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Arizona Doc Memo Re Aspc Kingman Environmental Observations 2010

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ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
INSPECTOR GENERAL BUREAU
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Greg Lauchner, Inspector General, ADC

FROM:

Kyle Fouts, Bureau Administrator, Inspections

DATE:

November 22,2010

SUBJECT:

Environmental observations - ASPC Kingman

During the week of November 15th -19th , 2010, members of the Inspections Unit
conducted a site inspection at the MTC facility in Kingman, Arizona. While the primary
goal of the evaluation was to determine the level of MTC's compliance with ADC policy
and procedure, our staff performed a secondary inspection in an effort to review
environmental issues at the complex. The following results were based upon our
verification of MTC corrective action plans, submitted in response to previous site
inspections.
~

The zone alarms for the area around the Cerbat vehicle sally port were found to
be alarming on a continuous basis, as the area could not be by-passed via the
control room during active periods. As a result, staff can become accustomed to
this zone being constantly in a state of alarm.

~

Security device repairs were found to be delayed for numerous reasons, and in
some cases were taking in excess of 20 days to complete.

~

Class B yard tools (wheelbarrow, shovels, and a rake) were found unaccounted
for at the Cerbat Unit, and security staff / supervisors took no action to resolve
the discrepancy.

~

Security staff was observed in possession of "convenience" keys which allowed
access between fenced areas of both units. In example, spline / gate officers
keyed members of the inspection team across yards, or into the Hualapai spline
area, in the presence of inmates.

~

Cerbat security and programs staff / supervisors were observed leaving a
security door leading into the administration building from fenced yard side area
unsecured by allowing the bolt to remain extended, with the door resting against
the door frame.

~

Fire detection alarm panels were found to be in "trouble silence" mode in every
area where these panels were inspected. This appears to be an issue across the
entire complex.

~

Inspection team members had concern with the lack of "command presence" of
middle managers during both routine tours, and the incident on the evening of
November 18th •

~

Security lights found to be non-functional on 9/28/10 were not repaired until
11/18/10, and only after the detailed involvement of the inspection team leader.
While the lights did function during the alarm activation, 75% of the lighting
would not work when simply turned on from the main control panel.

~

Staff on both units need additional practice with weapons associated with a
DART response. During monitored drills, all staff had difficulty in demonstrating
proficiency with weaponry and munitions.

~

During the evaluation period, perimeter staff failed several security challenges
specific to tracks placed in the perimeter sand traps on both units.

~

Inmate grooming compliance in both units remain an on-going issue. During
various tours, approximately 20% of the inmate population was found to be out
of compliance, with the most common issue being failure to display an
identification card properly.

~

D.O. 704 compliance remains an issue in both units as violations were observed
during various tours of all inmate living areas.

~

Excessive hobby craft items were found in living areas in both units, more so in
Cerbat, and to a lesser degree on Hualapai.

~

Staff post orders for numerous locations were found to be lacking specific detail
associated with the post in question. For example, perimeter post orders were
either very vague, or did not speak to use of vehicle turn-outs, emergency
response, or the ability of staff to use vehicle windows.

~

Additional training is necessary in regard to perimeter intrusions, based upon
staff failure to detect tracks in the perimeter, and discussions with perimeter
officers where the majority of these individuals had difficulty speaking to
acceptable corrections practices attributed to a perimeter patrol role.

~

Egress pOints were challenged during the course of the inspection, either by
purpose of the inspections team, or by the heavy flow of MTC staff arriving for

shift change. In every case, repeated security failures / violations were observed
as the lobby officers appeared to be overwhelmed by the heavy traffic.
~

Several buildings were observed to have awnings / shade structures attached,
which are in need of razor ribbon to control unauthorized access.

~

Dining room doors were found unsecured, and unmonitored on the Cerbat Unit.

~

MTC staff on both units were continuously being provided instruction regarding
egress protocols during their entry into the unit. This occurred on all three shifts,
more so during the swings and graveyard shift. These observations led the
inspections team members to believe the practice was new, and not a common
occurrence.

