

### INCIDENT REVIEW REPORT

Report Date January 7, 2009	Level of Review Assistant Deputy Dir	ector	
Offender Name Dravis, Donald A.	Offender DOC # - 943530		Critical Incident Review # 173-08P
Name of Initiator Earl X. Wright			Members el Green, Captain, ngton Corrections Center for en ra J. Rowden, Associate intendent, Clallam Bay ctions Center

#### INCIDENT

Date and Time: 12/29/08 at approximately 1736 Location: MICC

Brief Description of Incident: At approximately 1736 Offender Donald Dravis 943530 passed through major control of MICC without being asked by Sergeant Anderson to show identification. Offender Dravis then proceeded to the gate house and when questioned by Officer Snow about his ID, Offender Dravis stated he had left the ID in his truck. Officer Snow allowed Offender Dravis to proceed through the door and out of the fenced sally port. Officer Meyers was in the gate house and noticed an individual, whom he believed to be Offender Donald Dravis exit. Officer Meyers followed the individual and confirmed the person was Offender Dravis after the individual was seated on the MICC passenger boat. Officer Meyers notified the Shift Lieutenant, who sent Sergeant Johnson and subsequently sent Officers Bolden, Humphrey and Cummings to the dock to assist in escorting Offender Dravis to the gate house.

Upon being escorted into the gate house, Offender Dravis was placed against the staff mailboxes while escorting officers' awaited instructions from the Lieutenant and Shift Sergeant. Offender Dravis tensed and shifted his weight at which time he was escorted to the ground. Offender Dravis was then taken to the Health Services Unit for Assessment and subsequently placed in segregation on pre-hearing confinement.

Name, Title, & Address of All Employees Involved: All of the following staff work at the McNeil Island Corrections Center (MICC) located at P.O. Box 88900, Steilacoom, WA 98388: Lieutenant Simons, Sergeant William Anderson, Sergeant Herbert Johnson, Sergeant Diana Burton, Officer David Snow, Officer Jason Meyers, Officer Kevin Bolden, Officer Trevor Humphrey, Officer Jacob Cummings, Psychological Associate Carson Carter.

Name, DOC Numbers of All Offenders Involved: Dravis, Donald A. Jr. 943530

Location and Description of Property Damaged: N/A

#### REVIEW

Chronological Summary of Facts/Events:

At approximately 1730 offender Dravis entered MICC major control sally port in personal clothes without identification. It has yet to be determined if he entered the sally port alone or with other staff waiting to leave the facility.

Sergeant Anderson acknowledges he had an unidentified individual in the sally port and he did not ask for or verify any identification.

Sergeant Anderson admits he opens the exterior sally port door and released the individual to the MICC gate house Offender Dravis enters the gate house and is stopped and questioned by officer Snow to present his identification Offender Dravis states he left his ID in the truck

Officer Snow stated Offender Dravis was dressed like a CI staff member and let him exit the facility

Officer Meyers was in the area and observed the exchange and the departure and then recognized him as offender Dravis

Officer Snow and Officer Meyers had a brief discussion that officer Meyers thought it was offender Dravis Officer Meyers exited the facility, retrieved a van and followed offender Dravis to the MICC passenger boat

Officer Meyers observed offender Dravis enter the boat, approached him and identified him as offender Dravis
Officer Meyers exited the boat and by phone notified Sergeant Anderson in major control and was instructed to notify
Lieutenant Simons

Officer Meyers by phone notified Lieutenant Simons that he positively he had offender Dravis on the passenger boat Officer Meyers positioned himself awaiting further response from the facility

Lieutenant Simons dispatched only Sergeant H. Johnson to the passenger boat to check out the situation

Upon Sergeant H. Johnsons arrival, he and Officer Meyers approached offender Dravis and dialogued with offender Dravis

Offender Dravis began to make a scene

Sergeant D. Burton evacuated the boat of visitors and staff, returning them to a safe location on the MICC dock After further dialogue from Sergeant H. Johnson and CO Meyers, offender Dravis exited the boat unrestrained and unsearched, walked to the fenced speed boat area of the MICC dock

Approximately 8-10 to minutes later, CO Humphrey and CO Bolden arrived to the incident site with a transport van and camera

Video taping began, further dialogue occurred

Offender Dravis was argumentative and challenged staffs authority and was uncooperative

Offender Dravis with staff directives entered the van, unsearched and unrestrained

Lieutenant Simons radioed Sergeant H. Johnson regarding offender Dravis and status of restraints, then directed restraints to be applied and offender to be returned to MICC gate house.

