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Juvenile Justice Reform - Realigning Responsibilities, CA Little Hoover Commission, 2008

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JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM:
REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
July 2008

State of California

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
July 14, 2008
The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger
Governor of California
The Honorable Don Perata
President pro Tempore of the Senate
and members of the Senate

The Honorable Dave Cogdill
Senate Minority Leader

The Honorable Karen Bass
Speaker of the Assembly
and members of the Assembly

The Honorable Michael Villines
Assembly Minority Leader

Dear Governor and Members of the Legislature:
In shifting responsibility to the counties for hundreds of California’s youth offenders, the state
recognized that its juvenile justice system cannot be reformed without radical change.
Though prompted by cost concerns, the realignment of responsibilities to the counties was the
policy move, one previously recommended by this Commission and others. Many counties
demonstrated that they can provide programs and treatment to youth offenders who need to
their lives around in settings that allow them to reintegrate more successfully into
communities.

right
have
turn
their

Once realignment is complete, the number of youth offenders in state hands will shrink to fewer than
1,500. The annual cost of providing services to each ward, however, next year will rise to $252,000.
This startling figure reflects the overhead expenses of a system built to serve a far larger population,
the cost of reforms required under a court-supervised consent decree and the complex needs of these
seriously troubled youth. Californians may fairly ask what they are getting for this outlay and
whether other strategies can better deliver public safety and youth rehabilitation.
The state has made slow, yet undeniable, progress. Still, advocates for youth offenders, frustrated by
the pace of reform, have asked a court to place the juvenile justice system in receivership.
Whatever the court’s decision, the state’s costs per ward likely will increase as juvenile programming
and treatment services are expanded and its crumbling facilities continue to age. The state’s master
plan for renovating or replacing its juvenile facilities, promised to legislators, is long overdue. The
delay may mean that the cost of bringing California’s facilities in line with current programming
requirements or replacing them is unaffordable, particularly in light of the current budget deficit.
The prospect of ever-higher outlays for an ever-smaller juvenile population in state custody should
prompt policy-makers to extend realignment to completion. The Commission recommends that the
state begin planning now to ultimately eliminate its juvenile justice operations and create regional
rehabilitative facilities for high-risk, high-need offenders to be leased to and run by the counties.
Juvenile justice operations and policy should be moved from the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and placed in a separate Office of Juvenile Justice that reports to the governor’s office.
This office should combine and consolidate the juvenile justice divisions currently under the chief
deputy secretary of juvenile justice as well as the juvenile offender grant administration and
oversight currently under the Corrections Standards Authority. Consolidating these activities into

one office will fill gaps that exist despite the multiple agencies and committees charged with pieces of
juvenile justice policy and oversight.
Establishing an Office of Juvenile Justice does more than streamline and consolidate overlapping
functions; it establishes an office to lead statewide juvenile justice efforts, to ensure that a
continuum of proven responses to juvenile crime are available throughout California. The state has
long lacked a strong leadership structure for juvenile justice, and the realignment legislation failed to
assign a single entity to be accountable for state operations and for how counties use state funds.
The realignment legislation did temporarily reconstitute the State Commission on Juvenile Justice,
though the jury is still out on what role it can play in providing leadership or oversight. The
Legislature should extend the commission’s life another year.
Through the new office, the state can provide real value through consistent leadership, technical
advice and guidance to help counties implement and expand evidence-based programs for juvenile
offenders. This office should conduct research and analysis on best practices and share them with
counties. It should coordinate with other state agencies that provide youth services and provide
counties with guidance on how to best leverage funding sources.
In addition to consolidating juvenile justice functions into an Office of Juvenile Justice, the
Legislature should consolidate the major grant programs that provide funding for juvenile offenders,
including the new funding that the state agreed to provide counties through the realignment, into a
dedicated, annual allocation. Additionally, policy-makers should fix flaws in the realignment plan to
prevent counties from using their realignment funds to supplant existing funding and to require
counties to report annually outcomes for how they spent state money. Using staff and resources
shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority, the office should oversee and analyze county
outcomes for programs and services funded by the state and provide an annual report to the
governor and the Legislature. Unaddressed, these flaws could undermine counties’ ability to make
the most of this opportunity.
Without question, realignment will be a major challenge for many counties, especially those which
previously had not invested in juvenile offenders programs and treatment services. Early indications
suggest that counties are embracing the change, one made easier by the state’s commitment to help
fund the higher level of services required by this more complex group of offenders.
It is essential that this realignment succeeds. It can, with the help and leadership of a separate,
streamlined Office of Juvenile Justice.
The governor and the Legislature now must weigh their options for the juvenile justice operations
that will remain in state hands. Reforming the state system to meet the terms of the consent decree
may prove unaffordable. Failing to speed reforms may increase the likelihood of a court receivership,
incurring political costs that are unacceptable. The realignment is a start in the right direction on a
path that ultimately leads to the state closing or transferring its juvenile facilities. Faced with
options that may be unaffordable or unacceptable, it is the path the state must take.
Commissioner Eloise Anderson voted in favor of the report but disagrees with the recommendation to
establish an Office of Juvenile Justice reporting to the Office of the Governor, favoring instead that a
Department of Juvenile Justice be established within the Health & Human Services Agency.
Sincerely,

