1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 1 of 23

E-FILED

Tuesday, 02 September, 2025 01:57:07 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER,
a not-for-profit corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:25-cv-01369
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

v.
PEORIA COUNTY, ILLINOIS; CHRIS
WATKINS, Sheriff, individually and in his
official capacity; CARMISHA TURNER,
Corrections Superintendent, individually and in
her official capacity; BRIAN J. JOHNSON,
Assistant Corrections Superintendent,
individually and in his official capacity; and
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-5, Staff, individually
and in their official capacities,

Judge Jonathan E. Hawley
Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Hanna

Defendants.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Human Rights Defense Center (“HRDC” or “Plaintiff”) moves for a preliminary
injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and the associated Local Rules and guidelines,
to enjoin Peoria County, Illinois; Sheriff, Chris Watkins; Corrections Superintendent, Carmisha
Turner; and Assistant Corrections Superintendent, Brian J. Johnson (collectively, the
“Defendants”) from unconstitutionally censoring HRDC’s publications sent to prisoners at the
Peoria County Jail (the “Jail). Further, the Court should order Defendants to provide
Constitutionally required due process notice when rejecting publications sent to prisoners at the
Jail.

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 2 of 23

INTRODUCTION
HRDC seeks to provide prisoners with reading materials about their legal and civil rights
and options for accessing education while incarcerated. On numerous occasions since April 2025,
Defendants refused to deliver books and magazines HRDC sent to prisoners at the Jail, directly
violating HRDC’s First Amendment right to communicate information to these individuals. In
addition, Defendants have failed to provide HRDC with adequate notice and an opportunity to
challenge censorship decisions, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Defendants’ violations of the Constitution are causing HRDC irreparable harm. As
a settled matter of First Amendment law, the continued deprivation of HRDC’s free-speech rights
is precisely the type of irreparable harm that justifies preliminary injunctive relief.
HRDC’s publications pose no threat to the safety and security of the Jail and, in fact, are
distributed in jails and prisons all over the United States, including in jails and prisons throughout
the State of Illinois. HRDC has no alternative means of communicating with prisoners at the Jail,
and because of Defendants’ arbitrary policies, individuals incarcerated at the Jail have limited
access to reading and educational materials and no access to HRDC’s materials.
To remedy these constitutional violations, HRDC requests that this Court enter a
preliminary injunction: (1) prohibiting Defendants from continuing to arbitrarily and illegally
censor HRDC’s publications sent to prisoners at the Jail; and (2) requiring Defendants to satisfy
due process by providing HRDC with adequate notice of the reasons for any rejections of its
publications sent to persons incarcerated in the Jail and an opportunity to be heard.

2

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

I.

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 3 of 23

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Parties. HRDC is a not-for-profit charitable organization which, for more than 35
years, has focused its mission on education, advocacy and outreach to prisoners and the public
about the economic and social costs of prisons to society, the constitutional and human rights
afforded to prisoners, and the ways in which prisoners can access education while incarcerated.
(Declaration of Paul Wright (“Wright Decl.”) ¶ 2). HRDC accomplishes this mission through
advocacy, litigation, and publication and distribution of books, magazines, and other information
about prisons and the rights of prisoners. (Id.). Defendant Peoria County, Illinois, operates the Jail,
and is and was responsible for adopting and implementing policies governing incoming mail and
publications for prisoners at the Jail. (Complaint ¶ 8). The other named Defendants are employees
and agents of the Jail who have played a role in promulgating, enforcing, or overseeing personnel
who apply the Jail’s policies, practices, and procedures relating to mail and the reading material
available to prisoners. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11).
HRDC’s Publications. HRDC publishes and distributes a softcover monthly magazine
titled Prison Legal News: Dedicated to Protecting Human Rights (“Prison Legal News”), which
contains news and analysis about prisons, jails, and other detention facilities, prisoners’ rights,
management of prison facilities, prison conditions, and other matters pertaining to the rights and
interests of incarcerated individuals. (Wright Decl. ¶ 4). HRDC also publishes a second monthly
magazine, Criminal Legal News. This magazine focuses on review and analysis of individual
rights, court rulings, and news about criminal justice related issues. Criminal Legal News is
published and distributed in the same manner as Prison Legal News. (Id. ¶ 5). HRDC’s magazines
provide prisoners with timely, in-depth coverage of judicial decisions and other recent events
concerning our nation’s criminal justice system in a way that would be impossible through other