Offender Dravis was removed from van and wrist restraints were applied and was transported to MICC gate house Upon transport arrival, offender was escorted by CO Meyers and CO Cummings with CO Humphrey as camera operator and Sergeant H. Johnson as escort supervisor, through the pedestrian walk thru gates and entered MICC gatehouse

Lieutenant Simons and Sergeant H. Johnson engaged in a conversation away from the escorting staff. Escorting staff stopped and awaited direction at which time CO Snow made the statement to offender Dravis "Five Minutes for Five Years". (As admitted by CO Snow and verified by offender Dravis)

Offender Dravis responded and was verbally agitated by his comments

CO Meyers and CO Cummings escort offender Dravis and place him against the mailboxes to de-escalate the situation without supervisory direction

While holding offender Dravis against the wall, Officer Meyers looked at Lieutenant Simons and quietly whispered this is Dravis.

Lieutenant Simons and Sergeant Johnson stepped away from offender Dravis and the escorting staff and no dialogue was occurring with staff or offender Dravis.

Offender Dravis tensed up in the shoulder area and was taken to the ground by CO Meyers and CO Cummings. There was no supervisory direction for the offender to cease his action and for the staff to engage in force.

There was an attempt to apply leg irons to offender Dravis while he was on the ground. Lieutenant Simons directed staff to remove the leg irons and have offender Dravis sit on the table and have further dialogue.

There was lack of supervisory directives during the escort and use of force.

Summary of Witness Statements (Include Name of Each Witness):

Sergeant William Anderson: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1730 hours he was working as the Major Control Sergeant and was in major control alone while CO Kessler was on his break. He noticed an unidentified person (later identified as offender Dravis) in front of the outside slider, carrying a clip board and was in street clothing waiting to exit. He stated there was a group of employees, which he believed to be from mental health, with the unidentified person. He is certain there were several people present, because Dr. Carter was the only person he knew and Dr. Carter was talking about going to the casino. Anderson opened the slider and allowed all of the individuals to exit major control in route to the MICC gate house. He states that he did not see or check the ID of the unidentified person before he opened the slider. Sergeant Anderson contacted CO Snow at the gate house to inquire if he had checked ID of unidentified individual at which time CO Snow stated the unidentified person stated he had left ID in his truck and had gone to retrieve his ID.

Sergeant Anderson later received a telephone call from CO Meyers verifying that he had identified the individual as

offender Dravis #943350 at the MICC dock. Anderson directed CO Meyers to contact Lt. Simons immediately.

Sergeant Anderson stated that it is not part of protocol or post orders to check IDs of those passing through major control and he has never stopped anyone who did not have an ID. Anderson claims employees are never stopped at major control for not having their ID and that he hopes the person down the hill (at the gate house) checks for ID's. He stated things have become more stringent with ACA.

Officer David Snow: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1730 hours he was working as the gate house officer and he acknowledged an unidentified person (later identified as offender Dravis) who walked in from the steps leading from major control. He stopped the unidentified person and requested to see his ID and the unidentified person reached inside his shirt and stated that he must have left it in the truck at which time, officer Snow let him proceed out of the gate house.

Officer Snow stated he got concerned and contacted tower 3 as to the direction the unidentified person was walking and was told the unidentified person was walking towards the MICC dock. Officer Snow then contacted tower 2 and was told the unidentified person was not in site. Officer Snow discussed the situation with Officer Meyers who happened to be in the gate house and Officer Meyers stated the unidentified person looked like Offender Dravis. Officer Snow asked Officer Meyers to go and look for the individual and check for an ID.

Upon Offender Dravis' return to the MICC gate house, Officer Snow made the comment to Offender Dravis "Five Minutes for Five Years". Officer Snow then acknowledged participation in the use of force.

Officer Snow stated that normal protocol does not require notification to the tower officer if there is an unidentified person leaving it requires that the gate officer obtain additional identification from an unidentified person if they do not have their ID with them. He admits that part of the responsibility of the individual who works in the gate house are to check IDs coming in and out of the facility.