Daniel W. Hancock
Chairman

JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM:
REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES
Table of Contents
Executive Summary……………..……….……………………………………………………………
Juvenile Justice in California..………………………………………………………………………
Realignment Leadership and Oversight.………………………………………….……………..
Juvenile Offenders Remaining at the State Level.………………………………………………
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………
The Commission’s Study Process………………………...………………………………………..
Appendices……………………………………………………………………………………………..
Appendix A: Public Hearing Witnesses………………………………………..………………………..……

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21
39
53
55
57
59

Appendix B: List of 707(b) Offenses…………………………………………………………………………... 61
Appendix C: Summary of County Juvenile Justice Development Plans………………………………

65

Appendix D: Major Sources of Funding for
California’s Local Juvenile Justice Programs and Services…………….….…..…………

69

Appendix E: Selected Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………….. 71

Notes…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 73

Table of Sidebars & Charts
Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice….. vii
Rise and Fall of California Juvenile Justice……………………………………………………… 2
Involvement in State and Local Juvenile Justice Interventions…………………………….. 3
California Division of Juvenile Facilities Institutional Cost per Ward per Year:
1996 -- 2008……………………..…………………………………………………………………….
707(b) Offenses Defined..……………………………………………………………………………
Youthful Offender Block Grant Options…………………………………………...……………
What’s In a Name: DJJ or DJF?......……………………………………………………………….
Corrections Standards Authority..…………………………………………………………………
State Commission on Juvenile Justice.……………………………………………………..…….
Other State Agencies with a Role in Juvenile Justice……..……………………………..…..

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9
10
11
12
13

State Budget and Budgeted Positions for Youthful Offenders in State Facilities or on
Parole, FY 2007-08 (in millions)…………..……………………………………………………….
Major Juvenile Justice Grant Programs FY 2007-08 (in millions)..…………..…………….
Proposition 6: Criminal Penalties and Laws. Public Safety Funding.……..……………...
Youth Offenders Remaining in DJF…..…………………………………………………………..
Comparison of Youth Offenders in State Facilities 1996, August 2007 and
June 2008……………..……………..…………………………………………………………………
Orange County Juvenile Justice Continuum………………………………….…………………
Missed Opportunity to Lead..…...…………………………………………………………………
California Department of Justice…………...………………………………………………...…..
Restructuring Juvenile Justice in Washington.………………………………………………….
Major Sources of Funding for California’s Juvenile Justice System..………………………
Sacramento County’s Mix of Juvenile Offenders in State Facilities……………………….
Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice….
CDCR Organizational Chart 2006………………………………………………………………..
CDCR Organizational Chart 2008………………………………………………………………..
Annual Costs Per Juvenile Offender Housed in a State Facility 2007-08………………..
Organization of State Delinquency Institutions in Other States…………………………..

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary

E

ach year California spends nearly a billion dollars on its juvenile
justice system. More than half of that amount is spent confining
less than 2,000 youth offenders in state facilities. The remainder
helps fund programs and services for nearly 100,000 youth supervised at
the local level.1
Spending half a billion dollars annually on such a small number of youth
in state facilities is a choice the state has made. It is a sizeable
investment, next year more than $250,000 for each youth offender in
confinement.2 As Californians see policy-makers choose to cut budgets
for higher education, health care and services for the rest of the
population, they deserve an accounting for their return on this
investment. They are not getting improved public safety – three out of
four youth who leave state facilities commit a new crime within three
years of their release.3
To a large degree, this state and its taxpayers are paying now for choices
made earlier – to forego investment in adequate facilities and programs
and to allow a juvenile correctional culture to develop that elevated
punishment over rehabilitation.
Unsafe conditions and illegal practices in state juvenile facilities led
advocates for youth offenders to file the Farrell lawsuit in 2003. In
response to the litigation, the state hired experts to assess state juvenile
justice operations in 2003. The experts found a system plagued by
unprecedented violence and pervasive lockdowns that prevented
education and counseling programs, with some youth offenders locked
up 23 hours per day.4 In November 2004, the state entered into a
consent decree in which it agreed to embark on significant reforms.5 The
state’s attempt to comply with the consent decree is a substantial driver
of the rising costs. Yet nearly four years and hundreds of millions of
dollars later, the state still is struggling to implement the required
reforms. Though conditions have improved, the plaintiffs in the Farrell
case have asked a state superior court to appoint a receiver to oversee
the implementation of the agreed-upon reforms.
Realizing the state could not afford to comply with the Farrell consent
decree, in 2007, policy-makers acted to reduce the number of youth
offenders housed in state facilities by enacting realignment legislation