3

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 4 of 23

means of communication. (Id. ¶ 6). It is essential that the magazines are delivered in a timely
manner, as delays in delivery diminish the magazines’ news value. (Id.).
HRDC also publishes and/or distributes several different soft-cover books on criminal
justice, health, and legal issues that are of interest to prisoners and others. (Id. ¶ 7). Specifically,
HRDC publishes and distributes the Prisoners’ Guerilla Handbook: A Guide to Correspondence
Programs in the United States and Canada (“Prisoners’ Handbook”), which provides information
on enrolling at accredited higher educational, vocational and training schools. (Id.). HRDC also
publishes and distributes The Habeas Citebook: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (“Habeas
Citebook”), which describes the procedural and substantive complexities of federal habeas corpus
litigation with the goal of identifying and litigating claims involving ineffective assistance of
counsel. (Id.). HRDC does not publish, but is the sole national distributor of the book Protecting
Your Health and Safety (“PYHS”), which describes the rights, protections and legal remedies
available to persons concerning their health and safety while they are incarcerated. (Id.).
HRDC has sent thousands of its magazines and books by mail (including the distribution
of more than a million copies of Prison Legal News) to customers nationwide since its founding
in 1990. (Id. ¶ 9). Prison Legal News has thousands of subscribers in the United States and abroad,
including prisoners, attorneys, journalists, libraries, judges, and members of the general public.
(Id.). Since 1990, HRDC has sent its publications and books by mail to prisoners and law librarians
in more than 3,000 correctional facilities in all fifty states. These facilities include death row
housing units and “supermax” prisons like the federal Administrative Maximum Facility at
Florence, Colorado, which is known as the most secure prison in the United States. (Id. ¶ 10).
HRDC’s publications have been distributed without incident to prisoners at prisons and jails
throughout the State of Illinois including: FCI Pekin; FCI Greenville; MCC Chicago; FCI Marion;

4

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 5 of 23

FCI Thomson; Boone County Jail; Champaign County Jail; Cook County Jail; DuPage County
Jail; Henry County Jail; Jefferson County Jail; Kane County Jail; Kankakee County Detention
Center; Kendall County Jail; Knox County Jail; Lake County Jail; LaSalle County Jail; Lee County
Jail; Livingston County Jail; Macon County Jail; Marion County Jail; McHenry County Jail;
McLean County Detention Center; Mercer County Jail; Piatt County Jail; Pulaski Detention
Center; Randolph County Jail; Richland County Jail; Sangamon County Jail; Tazewell County
Jail; Vermillion County Jail; White County Jail; Will County Adult Detention Facility; Winnebago
County Justice Center; and Woodford County Jail. (Id.).
Defendants’ Unconstitutional Mail Policy. Defendants have adopted a policy and practice
that prohibits prisoners held at the Jail from receiving books and magazines from HRDC.
Defendants’ mail policy (the “Mail Policy”) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
All incoming Inmate mail will be opened and inspected for
contraband, but not read. Items that are NOT accepted by the jail
include but are not limited to:
Books, including torn out pages and copies of;
o Magazines, including torn out pages and copies of;
o Newspaper clippings; including copies of;
o Envelopes, stamps, and writing paper;
o Personal checks;
o Voice recorded or musical cards;
o Any metal or plastic;
o Sexually explicit material;
o Polaroid pictures;
o Pictures with gang signs or mugshots; or
o Anything determined by staff to be a security threat.
Any mailing found to contain contraband will be returned to the
sender in its entirety.
o

(Wright Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. A).

