not to move. Officer Albert grabbed the knife with his left hand and was able to bend the blade. One of the offenders then struck him in the head with an axe handle. The offenders handcuffed him with the handcuffs he was carrying and bound his legs with rope and tape and dragged him to the electrical room.

At approximately 1300, Mr. Lester Moczygamba, Maintenance Supervisor IV, returned from the boiler room with Offender Ambrosio Martinez #648556, to dispose of a piece of metal. Mr. L. Moczygamba noticed that the maintenance truck was pulled into the shop and the overhead door was closed behind it and locked. Offender Newbury approached Mr. L. Moczygamba and brandished a flat piece of metal, approximately 10-12 inches in length, and sharpened on both sides. Mr. L. Moczygamba pushed Offender Newbury's hand away and told him

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to stop. Mr. L. Moczygamba turned toward Offender Martinez. As he turned, Offender Newbury came up behind him and put the hand-made knife to his throat. Offender Newbury told him that he was serious and he did not want to hurt him, but he would if he did not lie down. Mr. L. Moczygamba laid down on the floor and Offender Halprin and Offender Newbury tied his hands and feet with plastic ties and duct tape and placed a sheet over his head. The offenders then took Mr. L. Moczygamba to the electrical room.

As this was occurring, Offender Martinez was attacked by Offender Murphy, who stabbed him on his left ring finger. Offenders Rivas and Garcia placed Offender Martinez's hands behind his back and bound his arms and legs with plastic straps and duct tape. One of the assailants then dragged Offender Martinez to the electrical room.

After the last victim was taken to the electrical room, the offenders secured the door from the outside. Mr. Schmidt was able to free himself of his restraints and began helping the others. Mr. Garza carried a pocketknife that was not discovered by the assailants. Mr. Schmidt was able to use the pocketknife to free the hostages' arms and legs from the restraints, except for Officer Albert who was handcuffed. The victims began to prepare themselves in case their assailants returned. They began tearing electrical conduit from the walls using it to barricade the door and potentially for their own defense. When the assailants realized that the victims had removed their restraints, one of the offenders attempted to regain entry into the room. When his attempt was unsuccessful, he tried to seal the door so that the victims could not exit. He secured the door using a hand-operated winch (come-a-long) to winch the door closed.

At approximately 1305, Officer Perez who was assigned to Central Control, telephoned the Maintenance Department and asked to speak with a supervisor. Offender Rivas, who answered the call, instructed another offender to come to the phone and impersonate Mr. P. Moczygamba. Officer Perez informed them that it was count time. The offender impersonating Mr. P. Moczygamba returned the phone call to Lieutenant Carr and advised that there were ten offenders in the Maintenance Department. To ensure that the count would balance, the offenders were careful to include the three offenders who were subdued in the electrical room and Offender Rodriguez who did not work in the department. Lieutenant Carr had no reason to believe that the person providing the count was an inmate and believed that the count he was given was accurate. Earlier during the incident, an offender, now believed to be Offender Rivas, impersonated a supervisor and called the A Turnout officer, the 3 Building desk officer, and the 18-19 Turnout officer. He notified them that only a skeleton crew of offenders would return to their job assignments after lunch.

At approximately 1315, Lou Gips, Correctional Officer IV, was working the backgate picket (B-Radio Tower). Officer Gips received a call from a person claiming to be from the Maintenance Department, informing him that maintenance employees were coming to install monitors in the picket. The telephone call and the description of the work order seemed legitimate to Officer Gips, because a similar installation was recently made on one of the other

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pickets. At approximately 1320, Vernon Janssen, Correctional Officer IV, who was working the backgate sallyport, received a similar call. He was also informed that a crew of maintenance employees would be installing monitors at the back gate.

Meanwhile, in attempt to call for help, Mr. Camber was able to set off the fire alarm from within the electrical room. At approximately 1335, Central Control was alerted by a flashing light on the control panel that the fire alarms were activated in the Maintenance Department. Officer Perez attempted to contact the department by telephone, but there was no answer.

At approximately 1340, two males wearing civilian clothing and two males in offender clothing approached the backgate in the Gator. The two males in offender clothing got out of the vehicle and walked to the pedestrian gate. The offenders knew that they were not allowed to exit through the vehicle gate and complied to keep the situation from seeming suspicious. Officer Gips, convinced by the earlier telephone call and expecting maintenance workers, opened the walk-through gate allowing the offenders into the fenced area behind the gatehouse. Officer Gips then opened the vehicle gate to allow the Gator into the vehicle area. Officer Janssen was inside the gatehouse and not aware that Officer Gips had opened the gate allowing the offenders into the vehicle area. The males dressed as civilians carried monitors and electrical wire with them as they exited the vehicle and walked into the gatehouse. They opened the back door of the gatehouse allowing the two dressed in prison whites to enter. Before Officer Janssen could ask for identification, a civilian dressed offender began examining an electrical outlet that was near the desk in the office area. The telephone that was on the desk rang and the civilian dressed offender answered it. The caller, impersonating an employee, was one of the offenders who remained in the Maintenance Department, calling to verify that the offenders had arrived to their destination at the back gate. The offender that answered the telephone, then handed the telephone receiver to Officer Janssen telling him that the call was for him. As Officer Janssen leaned over to take the receiver, one of the civilian dressed offenders grabbed him from behind putting his arm around Officer Janssen's throat and forcing him to the floor. The offenders removed Janssen's uniform pants and shoes, bound his arms and legs, and taped his mouth with duct tape. They placed Officer Janssen in the restroom in the gatehouse and secured the door.

At approximately 1345, one of the offenders, dressed in civilian clothing, exited the gatehouse, walked up to the exterior gate, and identified himself as "Maintenance." Officer Gips remembered seeing the maintenance supervisor earlier that day, wearing the clothes and the hat that were now worn by the offender, and from his vantage point, thought that it was the same person. Officer Gips looked around to make sure that there were no offenders in the area and opened the outside gate allowing this person to exit the compound. He subsequently opened the picket door allowing him to enter the tower. As the offender was coming up the stairs, the picket telephone rang. The caller identified himself as a maintenance supervisor and asked if Area Maintenance staff had arrived. The offender reached the top of the stairs and took the

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telephone call. He then removed his jacket and placed it on the chair in the picket, grabbing a .357 revolver that was lying on the desk. The offender, who was later identified to be Offender Halprin, held Officer Gips at gunpoint and told him that it was an escape. One of the offenders, still in offender clothing, later discovered to be Offender Murphy, yelled from the ground to open the gate. Offender Halprin, not familiar with the picket controls, threatened Officer Gips' life and forced him to provide instructions on how to open the picket door and the vehicle gate. Offender Halprin asked Officer Gips what kind of guns were in the picket and their whereabouts. The field force's guns and the transportation officer's guns were stored in the bottom of the picket. This was not the unit armory. After collecting the guns, Offender Murphy instructed Officer Gips to go downstairs. When they got to the bottom of the stairs, Offender Halprin used Gips' belt and one of his shoestrings to bind his hands and tie him to a structure within the picket. The offenders then exited the tower with the guns.

Immediately after the offenders exited the picket, Officer Gips freed himself and ran up the stairs to the top of the picket. The three offenders that had remained in the Maintenance Department drove the maintenance truck through the open vehicle gate where they picked up the weapons and their four accomplices and exited the compound. The maintenance truck had been brought inside the compound earlier that day in anticipation of an afternoon trip for supplies. At approximately 1358, Officer Gips used his handheld radio to request assistance. Officer Gips reported at that time that he could see the maintenance truck driving past 19 Building outside of the compound.

Warden Keith was in the company of a local law enforcement officer on the compound, when he heard the distress call. The officer immediately notified other local law enforcement to be on the lookout for a white TDCJ truck. While returning to the unit at approximately 1400, Officer Barton Olsen, assigned to the community work squad, reported seeing the white maintenance truck in the downtown area of Kenedy, in the vicinity of City Hall. Immediately after seeing the vehicle, Officer Olsen heard a call on the hand held radio and responded with directions to where he had seen the vehicle.

As an intensive search continued, at approximately 1600, a white TDCJ pickup was found abandoned behind the Wal-Mart in Kenedy. Based on film footage recorded by an automated teller machine camera in the Wal-Mart parking lot, it is believed that the escapees left the area in one or possibly two vehicles that were left in the parking lot by an unknown accomplice on the morning of the incident. A task force formed by the Office of the Inspector General, with the assistance of state and local law enforcement agencies has been investigating leads to the whereabouts of the fugitives. As of the date of this review, the escapees still remain at large.

Attachment B

CONNALLY (CY) ID - Prison

Unit Address/Phone: HC 67 Box 115, Kenedy, Texas 78119 / (830) 583-4003 (**068)

Unit Location: 2 miles south of Kenedy on Hwy 181 to FM 632 in Karnes County

Senior Warden: Timothy B. Keith

Regional Director: Doug Dretke, Region IV

Date Unit Established/On Line: July 1995

Total Employees*: 743

Security Employees*: 547

Non-Security Employees*: 105

Windham/Education Employees*: 20

Contract Medical Employees*: 71

Offender Population*/Gender: 2,834 / Male

Maximum Capacity*: 2,848

Custody Levels Housed: Minimum, Medium, Close, Administrative Segregation

Approximate Acreage: 818

Agricultural Operations: Contract Grazing, Security Horses/Dogs, Unit Garden, Unit Food Bank Garden

Industrial Operations: None

Facility Operations: Unit Maintenance

Medical Capabilities: Basic medical, dental and psychiatric services to include pharmacy, radiology, laboratory and emergency care; chronic disease clinics; substance abuse services; preventive medicine services; and referrals to other units and/or community based facilities as appropriate. Skilled nursing care available 24 hours a day.

Educational Programs: Literacy/GED, CHANGES/Pre-Release, English as a Second Language, Cognitive Intervention, Project RIO
Career and Technology Programs: Computer Maintenance Technician, Construction Carpentry, Diesel Mechanics, Electrical Trades, Piping Trades/Plumbing, Small Engine Repair.

Additional Programs: Substance Abuse Education and Support Groups, Spiritual Growth Programs, Career Day, Crime Stoppers

Community Work Projects: Services provided to city and county agencies, the Community Council of South Central Texas, and Texas Department of Transportation. Unit garden benefits the non-profit organization, South Texas Children's Home.

Volunteer Programs: Chaplaincy, Education, Substance Abuse


* Data as of June 30, 2000

Attachment C

Maintenance Department




This photo shows the maintenance office. The door labeled "Warehouse" is the door that the victims were prompted through and then closed behind them.




This photo is of the area in the warehouse that the victims were subdued. The cleared area of the floor was used as a take down area.

Maintenance Department



This photo shows the inside of the warehouse and the closest route from the take down area to the electrical room. The offenders dragged their victim down the path behind the shelving so that they would not be seen if an unexpected person were to enter. . .




This photo shows the electrical room where the victims were held.



This photos shows the inside of the Maintenance Department tool room.

Maintenance Truck



This photo shows the front of the Maintenance Department. This photo was taken as a reenactment of the location of the maintenance truck parked within the compound.




This photo was taken as a reenactment of the vehicle after offenders backed it into the shop area. The back of the truck was filled with plywood and boxes that five of the offenders hid under as they exited the compound.

Views From Backgate Picket




A view of the Connally Unit Maintenance Department from the backgate picket. This photo depicts the limited visibility of the department by the backgate picket officer.




A view of the backgate from the backgate picket. This photo depicts the view that the backgate picket officer had when the offenders arrived at the backgate. The small gate to the right of the image is the gate that the offenders walked through. The vehicle gate to the left of the image is the gate that the civilian dressed offenders were allowed to drive the Gator through. The vehicle area is outlined by the yellow stripes on the pavement.

Backgate Gatehouse




A view of the Connally Unit backgate gatehouse. This photo shows the desk that was next to the electrical outlet that the civilian dressed offenders pretended to examine.




A view of the restroom located in the gatehouse. This photo shows the area where the backgate officer was restrained.

Views From Backgate Picket




This photo illustrates the view that the backgate picket officer had when the civilian offender requested to exit from the compound and enter the backgate picket.



This photo illustrates perimeter road where the maintenance vehicle was traveling when the backgate picket officer used the handheld radio to report the escape.


Attachment D

Route From Maintenance To Backgate




Attachment E


Hand-Made Weapons




A small flathead screwdriver with a handle fashioned out of blue tape.



An 11" iron rod club wrapped in black plastic tape.



A 12" metal hand-made knife with a handle made from tape and fabric.



(2) Flat pieces of metal.

Attachment F



TEXAS DEPARTMENT

NUMBER: AD-03.19 (rev. 1)

OF

DATE: November 5, 1999

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

PAGE: 1 of 3

SUPERSEDES: AD-03.19
December 3, 1997

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF TOOLS/SENSITIVE ITEMS

AUTHORITY: Sections 493.001, 493.006, 494.001, and 494.002 (a), Texas Government Code

Reference: American Correctional Association (ACA) Standard 3-4188

APPLICABILITY: Institutional (ID) and State Jail (SJD) Divisions

POLICY: The purpose of this directive is to establish procedures to ensure strict accountability for all tools utilized in unit/facility operations. The procedures set forth in this directive are intended to be minimum requirements in the areas of tool control. Individual units/facilities or departments may add (but not lessen) requirements in regard to said control to address their unique situations.

PROCEDURES:

I. General

- A. All tool rooms shall be locked at all times. The use of a half or "dutch door" is allowable if an appropriate individual is present to issue and receive tools. Only offenders assigned to a tool room and authorized personnel shall be permitted access. In the event a unit/facility does not have sufficient space for a tool room, tools should be in a locked box or other secure container.
- B. Tool rooms shall use tool or shadow boards where possible to provide a quick and accurate method to account for tools during inventories. Spare tools shall be secured in locked storage.
- C. All tools shall be engraved with the controlling department's title or abbreviation of that title and in addition may be color-coded by department location. The decision to use color-coding is optional and rests with the Warden.

- D. To ensure accountability of all tools issued, maintain an ongoing tool control log with the following information: requester's printed name and signed initials; description of the tool; and time of issue/return. Unless special arrangements are made, tools shall be turned in at close of each day. Tool logs shall be kept for a minimum of 12 months.
- E. A list of all tools kept in tool boxes and pouches shall be made, and used to inventory the items. Pouches and portable tool boxes shall be inventoried daily, while larger tool boxes shall be inventoried at least weekly.

II. Sensitive Tools/Items

- A. Any tool or equipment likely to be used in an escape attempt or that poses a threat to unit/facility security should be considered "sensitive." Examples are: bolt cutters, hack saws and blades; files; portable grinders; kleins; cutting torches; utility knives, ladders; ropes, and other similar equipment. The list of sensitive tools may be expanded as deemed necessary by the Warden.
- B. "Sensitive" tools shall be stored separately from other tools in an area where offenders do not have access or there is constant staff observation and be maintained under lock and key. These tools shall be issued by a designated employee for use by offenders that are working under their supervision. No offender assigned to a crew using "sensitive" tools shall be allowed to leave the work area until said tools are accounted for.
- C. A thorough inventory of "sensitive" tools shall be maintained. Separate tool logs and tool destruction logs shall also be maintained, as detailed in Sections I. D. and III. B.
- D. Toxic, abusable and poisonous fluids shall be stored, secured and disposed of appropriately.


III. Damaged/Missing Tools

- A. When tools are discovered missing, the person to whom the tool was issued is responsible for immediately verbally notifying the appropriate department head (having control of the tool).
- B. The department head (having control of a tool) shall be notified in writing of any damaged, broken or missing tools by the end of the workday. Broken or unserviceable tools shall be secured in locked storage until destroyed. Destruction shall be by cutting, breaking, crushing, and other similar methods and then promptly discarded according to unit/facility procedures. If a tool is destroyed, the following information should be recorded on a "tool destruction log": name of officer

witnessing destruction; description of tool; and date destroyed. Tool destruction logs shall be kept for a minimum of 12 months.

NOTE: In the event a tool is a TDCJ fixed asset, departmental policy regarding fixed asset deletion and disposal must be followed.

