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Deuel Vocational Inst Staff Safety Eval 2005

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STATE Or: CALII'OI\NIA - OI!PARTMEM OF CORRECTIONS AND RI!HAIlII.ITA"'ON

ARNOLD SCHWARZEIIIEGG6R. GOViRNOR

CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY
600 Dercu1 Drive
SacnamDnto, CA 95814

916·4+6·5073

wvyw.cse.ce.gov

Novetnber 30, 2005
Secretary Rodericlc Q. Hickman
Ca.lifornia Depar1.luent ofCorrec:1.iOl1s alld Rehabilitation
1515 S Street. Room 502 S
Sacramento, CA 958]4
Dear Secretary Hickman:

In response to your

COllCerD abol\t prison and juvenile institutIOnal staff safety the Corrections
Standards AuthOl'ity (CSA) Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted an evaluation of the Deuel
Vocational Institute (DVJ) September 26-30, 2005.

As noted in the report, the most significant issues are the result of crowding and the physical plant
limitauons related to the institution t s mission as a reception center. Despite these issues, institution
staff reported feeling safein their duties. Staff fUI1:her reported a high degree of confidence in tbe
management of the instituwn.

We are simultaneously fonvarding the report to it'lterested members of CDCR in order that they may
begin cODSidering input ino any areas under their jurisdiction. We Ilre requesting a response fTom
DVI management to the findings of this evaluation within 30 days of receipt of the report. Prudenee
diC1ates that a cOlT=ctive aaion plan (CAP) also be developed; however, monitoring n CAP is beyond
tile scope of CSA and is thel'esponsibilit)' of the Dhrision of Adult lnstltlltions.
The enclosed report at0118 with the CAP will be presented to the CSA at the next scheduled meeting.
If you have any questions (J comments, please fee) n-ae to contact me.

S~?'eIYt

Q

~~ ~,S·~~

1<.arel1 L. Stoll
Executiv!::: Director (A)

ce'

EllC!OSUJ'e

Steve Moore, Wal'den
Wendy Still, Associate Director
.TOM Dovey, Director
Karen Wong, Risk Managemen1
Sandra Duvenec:l:., !-!uman Resources
A1"mand BUl'fuel, Fiscal Services
George Sifuentes, Facilities Management

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND

1' • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • "

EVALUATJON METHODOLOGY

1

tlt

••••• "

-

FACILITY PROF1LE

1

_

3

Current Usage

3

Population Summary

4

Staffing

-

,I.·t' ••• ·· •.•••..•.•••••.••.•••.•••.•••..••.•••. :>

JmVIEW OF DOClJMENTATION ....•..••.•.. ,.~
Staff Assnultlncident Reports

TraInIng ,.,

u

,

7

t •••••••••••••••••••• ,

,

7
10

, •••••••••• ,

Safety Equipment

PHYSICAL PLANT

12
r

" •••• , •••••••••

STAFF INTERVIEWS ..•....•................•...•..•....•.••..•..,•••.....,

Intemew Process

14

,. •••••••.••••••••••••.•,••••• 18
t1

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18

Custody Staff -lnteT'\'iews with Managers

18

CUGtodylTreatment Staff ~ Interviews with Supen'i~()rs

20

Custody Stnff-Intervie\'l's "'ith Ltne Staff

21

Intervie'Y\'s witllNon-Custody Staff

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,., .. ,

,

SUMMA.RY/CONCLUSION
ENTRA.NCE LETTER

n •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

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DATA MATRIX.

DESIGN CAPACITY

23

Attachment A

_

"5. CURRENT CAPACITY~

STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE••....•,•.•....._

EVALt1AT]ON TEAM MEMBERS AND ASSJGNMENT

24

Attachment B

_

Attachment C

,••.••••...... Attachment D

Attachment E

BACI(GROUND

In March 2005 t Sec~tary Roderic.k Hickmun requested that tlle Corrections Standards Authority
(CSA) develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the ~ta.tets adult and youth detention
facilities. At the May 19, 2005 meeting of the CSA. the proposal was presented fl1'ld Ilccepted.
On May 24·25 t 2005, a panel of state and l1ational subjbC\ matter eK.perts WEJS cOllvened to
es1ablish the criteria by which the evaJuaU011,S would be conducted. Based on those critena., a
team was developed md a til1leJine of evaluations was estabhshed.

On July 5-8, 2005, a temu comprised of staff from the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDeR) CSA. Adult Operations flnd Juvenile Justice conducted tile first Staff
Safety Evaltmbon at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). The evaluatiol' protocol consisted of a
request for advance data on staff assaults. including victim and perpetl'ato!' data; a pI'~li01inary
site visit of the physical plant; random interviews with val'ious custody and non-custody staff; a
review of applicable writtem policies and procedures governing the operation of the il1stittltion;
£Iud a review of documentation including incidents of staff assaults t staffing levels. ilunate
population and safet)'equipment.
EVALTJATJON METHODOLOGY
Deuel Vocational Inslrtutio11 was selected as the second adult facility for review and the MCSP
evaluation protocol was followed. An entrance letter was sent to Acting Warden Steven R.
Moore illforJning him of the September 26-30.2005 site visit dates and the proposed operational
plan (Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a datE! matrix to record information
n.-om lllcident reports (CDC 837) of inmate assaults on staff to determine if any trends could be
identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete the matrix before
the site visit (Attachment B). The evaluation team ask~d thal all incident reports and related
documentation be made available during ~ ~dtc visit. As the evaluation progrcssedt the team
identified other infonnation appropriate for review and staff at the institution providcd copies of
existing documents orreseal"ched their records for information.

The Facilities Standards and Operations Divisioll of the CSA led the evaluation team
(Attachment E). The evaluation began 011 Septelnbel' 26, 2005 at the instit\ltiol1 with m, e11trallce
conferel1ce with Acting Warden Moore. appropriate institutiol'lal ad111inistrative staff and
evuluation team members. Th~ c.onference ineJuded iUl operational ovcrview of the institution by
Acting Warden Moore as well as aD overview of the (;;v~lluation process by CSA Fjeld
Representative Roben Takeshta. Following the entrance conference. the evaluation t.eam
members were provided a tour of the irlStitution

Using a conference roum as the base of operation, the team broke into workgroups and began the
review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their observations. Documentation was
reviewed relative to tllC physical plant configurBtioll, policies, ~mfety equiplnel1t, staffing levt:ls,
staff assaults and imutlle poplllation. The: group looked for any trends or l'elatecl issues.
The physical plant tCRlll reviewed the institutioD design ,IS it rela.ted 1.0 stafiing and the inmate
population. The pUlpose of the review was to idcntif)' any issues that would n1iecl staff safety,

such 8S poor physical plant design/maintenance. imnate crowding, limited visibility, insufficient
supervision or lack of communication,
Institutional managers as wen as staff and supervisors on each of the three watches were
interviewed to provide an opportunity to identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues, A
questio!UWre was developed in pl'eporation for the review to ensure some consistency among the
interviews (Attaclunent D). The responses were categorized and a summary of the responses is
included in the Staff Interview section of this report (page 17-23). Conflicts between the
documentation, the staffs' perceptioll of the practice and staffs' concerns for safety issues were
noted during the interviews and are included in this report. The review team also made
observations and those are noted.
An eXIt conference

conducted with Acting Warden Moore and the institution management
staff to provide a summary of the results of the evaluation. The exit cOnfel'el1Ce included a
presentation of the team's perceptions and observations as well as a summary of comments made
by staff.
Wl:lS

FACILlTI.' PROFILE

Deuel VocationnJ 111StitUti011 (DVI)l locnted ncar tracy, California, was first opel"led in 1953 as a
general population institution wIth extensive vocational training progrnms and Pdsol1 Industry
Authority programs. The facility constructioll, often referred to as a "telephone pole" design
popu) ar in the 1950$, is ba.~ed on f\ long central con'idor that extends the length of the instituti on.
Buildings e>..1.e11d1l1~ from eucll side of tbe corridor contain severa) inmate housing units, !:l
medical unit, visiting areas, library, and other program arens. The housing units are of linear
de..ngD with intel·jor corridors. The administrative segregation unit is a linear design with
corridors separating tile cells from external walls.
The Reception Centcr is located at Oile end of the central corridor and the fonnel' vocational
shops and plant operations are located a1 the opposite end. Pel]Jendicularly hltel'Sec.ting the
central corridor at the center of the institution is a second COITidor. The gy111Ilasium, Uul1flte
dining rOOlnS, chapels and Prison Industry Authoril>' shops are located off of both sides of this
seool1d corridor.

The institution was originally constructed to house 1249 iml1ates in single cell linear housing
units. A 299-bed reception center was added in 1959 but deactivaled III 1974 and cOllverted into
a Maml.gement Control Unit. In 1978. a second bed was added to existing cells to convert them
to double occupancy cells. A 108-bed Mi111D1UIn Security Facility (MSF), located outside of the
s::cure area of the main complex, was added in 1981 to house support service hunates that
wor}ced on the f'8m1ing operation and pelformed institutional maintenance. In 1987, 100 more
beds were added to the MSF. The reception center was l'eactivated in 1988 with nearly 1000
beds. Today, the reception center population has expanded to include all but about 400 beds
withhJ the main security area of the institution. Current capacity in the main facility is 2875;
there are 228 beds in the MSF and J0 beds in the Fire House (PH). In addition, 960 emergency
beels have been added in various portions of the facility. This brings the totallltlmbcr of beds to
4073.
Curren1 Usage

DVl is currently used as a reception center fOI' the intake of up to 500 pll.role violators and new
COlll1l1itlnents per week from se\'eral counties Jocat~d in Northem California. Parole violators
make up nearly 75% of the inmates processad through the Reception Center (Re). The RC is
intended to be Zl temporary housing area for up to 90 days to allow the correctional cO'lmseling
stCLLl'ftime to decide where best to transfer the ll1D1ate fot' more ]1ermanen1 housing.
lntalte services include compiliJ'l.g historical information on each inmate including crimil1al
rccords, life hi!.1ories, history of conduct while in custody.. medical hisloties, gang affiliations,
psychological background, edllcatiol'ltlJ level and/or vocational skills. A medical unit is available
to those inmates in need of medical, menta.l health and substance abuse trea.tment.
GenC::l'all)', RC hUl1ates are cOl1sidered to be medium to higlJ secl11'ity inmates. MallY of the new
arrIvals hav~ special classification needs. In additio11 to the difficulties associated with avoiding
conflicts of h()usmg rival gang members, staff Jnl.11\l also separate inmates because they have

,.. • .Ll:.I

"dropped out" from some pX"evious gang affiliation and are now targets for assaults. Gang
dropouts) inmates requiring special housing because of the high profIle nature of their crimes)
and inmates who received threats fr0111 other inmates are classified as Sensitive Needs Yard
(SNY) ilunates and are housed in two cell blocks withul the reception cel1ter awaiting transfer to
a facility with desigililtecl SNY housing.