5

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 6 of 23

Without the ability to send its publications to prisoners in the Jail by mail, HRDC has no
alternative means of exercising its right to communicate with these persons. (Id. ¶ 33). HRDC’s
publications do not actually interfere with a correctional facility’s penological interests, or cause
security problems. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12).
Defendants’ Censorship of HRDC’s Mail. Between March 2025 and August 2025, HRDC
sent mail, including books, and magazines, to prisoners held at the Jail. Each item was individually
addressed to a specific recipient and separately mailed. (Id. ¶ 15). Defendants censored HRDC’s
publications by failing to deliver them to the intended prisoner-recipients at the Jail. Plaintiff can
identify at least thirty-eight (38) items rejected by Defendants, including fifteen (15) copies of
Prison Legal News; eight (8) copies of the Habeas Citebook; eight (8) copies of the Prisoners’
Handbook; four (4) copies Criminal Legal News; and three (3) copies of PYHS. (Id. ¶ 16). Many
of the rejected items were returned to HRDC’s offices marked “UNABLE TO FORWARD,” “Not
Deliverable As Addressed,” or “Items Not Approved.” (Id. ¶ 17).
Additionally, Defendants’ censorship of HRDC’s mail was done without any notice or any
opportunity to challenge the censorship decisions. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). HRDC continues, and will
continue, to try to communicate with prisoners confined in the Jail. (Id. ¶ 22).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may issue a preliminary injunction on
notice to the adverse party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff
must show that: “(1) without this relief, it will suffer ‘irreparable harm’; (2) ‘traditional legal
remedies would be inadequate’; and (3) it has some likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its
claims.” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen,
968 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020)). Once a plaintiff makes such a showing, the court proceeds to

6

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 7 of 23

a balancing analysis where the court must weigh the harm a denial of the preliminary injunction
would cause the plaintiff against the harm to the defendant if the court granted the injunction. Id.
The balancing analysis involves a “sliding scale approach.” Id. Under the sliding scale approach,
the more likely the plaintiff is to win on the merits, the less the balance of the harms needs to weigh
in plaintiff’s favor, and vice versa. Id. The Seventh Circuit has said, in cases involving the First
Amendment, “the likelihood of success on the merits will often be the determinative factor.”
Higher Society of Indiana v. Tippecanoe Cnty., Indiana, 858 F.3d 1113, 1116 (7th Cir. 2017)
(reasoning that because even a short deprivation of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable
harm, the balance of harms normally favors granting a preliminary injunction because the public
interest is not harmed by enjoining the enforcement of a policy that is probably unconstitutional).
III.

ARGUMENT

The Court should grant HRDC a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from
continuing to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights of free speech and due process because: (1)
HRDC is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims; (2) HRDC is currently suffering, and will
continue to suffer, irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; and (3) traditional legal
remedies are inadequate to compensate HRDC for the harm it is suffering. Further, issuing a
preliminary injunction would cause little, if any, harm to the Defendants, while preventing further
violations of HRDC’s constitutional rights.
A.

HRDC is Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Its Claims
1.

First Amendment Claim

A publisher’s right to send publications and other correspondence to prisoners is clearly
established. “[T]here is no question that publishers who wish to communicate with those who…
willingly seek their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to

7

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 8 of 23

prisoners.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989); see also Van den Bosch v. Raemisch,
658 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2011); Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 2000)
(acknowledging the First Amendment right of publishers to communicate with inmates); Howard
v. Braemer, No. 20-CV-1366-pp, 2021 WL 1979496, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 18, 2021) (“Those
outside of prison have an interest in corresponding with incarcerated persons”) (citing Raemisch,
658 F.3d at 785). “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections
of the Constitution,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987), nor do they bar others who are not
incarcerated “from exercising their own constitutional rights by reaching out to those on the
‘inside.’” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407.
The interests of the senders and their intended recipients are “inextricably meshed,” and
censorship of prisoner mail creates “a consequential restriction on the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of those who are not prisoners.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409-10
(1974) (“Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words on paper.
Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the addressee. Both parties to the
correspondence have an interest in securing that result….”), overruled in part on other grounds by
Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413-14 (emphasis added). “Whatever the status of a prisoner’s claim to
uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter’s interest is grounded in the
First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.” Id. at 408.
As such, to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, a prison policy must be “reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests” under the four Turner factors: (1) whether there is a
valid, rational connection between the prison regulation or action and the interest asserted by the
government, or whether the interest is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational; (2)
whether there exist alternative means to exercising the constitutional right in question; (3) what

8

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 9 of 23

impact the desired accommodation would have on the prison’s security staff, inmates, and
allocation of resources; and (4) whether there exists any obvious, easy alternatives to the
challenged regulation or action, which may suggest that it is not reasonable, but instead an
exaggerated response to prison concerns. See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 200 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-92). While this case involves free speech rights of free persons,
not prisoners, for purposes of this motion, HRDC assumes that the Court will employ the Turner
four-factor test as a means of ensuring that any injunctive relief incorporates due deference for the
demands of jail operation. As discussed below, HRDC is highly likely to prevail on each of the
Turner factors with regard to Defendants’ censorship.
a)

Defendants’ Publication Policy and Practices Are Not
Rationally Related to Any Legitimate Penological Objectives.

