Skip navigation
PYHS - Header

Ca Preston Juvenile Facility Safety Evaluation 2006

Download original document:
Brief thumbnail
This text is machine-read, and may contain errors. Check the original document to verify accuracy.
California Department Of Corrections and Rehabilitation

PRESTON YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

Staff Safety
Evaluation

July 12 - 15, 2005

Corrections Standards Authority
600 Bercut Drive, Suite A
Sacramento, California 95814
www.csa.ca.gov

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 1
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 1
FACILITY PROFILE ..................................................................................................................... 3
Current Usage ............................................................................................................................. 3
Population Summary................................................................................................................... 4
Staffing Allocation and Availability........................................................................................... 4
PHYSICAL PLANT, STAFFING & POPULATION.................................................................... 5
Physical Plant.............................................................................................................................. 6
Staffing........................................................................................................................................ 9
Population ................................................................................................................................. 10
REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION............................................................................................. 11
Staff Assault Incident Reports .................................................................................................. 11
Training..................................................................................................................................... 16
Safety Equipment...................................................................................................................... 18
STAFF INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................. 21
Custody Staff - Interview with Major/Chief of Security .......................................................... 21
Custody Staff - Interviews with Supervisors ............................................................................ 22
Interviews with Line Staff ........................................................................................................ 23
Interviews with Special/Intensive Treatment Programs ........................................................... 24
Interviews with Non-Custody Staff .......................................................................................... 25
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 26
ENTRANCE LETTER

Attachment A

DATA MATRIX

Attachment B

DESIGN & CURRENT CAPACITY

Attachment C

STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

Attachment D

EVALUATION TEAM ROSTER & ASSIGNMENT

Attachment E

GANG INCIDENTS

Attachment F

BACKGROUND
In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hickman requested that the Corrections Standards Authority
(CSA), develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the state’s adult and youth detention
facilities. At the May 19, 2005 meeting of the CSA, the proposal was presented and accepted.
On May 24-25, 2005, a panel of state and national subject matter experts was convened to
establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted. Based on those criteria, a
team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established.
On July 12-15, 2005, a team comprised of staff from the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice Division conducted a
Staff Safety Evaluation at the Preston Youth Correctional Facility. The evaluation protocol
consisted of a request for advance data on staff assaults including victim and perpetrator data, a
site visit of the physical plant, random interviews with various custody and non-custody staff, a
review of applicable written policies and procedures governing the operation of the institution
and a review of documentation including incidents of staff assaults, staffing levels, ward
population and safety equipment.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
The Preston Youth Correctional Facility was selected as the first juvenile facility for review and
an entrance letter was sent to Superintendent Jay Aguas informing him of the July 12-15, 2005
site visit dates and the proposed operational plan (Attachment A). The criteria panel had
suggested using a data matrix to record information from the Serious Incident Reports (SIR) for
staff assault or attempted assaults by wards to determine if any trends could be identified. The
institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete the matrix before the site visit.
(See Attachment B). The evaluation team asked that all incident reports and related
documentation be made available during the site visit. As the evaluation progressed, the team
identified other information appropriate for review and staff at the institution provided copies of
existing documents, or researched their records for information.
The Facilities Standards and Operations Division of the CSA led the evaluation team. The team
was divided into three work teams, each comprised of staff from the CSA, Adult Operations and
Juvenile Justice Division (each team had a member from each discipline – see Attachment E for
a roster of team members and assignment).
The evaluation began on July 12, 2005, at the institution, with an entrance conference with
Superintendent Aguas, appropriate institutional administrative staff and evaluation team
members. The conference included an operational overview of the institution by Superintendent
Aguas as well as an overview of the evaluation process by CSA Field Representative Bob
Takeshta.
Using a conference room in the Administrative Building as the base of operation, the team broke
into workgroups and began the review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their
observations.
Available documentation was reviewed relative to the physical plant

1

configuration, policies, safety equipment, staffing levels, staff assaults and ward population. The
group looked for any trends or related issues.
The physical plant team reviewed the institution design as it related to staffing, and the ward
population. The purpose was to identify any issues that would affect staff safety such as
crowding, limited visibility, insufficient supervision or lack of communication.
Facility managers as well as staff and supervisors on each of the three watches were interviewed
to provide an opportunity to identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A questionnaire
was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the interviews
and is included as an attachment to this report (see Attachment D). The responses were
categorized and a summary of the responses is included in the Staff Interview section of this
report (pages 21-25). Conflicts between the documentation, the staffs’ perception of the practice
and staffs’ concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included in this
report. The review team also made their own observations and those are noted.
An exit conference was conducted with Superintendent Aguas, Assistant Superintendent Tim
Mahoney, Chief Deputy Director Silvia Huerta-Garcia, Juvenile Justice Assistant Director of
Legislation Eric Csizmar and management staff from O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility,
DeWitt Nelson Youth Correctional Facility and El Paso de Robles Youth Correctional Facility,
to provide a summary of the results of the evaluation. The exit conference included a
presentation of the team’s perceptions and observations as well as a summary of comments made
by staff.

2

FACILITY PROFILE
Preston Youth Correctional Facility (Preston), located 40 miles southeast of Sacramento in Ione,
California was initially opened in 1894 as a reform school and accepted their first wards: seven
boys previously held in San Quentin Prison. Originally known as "The Preston School of
Industry" the building was intended to serve as a progressive action toward rehabilitating
youthful offenders, rather than simply imprisoning them in San Quentin. Construction has been
ongoing over the years and has included numerous building additions, remodels, and
demolitions. Many of the existing structures are over 50 years old. The original building, now a
historical landmark known as the “Castle”, was vacated in 1960 yet remains overlooking the
rolling grounds of the present institution.
Current Usage
With the closure of the Northern Reception Center and Clinic (NRCC) in Sacramento in 2004,
Preston became the youth reception center for Northern California. It also houses many youth
who are otherwise difficult to place in the youth correction and rehabilitation system.
This facility utilizes a “Normative Culture” program to promote responsibility and bring about
behavior change among wards on regular program. The creation of this social environment
includes the establishment of a community to promote positive peer influence. The communities
at this facility are not segregated by gang affiliation or by race. There are no fences around the
exercise yards. The lodges are either dormitory settings or individual sleeping rooms and are not
filled to capacity because the model works best with lower ward populations. One lodge with
individual sleeping rooms was configured for "close" security living but was not designated as
being administrative segregation housing. Crowding was not an issue at this facility.
Preston is the only youth facility in the state with a Specialized Behavioral Treatment program
designed to serve wards in need of a higher level of mental health program treatment by trained
mental health staff. Preston has three lodges that house wards with severe emotional and mental
health problems in individual sleeping room settings. The three programs include:
•

Intensive Treatment Program (ITP) for wards who are acutely disturbed and so impaired
they cannot be adequately programmed in other youth programs.

•

Specialized Counseling Program (SCP) for wards who exhibit acute social and emotional
disturbances at a level greater than can be addressed within other programs.

•

Specialized Behavioral Treatment Program (SBTP) for wards with mental health
disorders and who act out violently.

3

Population Summary
The ward population at Preston has fluctuated over the years, depending on numbers of wards in
the CYA system and the availability of programs. During peak times such as the 1960’s and
again in the late 1990’s, Preston held as many as 1000 wards. The current capacity, including
the closed lodges and recent remodeling, is 789. On the first day of our evaluation, the
institution housed 452 wards, including 22 ITP, 40 SCP and 24 SBTP designated youths.
Twenty-five percent of the ward population has been committed for crimes involving sexual
assault. Eighty-two percent have documented gang affiliations and eighty-five percent have
histories of substance abuse. Forty-eight percent of ward population is Hispanic, twenty-nine
percent black, fifteen percent white and eight percent classified as "other". The wards' ages
range from 14 to 22 and the average age is 17.1 years.
Staffing Allocation and Availability
Management staff at Preston consists of the Superintendent, an Assistant Superintendent and a
Major who is designated the Chief of Security at the facility. On the initial day of our evaluation
the funded staffing was established at 209 custody personnel (including the management staff)
Program Administrators, Lieutenants, Sergeants, Youth Correctional Counselors, Youth
Correctional Officers, Parole Agent I/III, Case Worker Specialists and Medical Technical
Assistants (MTA). The Superintendent has identified an additional 18 positions necessary for
the operation of the institution. Preston has 3 vacant custody positions and 32 custody personnel
are off work or otherwise unavailable for assignment. Of the 214 non-custody position
allocations, there are currently 28 vacancies and 6 non-custody employees were off on long-term
leave (over 3 months). See Table I below for a summary of positions, vacancies, long-term leave
and staff availability.
Table I
Custody Staff
Non-Custody Staff
Total

Allocated
Positions
209
214
423

Vacancies
3
28
31

Long-term Leave
32
6
38

Available Staff
174
180
354

It should be noted that these staffing numbers were provided by Preston staff and were not
confirmed or reconciled with numbers maintained by Division of Juvenile Justice headquarters.

4

PHYSICAL PLANT, STAFFING & POPULATION
Preston sits on 264 acres, 64 of which are inside the secure perimeter fence and includes many
buildings such as the 13 housing units, administrative offices, educational buildings, vocational
shops, and maintenance shops. The facility also has a receiving unit, an infirmary unit, dining
hall, kitchen, chapel, a swimming pool and a gymnasium within the secure perimeter. Twelve of
the housing units or “lodges” are currently in operation as living areas for wards. The lodges are
generally located around the perimeter of the exercise field and gymnasium. Four of the lodges
are designed with individual sleeping rooms and the others have open dormitories (see
Attachment C for design and current capacities). All of the buildings are separated by such
significant distances that search and escort officers must use vehicles to provide services to the
lodges.
The outer perimeter area includes several one, two and three bedroom homes available for rent to
staff. One ward housing unit, built as an open camp setting, is also located outside of the secure
fencing but is now closed.
Staff strategically assigned to posts throughout the facility control ward movement within the
secure perimeter. Critical to this function are staff posted in the two towers. Tower One is
approximately 100 feet above the ground and Tower Two is approximately 75 feet high. The
height of these towers allows for direct visual observation of most of the grounds.
Evaluation staff was unable to identify the classification level of the wards housed within the
facility due to the lack of a classification system within the Division of Juvenile Justice.
Educational services are provided onsite within the secure perimeter. There are 43 classrooms.
Some of these classrooms are dedicated to vocational education programs. Vocational programs
available to the wards include landscaping, masonry, auto mechanics, print shop, janitorial, and
computer graphics. Other vocational programs have been eliminated due to budget constraints.
Eight of the twelve lodges have a similar configuration. A dayroom is centrally located within
each lodge and shower and restroom areas are located behind an elevated staff area. A dormitory
is located adjacent to the dayroom and contains a secure area for the staff assigned to the first
watch. Additionally, wards have access to a toilet and washbasin located near the secure staff
area within the dormitory. A combination of single, double and triple bunks comprise the bed
configurations within each lodge.
The four remaining lodges contain single occupancy sleeping rooms configured in a linear
design off the hallway from the dayroom. Each of the sleeping rooms contain an intercom, bunk,
toilet and washbasin. The shower area is located off of the dayroom. Each of these lodges
contain a small number of rooms equipped with video monitoring systems.