- C. The verbal notification shall be followed up with a written report to the department head, submitted by no later than the end of the work day, fully detailing the incident (i.e., tool description; circumstances; employee or offender responsible; and other similar information). A copy of that report shall also be submitted to the Warden or designee.



Gary L. Johnson, Director
Institutional Division



Texas Department Number: AD-03.28
of Date: April 30, 1997
Criminal Justice Page: 1 of 6
Supersedes: AD-02.05
April 1, 1985

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE

SUBJECT: PROPER IDENTIFICATION AND VEHICLE SUPERVISION PROCEDURES FOR GATE/PICKET OFFICERS

AUTHORITY: §§493.001, 493.002, 493.004, 493.005, 493.0051, 493.006, 494.001, and 494.002 (a), Texas Government Code
Board Rule 37 T.A.C. §151.21

APPLICABILITY: Institutional Division, State Jail Division, and Parole Division

POLICY: The purpose of this directive is to reiterate security procedures for obtaining proper identification for persons and vehicles entering or exiting a facility. To outline procedures to be utilized in supervising and controlling delivery trucks that enter the facility for delivery or pickup. These procedures apply to Backgate Officers, Industrial Plant Managers, Commissary Managers, Department Managers receiving truck deliveries, Shift Utility Officers, and Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) employee and offender truck drivers.

PROCEDURES: Officers assigned to gate/picket locations will ensure that the following procedures are implemented:

I. Personal Identification

- A. All uniformed or non-uniformed personnel will be required to show their TDCJ identification card prior to admission to or exit from the facility.
- B. Non-TDCJ employees will be required to show a valid driver license prior to admission or exit from the facility. When a visitor does not have a valid driver license, the Warden/Facility Administrator will be contacted and determination for entry made on an individual basis. Approval for

admittance will be obtained from the Warden/Facility Administrator or his designee prior to admission to the facility.

- C. During normal hours, when offenders may receive visitors, officers will follow prescribed facility guidelines for identification of such visitors.
- D. It is a felony under Texas Penal Code, §46.035, for a person licensed to carry a handgun under Article 4413(29ee), Revised Statutes, to carry a handgun on the premises of a correctional facility, regardless of whether the handgun is concealed. For security reasons, all weapons, even those of law enforcement officers, must be checked at the picket.

II. Vehicle Identification and Supervision

- A. Before allowing any vehicle to enter an area, the officer will ascertain the purpose for the entry and the vehicle's destination and note the information on the appropriate log. Only those vehicles with authorized official business will be allowed entrance. No private vehicle will be allowed within the perimeter unless specifically authorized by the Warden/Facility Administrator or designee.
- B. All vehicles will be searched prior to entering or exiting through the facility compound perimeter fence. The required information will be recorded on the vehicle log. Searches will be conducted for weapons, contraband, drugs, unauthorized personnel and any items not authorized by TDCJ or by facility policy. The search will include, but not be limited to, the following areas of every vehicle:
 - 1. Engine Compartment
 - 2. Trunk
 - 3. Interior
 - 4. Glove Compartments
 - 5. Under Seats
 - 6. Body and Bed
 - 7. Undercarriage
- C. Additional responsibilities for officers assigned to these posts are outlined in the individual post orders, (e.g., Backgate Officer, Frontgate Officer, Highway Picket Officer). All facilities will develop special orders that expand upon the responsibilities and duties of officers assigned to these areas.

III. Delivery Trucks - Non-TDCJ Vehicles

- A. A non-TDCJ vehicle is any vehicle authorized to seek access at a TDCJ facility, such as a vehicle used by a vendor or delivery service, which is not owned and operated by TDCJ.
- B. When a non-TDCJ delivery truck arrives at the backgate, the Backgate Officer will ascertain the delivery truck's destination and then notify the department to send an employee to the backgate to escort the truck. If an employee is unavailable, the manager will request the security shift supervisor to send a Utility Correctional Officer to the backgate.
- C. Non-TDCJ delivery trucks will not be allowed into the sallyport until an escort arrives at the backgate.
- D. A search of all delivery vehicles will be accomplished. Drivers will be asked to vacate the vehicle and open or unlock all compartments of the vehicle (trunks, sleepers, tool boxes, and other similar compartments) for search purposes. The Backgate Officer and the escort will participate in the search.
- E. A thorough search of all areas will be conducted for controlled substances, weapons of any nature, or any material thought to be hazardous to the facility. If doubt arises concerning any material entering the facility, the security shift supervisor should be consulted.
- F. The Backgate Officer will utilize a mirror to check the undercarriage of all vehicles. If any questions arise, the officer will need to physically get under the vehicle to ensure a thorough search has been conducted.
- G. A ladder will be utilized to view the tops of all vehicles.
- H. When searching the vehicle and its contents, the officer will use extreme caution and comply with all safety regulations. (See TDCJ ED-10.61)

IV. Delivery Trucks - TDCJ

- A. When a TDCJ employee-driven delivery truck arrives at the backgate, the officer assigned will ascertain the delivery truck's destination and then notify that department that the truck is en route.
- B. All TDCJ delivery trucks will be searched in the same manner as stated above for non-TDCJ delivery trucks.

- C. Under normal circumstances, TDCJ delivery trucks will not require an escort. However, at the Warden/Facility Administrator or designee's discretion, an escort may be utilized in special situations (e.g., after normal delivery hours, in the event of a field force working near the delivery area) or for other specific security concerns. The escort, when utilized, will not cause unnecessary delays.
- D. All trailers, such as agriculture and farm shop tractors, are to be searched in the same manner as passenger and cargo type vehicles.
- E. The Food Service Refuse Trailer (slop wagon) will be probed with a rod to detect contraband or an offender escape attempt. The same procedures will be utilized for all trash trucks, dump trucks, and other similar vehicles. Safety precautions must always be used when searching these vehicles.

V. Delivery Trucks - TDCJ Offender Drivers

- A. Offender truck drivers are followed to their destination by a TDCJ employee truck driver (convoy style). There may be more than one delivery truck driven by an offender in the convoy. It may be necessary for the TDCJ employee driver to drop offender truck drivers off at one or more locations and to continue to another location in the immediate area.
- B. When a TDCJ delivery truck driven by an offender truck driver arrives at the backgate, the officer assigned will ascertain the delivery truck's destination and then notify that department to send an employee to the backgate to meet the truck. If an employee is unavailable, the manager will request the security shift supervisor to send a Utility Correctional Officer to the backgate.
- C. Offender truck drivers will not be allowed into the sallyport until escort arrives at the backgate.
- D. Offender truck drivers will be strip-searched before being allowed to leave the sallyport area.
- E. Offender-driven delivery trucks will be searched in the same manner as stated above for non-TDCJ trucks and TDCJ employee-driven delivery trucks.
- F. Offender truck drivers will be escorted into the facility by an employee or supervisor from the department receiving/shipping the load.

- G. If the offender truck driver has been dropped off by a TDCJ employee truck driver, the truck will remain in the vicinity outside the backgate area (locked and properly secured). The offender truck driver will return to the backgate and remain under supervision until his TDCJ transportation supervisor arrives to escort him to the next location. No offender driver will be allowed to leave the compound without an escort.


VI. Loading/Unloading Procedures

- A. The escort (if needed) will ride in the truck cab to the loading dock. Offender traffic (i.e., yard squads, work squads, and other offender work crews) should be avoided en route to the loading dock, if possible.
- B. The TDCJ employee truck driver, manager and escort are responsible for the security of the vehicle, products and offenders while loading/unloading (if the driver is a non-employee or an offender, the manager and escort are responsible for security). Adequate supervision for offenders loading/unloading is the sole responsibility of the department receiving/shipping the load. All offenders not loading/unloading the truck will be removed from the area. All doors and gates in the area should remain locked. The employee truck driver will lock the cab and remain at the loading dock in order to supervise the loading/unloading of goods.
- C. Arrangements will be made to accommodate more than one delivery truck at a time when dock space is available.
- D. When the trailer is loaded/unloaded it should be by the TDCJ employee responsible for the vehicle or applicable department manager and escort (when TDCJ offender drivers and non-TDCJ drivers). The offenders should be counted and returned to the department manager. The department manager must validate the count of the offender loaders and the offenders in the department.
- E. The manager of each TDCJ department that loads trailers shall be responsible for obtaining seals and keeping them in stock for the purpose of securing all trailers with product aboard. The seal number should be noted on the outgoing freight bill or envelope. This is to allow the driver to verify that the load is intact and secure before leaving the loading or staging site. Shippers with multiple drops may choose to send a seal for each drop. The driver will reseal the trailer and document each time the seal is broken.

VII. Procedure for Exiting the Facility

- A. The escort or TDCJ employee driver will call the Backgate Officer to alert him to their return. The department manager will immediately call the backgate as soon as the count is clear. When the backgate is clear, the driver and escort or TDCJ employee driver will return to the backgate, avoiding offender traffic, when possible.
- B. Once inside the sallyport, the Backgate Officer will obtain the seal number on the trailer and contact the department manager receiving/shipping the load to verify that the numbers match. If the numbers match, it will not be necessary to break the seal and search inside the trailer. The Backgate Officer and escort (if needed for TDCJ offender drivers or non-TDCJ drivers) will search the carriage of the truck. All compartments in the carriage will be unlocked and searched. (See Section II.B.)
- C. If the numbers on the seal do not match or if any security issue arises, the seal will be broken and a search of the trailer will be performed. The Backgate Officer and the driver will sign the freight bill noting that the seal was broken. After the seal is broken, the driver will use padlocks to maintain security until the load is totally searched.


Gary Johnson, Director
Institutional Division



Texas Department Number: PO-07.046 (rev. 2)

of Date: February 25, 1999

Criminal Justice Page: 1 of 5

Supersedes: PO-07.046 (rev. 1)
July 1, 1996

Authority: Gary L. Johnson, Director
Institutional Division

POST ORDER

SUBJECT: PERIMETER PICKET

AUTHORITY: Texas Government Code § 494.001

PURPOSE: To establish the duties and responsibilities of staff assigned to Perimeter Pickets. Specific orders for all pickets are in attachment form.

DEFINITION:

Perimeter Pickets: Structures that circle the building or unit/facility area and provide outside security to the unit/facility, preventing unauthorized egress/ingress to the area.

PROCEDURES:

- I. Officers assigned to Perimeter Pickets are responsible for the security perimeter of the facility, preventing offenders from escaping or attempting to escape over the walls or fences and aiding in the prevention and control of disturbances inside.
- II. All Perimeter Pickets shall be manned 24 hours per day, seven (7) days per week. Exceptions to this policy shall be approved by the Deputy Director of Security.
- III. Correctional Officers
 - A. The relieving officer shall inspect the post and equipment for damages and cleanliness. Any discrepancies observed and accountability of equipment shall be noted on the post log.
 - B. The relieving officer shall inspect all weapons, ammunition and other equipment assigned to that post. The daily inventory log shall be signed by the relieving officer indicating that all weapons/ammunition are accounted for and in working order. Any weapons/ammunition not accounted for or not in working order shall be immediately reported to the Shift Supervisor.

1. If an officer fails to report damage or loss of equipment, he shall assume financial responsibility for the damage or loss.
 2. It is imperative that officers report the condition of weapons and equipment assigned to this post.
- C. The officer shall observe and be aware of all activity around or near this post.
- D. Officers assigned to this post between the hours of dusk to dawn shall call the central control picket every 30 minutes.
- E. Officers assigned to this post from dusk to dawn shall not remain inside the post for more than 30 minutes at any given time, with the exception of the front gate picket. During periods of inclement weather, the officer may remain inside, but must ensure there is a clear line of sight to any adjacent perimeter.

IV. Weapons and Ammunition

- A. There shall be a minimum of two (2) of the following weapons issued to this post:
1. Smith & Wesson Model 65 Revolver;
 2. Colt AR-15 Rifle/.308; and
 3. Remington 870-P Shotgun.
- B. Ammunition

1. 6 rounds revolver
2. 15 rounds rifle
3. 5 rounds shotgun (.00 or .04 buckshot)

V. Use of Firearms

Whenever the use of firearms is necessary to prevent escapes; to quell a rebellion, riot, or disturbance in which loss of life or serious bodily injury to any person is imminent and where lesser means of major force have failed to achieve the quelling of such rebellion, riot, or disturbance; or to prevent serious bodily injury to a person, the officer shall take action in accordance with the *Use of Force Plan*.

- A. Prevention of Escapes

1. Whenever use of firearms is immediately necessary to prevent an escape, the officer must, if practical, shout for the offender to halt and if that fails, fire a warning shot. The officer must fire on the offender only when it appears probable that the offender will elude immediate effort for recapture. The following sequence shall be followed if sufficient time permits; however, escapes must be prevented.
 - a. The officer must give a verbal command to "Halt".
 - b. If the offender stops, the officer shall give a verbal command to lie down and remain still.
 - c. If the offender continues an attempt to escape after the verbal command, the officer shall fire a warning shot, if possible, in a safe direction.
 - d. If the offender stops, the officer shall give a verbal command to lie down and remain still.
 - e. If the offender continues the attempt to escape and the officer believes there is no physical force short of deadly force available or likely to be effective to stop the offender and the offender is attempting to climb a perimeter fence, the officer must fire at the offender.
 - f. When the offender halts, the firing shall immediately cease and the incident shall be reported to the officer's supervisor.
2. The officer shall not fire at an offender who is climbing a fence or wall other than a perimeter fence or who is loose inside the security perimeter. On units/facilities equipped with double perimeter security fences, the two (2) fences are considered one (1) fence.
3. Officers shall not fire on an offender if the firing will endanger the lives of others.
4. Picket Officers will alert other unit/facility personnel as soon as possible of the escape attempt by sounding an alarm, shouting or a telephone call.
5. Situation reports will be provided to supervisors by the Picket Officers as quickly and frequently as time permits.
6. Whenever possible, shots fired at offenders should be directed to disable rather than to kill.

B. Assaults

1. During an assault, the officer shall use all means available before firing. Verbal commands and a warning shot, if practical, will precede firing at the offender.
2. The officer must see that the offender possesses a weapon capable of inflicting serious injury or death before the officer utilizes firepower.
3. Officers shall not fire upon an offender if the firing will endanger the lives of others.
4. Whenever possible, shots fired at an offender should be directed to disable rather than to kill.
5. Picket Officers shall alert other unit/facility personnel as soon as possible through the use of an alarm, shouting, or telephone call.
6. Situation reports shall be provided to supervisors as quickly and frequently as time permits.

- C. Authorization for use of deadly force shall be made by the Assistant Warden or higher authority; however, in case of emergency, personnel may exercise deadly force without the consent of a higher authority if the situation does not permit the time to seek higher authorization.

VI. Standard Rules and Regulations for All Perimeter Pickets

- A. Officers are not permitted to sleep, read or engage in activities that shall distract their attention.

1. Reading materials and personal radios are not allowed on this post.
2. Officers shall not engage in any type of physical exercise activity while on their post that distracts from their official duties.
3. Officers shall not bring articles to this post not directly related to the performance of their official duties. Exceptions shall be: flashlight, binoculars and thermos bottles. Wardens can authorize other items as deemed necessary for their unit/facility.

- B. Weapons shall not be surrendered to any person except the authorized relieving officer.

- C. Weapons shall be examined for obvious damage and cleanliness.