The first factor established by Turner to determine the validity of a jail regulation is
whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This factor is a threshold inquiry. Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010);
see also Rudebush v. Lenski, No.14-CV-169-JDP, 2016 WL 5415924, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 28,
2016) (“Defendant’s failure to make a showing under the first Turner factor is enough to doom his
motion for summary judgment.”). If a prison fails to show that its regulation is rationally related
to a legitimate penological objective, the Court does not consider the other factors. Ashker v. Cal.
Dept. of Corr., 350 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d
1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the prison restriction was not rationally related to a
legitimate penological objective and declining to consider the other Turner factors).
The logical connection between the prison regulation and the penological objective cannot
be sustained where it is “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S.
9

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 10 of 23

at 89-90. Additionally, the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one. Id. To
make a showing under Turner prison authorities must show more than “a formalistic logical
connection between a regulation and a penological objective,” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 535
(2006). Once a plaintiff presents evidence to refute a “common-sense connection” between a
legitimate interest and a prison policy, the defendant “must present enough counter-evidence to
show that the connection is not so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Frost v.
Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 357 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Prison
authorities cannot rely on general or conclusory assertions to support their policies. Rather, they
must first identify the specific penological interests involved and then demonstrate both that those
specific interests are the actual bases for their policies and that the policies are reasonably related
to the furtherance of the identified interests. An evidentiary showing is required as to each point.”
Walker v. Summer, 917 F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Caldwell v.
Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 1986) (“the governmental interest asserted in support of a
restrictive policy must be sufficiently articulated to allow for meaningful review of the regulation
in question and its effect on the inmate’s asserted rights”).
Turner allows for deference to prison officials while providing an avenue for judicial
review to ensure prison officials are not encroaching on individual’s First Amendment rights. See
Beard, 548 U.S. at 535; see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); and Jackson v.
Thurmer, 748 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1001 (W.D. Wis. 2010). As such, “[i]n order to warrant deference,
prison officials must present credible evidence to support their stated penological goals.”
Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d
546, 553 (7th Cir. 2015) (“prison officials must still articulate their legitimate governmental

10

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 11 of 23

interest in the regulation and provide some evidence supporting their concern”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, Defendants cannot satisfy the first prong of Turner. Defendants’ policy of censoring
all publications advances no legitimate penological objective. To the contrary, Defendants’
censorship of HRDC’s publications hampers the Supreme Court’s recognized penological
objective of rehabilitating prisoners. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974)) (recognizing that because “most offenders will eventually
return to society, a paramount objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of those
committed to its custody”). Inmate access to reading material and freedom to correspond with nonprisoners has been found to benefit, not hinder, the goal of rehabilitation. See Martinez, 416 U.S.
at 412 (“[T]he weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom to correspond with
outsiders advances rather than retards the goal of rehabilitation ….”); see also Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (citing the “well nigh universal belief that good books … lift
the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character”); Cline v. Fox,
319 F. Supp. 2d 685, 694 (N.D.W. Va. 2004).
The first Turner factor weighs in HRDC’s favor because Defendants’ Mail Policy mail is
not rationally related to any legitimate penological objectives. In fact, Defendants’ deprivation of
access to materials published by the HRDC, and other publishers and distributors of books and
magazines, has and will continue to harm prisoners at the Jail by frustrating the critical penological
objective of rehabilitation. Because the first Turner factor is a threshold inquiry which Defendants
cannot satisfy, the Court need not consider the remaining factors. However, even if the Court
believes that Defendants can satisfy this threshold factor, HRDC should still prevail because the
remaining Turner factors also weigh in favor of the HRDC.

11

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

b)

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 12 of 23

There Are No Alternative Avenues for HRDC to Exercise Its
First Amendment Right to Communicate Information to
Persons Incarcerated in the Jail.