Officer Jason Meyers: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1730 he was assigned as a Response and Movement Officer. He was in the MICC gate house when an unidentified person (later identified as offender Dravis) entered alone in civilian clothing. He observed Officer Snow question the unidentified person for their ID badge, at which time the unidentified person stated, no I left it in the truck, I'll be back. Officer Meyers saw the individual exit facility at which time he commented to Officer Snow that the unidentified person looked like offender Dravis. Officer Meyers got in a van and observed the unidentified person walking on sidewalk towards the MICC dock, walk down the dock and enter passenger boat. Officer Meyers followed offender Dravis, located him sitting on passenger boat, approached him, and stated "Dravis" at which times the unidentified person looked up. He asked offender Dravis what he was doing and he stated he got released and he was going home. Officer Meyers asked where his release paperwork was and was told the counselor took care of them.

Officer Meyers exited the boat, notified Sergeant Anderson in control, pertain to Dravis' claim to release, Sergeant Anderson indicated there was no documentation. Officer Meyers notified Lieutenant Simons that offender Dravis was on boat, claiming that he had been released and there was no paperwork and that there was a possible escape attempt and he then posted himself outside the boat watching offender Dravis. Sergeant Johnson (Shift Sergeant) arrived and he and Officer Meyers approached offender Dravis to question him about his release paperwork. Offender Dravis stated that his counselor had taken care of his paperwork and that his time was done and that he was getting out of there. Sergeant Johnson convinced offender Dravis that he needed to exit the boat to get the issue resolved.

Officer Meyers and Sergeant Johnson escorted offender Dravis to the top of the dock by the speed boat area to wait for additional staff to arrive, which was approximately 8-10 minutes. Upon arrival of additional staff, offender Dravis was placed in van unrestrained upon direction of Sergeant Johnson. Lieutenant Simons radioed for the status of what was occurring with offender Dravis and inquired if he was restrained and was told no. Lieutenant Simons gave instructions for offender Dravis to be restrained at which time he was removed from van, restrained and returned to van and driven to MICC gate house. Upon arrival at gate house, Officer Meyers assisted escorting offender Dravis in to the gatehouse. Offender Dravis was placed against the mailboxes as there was no directions as to where to take

him from the on sight supervisor or the lieutenant upon their arrival in the gate house. Offender Dravis resisted and the escorting staff guided him to the ground.

Officer Meyers stated that he has worked major control and that one of their duties is to look at ID's of individuals passing through. He has questioned individuals about their ID's when he has worked in major control. Officer Meyers also stated that he is frustrated with the complacency of staff and that offender Dravis made it to the boat.

Lieutenant Dennis Simons: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1730 he was assigned as the Shift Commander. He was in the North Dining Hall when he received a phone call from Officer Meyers that he recognized a person on the vessel departing MICC as someone he thought was offender Dravis. He dispatched Sergeant Johnson to the MICC dock passenger boat as the on sight supervisor, since he was not 100% sure that the person identified by Officer Meyers was in fact an offender attempting to escape or a deck hand sitting on the boat. Lieutenant Simons contacted the boat Captain via Nextel Radio and advised him not to leave the facility until a determination was made who the offender was.

Lieutenant Simons stated when he received confirmation from Officer Meyers that the individual was in fact Offender Dravis, he gave instructions to restrain the individual. He stated that before it was confirmed that it was in fact an offender, would we be restraining an offender or would be restraining a civilian. Lieutenant Simons stated that he was not told that the individual did not have any identification on them when they were on the boat.

Lieutenant Simons stated that he had Officer McNally from B unit do a positive identification of offender Dravis:

Lieutenant Simons believes there is staff complacency especially around the egress areas of the facility and things that staff takes for granted.

Sergeant Herbert Johnson: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1730 he was assigned as the Shift Sergeant. He received a call from the Lieutenant to go to the boat as there was someone down there with a clipboard. He walked to the boat and met Officer Meyers and the two of them went and talked with Offender Dravis. Offender Dravis said he was not an inmate anymore and was not supposed to be there. He started elevating, so Sergeant Johnson thought he may be screwy. At this time there were between 75-100 visitors on the boat. Officer Meyers talked with Sergeant Burton about removing the visitors from the boat and to take them to the top of the dock. After the passengers had left the boat, I advised inmate Dravis he would need to leave the boat until we could clear this up with the shift commander. After several refusals, he complied and was escorted to the top of the dock area, next to where the rescue boat is located.