Mental health issues further complicate the classification and housing process. E11hallced
Outpatient Program (BOP) inmates and Clinical Care Case Management System (CCCMS)
im-nates have been identified as having varying levels of mel1tal health needs which dela.ys the
reception center processing time until there is an available bed at an appropriate institution,
The transformation from a vocational trailling facility to a reception center has reduced the
number of mainline inmates to a point where most of the vocational programs have been
terminated. Prison Industry AUthOl·lty continues to employ about 125 inmates and the MSF
inmates are utilized for general maintenance, operation of the dairy farm and the Fire House.
About 50 inmates are panicipating in educational programs such as the Correctional Leaming
Network (to teach life skills). GED, High School Diploma (through the Tracy School District»)
and the College Program (on-line). The educational staff also works with nearly 2000 inmates in
the Bridging Education Program. a program available to eligible iLUl1ates in the RC that includes
30 minl.lt=s of cell-front instruction by the programmer and 6.5 hours of in-cell study.
DVI has been selected for implementation of a pilot program developed in response to a recent
court case ruling that prohibits blanket segregations by race in CDCR institutions. The
integration program is lImIted to the RC lind is in the initial development stages) but will
ultimately include the mainline inmates. No 1IIlplementation date has been established at the time
of this writing.
DVI is the illmate transportation hub for Northern Cnlifornia.. Teams of officers, based at DVI,
move imnatcs between institutiollS thruughOl.lt California Several times every w~ek, when
moving inmates between northern and southern CalifOluia institutions, crews must layover for
the night at DVJ before continuing on their route. Each busload of as many as 38 aunates must
be process~ housed md cared for by custody staff until the following day.

l1'le processing of 500 il1c01ning inmates each weelc requires that staff release or transfer an
equal nUll1ber of ilunates to make beds available. Imllates may be released from custody at DVI
but more often they are transferred to another institution. The Receiving and Releasing (R&R)
process occurs primarily during the weekdays and th~ frequent movement requires staff to be
conlltantly vigilant in completing their duties.
Populatioll Summar1'
The total institution hed COUIl1 is 4073 (AtUichment C). all the first day of the evalua.tion, the
inmate CO'Ullt wa.'i 3,&27, with ~.6()(' within the secure perimeter and another 22J inmates at the
minimum-security !lUppOrl !>ervices arc:=a To accommodate the pOplllaticm) the inmitution has
added 960 emergency b~dc; (E-bed~). E-htlcls art tcnlpOrUI'Y bed1i that have heen placed in
huilding dayrooms) walkways Emcl the gymnasium. Currently, 432 imna1.es ~\re hmlsed in the

. . . . . . . . . . , ... , , , ..1 __ "

,._ •••• , '''''''"''U'~

t" • .L.L

gymnasium including 300 Lavel I-TI iJunates housed in one area aud 132 overflow RC inmates
housed separately in the bifurcated synma.c;ium.
Sblffing

On September 25, 2005. the initial day of the evaluation, the. fi.111ded staffing was established at
763.64 clls10dy penonnel, which includes the ranks of CCJI1"ectionw Officer tbJ:ough Wardell.
Thllt nwnbcr includes 87.64 vacant positions. The below listing reflects the ranges of custody
c1assifications

• Managerial Custody !daff at DVI consists of the Warden, Chief Deputy 'Warden, 3
Associate Wardens alld 4 Captains,
• Supervisor)' custody staff consists of Conectional Lietltcll811ts, CorrectiollaJ Counselor
Ils (CC II), CoITcctional Sergeants and Senior Medical Technical Assistants (SMTA).
• Rank and file custod)" staff consist of Con'eetional Officers, Medical Technical Assistants
(MTA) and Correctional Counselors I (CC 1). Of the 504 CorrectionaJ Officers cUl'l'ently
assigned to DVI, 40 are part~time intennittent (PIE) Correctional Officers.

TIlere are 403.41 allocated 1l011~custody positions with 43.91 vacancies. Additlonally, 15
were off 011 1011g term leaves (over 3 months) as were seven nOli-custody
employees.
custody employees

See Table 1below fOT a sunm1EUj' of positions. vacancies. long-term leave

lU1.d

staff availability.

Table I
Allocated
Positions
Custody Staff
76364
Non-Custody Staff 403.41
Tota!
1167.05

Vacancies

Lon~-term

87.64

15
7

Leave Available Staff
661
352.5

22

1013.5

43.91
131.55

Finding: Shiflreplacen'lent of custody po:dtions may be a contributing factor to staff assaults.
Discussion: The institutioll has a 13.4% vacancy rate among the custody line staff. Shlft
replacement must be fo\md to replace vacant officer positions, officers off on long term leave
(over 3 months for the pllrpo~c of this review). officers absent 10 attend training and officers off
on a ShOli term basis for all other types of leaves. As a result, the number of 'Volunteers is
insufficient to fill the required posts and (>fficers must he ordered to worl< overtime. The records
leviewed. by the team reflecl that an av~rage of 30 officers must be ordered to work overtime
eacll clay, ofteJl after working their assigned 8~h()tTr shift. OiIicers working shift replacement
()verul1le may be tired, preoccupied 01' performing al les!l than their f1.11J potel)tial because they
are workblg assignments in which they .we ullfamiliar. The team was llnable to c0111i1'm if staff
iIlil.1I'ies occurred at 8 highel' f,.eq u.cnc)' during o·vc1i.imt: shtfts than eluting regulur shifts.

Finding: Administrative staff responsible for the Prison Industry Authority facilities reported a
need for additional relief staff 1.0 provide supervision of inmate workers.
Disc.ussion: Seven staff are elm-entl)' assigned to provide instruction and supervision to inmates
within the five shops that complise Pl'iSOll Industry Authority operations at DVI. Two of these
staff fu,nction "as n1aintena11ce staff and provjde coverage within the shops When one of the
regularly assigned staff is not on duty. 011 average, two of the seven staff are not on duty each
day of the week. As a result, equipment &nd building maintena.nce is not o~currillg.
Additionally, the Prison Industry Authority administrator reported that he is often called upon to
provide supervision of imnate workers within the shop areas due to an inadequate number of
availabJe staff. The institution is encouraged to examine the staffmg level of the Prison Industry
Authority.

,.. • .1,)

1.N 1 WHKUl:.N·::> UI'" r- ll,..t:.

REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION
The DataJDoclunclllation Review Team reviewed available documentation. records and policy
manuals 10 identify Ilny trend/; or common then".les ronan£! the incidents. The items reviewed
included:

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•
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Incident reports for !'laff assaults Or attempted assaults (CDC 837).
Staff Al,saul\ Review CommitLt:e Minutes.
State CompClISation Reports (SelF) lor assaults 011 staff.
Inmate appeal\; (602).
Inventories of authorized safety equipment
Use of Force Executive Review COJ1U1'littec (ERC) findings.
Facllity training records
Corrective ac!ion plans fi'om previolls audits and inspections.
Employee safety grievances.
Daily chronological/watch commander's report.
I11Voluntar)' overtime by inverse seniority records
Staffing infonnauon.
Classificntionrecords.
Inmate files.
Department Operations Manual (DaM) - Relevant sections only.
Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) - Relevant sections only.

Staff Assault Incident Reports
Finding: After a collective review and discussio11 of the above listed documents. there were no
obvious trends identified relative Lo the issue of staff battery. Other thall inma.te classification
(see discussion below)~ no issues were identified as being significantly consistent among the
various incidents.

Discussion: Sixty-nine incidents of battery or attempted battery on staffwere repolted during the
time period, .Jamuuy 1.2004 through May l~ 2005 at DVl. The institution reports that 78 staff
members were victim! of batlery or were injured during incidents:

• Seventy-two victims were from the ranks of COlTectiollal officers and two were con-ectiona)
lieutenants. The l'mlail1ing victilnb included two MTAs. one CC I and One: physician.
• Sh.1. :y-two of the victims were male and 16 were female
• Porty-four ofthe victims wert:: white. 6 wt:r~ black. 19 werE! hispanic, aud 9 were reported as
Other.
Finding: With thl! exception of age. the victim demographics nre generally consisten1 with th(lse
of the overall institution. Younger officers werc involved in El higher incidence of staff aSliau)ts.

DiscU8siun: The average age of the victilns wa~ approximately 35 years with 7.7 years of seJ"vice
while the average age of all staff is 45 with 9.9 )/ears of seJ·vioe. Thil'ty-thtee victims had less

t

• .&."

than 4 years of experience while 13 victims had 15 or more years of experience. Management
expressed concern with no longer b~ing able to assign new staff to work with more veteran staff
as a part of the training process snd to baliUlce the experience levels on each shift. Post and bid
rules have prohibited such reassignment of staff
Finding: Race, age and county of commitment of the involved inmates do not appear to be
significant assault factors.

Disc'Ussion: No significant vilriances were noted when comparing the race, age or COUllty of
commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. White
lnmates were involved in 2B incidents; black mmates were involved in 25 incidents; Hispanic
inmates were involved in 17 incidents; and the l'emainil"lg 7 were dispersed among the other

races.
The inmates had been committed fi'om 19 counties with none being unusually represented.
Commitments from Sa::ramento and San Joaquin counties had the highest frequency with 15 and
13 inmates respectively Some counties initiall)' appeared to be underrepresented; however,
many were taking their prison commitments to San Quentin State Prison during lite reporting
period. San Quentin reduced the number of intakes they will accept resulting in an increase in
intakes at DVI.
The average age of the involved inmates was 33. not significantly different from the prison
population's average age of almost 36, and they had been incarcerated for an average of] 152
days, including 122 days at DVI.

