by Sagi Schwartzberg

In an issue of first impression, the Supreme Court of Maryland held that under the plain language of the Public Defender Act (“Act”), when the Office of the Public Defender (“OPD”) authorizes an attorney to file a petition for a writ of certiorari and the attorney accepts that responsibility, the indigent defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel even absent a general right to counsel for discretionary appeals – because Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure (“CP”) § 16-201(2) establishes the State’s unqualified policy to “assure the effective assistance” of counsel to indigent individuals in criminal proceedings. The Court further held that counsel’s failure to file the authorized petition constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and prejudice was established by the defendant’s loss of the opportunity to have the petition considered, without requiring a showing that the petition would have been granted.

Background

On March 1, 2010, Walter Bishop, a man hired by Karla Porter, shot and killed her husband, William Porter. An investigation into the shooting revealed a conspiracy to kill William involving several individuals. Defendant Seamus C. Coyle, Karla’s nephew, introduced Karla to his co-worker Bishop, who agreed to and committed the murder. Coyle was charged as an accessory before the fact.

At trial, Coyle testified in his own defense that he had no involvement in the murder and never believed Karla would seriously attempt to have her husband killed. The jury found him guilty on all charges. After his motion for a new trial was denied, on June 18, 2012, the circuit court sentenced Coyle to life imprisonment for murder, 25 years concurrent for conspiracy to commit murder, and five years concurrent for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.

On July 6, 2012, Coyle’s trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal. On August 7, 2012, Brian M. Saccenti, then Acting Chief Attorney of the OPD Appellate Division, entered his appearance for purposes of the appeal only. Subsequently, OPD assigned a panel attorney, Brian T. Edmunds, to represent Coyle on appeal. On July 11, 2014, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed Coyle’s convictions.

On June 29, 2020, Coyle filed a petition for postconviction relief contending that Edmunds rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari (“Petition”). At the October 22, 2020 hearing, Coyle’s postconviction counsel submitted an affidavit written and signed by Edmunds. In the affidavit, Edmunds averred that he had discussed filing the Petition with both OPD and Coyle and was authorized to file it. Edmunds stated that he believed the Appellate Court erred and believed some of the issues presented questions for which the Petition should be granted. Edmunds further averred that he had prepared the Petition, which was attached as an exhibit, but failed to timely file it due to various difficulties. He described having to inform Coyle of his failure as one of the “worst professional experiences of [his] career.”

On March 18, 2021, the circuit court denied Coyle’s petition for postconviction relief. On April 19, 2021, Coyle filed an application for leave to appeal, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel under CP § 16-204. The Appellate Court granted Mr. Coyle’s application for leave to appeal.

On March 25, 2024, the Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of relief. On May 6, 2024, Coyle petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of Maryland granted on August 27, 2024.

Analysis

The Court stated that the issues before it were: (1) whether Coyle was entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari when the OPD appointed counsel and approved counsel’s determination that the petition should be filed and (2) whether prejudice is presumed when, due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Coyle was denied the right to file the petition, or whether Coyle must establish the petition would have been granted.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo, the Court observed. State v. Krikstan, 290 A.3d 974 (Md. 2023). The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the actual intent of the General Assembly. State v. Bey, 156 A.3d 873 (Md. 2017). Courts begin by examining the normal, plain meaning of the statute to determine whether the language is unambiguous, presuming that the legislature “meant what it said and said what it meant.” In re M.P., 314 A.3d 348 (Md. 2024). If the language is unambiguous, courts apply it as written, neither adding nor deleting language to reflect an alternate intent. Bey. This typically ends the analysis without resort to other rules of construction. Courts interpret statutes as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage or meaningless. Woodlin v. State, 298 A.3d 834 (Md. 2023).

The Public Defender Act

The Court examined the relevant provisions of the Act. CP § 16-201(1) provides that it is the policy of the State to “provide for the realization of the constitutional guarantees of counsel in the representation of indigent individuals” in criminal proceedings. CP § 16-201(2) expressly states that it is the policy of the State to “assure the effective assistance and continuity of counsel to indigent accused individuals taken into custody and indigent individuals in criminal and juvenile proceedings before the courts of the State.”