5

Each lodge has one staff assigned to the first watch, two staff on the second watch and three staff
on the third watch. The Ironwood, Sequoia, Redwood, and Oak Lodges have enhanced staffing
levels due to the type of programs contained within each.
•

•
•
•

Ironwood Lodge contains the wards assigned to the Special Management Program (SMP)
and Temporary Detention (TD). Wards on SMP are identified as those with documented
behavior problems requiring a restricted program. Wards on TD are those identified as a
danger to themselves, to others, endangered, or likely to escape.
The Sequoia Lodge contains the Specialized Behavioral Treatment Program (SBTP).
Wards assigned to this program have been identified as requiring mental health
involvement.
The Redwood Lodge contains minors assigned to the Intensive Treatment Program (ITP).
The Oak Lodge contains wards assigned to the Specialized Counseling Program (SCP).
The SCP targets wards that have committed sexually related offenses.

The following lodges address the needs of different groups of wards as follows:
•
•
•
•

The Cedar Lodge contains the orientation program for the younger wards coming into the
system from the counties.
The Ponderosa Lodge contains the orientation program for the older boys.
The Greenbrier Lodge contains the Preston orientation program for new wards arriving
from other Juvenile Justice Division institutions.
The Buckeye Lodge houses wards assigned to work within the facility. These work
assignments include the kitchen and landscaping detail within the secure perimeter.

The remaining lodges are general programming.
The physical plant evaluation team toured the institution, reviewed institutional procedures and
interviewed staff of various classifications. The evaluation team looked specifically at the
overall conditions of the physical plant, the staffing levels within each area of the institution, and
the number of wards within each building of the institution. The evaluation revealed the
following concerns:
Physical Plant
FINDING: Some type of transitional intervention program is needed for handling assaultive or
violence prone wards.
DISCUSSION: The Tamarack Lodge was closed in March 2004. This lodge contained 64
single sleeping rooms designated to house those wards that had a previous history of assaulting
other wards and/or staff. Records indicate that ward on ward assaults prior to the closure of
Tamarack averaged approximately 18 per month. Following the closure of Tamarack, these
assaults immediately increased and have averaged approximately 61 per month since the closure
(see Attachment F).

6

The closure of the Tamarack Lodge and the corresponding increase in ward on ward assaults
have contributed to a safety issue for the staff that are required to intervene during these assaults
and for the wards housed at Preston. The Tamarack Lodge provided housing and programming
for wards with a history of assaultive behavior that require individual sleeping rooms and
specialized programming. Although the Juvenile Justice Division does not provide a system for
identifying the level of security for the purposes of assigning housing for wards, the wards
placed at Preston are recognized as in need of higher levels of security. Preston is comprised
primarily of open dormitories and there is a limited number of single occupancy sleeping rooms
available. These beds are committed to wards requiring specialized mental health programs.
Although the Tamarack Lodge is very old and in dire need of refurbishing (as is the case for
many of the buildings at this facility), some team members are of the opinion that with
appropriate modifications, the lodge offers great potential to provide a transitional intervention
program and is necessary given the security level of the wards currently housed at Preston.
Tamarack Lodge is not well lit and is painted a dull color. Updating and increasing the lighting
and painting the unit a brighter color would alleviate much of the dungeon-like appearance of the
building. The room-fronts are not conducive to staff supervision and serve to isolate wards
confined in the rooms. The archaic doors would need to be replaced with modern doors
equipped with large view panels to increase staffs’ ability to monitor the safety of the wards but
also reduce the level of isolation and deprivation the rooms currently promote. An additional
view panel could also be installed in the wall next to the doors to further increase the sense of
openness in the building. The roof over the exercise areas needs to be modified to allow more
light into the building. The program spaces would also need to be refurbished to update the areas
and make them more consistent with the mission of the Division of Juvenile Justice. While
refurbishing would require significant investment, it would be much less expensive than building
a new lodge for a transitional intervention program.
In concert with refurbishing, a well-defined program model that would promote desired behavior
would need to be developed for the use of the building. Policies would need to be clear as to
when this intervention would be used, the maximum length of time that a ward could spend in
the program, and levels of review by supervisors, managers, and health professionals to ensure
that policies and sound correctional practices were being followed.
Other evaluation team members are of the opinion that the Tamarack Lodge is beyond
refurbishing and is not a suitable place for the confinement of wards, regardless of how it is
updated. In any event, some type of transitional intervention program is a necessity.
FINDING: Some buildings at the Preston Youth Correctional Facility are over 100 years old.
There have been several additions and remodels over the years; however, the current design does
not lend itself to the current best practices of managing the incarcerated juvenile population and
is not congruent to the mission of the Juvenile Justice Division.
DISCUSSION: Although wards are not formally classified with regard to housing assignments,
the management staff within the Juvenile Justice Division has clearly defined the population at
this facility as requiring a higher level of security. The security level of the current ward

7

population is not appropriate for a facility comprised primarily of open dormitories, antiquated
infrastructures and living units spread over 64 acres.
The facility design does not lend itself to providing a safe place for staff and wards. Further, the
design does not lend itself to a rehabilitative environment. Smaller, self-contained living units
with some centralized programming would better fit the needs of the type of ward being held at
Preston.
This facility is in need of major upgrades. The current electrical supply is at capacity and will
need to be increased. The HVAC systems throughout the entire facility are in need of updating.
The open dormitory setting is adequate for wards identified as requiring a lower level of security.
With significant upgrades to the infrastructure, the evaluation team felt the facility could possibly
be utilized as a vocational training center for wards requiring lower levels of security. However,
in the final analysis, the Juvenile Justice Division and the committed wards would be best served
by replacing the physical plant rather than attempting to remodel a facility that has exceeded it
useful life expectancy.
FINDING: Transportation officers reported that the average vehicle used to transport wards is
more than five years old and has odometer readings in excess of 179,000 miles.
DISCUSSION: The Transportation Unit is physically located outside of the secure perimeter at
Preston. The transportation unit receives its direction from headquarters and provides
transportation of wards to Juvenile Justice Division facilities throughout the state. During the
time the evaluation team was onsite (four days), officers experienced mechanical problems with
transportation vehicles on four separate occasions while transporting wards. At best, these
vehicles are described as unreliable and present an officer safety issue when utilized for
transportation purposes. The team was advised that although requests for new vehicles have
been made, the requests have not been approved. The team recommends replacing the unreliable
vehicles and to establish protocols to replace transportation vehicles at regular intervals.
FINDING: The inventory for hazardous materials is not consistently maintained. There are no
visual Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) placed on the outside of the cleaning material
storage units and additional training and supervision is necessary for wards using the materials.
DISCUSSION: Wards had free access to cleaning materials and were observed mixing different
cleaning materials. This is not only unsafe for wards, but the hazardous materials could be used
as weapons against staff members. The team recommends placing MSDSs on the exterior of the
material storage units; limit ward use of cleaning chemicals; provide additional training and
supervision when wards are using the materials; and, maintain consistent inventory of all
hazardous materials.
FINDING: There was heavy plant growth between the perimeter fences that could conceal
contraband or aid in escapes.
DISCUSSION: While this is not necessarily a staff safety issue, the team recommends
assigning regular landscape maintenance personnel to keep plant growth to a minimum.

8

FINDING: High temperatures were noted within each of the lodges.
DISCUSSION: With the exception of Sequoia and Redwood, which house wards prescribed
psychotropic medications rendering these wards susceptible to heat related medical issues, all of
the lodges are cooled with swamp coolers. Thermometers located within these lodges were
observed in excess of 80 degrees during the afternoon hours. While this issue does not have a
direct link to staff safety, the frequency of staff assaults was highest during months of the year
typically having high temperatures including July, August and September. August was the most
notable with 18 incidents occurring, twice that of the nearest comparison month. The team
recommends upgrading the air conditioning system in all lodges.
FINDING: A large amount of combustible paper products was noted in ward areas throughout
the facility.
DISCUSSION: Evaluation staff was concerned about the potential fire hazard that the
accumulation of combustible materials presented and recommend procedures be adopted to
reduce the combustible load in ward areas.
FINDING: Due to their temporary detention or special management program status, the wards
in the Ironwood Lodge did not have access to the outdoor recreation areas.
DISCUSSION: Staff assigned to this unit said they would be comfortable taking small groups
of wards to an outdoor recreation area, providing the area was secure and not too large. Exercise
is an important tool in managing wards from both a physical and emotional perspective. The
team recommends installing a fence to secure an outdoor recreation area adjacent to the
Ironwood Lodge.
Staffing
FINDING: When teaching staff does not report for work for various reasons, a substitute is not
brought in (budget issue). As a result, wards are returned to their lodges to wait until the next
period to return to the school program.
DISCUSSION: Staffing within the lodge is reduced during the second watch (typically two
staff as opposed to three staff on third watch) because the wards are scheduled to be out of the
lodge and in school during this time. The evaluation team observed groups of wards, numbering
as many as twenty, within the dayrooms of several lodges not attending school during school
hours. Supervising these wards creates a safety issue for the lodge staff during this time. The
team recommends either increasing the staffing in each lodge to adequately supervise and
provide programming to the wards during the second watch, or provide sufficient numbers of
teaching staff to accommodate the ward population.