Finding: The vast m~iority of the staff assaults did not result in seriO\1S injury to the victim staff
member or to other personnel involved in the emergency response.
Discussion: In the reports reviewed, no serious injuries' were initially reported by L~e victims
and few required medical attention followins th~ initial treatment at the institution's infirmary. In
aU but nine incidel~ts, no staff workdays were lost. Six of the 69 incidents reviewed resulted in
.staff being off work for over one day. 111 the most serious case, no serious injuries were initially
reported; howeve1'. one staff member has been off duty for over 168 days as a result of injuries
and has not returned to work. The Return to Work Coordinator added that only three instances
of staff' being injured during emergency respollses had occutJ'ed during 2005.
Finding: Accidental injuries are ltot a frequent oCcurrence.
Discussion: The evaluation team review~d staff injury reports for the period from JiUlUWY 2004
through May 2005. The evaluation team noted that staff iJljuries occurring as a result of
responding to emergel1CY ~tlarln!l Ul'e significllntly le!lS at DVJ (tlu'ce injuries from January I,
2005 to present) when compared 10 other in~titulicms. The living areas and support facilities at
DVI are all acces~ihJc hy c:ol1necting indo'l)' cCI1·ric!ol's that spun north to south and east to west.
I A Hcrioull injury L~ c1cnllod by Tille IS, SCCliOll 3()(J() III; a sel'ioll~ impllirmcllIlll' flhYlIicl\1 cllIItlilion. inc.:ludlo/:. I)UI oolli\liIlr.:c1 10.
Ihr.: lilllllWillll: 1"11~ llrr.:unllr.:ioustltlss; (;1I11Cus~it'n; hUllc li'uU!lIrU; prlltnn:llld hl/l:; ur ill1l1l1inncnl uf(ullctinn IIfuny hlltilly mcnlhcr
UI nr!lnn: II wound l-crillirulg S1lulring; and c1il:li~lIre:nll:lIl.

,... J.:>

The corridors allow for L\Il<lbstrut:ted emergency response because of the concrete floors ilia1 are
smooth al1d void of Ully il1"l:'gularities such as potlwles lIr uneven surfaces, DVl has also ma1'ked
the center of the corridurs with an ol'il11ge lane designated for respol1ding st.&fI' during
emergeJ1cj~s, nOlHesponding s1aff and inmates step to th~ side allowing responding staff clear
passage,
Jfindillg: Timely documentfLtio11 of reviews for incidents of accident/injury of custody staff
l1e~ds to

occur,

Dil;CllSoIiioll: Reviews following accidental injuries are not beillg conducted for custody staff.
The Safety Officer conducts accident and iqjury reviews of il1cidellts involving non-peace of"ficel'
staff but was unaware of any follow-up being completed for custody staff. The Safety Officer
said the il~lJry package, including th~ form IIPP-5 that is used to repol1. the findings of the
review, wa.o; not b~ing completed for all injuries of custody staff and he does no1 follow up to
ensure that i1 is completed by the injured employee's supervisor. The Safety Officer said be is
not lnade aware of staff assault injuries and confines his actions to accidental injuries in the
workplace. TIle facts surrounding specific injury cases and staff assault cases are not discussed
at the safety meetings. The review team suggests that oue person be designated to oversee the
.required review pl'OceSS, maintain the appropriate documentation) and share Bl1y lessons lea."I1cd
with the appropria.te personnel. .'

Finding: llmlates with high security classifications 01' serious mental health issues are more
likely to commit assaults on staff. Length of stay fOT these inmates :nay also be an influCDCing
factor.
Discussion: All but one of the 69 incidents involved inmates still classIfied as being in RC,
Thirty-three of the incidents involved inmates with high security classifications or serious menta]
health issues. Twenty-one of the incidents occurred ill the admhristrativc segregatioll units, Ten
of the incidents occurred in the medical/mental health treatment area
Six of the incidents lllVolved Enhanced Outpatient Program (EOP) inmates. BOP inmates, while
ienerally descrjbed as mentnl health patients because of their diagnosis, require a significantly
higher level of clinical care than do other mentally ill ilUl'lates. Twenty-three of the incidents

involved Clinical Cal'e Case Management System (CCCMS) inma1es wllo are also diagnosed
with mental illness but n01 requiring the heightened level of care of EOP inmates.
As previousl)' stated, CCCMS and EOP i.nmates are more difficult to place w the CDeR system
because of limjted the bed spaCE: available to those classIfications, As £l result, the proccRsing

time in RC is often extended pelst the SlO-da)' period that CDCR uses as a benclunal'k for their
recc:pOoD centers. Of the 16 inmates invoh'ed in staff assaLllt tha1 were designated as being
CCCMS, 6 had been at DVJ longer them 90 days and the b'l'Ol:JP average was] 26 da)'s. Ofthc: 4
EOP inmates, 3 had been at DVJ longer thut 90 da)'s tl11d the grCll.l)) average was 24J d2IYS.
Finding: bWllte mal1ufac.1ured weapons were 110t factors in assaults on staff.

r' • .1.0

Discussion: Inmate manufactured weapons were not involved in BUy of the incidents reviewed.
Inmates threw or attempted to throw an unknown liquid substance on staffUl 1S of the incidents.
In the remainder of the cases reviewed, inmates battered or a.ttempted to batter staff by striking,
kicking or otherwise unlawfully touching with their hands and or their feet. Doors or gates were
used as weapons in three incidents and a food tray in another.
Finding: Insufficient data were available to determine if gang affiliation was a contributing
factor related to staff assauJts.
Discussion: In the reports reviewed, only seven documented that the involved inmate was a gang
member al1d no single gang was identified in a significant nUInber of incidents. The majority of
inmates 1tlvolved were RC inmates and their gang involvement, if any, had not yet been
validated at the institution.
Finding: Hours of:the day and months ofthe year may be factors in assaults on staff.
Discussion: The frequency of incidents was highest during the third watch with 36 occurrences;
second watch had 32 incidents while only one occulTed duri11g first watch. The probability of
being the victim of a staff assault may be higher during third watch because the number of
available staff IS significantly less than that of the second wa.tch. Although the data were
insufficient to draw any conclusions, the frequency of incidents was highest'during the month of
December in 2004 with 8 assaults and lowest ill August 2004 with only one incident. Tne
frequency of occurrences was evenly distributed among the days Dfthe week.

Training
Finding: Documentation received by the evaluation team confirmed that custody staff, non
custody staff, and all new employees at DVJ are receiving mandated training in addition to all
other required departmental and site specific training.
Dis~ussion: The In-Service Training (IST) manager receives a list of requir:d formal training
topics from the Office of Training and Professional Development (OTPD), CDCR headquarters.
The trailllng topics identified by the OTPD are specific to employee job classifications at the
institution. The IST mana.ger provided documentation of mandated training and institutional
orientatioll training faT bnth cudody and non-custody staff. Mandated training topics are
specified by the Califomia Penal Code, Califonlia Code of Regulations • Title ] 5. and the
Departmental Opera.tions Manual (DOM). The il'1stitutiol'l nlay add training that would be
considered site-specific. Depel'ldillg on the institution's mission and construction, site-!o>-pecific
training topics are determined by the trainil1g manager and subject to fmal approval by the
Warden. The follOWing are the trainiIlg requirements for the various employee classifications.

•

CUJ:ltody employees lip III the runl( of correctional li cmlenant are receiving 40 hours of
required annual training in addition 10 12 hours of on the job traini11B (OJD via module
segments. Mamlgemt:ml clussifica1illlls (C~lr1ain lluough Warden) receive mandatory
annual training d'lring AdministrJtive.: Officc:r of lht: OilY (AOD) train.ing.

'1\

r.J.(

• Non-custody employees are receiving J0 hours of fc.nmal classroom training annually in
addition to 32 hours of OIT module s~gll1en1S.

•

Ol'ientation traiI'liJlg is ])l'ovidcd 1.0 all custody and l'lOn-Cl.lst.ody CDCR staff 'Upon their
assignment Lo the institution, n:gardless of their experience level or previous assigrune.l'1ts.
The orientation training includes 40 hours of classroom instruction specific 10
departmental requhements and institutional needs.

In addition to the Rbove annual u·ail'J.ing req'llirCmentli. each employee may attend or request.
additional training {i'om the 1ST department Monthly training bulletins are available 10 each
employee and provide a schedule of all upcommg monthly Lraining classes and/or OJT modules.
Each emplo)rce s training year begills on his/her birthday nl.ther thElIl on a calendar or fiscal year
cycle. A training Sl.Unnulry is generated during the last quarler of each employee's al'l1'lUal
trainmg cycle listing all successfully completed training classes as well as a list of any required
courses yet to De completed. The employee and the supervisor have an opportunity to schedule
any lleeded classes before the cycle el'lds. The training files reviewed contained dOCW11entation
that regular, ongoing trainillg was beu'lg pClformed. The training manager reported that all
employees, with the exception of those on extellded leave) were complial1t with the training
mandates.
I

Finding: No special training is provided to staff members who act as training officers for
pwposes of orientation trailung.
Discussion: Supervisors and managers interviewed said the orientation provided to new
employees is limited to the 40-hour orientatiol1 process. No specialized tl-aining officers are
utilized for the traiIJing/orientation. Sup::rvisors and managers inten'Jewed sald the officers
pelforming orientation traullng are determined by the post allQ bid process rather than a formal
st:lectiol1 process. In the Pa!lt~ trail1hlg officers were sclected based on the m.anager's personal
assessment of the staff selecit::d to provide the orienta.tion. The officer bidding to that assignment
DOW trains Dew staff. No formal proct::ss is used to recruit and select train.ers. No special1.Taining
is provided to S1aff members who act as training officers.
Finding: No formal training program is in place to' provide "field trail1ing" to newly appointed
peace officers. The team sLlggestq. tIle CDCR Adtd1 Division consider developing a fomlalized
institutional trailljng pTt1gram for new recruits and a11 abbreviated program fol' newly trallsferr~d
officers.

.