The second factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a jail restriction is whether
there are alternative means available to exercise the constitutional right in question. Turner, 482
U.S. at 90. Absence of an alternative means may be seen as evidence that the prison restriction in
question is unreasonable. Beard, 548 U.S. at 532 (holding that no alternative means of
communication can be seen as “some evidence” that the prison regulations in question were
“unreasonable”). In an analogous case to the one here, involving a jail’s policy of prohibiting
prisoners from receiving books or magazines through the mail, a district court found that the
second Turner factor “clearly favor[ed Plaintiff, Prison Legal News].” Prison Legal News v. Nw.
Reg’l Jail Auth., No. 5:15-cv-00061, 2017 WL 4415659, at *6 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2017). The
court there found that the defendant’s policy “was effectively a complete ban on any prisoner being
able to obtain [Prison Legal News] publications, whether through a subscription or a gift
subscription” and “[Prison Legal News was] being denied total access to the prisoners at the jail
and [did] not have an adequate alternative method for reaching prisoners.” Id. The same is true
here with respect to HRDC.
Here, Defendants do not provide HRDC with any alternative means of effectively
communicating the content of its books and magazines to prisoners in the Jail. Defendants ban
prisoners from receiving any books or magazines, thus precluding HRDC, and all other publishers
and distributors of books and magazines, from conveying their message to prisoners in custody at
the Jail. Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (even if there are other means by
which a prisoner can obtain general information, those avenues “should not be considered a
substitute for reading newspapers and magazines”). HRDC’s monthly issues of Prison Legal News
and Criminal Legal News provide prisoners with timely, in-depth coverage of judicial decisions
12

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 13 of 23

and other recent events related to the criminal justice system in a manner that would be impossible
to attain through other means of communication. This is also true for: HRDC’s Prisoners’
Handbook, which provides prisoners information on enrolling at accredited higher educational,
vocational, and training schools; PYHS, which describes rights, protections, and legal remedies
available to prisoners; and the Habeas Citebook, which describes the procedural and substantive
complexities of federal habeas corpus litigation with the goal of identifying and litigating claims
involving ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Defendants’ current Mail Policy, HRDC has no
practical way to reach its intended audience. (Wright Decl. ¶ 33). Thus, the second Turner factor
weighs in favor of HRDC.
c)

Accommodating HRDC’s First Amendment Rights Would
Impose No Significant Burden on Jail Officials, Other Prisoners,
or Defendants’ Allocation of Resources.

The third Turner factor considers “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional
right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.”
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. When evaluating this factor, the Supreme Court has noted that the policies
followed at other institutions are instructive and relevant to a determination of the need for the
particular type of restriction. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 414 n.14. Therefore, the ability of other
institutions to effectively accommodate the constitutional right and the particular publications in
question support a court finding that the particular prison restriction is unnecessary.
For more than 35 years, HRDC has sent its publications and materials to thousands of
prisoners nationwide and beyond. (Wright Decl. ¶¶ 9-10). HRDC distributes its publications to
thousands of federal, state, and local correctional facilities throughout the United States, including
“supermax” prisons operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, without censorship. (Id. ¶ 10).
HRDC is unaware of any jail or state or federal prison where HRDC’s books have created a
security problem or burden on correctional officials or resources. (Id. ¶ 11). Some correctional
13

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 14 of 23

facilities that previously maintained publication bans have recognized, after rescinding the
problematic publication policies, that allowing prisoners to read books and magazines has
generated a “win/win” for everyone involved. Prison Legal News v. Nw. Reg’l Jail Auth., No.
5:15-cv-00061, 2019 WL 4786054, at *3 (W.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2019). The fact that thousands of
correctional institutions nationwide accommodate HRDC’s free speech rights and permit prisoners
to receive their publications without censorship is strong evidence that Defendants’ policy is
unnecessary and that the third Turner factor weighs in favor of HRDC.
d)

Defendants’ Mail Policy is an Exaggerated Response to
Perceived Security Concerns.