- D. Tampering with weapons, ammunition or other equipment is prohibited.
- E. All weapons in active status shall be cleaned and oiled by designated personnel only.
- F. Sidearms shall be carried in the holster attached to pants belt.
- G. The use of personal weapons by on-duty personnel is strictly prohibited.
- H. The relieving officer shall report to the Shift Supervisor at the designated time and area specified in the special order.
- I. Near the end of each shift, the officer on duty shall clean the post thoroughly and report any damages and repairs needed to the Shift Supervisor. An entry shall be recorded on the post log of this action.
- J. Telephone use is restricted to official calls only. A complete and up-to-date list of telephone extensions shall be prominently displayed in each post.
- K. If doubt arises concerning any emergency, the officer shall immediately contact the Shift Supervisor for instructions.
- L. Shouting shall be the normal method for gaining an offender's attention. Warning shots shall not normally be used for gaining an offender's attention.
- M. An incident report must be submitted in the event of a round being fired, lost or damaged. The incident report must be submitted before leaving the facility.
- N. The Building Major shall ensure that his designee (a C.O. III or above) inspects each post at least weekly, to ensure that all directives pertaining to the post are adhered to. Any discrepancies found during the weekly inspection shall be reported in writing to the Building Major for appropriate action.
- O. All completed forms shall be routed to the Building Major from the Shift Supervisor for appropriate review and handling.
- P. The officer shall be responsible for any other duties as might be assigned by a supervisor.



Texas Department
of
Criminal Justice

Institutional Division

NUMBER: PO-07.048-Rev 3
DATE: August 1, 1997
PAGE: 1 of 6
SUPERSEDES: PO-07.048-Rev 2
March 1, 1997
AUTH: Gary Johnson, Director
Institutional Division

My 8/6/97

POST ORDER

SUBJECT: BACK GATE PICKET

AUTHORITY: Texas Government Code § 494.001
Executive Directive 01.21

PURPOSE: To establish the duties and responsibilities of officers assigned to the Backgate Picket. Specific orders for all pickets are in attachment form.

DEFINITION: Perimeter Pickets: are structures that encompass the building or Unit area and provide outside security to the Unit.

PROCEDURES:

- I. Officers assigned to Perimeter Pickets are responsible for the security of the institution, preventing offenders from escaping or attempting to escape over the walls or fences and aiding in the prevention and control of disturbances inside.
- II. All Perimeter Pickets shall be manned (24) hours per day, seven days per week. Exceptions to this policy shall be approved by the Deputy Director of Security.
- III. Correctional Officers
 - A. The relieving officer shall inspect the post and equipment for damages and cleanliness. Any discrepancies observed and accountability of equipment shall be noted on the post log.
 - B. The relieving officer shall inspect all weapons, ammunition and other equipment assigned to that post. The daily inventory log shall be signed by the relieving officer indicating that all weapons/ammunition are accounted for and in working order. Any weapons/ammunition not accounted for or not in working order shall be immediately reported to the Shift Supervisor.
 1. If an officer fails to report damage or loss of equipment, he/she shall assume financial responsibility for the damage or loss.

2. It is imperative that officers report the condition of weapons and equipment assigned to this post.
- C. The officer shall observe and be aware of all activity around or near the post.
- D. Officers assigned to this post shall call the central control picket every (30) minutes from dusk to dawn.
- E. Officers assigned to this post shall not remain inside the post for more than (30) minutes at any given time. During periods of inclement weather, the officer may remain inside but must ensure there is a clear line of sight to any adjacent perimeter. Conditions causing diminished visibility will be reported to the Shift Supervisor.

IV. Weapons and Ammunition

- A. There shall be a minimum of two of the following weapons issued to this post:

1. Smith & Wesson Model 65 Revolver;
2. .308 Caliber Bolt Action Rifle;
3. Remington 870-P Shotgun; and
4. AR-15.

- B. Ammunition

1. 6 rounds revolver
2. 15 rounds .308 caliber
3. 5 rounds shotgun (.00 or .04 buckshot)
4. 15 rounds .223 caliber

- C. .308 Caliber Bolt Action Rifle/AR-15

1. The .308 Caliber Bolt Action rifle /AR-15 shall remain in the cabinet at all times and only be removed when necessary to prevent escapes, stop assaultive behavior when an offender is threatening serious injury toward other offenders, staff or citizens, or to prevent arson.
2. Each cabinet will have a seal on the cabinet hasp. Each officer assigned to the picket will inspect the cabinet for damage to and/or a broken seal. In the event the seal is damaged or broken the following procedures shall be complied with:
 - a. Date and time of inspection noted on Picket Inspection Log;

- b. Shift Supervisor will be notified of damage;
- c. Shift Supervisor will submit a written report to the Building Major and Unit Warden detailing the reasons for the damage or broken seal on the .308 Caliber Bolt Action Rifle cabinet; and
- d. The Unit Armory Officer will be responsible for replacing the seal and re-zeroing the .308 Caliber Bolt Action Rifle and/or the AR-15.

This procedure will apply only to Units equipped with the .308 Caliber Bolt Action Rifles with scopes.

V. Use of Firearms - Picket Officers

When the use of firearms is immediately necessary to prevent an escape, stop assaultive behavior when an offender is threatening serious injury toward other offenders, staff or citizens, or to prevent arson, the officer shall take action in accordance with the Use of Force Plan.

A. Prevention of Escapes

1. Whenever use of firearms is immediately necessary to prevent an escape, the officer must, if practical, shout for the offender to halt and if that fails, fire a warning shot. The officer must fire a warning shot. The officer must fire on the offender only when it appears probable that the offender will elude immediate effort for recapture. The following sequence will be followed if sufficient time permits; however, escapes must be prevented.
 - a. The officer must give a verbal command to "Halt".
 - b. If the offender stops, the officer will give a verbal command to lie down and remain still.
 - c. If the offender continues an attempt to escape after the verbal command, the officer shall fire a warning shot, if possible, in a safe direction.
 - d. If the offender stops, the officer will give a verbal command to lie down and remain still.
 - e. If the offender continues the attempt to escape and the officer believes there is not physical force short of deadly force available or likely to be effective to stop the offender and the offender is attempting to climb a perimeter fence, the officer must fire at the offender.
 - f. When the offender halts, the firing will immediately cease and the incident will be reported to the officer's supervisor.

2. The officer will not fire at an offender who is climbing a fence or wall other than a perimeter fence or who is loose inside the security perimeter. On Units equipped with double perimeter security fences the two fences are considered one fence.
3. Officers will not fire on an offender if the firing will endanger the lives of others.
4. Picket Officers will alert other Unit personnel as soon as possible of the escape attempt by sounding an alarm, shouting or a telephone call.
5. Situation reports will be provided to supervisors by the Picket Officers as quickly and frequently as time permits.
6. Whenever possible, shots fired at offenders should be directed to disable rather than to kill.

B. Assaults

1. During an assault, the officer will exhaust all other means before firing. Verbal commands and a warning shot, if practical, will precede firing at the offender.
2. The officer must see that the offender possesses a weapon capable of inflicting serious injury or death before the officer utilizes firepower.
3. Officers will not fire upon an offender if the firing will endanger the lives of others.
4. Whenever possible, shots fired at an offender should be directed to disable rather than to kill.
5. Picket Officers will alert other Unit personnel as soon as possible through the use of an alarm, shouting or telephone call.
6. Situation reports will be provided to supervisors as quickly and frequently as time permits.

- C. Authorization for use of deadly force shall be made by the ranking supervisor on duty; however, in case of emergency, personnel may exercise deadly force without the consent of higher authority if the situation does not permit the time to seek higher authorization.

VI. Standard Rules and Regulations for All Perimeter Pickets

- A. Officers are not permitted to sleep, read or engage in activities that shall distract their attention.

1. Reading materials and/or personal radios are not allowed on this post.
 2. Officers shall not engage in any type of physical exercise activity while on their post that distracts from their discharge of duty.
 3. Officers shall not bring articles to this post not directly related to the performance of their official duties, exceptions shall be: flashlights, binoculars and thermos bottles. Unit Wardens can authorize other items as deemed necessary for their Unit.
- B. Weapons shall not be surrendered to any person except the authorized relieving officer.
- C. Weapons shall be examined for obvious damage and cleanliness.
- D. Tampering with weapons, ammunition or other equipment is prohibited.
- E. All weapons in active status shall be cleaned and oiled by designated personnel only.
- F. Sidearms shall be carried in the holster attached to pants belt.
- G. The use of personal weapons by on-duty personnel is strictly prohibited.
- H. The relieving officer shall report to the Shift Supervisor at the designated time and area specified in the special order.
- I. Near the end of each shift, the officer on duty shall clean the post thoroughly and report any damages and repairs needed to the Shift Supervisor. An entry shall be recorded on the post log of this action.
- J. Telephone use is restricted to official calls only. A complete and up-to-date list of telephone extensions shall be prominently displayed in each post.
- K. If doubt arises concerning any emergency, the officer shall immediately contact the Shift Supervisor for instructions.
- L. Shouting shall be the normal method for gaining an offender's attention. Warning shots shall not normally be used for gaining an offender's attention.
- M. An incident report must be submitted in the event of a round being fired, lost or damaged. The incident report must be submitted before leaving the institution.
- N. The Building Major shall ensure that his/her designee (a C.O. III or above) inspects each post at least weekly, to ensure that all directives pertaining to the post are adhered to. Any discrepancies found during the weekly inspection shall be reported in writing to the Building Major for appropriate action.
- O. All completed forms shall be routed to the Building Major from the Shift Supervisor for appropriate review and handling.

- P. The officer shall be responsible for any other duties as might be assigned by a supervisor.

VII. Back Gate Procedures

- A. The Back Gate Picket Officer shall ensure all persons entering or exiting the Unit through the Back Gate are appropriately identified. All employees and visitors shall present their photo identification card. Individuals unable to produce appropriate identification must receive approval from the Unit Warden to enter through the Back Gate.
- B. The officer shall visually search all vehicles entering the Unit.
- C. The officer shall stand on the catwalk with a weapon in his possession observing when any group of offenders is in the Back Gate area.
- D. On those Units where the Back Gate Picket Officer controls the gates to the Back Gate area, the officer shall ensure that only one gate is opened at a time.
- E. The officer shall be responsible for the issuance of weapons assigned to the picket. The officer must:
 - 1. Ensure proper authority for issuance of weapon;
 - 2. Maintain log of weapons issued and returned; and
 - 3. Refer to Weapons Policy.
- F. The officer shall be observant of all activities in the area of the Back Gate and shall assist the Back Gate Officer in the operation of the back gate.

- VIII. The officer shall be responsible for any other duties as might be assigned to the post by a supervisor.



Texas Department
of
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Institutional Division

NUMBER: PO-07.053-Rev1

DATE: July 1, 1996

PAGE: 1 of 2

SUPERSEDES: PO-07.053

AUTH: Jerry Peterson, Deputy
Director for Security

POST ORDER

SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE OFFICER

AUTHORITY: Texas Government Code § 494.001;
Administrative Directive 01.21

PURPOSE: To specify the duties of the Maintenance Officer in supervising inmate work squads performing maintenance on the Unit.

PROCEDURES:

- I. The officer shall receive his/her daily instruction from the Maintenance Supervisor.
 - A. After receiving instructions, the officer shall call for his/her squad of inmates.
 - B. The officer shall count the squad before proceeding to the work area.
 - C. The officer shall maintain a running count of the work squad during work hours.
 - D. The officer shall maintain visual sight of the work squad at all times while on a work site.

- II. Tools and Equipment
 - A. The officer shall be responsible for the accountability of all tools and equipment used by the work squad. The officer shall:
 1. Issue tools and equipment and maintain a record of tool issuance; and
 2. Ensure that all tools and equipment are returned.
 - B. The officer shall ensure the tools and equipment are not used for the purpose of making contraband or weapons.

III. Other Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The officer shall search all inmates in the work squad before releasing the inmates to turn-in.
- B. Due to the nature of maintenance work, the officer shall be responsible for any other duties assigned by the supervisor.



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NUMBER: PO-07.054-Rev 2

DATE: August 1, 1997

PAGE: 1 of 6

SUPERSEDES: PO-07.054

AUTH: Gary Johnson, Director
Institutional Division

POST ORDER

SUBJECT: BACK GATE OFFICER

AUTHORITY: Texas Government Code § 494.001;
Executive Directive 01.21

PURPOSE: To establish guidelines and procedures in the operations of the Back Gate. To ensure no contraband articles are introduced into the Unit either on a person or in a vehicle, and to ensure each person is properly identified before allowing passage.

DEFINITIONS: Turn-Out Roster - A list of offenders by name, TDCJ-ID number, job assignment and housing area.

Level of Supervision - The required level of security in reference (armed or unarmed) to offender custody.

PROCEDURES:

- I. The Unit Administration shall provide the Back Gate Officer with an accurate turn-out roster on a daily basis, listing each offender authorized to enter and/or exit through the Back Gate.
 - A. The officer must ensure proper identification of offenders before allowing passage in and/or out of Unit.
 - B. After ensuring the offenders identity and noting the time in and/or out on the roster, the offender will be searched (pat or strip).
- II. Offenders whose names do not appear on the approved turn-out roster will not enter and/or exit the compound through the Back Gate, with the following exceptions:
 - A. Incoming/Outgoing chain; and
 - B. A written authorization from an appropriate authority.

- III. All offenders shall be strip searched upon entering the compound and pat searched and/or strip searched when exiting the compound. All offenders shall be escorted with the required level of supervision as indicated below.
- A. Line Class I, II, III, SAT 3, SAT 4 ---- Direct Armed Supervision outside the compound perimeter.
 - B. SAT II Restricted ---- Direct unarmed supervision at all times outside the security perimeter.
 - C. SAT II ---- (to include Line I minimum-out) Sight checked once per hour at a minimum when outside the security perimeter.
 - D. SAT I ---- Under frequent unarmed supervision outside the perimeter during appropriate work hours.

Note: All offenders must use the foot traffic sally port.

- IV. The Back Gate Officer shall identify and document all staff/visitor traffic, and identify and thoroughly search all offender/equipment traffic to control contraband.
- A. The offender shall be identified through the photo identification card.
 - B. Texas Department of Criminal Justice employees and visitors shall present their photo identification card. Individuals unable to produce appropriate identification must receive approval from the Unit Warden to enter through the Back Gate.
 - C. Visitors are required to sign in and out on the "Visitors Log" which will reflect their destination, vehicle identification, driver's name and license number. A temporary visitors pass or badge may be issued while on the Unit which will be surrendered upon their departure.
 - D. All personal items shall be removed from any vehicles entering the Unit for repair. The only items permitted shall be a spare tire and jack. The Back Gate will not store any excess items for anyone.

- V. Vehicle Traffic: All passengers, whether offender, employee, or free-world vendors, will be politely asked to exit the vehicle.

- A. Authorization to enter the Unit
 - 1. The Back Gate Officer must determine the destination and purpose of the vehicle prior to permitting any vehicle to enter the sally port.
 - 2. Before allowing access to the Unit, the officer must log the time, vehicle

proper log. Only those vehicles with authorized official business will be allowed entrance.

3. No private vehicle will be allowed within the perimeter unless specifically authorized by the Warden/Facility Administrator or designee.
4. Authorization must be obtained from the Senior Shift Supervisor or a Department Head such as Commissary, Food Service, etc., who shall be responsible for escort.
5. Offender truck drivers will not be allowed into the sallyport until escort arrives at the back gate.
6. Offender truck drivers will be strip searched before being allowed to leave the sallyport area.

B. Search Procedures Inside the Sally Port

1. The driver will be asked to open or unlock all compartments of the vehicle (trunks, sleepers, tool boxes, etc.) for search purposes.
2. A thorough search of all areas will be conducted for controlled substances, weapons of any nature or any material thought to be hazardous to the Unit. If doubt arises, consult the Shift Supervisor who will get in touch with the Unit Safety Officer. The search will include, but not be limited to, the following areas of every vehicle:
 - a. Engine Compartment
 - b. Trunk
 - c. Interior
 - d. Glove Compartment
 - e. Under Seats
 - f. Body and Bed
 - g. Undercarriage
3. The Back Gate Officer shall utilize a mirror to check under the carriage of the vehicle.
4. When searching the vehicle and its contents, the officer shall use extreme caution and comply with all safety regulations. A ladder shall be utilized to view the tops of all vehicles.
5. All trailers, such as agriculture and farm shop tractors, are to be searched in the same manner as vehicles.