~

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DisCIlssion: All deputy sheriffs, police officers and the
of locaJ juvenile and nclull
correctional officers are requireclto complete a formal training program under the clirectioll of 11
specially selected and trained ofiicer. The program is desi1:.rn~d to ensure tbe tra.il'lee U:; exposed
tel most situations that would be routinely encountered during the ussigmnellt and instructed em
the expected performance. The b'aining program ellsures the employee: performs whhill the
applicable law, the depaJtmellt's policy and in a safe lnaIlller. Tht training officer ob~erves the
employee's pel"fol'mance at regular illt~rvals, dOC,"UlleI315 the progress, and provides any

necessary remedial instruction. The trainee must demonstrate competence before being allowed
to function alone in the position.
Finding: The review team was unable to fInd documentation of institutional orientation training
being provided to contract employees who provide short-term services 0.1 the institution.

Discussion: In order to maintain a sufficient number of staff to provide mandated services.
temporary vacancies arc: filled with temporary workers sent to the institution by contract
employment services. Examples include replacement health care workers such as registry nurses
and physicians. Building and maintenance contractors perfoIDling repall' or construction work
would also be included in this category. These employees may only worle one day at the
institution or they may worle for a few days. They are not state employees. Even though the
responsibility for orientation training may reside with the employment service., the In-Service
Training (lSI) manager 8l1d the Warden recognized the information may better be delivered by
CDCR staff We discussed some options such as using a checklist generated by institution staff
or tl short video and acknowlf:dgment pl'oduced by CDCR to ensure that a basic standardized
orientation is provided in a consistent manner to all COl1.traet employees. At the exit conference
the evaluation team W/JS advised that a checklist had been developed and implemented as a result
of this finding.

Safetv Equipment
Finding: The CDCR requires that the institution provide identified custody staff with specific
personal safety equipment. The institution is required to provide personally fitted stab-resistant
vests to specific employees. DVI is compliant in issuing equipment as specified in policy.
.

.

Discussion: The soft body armOr stab-resistant vest inventory records were reviewed. The
armory sergeant informed the review team that all custody staff have been fitted and issued
personal stab-resista.nt safety vests. All new custody staff are immediately fitted for a vest and
issued .l1 temporary vest during the intcl1m.
Finding: The Medical Technical Assistants (MTA) and Correctional Counselors (CC) who are
custody staff, are not fined and issued stab-resistant vests.
Discussion: The soft body anllor stab-resistant vest inventory records were reviewed and it was
noted that the MTAs and CCs who are custody staff are not issued vests. Vests are available for
these officers to lise when they plan to go into an area of sigl1ificant rislC; however, they are not
routinely worn in their normal assignments.
While these clas&ificatitJnS a.re not first r~sponders to alarn"l..~, they cOLdd be pl'eSellt or in the
immediate vicinity when emergency response i!i needed. Absent a policy dir~ctjon for the
distribution of vests (and the classification of tmpJoyee desigllaled to receive vests), the team
suggests that (~011sjderali(Jn he given tel inclUding the MTA anc! CC classificati()n~ among the
staff to he issued vc:!>1S. Alternatively, institution administra1.or~ musl en.. . ure that there is a pool
of clean, serviceable v~stl\ made ~\"ailabJe Jill" (hes~. ~mpJoy~es.

; • .L:>

Finding: Officers transfel1'ing to other ill!~titutiOllS arc not permitted to keep their vests.
Discussion: TIle soft body annal' sta.b-resistant vests arc issued to staff dependi11g on their
facility speci:ficassigmncnt. With the e"ceptiol1 of transfers to Kern VallC)1 Sta.te Prison, officers
tr~nsferring or promllung to 01l1e:J' CDCR il1!:titutions must surrellder their personally fined -vests
before leaving. TIle team suggested allowing the officer to COl1til1ue to use their issued 'Vest and
purchase 1l n~w ves( for the replacemel1t staff person if n~~ded.· This would allow ofticers to
retain the vests for whicll they were fitted and provide neW, fitted vests to new officers.
.Finding: The institutional armory and sub-armory used for the storage and ready dispersal of
lethal weapons, less lethal weapons. ll'lUnitio11s and related emergenc), equipment are maintained
in proper and secure order.
Discussion: The evEJ.:1uation team toured the armory and sub Sr1110l'Y. and examined
documentatioll pertaining to required inventol'y and l1laintel1al'lC~e of lethal weapons, less lethal
weapons) munitions, and all emergency equipment.

The institution IS main armoJy consists of a freest~Ulding concrete building Ioca.ted outside of the
institution's sec'W'e perimeter and is enclosed with a chain link fence topped with ruzor wire.

The annOlJl is under COllstant observation (2417) by an armed staff assigned to a tower adj acent
to the armory structure. Access to the armory is restricted to specific authorized perSOillleI or
personnel authorized by the watch cODllnander during extreme emergencies. The tower officer
has direct control of mnory access.

The institution's sUb-annol)' is mail1tained inside of the central control room which is contained
in ~ secured armed looation within the instituti011's secured perimeter. The sub~armory maintains
lethal weapOlls, less lethal weapons, munitions and emergency equipme11t.
During the tour of the amlory and sub armor)'. the evaluation team noted that appropliate entry
and exit log books were in place and ~vall.latioD tewn Inembers were l'eCJuit'ed to sign in and out.
Alll'equirecl inventory controls al1d doctummtation was founc1 to be appropriate and current,

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PHYSICAL PLANT
The facility is constructed in a linear fashion. An intake area, 12 cellblooks, educational areas
and a library are primary features situated along a central corridor exteDding east and west that is
over v..-rnile long. Intersecting this corridor approximately midway is another corridor provIding
access to the four dining halls, three chapels. the gymnasium. and Prison Industry Authority

shops.

.

The cellblocks have similar designs. The cells are situated across from one another, three stories
high, along a wide central corridor that extends the length of the block. The administrative
segregation cells have an exterior corridor. A typical cell contains two bun1cs, e. toilet and
washbasin. The dayrooms in several wings have been cOlwerted to a dormitory on the lower
floor.
Persistent crowding has lead to conversion of program space into dormitories and the bifurcation
of the large gymnasium into two large donllitories, TIlcse dormitories contain single, double and
triple bunk configllrati()lls. Bathrc)om and shower facilities are located within each dormitory,
Intake and release functions occur at the far west end of the main corridor. Vocational shops are
located a1 the far east end and tbe Prison Industry Authority ~hops are located at the northeast
end of the shorter corridor across from the gymnasium.
.

j

01.1tside recreation occurs in a large exercise yard located within the secure perimeter in the
northwest portion of the facility. "Three small outside exercise yards are provided. One is
located between the East and West Hall and is utilized by inmates with Protective Cuslody
classifications. The others are located 11eh1 to the K Wing and J Wing. Inmates on
administrative segregation utilize these yards.
An iniimlary is located a!011g the maill COITidol' and provides health care: services to the irunates.
Additionally, four Outpatient Housing, Ul1il (OHU) rooms are located within the innnnary. Two
of these OHU cl:lls are padded.
Finding; Within the receiving/intake area, an inadequate amount of space is available for
processing up w 500 intakes received each week.

Discussion: The recejYing/inUlke area was originally designed to process 25 inmates a week.
Since DVI transitioned from a vocational institution 10 a reception center. records indicate that
the number of new illtakes has increased to approximately 500 ilUnates per week. TIle drc1I11atic
il1cl'eaSl:: in intakes in the relatively small iIltalce area bas hhldered custody staffs' ability to safely
performing the necessary functions of escorting, searching and pl'(Jcessing new intakes.
Finding: The facility is crowded. As a result. 960 emergency-heds are utilizec1 thr()tlghout the
in:;titutiol1. "n,il: WHS flcc()mpli~ht:d h)' J1lm~il1~~ drll.1blc; hunks in thf: .h~\) IWHy!; of lhe housing lmilc;
(known as broadwily heds), cOl1vct'lh'lg illllHlte progl'<Im Nr'.lCeli illto (10Tn'litOl'i<::1-: and converting
the: entire £yn1l1aliium intCl inmate housing tll'Cus.

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I.'.i,

DiSCWisilln: Emel-gency-bcds (broadway) obl\erved within the open central corridors of the
cellblocks pose a significal1t .risk to officer sufety due to poor visibility created by the height of
the double bunks. Additiomu)y. inmate persona) items hanging from b~ds obstruct visual

observation of the IJU11at~s.

The gymnasium was bifumaled several years ago as Cl means of creati11S living spaces to
temporm'jly alleviate cTowcling. As a result, the gymnasium is no lon.ger avallable for its
intended use. The large inmate popula.tion taxes the remaining outside exerCise areas and, in
turn, limits the amount of yard tune available to inmates, especially during inclement weather.
TIle gymnasium was not intended to be used for housing inmates and mcas\.lTes need to be taken
to return this space 10 its intended use.
Finding: The evaluation team encourages the Diyision of Adult Institutions to consider utilizing
a facility Witll a modern podular design as the regional reception center.

Discussion: This facility was origi.nally designed as a vocational institution, which it
successfully operated at; for many years. Currently, the mission of this institution has changed to
that of a reception center for Northern California which is ill-served by the design. The staff has
accepted this change and has made the best of the shortcomings and limitations the facility
design has presentedDVl is better suited as a vocational center and its desig.v. does not lend itself
to being a reception center.

Finding: The constant non-stop program movement of imnates in a l'telephone pole" design
. institution creates opportunities for inmates to attack each other or staff
Discussion: Statisti;s support that there is a greater frequency of staff assaults in the west
corridor. The east/west con'idol' is approxilnate]y l,I.-mile in length, and the houSll1g willgS
branch off of the west corridor. Due to program requirements, thel'e is constant movement of RC
inmates from their housing wings alOl'lg the west corridor, and inmates use this opportunity to
a.ttack their enemies, Staff has suffered various illiuries from inte1'ceding to prevent i~iuries to

inmates.
Finding: Security cam~ras are cun'ent}y located in several locations, including emp}o)'ee
elltrances to the institutioll and in the Z and Y dorms. PlA llhclP areas and ·01") the J alld K Wing
exercise yards. Adding cameras in uther locations may tmhant.:e safety and security.

Discussion: The illstitutiol1 ~ho\lld cOllsider placement of security cameras ill strategic areRS of
the cellblock.q and other areas of the instit'lltioll. Additionally, these can1eras ShOl.lld provide a
di git11J recording. 'nlcse systems have ShOWll to he usefllJ ill supplementing staff !il1p~rvisiol1 of
ilUl1ates and can be used to exonerate staif wrong))' uccusecl of misccmd\lct and provide evjdenctl
in incidt:nts of inmate misconduct. A needs assessment for camera placement is recommended
being mindful of the added responsihility to cOI1troJ rOOlD staff for mcmitorin'=t additional
cameras.

r ."