~

Inmate workers continue to access the Hualapai perimeter road when traveling
from the Cerbat Unit, to the ACI / Complex work locations.

~

Ice storage machines were found on the yard at Hualapai, which pose a security
concern as these can be used to aid in unauthorized access to building rooftops.
While some of these machines had been moved to the perimeter side of the
inner unit fences, two remained on the yard.

~

Sweat lodges remain in the "no-man's" areas, in various stages of readiness,
however none were functional and in use at the time of the site inspection.

~

Metal horseshoes were found being used by inmates at Cerbat.

~

The Hualapai Unit continues to schedule recreation turn-outs for all three
recreation yards at the same time.

~

During the formal counts monitored on both units, the count officer cleared the
count instead of the shift commander.

~

Unit trash compactors were found locked, but are not enclosed in a fenced area.

~

Ammunition and weapons inventories in both units were found to have
procedural errors in either munitions totals, or weapon counts.

~

A master inventory was not affixed to the armory entrance.

~

Food items were found stored under cooling units / fans in the kitchens of both
units.

~

Signage has not been installed on the freeway noting the proximity to a prison
complex.

The findings listed below were identified based upon the inspection teams use of the
current Inspector General Inspection Unit evaluation instrument.
~

Perimeter consistency was approximately 75% sand, and 25% soil, which did
not allow for clear impressions of tracks.

~

Instructions for perimeter operations are vague, specifically in respect to escape
response, and/or emergency procedures.

~

Perimeter patrols are in need of low level "bumper" lights allowing for better
illumination of the perimeter, as hand held spotlights were ineffective.

~

All units failed security challenges in the form of tracks being set in the drag
areas, on both the swing and graveyard shifts.

~

Perimeter post orders are in need of additional information and direction for
staff in regard to emergency response and escape procedures, as the current
level of direction is too vague.

~

Food items were observed stored under cooling units and condensers in both
units.

~

"wet nesting" of clean food trays was observed in both units.

~

Inmates were not required to pass through a metal detector when entering or
exiting from housing units.

~

Locations for off-site work crew strip searches is located in an area which allows
for inmates to travel several hundred yards to the Cerbat sally port after the
searches are conducted.

~

Medical staff were observed with keysets which allowed access to control rooms
at the Cerbat Unit.

~

During a formal count, the accountability officer at Cerbat was observed
discussing a missing inmate with staff in the field responsible for verifying the
inmate's location. A Lieutenant and CPS present did not address this issue.

~

Despite written reco~monthly rotations of weapons and
ammunition, damaged _ _ _ were found on nearly every perimeter

post inspected, and in one instance,
from service.

had to be removed

)- Inmates at Cerbat were observed to be idle, during the late morning tours. This
is attributable to the fact approximately 50% of the population does not have
gainful employment.
)- Inmate led "same race" recreation activities were observed on the Hualapai
Unit, on two of the three recreation fields monitored.
)- Inmate shower curtains were not "short", but instead were clear plastic on the
bottoms, however hard water stains had rendered these areas of the curtain
clouded to the degree visibility was not feasible.
)- The Perimeter Officers for both Cerbat and Hualapai do not make journal entries
to indicate when discrepancies are noticed or when rake marks are made. These
entries would allow for subsequent perimeter officers to make verifications if
track or discrepancies are noticed.
)- Tracks were found on the perimeter on Wednesday night at approximately 2200
hours. The tracks were from earlier in the day, when an officer crossed the
perimeter for an unknown reason and failed to ensure all of their tracks were
removed. The unit ADW found these tracks versus the perimeter officer.
)- The Perimeter Officer for the Hualapai Unit on Thursday Swing Shift was driving
quickly, with minimal use of the auxiliary lighting in the vehicle (hand Held Spot
light), thus could not detect the tracks. The auxiliary lighting in the vehicle was
too bright for the manner in which the light was being used. Perimeter Officers
have had little or no instructions on how to utilize the light to detect tracks while
performing duties as perimeter officer.
)- Only one perimeter officer of the five posted was assigned _
stationary static posts h a d _ only.
)- The
manufacturer
determined.