The fourth and final Turner factor inquires whether the restriction is an “exaggerated
response” to jail concerns. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Court has stated that “the existence of
obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable…” Id. When a
claimant can provide an alternative that fully accommodates the constitutional rights in question,
at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider this evidence that the jail
regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard. Id. at 91. Once a court finds that a
restriction is an “exaggerated response” to prison concerns, the restriction cannot stand. See id at
91, 97-99.
The fact that thousands of correctional facilities nationwide allow prisoners to receive
HRDC’s publications and other mail pieces, without creating security or other penological
problems, demonstrates that there are available alternatives to banning HRDC’s publications. See,
e.g., Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the final Turner factor
favored the publisher challenging the county jail regulation because it was undisputed that the
publisher’s magazine was already being distributed in other California county jails). The
distribution of HRDC’s books, magazines, and other communications in other facilities, including
14

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 15 of 23

at least 35 facilities in Illinois (Wright Decl. ¶ 10), demonstrates that Defendants’ publication ban
is both unnecessary and unreasonable. The Jail’s ban on books and magazines is an “exaggerated
response” to perceived security concerns, and, as such, the fourth Turner factor also weighs in
favor of HRDC.
2.

Due Process Claim

For decades the Supreme Court has recognized that a publisher’s right to communicate
with prisoners is as grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment as it is in the First Amendment.
Martinez, 416 U.S. at 418. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle and
recognized that there is a liberty interest in correspondence under both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. See, e.g., Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648, 652-653 (7th Cir. 1982) (the right to
correspond is protected by both the First and Fourteenth Amendments). The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that a correctional institution provide notice and an opportunity to challenge
each censorship decision that it makes, and this notice must be provided to both the incarcerated
person and the sender of the correspondence. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 418; see also Moyler v.
Fannin, No. 7:20-cv-00028, 2023 WL 2541131, at *8 (W.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2023).
In Montcalm Publishing Corporation v. Beck, 80 F.3d 105, 109 (4th Cir. 1996), having
recognized that the plaintiff publisher had a constitutional interest in communicating with its
inmate subscribers, the Fourth Circuit held senders of publications are entitled to procedural
protections when prisons prevent inmate-recipients from receiving the publications. The Montcalm
Court stated that providing notice and opportunity to an incarcerated person alone does not suffice
because “[a]n inmate who cannot even see the publication can hardly mount an effective challenge
to the decision to withhold that publication,” adding that while a prisoner can ask for help from
the publisher in challenging the prison authorities’ decision, “the publisher’s First Amendment

15

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 16 of 23

right must not depend on that.” Montcalm Pub. Corp., 80 F.3d at 109 (emphasis added). “Without
notifying the free citizen of the impending rejection, he would not be able to challenge the decision
which may infringe his right to free speech.” Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 244 (6th Cir. 1986);
Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 433 (10th Cir. 2004); see Cook, 238 F.3d at 1153.
Courts have upheld Plaintiff’s due process rights in circumstances similar to this case. For
example, in Human Rights Defense Center v. Southwest Virginia Jail Authority, the Court held
“HRDC was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the defendants’
interference with its First Amendment right to communicate with prisoners,” stating that the
undisputed facts show defendants violated HRDC’s due process rights “by failing to give notice
of confiscations, giving inadequate notice, and not providing a reasonable opportunity to appeal.”
Human Rights Defense Center v. Southwest Virginia Jail Authority, 396 F. Supp. 3d 607, 625
(W.D. Va. 2019). In Prison Legal News v. Northwestern Regional Jail Authority, the court held
that the defendant violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by failing to consistently provide Plaintiff
notice that its mail was being rejected, and by failing to advise Plaintiff of any way to appeal the
rejection. See 2017 WL 4415659, at *12.
The constitutional mandate for publishers to have an opportunity to be heard and challenge
censorship decisions that affect their First Amendment rights is crucial. Among other things,
without such procedural protections, publishers cannot assist subscribers, who might not otherwise
be aware of the substance of the rejected correspondence, in filing challenges to such violations
within their correctional grievance system. See Montcalm, 80 F.3d at 108-109. Publishers and
prisoners cannot know what correspondence is being censored and effectively challenge the
censorship if correctional facilities are permitted to reject items without notice. Id. HRDC simply

16

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 17 of 23

asks Defendants to provide due process when Defendants censor publications or other
correspondence.
Defendants are constitutionally mandated to afford due process protections to publishers
when censoring prisoner mail. They have plainly failed to do so here. To date, for all rejected
material at issue, HRDC received no notice when its publications were censored. (Wright Decl. ¶
20). HRDC was not provided any reason for the censorship, nor an avenue or opportunity to
challenge the rejection of its mail by the Jail. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). As a result, Defendants have
repeatedly violated HRDC’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
B.