9

FINDING: Teaching staff indicate that the transfer of information between custody and
teaching staff does not always occur in a timely fashion. At times, this information pertains to
security issues that affect the entire institution.
DISCUSSION: The team was advised that there is a practice of the Assistant Superintendent or
his designee conducting briefings for education staff as necessary; however, management
personnel acknowledged that the briefings do not always occur or at least not as timely as they
could. The team recommends that formalized process of regular briefings between custody and
education staff regarding critical daily operational issues be developed.
FINDING: Post orders provided by staff posted within each lodge were outdated and did not
reflect current practice.
DISCUSSION: Of particular concern were post order related to emergency response duties for
the staff posted within the lodge. Outdated post orders and uninformed staff lead to a potentially
dangerous situation. The team recommends that post orders are updated and training is provided
to staff regarding emergency response duties.
FINDING: Hair care service areas are located within the program center. The post orders do
not include a regular documented inventory/accounting of the tools used in the hair care area.
DISCUSSION: The team recommends the development of post orders to address inventory of
the tools and equipment contained in this area.
Population
FINDING: The Juvenile Justice Division does not utilize a classification system to establish a
level of security for housing or facility placement decisions concerning wards.
DISCUSSION: Local adult and juvenile detention facilities and the CDCR Division of Adult
Operations utilize a means of identifying those in their care that require different security levels
and/or housing needs to ensure the safety and security of the person in custody, others in custody
and the staff. The team recommends that the Juvenile Justice Division consider developing a
system for identifying the security needs of each ward in custody and identify specific housing
designed to address the identified needs. It is further recommended that policies and procedures
be developed for each type of housing unit based on the classification of wards being held.

10

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION
Team members reviewed available documentation, including reports, records and policy manuals
to identify any trends or common themes among incidents. The team also noticed some general
areas of concern and included them in the discussion. The items reviewed included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Serious Incident Reports for staff assault or attempted assaults (SIR) for 12-month period
(2004).
Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes.
State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for assaults on staff.
Safety Committee Meeting minutes including Risk the Management Plan.
Inventories of authorized safety equipment.
Use of Force Executive Review Committee findings.
Facility training records.
Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections.
Employee safety grievances.
Daily Operations Reports
Duty Roster Worksheet for first day of site visit.
Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records.
Staffing information.
Classification records.
Ward files as requested.
Ward Grievances
Youth Authority Manual (YAM).
Institutions and Camp Manual.
Institution Operation Manual.
Administrative Summary.
OBITS Report.

Staff Assault Incident Reports
FINDING: After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were a
few notable statistics; however, no obvious trends were identified relative to the issue of staff
assaults. Other than ward classification (see discussion below), no issues were identified as
being significantly consistent among the various incidents.
DISCUSSION: Fifty-four incidents of battery and attempted battery on staff were reported
during the time period, January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2004 at Preston Youth
Correctional Facility.
•

The victims included employees of several classifications including:
o 26 Youth Correctional Counselors.
o 18 Youth Correctional Officers.
o 3 Lieutenants.

11

•
•

o 3 Case Worker Specialists.
o 1 Medical Technical Assistant (MTA).
o 1 Registered Nurse (RN).
o 1 Dental Assistant.
o 1 Doctor.
The victims included 42 males and 12 females.
The race of the victims included:
o 42 white.
o 6 black.
o 3 hispanic.
o 2 reported as “other”.

The team was unable to confirm whether the victim demographics were consistent with those of
the institution’s as those statistics were not readily available. The safety manager reported that
over the past three years the average age of all officers filing work related injury reports has been
47 years of age.
FINDING: Race, age, gang affiliation and length of time in custody shed little light on the
profile of assaultive wards.
DISCUSSION: One significant variance was noted when comparing the race, age or length of
time in custody of the assaultive wards to that of the overall ward population. Hispanic wards
were involved in 26 incidents and black wards were involved in 11, a ratio consistent with the
facility population. White wards were involved in 16 assaults rather than the expected 6
incidents, if the frequency of incidents were to be reflective of the overall facility population.
The average age of wards involved was 17, the same as the facility population’s average age.
Seventy-five percent of the wards involved in the incidents have documented gang affiliations,
compared to eighty-two percent documented as gang members in the overall facility.
The data describing the length of time in custody may have been skewed depending on the
interpretation of the query by the person responsible for completing it. Using the dates of intake
provided, it appeared that wards were more aggressive during the initial 9-month period
following their arrival at Preston. When asked about a possible explanation, staff said the wards
were probably establishing themselves among their peers. Wards do so to prevent being "picked
on" or taken advantage of by other wards. In reviewing the data for 2004, the following
relationships were noted.
•
•
•
•
•

0 – 3 months in custody: 17 wards were involved in assaults.
3 – 6 months in custody: 10 wards were involved in assaults.
6 – 9 months in custody: 5 wards were involved in assaults.
9 – 12 months in custody: 0 wards were involved in assaults.
12 months or longer: 18 wards were involved in assaults.

FINDING: Hours of the day and months of the year may be factors in assaults on staff.

12

DISCUSSION: The frequency of incidents was highest during the third watch with 39
occurrences while none occurred during first watch. The frequency of incidents was highest
during months of the year typically having high temperatures including July, August and
September. August was the most notable with 18 incidents occurring, twice that of the nearest
comparison (see the discussion concerning lodge temperatures in the Physical Plant section of
this report). The days of the week with the greatest number of incidents were Monday and
Saturday and the remainder of the incidents was divided among the other days of the week.
FINDING: Wards with serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff.
DISCUSSION: Thirty-seven of the fifty-four incidents involved wards with serious mental
health issues. Twenty-nine of the incidents occurred in Sequoia Lodge, which houses a
maximum of 24 wards in the Specialized Behavioral Treatment Program (SBTP). Admission
into the program is limited to only those wards diagnosed with serious mental health disorders
and who have a recent history of acting out violently. Only 7 incidents involved wards on
general program status.
FINDING: Ward manufactured weapons were not a factor in assaults on staff.
DISCUSSION: A sharpened stabbing instrument (ward manufactured weapon) was utilized in
two of the incidents reviewed. Wards threw an unknown liquid substance on staff in 17 of the
incidents. Wards spit on staff in 6 of the incidents. In one of the incidents, a rock was used as a
weapon. In the remainder of the 24 cases reviewed, wards used their hands to batter or attempt
to batter staff.
FINDING: Data on the subject of staff assaults is difficult to capture and analyze. Reporting
of staff assaults needs to use similar reporting criteria. A central tracking system for incidents,
particularly regarding staff assaults, would provide more meaningful data and trends may be
identified as a result.
DISCUSSION: The definition of staff assault is dependent on the rules of the agency to which
the information is being provided. The definition of staff assault for Cal-OSHA, risk
management and the courts are all different. The requirements range from the victim being off
work, to being slightly injured, to having no injuries sustained and lastly, the unlawful touching
or attempt to touch a staff person is sufficient to be considered a staff assault.
The tracking of each type of assault uses a different method and may be compiled by different
personnel. A budget analyst maintains some data; other data is maintained by the safety officer
and yet other information by the court liaison officer. Tracking may be done based on a calendar
year as compared to a fiscal year. Recent changes over the past year yielded some skewed data
when comparing time periods.
FINDING: Injuries do not appear to be initially well documented.
DISCUSSION: In the Serious Incident Reports reviewed from calendar year 2004, the victims
initially reported no serious injuries and few required immediate medical attention following the

13

initial treatment at the institution’s infirmary. A review of the safety records suggests the
injuries are much worse.
The safety officer reported the following statistics:
•

Thirty-eight staff are currently off work on long term leave (more than 3 months).
Twenty-one have no return to work date or are pending retirement as a result of their
injuries.
o Thirty are off work as a result of injuries sustained on duty.
o Thirty-two are custody staff.
o Fourteen are off as a result of staff assault, responding to emergencies, or injuries
sustained while taking action necessary at the scene of an emergency.
o

In the first six months of 2005, 20 incidents of staff assault have resulted in 23 claims of injury.
Some officers have cumulative injuries; one supervisor was injured three times before the
injuries were severe enough to be off of work.
FINDING: Depleted staff levels have resulted in mandated overtime.
DISCUSSION: As previously stated, 32 custody staff are off work for an extended period as a
result of injuries incurred while on duty (IOD). The absent officer must be backfilled as well as
officers off work for training, vacation, sick and annual leave. Managers explained that the need
for overtime backfill stemmed from increased sick leave usage following a change in the
employment contract.
When the Northern Reception Center and Clinic (NRCC) was closed in 2004 and the reception
process was moved to Preston, several staff members were also transferred to Preston. As a
result, Preston is overstaffed by 29 custody personnel. Even with the additional staff, significant
incidents of mandatory overtime have occurred in the last fiscal year to backfill for the absent
officers and to meet the minimum staffing levels. Most notably, in June 2004 and again in May
2005, about 150 staff including Youth Correctional Officers and Youth Correctional Counselors
were mandated to work overtime by inverse seniority. To accommodate the need and to prevent
exhausted officers from having a traffic accident following a mandated shift, two sleeping rooms
have been set up in the administrative area. The issue is a concern in both hard-dollar costs as
well as the potential hidden costs of increased worker compensation claims, increased sick leave
usage and effects on employee morale.
Preston has 28 vacancies among the allotted 214 non-custody positions. Additionally, 6 noncustody employees were off on long-term leave (over 3 months). Of particular concern, 21 of
the 79 educational staff positions are vacant and 3 staff have been relocated to Headquarters.
The team was told that due to budget constraints, teachers are not replaced when they are absent
from work and the class is cancelled.
FINDING: The safety officer has made significant efforts to promote safety among the staff
though additional training in specific areas remains an unfilled need.