6. The Food Service Refuse Trailer (slop wagon) shall be probed with a rod to detect contraband or an offender escape attempt. The same procedure shall be utilized for all trash trucks, dump trucks, etc. Safety must always be used when searching these vehicles.
7. When a vehicle attempts to depart the Unit, the same process for allowing a vehicle to enter the Unit shall be utilized.
8. Where seals are utilized, when a delivery truck is exiting the unit and is inside the sallyport, the Backgate Officer will obtain the seal number on the trailer and contact the department manager receiving/shipping the load to verify the numbers match. If the numbers match, it will not be necessary to break the seal and search inside the trailer. The carriage of the truck and all compartments in the carriage will be unloaded and searched.
9. If the numbers on the seal do not match, or if any security issue arises, the seal will be broken and a search of the trailer will be performed. The officer will sign the freight bill noting the seal was broken.

VI. Field Force

- A. The Back Gate Officer will be notified prior to the line force turn-out from the building at which time the officer will clear the Back Gate of all traffic.
- B. Line force offenders will be lined up in pairs at the foot sally port. The Back Gate Officer will count all line force offenders as they exit/enter the foot sally port. An accurate count will be maintained and logged on the proper form.
- C. Any discrepancy between the exiting/entering of the line count **MUST** be reported to the immediate supervisor without delay.
- D. Both gates to the foot sally port shall not be opened at the same time unless written instructions have been given to do so.
- E. Line force offenders require the presence of armed and mounted staff prior to exiting the institution through the Back Gate.

VII. Chain Bus

- A. The Back Gate Officer shall assist the Chain Bus Officers with the incoming and outgoing chain. (Every effort will be made to process the chain in a fast, efficient and orderly manner.)

2. The Back Gate Officer shall ensure the travel card, transfer roster and medical records accompany each offender prior to permitting the chain bus to exit the sally port.
3. Any problems, unusual incidents or delays that occur will be reported to the Shift Supervisor immediately.
4. The Back Gate Officer will be responsible for incoming and outgoing mail from the chain bus.

B. Security Precautions

1. The Back Gate Officer shall immediately notify the Shift Supervisor upon the arrival of the chain bus. The Back Gate Officer shall ensure that the Chain Bus Officer riding security has properly secured all weapons prior to permitting entry into the sally port.
2. The double gates for vehicle and foot traffic will not be open or unlocked during the loading and unloading of offenders.

VIII. Sally Port Gates

- A. Only one gate to the vehicle sally port will be open at any given time.
- B. When the vehicle has been completely searched and authorization to enter the Unit has been granted, the Back Gate Officer shall open the main sally port gate and permit the vehicle to enter.
- C. If Support Service Offenders are utilized to assist in operating Back Gate, the following requirements must be met:
 1. No offender pedestrian traffic may pass through these gates.
 2. Support Service Offenders assigned to the Back Gate do not handle keys.
 3. All gates are unlocked and locked by a staff member after which Support Service Offenders are permitted to push open and close the gates.
 4. Support Service Offenders assigned to the Back Gate receive direct supervision from a staff member whenever they operate the gates.
 5. All Support Service Offenders must be approved by the Classification and Records Officer.

- A. At least one hand-held metal detector should be assigned to the Back Gate.
- B. The officer shall use the metal detector to search packages, bags, clothing, linen and containers that cannot be searched properly by hand or visually.
- C. The officer shall use the metal detector to assist spot clothing searches and any time there is reasonable belief that metal contraband may be hidden on an offender.

X. Counts

- A. Prior to any formal count, the officer shall cease all offender traffic through the Back Gate.
- B. The officer shall then count his roster to determine the number and location of all offenders who are outside the Unit or at the Back Gate.
- C. This count shall be called in to the supervisor in charge of the count.
- D. Normal Back Gate operations shall not resume until the officer is notified that the count is clear, unless otherwise instructed by Unit Policy.

XI. Shift Changes and/or Relief

- A. The officer assigned to the Back Gate shall assume responsibility for the count of offenders, name of supervisor and location of all offenders outside of the Unit. The relieving officer shall confirm this information from the officer being relieved. All special instructions and other pertinent information shall be exchanged at this time.
- B. At the end of each day's operation, the Back Gate officer on duty shall ensure that the offender roster used that day is turned in to the proper officer. The roster serves as documentation of offender movement through the Back Gate for that day.

XII. Additional Orders

- A. No weapons or ammunition of any type shall be permitted to pass through the Back Gate without special authorization from the Unit Warden or designee.
- B. The Back Gate Officer shall be responsible to perform any and all additional duties that may be required by a ranking security supervisor.
- C. The officer is responsible for supervising any Support Service Offenders assigned to the Back Gate in accordance with the established guidelines in the Support Service Offender Compliance Agreement and in keeping with Department Policies and Procedures.



Texas Department
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Criminal Justice

Institutional Division

NUMBER: PO-07.103
DATE: July 1, 1996
PAGE: 1 of 3
SUPERSEDES: None

AUTH: Jerry Peterson, Deputy
Director for Security

POST ORDER

SUBJECT: TURNOUT DOOR OFFICER

AUTHORITY: Texas Government Code § 494.001
Administrative Directive 01.21

PURPOSE: To specify the duties of the Turnout Door Officer in insuring that an accurate accounting of all inmates who enter or exit the Unit through the back door is kept and recorded, that no contraband articles are introduced into the Unit and to ensure that each person is properly identified before allowing passage.

PROCEDURES:

I. Inmate Traffic

A. The officer will be provided a roster by the Unit Countroom containing the name, Texas Department of Criminal Justice number and job assignment of each inmate who is allowed to exit the Unit through the Turnout Door.

1. The officer must ensure proper identification of all inmate(s) before allowing passage. Proper identification consists of:

- a. Verification using picture ID card;
- b. Verification by Shift Supervisor; and
- c. Personal recognition.

2. After properly identifying the inmate, the officer will document his or her ingress/egress using specific unit tracking procedures.

3. Inmate work squads will be paired and physically counted to reflect accuracy of the turnout roster.

B. Turnout times are to be established by unit staff.

- C. When an inmate who has been outside the building enters the back door the officer shall:
1. Properly identify the inmate;
 2. Strip search the inmate;
 3. Ensure no contraband is introduced into the building by the inmate;
 4. Ensure the roster reflects entry into the building; and
 5. Units utilizing more than one Turnout Door shall require inmates to enter through the same door they had exited from earlier (i.e., inmates who exited through the South Turnout Door, must enter via the South Turnout Door, not the North Door). This will not apply to maintenance work squads being carried by Maintenance Supervisors unless they are turning in.

II. Staff and Visitor Traffic

- A. All persons entering or departing through the Turnout Door will produce proper identification before passage is permitted. Proper identification consists of:
1. Texas Department of Criminal Justice - ID card;
 2. Driver's License;
 3. Visitor's Pass; and
 4. Identification by Security Supervisor.

III. Counts

- A. Prior to any formal count, the officer will cease all inmate traffic through the Turnout Door.
- B. The officer will then count the inmates checked out on the roster to determine the number and location of all inmates who are outside the Unit or at the Back Gate.
- C. This count will be called into the supervisor in charge of the count.
- D. Normal turnout operations will not resume until the officer is notified the count is clear.

IV. Shift Changes and Relief

- A. The officer assigned to the Turnout Door will assume responsibility for the count and location of all inmates outside the building. The relieving officer will confirm this information with the officer being relieved. All special and pertinent information will be exchanged at this time.
- B. At the end of each day's operation, the Turnout Door Officer on duty will ensure that the inmate roster used that day is turned into the proper office. The roster serves as documentation of inmate movement through the Turnout Door for that day.

V. Other Duties and Responsibilities

- A. The officer shall be responsible for supervising any inmates assigned to the Turnout Door area.
- B. The Turnout Door Officer shall be responsible for performing any and all additional duties that may be assigned by a ranking officer.

Attachment G

Tools Taken From Tool Room

Count	Description
1	Pliers - Slip Joint
1	Pliers - Needle Nose
1	Ball-Peen Hammer
1	Claw Hammer
1	Vise Grip Pliers
1	10" Channellock Pliers
1	25' Tape measure
1	10 pc. Allen Wrench Set
2	Cordless Drill
2	4" Flat Screwdriver
1	5" Flat Screwdriver
1	3" Flat Screwdriver
1	#2 Phillips Screwdriver
1	#1 Phillips Screwdriver
1	7/16" Hex bit; 1/4" extension F/Hex Bits
ADDITIONS	
2	Manhole Cover Hook
2	6" Crescent Wrench
1	Allen Wrench Set
1	44 pc. Socket Set

Tools Taken From Sensitive Tool Room

Count	Description
2	5" Dyke Cutter Pliers
1	7" Dyke Cutter Pliers
1	7" Klien Cutter Pliers
1	8" Klien Cutter Pliers
2	Hacksaw
2	Striker
1	Utility Knife
1	Bolt Cutter

Tools Recovered

Count	Description
1	Bolt Cutter
2	Hacksaw
1	Utility Knife
2	Small Wire Cutters (5" Dyke Cutters)
1	Side Cutter Pliers (8" Klein Cutters)
2	Strikers
1	Ball-Peen Hammer

Tools Still Missing (Tool & Sensitive Tool Rooms)

Count	Description
1	Pliers - Slip Joint
1	Pliers - Needle Nose
1	Ball-Peen Hammer
1	Claw Hammer
1	Vise Grip Pliers
1	10" Channelock Pliers
1	25' Tape measure
1	10 pc. Allen Wrench Set
2	Cordless Drill
2	4" Flat Screwdriver
1	5" Flat Screwdriver
1	3" Flat Screwdriver
1	#2 Phillips Screwdriver
1	#1 Phillips Screwdriver
1	7/16" Hex bit; 1/4" extension F/Hex Bits
2	Manhole Cover Hook
2	7" Dyke Cutter Pliers
1	7" Klien Cutter Pliers
2	6" Crescent Wrench
1	Allen Wrench Set
1	44 pc. Socket Set

Attachment H

Missing Weapons and Ammunition

Count	Description
1	Remington 870-P Express 12 gauge pump shotgun with 14 rounds of 12 gauge-00 buckshot
1	AR-15 Colt Sport Target Model .223 caliber with 15 rounds of .233 caliber 55 grain bullets
14	.357 Magnum Revolvers, Smith & Wesson Model 67 and approximately 210 rounds of 38 special - 158 +P ammunition

Attachment I

Time Line

- 11:20 Maintenance employees returned their offenders to their housing assignments and went to lunch. Mr. P. Moczygemba remained in the Maintenance Department with 6 offenders.
- 11:30 Mr. P. Moczygemba was subdued by the offenders.
- 11:45 Mr. Camber and Officer Marroquin returned to the Maintenance Department and were subdued by the offenders.
- 12:00 Mr. Segura and Mr. Burgess returned to the Maintenance Department and were subdued by the offenders.
- 12:20 Coach McDowell went to the Maintenance Department, retrieved his tools, and left the area.
- 12:25 Mr. Garza, Mr. Gilley, and Mr. Haun returned to the Maintenance Department and were subdued by the offenders.
- 12:40 Mr. Schmidt escorted two offenders to the Maintenance Department. Mr. Schmidt and the offenders were subdued.
- 12:45 Officer Albert went to the Maintenance Department to get a tool and was subdued by the offenders.
- 1:00 Mr. L. Moczygemba and an offender returned to the Maintenance Department. Mr. L. Moczygemba and the offender were subdued.
- 1:05 Officer Perez calls the Maintenance Department and asks to speak with a supervisor. Officer Perez notified a person who identified himself as "Moczygemba" that it was count time.
- 1:15 Officer Gips received a call from someone in Maintenance that they were going to install monitors in the picket.
- 1:20 Officer Janssen received a call from someone in Maintenance that they were going to install monitors in the backgate gatehouse.
- 1:35 Fire alarms went off in the Maintenance Department. Officer Perez called the Maintenance Department but received no answer.
- 1:40 Two males wearing civilian clothing and two males wearing offender clothing approached the backgate. The individuals were allowed into the sally port area and walked into the gatehouse. Officer Janssen was subdued.

Time Line

- 1:45 A male wearing civilian clothing approached the gate exiting the compound and asked to enter the picket to take measurements. Officer Gips was subdued.
- 1:58 Officer Gips broke loose, returned to the top of the tower and requested assistance over the radio. Officer Gips reported that he saw the white maintenance truck on the perimeter road, going past 19-Building.
- 2:00 While returning to the unit, Officer Olsen saw the white truck in the downtown area of Kenedy.
- 4:00 The maintenance truck was found abandoned behind Wal-Mart in Kenedy, Texas.

Attachment J

Items Taken From The Victims

The following items were taken from the staff members during the offenders' escape:

Maintenance Staff:

- Ronny Haun:** Pants, jacket, steel-toed boots, socks, wallet containing: Security Card, Texas Drivers License, Visa credit card, phone card, TDCJ ID card, work keys (including master key), Timex watch, \$15 - \$20 cash.
- Terry Schmidt:** Black boots, tan baseball cap, watch, keys
- Martin Gilley:** Blue jeans, jacket, brown boots, felt cowboy hat, leather gloves, pocket knife, watch, \$10 - \$20 cash, keys (work & home).
- Manuel Segura:** Blue Jeans, brown boots, camouflage hat, belt, wallet - containing: American Express credit card, Visa credit card, Texaco credit card, Fina credit card, TDCJ ID card, \$3 - \$4 cash.
- Patrick Moczygemba:** Wrangler blue jeans, gray & black flannel shirt, (2) blue TDCJ coats, brown Red Wing boots, sunglasses, camouflage cap, blue ski cap, watch, keys, wallet containing: Diamond Shamrock credit card, Chevron credit card, Texaco credit card, Visa credit card, TDCJ ID card, \$25 - \$30 cash.
- Lester Moczygemba:** TDCJ ID card
- Alan Camber:** Black Wrangler jeans, Ranger belt, brown boots, Gerber pocket knife, keys, wallet containing: TDCJ ID card, hunting license, \$60 cash.
- Mark Garza:** Gold chain with religious medallion, wallet containing: ATM card, Texas Drivers License, Sam's Club membership card, Blockbuster membership card.
- Mark Burgess:** Black sweatshirt, maroon long sleeve shirt, gray sleeveless undershirt, gray canvas coat, Georgia Giant boots, wallet containing: TDCJ ID card, Texas Driver's License, Social Security Card, Visa credit card.

Items Taken From The Victims

Correctional Officers:

Randy Albert: Prescription eyeglasses, Leatherman multi-use tool, watch, keys, leather gloves, \$100 cash.

Alejandro Marroquin: TDCJ uniform pants / shirt, cap, black shoes, jacket, long sleeve gray shirt, belt, G-Shock watch, keys, TDCJ ID card, \$65 cash.