Finding: The placement of convex mirrors within the law library would allow staff to provide
better inmate supervision. Ubfary indicated that they were unable to view around comers into
blind spots.
Discussion: The evaluation team observed several blind spots within the library where the
placement of a convex nlm-or would improve supervision and aid staff. The evaluation team
encourages plant opera.tion and DVI administrative staff to consider the placement of mirrors in
the law library.
Finding: Clergy staff were unaware of emergency procedures or their responsibilities during an
emergency. Additionally, office equipment located witllin the chapel areas has not been
regularly inventoried.

Discussion: Updated post orders that address emergency procedures for the clergy staff are
needed. Imnatc workers were observed inside one chapel area utilizing a double edge ruor
blade as a means to open boxes. These blades were not on specific inventories and the clergy
staff were not able to account for the nu.111bf:r of razor blades to which the inmate worl<ers had
access. Appropriate tools and office eqUlpment need to be identified, as does a means of
inventorying the tools and equipment utilized in the chapels.
Finding: There are a number of maintenance and/or capital improvement issues (identified
below) in need of attention in order to improve staff safety.

Discussion: Many of the projects have been identified by DVI management as needmg repair
and in many instances, funds have been identified to corre~t the problems. However, the
evaluation team encourages DVI management to ensure that the following issues are addressed:

•

The asphalt surface areas of the outside exercise areas located between East and West

Halls and the K Wing are in need of repair. Large chunl,s of loose asphalt and rocks
accessible to the inmates were obl;erved within these exercise yards. The loose materia}
can be used as weapons and the subsequent potholes create a trip hazard for staff
responding to incident... Institution administratc>r!i have secured ful1dil1g to resu:face
the-Cle areas. Ensuring that the necessary repairs to these elJ..ercise yards are completed is
encouraged.
~~'
The railing along the stairway leading up to the X~g is low. The low railing height
presents a risk to offiters and iluuatcs. The department should C011Sidcl' raising the height
of the stair rail along this stairway.
Orle of the window franles in the stairwell leading to L3 protrudes into the stairwell when
opened. These window~ are opened during the summer months as a means of providing
ventilation to the stairwell. Because of the low height of this window, staff is at risk of
striking the window l'rame. Consideration sh()uld he given to restricting the distance the
window can be opel1ed into this ,c;tairway, or preventing the window from opening at all.
SOIllE: of the individual swntlttp holding I.llnk.~ 1(I(~ate::d in the release llnd I"eceiving area
and in the K Wing al'e J1()t eqllipp(:c! with Plexigll:ls shields l() prevent inmates from
spitting at passing inmates 01' staff. The c1e:parlmcnt is encouraged to phlce Plexiglas
shielde; on all individual ;;uJndup hoI dint; umks.

•
•

•

, • ...... _

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•

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Staff and inmates reported the drinklllg water. at the facility had a bad taste) odor and
color. Planl operation s'laff reported the fi:1cility water is safe for drinking, but fails to
meet a "~econda]'y" water quality standurd (unenforceable) due to the taste and smell.
Elevated levels of manganese in the drinking wa~er ure responsible for the pOOl' water
quality. Plant Operations staff sald repairs to the water supply system are In the works.
The institution is el1couraged to expedite thtsc: repairs.
• The DVI Fire Departmem fire truck holding tfll~ has a significant water leak. Staff
l'eporl.S the trLlck must he refilled several times per dCl)'. Records indicate the DVI Fire
Department responded to 160 fires last year and 130 this calen:lar year. The department
is encou1'aged to make the necessary repairs the fire truck.
• The kitchen is ill desperate need of rcpau' and refurbishment. Much of the cast iron has
deteriorated, large portions of the fluor tiles are broken 01' missing, paill1 is peeling and
electrical conduits are 1i1sted exposing electrical wiTt~s. Evaluation team members
observed a rodent
roaches ilJ food preparation ~lrt:as during 1he tour of this area, An
environmental health evaluatio11 is needed.to access the eX1.en1 ofrep81l"s.
• Fh'e Department staff report.cd the fire suppression sprinkler system in the Prison Industry
A'.lthority portion of the facility has obstructions in the pipe (resulting in low water flow)
and is in need of repair. Due to the age and fUl'lction of this po:rtion of this facility I it is
essentIal thal the fire suppression system is fully functional. The department is
encouraged to ensure the fire suppression system is in proper woddng order.
• TIle roof at tbe staff living quarters at the DVI Fire Department appears to leak. Water
damage is evident in the ceiling Blld walls. TIle department is encomaged to obtain an
environmental health evaluation and malce necessary repairs to the roof of this area
•

and

Finding~ The fire ex.it in the Muslim Chapel, as idel1tified on the posted emergency £ire
map, is blocked by several items of fLlrniture.

eXlt

Discussion: The inslimtion is encouraged to keep all identified fzre exits. clear.

Finding: Eyaluatioll staff 110t60 a large amount of combustible material in the staff areas and in
inmate sleeping areas.
Discussion: This fatility was constructed during II time when ~D1olce detectioll equipment and
:fire suppression systems were not required. The institution is encouraged to enforCE: polic)' and
procedures, in conjunction with the fire authority, that identify and limit the amount of
combustible material in staff and inmate areas.

STAFF INTERVIEWS

Interview Process

The Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted rlmdom interviews with custody and non-custody
staff at Deuel Vocational Institution (DVI) from Monday, September 26 through Friday,
September 30. 2005. Members of the evaluation team interviewed staff about safety related
issues (e.g., safety equipmeI'lt issued to staff and their perception of personal safety at the
instItution). TIle list of specific questions asked by the lllterview team is included as Attachment
D.

The team conducted ra.ndom interviews with DVJ staff during the first, second, and third watches
at the following work locations: receiving and release, reception center medical and mental
health clinics, l'eccption center records, West and East halls, C, D, E, F, G, H, J, K, L Wings, X,
Y, Z dorms, canteen, chapels, education building, infirmary, ldtchens, the minimum facility, and
inmate visiting. Custody staff classifications interviewed included: the associate wardens,
correctional and facility captains, HeutenBnts, sergeants. correctional officers, medical technician
assistant, correctional counselors I, II, 1Il, and the fire chief. Reception Center classifications
included: senior psychologists and psychologists. Non-custody staff classifications included: the
medical physician, dentists, psychiatrists, healthcare manager, registered nurses, licensed
vocational nurse, laboratory manager, pharmacy technician, associate governmental program
analyst, office technician,' office assistant, correctional food manager, records manager.
supervisor of records, case record specialists, canteen manager. chaplains. librarians, teachers,
and plant operations perS011nel.
For purposes of this report, the interview team is highlighting staff safety perceptions that were
shared by staff during our interviews. Responses are grouped for custody staff and non-custody
staff.
Custodv Staff- Interviews with Managcrli

The i1'lterview tenn met with associate wardens and capt.a:in~. This group of managers has been
assigned to this institution for a minimum of 12 months and have up to 14 years experience as a
manager with CDeR. All of the .managers Imew what safety equipment items are issued to their
staff'. and they informed the interview team that all unifol'med custody staff have been fitted for
and issued a stab-resistant vest.
The managers agreed that DVJ is a safe place for staff to work. However, they added that it is
incumbent for staff to be constantly on guard because inmates housed in reception centers are
kO(lWll to dl;l!)onstrate unpredictable behavior. They said that n'l.al1y of the ilUl".lCltes might have
extensive psychological di~ordet's rcquiri11g psychotrupic medications to contrn! theil' behavior.
Staffsnfct)' j~~ue~ iden1ified by the: managers included th{~ followi1lg:
Finding:

Deuel Vuc4J.liomd Jnstitl.ltie)l1 wmi not designed as

ad~quale reSOUl'ces

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uncilJ~lry rCSOL/n:c.q

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Dilicussinn: The managers said that DVI is receh1ing up to 500 inmates (new commitmell'lS,
diagnostic ~es, parole violators returned to custod)', parole "jolntors with a l"1eW term, and DJJ
failures) per week at the reception center. They said receiving and reception can have as man)'
as 80 il1l11ales ill the intake area a.t one time, and there are 1)Ot a sUfficientntunbeJ' of hoI cling c~lls
to separate inmates peJ.lding housing assignmCJlts. They also said there are insufficient lockup
cells, and new aniving it1l11ates are usually housed ill bunk beds on the llbroadway" of the lockup
cells, or housed in double or triple bunks in makeshif1 dormitories in the gymnasium. Receiving
and release custody staff are held over on a daily basis to prooess the expected and unexpected
arrivals !rOl'l~ count)' jails and parole Rweeps
Finding: Managers said there is a need to provide additional staff training beyond the mandated
1ST topics.
Discussion: Managers believe that staff is ill need of additional training. SpecIfically. they s81d
that some staff members display a complacent attitl\de with the huna.tes, and they are not vigilant
when working around OJ' witb the inmates. TIley said this demeanor becomes more common,
whe11 staff adopt an anitude of "nothing has happened in a while." They said that inexperienced
staff need to develop their communication skills. They are less likely to engage inmates in
conversation to develop them as sources of infol'!UBtiol1, or to develop a sense that something
"isn't right" They also said a training progi'a111 needs to be developed for lateral transfers (e.g.;
staff1ransferred frOD! other institutions) to familiarize them with operational procedures at DVI.
Finding: Inmates held at the RC are transient, pending their transfer to a suitable institution
(e g.; right inmate) right mission. and right prison) and. consequently, exhi~it destructive

behavior.