Sergeant Johnson stated he informed Sergeant Burton to allow the visitors to board the boat after checking ID's. After the rest of the officers arrived, which Sergeant Johnson indicated took approximately 10 minutes Offender Dravis was placed in the van. Lieutenant Simons stated we needed to put restraints on, so we took him off the van, pat searched him, put restraints on and placed him back on the van.

Sergeant Johnson indicated that there was no radio communication regarding emergency traffic only or of the possible escape. He stated that Officer Meyers was sure that the individual in question was offender Dravis and he (Sergeant Johnson) was sure it was an inmate, because of the paperwork he had in his pocket.

Sergeant Johnson stated that it is an implied duty that officers in major control check ID's. Sergeant Johnson stated that he would stop people with no ID. In the past if someone had no ID, major control would send the individual to see the shift supervisor. The shift supervisor would give the individual a temporary chit, which would then be turned in to major control for a temporary ID. Sergeant Johnson stated he did not think it had been a problem in the past of people being let through major control with ID's not being checked.

Officer Kevin Bolden: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1736 he was assigned as Response and Movement Officer. He was standing mainline and directed by Lieutenant Simons to respond to the boat dock. He

stated when he arrived at the dock offender Dravis had a good story and as he had never met offender Dravis, he did not know if he was a staff or an inmate. He stated Sergeant Johnson and Officer Meyers were speaking with offender Dravis who was standing by the fence. They were escorting offender Dravis to the van and he stated "Get your fucking hands off me" and got in the van and did not want anyone to sit next to him. Officer Bolden stated Lieutenant Simons called on the radio to see if Offender Dravis was in restraints. Sergeant Johnson told him no, so he was removed from the van, placed in restraints and returned to the van.

Officer Bolden helped escort offender Dravis into the gate house. When offender Dravis tried to break away, he placed leg irons on offender Dravis. Officer Bolden stated offender Dravis was not searched until he was strip searched in the Health Services Unit.

Officer Bolden stated the first time he saw the picture card of what offender Dravis was supposed to look like was in the gate house and the picture was nothing what he currently looks like.

Officer Bolden stated the gate officer is to check ID's and if someone does not have an ID the Lieutenant is to be notified and they are given a pink ID and they are supposed to do an incident report.

Officer Trevor Humphrey: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1736 he was assigned as Response and Movement Officer. He was directed by Lieutenant Simons to respond to the boat dock with a video camera. He along with Officer Bolden responded to the dock. The video taping of the incident began upon arriving at the dock. Offender Dravis was by the patrol boat and approximately 20-25 visitors were by the benches with Sergeant Burton. When he arrived he saw Sergeant Johnson speaking with inmate Dravis and he began operation of the video camera. Offender Dravis was placed in the van and they received a radio call to place him in restraints. He was removed from the van, placed in restraints and returned to the van.

When they arrived at the gate house and were escorting offender Dravis in the door, Officer Humphrey stated he heard Officer Snow say to inmate Dravis, "I'm gonna kick your ass". Officer Humphrey said it appeared offender Dravis pushed his weight back on the escorting officers. There were no directives given to take inmate Dravis to the ground as the Lieutenant and Sergeant were off to the side to figure out who he (Offender Dravis) was. The Lieutenant talked to Offender Dravis after he was on the ground. Officer Humphrey cannot remember offender Dravis ever being searched, until he was escorted to the Health Services Unit, when he assisted in the strip search.

Officer Humphrey stated that when he worked major control he would consider ID checks to be important and when he worked there, everyone had an ID. He also said that definitely the gate house is to check ID's for everyone that comes in and out.

Officer Jacob Cummings: states that on December 29, 2008 at approximately 1736 he was assigned as Recreation Officer. I was in the North Dining Hall when a phone call was received from Officer Meyers, stating there was a possible escape, at which time he gave the phone to Lieutenant Simons. Lieutenant Simons instructed him to respond to dock and it took him a couple of minutes to walk to the dock. By the time he got there, the van containing inmate Dravis was coming up the causeway. The roving patrol had been instructed by Lieutenant Simons to post at the end of the dock, so the roving patrol gave him a ride to the gate house.