Vernon Janssen: TDCJ uniform pants, boots, wallet



ATTN: JEFF BALDWIN

P.O. Box 99 Huntsville, Texas 77342-0099

quartz committee

Wayne Scott
Executive Director

Gary Johnson
Institutional Division Director

Timothy B. Keith
Senior Warden

Administrative Incident Review
AD-02.15

DRAFT

INCIDENT NUMBER: 00-0770-00-00

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

John R. Connally
December 13, 2000

TO: *Emergency Action Center*

THRU: *Mr. Douglas Drake*
Region IV Director

SUBJECT: **ESCAPE**
Maintenance Department/Backgate/B-Picket

PERSONS
INVOLVED:

MOCZYGEMBA, Patrick	SSN 464-33-1239
<i>(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Asst. Maintenance Mgr.)</i>	
CAMBER, Alan	SSN 458-47-7987
<i>(Maintenance Supervisor IV - HVAC)</i>	
BURGESS, Mark	SSN 460-23-5136
<i>(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Carpenter/Lock Tech)</i>	
SEGURA, Manuel	SSN 458-04-8875
<i>(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Plumber)</i>	
MOCZYGEMBA, Lester	SSN 461-80-5599
<i>(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Boiler Tech)</i>	
HAHN, Ronny	SSN 460-27-0309
<i>(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Lock Tech)</i>	

GARZA, Mark (Maintenance Supervisor IV - General Maintenance)	SSN 465-43-9536
GILLEY, Martin (Maintenance Supervisor IV - Plumber)	SSN 460-90-4749
SCHMIDT, Terry (Maintenance Supervisor IV - Lock Tech)	SSN 467-96-7687
MARROQUIN, Alejandro (Correctional Officer III - Paint Squad)	SSN 452-43-4123
ALBERT, Randy (Correctional Officer III - Field Force)	SSN 460-35-6313
JANSSEN, Vernon (Correctional Officer IV - Back Gate Security Officer)	SSN 457-88-1398
GIPS, Lou (Correctional Officer IV - Radio Picket Security Officer)	SSN 457-52-6732

OFFENDERS INVOLVED:

Escapes:

RIVAS, George	TDCJ-ID #702267
NEWBURY, Donald	TDCJ-ID #824631
HALPRIN, Randy	TDCJ-ID #786259
MURPHY, Patrick	TDCJ-ID #386888
GARCIA, Joseph	TDCJ-ID #774391
HARPER, Larry	TDCJ-ID #861910
RODRIGUEZ, Michael	TDCJ-ID #698074

Victims:

FISHWICK, Richard	TDCJ-ID #604792
MARTINEZ, Ambrocio	TDCJ-ID #648556
COOK, David	TDCJ-ID #435179

SUMMARY:

On Wednesday, December 13, 2000, at approximately 1355 hours, seven offenders escaped the custody of the John B. Connally Jr. Unit in a State vehicle, identified as a White 1994 GMC 1500 1/2 ton pickup, TDCJ identification #52592, license plate number 660-358. The offenders overpowered a total of thirteen employees and three offenders then escaped through the backgate. The offenders are identified as the following:

RIVAS, George #702267; Maintenance Worker, housed in 3C-09T
 NEWBURY, Donald #824631; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-89
 HALPRIN, Randy #786259; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-37
 MURPHY, Patrick #386888; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-43
 GARCIA, Joseph #774391; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-08

The well-planned escape began in maintenance at approximately 11:30 a.m., when the Maintenance Department began its normal lunch hour. Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA, Assistant Maintenance Supervisor was left behind in the Maintenance Department with the aforementioned offenders, on the pretext of having to complete some work and having their own food prepared in an offender style "spread", while the remaining maintenance staff went to eat lunch. Almost immediately, Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was assaulted, by an unknown offender and knocked unconscious momentarily. Upon regaining consciousness, Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was threatened by offender GARCIA with a homemade weapon and stating they were prepared to kill. The weapon was described in the various accounts as a homemade "shank" and/or a sharp pointed object). Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was then tied with his hands behind his back and his pants were taken. After securing his legs, the offenders untied his hands, took his shirt and then re-secured him. A pillowcase was placed over his head and he was taken to the electrical room and laid on the floor.

Officer MARROQUIN and Mr. CAMBER were the second and third victims. Officer MARROQUIN was taken to the floor by offenders RIVAS, HALPRIN, HARPER, and NEWBURY, bound with plastic ties, gagged and taken to the electrical room.

Mr. CAMBER, who had returned to maintenance with Officer MARROQUIN, was attacked from behind by offenders RIVAS and GARCIA. Offender GARCIA threatened to kill Mr. CAMBER with his homemade weapon. Mr. CAMBER was secured with duct tape and twist ties. His black Wrangler jeans and Wolverine work boots were taken and he was then taken to the electrical room. Once in the electrical room, the offenders struck Mr. CAMBER's head into some conduit causing him to lose consciousness. When Mr. CAMBER regained consciousness he had had a gag placed in his mouth and a pillowcase placed over his head. Later, offender RODRIGUEZ wrapped additional duct tape around the hood over Mr. CAMBER's eyes.

Mr. BURGESS was the fourth to fall victim to the offenders' escape plot. Upon his return to maintenance, he was struck in the head from behind while being distracted by offender HALPRIN and knocked into a semi-conscious state. Mr. BURGESS did see offender NEWBURY with a homemade weapon, described as a "shank". He (BURGESS) did suffer a puncture wound to his right arm pit area. Mr. BURGESS was stripped to his shorts by offenders RIVAS and HALPRIN and was bound with plastic ties and duct tape. Mr. BURGESS was then taken to the electrical room and then carried to the electrical room and laid on the floor.

room, offender GARCIA placed his aforementioned homemade weapon in Mr. BURGESS' ear and threatened to kill him by stabbing him in the head.

The fifth victim of the escape plot in maintenance was Mr. SEGURA. When Mr. SEGURA returned to maintenance from his lunch break, he was attacked and taken to the floor by offenders RIVAS and NEWBURY. Mr. SEGURA's hands were then secured behind his back with plastic ties, he was gagged and his legs were bound with duct tape. His boots and state radio (Motorola Model GP-300, serial #174FVA5185; TDCJ #104625) were taken and he was dragged to the electrical room. A pillowcase was placed over his head and offender GARCIA placed his homemade weapon in Mr. SEGURA's ear and threatened to kill him in the same manner as he had with Mr. BURGESS.

The order of the next three victims cannot be precisely determined, however based on their own time estimates it would be as follows: victim #6 R. HAHN, #7 Mr. GARZA, and victim #8 Mr. GILLEY.

Mr. HAHN was attacked by offenders NEWBURY and RIVAS and restrained. His shoes, jeans and jacket were taken and he was secured with plastic ties and duct tape, as well as being gagged. Mr. HAHN was then taken to the electrical room.

Mr. GARZA, after returning to maintenance from lunch, was assaulted by offenders RIVAS, HALPRIN, and HARPER with the aid of a homemade weapon described as "sharp". Mr. GARZA was bound with plastic ties, duct tape and gagged, dragged to the electrical room and a pillowcase placed over his head.

Mr. GILLEY, after being informed by offender MURPHY that Mr. MOCZYGEMBA wanted to see him in the warehouse and going to that location, was assaulted by offenders GARCIA, HALPRIN, NEWBURY, and RODRIGUEZ. Both offenders NEWBURY and GARCIA held sharpened weapons to Mr. GILLEY's head, cutting him by either ear. Mr. GILLEY's pants and shoes were removed and he was bound with nylon tie straps. As with the others, was gagged, a pillowcase placed over his head and he was dragged into the electrical room with the other victims.

Mr. SCHMIDT entered the Maintenance Department with offenders COOK and FISIWICK. After being lured to the warehouse, again on the pretext that Mr. MOCZYGEMBA wanted to speak with him, he was assaulted from behind and a homemade weapon was used to cut his ear. He was bound with plastic ties, duct tape and gagged, dragged to the electrical room with the others.

The next two victims in the plot were in fact the two offenders assigned to work with Mr. SCHMIDT, offenders FISHWICK and COOK. Both offenders were lured back to the warehouse individually with the promise of some food. Offender COOK was struck by offender RIVAS and knocked unconscious, when he was beginning to regain consciousness, offender HARPER was placing duct tape around his feet. Offenders RIVAS and HARPER then threatened to kill offender COOK with the weapons they were holding, described as a "knife" and a "round sharpened rod", respectively. As with the employees, offender COOK was bound - hand and foot, gagged, a pillowcase placed over his head and dragged to the electrical room. Offender FISHWICK was assaulted by offenders MURPHY, NEWBURY and RIVAS and struck with an axe handle in the head. Offender NEWBURY put his homemade weapon to offender FISHWICK's throat and threatened to kill him if he continued to resist. Duct tape was placed across his eyes, he was bound - hand and foot with wire and duct tape and dragged to the electrical room with the other victims. Offender FISHWICK was repeatedly kicked and hit on his left knee during this process.

The tenth victim was Officer R. ALBERT, in charge of the trash crew that day, only went to maintenance to get a "Gator" tractor. He was informed by the offenders in the front that Mr. MOCZYGEMBA was in the warehouse. Seeing him, Officer ALBERT proceeded to the warehouse and was attacked by three offenders who wrestled him to the floor. Officer ALBERT was threatened with a homemade weapon and struck on the head with a metal bar. Officer ALBERT was then bound hand and foot, (his own handcuffs were utilized), gagged, had duct tape placed directly over his eyes and dragged to the electrical room. At this point, offender RODRIGUEZ put a weapon to Officer ALBERT's head and stated what had been stated to other victims before, "just three pounds of pressure and it will go through your head". Officer ALBERT had his keys, his watch, and \$100.00 taken from him.

The eleventh, and final employee victim in maintenance was Mr. L. MOCZYGEMBA. When Mr. MOCZYGEMBA and offender MARTINEZ entered the shop, they saw the maintenance truck parked inside the shop with the rolling garage door down. The truck had earlier in the day been driven into the compound by Mr. HAHN, at the direction of Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA, ostensibly to pick up some supplies from town. Mr. L. MOCZYGEMBA was immediately approached by offender NEWBURY, who displayed his weapon, described as ten to twelve inches in length, 3/4 of an inch wide and sharpened on both sides. Mr. L. MOCZYGEMBA had the weapon placed to his throat and was threatened.

He was then tied and a sheet placed over his head and forced to hop to the electrical room after they took his boots. Mr. MOCZYGEMBA did see offender GARCIA, dressed in blue jeans, black tennis shoes, and a dark shirt or jacket.

Offender MARTINEZ, who had accompanied Mr. MOCZYGEMBA into the Maintenance Department was stabbed in the hand during his assault. He also was tied and taped then placed in the electrical room. In the course of an hour and a half, there were eleven employees and three offenders taken and being held in the electrical room. The approximate time was 1300 to 1310 hours.

It should be noted that another employee, Coach Jerry McDOWELL, went to the Maintenance Department at approximately 1220 hours, spoke with offenders RIVAS, MURPHY, and HALPRIN for approximately five minutes, reportedly with the offenders being the only staff members. While in the maintenance department, the coach was 'invited' back into the shop, but did not go and hurriedly left. It should also be noted that the offenders phoned in their own count pretending to be staff.

For the next stage of the escape plot, the offenders utilized the clothing they had taken from the maintenance staff and maintenance equipment in the area. To prepare their way, the offenders, pretending to be staff, telephoned the backgate and the radio picket informing them that Southwest Area Region Maintenance would be coming out to install some cameras and monitors, as had been done recently in Administrative Segregation.

At approximately 1320 hours, two offenders dressed as civilians and two offenders in prison whites, drove up to the backgate in a "Gator". The offenders carried with them tools, wires, cameras, and monitors continuing their ruse to gain access into the backgate area. Officer GIPS, in the radio picket, believing the two to be with area maintenance, opened the vehicle gate while the two "offenders", proceeded into the walk-through gate. Officer JANSSEN, the backgate officer, then received another telephone call, with the caller asking for the area maintenance man, described as approximately 5'10" and thin. The other "civilian" is described as slightly bigger than the first with what appeared to be long black hair. After speaking on the phone for a few moments the first "civilian" told Officer JANSSEN that the party on the other end of the line wished to speak to him. When Officer JANSSEN took the phone he was assaulted from behind, threatened with a weapon and subsequently handcuffed. The escapees then took his boots and uniform pants, gagged him with duct tape, whipped around the other side of the gate and entered the building into the bathroom, closing the door after him.

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One of the civilian-dressed offenders then bluffed his way out of the backgate area and into the radio picket carrying a box. While Officer GIPS was distracted by another phone call, in which the caller was asking for the area maintenance man, the offender took Officer GIPS' .357 revolver, which was laying on the desk. This offender's description is 6'2", about 230 pounds dark hair, olive complexion. After informing Officer GIPS that this was an escape and threatening to kill him, this offender opened the weapons locker and took out an AR-15 (serial #034152; TDCJ #31326) and a loaded Remington 870 P Express shotgun (serial #B17839 OM; TDCJ #31944). A second offender, dressed in whites with a green jacket, described as white male, tall and slender build then entered the radio picket. Several (14) Smith & Wesson Revolvers were then placed in a box (see attached list for serial numbers) with approximately 700 rounds of ammunition. Officer GIPS was then escorted downstairs.

The civilian-dressed offender had, during the course of this had opened the vehicle gate and allowed the maintenance truck with the three remaining escapees into and through the backgate. Officer GIPS was tied with a belt and one of his shoestrings and then tied to the framework of the picket with another belt. As soon as the radio picket door was closed and locked Officer GIPS was able to free himself. Officer GIPS immediately ran back upstairs and managed to see the maintenance truck going around the outside perimeter road by the dorms. Officer GIPS then called out on the radio a '10-98', offender escape in progress. The reported time was 1355 hours.

Unit staff immediately responded to the backgate. Sergeant R. AVILA and Officer D. ORNELAS discovered Officer JANSSEN in the bathroom. Officer ORNELAS removed the hand restraints, Sergeant AVILA cut off the duct tape and medical staff was called. Officers ORNELAS and SAUCEDA then proceeded to the radio picket and relieved Officer GIPS and an inventory of the missing weapons was immediately initiated by the armory officer, ORNELAS.

Meanwhile, in the electrical room in the Maintenance Department, the employees and offenders were able to free themselves with a pocketknife which was overlooked in Mr. GARZA's pocket. Officer ALBERT, however remained in his handcuffs. The assailant offenders discovered the employees, while they were freeing themselves and attempted to re-enter the electrical room but were held off by the employees and offenders inside. Finally, the escaping offenders secured the door to the electrical room with wire and rigged a phony booby trap before departing in the maintenance truck. It should be noted that the

that the trapped personnel in the maintenance electrical room were able to trip the fire alarm, attempting to alert security staff. The alarm was silenced and reset at approximately 1335 to 1345 hours by the Central Control Officer, A. PEREZ, who was relieving the primary Central Control Officer. Several minutes later it again went off and was again silenced and reset by the Central Control Officer. Officer PEREZ attempted to telephone maintenance, the backgate and radio picket to inquire about the alarm but no one ever answered. It was at this time that Officer GIPS sounded the '10-98'.

Warden GUTERREZ, at this time ordered the Unit to be immediately racked up and a special count initiated. Special count began at 1400 hours and ended at 1550 hours. Building searches were conducted.

Lieutenant J. ALXIER, one of the staff responding to the backgate after the alarm was sounded, heard the fire alarm going off and along with Captain T. SAMANIEGO and additional staff responded to the Maintenance Department. The escaping offenders had placed debris in the door locks throughout; security had to break into the building. What appeared to be a booby trap consisting of two acetylene bottles hooked to an electrical wire was in front of the electrical room. Lieutenant AUXIER climbed up to a vent and found out who was trapped inside and whom the escaping offenders were which was quickly disseminated. Due to there being offenders inside the room with the employees, a five-man team with vests and helmets was assembled. The employees and offenders trapped in the room were instructed to kneel down and the team entered placing all the individuals in hand restraints and escorting them out. After the identity of each person was determined the hand restraints were removed and they were escorted to the Medical Department for immediate treatment for their injuries (see attached SAF-04 Injury Reports) and subsequently taken to Otto Kaiser Memorial Hospital. Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was kept overnight for further observation.

With the escaped offenders identified, staff was immediately dispatched to their housing area and the offender's property was secured. The only cellmate, offender CROSS, John TDCJ #341998 (3C-09B; offender RODRIGUEZ's cellie) was placed in Pre-Hearing Detention (PHD) and his property secured as well. The three offenders who had been trapped with the officers also had their property picked up and two were placed in PHD. Due to offender COOK's injury, he was placed in a hospital cell. All were subsequently interviewed by Internal Affairs Division (IAD) that evening.

Upon the discovery of Officer JANSSEN in the toilet in the backgate the escape plan was fully initiated. State and local law enforcement, as well as neighboring units were notified and their assistance was requested. Kennel teams and additional staff from the following units: Stevenson, Briscoe, Garza East, Garza West, Training Academy, McConnell, Torres, Ramsey, and Darrington responded and were deployed on the roads in the surrounding area on the possibility the escapees were still in the area. Roadblocks of the highways leading out of Kenedy were established by law enforcement officials but to no avail. It has since been learned that the escapees had some sort of outside assistance and at least one vehicle waiting for them.