-

Discussion: The managers said that RC inmates are desttilctive toward c~l1 furnishings, because
the)' know they will b~ transfen·ed to another institution to complete the term of their sentences.
They said that during the 5111nl1'leJ' months, inmates break out their cell windows and throw trash
out the windows. Inmates arc elecu'ical outlets alld will start fires in their cells or outside their
broken cell windows. The lUstitutioll has spent ovel' $40,000 of Its budget to replace the broken
windows. The fire chief said they have responded to over 130 fires 'at the institution since
January of2005. He said mElDY of these fires are a result ofirm'lates tossing lit material outside
their bl'oken cel] windows. Managers said that offel'!ding imna.tes EIre chal'ged with an additional
crime, but this has not altered their b~ha"ior.
'{he warden's office is attempting to mitigate this liability, The warden has received budget
a.pproval for $90,000 to install metal ~creens designed to prohibit the: inmates from breakil'lg out
the ghlss windows and setting fires outside of their cell windows.
Finding: Pos1 and bid prevents managers from fillingpos1s with the best-qualified staff,
Di~cu$sjlJn;

The managers said that "pDst and bid" (El process in which lieuten&nt, sergel:1l1ts and

COs reqLleSl to work aspecific post based em th~jT seniority) l'es1.l1cts mal'lagers' abibt)' to ensure
a high level uf institutionaJ anel stclff safety. :Mallagel'S said tl18t supervisor ]'051 and bid has
limited their abiljt)' to place qualified supervisory staff il'! udministrative positiollS identifil::d for

,..~g

priSOD program facilitation and operation, The
senior.

best~qualificd

individual is

Dot

always

th~

most

Finding: Managers indicated that staffing shorta.ges are cOlltnbuting to an increase in siclc.leave
use for liile staff.
Discussion: The managers said there are over 80 staff vlI.c;ancies at the .institution, and as a
result.. overtime is necessary to staff the required posts. When staff are scheduled for vacations
or call in sick, the on duty shift may be held over (work a double shift), because of operational
necessity, Managers said tJlat since excessive sick leave was eliminated from the Bargaining
Unit 6 contract, the use of sick leave ha.'I; increased. Tney believe that many of th~ st2.ff feel
entitled to use sick leave whenever they don'1 feel like reporting for work They said they would
Wee to sec it changed back, to reduce the abuse of sick leave and to hold employees accountable.
The negative effect of worldng excessive overtime (fatigue, morale issues, ete.) could be
mitigated as well.

Finding: Managers expressed fi'ustration about the inequity in pay resultil1g from compensation
contracts negotiated by the R06 and 806 groups. In addItion, the pay inequity has resulted in
little incentive for qualified staff to assume managerial responsibilities.
Discussion: Due to recent enhancementc: to R06 ,md S06 groups) managers often make less
money than those that they supervise. This not only affec1s managers" morale but also provides
little mccntive for qualified employees to seek "promotions,"

The managers also expressed frustration over their increasing workload and the lack of
compensatory acknowledgement for their efforts. Operational requirements, ongoing audits,
compliance monitoting, and court agreements are contributing EO a constant battle for internal
resources to avoid future litiga.tion. Managers also would like to be involved in determining
budget priorities fol' theiT respective areas al the institution.
Custodyrrreatrnent Stuff· Inten' iews with Supen'l,;ors

The first and second line supervisors (Sergeant, Lieutenan~ Senior MTA, and Correctional
Counselor II - Supervisor) were interview~d at various work locations from Septemb~ 26-29,
2005. Supervisol' concerns mirrored those of managers regurdi.1'lg post and bid and sick leave
abuse. Otllcr issues fll'e listed below.
Finding: Reception Center (RC) inmates are averaging
are transfen°ed to another institution.

mOTC

than 90 days at DVJ

befoT~

they

Discussion: Supervioiors said that inmates are r(lutinely held for more than 90 days at the
reception center dUt: to a lack of bed space !:yncm-wide fUT EOI') SNY, CCCMS, and Level III
and TV ilUl1ates. Adding to this dela)J i!i the current lack of medicul physici~lns (fOlll' vacall1
positions) 10 oonduct required in.mate physicals, unel the diversion of record analysts to assist
wiU, the Valdivia Hearillgs. According l{l thl:l CCs who are r~!ipOl1sible for reviewing chl'Oll()
tiles, there is !l 4 tc) 6 week delay before tl He i1Ul1atc: can be )Oe... iewed for appl'Opri2Lte f,,-al1fifel'.

KenDrl DVI dnllI.do:: 11/301200,';

.,11

Finding: Crowding at DVI incl't;astJs the:: pl'eliSUre 011 staff to pl'Ovide the basic services to the
inmates, As a l'esu1~ supervisory staff indicate that custody staff take Sl101tcutS to complete these
basic acth~ties.

Discussion: Supervisors aclOlowledged that they were aware of COs taldng shol'tcl.lts in order to
accommodate the basic needs of inmates such as showering, exercise yard release, dothing and
linen exchange
't-~
~

HOU~1l1g

1.

'\\i-

l.mils have inmates sleeping in clouble bunks (ll]){ 40 inmates). in the back of the
"iockup wing, 011 the "hroadway" floor (open ar£::b). Whe~l lIll11ates housed in the loclcup cells
require movement for basic needs (e.g., showering, going to yard, feedi.ng, etc.), the inmates on
the broadway floor are reguired to be moved and secLlre:d away :£i'OIll the celled inmates. In many
installceS, the officeIS do D01 have available space or time to isolate the inmates 011 the broadway,
TIlerefore, the :floor officer will go to the back of the W'lit and stand between the inmates who ere
assigned to the broarlwa~' and dle illmates released from their cells. This action by the officers is
nol an attempt to shirk their respollsibilities fOl' keeping the iIU11aies separated~ they are simply
trying to stay 011 track with their daily duties, in an honest, dedicated and professional attempt to
provide each iMlate with their basic services.

Finding: SupelVisors said that custody and non-custody staff would benefit from additional
menta! health training.
Discussion: Supervisors said the cunent training in mental health is generic and outdated. They
all agreed that custody staff as well as non-custody staff would benefit from OIT training in
mentalllealtb tec1u1iq116S when deali11g with CCCMS and EOP hunates,
.eustod}' Stuff - Interviews with Line Staff

The interview team conducted random interviews with line stafffi'om September 26·29.
Finding: Staff reported dlat they felt comf01table and satisfied with the safety equipment that is
issued to them at the institution.
Discussion: All Ib.le staff intervitlwed said the}' feli safe working a1 DVI. LU1e staff on all tlll'ee
watches described the type of safety equipment issued to theni. TIle list iucluded: persol1w
alarms, radios in designated positions, handcl\fi'~, side-handle batcms, stab-:rcsistant vests, !(eys
aJld DC spray. Additjollal1y~ they reported that the equipment could be obtained at the sergeant's
office, conu'ol booths, emergellc)' re~1Jonse stnging at't:as~ or fl'om the JJerSOll being relieved at
sbift chEUlge. All uniformed peae~ officer personnel stated they were fitted for and i"l~ued a stabr
resistallt vest. The)1 added that the)' wear 1heil' vests at ~LlI1in'les while on duty.
Finding: MTA and eel staff repol1.ed they hm1e n01 been fi tied or issued a stab·resistant vest at
DVl.

Discussion: MIAs and eCls do not have stab-resistant vests. issued to them for duty
assignments at DVl. They believe they are performing line staff pea.ce officer functions. and
they should be issued the same safety equipment as CO, Sergeant, and Lieutenants. The MTA
and eeJ staff indicated that said their duties require them to interv.iew or ll1teract with inmates
facc to face. Often, floor staff are too busy with other duties to escort them to see inmates, so
they are left one on one witb inmates TIley feel especially vulnerable when tbey axe isolated
with a. large number of i1lJl1ates at the back of the broadway.
The eel group stated it is their wlderstanding that eer personllcl at other CDCR adult
operations institutions have been fitted and issued stab-resistant vests. The CCI group said that
despite the low frequenCy of inmatc assaults on staff at DVI, issuing a. stab-resistant vest to Cel
staff should be given consideration.

The MTA group reported the only time they wear a stab-resistant vest is when delivering
medications in Ad Seg. (IC Wing). The MTA staff often have contact with inmates at their worst
moments (e.g., inmates acting out because they didn't get theirmedioation), They also said they
do have emergency response involve,mellt, as a second responde1'. They said because they are a
peace officer classification. they should be i."sued stab-resistant vests.
Finding: Crowding is a major safety concern with line staff.

Discussion: CO personnel feel that the bl'oadways should be staffed with one additional officer
(2 CO VS. 1 CO). This is especially necessary during loclcdovm programs with the increased
movement of inmates, separation requirenlents (ethnic/gangs), and obstructed sightlines at the
back of the broadways. Staff would also like to see broadway inmates that are on lockdown
status housed in cells, and nOll-locked down inmates placed in the broadways.
The CC I staff indicated that irunates r~ceived at the reception center with new commitments or
parole revocation irullates with new terms should 110t be housed in the dormitories until their
chrono files a.re reviewed by the CC Is. They believe the Division of Adult !n.l)t.itutions should
develop standardized criteria fol' SNY imnates, It has beel,} an institutional practice to classify
iIl1nates as SNY if they request pl'otection from the general population (e.g" an imnate admits
they he is a gang dropout, and claims he needs protective housing). The increase in the number
of SNYs system-wide has placed limits 011 where an SNY inmate can be housed, and there are a
lilnited number of beds available for this population.
Finding; Line staff expressed a de.c;ire t(1 be better informed of relevant safety issues (e.g" riot at
~Ulother il.'lS1itution).

.

Discussion: Lhle staff said that in the past, safety meetings would occur periodically witl, the
sergeants and lieutel1.at1ts. 'rhe purpose of these meetings was to infornl line staff of safety issl1e~
such as a new method for inmates to smuggle narcotics or weapons into the insiitutiol1. TIley
said they were not informed aboul tht! ri[)t~ a1 Cttlipatria or elM (9/22/05). They Raid they found
out about these incid~t1t~ from h,tt;mel and 1'~ll:IiCl news br()aclca!lts, LillI.: .'llaff wen.tld like Lo see
communications impTClved Ibr Nharing information rCl,{l.Irding. incident!; at other pJ'i~011 sites,
rathel' than beal'illB, the information !Ieccmcl/third hLtnd or r"oln (he inl11Clles.

., ...

Inten'iew8 with Non-Custudy Stuff
The iI\1ervjew team spolce with n011-cus1ody f;1afl' from September 26 - 29 at various werle
locations.

Finding,;: Some s110rHerm contrac1 em]>lrlyees' have not received the mandated CDeR
employee orientation.
Discussion: The revjew temu taUced with several registry nurses, and during the il1terview, it
was evident that they had not received the basic training requirement for orientation. 011£
contract nurse told the interview team thai she was not aware of the Department's "llCl hostage
negotiation" polic)1 As 110ted in the Trail'li..n.g section (1j' this report., measures have been
implemented to remedy this issue.