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
which shifted responsibility to the counties for all but the most serious
youth offenders. This major step had long been recommended by youth
advocates and experts, and by this Commission in 1994 and 2005, as
many counties had demonstrated they were more effective and efficient
in managing and rehabilitating youth offenders.
As part of the
realignment, the state made the historic commitment to provide counties
with the money to pay for the programs and services for the shifted
population.
The Commission took the opportunity to evaluate the realignment as it
unfolded with the goal of making recommendations on areas in which the
state could improve. This study focused on two key areas of California’s
juvenile justice system:
9

Implementation of the realignment and what it will take to be
successful and efficient.

9

Effective management of the small number of youth offenders
who, under the realignment legislation, will remain at the state
level.

Most involved with the realignment agree that so far the process appears
successful and marks an important first step in improving California’s
juvenile justice system, though many point to areas that require
attention. In particular, while the state is giving an increasing portion of
its juvenile justice budget to counties, it is not providing leadership or
oversight to ensure this money is spent well or that outcomes are
monitored and measured.
Juvenile justice represents a very small part – less than 10 percent by
budget – of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, an agency
whose focus is dominated by its adult correctional operations.6 The
agency currently is grappling with the substantial challenges of prison
overcrowding and related federal litigation as well as a costly federal
court receivership of its medical system. It is unrealistic to believe the
agency’s juvenile division will be able to get the attention it requires. The
state must do what is necessary to avoid a costly court receivership of its
juvenile operations. At the same time, it is untenable to continue to
invest money into a system that has failed for many years and, despite
recent signs of progress, will take many more years to fully turn around.
Looking forward, the state must plan to take the process to its logical
conclusion – turning supervision of all youth offenders over to counties
and providing the resources for counties and county consortiums to
supervise the most serious youth offenders. This report provides a longterm vision for an effective, efficient and sustainable statewide juvenile
justice system. In it, counties take the biggest role. The counties have

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
proven more adept at juvenile justice, and given time to develop or
contract for programs and rehabilitation facilities and with dedicated
funding, the counties could rescue the state from the grip of a fiscal and
legal vice.

Realignment Leadership and Oversight
Through the 2007 realignment legislation, the state has transferred the
responsibility to the counties for all but the most serious youth
offenders, saving millions of dollars. The counties have long supervised
the vast majority of youth involved in the juvenile justice system, but up
until the realignment, they had flexibility in choosing which offenders
they sent to state facilities. Under the realignment, the state has codified
which offenders can be sent to the state. The realignment also dedicated
new funding from the savings to counties to establish and expand
programs and services for the shifted youth offender population.
Through this historic policy change, policy-makers could have, but chose
not to create or designate an existing government department or
committee to lead and oversee the realignment to ensure that a
continuum of effective juvenile justice responses is available statewide.
Policy-makers opted instead for a “hands off” approach. They tasked the
Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) with administering two new grant
programs:
9

The Youthful Offender Block Grant, which provides annual
funding to counties to expand programs and services for youth
offenders.

9

The Youthful Offender Rehabilitative Facilities Construction grant
program, which provides up to $100 million for counties to
expand facilities for youth offenders.