It should be noted that at approximately 1400 hours, Officer B. OLSON, and Officer W. DOSKO, while returning to the unit with the community work squad in the unit bus, observed the maintenance truck with the escaping offenders heading west on Business 181 in downtown Kenedy. It was not until a minute or so later that Officer OLSON became aware of the significance of the truck and was able to alert the unit about its position and direction of travel. Confusion in the communication led searchers, however to believe the escaping vehicle was further west than it actually was. It was not until 1600 hours, however, that an off duty officer (G. MARTIN, CO III), who resides in an apartment complex next to the local Wal-Mart observed the parked maintenance truck behind Wal-Mart and notified the unit.

With rotating shifts of officers the area deployment continued until the following day, Thursday, December 14, 2000, at 1400 hours, when the immediate area search was called off. The unit lockdown continued through Sunday, December 17, 2000, when it was lifted the following morning.

A Serious Incident Review Board began conducting an investigation on Tuesday, December 19, 2000. At this time the seven escapees remain at large.

EMPLOYEE ACTION/INACTION: Employee inaction/negligence was identified and all appropriate employees will be disciplined according to Agency policy and procedures.

Offender NEWBURY, Donald, TDCJ-ID #824631, is a 38 year old White male serving a LIFE sentence for Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon out of Travis County. His sentence began on August 19, 1997, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is May 15, 1998. Offender NEWBURY was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender HARPER, Larry, TDCJ-ID #861910, is a 37 year old White male serving a 50 year sentence for Aggravated Assault, Aggravated Sexual Assault out of El Paso County. His sentence began on April 02, 1994, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is March 29, 1999. Offender HARPER was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender HALPRIN, Randy, TDCJ-ID #786259, is a 23 year old White male, serving a 30 year sentence for Injury to a Child out of Tarrant County. His sentence began on September 04, 1996, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is May 30, 1997. Offender HALPRIN was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender RIVAS, George, TDCJ-ID #702267, is a 30 year old Hispanic male serving a LIFE sentence for Aggravated Kidnapping out of El Paso County. His sentence began on September 22, 1991, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is April 20, 1995. Offender RIVAS was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum custody.

Offender RODRIGUEZ, Michael, TDCJ-ID #698074, is a 38 year old Hispanic male serving a LIFE sentence for Capital Murder out of Bexar County. His sentence began on January 30, 1995, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is March 16, 1995. Offender RODRIGUEZ was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender GARCIA, Joseph, TDCJ-ID #774391, is a 29 year old Hispanic male serving a 50 year sentence for Murder with a Deadly Weapon out of Bexar County. His sentence began on February 07, 1996, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is February 10, 1997. Offender GARCIA was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender FISHWICK, Richard, TDCJ-ID #604792, is a 46 year old White male serving a 30 year sentence for Possession of a Controlled Substance out of Aransas County. His sentence began on June 01, 1991, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is January 09, 1992. Offender FISHWICK is currently assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender MARTINEZ, Ambrocio, TDCJ-ID #648556, is a 39 year old Hispanic male serving a 30 year sentence for Aggravated Robbery/Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon out of Bell County. His sentence began on December 18, 1992, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is September 23, 1993. Offender MARTINEZ is currently assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender COOK, David, TDCJ-ID #435179, is a 36 year old White male serving a LIFE sentence for Murder out of Harris County. His sentence began on July 04, 1986, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is October 28, 1986. Offender COOK is currently assigned to Minimum Custody.

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TYPE OF INCIDENT <u>Escape</u>		UNIT CODE <u>CY</u>	DATE / TIME REPORTED <u>12-13-00 14:58</u>		REPORTED BY <u>Janie Cockrell</u>
DATE / TIME OCCURED <u>12-13-00 13:55</u>	SPECIFIC LOCATION <u>MI Backgate</u>	AS	AG	GANG RELATED YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	GANG IDENTIFICATION <u>N/A</u>
MOTIVE:					

SHIFT: _____ EMPLOYEE INFO.

NAME _____ SSN _____ RANK _____ RACE _____ SEX _____ AGE _____
(last name / first name / MI)

DISPOSITION: Seven (7) MI custody offenders successfully escaped from the unit Backgate in a state truck. A manhunt is in progress utilizing all Region IV resources.

INMATE INFO.

NAME	TDCJ #	RACE SEX	AGE	CUSTODY CODE	INJURIES	A-V
Newbury, Donald	824631	W/M	38	MI	Unknown	N/A
Rivas, George	702267	H/M	30	MI	Unknown	N/A
Harper, Larry	861910	W/M	37	MI	Unknown	N/A
Garcia, Joseph	774391	H/M	29	MI	Unknown	N/A
Murphy, Patrick	386888	W/M	39	MI	Unknown	N/A
Halprin, Randy	786259	W/M	23	MI	Unknown	N/A
Rodriguez, Michael	698074	H/M	38	MI	Unknown	N/A

WEAPON INFO.

WEAPON: DESCRIBE IN DETAIL: (TYPE) Unknown - Staff states sharpened metal rods were used by offenders to threaten them - these weapons were not recovered

CUSTODY CODE N/A **DEATH INFO.**

NAME OF INMATE N/A TDCJ# N/A UNIT N/A
(last name / first name / MI)

RACE N/A SEX N/A AGE N/A DIED AT OR IN ROUTE TO N/A

CAUSE OF DEATH N/A WHO DECLARED DEATH N/A

DISPOSITION OF BODY N/A AUTOPSY N/A YES N/A NO N/A

NEXT OF KIN NTFD YES NO BY: _____

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

THIS / DATE NOTIFIED _____

WILL RESPOND _____ YES _____ NO-NAME OF INVESTIGATOR _____

AGENCY CASE # _____ REMARKS _____

AUTHOR: CYUNT39 - DANIELS, BILL

SUBJECT: I-14032-12-00

ON 12-13-00 AT APPROXIMATELY 1255 HOURS, OFFICER L. CIPE, CO111, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 457-52-6732, THE B TOWER RADIO PICKET OFFICER, RADIOED A DISTRESS CALL THAT SEVERAL INMATES WERE ESCAPING IN A STATE VEHICLE THROUGH THE BACKGATE. STAFF IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO THE SCENE AND FOUND THE BACKGATE OFFICER, V. JANSSEN, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 457-88-1398, BOUND WITH DUCT TAPE.

THE UNIT WAS IMMEDIATELY LOCKED DOWN AND A SPECIAL COUNT INITIATED. THE EMERGENCY/ESCAPE PLAN WAS PUT INTO EFFECT.

IT WAS SHORTLY DISCOVERED THAT A GROUP OF SEVEN INMATES IN THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT HAD ASSAULTED AND OVERPOWERED NINE MAINTENANCE STAFF, TWO SECURITY OFFICERS AND THREE INMATES, BOUNDING THEM AND SECURING THEM IN A BACK ROOM IN THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT. FOUR INMATES, TWO DRESSED IN FREE WORLD CLOTHES ESCORTING TWO INMATES DRESSED IN WHITES, THEN PROCEEDED TO THE BACKGATE CARRYING TOOLS, WIRES, CAMERAS AND MONITORS USING THE ROSE THAT THEY WERE SOUTHWEST AREA MAINTENANCE THERE TO INSTALL THE EQUIPMENT. AFTER GAINING ACCESS TO THE BACKGATE OFFICER, OFFICER JANSSEN WAS ASSAULTED AND SUBDUED, SUFFERING A POSSIBLE FRACTURED RIGHT THUMB AND SWELLING TO THE WRISTS. OFFICER CIPE THEN OPENED THE DOOR OF THE RADIO-PICKET TO ALLOW THE WORKERS INSIDE. (HE HAD BEEN CALLED EARLIER FROM THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT INFORMING HIM THAT THE EQUIPMENT WAS TO BE INSTALLED) HE WAS SUBDUED, SUSTAINING NO INJURIES. ONCE INSIDE B TOWER, WHICH ALSO SERVES AS A SUB-ARMORY, THE INMATES SHOWED ONE (1) AR-15 RIFLE WITH 15 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION, A 12 GAUGE SHOTGUN WITH 19 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION, AND 14 SMITH AND WESSON .357 REVOLVERS AND APPROXIMATELY 200 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION.

THE THREE REMAINING INMATES IN THE ESCAPE CONSPIRACY THEN DROVE THE STATE MAINTENANCE PICK-UP TRUCK TO THE BACKGATE, PICKED UP THE FOUR INMATES ALREADY THERE AND DROVE AWAY FROM THE UNIT.

OFFICER CIPE MANAGED TO FREE HIMSELF WITHIN MINUTES AND RAISED THE ALARM. THE SEVEN INMATES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS:

- 1) NEWBERRY, DONALD #924631 WHITE MALE 6' - 179 LBS - AGE 38 19Y-89
- 2) HALPRIN, RANDY #786259 WHITE MALE 5' - 197 LBS - AGE 23 19Y-37
- 3) MURPHY, PATRICK #386888 WHITE MALE 5'7 143 LBS - AGE 35 19Y-43
- 4) GARCIA, JOSEPH #774391 HISP. MALE 5'11 198 LBS - AGE 29 19Y-06
- 5) HARPER, LARRY #561910 WHITE MALE 5'11 165 LBS - AGE 37

FEB 08 2001 11:06 FR SENATOR MIKE MONCRIEF 512 4753745 TO 99362169
INVENTORIED, THOROUGHLY EXAMINED BY SECURITY STAFF FOR ANY POTENTIAL
CLUES AS TO THE INMATES PLANS OR DESTINATION. ALL PERTINANT INFORMATION
AND CORRESPONDANCE WAS RELINQUISHED TO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT,
STAFF RESPONDED TO THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT THE ELEVEN EMPLOYEES AND
THREE INMATES TRAPPED IN THE SACK ROCK. AREA MAINTENANCE HAD TO BE
CALLED IN, IN ORDER FOR THEM TO BE FIRED. ALL EMPLOYEES AND THE THREE
INMATES WERE FOUND TO HAVE SUFFERED INJURIES AS A RESULT OF THE ASSAULT
BY THE ESCAPEES; ONLY ONE REQUIRING (VERNIGHT HOSPITALIZATION. MEDICAL
STAFF WAS PRESENT AT THE SCENE. THE EMPLOYEES WHO HAD BEEN ASSAULTED
AND LOCKED IN THE STORE ROOM ARE:

P.15/18

- 1) BURGESS, MARK SSN# 460-23-5136 LUNCTURE WOUND TO LEFT UPPER CHEST,
ABRASION TO LEFT AND RIGHT WRISTS
- 2) NCCZYGENBA, PATRICK SSN# 464-33-239 MULTIPLE CONTUSIONS TO
FOPEHEAD CONTUSIONS TO BOTH
EARS, NOSE AND LACERATION TO
LEFT EAR
- 3) NCCZYGENBA, LESTEE SSN# 461-60-5:55 LACERATION LEFT FOREARM,
CONTUSIONS TO HEAD, LEFT
WRIST BRUISED
- 4) GILLEY, MARTIN SSN# 460-90-4749 LACERATION BEHIND LEFT EAR,
ABRASION TO LEFT HAND, LACERATION
TO RT EAR
- 5) ALBERT, BANDY SSN# 460-35-6313 POSSIBLE FRACTURED NOSE, SWOLLEN LEFT
AND RIGHT WRISTS, CONTUSION TO
HEAD
- 6) MABROQUIN, ALEJANDRO SSN# 452-43-4123 SCRAPED WRISTS, POSSIBLE
FRACTURED RT THUMB, POSSIBLE
NOSE FRACTURE, CONTUSIONS TO
BOTH EYES
- 7) HARR, RONNY SSN# 460-27-0305 CONTUSIONS TO FACE, ABRASION RT ARM
- 8) SECURA, MANUEL SSN# 458-04-8875 NUME HANDS
- 9) SCHMIDT, TERRY SSN# 467-96-7667 1" SCRATCH TO LEFT HAND, PAIN TO
FACE AND BACK
- 10) CAMBER, ALLEN SSN# 458-47-7907 SUPERFICIAL LACERATION TO LEFT AND
RIGHT WRISTS, ABRASION RIGHT ELBOW
TOP OF HEAD AND RIGHT EYE AREA
- 11) CARZA, MARK SSN# 455-43-9536 LEFT WRIST SWOLLEN

THE INMATES WHO WERE ASSAULTED AND LOCKED IN THE STORE ROOM ARE:

3) MARTINEZ, ANGELOSIO #648556 HISP. MALE - 2 LACERATIONS TO RIGHT
WRISTS REQUIRING SUTURES

THESE THREE INMATES WERE PLACED IN P.F.D TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF
THE INVESTIGATION.

ALL AFFECTED EMPLOYEES AND INMATES WERE INTERVIEWED BY INTERNAL
AFFAIRS. ALL RECEIVED POST TRAUMA SUPPORT FROM UNIT AND REGION USSO
STAFF.

THE ESCAPE PLAN WAS FULLY INITIATED AND ALL APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES
WERE NOTIFIED. UNIT KENNEL TEAMS, STAFF AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WERE
DEPLOYED IN THE KENNEDY/KARNES CITY AREA WITH AREA/UNITS PROVIDING
VALUED MANPOWER ASSISTANCE.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1630 HOURS THE UNIT MAINTENANCE TRUCK WAS FOUND
PARKED BEHIND THE LOCAL WAL-MART AND A SIGHTING OF THREE INMATES ON THE
GROUND IN THE AREA WAS REPORTED. A PERIMETER HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND
THE SEARCH IS ON GOING AT THIS TIME.

THE EMERGENCY ACTION CENTER HAD BEEN NOTIFIED AND INCIDENT #
I-14032-12-00 WAS ISSUED.

MORE INFORMATION TO FOLLOW AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

AUTHORITY: CAPT. T.S. HINCLE
JOHN B. CONNALLY UNIT

Sent to: ADSEGEAC

<list>

(cc)



P.O. Box 69 Huntsville, Texas 77342-0099

Wayne Scott
Executive Director

Gary Johnson
Institutional Division Director

Timothy B. Keith
Senior Warden

Administrative Incident Review
AD-02.15

INCIDENT NUMBER: 1-14032-12-00

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
John B. Connally Unit
December 13, 2000

TO: *Emergency Action Center*

THRU: *Douglas Dreike*
Region IV Director

SUBJECT: **INSTITUTIONAL LOCKDOWN LIFTED**
Connally Unit

PERSONS INVOLVED: John B. Connally Jr. Staff

OFFENDERS INVOLVED: Sec Attached

SUMMARY: On December 13, 2000 at approximately 1355 hours, the John B. Connally Unit was placed on Lockdown due to a escape that occurred just minutes prior. A total of 2,806 offenders were affected by the Institutional Lockdown.

The Emergency Action Center was established at 1355 hours on December 13, 2000. All other authorities were notified including Mr. Dreike, Region IV Director.



TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE


P.O. Box 99 Huntsville, Texas 77342-0099

Wayne Scott
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Gary Johnson
Institutional Division Director


Timothy B. Keith
Senior Warden

Administrative Incident Review
AD-02.15



INCIDENT NUMBER: I-14032-12-00


TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
John B. Connally Unit
December 13, 2000



TO: *Emergency Action Center*

THRU: *Mr. Douglas Dretke
Region IV Director*

SUBJECT: **ESCAPE**
Maintenance Department/Backgate/B-Picket



PERSONS INVOLVED:

- MOCZYGEMBA, Patrick SSN 464-33-1239
(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Asst. Maintenance Mgr.)
- CAMBER, Alan SSN 458-47-7987
(Maintenance Supervisor IV - HVAC)
- BURGESS, Mark SSN 460-23-5136
(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Carpenter/Lock Tech)
- SEGURA, Manuel SSN 458-04-8875
(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Plumber)
- MOCZYGEMBA, Lester SSN 461-80-5599
(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Boiler Tech)
- HAHN, Ronny SSN 460-27-0309
(Maintenance Supervisor IV - Lock Tech)

Incident #I-14032-12-00

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GARZA, Mark (Maintenance Supervisor IV - General Maintenance)	SSN 465-43-9536
GILLEY, Martin (Maintenance Supervisor IV - Plumber)	SSN 460-90-4749
SCHMIDT, Terry (Maintenance Supervisor IV - Lock Tech)	SSN 467-96-7687
MARROQUIN, Alejandro (Correctional Officer III - Paint Squad)	SSN 452-43-4123
ALBERT, Randy (Correctional Officer III - Field Force)	SSN 460-35-6313
JANSSEN, Vernon (Correctional Officer IV - Back Gate Security Officer)	SSN 457-88-1398
GIPS, Lou (Correctional Officer IV - Radio Picket Security Officer)	SSN 457-52-6732

**OFFENDERS
INVOLVED:**

Escapes:

RIVAS, George	TDCJ-ID #702267
NEWBURY, Donald	TDCJ-ID #824631
HALPRIN, Randy	TDCJ-ID #786259
MURPHY, Patrick	TDCJ-ID #386888
GARCIA, Joseph	TDCJ-ID #774391
HARPER, Larry	TDCJ-ID #861910
RODRIGUEZ, Michael	TDCJ-ID #698074

Victims:

FISHWICK, Richard	TDCJ-ID #604792
MARTINEZ, Ambrocio	TDCJ-ID #648556
COOK, David	TDCJ-ID #435179

SUMMARY:

On Wednesday, December 13, 2000, at approximately 1355 hours, seven offenders escaped the custody of the John B. Connally Jr. Unit in a State vehicle, identified as a White 1994 GMC 1500 ½ ton pickup, TDCJ identification #52592, license plate number 660-358. The offenders overpowered a total of thirteen employees and three offenders then escaped through the backgate. The offenders are identified as the following:

RIVAS, George #702267; Maintenance Worker, housed in 3C-09T
 NEWBURY, Donald #824631; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-89
 HALPRIN, Randy #786259; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-37
 MURPHY, Patrick #386888; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-43
 GARCIA, Joseph #774391; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-08
 HARPER, Larry #861910; Maintenance Worker, housed in 19Y-105
 RODRIGUEZ, Michael #698074; Inside Yard Squad, housed in 3C-13B.

The well-planned escape began in maintenance at approximately 11:30 a.m., when the Maintenance Department began its normal lunch hour. Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA, Assistant Maintenance Supervisor was left behind in the Maintenance Department with the aforementioned offenders, on the pretext of having to complete some work and having their own food prepared in an offender style "spread", while the remaining maintenance staff went to eat lunch. Almost immediately, Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was assaulted, by an unknown offender and knocked unconscious momentarily. Upon regaining consciousness, Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was threatened by offender GARCIA with a homemade weapon and stating they were prepared to kill. The weapon was described in the various accounts as a homemade "shank" and/or a sharp pointed object). Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was then tied with his hands behind his back and his pants were taken. After securing his legs, the offenders untied his hands, took his shirt and then re-secured him. A pillowcase was placed over his head and he was taken to the electrical room and laid on the floor.

Officer MARROQUIN and Mr. CAMBER were the second and third victims. Officer MARROQUIN was taken to the floor by offenders RIVAS, HALPRIN, HARPER, and NEWBURY, bound with plastic ties, gagged and taken to the electrical room.

Mr. CAMBER, who had returned to maintenance with Officer MARROQUIN, was attacked from behind by offenders RIVAS and GARCIA. Offender GARCIA threatened to kill Mr. CAMBER with his homemade weapon. Mr. CAMBER was secured with duct tape and twist ties. His black Wrangler jeans and Wolverine work boots were taken and he was then taken to the electrical room. Once in the electrical room, the offenders struck Mr. CAMBER's head into some conduit causing him to lose consciousness. When Mr. CAMBER regained consciousness he had had a gag placed in his mouth and a pillowcase placed over his head. Later, offender RODRIGUEZ wrapped additional duct tape around the hood over Mr. CAMBER's eyes.

Mr. BURGESS was the fourth to fall victim to the offenders' escape plot. Upon his return to maintenance, he was struck in the head from behind while being distracted by offender HALPRIN and knocked into a semi-conscious state. Mr. BURGESS did see offender NEWBURY with a homemade weapon, described as a "shank". He (BURGESS) did suffer a puncture wound to his right arm pit area. Mr. BURGESS was stripped to his shorts by offenders RIVAS and HALPRIN and was bound with plastic ties and duct tape. Mr. BURGESS also was gagged and blindfolded with duct tape, and then carried to the electrical room. Once in the electrical

room, offender GARCIA placed his aforementioned homemade weapon in Mr. BURGESS' ear and threatened to kill him by stabbing him in the head.

The fifth victim of the escape plot in maintenance was Mr. SEGURA. When Mr. SEGURA returned to maintenance from his lunch break, he was attacked and taken to the floor by offenders RIVAS and NEWBURY. Mr. SEGURA's hands were then secured behind his back with plastic ties; he was gagged and his legs were bound with duct tape. His boots and state radio (Motorola Model GP-300, serial #174FVA5185; TDCJ #104625) were taken and he was dragged to the electrical room. A pillowcase was placed over his head and offender GARCIA placed his homemade weapon in Mr. SEGURA's ear and threatened to kill him in the same manner as he had with Mr. BURGESS.

The order of the next three victims cannot be precisely determined, however based on their own time estimates it would be as follows: victim #6 R. HAHN, #7 Mr. GARZA, and victim #8 Mr. GILLEY.

Mr. HAHN was attacked by offenders NEWBURY and RIVAS and restrained. His shoes, jeans and jacket were taken and he was secured with plastic ties and duct tape, as well as being gagged. Mr. HAHN was then taken to the electrical room.

Mr. GARZA, after returning to maintenance from lunch, was assaulted by offenders RIVAS, HALPRIN, and HARPER with the aid of a homemade weapon described as "sharp". Mr. GARZA was bound with plastic ties, duct tape and gagged, dragged to the electrical room and a pillowcase placed over his head.

Mr. GILLEY, after being informed by offender MURPHY that Mr. MOCZYGEMBA wanted to see him in the warehouse and going to that location, was assaulted by offenders GARCIA, HALPRIN, NEWBURY, and RODRIGUEZ. Both offenders NEWBURY and GARCIA held sharpened weapons to Mr. GILLEY's head, cutting him by either ear. Mr. GILLEY's pants and shoes were removed and he was bound with nylon tie straps. As with the others, was gagged, a pillowcase placed over his head and he was dragged into the electrical room with the other victims.

Mr. SCHMIDT entered the Maintenance Department with offenders COOK and FISHWICK. After being lured to the warehouse, again on the pretext that Mr. MOCZYGEMBA wanted to speak with him, he was assaulted from behind and a homemade weapon, a "shank", was held to his head. Mr. SCHMIDT had his watch, shoes and keys taken, he was bound hand and feet with plastic straps, gagged, a hood placed over his head, and dragged into the electrical room with the others.



The next two victims in the plot were in fact the two offenders assigned to work with Mr. SCHMIDT, offenders FISHWICK and COOK. Both offenders were lured back to the warehouse individually with the promise of some food. Offender COOK was struck by offender RIVAS and knocked unconscious, when he was beginning to remain consciousness, offender HARPER was placing duct tape around his feet. Offenders RIVAS and HALPRIN then threatened to kill offender COOK with the weapons they were holding, described as a "knife" and a "round sharpened rod", respectively. As with the employees, offender COOK was bound - hand and foot, gagged, a pillowcase placed over his head and dragged to the electrical room. Offender FISHWICK was assaulted by offenders MURPHY, NEWBURY and RIVAS and struck with an axe handle in the head. Offender NEWBURY put his homemade weapon to offender FISHWICK's throat and threatened to kill him if he continued to resist. Duct tape was placed across his eyes, he was bound - hand and foot with wire and duct tape and dragged to the electrical room with the other victims. Offender FISHWICK was repeatedly kicked and hit on his left knee during this process.

The tenth victim was Officer R. ALBERT, in charge of the trash crew that day, only went to maintenance to get a "Gator" tractor. He was informed by the offenders in the front that Mr. MOCZYGEMBA was in the warehouse. Seeking him, Officer ALBERT proceeded to the warehouse and was attacked by three offenders who wrestled him to the floor. Officer ALBERT was threatened with a homemade weapon and struck on the head with a metal bar. Officer ALBERT was then bound hand and foot, (his own handcuffs were utilized), gagged, had duct tape placed directly over his eyes and dragged to the electrical room. At this point, offender RODRIGUEZ put a weapon to Officer ALBERT's head and stated what had been stated to other victims before, "just three pounds of pressure and it will go through your head". Officer ALBERT had his keys, his watch, and \$100.00 taken from him.

The eleventh, and final employee victim in maintenance was Mr. L. MOCZYGEMBA. When Mr. MOCZYGEMBA and offender MARTINEZ entered the shop, they saw the maintenance truck parked inside the shop with the rolling garage door down. The truck had earlier in the day been driven into the compound by Mr. HAHN, at the direction of Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA, ostensibly to pick up some supplies from town. Mr. L. MOCZYGEMBA was immediately approached by offender NEWBURY, who displayed his weapon, described as ten to twelve inches in length, 3/4 of an inch wide and sharpened on both sides. Mr. L. MOCZYGEMBA had the weapon placed to his throat and was threatened.

He was then tied and a sheet placed over his head and forced to hop to the electrical room after they took his boots. Mr. MOCZYGEMBA did see offender GARCIA dressed in blue jeans, black tennis shoes, and a dark shirt or jacket.

Offender MARTINEZ, who had accompanied Mr. MOCZYGEMBA into the Maintenance Department was stabbed in the hand during his assault. He also was tied and taped then placed in the electrical room. In the course of an hour and a half, there were eleven employees and three offenders taken and being held in the electrical room. The approximate time was 1300 to 1310 hours.

It should be noted that another employee, Coach Jerry McDOWELL, went to the Maintenance Department at approximately 1220 hours, spoke with offenders RIVAS, MURPHY, and HALPRIN for approximately five minutes, reportedly checked out some tools, and never saw any staff members. While in the maintenance department, the coach was 'invited' back into the shop, but did not go and hurriedly left. It should also be noted that the offenders phoned in their own count pretending to be staff.

For the next stage of the escape plot, the offenders utilized the clothing they had taken from the maintenance staff and maintenance equipment in the area. To prepare their way, the offenders, pretending to be staff, telephoned the backgate and the radio picket informing them that Southwest Area Region Maintenance would be coming out to install some cameras and monitors, as had been done recently in Administrative Segregation.

At approximately 1320 hours, two offenders dressed as civilians and two offenders in prison whites, drove up to the backgate in a "Gator". The offenders carried with them tools, wires, cameras, and monitors continuing their ruse to gain access into the backgate area. Officer GIPS, in the radio picket, believing the two to be with area maintenance, opened the vehicle gate while the two "offenders", proceeded into the walk-through gate. Officer JANSSEN, the backgate officer, then received another telephone call, with the caller asking for the area maintenance man, described as approximately 5'10" and thin. The other "civilian" is described as slightly bigger than the first with what appeared to be long black hair. After speaking on the phone for a few moments the first "civilian" told Officer JANSSEN that the party on the other end of the line wished to speak to him. When Officer JANSSEN took the phone he was assaulted from behind, threatened with a weapon and subsequently handcuffed. The escapees then took his boots and uniform pants, gagged him with duct tape, wrapped around his head covering his mouth and dragged him into the bathroom, closing the door after him.

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One of the civilian-dressed offenders then bluffed his way out of the backgate area and into the radio picket carrying a box. While Officer GIPS was distracted by another phone call, in which the caller was asking for the area maintenance man, the offender took Officer GIPS' .357 revolver, which was laying on the desk. This offender's description is 6'2", about 230 pounds dark hair, olive complexion. After informing Officer GIPS that this was an escape and threatening to kill him, this offender opened the weapons locker and took out an AR-15 (serial #034152; TDCJ #31326) and a loaded Remington 870 P Express shotgun (serial #B17839 OM; TDCJ #31944). A second offender, dressed in whites with a green jacket, described as white male, tall and slender build then entered the radio picket. Several (14) Smith & Wesson Revolvers were then placed in a box (see attached list for serial numbers) with approximately 200 rounds of ammunition. Officer GIPS was then escorted downstairs.

The civilian-dressed offender had, during the course of this had opened the vehicle gate and allowed the maintenance truck with the three remaining escapees into and through the backgate. Officer GIPS was tied with a belt and one of his shoestrings and then tied to the framework of the picket with another belt. As soon as the radio picket door was closed and locked Officer GIPS was able to free himself. Officer GIPS immediately ran back upstairs and managed to see the maintenance truck going around the outside perimeter road by the dorms. Officer GIPS then called out on the radio a '10-98', offender escape in progress. The reported time was 1355 hours.

Unit staff immediately responded to the backgate. Sergeant R. AVILA and Officer D. ORNELAS discovered Officer JANSSEN in the bathroom. Officer ORNELAS removed the hand restraints, Sergeant AVILA cut off the duct tape and medical staff was called. Officers ORNELAS and SAUCEDA then proceeded to the radio picket and relieved Officer GIPS and an inventory of the missing weapons was immediately initiated by the armory officer, ORNELAS.

Meanwhile, in the electrical room in the Maintenance Department, the employees and offenders were able to free themselves with a pocketknife which was overlooked in Mr. GARZA's pocket. Officer ALBERT, however remained in his handcuffs. The assailant offenders discovered the employees, while they were freeing themselves and attempted to re-enter the electrical room but were held off by the employees and offenders inside. Finally, the escaping offenders secured the door to the electrical room with wire and rigged a phony booby trap before departing in the maintenance truck. It should be noted at this time

that the trapped personnel in the maintenance electrical room were able to trip the fire alarm, attempting to alert security staff. The alarm was silenced and reset at approximately 1335 to 1345 hours by the Central Control Officer, A. PEREZ, who was relieving the primary Central Control Officer. Several minutes later it again went off and was again silenced and reset by the Central Control Officer. Officer PEREZ attempted to telephone maintenance, the backgate and radio picket to inquire about the alarm but no one ever answered. It was at this time that Officer GIPS sounded the '10-98'.

Warden GUTERREZ, at this time ordered the Unit to be immediately racked up and a special count initiated. Special count began at 1425 hours and ended at 1550 hours. Building searches were conducted.

Lieutenant J. AUXIER, one of the staff responding to the backgate after the alarm was sounded, heard the fire alarm going off and along with Captain T. SAMANIEGO and additional staff responded to the Maintenance Department. The escaping offenders had placed debris in the door locks throughout; security had to break into the building. What appeared to be a booby trap consisting of two acetylene bottles hooked to an electrical wire was in front of the electrical room. Lieutenant AUXIER climbed up to a vent and found out who was trapped inside and whom the escaping offenders were which was quickly disseminated. Due to there being offenders inside the room with the employees, a five-man team with vests and helmets was assembled. The employees and offenders trapped in the room were instructed to kneel down and the team entered placing all the individuals in hand restraints and escorting them out. After the identity of each person was determined the hand restraints were removed and they were escorted to the Medical Department for immediate treatment for their injuries (see attached SAF-04 Injury Reports) and subsequently taken to Otto Kaiser Memorial Hospital. Mr. P. MOCZYGEMBA was kept overnight for further observation.

With the escapee offenders identified, staff was immediately dispatched to their housing area and the offender's property was secured. The only cellmate, offender CROSS, John TDCJ #341998 (3C-09B; offender RODRIGUEZ's cellie) was placed in Pre-Hearing Detention (PHD) and his property secured as well. The three offenders who had been trapped with the officers also had their property picked up and two were placed in PHD. Due to offender COOK's injury, he was placed in a hospital cell. All were subsequently interviewed by Internal Affairs Division (IAD) that evening.

Upon the discovery of Officer JANSSEN in the toilet in the backgate the escape plan was fully initiated. State and local law enforcement, as well as neighboring units were notified and their assistance was requested. Kennel teams and additional staff from the following units: Stevenson, Briscoe, Garza East, Garza West, Training Academy, McConnell, Torres, Ramsey, and Darrington responded and were deployed on the roads in the surrounding area on the possibility the escapees were still in the area. Roadblocks of the highways leading out of Kenedy were established by law enforcement officials but to no avail. It has since been learned that the escapees had some sort of outside assistance and at least one vehicle waiting for them.