Findings: During aane-hotU· PCllOd each n.1DrJlil'lg (3 :00 a.m. 104:00 a.ln.) there is nO wliformcd
officer assiglled to supervise 25-30 imnates as filey are preparing breakfast in the kitchen area.
Di~cussion:

Supervising Cooks are assigned to the main kitchens, and they prepare the morning
meal from 3:00 a.m. to 11 :00 a.m. TWe.n1y~five to thirty inmates arc assigned to the kitchen to
help in the preparation of meals.
inmates report for work at 3:00 a.m. when the Cook
Supervisors arrive. Although there is l\ culinary officer assigncd to the Idtchen, this officer does
not report for duty until 4:00 a.m., leaving a olle-l10ur gap of no unifOImed custody supervision
of inmates il~ the Idlebel1 The cooks agreed n,at a full time presence (e.g., 3:00 a.m. to 11 :00
a.m.) ofa unifonncdcustody officer is vitaJ 10 tlle security and safety ofthe Idtehen.

n,e

Finding; The psychiatric staff assigned to the Reception Center stated that they would like a
better HIle of comml.lJlicatiol1 between theil' office Blld custody staff.
Discussion: The psychiatric staff feels that 11 would be beneficial to the overall operation of the
institutiol1., if they had a.ccess to infonnation pl'Dvided to custod)' (e.g., AOD report, unit gang
lllforL11atioll, racial tellsion incidenLs, etc.). They related that the)' in tum cOl.l1d pass on vital
infol'll1ation to custody staff relating to mental l1ealth issues.

I

,!
,I

:

I

......CoI

SUl\1MARY/CONCLUSION
The Deuel Vocational Institute (DVI) appears to he a well-run institution. Staff cOl'ltacted during
the evaluation expressed pride in their work and a high degree of confidence in the management
and executive staff at DVI. Staff reported that they felt safe in their duties despite the fact that
they work in an inherently daJ,1geroUS setting.
It is clear from the ph)'sical plant evaluation; observations of the intake area and fue intake
process; as well as interviews with staff, that DVJ is not well suited to be a reception center.
Exacerbating the situation is the crowding that is occuning at DVI. The broadway beds (beds
installed in the open corridors of living units) and conversion of the gymnasium and other
program areas to dormitories results ill lmsafe conditions for staff and inmates.

System crowding is also contlibuting to staff safety issues at DVl. Because of a lack of bods fOT
hard to place inmates (Level IV, EOP and SNY irmlates)) these type of inmates are often held at
the reception center in excess of 90 days. The reception center mission is incongruent with the
needs of hard to place inmates and ~1eps Rhuuld be taken to resolve this situation.
I

It is the opmioD of the evaluation team that the staff at DVJ are doing an exemplary job in spite
ofthe many barriers they encounter.

As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority, the findings from this evaluation will be
presented to the eSA at their next ~cheduled meeting and copics ofthe report will be provided to
CSA members, CDCR a.dnlinistration and Warden Moore. 11 is outside the scope oitills project
for the CSA to receive and monitor a correcti"Ve action plan and appropriate a.ction will be the
responsibility ofeneR Division of Adult Institution£.

11I','MI J )Vl limn

c111~.llflllr.Wll~

"lA

ATTACHMENT A
8TATE Of CAUFORNIA - DEPARTMENT OF CORReCTIONS AN!> nl!l'iIIwLlTATION

ARN::lLO SCHWAAZENEOGER. GOV&I\NOA

CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY
600 Bill/CUI

Drlv~

Sacramento. CA 95814

SepLember 15, 200S
Steve Moore, Warden (A)
Deuel Vocational Institute

P.O. Box 400
Tracy. CA 95378-0004
Deal' Wardell Moore:

The Califomia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDeR) asked the Corrections Standards
Authority (CSA) to develop B pjDJ) to evaluate staff safet)' Issues at Adult Operations and Di"ision of
Juvenile Justice detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the CSA unanimous})' approved a
proposal to assemble a pal1el of SUbject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting staff safety
evall1ations.
The panel met on May 2+25, 2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted.
As II result. a team comprised of CSA, Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice will be
conducting the evaluations over the. next 28 months, We expect to be on site at Deuel Vocational Institute
for fiw days, September 26·30 and plan to observe operations during 011 shifts ifpossibJe.

We would like to begin with an entrance conference with yol.! andlor appropriate administrative staff on
September 26, 2005 at 9:00 a.m, to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be
conducted and to get B general overview offacility operations and any conC6ms you may have.
In ord"'T to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team t s use while at Deuel
Vocational Institute (The evaluation team may a.sk for addi\ional resources, depending on the initial
assessment.):
• A contac1 person with whom the tealIl may coordinaLe their activities (please call or e.-mail this
information when the contac1 is idenlifil:'d).
• An office or conference room equipped with II table, chairs, facility map. facility telephone
direclory and a telephone in which a team of nine may work.
•

Access to HI! levels of staff for short illlerviews. Theile inttTviews cnn t~ke place at their
assigned work al'ellS and we wiJl Dvoid inlt:l'rupling their schedult::S l1S much a~ possible.

• Copies of all documentation I'elativt: to each incident of stl1ff us.!mlllt including: Inciden1 J{epOI'ts
for ASSBUl1,ll on Staff - CDC S37 (previoUSly provided); Use of FOl'ce Review findings
(previously provided); tlnd Stale Compel1saliol~ Reporl~ (SelF) generated as a result of each
incident;

•

Staff Assault Con\mittee Minutes

•

Summaries of State Compensation Reports (SelF) for all injuries on staff and/or the complete
l'epoT"o.S. Summaries arc: reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator

• A copy of the Confidential and Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM)
Supplemental Data !"o;oul'ces - to be accessed as needed

Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes·
o Grievances, Recommendations, Actions
• Inmate Appeals (CDC) '"
'. Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOV) at certain fa.cilities'"
• Authorized Equipment and Functionality
• Use of Force COlnminee Minutes and responses to recommendatiolls*
• Employee Training records including summary of curriculum and a.tterldance for orientation
and annual updates for ~elected areas'"
• Corrective Action Plans for prevIous 8ltdit~'"
• Safety Committee Meeting Minutes and RisJ( Management Action Plans
• Program descriptions and locations
• Staffing summary including duty rostt:l', allotted positions, vacancies, and 'leave of absence for
over 120 days for all staff.
• Staffing profile summary 'including age, sex. years of service and ethnicity
• Facility design and current capacity
• Men's Advisory Counsel (MAC) minutes*.
,
Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit cOl1ference
with you and/or appropriate members of youI' staff (on Dr about October 3, 2005). The results of the
evaluation will be reported to the CSA at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be
forwarded t~ CDeR with a courtesy copy ~ent to you.
•

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in thi~ matte\', If you have any questions, please
feel free to contact Jerry Read. Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445·9435 or jreadra>.bdcou',cll,gov,

Sincerely.

Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A)
"'~

eo:

2004 and 2005 to dElle

.foe McGrath, Chie/' Deputy Secrelal')'

Adult Operations

Ilelllll' Ilvr drll'i.LIl1~ .. III:IOl2l1(J~

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Dellel Vocalicnalloslllllie
Siafl Assault [)ala
January 2004 throug" APill 2005

.':.u::.chmc!U E

\'IC"ltU lNFO~M:'11ON

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Attachment C
COR.RECTIONS STANDARDS AUTflOJUTY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATJONS
Instltutionallnfnrnlntioll

LIVING AREA SPACE IJVALUATlON

rv:

I

Deuel Voclltional InstitUte

TYJ'E:
R.eception Ccntt;T

Buildinl!l.Housin~

\11

I DATE:

9<28-05

Each ~uildlnll:

Unit

Staffin~

EACH CELL

Cell
Type

Custody

1/

L.~v:l

Cells

Beds

E Beds

Holding

RC

4

o

o

Double

RC,PC

ISO

300

o

Pop.

280

Pro;ram
Intake

5

'i 7

Reception, Proteeti ve

2

3 3

Cuslody

--t----+-----t---+----t----I....-_+_--------+---~I-+--t--+--I--+-....;--I

fill

Double

RC.PC

148

296

o

29()

Receplion, ProLCctive

I

3 3

Cu!:tody

.1e
ng

DO\Jblc
DCl:m

Re, TI, II1

OO\lble
Broadway

RC

Double

RC

132

2G4
264

132

264

20

Do:m

40
RC

IJi.
I

264

RC,or

Btolltlway
Don"
Double

2

4 4

262

Reception

i

3 3

304

Rece:plion

2

3 3

2

4 4

1211

264

1
IJf & IV

13 J

288
20
24

Dorm
Dou~le

Orientation, Main Line,
R.eception

20

8ro;!dwny

Double

297

40

BrlladWll)'

in~

o

)1I6

Reception

2

4 "

196

Reception

2

3 3

20
40

Hrllll(lwny

Durn)

Double

il1~

)

He. Ag
Seg

130

G 6 <i

I

A naclu11l::nt

I{\:ecptiull.

I I ()

till

C

lllllllllt'

Wlll'kl:r~

JT
RC J. n.
UI

Single

I

26

16

Infil'lnill'y

12

II

2

3 3

o

::!

1
4 8 8

The$E: ofiicer~ arC:
posted along lhe
C01Tidor.;

and prO\,icle

security and escort \0
the cell blocl:s.

t:l
,
0rm

Dorm

I

1C
_1_'_I1_.-.,..__'_..;.-_1_0_.....· -_O_-L-_ . j
1._1_1_

1

20

IT
-1-

I. II
,..J

:w

u

20

'-l-n-m-a-le-\'o-'-Ol-'k-e-l'!o-:-IO-t-il\-e-d-i--+~----":'-+-+~-~+-1nl11al~ wl>rkerfi, located
secure
perimeler.

OUll:idt: (If lht:

I~:_~"

'·'5'

I
..:.-.-.-

I CI
•

I

hllllcllC- wllrl(\ws.
ClUlSid(!

localed·

oflht secllre::

I ••.~_...;...pel'jmelcr.

....-1.----4--.

......

1>01'111

19

of the secure
perimcter.

l.1l

........

pel'imeter.

0

-1-------1----1- -

+

outsideworkers,
of {he secure
Jl1ma~e
located
(l\)l.~ide

J.1I

Dorm

I

i

I

~

lJ

I

._ _

... _

....