Officer Cummings stated when they arrived at the gatehouse, offender Dravis was slowly getting agitated and was making references to the CIA. He heard a comment made by Officer Snow, but he does not know what the comment was. There was no direction from the Lieutenant of Sergeant when they entered the gate house, so he instructed offender Dravis to walk towards the mail boxes and remain still. He states offender Dravis suddenly tensed up and he put pressure on him and offender Dravis pushed back and was then escorted to the floor. An attempt was made to put leg irons on inmate Dravis at this time, but Lieutenant Simons said no. When Offender Dravis was on the ground, he didn't seem to be much of a threat. At no time, was the offender searched, until he was at the Health Services Unit and I patted him down while he was sitting in a chair as Lieutenant Simons didn't want him to stand up.

Officer Cummings stated that he has worked major control and that people in there don't pay a lot of attention and

there is complacency among staff. He stated when he has worked the gate house that he has checked ID's and asked individuals for their ID's. At times he would have to call the tower to ask them who they let in to the facility and the tower would say that they knew the individual so they could come in. Officer Cummings stated that you can't see anything from the tower and if someone didn't have an ID, he would rather make a call to the Lieutenant. There are also island residents that come in and out of the facility without ID's.

<u>Psychological Associate Carson Carter</u>; states that on December 29, 2008 he was leaving work for the day at approximately 1725. He remembers the weather being rough and not wanting to miss the boat, so he left a little early. He approached major control and the door was closed. He states that he was alone and there was no other staff in the sally port or that were leaving with him. He does not recall seeing anyone else in major control except for Sergeant Anderson. When he entered the gate house he was by himself. When he left the gate house he said something to Paula who was in the tower.

Mr. Carter states when he entered the boat he looked at the front of the boat and saw a man (later identified as offender Dravis) sitting with a lady and they looked like they were talking. He thought they were visitors since it was a visit day. Mr. Carter states he went to the bow and sat in a single seat and began reading the paper.

Mr. Carter noticed Officer Meyers and Sergeant Burton speaking with the individual. He stated that Sergeant Burton was being very nice with her tone and stated that they did not think he needed to be here and that if he was free, that he needed to be escorted. Mr. Carter stated that Sergeant Burton spoke with offender Dravis for approximately 15 minutes and at one point offender Dravis pulled out some papers and she said that she needed to confirm the papers. Mr. Carter stated that Sergeant Burton then cleared the boat of all visitors, then staff.

Mr. Carter stated that he saw offender Dravis a couple of times in 2006 and said that he is pretty delusional. He also said that he would not recognize him visually if is saw him, since he saw him so few times as a patient.

Offender Donald Dravis #943530: states that on December 29, 2008 he was leaving unit B, as if he was going to the dining hall. Offender Dravis stated that he should have been out in 2008 but his new ERD in OMNI was 2011. He stated that he thought he would be out and could get caught in Pierce County so he would quit getting the run around by DOC. Offender Dravis stated this was a spur of the moment decision, that he wore his personal clothing and he went through major control by himself. Offender Dravis said he left his ID in his room and decided if the slider was open, he was going to go through. He said that there were so many opportunities and that he did not think not having an ID would be a big deal. Offender Dravis stated the first slider to major control was open, there was one person in the booth that did not even look at him. Offender Dravis stated he was asked about his ID in the gate house and stated it was in the truck and was allowed to leave.

He stated that he had not had a review in 15 months and that Counselor Joyner, CUS Cosset or Sergeant Estes had been not help in getting his review done. He stated he had been to the law library trying to do some legal work, but there were no computers or records that would assist him. Offender Dravis stated that he was on medications that he did not want to take, he said he was edgy but that he never went after cops only got in verbal arguments at time.

While walking to the boat, offender Dravis stated he passed a couple of people who were walking up toward the facility. He didn't see any of the MICC offender workers when he got on the boat. He sat down and looked up and noticed that there was a camera in front of his face, so he got up and moved to a different seat.

Officer Meyers approached him and asked what he was doing and he stated that he was out of here. Officer Meyers asked him if he had release papers and he said no. Offender Dravis stated that officers started forming a circle around him. Sergeant Johnson stated that they would hog tie him unless he got off of the boat voluntarily. Offender Dravis told Sergeant Johnson he didn't want to, but decided to comply. Officers escorted him off, one on both side and offender Dravis commented he was surprised he was not restrained. Offender Dravis stated he got in the van, then there was an order over the radio to put on restraints.

Offender Dravis stated he was walked into the gate house and a black guy stated "5 minutes of freedom, for 5 years of time". He doesn't know the name of the individual. Offender Dravis stated he was trying to adjust himself and was taken to the ground, tackled, elbowed in the lower back, his ankle turned and a 45 degree angle and he heard a couple of pops.