Defendants’ Constitutional Violations Are Causing HRDC to Suffer
Irreparable Harm.

As the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit have stated, “[t]he loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (emphasis added); Joelner v. Village of Washington Park,
Illinois, 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Elrod). The loss of First Amendment rights is
presumed to cause irreparable harm based on “the intangible nature of the benefits flowing from
the exercise of those rights; and the fear that, if those rights are not jealously safeguarded, persons
will be deterred, even if imperceptibly, from exercising those rights in the future.” Ezell v. City of
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, courts have repeatedly found irreparable harm based on the denial of First
Amendment rights in correctional settings. See, e.g., Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258, 277 (6th Cir.
2009) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction against prison mail policy); Prison Legal News v.
Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 699-700 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of permanent injunction of prison
ban on non-subscription bulk mail and catalogs requested by incarcerated person); Human Rights
Defense Center v. Sw. Va. Reg’l Jail Auth., No. 1:18CV00013, 2018 WL 3239299, at *6 (W.D.
17

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 18 of 23

Va. July 3, 2018) (granting preliminary injunction against jail authority’s ban on staples); Prison
Legal News v. Cnty. of Ventura, No. CV 14–773–GHK (ex), 2014 WL 2519402, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
May 29, 2014) (granting preliminary injunction against jail’s postcard-only policy); Mem. Opinion
and Order, Prison Legal News v. Betterton, No. 2:12-CV-00699-JRG, (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2013),
Dkt. No. 59 at 13-15 (granting preliminary injunction against jail’s impermissibly vague and
arbitrary policy on mail censorship and inadequate appeals process); Prison Legal News v. Cnty.
of Sacramento, No. 2:11-CV-00907 JAM-DAD, 2012 WL 1075852, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012)
(granting preliminary injunction against jail’s ban on staples).
The irreparable harm suffered by HRDC is concrete, severe, and ongoing. Defendants will
continue to censor HRDC’s mailings to prisoners, without due process, thwarting HRDC’s
protected speech on critical subjects like government policies, the civil and legal rights of
prisoners, jail conditions, and the criminal justice system. HRDC’s irreparable harm is exacerbated
because Prison Legal News and Criminal Legal News report on current newsworthy topics on a
monthly basis. (Wright Decl. ¶¶ 4-5). The passage of time depletes the publications’ news value.
(Id. ¶ 6). Accordingly, HRDC will continue to suffer irreparable harm without a preliminary
injunction and this factor weighs in favor of granting HRDC’s preliminary injunction.
C.

Traditional Remedies are Not Adequate to Prevent the Harm to HRDC.

Traditional remedies are inadequate to compensate plaintiffs when constitutional rights are
violated and damages are difficult to quantify or rectify. ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583,
589 (7th Cir. 2012). Similar to many First Amendment cases, the damages to HRDC are difficult
to quantify, and therefore damages are not an adequate remedy in this case. HRDC seeks damages
for: (1) the suppression of its speech; (2) the impediment of its ability to disseminate its message;
(3) the frustration of its non-profit organizational mission; (4) the loss of potential subscribers and

18

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 19 of 23

customers; and (5) the inability to recruit new subscribers and supporters. (Complaint ¶ 35).
Damages of this sort cannot be calculated by easy reference to formula or invoice amount; rather,
they require intricate analysis and the quantification of the abstract ideas that constitute the rights
and liberties afforded by the constitution. Consequently, it is more effective to prevent the damage
in the first place, instead of attempting to put a number on them after the fact. This factor weighs
in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.
D.

The Balance of Equities Weighs in HRDC’s Favor.