14

DISCUSSION: The safety officer holds regular safety meetings and includes the appropriate
persons. Action plans are developed and reviewed at subsequent meetings. She holds contests
to promote safety and gives awards to those with the best suggestions. She, as well as other
custody staff, attend meetings with medical staff to discuss many issues, including safety issues
specifically related to the management of the Specialized Behavioral Treatment Program
(SBTP). This program involves wards most likely to commit staff assaults (see later discussion).
Statistics provided by the safety officer support the need for increased training in ward relations,
officer safety and emergency responses. Reinforcement by supervision at all levels is needed to
ensure the information received during the training is applied in the workplace.
FINDING: The Juvenile Justice Division lacks a formal objective classification system. The
current method for determining ward facility and housing assignments fails to account for the
security and custody needs of the youth.
DISCUSSION: When asked how the institution managed the ward population, the team was
told that the agency had no central classification system. Staff uses several factors to decide
placement. Age, program needs and gang affiliation appear to drive the process of housing
wards. The Parole Agent III constantly monitors the distribution of known gang members
among the lodges to maintain a balance so that no one group is of sufficient numbers to dominate
over others. The role requires constant intelligence gathering as well as frequent monitoring of
current placements.
Program designation for the more difficult to manage wards is determined at Juvenile Justice
headquarters and in consultation with mental health service providers. Adjustments are made
depending on the ward's progression in the assigned program.
Another classification related measure is the category level of the ward. Categories 1-7 are
determined at the time of intake into the state system. The levels are based primarily on the
original crime for which the ward is committed. Categories 1-2 are the highest security level and
include wards committing murder and serious assaults. Categories 5-7 are the lowest and
typically include wards failing to complete programs at the local level and the sentencing judge
referred them to the state. This measure is seldom used to determine placement because it is not
a dependable indicator of the ward's conduct while in custody.
A formal system is planned but is not operational. The system is expected to include: an intake
risk needs assessment; a custody/security classification and reclassification process; and a parole
risk/need assessment. Staff was unaware of an expected start date for implementation.
FINDING: The Institutional Policy Manual sections pertaining to emergency response and staff
accounting need to be reviewed and updated.
DISCUSSION: The Institutions Multi-Hazard Emergency Plan (Restricted Emergency
Operational Procedures) references the emergency plan review and revision process in a Forward
acknowledgement dated January 1, 1980. A copy of these emergency procedures was reviewed;
however, it did not contain origination dates, revision dates, or signatures of authority on the
specific procedures. Absent of these indicators, it is difficult for staff to determine if these

15

procedures are outdated, current, or reflect procedural changes to the emergency operational
plans.
The review team noted that the institution's Policy and Procedures Manual, and the Youth
Authority Manual (YAM), do not include a written emergency plan for the visual accountability
of on-duty staff. The institution currently utilizes the Identix/Bio-Metric System to process
employees in and out of the institution. However this system does not account for the staff
member’s actual location or well being once inside of the institution.
A review of the Facilities Multi-Hazard Emergency Plan for Mutual Aid response revealed that
the current procedure (PYC Resource Supplement 28) is very vague, outdated and contains
incorrect information. Some contact phone numbers are wrong and one contact agency, the
Northern California Women’s Facility (NCWF) no longer has available resources. Mutual Aid
agreements are in place, however are not referenced in the Multi-Hazard Emergency Plan and
were not readily available at the time of request.
Training
FINDING: Custody staff appear to be receiving training in safety related issues, but mandated
annual training hours are not being completed.
DISCUSSION: The policy manual sections reviewed by the team specify that custody staff
receive a minimum of 52 hours of annual training. The policies identified a baseline of training
topics to be included. Institutional-specific training supplements the baseline in order to total
the 52 hours of required training.
The Training Manager provided documentation concerning the delivery of mandated training
and institutional orientation training for both custody and non-custody staff. The documentation
reviewed was not in compliance with policy. Custody staff was provided 33 hours of annual
training during the last 13 months (July 2004 through July 2005). Selected non-custody staff
was also included in the training offerings, if it was determined the training was related to their
duties.
The annual training included the following subjects:
• Water safety, 2 hours
• Staff/Offender interaction, make-up, 4 hours
• Team meetings/safety/security, make-up, 4 hours
• First aid, 4 hours
• CPR, 4 hours
• Staff/Offender interaction, 1 hour
• Injury Illness Prevention Program (IIPP), 2 hours
• Respirator fit testing, 2 hours
• Use of force, 2 hours
• Other miscellaneous subjects including: Code of Silence, suicide prevention, drugs and
medication, staff/supervisor interaction and disciplinary decision making system.

16

Custody staff in specific assignments, such as transportation or tactical team (those requiring the
use of weapons) require additional training to maintain perishable skills. The firearms training,
chemical agent training and baton training are being provided. Supervisors are receiving
supplemental training necessary for their positions including restraint chair use, employee
substance abuse and hostage situation management.
FINDING: Tracking attendance and ensuring all persons actually attend training as scheduled
remains a challenge for the Training Manager. The team members were concerned that not all
officers were trained on the appropriate subjects.
DISCUSSION: The attendance rate at training appeared to be about 90% among the officers
scheduled to attend. Training records only track hours, not which classes were actually attended.
No follow up is done to ensure absentees attend the "make-up" classes. Not all officers were
sent to all of the training classes. The Training Manager said headquarters determines which
training classes are relevant to certain assignments and designates specific staff to attend. He
also reported that while training is being offered, supervisors are often unable to release their
staff to attend. The staffing is always at a minimal level and overtime is not available to backfill
for officers while they are away from their post. When limited resources are available to
backfill, supervisors must decide which officers may attend and not release others. As a result,
many officers do not receive needed training. With few exceptions, because of mandated
overtime, all officers have the potential of working all possible assignments and should receive
the appropriate training.
FINDING: Policies for orientation and training of non-custody staff have not been updated since
1999. Many non-custody staff receive little or no initial training or new employee orientation.
DISCUSSION: The policies specified that ancillary and professional staff having ward contact
receive 40 hours orientation training prior to assuming regular duties and 40 hours of annual
update training. Clerical support staff with duties not requiring continuous contact with wards
are required to receive 40 hours of orientation training prior to assuming their regular duties and
16 hours of update training annually thereafter. The Training Manager is not always informed of
the arrival or departure of employees. He said, when he is informed of the hiring of a new
employee, he provides a one-hour tour of the facility and one hour of orientation and uses a
checklist to document the orientation. He said the initial 40-hour training referred to in the
policy was originally provided at the CYA training facility but has since been discontinued. The
policy was dated 1999.
The review team interviewed staff throughout the facility. There were concerns from several
non-custody employees about not receiving adequate training prior to assuming their positions
within the institution. Some employees told the evaluation team that they have been employed at
Preston almost a year without receiving orientation training.
FINDING: An annual training plan needs to be developed for the facility in concert with an
agency-wide annual training plan.

17

DISCUSSION: When asked if an annual training plan was available to review, the team was
told that no formal plan was available. All training directives originate from headquarters.
Subject matter, lesson plans and the names of the designated attendees are included in the
directives.
Training is often litigation driven or as a result of a change in policy, practice or the law. Such
frequent changes make long-term planning difficult. The team provided a copy of the Agency's
annual training plan to the Training Manager who said he was aware that one existed but had not
personally received a copy. He understood it was still in the development stage and not been
operationalized.
FINDING: Training deficiencies at Preston could be improved through better coordination and
forming partnerships with other agencies (e.g. Mule Creek State Prison, and other neighboring
law enforcement/corrections agencies).
DISCUSSION: The Illness and Injury Prevention Program (SB 198 mandate) training is not
included in the annual training plan. The Illness and Injury Prevention Program (IIPP) training is
coordinated through the Safety Officer at the facility and not the Training Manager. The team
thought, depending on the subject matter, IIPP training might serve to satisfy both requirements
if the programs were coordinated.
The team suggested combining training resources with Mule Creek State Prison, an adult prison
located next door to Preston, to provide some of the training. The Mule Creek facility is able to
offer a 40-hour orientation class to all employees before they assume their duties. If some of the
orientation material is relevant to both facilities, or could be adapted to include both; a
partnership may result in more consistent and relevant training to all staff.
The court liaison identified a training need in criminal case preparation including interview
techniques, evidence collection and preservation, and other issues related to the successful
prosecution of offenses committed within the facility. Partnerships with neighboring law
enforcement/corrections agencies including the Mule Creek Facility might present opportunities
to provide additional training to staff to improve investigative techniques.
Safety Equipment
FINDING: The personal alarm system utilized by the facility is comprised of several systems.
Each system is zone specific and staff must know what zone they are in and have the proper
alarm actuator for the system to work.
DISCUSSION: Most staff prefer to wear alarms. The alarms are smaller than the radios and the
history of wearing an alarm precedes the radio. Three types of alarms are used because not all of
the alarms will function properly in all areas of the facility. The rolling grounds, building
construction and signal coverage determine which alarm format provides the best service.
Officers are issued the alarm most appropriate for the work location; however, staff report that
even with the proper alarm equipment, there are areas within the facility that are not covered by

18

the alarm systems. The team recommends replacing the current personal alarm system with one
that will provide coverage for the entire facility.
FINDING: Staff were provided radios, however, in most cases the radios were turned off.
DISCUSSION: Staff reported that the practice of maintaining radios in the off position
prevented wards from hearing radio communications between the staff. It was explained that
this practice prevents the escalation of incidents when the wards “hear” what is happening in
other lodges.
Radios offer many advantages (compared to personal alarms) including two-way voice
communication between all users and radios function in all work areas. An emergency response
can be directed much more precisely and effectively when radio communication is available.
The exact location can be radioed to back-up officers as well as any special information needed
to ensure a safe response. The team recommends providing a radio earpiece that would allow
staff to privately monitor radio communications, stay informed of situations occurring
throughout the facility and be available to be contacted via the radio.
FINDING: The Chaplain did not have a personnel alarm or radio. The Chaplain was not aware
of duty statements or post orders that provide safety and security guidance to the religious staff
working in the chapel. The chapel area did not contain areas clearly marked as out of bounds.
DISCUSSION: All personnel should be required to wear personal alarms (or other
communication device) and this policy needs to be reinforced with staff at the facility entrance
point. Duty statements or post orders need to be developed for the religious staff to guide them
in their duties and responsibilities. The team recognizes that signs cannot be posted at every outof-bounds area; however, the out-of-bounds area around the chapel is not well defined and the
team recommends placing signs in order to better control the movement of wards around the
chapel and hold them accountable for noncompliance.
FINDING: A Supervising Case Work Specialist was not carrying personal safety items (pepper
spray, hand cuffs, FM alarm, or radio)
DISCUSSION: Management and supervisors must ensure that all staff carry required safety
equipment with them at all times. This is an issue of staff safety for the employee in question
and also impacts the safety of the other staff, either from having an unequipped staff person who
could not render adequate aid, or staff having to come to the aid of an employee who fell victim
due to being ill-prepared.
FINDING: Officers are provided safety equipment as specified by policy but the inventory of
specific items may be insufficient due to the facility size and design.
DISCUSSION: Each officer is issued handcuffs, OC spray and latex gloves. Respirators are
available in all living units, security vehicles and are issued to individual staff assigned to special
teams. Tactical team members and the medical transportation team members are issued batons.
A "911 Rescue Tool", a tool used to cut a suicide ligature, is available in all living units and is