CP § 16-208(c)(1) provides that the “primary duty of a panel attorney is to the indigent individual represented by the panel attorney with the same effect and purpose as though privately engaged by that individual.” CP § 16-205 provides that representation “shall continue until the final disposition of the case or until the assigned attorney is relieved by the Public Defender or order of the court.”

The Court concluded that CP § 16-201 gives effect to the State’s policy of both providing the “constitutional guarantees of counsel” and assuring “the effective assistance” of counsel to indigent people in criminal proceedings. A plain reading of CP § 16-201(2) does not link the goal of assuring effective assistance to defendants having a right to counsel under the Act, and it “leaves no ambiguity as to the General Assembly’s intent that indigent defendants be guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel in criminal and juvenile proceedings,” the Court reasoned.

Therefore, under the plain language of the Act, where an attorney is authorized to represent an indigent defendant and takes responsibility for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari, the attorney must render effective assistance of counsel, the Court determined. Importantly, the Court clarified that its holding does not entitle a defendant to representation in the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari; rather, it is only where an attorney is authorized or designated by the OPD under the Act to file such petition – and the attorney is aware of and has accepted the assignment – that the indigent defendant is entitled to effective assistance.

The Court reasoned that to interpret the policy of providing effective assistance as derivative of a right to counsel would render the language in CP § 16-201(2) meaningless or surplusage. Such an interpretation would also produce an illogical outcome: where a right to representation exists under the Act, a panel attorney must provide effective assistance, but where appointment is discretionary, the panel attorney would not be required to provide effective assistance. This would contradict the State’s policy to provide effective assistance to indigent individuals in criminal proceedings.

The Court determined that the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law concerning the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in discretionary appellate proceedings does not govern this case. In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in discretionary state or federal court proceedings. In Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that because a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary appeals, counsel’s failure to timely file could not deprive the defendant of effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment.

The Court concluded these cases do not control because Coyle’s claim arises under the Maryland Public Defender Act, not the U.S. Constitution.

Instead, the Court relied on State v. Flansburg, 694 A.2d 462 (Md. 1997), which concluded that entitlement to assistance of counsel in connection with a motion for modification of sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(b) “would be hollow indeed unless the assistance were required to be effective.” By analogy, where an attorney is designated by the OPD pursuant to its discretionary authority under the Act, the representation would similarly be meaningless unless effective assistance was required.

Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Analysis

The Court noted that review of a postconviction court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact. Harris v. State, 496 A.2d 1074 (Md. 1985). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. State v. Syed, 204 A.3d 139 (Md. 2019). Under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Both parts must be satisfied.

Regarding deficient performance, Edmunds was authorized by OPD to file the petition, he accepted that responsibility, and he believed the case presented issues warranting certiorari review. Yet he failed to complete the petition by the due date and ultimately did not file it, not as a strategic decision but due to personal difficulties. The Court concluded this conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, satisfying the first prong of Strickland.

Generally, to establish prejudice, a petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed an “unusual” case where counsel’s deficient performance was not at a judicial proceeding but rather led to “the forfeiture of a proceeding itself,” holding that when counsel’s deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective assistance claim.

Applying Flansburg, where the court held that counsel’s failure to file a motion for modification resulted in the loss of “any opportunity to have a reconsideration of sentence hearing” without requiring the defendant to demonstrate the motion would have been granted, the Court concluded that Coyle need not demonstrate his certiorari petition would have been granted. Prejudice was established by showing that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in the loss of the opportunity to have a petition considered.

The Court explicitly declined to presume prejudice. Instead, it concluded that Coyle satisfied the Strickland prejudice requirement by demonstrating that his attorney was authorized by OPD to file the petition, his attorney accepted the responsibility, and due to his attorney’s deficient performance, he lost the opportunity to have the petition considered. Where there is such a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the attorney’s deficiency and prejudice, the defendant has satisfied Strickland, the Court declared.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and ordered that Coyle may file a belated petition for a writ of certiorari no later than 30 days after the date of the opinion or 15 days after issuance of the mandate, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-302. See: Coyle v. State, 335 A.3d 923 (Md. 2025).  

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