### Summary of Facts:

- Sergeant Anderson in major control allowed access and egress to the facility without positive identification.
  - o Sergeant Anderson indicates that offender Dravis entered the sally port with a group of individuals that included Carson Carter who works in the mental health unit.
  - o Carson Carter indicates that he was the only individual that entered and exited major control and Sgt Johnson was in major control.
  - o Offender Dravis indicates that he was the only individual that entered and exited major control.
  - o Based on conflicting testimony, the team was not able to substantiate if offender Dravis was alone or in a group of individuals when entering and exiting major control.
  - o At the Gatehouse CO Snow allowed offender Dravis to exit the gatehouse without positive identification.

### Response:

- Escape in progress and there was no initial notification to the shift commander.
- No immediate activation of emergency escape response once the shift lieutenant was notified of a possible or positive identification of the offender.
- When Lieutenant was given verification of inmate Dravis he only sent Shift Sergeant. Did not deploy a QRST team, lethal or non-lethal alternatives from major control.
- Checklist driven escape protocol was not followed upon initial notification of escape i.e. recall, notification, specialty teams, escape posts, etc. in a timely manner. This protocol was implemented at the direction of the Associate Supt 25 minutes into the incident.
- Lack of rapid response.
- ICS 201 form was not completed by the incident commander.
- When notification was made, the institution escape siren was not sounded. No notification to island residents prior to completion of count.

Escort and Use of Force: Apprehension protocol was not followed. Offender was not searched or restrained upon being taken off the boat.

- During the escort to the gate house, the Sergeant (on scene supervisor) went hands on with the offender.
- Upon entering the MICC gate house, there was lack of supervisory direction during application and direction of use of force.
- There was a lack of dialogue and direction given to offender Dravis by escorting and supervisory staff during the escort to gatehouse and prior to the use of force.
- Custody staff began applying leg restraints at which time the Lieutenant directed them to take the restraints off
- No debrief after incident.

# Physical Plant:

- Tower three does not have clear visuals of the gate during darkness and inclement weather (rain).
- Windows are fogged, darkened, and has condensation on them.
- Speaker does not work on builhorn.
- Staff members rely on binoculars for identification.

### Other Items:

- Environment of Denial that the escape was occurring and the staff appeared to be in disbelief it was occurring.
- Some staff members claim it is not their responsibility to check IDs (old vs new staff).
- False sense of security that if CO Kessler would have been in major control this escape would have not occurred.

- False sense of security due to the water there was not a sense of urgency to respond in a quicker manner.
- Continuity of Response ICS model was not followed in accordance with policy and procedure and ICS training.
- Some confusion, chaos, and gave the appearance that staff didn't know how to respond.
- Operational Memorandum not reviewed/updated at same time as DOC policy, it DOC 410.360 updated 5/23/08, MICC OM updated 3/30/07.
- Control card photos and individuals current appearance are not similar.
- Post orders are generic and do not include verbiage regarding verifying IDs.
- Feedback from visitors that were on the island during the incident was positive and professional.

## LIST OF APPLICABLE RCW'S WAC'S DOC POLICIES & PROCEDURES

RCW 9A.76.110 - Escape in the first degree

410.200 - Use of Force.

410.230 - Use of Deadly Force

410.360 - Escape Preparedness and Response

410-370 - Emergency Perimeter Security

## FRECOMMENDATIONS

### Improvements

- 1. Process for identifying and updating offender photos/face sheets. Develop facility procedure for identifying and updating photos of offenders where appearance has dramatically changed.
- 2. Revise Post Orders at Control Points and all custody posts in the institution. Include verbiage to include the responsibility of checking and verification of staff and offender ID's. Reinforce established procedures that no staff (including island non-staff residents) be allowed to come into gatehouse to check mailboxes or have access to institution with out proper identification.
- 3. Inform all staff on the responsibility of checking, wearing, and identification of ID's. We would recommend that management staff meet with staff in all areas of the institution (versus an email) to reinforce that it is the responsibility of all staff to complete this duty, not just custody staff.
- 4. Training of supervisory staff on the application and supervision of Use of Force. This training needs to emphasis the role of the on scene supervisor, dialoging with the offender, and restraint application.
- 5. Review, evaluation, and training for custody staff on Apprehension procedures and protocol.
- 6. Review of Emergency Response Model and basic emergency response protocal to include training in the following areas.
  - Detection, notification, isolation, and containment as it relates to an offender escape and any emergency.
  - Timely activation of the escape checklist and deployment of resources by shift commander.
  - Training on the completion and content of ICS forms.
  - Staffing needed in the Incident Command Post during an emergency.
- 7. Physical Plant: Based on the investigation and current conditions of Tower 3, it can not be relied upon for identification of individuals during the hours of darkness and inclement weather. We would not recommend it be relied upon as a final control point before individuals exit the institution.
- 8. Emergency Response Drills need to be realistic versus table top. Based on the information obtained during the investigation, it appears there are more table top exercises (talking about what would be done) than drills that involve roles players and actual response. (actual active live response with role players in a controlled situation with drill controllers and raters)