19

issued to staff in roving assignments. CPR masks are available in the housing units and security
vehicles.
The team recommends that because the facility is so large and many of the buildings occupied by
wards are not living units; some consideration be given to issuing safety items to officers rather
than making equipment available in the living units. A rescue could be delayed because a CPR
mask or 911 Tool needed for an emergency occurring in a location other than a living unit was
not readily available.
FINDING: The number of incidents of staff assault are more frequent in three living units
where vests are not available than in the living unit where vests are mandated.
DISCUSSION: Only the officers assigned to the Ironwood Lodge (see attachment C) are issued
soft body armor stab resistant vests and a supply of vests is stored in the lodge for visitors or
shift replacement staff to wear. The vests are not fitted to individual officers and must be
relinquished when the officer changes assignment.
Five incidents of staff assault occurred in the Ironwood Lodge during the year of 2004. An equal
number occurred in the hospital ward, 8 occurred in the Redwood lodge and 27 occurred in the
Sequoia lodge. These statistics support the immediate issuance of vests to officers assigned to
Sequoia lodge and suggest that strong consideration be given to issuance of vests to all officers.
Vests should be available to visitors in Sequoia and Redwood Lodges.

20

STAFF INTERVIEWS
The Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted random interviews with custody staff, Intensive
Treatment Program staff, and non-custody staff at the Preston Youth Correctional Facility from
Tuesday, July 12 through Friday, July 15. Members of the team interviewed staff about safety
related issues (e.g., safety equipment issued to staff and their perception of personal safety at the
institution). The list of specific questions asked by the interview team is included in Attachment
D).
The team conducted random interviews with Preston staff, on the first, second, and third watches
at the following lodges: Arbor, Buckeye, Cedar, Evergreen, Greenbrier, Hawthorne, Ironwood,
Manzanita, Oak, Outpatient Housing Unit, Ponderosa, Redwood, and Sequoia. Interviews were
also conducted at the gymnasium and education classrooms. Custody staff classifications
interviewed included: major, lieutenant, sergeant, youth correctional officer, youth correctional
counselor, and medical technician assistant. The Intensive Treatment Program interviews
included senior psychologists, psychologists, treatment team supervisors, supervising case work
specialists, case work specialists, senior youth correctional counselors, and youth correctional
counselors. Non-custody staff interviewed included the medical physician, psychiatrists,
supervising registered nurse, registered nurses, vice principal, teachers, chaplain, cook, office
technician, and warehouse staff.
For purposes of this report, the interview team highlighted staff safety perceptions that were
shared by staff during our interviews. Responses are grouped for custody staff, the
Specialized/Intensive Treatment Programs, and non-custody staff.
Custody Staff - Interview with Major/Chief of Security
The interview team met with the Facility Major, who is also the Chief of Security, on July 15,
and asked him to describe his concerns for staff safety at Preston. He prefaced his response by
saying that the ward population has dramatically changed at Preston. He said more than 82% of
the wards claim gang affiliation, they demonstrate violent behavior towards other wards and
staff, and are not concerned about consequences for violating the institutional rules.
FINDING: There is a crucial need to have adequate programming space for assaultive wards.
DISCUSSION: When asked about solutions to reduce staff assaults, the major said that ward
behavior should drive the program needs. He said behavior modification is an important tool,
and if wards constantly step outside the program boundaries, they should be held accountable for
their actions. The major said that in the past, if a ward committed a level three offense (i.e.,
serious rule violation), he could be moved to the Tamarack program, which provides wards with
a structured setting. He added that after a ward successfully completed the program at
Tamarack, the ward would be transitioned to the Ironwood program for 60 days, which provided
the ward with group and individual counseling, in a more open, less restrictive setting than the
program at Tamarack. After the ward completed this program, he would move back to an open
dormitory setting. The major said that the transition from Tamarack, to Ironwood, to the open

21

dormitory reinforced the expected norms at Preston, and the wards seemed less likely to become
involved in a future rule violation offense.
The major indicated that after the Tamarack program closed, the violence quotient for ward on
ward assaults and ward on staff increased dramatically. He said the primary reason for the
increase in violence was because the wards could only be removed from their dormitory setting
for a few days, due to the lack of an alternative programming area. The wards knew they would
be returned to their dormitory, as Tamarack was closed and Ironwood did not have available
rooms. This knowledge seemed to empower the wards, as they knew they could retaliate against
their rivals upon their return, or challenge staff without fear of being locked up for their
behavior.
Supervisors and line staff concurred with the major that the closure of Tamarack (e.g. single
cells, which housed assaultive and disruptive wards from the main population) has resulted in
increased assaults, and staff is deeply concerned for their personal safety. With the loss of the
Tamarack program space, it is the opinion of staff, that the wards know that “staff have their
hands tied”, as they cannot administer appropriate consequences for rule challenging wards.
Custody Staff - Interviews with Supervisors
The first and second line supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants) were interviewed at various
work locations from July 12–15.
FINDING: Supervisors need to supervise and not be utilized to backfill line positions.
Additional custody staff, especially on the second watch, is needed.
DISCUSSION: The typical staffing pattern requires two staff (e.g., two youth correctional
counselors, or one youth correctional officer and one youth correctional counselor) to be
assigned to one lodge, unless it is an Intensive Treatment Program (ITP). Due to operational
absences (i.e., staff injuries, illnesses, and scheduled vacations), or other vacancies, the senior
youth correctional counselor (SYCC) is routinely used to backfill a line position in a lodge.
During our tours of the lodges, we observed supervisors working as the second staff position at
numerous lodges. In the team’s opinion, this results in the SYCC not being able to perform
supervisory responsibilities including supervising and directing, developing and training staff,
completing staff work on time, conducting investigations, and preparing staff evaluations.
FINDING: Using lodge officers as escort officers dilutes the staff to ward ratio during heavy
movement periods.
Day-to-day operations require constant ward movement from the lodge to exterior programs (i.e.,
education, dining hall, outpatient housing unit, and recreation). When this movement occurs,
lodge staff must escort wards, and this results in only one youth correctional officer or youth
correctional counselor left on the housing unit, to supervise up to 30 wards. While the team was
conducting interviews, they were constantly reminded of this issue when observing wards
moving about the institution grounds, without direct supervision from staff, or loitering together

22

outside of their lodges. On more than one instance, the interview team witnessed wards verbally
challenging staff inside open dormitories.
Interviews with Line Staff
The interview team canvassed the institution from July 12–15, conducting random interviews
with line staff.
FINDING: Line staff stated that there is a need for additional staff.
DISCUSSION: Line staff said that an additional staff member is needed in the intake and
orientation lodges, as well as the hillside open dormitories. Line staff said if they have a
disruptive ward acting out in these areas, it is difficult to isolate him, because of the open setting.
Staff said it is important to control the situation as soon as possible, so other wards don’t become
emotionally and physically involved. They reiterated that they would be less likely to take action
if they were the only staff on the lodge, because of the potential to be attacked by more than one
ward.
FINDING: Line staff is concerned about their safety because of the intermittent efficiency of
their personal alarms.
DISCUSSION: The interview team asked line staff to describe the safety equipment issued to
them. As a group, they said they were issued: personal alarms, radios in designated positions,
handcuffs and OC spray (the team noted that staff told us that they do not turn in their OC spray
at the end of shift; they keep in their personal possession).
Staff informed the interview team that they must carry a radio when outside the lodges, but they
are not required to carry them inside. The interview team noted that in most lodges, staff
maintained the radios in a locked office or cabinet, not immediately accessible to staff. When
the interview team questioned staff as to why they would not carry a radio as a primary
communication device, they told the team that the culture at the institution is to rely on personal
alarms to request assistance in the case of an emergency.
However, staff voiced their concerns about their safety because of the intermittent efficiency of
the personal alarms. They told the interview team that depending on their work location; they
may have to carry up to three different personal alarms (i.e., FM frequency, digital, or unicex).
They said the FM alarm works in certain lodges and buildings, but not outside of the structures.
They indicated that the alarm might activate in 50% to 80% of the instances when staff may
deploy it.
To compound this problem, staff said that third watch complains that there are insufficient
alarms available for them when they report for duty. Staff said the reason is because of the
number of alarms issued out to second watch, and the lack of an adequate number of reserve
alarms for the oncoming shift. The interview team was also informed that there are no alarms

23

assigned to the Hawthorne lodge. Staff is hopeful that an impending upgraded alarm system will
alleviate these issues.
Interviews with Special/Intensive Treatment Programs
The interview team conducted interviews with staff assigned to Intensive Treatment Program
(Redwood), Specialized Counseling Program (Oak), Special Management Program (Ironwood),
and the Specialized Behavioral Treatment Program (Sequoia) from July 12 – July 14.
FINDING: Specialized/Intensive Treatment programs treat the most difficult and troubled
wards. It is essential that there are a sufficient number of qualified and trained staff available at
all times. Currently, there are not a sufficient number of psychologists onsite to provide
treatment for these wards.
DISCUSSION: The interview team had the opportunity to spend several hours at each of these
locations. During our stay, we observed staff interacting with wards in a positive manner (i.e.,
acknowledging the ward), while at the same time, being cognizant of safety and security issues.
There appeared to be adequate treatment staff available (Treatment Team Supervisor, Sr. Youth
Correctional Counselor, Youth Correctional Counselors, Sr. Casework Specialists, Casework
Specialist, and registered nurses); however, there are not a sufficient number of psychologists
onsite to provide treatment for these wards.
In interviews with staff, we were informed that two psychologists were assaulted by wards, in
separate incidents, while working at the Sequoia Lodge. These psychologists are still not
working due to these attacks. As these wards need intensified treatment, it is imperative that this
void be filled, as it is unknown if these psychologists will be able to return to work.
FINDING: The recent addition of a staff member in the Sequoia Lodge on weekdays should be
designated as a permanent seven day a week post.
DISCUSSION: The interview team was informed that a youth correctional officer is available
to assist the second watch in the Sequoia Lodge from 1000-1800 hours Monday – Friday. We
were informed that this position was added as a result of litigation (suicide watches). Due to the
high volume of ward movement and activities, it would be prudent to fill this post seven days a
week.
FINDING: Custody staff needs training on how to deal more effectively with mentally ill
wards.
DISCUSSION: The Specialized and Intensive Treatment Program staff said, many times,
custody staff are assigned to work in the intensified or specialized treatment programs, and they
are not familiar with the needs of this population. They suggested that In-Service-Training
provide a block of training for all staff working at Preston in the identification, recognition, and
systematic approach for dealing with mental health issues.