All

in the Cerbat Control Forward Ready Room had the
worn off and the type of ordinance could not be

)- There were several keys from the new furniture on Cerbat Unit wliich needed to
be place on key rings for accountability.
)- Both units had excessive amounts of ring style binders in use without any form
of accountability.

}>

The Hualapai Kitchen needs to proVide better afcountability of the oven and
steamer racks. A piece of a steamer rack, which was broken off, was observed
in the Hualapai Kitchen office, easily accessible to an inmate.

}>

Sprinkler head tools and parts stored in the Hualapai Tower were unsecured,
and unaccounted for.

}>

Inmates and staff members reported the Hualapai Kitchen runs out of food
almost every time chicken is served as the evening meal. When food shortages
occur, security staff members do not document the incident on an incident
report. It could not be determined how many times this has occurred.

}>

There are no meal evaluations completed to document the quality of the food
being served.

}>

As a security challenge, tracks were placed on the Cerbat Perimeter at 1546 on
Thursday. The tracks were missed at least seven times by two different
perimeter officers.

}>

Tracks were placed on the Hualapai Perimeter at 2045 hours on Thursday. The
tracks were missed at least four times by the roving perimeter officer.

}>

ASP-Kingman uses a modified DART response when there are adequate staff
members available, along with ample equipment, to staff a complete DART
team.

}>

DART simulations at the Cerbat Unit do not include staff practicing the service
loading of weapons.

}>

Staff members at both units need to become more familiar with the location of
the different types of rounds available in the DART vests, especially the 37 MM
shells. The "Knee Knocker" rounds at the Cerbat Unit are stored on the back of
the vest, making it hard for the officer to access the rounds if needed.

}>

After DART drills, the weapons were returned to the DART locker without a
safety check to ensure the weapons were unloaded and had ~een made safe.

}>

Neither unit has a complete master key inventory. Neither unit receives a list of
any locking device preventative maintenance completed during the month. Both
items should be included in the monthly key report.

}>

Neither unit receives a monthly report of weapons assigned to the unit.

'",

)- The Inspections team received several complaints about the unit program
manager's lack of knowledge and inmate interaction, especially in the areas of
release packets and mental health complaints.
)- Where ice machines were outside of the interior fence, staff members were
required to open a gate to "no-man's land" when distributing the ice to the
inmate population.
)- On 11/18, an incident occurred in which inmates on one of the three recreation
yards at Hualapai refused to lock down. Command staff allowed an adjacent
recreation yard to remain open while the situation, allegedly involving a racial
dispute, was resolved.
)- Each dorm at ASP - Kingman had five sets of barber equipment, (one for each
race) Accountability of the equipment seems to be non existent or very poor.
)- As a security challenge, an emergency exit was accessed without the knowledge
of the Dorm Control Room Officer. The officer reset the alarm but did not
initiate a response to ensure the security of the unit was not compromised.
)- The inspections team received complaints about the ineffectiveness of the town
hall meetings conducted at the Hualapai Unit, specifically the failure of the unit
administration to take agreed upon action leaving issues unresolved on the unit.
)- Kitchen tools at Cerbat were not accounted for at the beginning/end of meals.
)- The Hualapai armorer and back-up armorer were not identified by the unit
Warden, in written format.
)- Several inmate detention files were incomplete and/or missing at the Hualapai
Unit. Some files were found the control room in various stages of completion.
)- At the Hualapai Unit, case workers had little to no understanding of how to
place an inmate on mental health watch and could not produce a written
procedure on steps to perform this task.
)- The HNH Trailers (ACI work area) tool storage area at Complex was not in
compliance with D.O. 712 Tool Policy.
Observations regarding inmate work activity, programs, and educational opportunities
will be discussed in detail within the report submitted by Chuck Manning.
If there are any questions regarding these observations, please contact me for further
discussion.

 

 

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