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

#### Things That Worked Well

- 1. Institution staff was forth coming with information during the interviews.
- 2. Institution staff did a great job of putting together all the needed documentation for the review.
- 3. Officer Jason Meyers should be acknowledged for the actions that he took which prevented offender Dravis from escaping. Even though his actions did not follow emergency response guidelines, without this officer following his good instincts this team is convinced that offender Dravis would have made it to the mainland.

Visiting staff did a good job security and keeping them to depart the island.	in keeping the visitors segregated updated on information on what w	d from the incident, maintaining their safety and vas taking place and when the visitors would be a
and		1/27/09
Team Lead Signature	VIII 115	Date 2/5/09
Deputy Secretary/Designee Signature		Date Social Security Numbers are considered confidential

The contents of this document may be eligible for public disclosure. Social Security Numbers are considered confidential information and will be redacted in the event of such a request. This form is governed by Executive Order 00-03, RCW 42.56, and RCW 40.14.



# CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

Date of Incident: 12-29-2008	Location of Incident: MICC				CIR Number: 17308P
Division/Department: DOC MICC	Brief Description of Incident: Escape				Offender Name: Dravis, Donald A. Jr.
Date of Action Plan: 12-30-2008	Team Members: Murphy, Flynn, Bratten, Pershan,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		 •	Offender Number: 943530
Plan Completed By: Capt. David T. Flynn	Plan Reviewed/Approved By: Associate Supt. Sean Murphy		•		Date Final & Sent to Risk Management:

An action plan has been developed as a result of a completed Critical Incident Review. The issues listed below have been identified as requiring ditional follow-up or actions.

ITEM	DESCRIPTION/TASK	ASSIGNED TO	ASSIGNED COMPLETION DATE	COMPLETION DATE
1.	Review methods to process of External Transoprts - out of G-Unit.  This review will reinforce the facilities perimeter access and egress points to deter the possibility of a reoccurrence of the escape	David Flynn	Jan 29	Jan 5
2.	Review the process of release at Control.  What are the Gate Card, Documentation, ID Checks that are in place.	Kenneth Bratten	Jan 29	Jan 8
	This process will strengthen the facilities perimeter access and egress points to deter the possibility of a reoccurrence of the escape		_	•• •
3.	Evaluation of sign in and sign out sheets for visitors, guests, and volunteers	David Flynn	Jan 29	Jan 5
	Increase lighting on Sally Port of front gate.	Jim McGinnis	Jan 29	Feb 4
	Improve the tower officers vision of the perimeter access and egress			
5.	Increase lighting on Towers.	Jim McGinnis	Jan 29 .	·
·	Improve the tower officers vision of the perimeter access and egress			
6.	Unassigned all involved staff for an investigation to be completed	Ken Bratten	Jan 8	Investigations
	Just cause investigations initiated for responsible staff.			Pending
7.	Pop lock at doors of MC Gatehouse. Staff Door Visiting doors Secure pop door at Visiting Room.	David Flynn	Jan 29	Jan 12 initial installation initiated

DOC 18-024 (Rev. 11/04/08)

