by Sagi Schwartzberg

Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court of Washington vacated a second-degree murder conviction and held that the trial court committed multiple reversible errors in a case involving a 16-year-old defendant. The Court ruled that the defendant did not validly waive her constitutional rights before a custodial interrogation because the State failed to demonstrate she sufficiently understood those rights, despite receiving a verbal Miranda warning. The Court further held that the trial court erroneously excluded a social media image the defendant believed showed the victim threatening her with gang violence, violating her right to present a defense.

Background

In January 2021, Lola Felipa Luna, who had recently turned 16, became involved in a fatal altercation with S.P.T., another 16-year-old girl she knew only through social media. The confrontation started when S.P.T. contacted a mutual acquaintance, H.D., expressing a desire to fight Luna over prior “drama,” including a brief mall fight between Luna and H.D. months earlier. H.D. texted Luna requesting a fight, and Luna responded by providing her home address, believing she could resolve matters without violence. Unbeknownst to Luna, H.D. forwarded the address to S.P.T., who traveled to Luna’s home.

Before stepping outside, Luna retrieved a pocketknife she testified she routinely carried for protection. When S.P.T. arrived and a verbal altercation ensued, Luna concealed the opened knife behind her back. S.P.T. initiated physical contact by punching Luna in the head. Luna responded by stabbing S.P.T. with the pocketknife. The fight lasted less than one minute, during which S.P.T. punched Luna approximately 38 times while Luna slashed or stabbed S.P.T. approximately 27 times. S.P.T. subsequently died from her injuries.

Police arrested Luna approximately 20 to 30 minutes after the fight and transported her to the police station. Luna’s mother demanded that she or an attorney be present before any questioning. This request was never communicated to interrogators. Luna complained of head pain, light-headedness, dizziness, and feeling like “the room was at a slant.” Medical personnel checked her vital signs but administered no tests and cleared her for interrogation.

A detective read Luna a verbal Miranda warning with juvenile-specific language, and she indicated she understood. He provided no written warning, no form to sign, and did not inform her she could have her mother present. Luna testified she did not fully understand what it meant for statements to be “used against” her, did not know how to request an attorney, and believed she had to comply with the detective’s instructions. She had never previously been arrested, given Miranda warnings, or subjected to custodial interrogation.

The State charged Luna with three alternative counts of murder. At trial, the court admitted Luna’s social media posts, including a Halloween video referencing the movie The Purge showing her stabbing a knife toward the camera, and a comment about having “stabbing energy.” The court also admitted a video of Luna’s earlier mall fight with H.D. under the res gestae exception, which permits evidence of other acts to “complete the story” of the charged crime by providing immediate contextual background for the jury. However, the court excluded a social media image Luna received before the fight of a text claiming to put a “green light” on Luna and stating S.P.T. had “a whole gang ready to take Luna out,” finding insufficient foundation and hearsay concerns.

A jury found Luna not guilty of premeditated murder but guilty of intentional second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while the Purge video and “stabbing energy” comment were erroneously admitted, the error was harmless.

Analysis

Retroactivity of RCW 13.40.740

Luna argued that RCW 13.40.740, which requires law enforcement to provide juveniles access to attorney consultation before any waiver of constitutional rights during custodial interrogation, should apply to exclude her statements. The statute was enacted in 2021 and became effective on January 1, 2022, after Luna’s January 2021 interrogation.

The Court determined that the triggering event for the statute’s application is law enforcement’s act of seeking a constitutional waiver without providing attorney access, not the subsequent attempt to admit statements at trial. Because Luna’s interrogation occurred before the statute’s effective date, application would be retroactive.

Addressing whether the statute should nonetheless apply retroactively, the Court explained that while remedial statutes may apply retroactively, this exception “refers to statutes that prescribe a new or different remedy for a preexisting right, not those that grant a new right (or establish a new liability) with an accompanying remedy.” The Court concluded that RCW 13.40.740 creates a new substantive right to attorney consultation, not a remedy for preexisting constitutional protections, because “state and federal courts have long held that a defendant may validly waive the right against self-incrimination though they have yet to consult with an attorney.” Thus, the Court ruled that the statute does not apply retroactively.