Inmlllt: wurkt.:rl•. !l1cttltld
(llllsirll: (~I lhe secure
p:.:l'Illle:Il:~·:

:!

3 4

'I--1-_!~_+--I-_!_~--4-·..l-

I

1

:.......!_..L_!.._...I-..L......:..--!-.!-

I

,",VI

Attachment D
Deuel Vocational Institution
September 26 - 30, Z005
Line StRff:
1,

What is your current job title?

2.

What lS your assignment? V.Tllat are your primary duties (Post Orders)?

3. '

When did you stan worldng for the department as... ?

4,

How long have you been assigned to this facility?

5.

How many inmates do you supervise? What is their general classification?

i.
Wha.t sa.fety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at all
imes, otherwise have access to, or h.ave to check ot.\t from a cel1tl.'allocation?

What is the general condition of your safety equipment?
Is the safety equipment iSRuecl

t(}

you adequate for your job d1.llie:l?

If the answer is no, what additional safety equip1nen1. is l1e~essary?

Do you have a stab vest? Have you been

I,

~tted

for olle? Do you wear it at aU times?

scale of I to ]O. with I as the lowe~1 score and lOa.... the highe,cl( score, how ~afe do
u feel working at this facility? \Vhy do you leel that way'!
0118

J

Where do you fc:;ellhe least suk'! Ctl1'l you dus<.:rihe why
feel tbe most safe?

thul i~'l Whel't! and when

What ~taff ~arety is;)ut\ lJI't: y01I m()~1 com:crntld uhoul'! Wln\l worries you Lhl.' most
perf"rmin g you]' d uti C.'i?

.

.

'

,

~,

' ..... , ..... ,~~.

-

do

Wi yOll

• ..,.J'-J

...

"
A tll:u:hl'l'len1

D

s~c chaugcd Lo ill1prov~ Sllirr Sl.dcly?

15.

WbAI lllos1 would you like tCI dCI

16.

]-Jow Clflen do )'CHI SCI: wId/or ~peHk with Y(IUI' l'l,pl:rvisor'! YtlllI' sup~rvh:or'~ !'L1)'lt:l"vjStlJ''!

(\1'

Thl' wurdl:u'!

17.

Are proltlcob in plae/: '(n' tmel'gency r~!.'P(lnses'!

J 8.
(policy?)Whallulppenli when ~I staff member is ,lss~llIltecl? If the staff perSC)ti is injl.:l'ed,
where dCI lhey go for fil'sl aid or {hI' eltltrgency tJ'ealmenl in mort serious case:;? Hem' long
might lhal take? Who investigales? Are climinClI char~es filed?

Supen'is or~:

1.

How mall}' years have you been a supervisor?

")

HIlve you worked as a supervisor at any other CDC

3.

Have long have you been 'lssiglled to this facility as a supervisor?

4.

Dtscl'ihe your dulie~ lind responsibilities, and bow ~'(IU car.l')' them out dUl:ing 1\

iI1~tjtuti()lls'!

shift.

ll1"I1~'

indirect!)

~Llpc,.vis(·'!

How

7.

What il- lilt, pl:rCt:l1Hl~(' nf timt (.lihi 11) lIlI you ~;pt'ncl personal!)' obsl::rvinp your

l"ubordinul cs',)

do

~/(lU

6.

l'ClLllint:

Attachment D
8.
Whl1t kind of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge?
How do you handle them?
9.

How often do you see your supeT"isors?

10.

Wha1 safet)' equipment is issued and carried by your staff?

11.
is it,

12.

Is there any other safety equipment, which you know oft available for staffs use? \Vhat
El.l'ld how is it issued?

Does your staff have stab vests'} I-lave the)' been fitted for one? Do you ensure that they

weal' it at all times?

13.

Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for (me? D() you wear it at all times?

14.

On a scale of ) to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and lO as the highest score, how safe de
feel worldng at this facility?

yOl.l

15.

What i~ your greatest COnCel'l1 about ~taff saiety for yow' suoordinate.c;?,

16.
Whut would you like ltl do or :;ee changecllo improve slaff safety and reduce staff
assaults?
en~Ul'e

17.

What do you d(l tel

a safe working environment for your staff'?

18.

What protoculs in place fur emergency responses!

J 9.
What happens when a t-italT memo!::r is assalllted? Jfthe sUlff perSO!1 is injured. where do
they go for fir~t aid OJ' for emel'ge::Iil:Y In.:tltnlclif in \TIort: seriou~ Cl\S~:;'? How long IT\igh[ that
l<.Lkc'! Who invcstigalc~~} Arc criminal cJwrpl:!\ flied')

I.

lIow

mUll)! )''JIlI'!.;

do 'you have as

~l nl~lIH1gt:r'!

--- --- ----

_.. -'.'--" - _... -•

AU<.1t:h:m::l1 :)

4.

lk'iL:rib~ your duucs and n:~p(Jn'iihllilit::-':, ulld huv, you L:iJ.rr) thL:l11 (lUI dllrin~

,;1

routine

shiil

5.

Hi:M.' ~ffi(;!'1 d() you ''1',llli tbrough

tIlL'

rilciJjl) It' Hill, wilh std'] ~\1lcJ (Jb,';(;l'v(: gt:nr;nd

;:;li:lfr

safely pmCllcl::s'?
6.
t!lt:111

C~n YlJU d:::scrihc the safel) equiplll!:::ililhal il> j!l'su:-d to lint 5:afJ'? ",1Jmt l!- uv;!.ilabl~ k:
w use?

7.
15 tl)ere <m)' othel s"fetr equipl:lenl. whic:l you knClw (11. .<1\·ailab:l: for s:tff s use? Wr.:t
i.s it. and no,", i::: i: iss!J~=?

.

si.affhavt' oet:.n :ssuea s:ah \'es:s? HCl\,\'I11<1i1'". h21'{ been fi:ted? ~':1a1
is the ,il:l::::ne fa:' issl.llr.g vests? \Vho ha!- o::::::n jjenlij~d tel rec~jve them')
8.

rIo'" m::mv

9.

.

0:\'01.11'

On Ci sl.:ult. Df 1 t(l 10, with I as the lowes1 scon:: und 1(J
yOll feel Walkins at th!:; filci!il,\'"

a..<.,

tbe highC::Sl score, bow 511ft GO

10.

When wnsidering sl:.dTsart.!y. whal typl:!> of"con(;l.:rn!. tit) you lwvr:'!

, 1.

From

yOl1l

p~r...peclJ \It. Whill (;~ll,!,j (;:.. {he grt,.;iH(;~l IW\Cllli ill /(11' MulT inj my?

Attachment D

)S.
If YOll had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would yotl make to yom
operation to reduce stnff assnults 01' the potential for assaults? Physical plant, service and supply,
op~rationaI changes and/or staff changes?
·16.

WIlat protocols in place for ::mcrgcncy responses?

17.
'What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where do they
go forfuSl aid or for emergency treatment llllUore ~erious cases? How long might that take?
Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

"'v. _.,,,,_,, ...

~

. . _-

AH::l:.:hm:::l !::
Evaluation Team Members
Deuel Vocational Institute
TCIlIll

1

Stan !:lll:rviuws
R:IOC:11 Tilk,:,shli.1. C:SA rl:ld Hcpn:!'t:.'l!::!iv:
. ,!nl-.n MI,;A.llil'fc, Ac.Juh ()pt;r;ttions, Cr,rrl,;:':lion!lJ Cuumdor JJ
Jl·[f]'lunkti1. Juvt:llile JLlstic,:" Coplain
']'c:Iln 2
Physic'll Planl, Si:llTing ,lnel l'llj1LIJati(ln:
Gury WiOll, CSA Field R~pn:Stllt,Jlivt'
Mlll'li Perkill5:, Adlll\ ()J1t:ralioJ1~, racililY C:uptain
(i~IT)' G<ll'Cift. ,Iuvenile .Jwnic(;;, Liememllli

TCllm 3

FacilIty ProfilE::. Docu:l1e!1tmion

Rcvj~", a!ld Data AnalY!iis,

Don Allen. CSA Field Representative
Dave Stark. Adtlll Operations, Lieul:mmt
gob Moor: . .Iuvenil~ Justic=:, Majo:
Roben Takesh:a, ,=ieJd

?!!pre~!nlative

Cjrrecilons Staaar:i5 AUL'lonly
Phone 5116-322.8345

Fax'

;115-227·3317

Mark Perkins, Captain
Adutl OperSbons

Phone ['16·355·2626
Far..
910-355-2'99

'=:·Mail :>;:lk'!sti;.=fEI~oc::rr C2.0:W

=-Mal/: mOerl{ nSlol=orr,c3 oov

Gary Wion. =lelo R~tm::sen~lJv~
Correcllons StadClrds AUlhomy
Phone, 916-324-1641
Fax,
!:J16·327.3317

Jeff PJunl(ett, Captain
DivIsion ot JuvenilE Justice
Phone: !:J1S·262·0a02
Fell'::
916·262-1767
E-Mail IP!unl(eU(Q)cyaB....Q.2Y

E-Mail:

~on({MJdcorr cOl.aov

Don Allen, Fie:ld RepresenlallVe

Co,reciions Sladards .c..uth:lfJly
Phone' 916·n4-9153
Fen:;

916·327·3317

Nicholas Andrade, Major (A)
Division of Juvenile: Jl151ice
P~IClfle'

209·274·81'/5

rax,

109·274.0<41B2

~·Ma)1: d<1'lenlglQQQ£L=ll.E.QY

E·M<.l:1. nalldrc(1f:.6Jcdcr.~

John McAuliffe Correcllon"" COLnselor "
Adull Operations

DIVlf,lon of .!uven,ole Ju;:tlce

Phone' 916.35r..~G2a

Fa,:'

:J16<i5E:-~636

E.·Mal' I~Jln mr:;'luJ;fI::IGJ;orr Ci! Q~

Dave St<lrl;.. LI€ul':.-fli:lnl
Aclull Operations
Phofl!!' ~1e.35El·?'~i3
I=flY.,
S>1Ei·35f,·2A9!:J

E·Mail: d;.iV~ st<lrk(i'j)corl.::~ af!l'

auz Goncalves, LIE:ul~n<lnl

Phone 209.!i.G4·617f,
F~):'

209-~65·2963

E-M311

hOMC':iI!VP.:;{ck::GCf

ttl

OOV

 

 

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