It should be noted that at approximately 1400 hours, Officer B. OLSON and Officer W. YOSKO, while returning to the unit with the community work squad in the unit bus, observed the maintenance truck with the escaping offenders heading west on Business 181 in downtown Kenedy. It was not until a minute or so later that Officer OLSON became aware of the significance of the truck and was able to alert the unit about its position and direction of travel. Confusion in the communication led searchers, however to believe the escaping vehicle was further west than it actually was. It was not until 1600 hours, however, that an off duty officer (G. MARTIN, CO III), who resides in an apartment complex next to the local Wal-Mart observed the parked maintenance truck behind Wal-Mart and notified the unit.

With rotating shifts of officers the area deployment continued until the following day, Thursday, December 14, 2000, at 1400 hours, when the immediate area search was called off. The unit lockdown continued through Sunday, December 17, 2000, when it was lifted the following morning.

A Serious Incident Review Board began conducting an investigation on Tuesday, December 19, 2000. At this time the seven escapees remain at large.

EMPLOYEE ACTION/INACTION: Employee inaction/negligence was identified and all appropriate employees will be disciplined according to Agency policy and procedures.

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ATTACHMENTS: TNG-93, Incident Report
Copy of E-Mail Message
Time Line
Participant Statements
WANTED Posters of Escaped Offenders

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW:

Warden's Comments:

Upon completion of the serious incident review any findings/recommendations will be addressed and corrective actions taken.



Timothy B. Keith, Senior Warden

12/27/00

Date

Regional Director's Comments:

see attached



Douglas Dretke, Region IV Director

1/16/01

Date

OFFENDERS INVOLVED:

Offender MURPHY, Patrick, TDCJ-ID #386888, is a 39 year old White male serving a 50 year sentence for Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon, Burglary of a Building out of Dallas County. His sentence began on March 22, 1984, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is November 27, 1984. Offender MURPHY was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum custody.

An in-depth written account and critical assessment of the incident was performed/conducted by Mr. Gary Gomez, Region III Director "Serious Incident Review Chairman".

The Region IV Directors Office will provide a 90 day review and follow-up into the implementation of the recommendations identified in that report.



Douglas J. Dretke
Region IV Director

1/16/01

Date

Offender NEWBURY, Donald, TDCJ-ID #824631, is a 38 year old White male serving a LIFE sentence for Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon out of Travis County. His sentence began on August 19, 1997, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is May 15, 1998. Offender NEWBURY was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender HARPER, Larry, TDCJ-ID #861910, is a 37 year old White male serving a 50 year sentence for Aggravated Assault, Aggravated Sexual Assault out of El Paso County. His sentence began on April 02, 1994, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is March 09, 1999. Offender HARPER was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender HALPRIN, Randy, TDCJ-ID #786259, is a 23 year old White male serving a 30 year sentence for Injury to a Child out of Tarrant County. His sentence began on September 04, 1996, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is May 30, 1997. Offender HALPRIN was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender RIVAS, George, TDCJ-ID #702267, is a 30 year old Hispanic male serving a LIFE sentence for Aggravated Kidnapping out of El Paso County. His sentence began on September 22, 1991, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is April 20, 1995. Offender RIVAS was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum custody.

Offender RODRIGUEZ, Michael, TDCJ-ID #698074, is a 38 year old Hispanic male serving a LIFE sentence for Capital Murder out of Bexar County. His sentence began on January 30, 1995, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is March 16, 1995. Offender RODRIGUEZ was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender GARCIA, Joseph, TDCJ-ID #774391, is a 29 year old Hispanic male serving a 50 year sentence for Murder with a Deadly Weapon out of Bexar County. His sentence began on February 07, 1996, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is February 10, 1997. Offender GARCIA was, at the time of the incident, assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender FISHWICK, Richard, TDCJ-ID #604792, is a 46 year old White male serving a 30 year sentence for Possession of a Controlled Substance out of Aransas County. His sentence began on June 01, 1991, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is January 09, 1992. Offender FISHWICK is currently assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender MARTINEZ, Ambrocio, TDCJ-ID #648556, is a 39 year old Hispanic male serving a 30 year sentence for Aggravated Robbery/Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon out of Bell County. His sentence began on December 18, 1992, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is September 23, 1993. Offender MARTINEZ is currently assigned to Minimum Custody.

Offender COOK, David, TDCJ-ID #435179, is a 36 year old White male serving a LIFE sentence for Murder out of Harris County. His sentence began on July 04, 1986, and his TDCJ-ID receive date is October 28, 1986. Offender COOK is currently assigned to Minimum Custody.

**CONFIDENTIAL
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

O RAPE

TYPE OF INCIDENT		UNIT CODE	DATE / TIME REPORTED		REPORTED BY
Escape		CY	12-13-00 14:58		Janie Cockrell
DATE / TIME OCCURED	SPECIFIC LOCATION	AS	AG	GANG RELATED YES NO	GANG IDENTIFICATION
12-13-00 13:55	JV Backgate			N/A N/A	N/A
MOTIVE:					

SHIFT: _____ **EMPLOYEE INFO.**

NAME _____ SSN _____ RANK _____ RACE _____ SEX _____ AGE _____

DISPOSITION: Seven (7) MI custody offenders successfully escaped from the unit Backgate in a state truck. A manhunt is in progress utilizing all Region IV resources.

INMATE INFO.

NAME	TDCJ #	RACE SEX	AGE	CUSTODY CODE	INJURIES	A-Y
Newbury, Donald	824631	W/M	38	MI	Unknown	N/A
Riyas, George	702267	H/M	30	MI	Unknown	N/A
Harper, Larry	861910	W/M	37	MI	Unknown	N/A
Garcia, Joseph	774391	H/M	29	MI	Unknown	N/A
Murphy, Patrick	386888	W/M	39	MI	Unknown	N/A
Halprin, Randy	786259	W/M	23	MI	Unknown	N/A
Rodriguez, Michael	698074	H/M	38	MI	Unknown	N/A

WEAPON INFO.

WEAPON: DESCRIBE IN DETAIL: (TYPE) Unknown - Staff states sharpened metal rods were used by offenders to threaten them - these weapons were not recovered

CUSTODY CODE N/A **DEATH INFO.**

NAME OF INMATE N/A TDCJ# N/A UNIT N/A

RACE N/A SEX N/A AGE N/A DIED AT OR IN ROUTE TO N/A

CAUSE OF DEATH N/A WHO DECLARED DEATH N/A

DISPOSITION OF BODY N/A AUTOPSY N/A YES N/A NO N/A

NEXT OF KIN NTFD YES NO BY: _____

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

WILL RESPOND _____ YES _____ NO-NAME OF INVESTIGATOR _____

AGENCY CASE # _____ REMARKS _____

AUTHOR: CYUNTS9 - DANIELS, BILL

SUBJECT: I-14031-13-00

ON 12-13-00 AT APPROXIMATELY 1255 HOURS, OFFICER L. GIBB, CO111, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 457-52-6732, THE B TOWER RADIO PICKET OFFICER, RADIOED A DISTRESS CALL THAT SEVERAL INMATES WERE ESCAPING IN A STATE VEHICLE THROUGH THE BACKGATE. STAFF IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED TO THE SCENE AND FOUND THE BACKGATE OFFICER, V. JANSSEN, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 457-88-1398, BOUND WITH DUCT TAPE.

THE UNIT WAS IMMEDIATELY LOCKED DOWN AND A SPECIAL COUNT INITIATED. THE EMERGENCY/ESCAPE PLAN WAS PUT INTO EFFECT.

IT WAS SHORTLY DISCOVERED THAT A GROUP OF SEVEN INMATES IN THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT HAD ASSAULTED AND OVERPOWERED NINE MAINTENANCE STAFF, TWO SECURITY OFFICERS AND THREE INMATES, BOUNDING THEM AND SECURING THEM IN A BACK ROOM IN THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT. FOUR INMATES, TWO DRESSED IN FREE WORLD CLOTHES ESCORTING TWO INMATES DRESSED IN WHITES, THEN PROCEEDED TO THE BACKGATE CARRYING TOOLS, WIRES, CAMERAS AND MONITORS USING THE RUSE THAT THEY WERE SOUTHWEST AREA MAINTENANCE THERE TO INSTALL THE EQUIPMENT. AFTER GAINING ACCESS TO THE BACKGATE OFFICER, OFFICER JANSSEN WAS ASSAULTED AND SUBDUED, SUFFERING A POSSIBLE FRACTURED RIGHT WRIST AND SWELLING TO THE WRISTS. OFFICER GIBB THEN OPENED THE DOOR OF THE RADIO-PICKET TO ALLOW THE WORKERS INSIDE. (HE HAD BEEN CALLED EARLIER FROM THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT INFORMING HIM THAT THE EQUIPMENT WAS TO BE INSTALLED) HE WAS SUBDUED, SUSTAINING NO INJURIES. ONCE INSIDE B TOWER, WHICH ALSO SERVES AS A SUB-ARMORY, THE INMATES STOLE ONE (1) AR-15 RIFLE WITH 15 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION, A 12 GAUGE SHOTGUN WITH 19 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION, AND 14 SMITH AND WESSON .357 REVOLVERS AND APPROXIMATELY 200 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION.

THE THREE REMAINING INMATES IN THE ESCAPE CONSPIRACY THEN DROVE THE STATE MAINTENANCE PICK-UP TRUCK TO THE BACKGATE, PICKED UP THE FOUR INMATES ALREADY THERE AND DROVE AWAY FROM THE UNIT.

OFFICER GIBB MANAGED TO FREE HIMSELF WITHIN MINUTES AND RAISED THE ALARM. THE SEVEN INMATES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS:

- 1) NEWBERRY, DONALD #424531 WHITE MALE 6' - 179 LBS - AGE 38
- 19Y-89 2) HALFRIN, RANDY #786259 WHITE MALE 6' - 197 LBS - AGE 23
- 19Y-37 3) MURPHY, PATRICK #385666 WHITE MALE 5'7 143 LBS - AGE 35
- 19Y-43 4) GARCIA, JOSEPH #774391 HISP. MALE 5'11 198 LBS - AGE 29
- 19Y-66 5) HARPER, LARRY #851910 WHITE MALE 5'11 165 LBS - AGE 37

INVENTORIED, THOROUGHLY EXAMINED BY SECURITY STAFF FOR ANY POTENTIAL CLUES AS TO THE INMATES PLANS OR DESTINATION. ALL PERTINANT INFORMATION AND CORRESPONDANCE WAS RELINQUISHED TO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT. STAFF RESPONDED TO THE MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT THE ELEVEN EMPLOYEES AND THREE INMATES TRAPPED IN THE BACK KITCH. AREA MAINTENANCE HAD TO BE CALLED IN, IN ORDER FOR THEM TO BE FIRED. ALL EMPLOYEES AND THE THREE INMATES WERE FOUND TO HAVE SUFFERED INJURIES AS A RESULT OF THE ASSAULT BY THE ESCAPEES; ONLY ONE REQUIRING (OVERNIGHT HOSPITALIZATION. MEDICAL STAFF WAS PRESENT AT THE SCENE. THE EMPLOYEES WHO HAD BEEN ASSAULTED AND LOCKED IN THE STORE ROOM ARE:

- 1) BURCESS, MAX SSN# 460-23-6136 LUNCTURE WOUND TO LEFT UPPER CHEST, ABRASION TO LEFT AND RIGHT WRISTS
- 2) NOCZYCENKA, PATRICK SSN# 464-33-1239 MULTIPLE CONTUSIONS TO FOREHEAD CONTUSIONS TO BOTH EARS, NOSE AND LACERATION TO LEFT EAR
- 3) NOCZYCENKA, LESTER SSN# 461-60-9199 LACERATION LEFT FOREARM. CONTUSIONS TO HEAD, LEFT WRIST BRUISED
- 4) GILLEY, MARTIN SSN# 460-90-2749 LACERATION BEHIND LEFT EAR, ABRASION TO LEFT HAND, LACERATION TO RT EAR . .
- 5) ALBERT, BANDY SSN# 460-35-6313 POSSIBLE FRACTURED NOSE, SWOLLEN LEFT AND RIGHT WRISTS, CONTUSION TO HEAD
- 6) MADROQUIN, ALEJANDRO SSN# 452-43-4123 SCRAPED WRISTS, POSSIBLE FRACTURED RT THUMB, POSSIBLE NOSE FRACTURE, CONTUSIONS TO BOTH EYES
- 7) BARR, RONNY SSN# 460-27-0105 CONTUSIONS TO FACE, ABRASION RT ARM
- 8) SECUBA, MANUEL SSN# 458-04-8875 NUME HANDS
- 9) SCHMIDT, TERRY SSN# 457-96-7667 1" SCRATCH TO LEFT HAND, PAIN TO FACE AND BACK
- 10) CAMBER, ALLEN SSN# 458-47-7907 SUPERFICIAL LACERATION TO LEFT AND RIGHT WRISTS, ABRASION RIGHT ELBOW TOP OF HEAD AND RIGHT EYE AREA
- 11) GARZA, MARK SSN# 455-43-9536 LEFT WRIST SWOLLEN

THE INMATES WHO WERE ASSAULTED AND LOCKED IN THE STORE ROOM ARE:

3) MARTINEZ, AMBROSIO #646556 HISP, MALE - 2 LACERATIONS TO RIGHT
WRISTS REQUIRING SUTURES

THESE THREE INMATES WERE PLACED IN P.F.D TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF
THE INVESTIGATION.

ALL AFFECTED EMPLOYEES AND INMATES WERE INTERVIEWED BY INTERNAL
AFFAIRS. ALL RECEIVED POST TRAUMA SUPPORT FROM UNIT AND REGION USSO
STAFF.

THE ESCAPE PLAN WAS FULLY INITIATED AND ALL APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES
WERE NOTIFIED. UNIT KENNEL TEAMS, STAFF AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WERE
DEPLOYED IN THE KENEUDY/KARNES CITY AREA WITH AREA/UNITS PROVIDING
VALUED MANPOWER ASSISTANCE.

AT APPROXIMATELY 1630 HOURS THE UNIT MAINTENANCE TRUCK WAS FOUND
PARKED BEHIND THE LOCAL WAL-MART AND A SIGHTING OF THREE INMATES ON THE
GROUND IN THE AREA WAS REPORTED. A PERIMETER HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND
THE SEARCH IS ON GOING AT THIS TIME.

THE EMERGENCY ACTION CENTER HAD BEEN NOTIFIED AND INCIDENT #
I-14632-13-00 WAS ISSUED.

MORE INFORMATION TO FOLLOW AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

AUTHORITY: CAPT. T.S. HINELE
JOHN B. CONNALLY UNIT

Sent to: ADSECEAC <list> (cc)



P.O. Box 99 Huntsville, Texas 77342-0099

Wayne Scott
Executive Director

Gary Johnson
Institutional Division Director

Timothy B. Keith
Searler Warden

Administrative Incident Review
AD-02.15

INCIDENT NUMBER: 1-14032-12-00

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
John B. Connally Unit
December 13, 2000

TO: *Emergency Action Center*

THRU: *Douglas Dreike*
Region IV Director

SUBJECT: **INSTITUTIONAL LOCKDOWN LIFTED**
Connally Unit

PERSONS INVOLVED: John B. Connally Jr. Staff

OFFENDERS INVOLVED: See Attached

SUMMARY: On December 13, 2000 at approximately 1355 hours, the John B. Connally Unit was placed on Lockdown due to a escape that occurred just minutes prior. A total of 2,806 offenders were affected by the Institutional Lockdown.

The Emergency Action Center was established at 14032-12-00 was established. All other authorities were notified including Mr. Dreike, Region IV Director.

Connally Unit

HC 87 Box 115

Kenedy, Texas 78119