DOC 400.110

Critical Incident Review Corrective Action Plan

	Camera at Gate for Tower to see individuals moving			FR submitted to Earl Wright
				to can whight
8.	Review supervision of porters for visit program.	David Flynn and Dan Fitzpatrick	Jan 29	Jan 9
	Reduce the amount of offenders in the gatehouse area. This reduction will simplify the process for offender access and egress. New process eliminates unrestrained offenders with a custody level of MI3 or Med into the gatehouse.			
9.	Review movement of porters to Gatehouse and Admin Bldg.	Sean Murphy	Jan 29	Jan 8
:	Reduce the amount of offenders in the gatehouse area. This reduction will simplify the process for offender access and egress. New process eliminates unrestrained offenders with a custody level of MI3 or Med into the gatehouse.			
10.	Use pedestrian gate for foot traffic and vehicle gate for vehicles only	David Flynn	Jan 29	Jan 8
·	All staff movement goes through the pedestrian gate only. Gatehouse officers have permanent communication via steno phone from the tower to the gatehouse. Additionally during large shift change times, the shift sergeant assists in pedestrian identification.			
11.	Eliminate foot traffic through the Rear Gate.	David Flynn	Jan 29	Evaluated and will not be completed
12.	Eliminate any/all work crew processing through the MC Gatehouse. Reduce the amount of offenders in the gatehouse area. This reduction will simplify the process for offender access and egress. New process eliminates unrestrained offenders with a custody level of MI3 or Med into the gatehouse. MI2 only	David Flynn,	Jan 29	Jan 9
13.	Draft an all Staff memo communicating changes Staff have been informed of the new changes in writing. Additionally the post orders reflect the new changes.	Sean Murphy	Jan 29	Jan 9
14.	Memo to staff about identification by viewing ID's Staff have been informed in writing of their requirement to check ID's	David Flynn	Jan 29	Jan 9
,,J,	Install Signs indicating everyone must have ID visible at all times	Jim McGinnis	Jan 29	Jan 6
	maken organic materials governorme materials visible at all times			
16.	Training to all staff about Escape Response Procedures- Arrest, search, seizure, weapons requirements	Rand Palmer	Jan 29	.3 month training scheduled being developed
17	Training to all R&M and Medical staff about the use of video tapes –One time only- Staff will not re-record over any incidents	Ken Bratten	Jan 29	Completed Jan 28
	All staff memo		·	<u> </u>

18.	Transport training for all inmates outside of the facility perimeter- All offenders must have on leg restraints until they get to the boat. Then immediately on the other side on the dock they will be place back on.	David Flynn	Jan 29	Schedule for implementation for Feb
19.	Process change for the issuance of volunteer badges. They will be issued at the Dock	David Flynn Felice Newcomb	Jan 29	15. Jan 9
	Letter sent to volunteers requesting that they show up sooner.			
20.	Review the impacts of the bus schedule with the changes requested.	Sean Murphy	Jan 29	Scheduled for Jan 13
21	Meet with Steilacoom and State Patrol to update MOU. Current MOU is active, but it is time for the yearly review.	Sean Murphy	Jan 29	Jan 13
	Update Post orders for Gatehouse, Tower 3, and Control	David Flynn Kenneth Bratten Sean Murphy	Jan 29	On going for all posts.
23	Memorandum to Island Residents restricting access to the facility for all Non-DOC Island Residents.	David Flynn Sean Murphy	Jan 29 :	Jan 9
	Past practice was to allow island residents into the gatehouse to pick up their mail. Process discontinued			
24	Memo to all staff reminding of the Steam Whistle for escapes	Rand Palmer	Jan 29	Jan 12
	Training on Escort and Use of Force for supervisors and managers	Dan Davis	Feb 28	
	Physical Plant concerns with Tower 3's windows	Jim McGinnis	Feb 28	·
,	Will submit requests for the installation of new window in the tower.			
	Order a new bull horn for tower 3	David Flynn	Feb 15	Feb 4
	Create muster cards designed to prepare staff for required response of a situation. This includes a plan to implement functional exercises for the facility. ERC will develop a back to basics plan to deal with issues surrounding Detection, Notification, Isolation, containment as it relates to escape apprehension.	Dan Davis Kenneth Bratten ERC Committee	Feb 28	Ongoing
	Update MICC OM for escape response	David Flynn Sean Murphy Rand Palmer	March 1	Current OM is upto date. Will update at annual
		<u> </u>	L	review

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	Update of staff and offender photos institution wide Dan Fitzpatrick	Jan 15	Jan 15
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Constraints/Concerns: Budget issues warrant some concern on the physical plant issues.

The contents of this document may be eligible for public disclosure. Social Security Numbers are considered confidential information and will be redacted in the event of such a request. This form is governed by Executive Order 00-03, RCW 42.56, and RCW 40.14.