Because HRDC has shown that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction under the first three
Turner factors, the Court “must weigh the harm the denial of the preliminary injunction would
cause the plaintiff against the harm to the defendant if the court were to grant it.” Mays, 974 F.3d
at 818. Here, any potential injuries to Defendants are minimal and speculative. There is no great
cost or expenditure of time required to change the current policy to allow HRDC to deliver its
publications to prisoners and afford HRDC its constitutionally mandated due process. As discussed
above, thousands of correctional institutions nationwide, including prisons and jails throughout
Illinois, have policies that both allow HRDC publications and afford HRDC its right to due process
with regard to rejected mail. This demonstrates that there would be no substantial harm to
Defendants if they were enjoined from enforcing the mail policy currently in effect.
In contrast, as explained above, the irreparable harm suffered by HRDC is concrete, severe,
and ongoing. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The restrictions
involved apparently do not significantly reduce the risk of fire or damage to jail facilities. On the
other hand, pretrial detainees, regardless of the length of detention, suffer substantial deprivation
of their first amendment rights when access to newspapers, books and magazines is arbitrarily
circumscribed.”) As a result, the balance of equities leans in HRDC’s favor given the irreparable

19

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 20 of 23

harm suffered by HRDC in the absence of a preliminary injunction, and the minimal effort
necessary to vindicate its rights under the Fist and Fourteenth Amendments.
E.

The Bond Requirement Should Be Waived.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), district courts have discretion to determine
the amount of the bond accompanying a preliminary injunction, and this includes the authority to
set no bond, or only a nominal bond. Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 458
(7th Cir. 2010); see also Anderson v. Hansen, 489 F. Supp. 3d 836, 846 (E.D. Wis. 2020). HRDC
is a small non-profit organization of twelve employees that would be unable to post anything more
than a nominal bond. (Wright Decl. ¶ 34). A bond requirement would effectively deny access to
judicial review for HRDC, which is especially harmful here, because HRDC is alleging violations
of its fundamental rights under the Constitution. See Complete Angler, LLC v. City of Clearwater,
Fla., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“Waiving the bond requirement is particularly
appropriate where a plaintiff alleges the infringement of a fundamental constitutional right.”); see
also Koons v. Platkin, 673 F. Supp. 3d 515, 670-71 (D.N.J. 2023) (appeal pending). Further,
Defendants would not incur damages if an injunction is issued. Accordingly, waiving the bond
requirement is appropriate in this case.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, HRDC is likely to succeed on the merits of its constitutional claims.
HRDC is suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable harm to its First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and HRDC lacks any adequate remedy at law to address the ongoing violations
of its constitutional rights. Finally, any harm to the Defendants if an injunction were issued would
be negligible, if at all existent. For these reasons, HRDC respectfully requests that this Court grant
its motion for preliminary injunctive relief, waive the bond requirement, and enjoin the Defendants
from censoring HRDC’s mail and publications from the Jail during the pendency of this litigation.
20

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

Dated: September 2, 2025

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 21 of 23

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Caryn C. Lederer
Caryn C. Lederer
State Bar No. 6304495
Elizabeth Mazur
State Bar No. 6290163
Kate Schwartz
State Bar No. 6310130
HUGHES SOCOL PIERS RESNICK & DYM
70 W. Madison St., Suite 4000
Chicago, IL 60602
Telephone: (312) 604-2726
emazur@hsplegal.com
clederer@hsplegal.com
kschwartz@hsplegal.com
Jonathan Picard*
Florida Bar No.: 105477
HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER
P.O. Box 1151
Lake Worth, FL 33460
Telephone: (561) 360-2523
Facsimile: (561) 828-8166
jpicard@humanrightsdefensecenter.org
Attorneys for Human Rights Defense Center
*Admission pending

21

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 22 of 23

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This memorandum complies with the type volume limitation of Rule 7.1(B)(4)(c) of the
Local Rules for the United States District Court Central District of Illinois because it contains
6,260 words.
/s/ Caryn C. Lederer
Caryn C. Lederer

22

1:25-cv-01369-JEH-RLH

#5

Filed: 09/02/25

Page 23 of 23

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, an attorney, certifies that on September 2, 2025, she caused the foregoing
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum and accompanying
Declaration of Paul Wright and its exhibits to be sent to the Peoria County State’s Attorney via
email, with subsequent telephone notification, and via FedEx overnight mail at the email address
and address listed below.
Jodi Hoos
Peoria County State's Attorney
324 Main Street
Room 111
Peoria, IL 61602
(309) 672-6900
sao@peoriacounty.org
/s/ Caryn C. Lederer
One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys