by Sagi Schwartzberg

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that when a defendant’s term of confinement comprises multiple consecutive sentences and one or more underlying convictions is vacated while at least one valid sentence remains, Maryland Code Ann., Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) § 6-218(d) requires that the defendant receive credit for time served immediately upon vacatur, calculated from the commencement date of the first invalidated sentence. The Court further held that CP § 6-218(c) governs any residual credit remaining after subsection (d) has been applied when a subsequent reprosecution yields a new conviction. Additionally, the Court ruled that sentences arising from new convictions obtained through reprosecution occupy the final position in any consecutive sentencing sequence and that the sentencing judge imposing such sentences holds the last position in what Maryland courts term the sentencing “batting order.”

Background

Amondre Clark received sentences in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in January 2016 totaling 26 years, with all but 13 years suspended, arising from firearm- and burglary-related convictions in three separate cases. In February 2016, Clark received an additional three years and six months for a probation violation, to run consecutive to the earlier sentences. In October 2022, Clark received a one-year-and-one-day sentence in Washington County, ordered consecutive to all outstanding sentences. Designating these sentences sequentially as A through E, Clark’s active sentences totaled 17 years, six months, and one day.

On October 20, 2023, the Circuit Court granted Clark’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, determining that Clark had entered a binding plea agreement promising a 15-year incarceration cap but received 26 years. Clark elected to withdraw his guilty pleas rather than seek specific enforcement. The court withdrew the pleas and held Clark without bond pending new trials. This vacated the convictions underlying sentences A, B, and C, while sentences D and E remained valid.

The Division of Correction (“Division”) did not execute sentences D and E upon the vacatur. Instead, the Division tolled those sentences pending disposition of the reprosecution. On April 17, 2024, Clark pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and received what the sentencing court characterized as a “time served” sentence of eight years, eight months, and 26 days. The sentencing transcript reflected that all parties, including the court, expected Clark’s immediate release. The State entered nolle prosequis in the remaining two cases.

The Division refused to release Clark. Rather than treating the April 17 sentence as a new judgment, the Division characterized it as a “replacement sentence” for former sentence B and attached the previously tolled sentences D and E consecutively to it. This calculation yielded a maximum release date of October 2028.

Clark filed a habeas corpus petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The habeas court granted relief and ordered Clark’s immediate release, concluding that the Division had violated CP § 6-218(d) by failing to execute sentences D and E when Clark’s convictions were vacated. The Division timely appealed, and the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari.

Analysis

The Court observed that CP § 6-218 is a comprehensive statute addressing various contexts for crediting time spent in custody. Subsection (d) addresses defendants serving multiple sentences where one sentence is set aside through direct or collateral attack, mandating credit for all time served under the invalidated sentence against remaining valid sentences. Subsection (c) addresses defendants whose sentences are set aside and who face reprosecution or resentencing, requiring credit for time served under the prior sentence against any new sentence imposed.

The General Assembly enacted the predecessor statute to eliminate what courts have termed “dead time,” periods of custody that would otherwise receive no credit against any valid sentence. See Fleeger v. State, 482 A.2d 490 (Md. 1984). The Court stated that this objective of ensuring day-for-day accounting for all custody time guided its analysis throughout.

Application of Subsection (d)
Upon Vacatur of Convictions

The Court determined that Clark’s circumstances fell squarely within subsection (d)’s plain language. His convictions underlying sentences A, B, and C were vacated on October 20, 2023, at which point he became entitled to credit against his remaining valid sentences. The Court stated that the statute’s use of “shall” establishes a mandatory obligation, leaving the Division without discretion to withhold credit pending reprosecution.

Had the Division properly applied subsection (d), sentence D would have commenced from July 24, 2015, the start date of the first invalidated sentence, followed by sentence E. Under this calculation, Clark’s Division term would have expired by October 2023, requiring his transfer to county detention pending readjudication, the Court explained.

The Court rejected the Division’s argument that subsection (c) exclusively governs where reprosecution remains possible. Nothing in subsection (d)’s text permits tolling the next valid sentence to await a new conviction under subsection (c), the Court reasoned. The two provisions operate in tandem. Subsection (d) applies immediately upon vacatur, while subsection (c) addresses any residual credit after subsection (d) has been satisfied should reprosecution produce a new conviction, according to the Court.

The Division’s interpretation would produce results inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, the Court observed. Reprosecution or retrial may require months or years, during which a defendant would receive no credit for time served on vacated convictions. Additionally, the Division’s approach fails to account for dispositions other than conviction – as occurred in the present case, where the State nolle prossed two of three cases.

The Court stated that the Division’s tolling policy contravenes foundational criminal justice principles. When convictions are vacated, the defendant returns to the legal position of one awaiting trial. See Alston v. State, 40 A.3d 1028 (Md. 2012). The slate is “wholly nullified” and “wiped clean.” See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). This clean slate rule undergirds the State’s ability to retry defendants without offending double jeopardy principles, the Court noted. Id. The Division’s policy of withholding credit pending potential reconviction is incompatible with this doctrine and with the defendant’s restored presumption of innocence. Vigna v. State, 235 A.3d 937 (Md. 2020).

Sentencing Batting Order

The Court distinguished its prior decision in Scott v. State, 164 A.3d 177 (Md. 2017), which addressed vacated sentences where the underlying conviction remained intact, from circumstances where the conviction itself has been nullified. Scott addressed a vacated sentence where the underlying conviction remained intact, preserving the conviction’s function as a placeholder in the sentencing sequence for the resentencing court’s new penalty determination. The Court explained that this reasoning does not extend to vacated convictions, which are entirely erased and leave no shell or placeholder for subsequent sentences.

The Court explained that when a conviction is vacated, remaining consecutive sentences drop down to replace the invalidated sentences, calculated as though the first remaining valid sentence began when the first invalidated sentence commenced. Any new sentence arising from reprosecution constitutes an entirely new link in the chain, taking last place because it did not exist when the earlier sentences were imposed.

This sequencing comports with the “batting order” principles that Maryland courts have recognized for over four decades, according to the Court. See State v. White, 398 A.2d 433 (Md. App. Ct. 1979). A sentencing judge imposing a new sentence upon a new conviction takes the final position in the batting order and may make that sentence concurrent or consecutive to any then-existing sentences, a discretionary determination that the Division’s reordering policy impermissibly usurps.

Although the Court agreed with the habeas court’s legal conclusions, the sentencing record did not clarify whether the sentencing judge accounted for the valid consecutive sentences when imposing the “time served” sentence. The transcript reflected expectations of immediate release, yet sentences D and E were never discussed. The Court noted that if subsection (d) had been properly applied, four years, six months, and one day of credit would have been allocated to sentences D and E, leaving just over four years of credit for the new sentence, not the eight years, eight months, and 26 days the court announced.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated the habeas court’s judgment and remanded the case to the habeas court with instructions to vacate the April 17, 2024, sentence and remand the petition to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County so the sentencing court can exercise its discretion with a full and complete understanding of the status of the valid sentences. See: Bivens v. Clark, 339 A.3d 931 (Md. 2025).  

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