24

Interviews with Non-Custody Staff
The interview team spoke with non-custody staff from July 12 – 15 at various work locations.
FINDING: There needs to be a more visible presence of uniform custody officers while wards
are in the classroom moving to and from the classrooms and in the gymnasium.
DISCUSSION: Teachers at every lodge, with the exception of Sequoia and Ironwood, noted
that ward movement to class is monitored by custody staff, but usually from a distance. Every
teacher the interview team spoke with would feel safer if the custody officer were present while
the wards filed into or out of the classrooms. Additionally, at remote locations, such as the
gymnasium, the teacher indicated the need for a periodic visit from uniform staff.
FINDING: The nurses working at the specialized and intensive treatment programs felt safer
than the nurses assigned to the clinic.
DISCUSSION: The perception of the nurses assigned to the clinic is they feel unsafe when
having to dispense medication in the intake, orientation, and open dormitories. The rationale is
that custody and treatment staff has less physical control of the wards, and if a ward is acting out,
they can break free from staff. The nurses who transferred from the Northern Reception Center
and Clinic are also concerned about the physical layout of Preston, as they feel unsafe when they
have to walk the vast grounds, while wards are walking unescorted.

25

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This is the second Staff Safety Evaluation conducted at the direction of the Corrections
Standards Authority and the first evaluation of a Division of Juvenile Justice Facility (the first
was conducted at Mule Creek State Prison, July 5-8, 2005). It is important to note that the
evaluation team concentrated on areas that are not currently being audited by other auditing
bodies (e.g.: Office of the Inspector General, Bureau of State Audits, internal compliance
monitoring) and the findings should not be considered to be “all encompassing”.
While there are a number of deficiencies detailed in this report, many are due to a lack of
resources. The team believes that the staff at the Preston Youth Correctional Facility are doing
the best they can in many instances with available resources. The physical plant and equipment
needs of this facility appear to have been neglected and in the opinion of the team, capital
improvements are needed in order to help meet the mission of the Division of Juvenile Justice.
In addition to the capital improvements, training and staffing needs should be further analyzed.
It is unfortunate that in trying fiscal times, training resources fall victim to shrinking budgets and
the challenge to maintain an adequate number of well-trained human resources grows.
As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority, the findings from this evaluation will be
presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to
CSA members, CDCR administration and Superintendent Aguas. It is outside the scope of this
project for the CSA to receive and monitor a corrective action plan and appropriate action will be
the responsibility of CDCR Division of Juvenile Justice.

26

Attachment A
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR

BOARD OF CORRECTIONS
600 BERCUT DRIVE, SACRAMENTO, CA 95814

916/445-5073
WWW.BDCORR.C.AGOV

June 27, 2005
Jay Aguas, Superintendent
Present Youth Correctional Facility
201 Waterman Road
Ione, CA 95640
Dear Superintendent Aguas:
The Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) asked the Board of Corrections (BOC) to
develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at Department of Corrections (CDC) and Department of
the Youth Authority (CYA) detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the Board
unanimously approved a proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for
conducting staff safety evaluations.
The panel met on May 24-25, 2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be
conducted. As a result, a team comprised of BOC, CDC and CYA staff will be conducting the
evaluations over the next 28 months and will be evaluating staff safety at the Preston Youth
Correctional Facility on July 12-15, 2005. We expect to be on site for four days and plan to observe
operations during all shifts if possible.
We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and/or appropriate administrative staff
on July 12, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be
conducted and to get a general overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have.
In order to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team’s use while at
Preston Youth Correctional Facility:
•

A contact person with whom the team may coordinate their activities (please call or e-mail
this information when the contact is identified).

•

An office or conference room equipped with a table, chairs and a telephone in which a team
of nine may work.

•

Access to all levels of staff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their
assigned work areas and we will avoid interrupting their schedules as much as possible.

Attachment A
Superintendent Aguas

Page 2

June 27, 2005

•

Incident Reports for Assaults on Staff (CYA 8.403 Behavior Report; CYA 8.412 Serious
Incident ReportCYA Use of Restraint Report):
A data collection form was sent via e-mail asking that facility staff code staff assault
incident reports for the past year in the identified format, addressing incident information,
inmate information and victim(s) information (please provide an electronic copy of this
data as soon as practical).

•

State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for assaults on staff.
(Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator)

•

Access to copies of applicable operations manuals.

The evaluation team may ask for additional resources, depending on the initial assessment. Please
keep in mind that Preston Youth Correctional Facility is the first CYA facility for which staff safety
evaluations will be conducted, so all needed information is still being determined.
Supplemental Data Sources –
where applicable - to be accessed as needed
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes*
o Grievances, Recommendations, Actions
Staff Action Grievance (CYA)*
Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOU) at certain facilities*
Authorized Equipment and Functionality
Use of Force Committee Minutes and responses to recommendations*
Employee Training records for selected areas*
Corrective Action Plans for previous audits*

Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit
conference with you and/or appropriate members of your staff (on or about July 15, 2005). The
results of the evaluation will be reported to the BOC at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written
report will be forwarded to YACA with a courtesy copy sent to you.
Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions,
please feel free to contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or
jread@bdcorr.ca.gov.
Sincerely,
Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A)
*= 2004 and 2005 to date
cc:

Walt Allen, Director
Department of the Youth Authority

Attachment B

Preston Youth Correctional Facility
Staff Assault Data 2004
Page 1 of 2

1/25/2004

Time
17:45

Day of
Week

Site and Location

Type of Assault

Sunday

Redwood room T1Pushing object (door) /Stricking face w/ towel

Serious
Injury
Yes

Inmate
Weapon
Hands

IM#/YA#
87594

Native AmericanITP

Rec'd CDCCYA

Rec'd Inst
9/9/2002

Anticipated
Rel
Date/PBD Age

Housing
Loc

5/26/2004

18

Redwood

Special
Program/M
H Status
ITP

Gang
Nonaffliliated

Work
Assign
None

Gender
M

Classification
(CO/CCII/Cook,
etc)

Date

Classification

IR/SIR#

VICTIM INFORMATION

INMATE/WARD INFORMATION

Ethnicity

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Lt.

Age

Yrs of
Svs

Race
White

4/1/2004

11:50

Thursday

Redwood #C-2

Spit out the cuffing port stricking staff

No

Mouth/Spit

89206

Afr American

ITP

1/2/2004

8/8/2005

14

Redwood

ITP

AfrAm/415/Bay None

M

YCC

White

5/16/2004

18:45

Sunday

Ironwood Lodge

Dispersed urine at staff/combative/ physically restrictive

No

Urine

89883

Hispanic

SMP

5/12/2004

Mar-06

18

Ironwood

SMP

Sureno

None

M

YCO

White

5/23/2004

12:45

Sunday

Sequoia Lodge

Spit on staff

No

Mouth/Spit

85436

Hispanic

SBPT

3/6/2003

7/1/2007

17

Sequoia

SBPT

Nonaffiliated

None

M

YCC

White

6/14/2004

17:10

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw unknown liquid on staffs arm

No

Ukn liquid

88461

Afr American

SBPT

3/3/2004

4/1/2007

17

Sequoia

SBPT

Blood

None

M

YCC

White

6/17/2004

6:28

Thursday

Fir Lodge

Striking staff in rib area, shoulder area, an head

No

Battery

89879

Hispanic

Intake

5/18/2004

Mar-06

17

Fir

Intake

Norteno

None

M

YCO

White

6/30/2004

11:40

Wednesday Sequoia Lodge

Striking staff in neck, chest and arm with liquid substance No

Ukn liquid

88250

Hispanic

SBPT

6/2/2003

Mar-07

16

Sequoia

SBPT

Norteno

None

M

YCO

White

7/1/2004

15:39

Thursday

Redwood Dorm

Struck staff on the left side of forehead with clenched fist Yes

Battery

89814

Hispanic

ITP

4/14/2004

1/1/2006

18

Redwood

ITP

Bulldog

None

M

YCO

White

7/6/2004

15:20

Tuesday

Redwood Dorm

Struck staff on the right side of his head with a closed fist Yes

Battery

89814

Hispanic

ITP

4/14/2004

1/1/2006

18

Redwood

ITP

Bulldog

None

M

YCO

White

7/7/2004

14:14

Wednesday Arbor Lodge

Spitting on staff (head, neck, and face)