Constitutional Validity
of Luna’s Miranda Waiver

The Court then addressed whether Luna validly waived her constitutional rights, applying the totality of circumstances test. Under this framework, courts assess “the defendant’s condition, age, and experience, and the conduct of police” to determine whether waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1996); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The inquiry has “two distinct dimensions”: first, whether the waiver “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception”; and second, whether it “was made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).

The Court stated that “there is no presumption in favor of a waiver of constitutional rights” and that the State bears a “heavy burden” to demonstrate valid waiver. State v. Emmett, 463 P.2d 609 (Wash. 1970); see also Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882). Distinguishing between a defendant appearing to understand rights and actually understanding them, the Court stated: “If substantial evidence shows only that the defendant appeared to understand their rights, not that they in fact understood those rights, then the State has not met its ‘heavy burden of proof’ for a valid waiver.”

The Court concluded that several objective facts weighed against finding Luna actually understood her rights: she had recently turned 16; she had never been questioned as a suspect, given Miranda warnings, or exercised her rights before; and she had just sustained dozens of blows to her head. Luna testified she did not fully understand what it meant for statements to be used against her, did not know how to request an attorney, and believed she had to comply with the detective.

The Court cited research showing that “44.8% of juveniles, as compared to 14.6% of adults, misunderstood their right to consult an attorney,” and that “61.8% of juveniles, as compared to 21.7% of adults, did not recognize that a judge could not penalize an individual for invoking their right to silence.” The Court stated that these findings “resonate with Luna’s testimony.”

The trial court had relied primarily on facts showing the detective’s compliance with Miranda’s minimum requirements. The Court found this insufficient, quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948): “Formulas of respect for constitutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them.” The absence of additional measures – such as comprehension questions or explaining how to request counsel – left “an insufficient factual basis to conclude that Luna, a 16 year old suffering recent head trauma with no prior experience as a target of police interrogation, had more than a surface level understanding of her rights,” according to the Court.

Exclusion of the
“Green Light” Image

Luna sought to admit the “green light” image not for its truth but for its effect on her state of mind, a nonhearsay purpose relevant to self-defense. The Court explained that for evidence offered to show a defendant’s subjective fear, foundation analysis differs from evidence offered to establish objective facts. Luna’s testimony that she believed the image showed S.P.T. threatening her “made the evidence tendered relevant and material” to her defense. The inability to identify the sender or attribute the text to S.P.T. was not dispositive because Luna’s testimony “provided sufficient evidence to find that she honestly believed the image to be a threat.”

Applying the constitutional balancing test for right-to-present-a-defense claims, the Court found the image “was the single most probative piece of evidence offered to show her reasonable fear of S.P.T.” Excluding it “effectively prevented Luna from explaining to the jury not only the true extent of her fear but why that fear was reasonable.” The State presented no compelling interest justifying exclusion.

Admission of the Mall Fight Video Under Res Gestae

The Court clarified that res gestae, which permits admission of evidence of other bad acts to “complete the story of the crime by establishing the immediate time and place of its occurrence,” requires temporal proximity and a contextual connection to the defendant’s actions in relation to the charged offense. Here, the mall fight occurred months before the charged offense (roughly six months earlier) and at a different location.

The Court disapproved Court of Appeals cases suggesting res gestae falls outside ER 404(b)’s scope, stating: “ER 404(b) plainly addresses all evidence of a person’s ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts,’ whether criminal or not, close or far in time.” The trial court abused its discretion by applying an erroneous interpretation of the doctrine.

Conclusion

Thus, the Court held that RCW 13.40.740 does not apply retroactively but that Luna’s constitutional rights were violated by admission of interrogation evidence obtained without valid waiver, exclusion of defense evidence central to her reasonable-fear argument, and admission of prejudicial character evidence under a misapplied res gestae doctrine.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the jury verdict and remanded for further proceedings. See: State v. Luna, 578 P.3d 273 (Wash. 2025) (en banc).  

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