No

Mouth/Spit

88621

White

General

6/3/2003

11/1/2007

17

Arbor

General

Nonaffiliated

None

M

YCC

White

7/7/2004

19:55

Wednesday Arbor Lodge

Stricking with fist to staffs chest

No

Battery

89482

White

General

1/28/2004

Sep-05

16

Arbor

General

Nonaffiliated

None

M

YCC

White

7/23/2004

16:40

Friday

Ironwood Lodge

Grabbed right wrist of staff through food slot/ pulled arm No

Battery

87686

Afr American

SMP

12/11/2004

Oct-06

18

Ironwood

SMP

Crip

None

F

YCC

Afr Amer

7/23/2004

19:58

Friday

Ironwood Lodge

Squirted a white colored unknown liquid on staff

No

Ukn liquid

89879

Hispanic

SMP

5/18/2004

3/1/2006

17

Ironwood

SMP

Norteno

None

F

YCC

Afr Amer

7/23/2004

20:30

Friday

Ironwood Lodge

Contact with foreign substance to chest and arms

No

Ukn liquid

89879

Hispanic

SMP

5/18/2004/

3/1/2006

17

Ironwood

SMP

Norteno

None

M

YCO

White

8/9/2004

18:37

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff and Wards

Yes

Battery

85146

White

SBPT

3/7/2001

11/1/2004

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Skinheads

None

M

YCO

White

8/9/2004

18:37

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff and Wards

Yes

Battery

88134

White

SBPT

1/23/2004

5/1/2005

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Peckerwoods

None

M

YCO

White

8/9/2004

18:37

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff and Wards

Yes

Battery

89219

Hispanic

SBPT

7/28/2004

11/1/2005

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Sureno

None

M

YCO

White

8/9/2004

18:37

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff and Wards

Yes

Battery

85467

White

SBPT

5/31/2001

1/1/2005

16 Sequoia

SBPT

Fresno Peck

None

M

YCO

White

8/9/2004

18:37

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff and Wards

Yes

Battery

87363

Hispanic

SBPT

2/21/2003

12/1/2005

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Nonaffiliated

None

M

YCO

White

8/9/2004

18:37

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff and Wards

Yes

Battery

89155

Hispanic

SBPT

7/6/2004

10/1/2005

15 Sequoia

SBPT

Norteno

None

M

YCO

White

8/9/2004

18:37

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff and Wards

Yes

Battery

87185

Hispanic

SBPT

4/10/2002

9/1/2004

19 Sequoia

SBPT

Nonaffliliated

None

M

YCO

White

8/10/2004

9:50

Saturday

Sequoia Lodge

Sexually violating staff

No

Battery

89814

Hispanic

SBPT

4/14/2004

1/1/2006

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Bulldog

None

F

DA

White

8/10/2004

9:50

Saturday

Sequoia Lodge

Battering staff

No

Battery

89814

Hispanic

SBPT

4/14/2004

1/1/2006

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Bulldog

None

M

YCO

White

8/10/2004

10:45

Saturday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff w/Foreign Substance (spit)

No

Mouth/Spit

85146

White

SBPT

3/7/2004

11/1/2004

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Skinheads

None

F

CWS

White

8/10/2004

10:45

Saturday

Sequoia Lodge

Battery on Staff w/Foreign Substance (spit)

No

Mouth/Spit

85467

White

SBPT

5/31/2005

1/1/2005

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Fresno Peck

None

F

CWS

White

8/11/2004

1:00

Sunday

Ironwood Lodge

Grabbed belt of officer, slamming him into cell door

No

Hands

87360

White

SMP

6/13/2004

9/1/2007

17 Ironwood

SMP

415/Bay

None

M

YCO

White

8/19/2004

16:50

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Kicked staff in the elbow

No

Feet

89219

Hispanic

SMP

7/28/2004

11/1/2005

18 Sequoia

SMP

Sureno

None

M

YCO

White

8/19/2004

16:50

Monday

Sequoia Lodge

Injuried staffs hand while being restrained

No

Hands/Body 89219

Hispanic

SMP

7/28/2004

11/1/2005

18 Sequoia

SMP

Sureno

None

F

CWS

White

8/24/2004

13:10

Saturday

Redwood Lodge

Stuck staff in the left eye

Yes

Hands

89269

Hispanic

ITP

2/26/2004

11/1/2004

17 Redwood

ITP

Sureno

None

M

YCC

Hispanic

8/28/2004

17:15

Tuesday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw an unknown type of yellow liquid on staff

No

Ukn liquid

85467

White

SBPT

5/31/2001

1/1/2005

16 Sequoia

SBPT

Fresno Peck

None

M

YCC

White

8/28/2004

17:15

Tuesday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw an unknown type of yellow liquid on staff

No

Ukn liquid

85467

White

SBPT

5/31/2001

1/1/2005

16 Sequoia

SBPT

Fresno Peck

None

F

YCO

Hispanic

8/29/2004

14:25

Thursday

Redwood Lodge

Threw unknown liquid on staff

No

Ukn liquid

86322

White

ITP

9/16/2002

11/1/2005

16 Redwood

ITP

Bulldog

None

F

YCC

Afr Amer

8/29/2004

17:05

Thursday

Sequoia Lodge

Spitting on staff (facial area)

No

Mouth/Spit

87094

Afr American

SBPT

12/19/2002

Dec-05

17 Sequoia

SBPT

Asian Boys

None

M

YCC

White

8/30/2004

14:45

Friday

Sequoia Lodge

Projected unidentified liquid onto staff

No

Ukn liquid

85146

White

SBPT

3/7/2004

11/1/2004

19 Sequoia

SBPT

Skinheads

None

M

YCC

White

9/11/2004

19:00

Saturday

Sequoia Lodge

Spit on staffs face

No

Mouth/Spit

89073

Hispanic

SBPT

3/17/2004

11/1/2005

16 Sequoia

SBPT

Norteno

None

M

YCO

White

9/12/2004

17:47

Sunday

Sequoia Lodge

Attempted battery on staff with wepon

No

Att. Battery

88250

Hispanic

SBPT

6/2/2004

3/1/2007

17 Sequoia

SBPT

Norteno

None

None

9/14/2004

7:30

Tuesday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw an unknown substance on staff

No

Ukn liquid

89335

Afr American

SBPT

12/24/2004

7/1/2006

17 Sequoia

SBPT

415/Bay

None

M

YCC

Hispanic

Attachment B

Preston Youth Correctional Facility
Staff Assault Data 2004
Page 2 of 2

9/21/2004

Time
9:30

Day of
Week
Tuesday

Site and Location
Sequoia Lodge

Type of Assault
Kicked staff in the chest and the groin

Serious
Injury
Yes

Inmate
Weapon
Feet

Hispanic

SBPT

IM#/YA#
88784

Rec'd CDCCYA

Rec'd Inst
7/3/2004

Anticipated Rel
Date/PBD
4/1/2005

Age

VICTIM INFORMATION

Housing
Loc

Special
Program/M
H Status

Gang

Work
Assign

Gender

Classification
(CO/CCII/Cook,
etc)

Date

Classification

IR/SIR#

INMATE/WARD INFORMATION

Ethnicity

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Age

Yrs of
Svs

Race

17 Sequoia

SBPT

Bulldog

None

M

DR.

White

General

White

9/22/2004

18:30

Wednesday Evergreen Lodge Punched staff in the chest/ wreseled around causing injuryYes

Hands

89875

Hispanic

SBPT

5/13/2004

1/1/2006

17 Evergreen

Norteno

None

M

YCC

9/26/2004

17:45

Sunday

OHU/Greenbrier

No

Rock

88606

Afr American

General

3/17/2004

9/1/2005

16 Greenbrier General

Crip

None

F

MTA

White

9/26/2004

18:00

Sunday

Manzanita Lodge Struck staff in the nose and right forehead with fist

Yes

Hands

88675

Afr American

General

3/17/2004

10/1/2005

17 Manzanita

General

Jamacian MafiaNone

M

Lt.

White

9/28/2004

17:15

Tuesday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw yellow liquid on staff

No

Urine

85467

White

SBPT

5/31/2001

1/1/2005

16

Sequoia

SBPT

Fresno Pek

None

M

YCC

White

9/28/2004

17:15

Tuesday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw yellow liquid on staff

No

Urine

85467

White

SBPT

5/31/2001

1/1/2005

16

Sequoia

SBPT

Fresno Pek

None

F

YCO

Hispanic

10/10/2004

7:30

Sunday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw an unknown liquid/possesion of ward made weapo No

Ukn/wepon 89073

Hispanic

SBPT

12/11/2003

9/1/2006

16 Sequoia

SBPT

Sureno

None

M

YCC

White

10/10/2004

7:30

Sunday

Sequoia Lodge

Threw unknown liquid/possesion of ward made weapon

Liquid/Wea 89703

Hispanic

SBPT

12/11/2003

Sep-06

SBPT

Sureno

None

M

YCC

White

10/12/2004

18:17

Tuesday

Redwood Lodge

Threw unknown liquid/soaked clothing in groin area of sta No

Ukn liquid

Hispanic

ITP

4/14/2004

1/1/2006

ITP

Bulldog

None

M

YCC

White

Threw a rock, striking staff

No

89814

16

Sequoia

18 Redwod

10/12/2004

18:17

Tuesday

Redwood Lodge

Threw unknown liquid/soaked clothing, groin area of staff No

Ukn liquid

89814

Hispanic

ITP

4/14/2004

1/1/2006

18

Redwood

ITP

Bulldog

None

M

YCC

White

10/12/2004

15:20

Tuesday

Sequoia Lodge

Unknown liquid thrown out of food slot

No

Ukn liquid

85436

Hispanic

SBPT

3/6/2003

7/1/2007

17

Sequoia

SBPT

Nonaffiliated

None

M

YCC

White

10/16/2004

10:47

Saturday

Redwood Lodge

Right knee swelling

No

Hands/Body 89986

Afr American

ITP

9/8/2004

May-08

16

Redwood

ITP

Blood

None

M

YCC

Afr Amer

11/13/2004

17:15

Saturday

Greenbrier Lodge Threw a wad of paper and pen at staff

No

Hands

Afr American

General

8/3/2004

Oct-06

15

Greenbrier General

Nonaffiliated

None

M

YCC

Hispanic

11/13/2004

17:15

Saturday

OHU

Battery on staff: repeated advancements

Yes

Hands/Body 88534

White

SMP

6/26/2003

6/1/2005

17

OHU

Norteno

None

M

YCC

White

11/13/2004

17:15

Saturday

OHU

Battery on staff: repeated advancements

Yes

Hands/Body 88534

White

SMP

6/26/2003

6/1/2005

17

OHU

Various

Norteno

None

F

YCC

White

11/13/2004

17:15

Saturday

OHU

Battery on staff: repeated advancements

No

Verbal

89720

Hispanic

SMP

3/17/2004

2/1/2007

17

OHU

Various

Norteno

None

M

YCC

White

11/13/2004

17:15

Saturday

OHU

Battery on staff: repeated advancements

No

Verbal

87671

Afr American

SMP

5/6/2003

Jan-07

16

OHU

Various

415/Bay

None

M

YCC

White

11/18/2004

17:00

Thursday

Sequoia Lodge

Squirted staf with urine and water mixed together

No

Urine

88784

Hispanic

SBPT

7/3/2003

Apr-08

17

Sequoia

SBPT

Bulldog

None

M

YCC

White

12/9/2004

19:28

Thursday

Oak Lodge

Splashed yellow liquid onto staff

No

Urine

89629

White

General

6/15/2004

1/1/2006

17

Oak

General

Peckerwood

None

F

YCC

Afr Amer

17

Sequoia

SBPT

Nonaffiliated

None

F

RN

Phillipine

18 Sequoia

SBPT

Crip

None

M

YCC

Afr Amer

90071

12/22/2004

12:30

Wednesday Sequoia Lodge

Threw cup of unknown liquid inot facial area of staff

No

Ukn liquid

88331

White

SBPT

2/28/2003

4/1/2006

12/27/2004

19:10

Monday

Threw an unknown type of liquid through food slot

No

Ukn liquid

87335

Afr American

SBPT

4/23/2004

9/1/2006

Sequoia Lodge

Various

CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY – STAFF SAFETY EVALUATIONS

PRESTON YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
LIVING AREA SPACE EVALUATION
Building/Housing Unit

Each Building
EACH
CELL
Bed
E
s
Beds
55
0

Staffing

Cell
Type

Design
Capacity

#
Cells

Arbor

Dorm

55

1

Buckeye

Dorm

55

1

55

0

56

Cedar

Dorm

65

1

65

0

38

Evergreen

Dorm

55

1

55

0

44

Ponderosa

Dorm

55

1

55

0

40

Greenbrier

Dorm

55

1

55

0

40

Hawthorn

Dorm

55

1

55

0

40

Ironwood

Single

50

50

50

0

50

Sequoia

Single

50

33

33

0

24

Manzanita

Dorm

55

1

55

0

43

Oak

Single

50

43

43

0

39

Redwood

Single

50

41

45

0

Fir

Dorm

104

1

104

Tamarack

Single

64

64

64

Bldg Name

Pop

Program/Security Level
1st

2nd

3rd

1

2

3

Houses wards assigned to
work throughout facility

1

2

3

Clinic orientation for younger
boys

1

2

3

1

2

3

Clinic orientation for older
boys

1

2

3

Orientation unit for wards
coming to Preston from other
YA facilities.

1

2

3

1

2

3

Houses wards on temporary
detention and Special
Management Program. All
wet rooms.

2

6

5

Houses wards on Specialized
Behavioral treatment Program.
All wet rooms.

2

9

9

1

2

3

Houses Specialized
Counseling Program, which
targets sex offenders. All wet
rooms.

2

3

3

22

Houses wards on ITP program
and is the overflow for Oak.
All wet rooms.

2

2

3

0

0

Closed

0

0

0

0

0

Closed

0

0

0

37

Attachment D
Preston Youth Correctional Facility
July 12 – 15, 2005
Line Staff:
1.

What is your current job title?

2.

What is your assignment? What are your primary duties (Post Orders)?

3.

When did you start working for the department as…?

4.

How long have you been assigned to this facility?

5.

How many wards do you supervise? What is their program assignment?

6.

What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at all times,
otherwise have access to, or have to check out from a central location?

7.

Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?

8.

What is the general condition of your safety equipment?

9.

Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for your job duties?

10.

If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary?

1

Attachment D
11.

On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you feel working at this facility? Why do you feel that way?

12.

Where do you feel the least safe? Can you describe why that is? Where and
when do you feel the most safe? How do other staff feel about this?

13.

What staff safety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the
most as you are performing your duties?

14.

Do you have any general suggestions or comments relating to staff safety?

15.

What most would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety?

16.

How often do you see and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor’s
supervisor? The superintendent?

17.

Are protocols in place for emergency responses?

18.

(Policy?)What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is
injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious
cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

2

Attachment D
Supervisors:
1.

How long have you been assigned to this facility as a supervisor?

2.

How many years do you have as a supervisor?

3.

Have you worked as a supervisor at any other CYA institution?

4.

Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a
routine shift.

5.

How many staff do you directly supervise?

6.

How many do you indirectly supervise?

7.

What is the percentage of time (shift) do you spend personally observing your
subordinates?

8.

Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff?

9.

What safety equipment is issued and carried by your staff?

10.

Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff’s use?

3

Attachment D
11.

If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?

12.

Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all
times?

13.

Does your staff have stab vests? Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure
that they wear it at all times?

14.

How often do you see your supervisors?

15.

How many of your available staff are on overtime? Ordered over? Voluntary?

16.

On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you feel working at this facility?

17.

What is your greatest concern about staff safety for your subordinates?

18.

What kind of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that
emerge? How do you handle them?

19.

What do you do to ensure a safe working environment for your staff?

4

Attachment D
20.

What would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety and reduce staff
assaults?

21.

What protocols in place for emergency responses?

22.

What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured,
where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases?
How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

5

Attachment D
Managers:
1.

How long have you been assigned to this facility as a manager?

2.

How many years experience do you have as a manager?

3.

Have you been a manager at any other CYA institution?

4.

Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a
routine shift.

5.

Have often do you walk through the facility to talk with staff and observe general
staff safety practices?

6.

Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? What is
available for them to use?

7.

Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff’s use?

8.

If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?

6

Attachment D
9.

How many of your staff have been issued stab vests? How many have been
fitted? What is the timeline for issuing vests? Who has been identified to receive
them?

10.

On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you feel working at this facility?

11.

When considering staff safety, what types of concerns do you have?

12.

From your perspective, what carries the greatest potential for staff injury?

13.

What might mitigate or reduce staff assaults?

14.

What kinds of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that
emerge?

15.

Do you have any long range plans to ensure staff safety and to reduce staff
assaults?

16.

Do you have anyone assigned to monitor staff assaults or track occurrences to
identify trends?

7

Attachment D
17.

If you had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would you make
to your operation to reduce staff assaults or the potential for assaults? Physical
plant, service and supply, operational changes and/or staff changes?

18.

Have the number of vacancies, SCIF 3301, other leave of absences affected staff
safety? Do you have mandated overtime for staff and supervisors?

19

Do you have any staff off duty as a result of an assault? How long? Have you
had contact with them while they were off duty?

20.

What level of repair is your facility? Have you made requests for service or
special projects that affect the level of staff safety? Have those requests been
approved?

21.

What protocols in place for emergency responses?

22.

What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where
do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How
long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

8

Attachment E

Attachment E
Evaluation Team Members
Preston Youth Correctional Facility

Team 1
Staff Interviews:
Robert Takeshta, CSA Field Representative
John McAuliffe, Adult Operations, Correctional Counselor II
Jeff Plunkett, Division of Juvenile Justice, Captain
Team 2
Physical Plant, Staffing and Population:
Gary Wion, CSA Field Representative
Mark Perkins, Adult Operations, Facility Captain
Mark Miller, Division of Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant
Team 3
Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis:
Don Allen, CSA Field Representative
Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieutenant
David Finley, Division of Juvenile Justice, Major
Robert Takeshta, Field Representative
Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-322-8346
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail: btakeshta@bdcorr.ca.gov

Gary Wion, Field Representative
Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324-1641
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail: gwion@bdcorr.ca.gov

Don Allen, Field Representative
Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324-9153
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail: dallen@bdcorr.ca.gov

John McAuliffe, Correctional Counselor II
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2628
Fax:
916-358-2636
E-Mail: john.mcauliffe@corr.ca.gov
Dave Stark, Lieutenant
Adult Operations
PRESTON Report.doc;12/16/2005

Phone: 916-358-2473
Fax:
916-358-2499
E-Mail: dave.stark@corr.ca.gov

Mark Perkins, Captain
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2626
Fax:
916-358-2499
E-Mail: mperkins@corr.ca.gov

Jeff Plunkett, Captain
Division of Juvenile Justice
Phone: 916-262-0802
Fax:
916-262-1767
E-Mail: jplunkett@cya.ca.gov

David Finley, Major
Division of Juvenile Justice Division
Phone: 805-278-3710
Fax: 805-278-1499
E-Mail: dfinley@cya.ca.gov
Mark Miller, Lieutenant
Division of Juvenile Justice Division
Phone: 209-274-8394
Fax: 916-262-1525
E-Mail: mmiller@cya.ca.gov

Attachment F

GANG INCIDENTS AT PRESTON YCF
DURING 2003
1 ON 1

3 TO 7

8 OR MORE

100
90

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS

80
70
60
50
40

40

30
20

21
16

18

13

10
2
0
0
JAN

21

1
0
FEB

1
0
MAR

3
1
APR

2
0
MAY

20

20

14
1
JUN

12
3
0
JUL

1
0
AUG

MONTH OF OCCURRENCE

PRESTON Report.doc;12/16/2005

2
0
SEP

3
1
OCT

7
3
1
NOV

11
4
1
DEC

Attachment F

G ANG IN CIDENT S AT PREST O N YCF
D U R ING 2004
1 ON 1

3 TO 7

8 OR MORE

100
92

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS

90
80

80

70

70

70

63

60

67

65
53

50
44

40

42

30
20
10

9
5
0

0
JA N

12
6
3
0

3

FEB

MAR

1
0

APR

3

MAY

8
7

7
2

JUN

JUL

11
5

A UG

M ONTH O F O CCURRENCE

PRESTON Report.doc;12/16/2005

10
7

SEP

3
2

8
4

OC T

NO V

5
1

DEC

Attachment F

G AN G IN C ID E N TS AT P R E S TO N Y C F
J AN U AR Y TH R U M AY 200 5
1 ON 1

3 TO 7

8 OR MORE

100

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS

90
80
70

68

65

60
50

50
44

43

40
30
20
10
5
2

0
JA N

3
1
FEB

4
1
MAR

M O N TH O F O C C U R R E N C E

PRESTON Report.doc;12/16/2005

5
4

3

APR

MAY

 

 

Federal Prison Handbook - Side
Advertise Here 3rd Ad
Prison Profiteers - Side