Lawmakers gave the CSA a very limited oversight role.
As part of the realignment, lawmakers also revived the State Commission
on Juvenile Justice and gave it responsibility for developing a Juvenile
Justice Operational Master Plan by January 2009. This new commission
has a short life – it will sunset when the plan is due – and although it
appears to be on track with the plan development, it has not yet
demonstrated whether it could live up to a broader mission of leadership
or oversight. Language within a budget trailer bill to extend the life of
the commission an additional year currently is under consideration by
the Legislature.
Youth advocates told the Little Hoover Commission that the most serious
threat to successful realignment was the lack of a leadership structure at

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
the state level to guide and oversee the juvenile justice system.
Witnesses did not criticize state officials and staff with various state-level
roles in juvenile justice, and in fact frequently praised the
professionalism and dedication of those involved with the realignment
and juvenile justice reforms. Witnesses also were quick to point out that
the weak leadership structure was not new. Youth advocates, this
Commission and others have identified this unusual structural void
numerous times over the past two decades.
Now, the state has reached a critical juncture where it efficiently could
establish an office to provide the leadership that has been lacking for so
long. And it must do so, given the state’s diminishing role in supervising
youth offenders and its commitment to provide an increasing amount of
taxpayer money to counties to expand their role in juvenile justice. As
the state realizes savings from the reduced juvenile offender population
under state supervision, it should shrink the state bureaucracy within
the various juvenile justice-related entities within the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), streamline statelevel juvenile justice functions and consolidate resources into a unified
Office of Juvenile Justice within the governor’s office. A small but
focused office should be given the resources and authority to provide
leadership and oversight of the state’s juvenile justice system. One of its
goals should be to ensure that a continuum of effective responses is
consistently available statewide.
Witnesses also identified several specific shortcomings in the realignment
that present opportunities for the state to bolster its efforts, including:
9

The statutory code created by the realignment does not contain
language to prevent counties from supplanting rather than
expanding existing spending on programs and services for youth
offenders with the new block grant money.

9

Although counties were required to provide a plan to the state
identifying how they would use the partial-year grant money
provided in 2007-08, no plans are required in the future.

9

Counties are not required to report how the grant money was
spent, what outcomes were expected or what success they had in
meeting those outcomes. A budget trailer bill that would require
counties to provide an annual plan and report outcomes for the
new block grant currently is pending in the Legislature.

9

Grant accountability is diluted.
The Corrections Standards
Authority has limited oversight of the new block grants; the
Department of Finance determines the grant amount; and, the
State Controller’s Office has fiduciary responsibility for the
grants.

iv

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
9

The new block grant adds another funding stream to a mix of
state and federal funding sources with overlapping objectives and
different reporting requirements.

9

The new block grant initially increased overall state funding for
local juvenile offenders, until two existing state-funded grant
programs – the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act and the
Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding – got caught in the
crossfire of broader state budget maneuvering. Another funding
piece is a November ballot measure that, if passed, would cement
in juvenile offender funding permanently but would leave the
state with little control over whether the money is used efficiently
or effectively.

9

Recent research has identified gaps in local juvenile offender
programs, but the state lacks a way to ensure that the new
money will be used to fill those gaps. In the past, significant state
and federal grant money was available for juvenile hall
construction. In the absence of guidance from the state, some
counties overbuilt, resulting in under-utilized facilities, while
other counties lack space.

9

Many counties were caught off guard by the swift policy shift and
are struggling to implement programs and services quickly for
dangerous, severely mentally ill offenders these counties now
must serve.

To ensure the success of the realignment, policy-makers should establish
a state-level entity to provide leadership and oversight of the realignment
effort. Additionally, policy-makers should take steps to address specific
identified weaknesses in the realignment. Finally, lawmakers should
lengthen the life of the State Commission on Juvenile Justice to give it
the opportunity to implement its recommendations that are due in
January 2009.

Recommendation 1: To improve public safety and provide statewide leadership on
juvenile justice policy, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate programs and
services into a streamlined Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice outside of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to develop a strategy for a
comprehensive, statewide juvenile justice system that includes a complete and consistent
continuum of evidence-based services for youth and to oversee county programs funded
by state General Fund allocations. Specifically, the Office of Juvenile Justice should:
‰ Be led by a director, formerly the chief deputy secretary of juvenile
justice, who is appointed by the governor and reports directly to the
governor’s office.

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
‰ Have two divisions that coordinate and collaborate: the Division of
Juvenile Justice Policy and the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning
and Programs.
‰ Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Policy, consisting of positions
shifted from the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, including officials from the Divisions of Juvenile
Facilities, Programs and Parole, to:
9

Provide leadership, technical assistance and guidance to help
counties implement and expand evidence-based programs for
juvenile offenders to improve outcomes, to set priorities for filling
identified gaps and to lead and guide counties in developing
regional consortiums and regional juvenile offender facilities.

9

Conduct research and analysis on best practices and provide a
Web-based information clearinghouse.

9

Coordinate with other state entities that have a role in providing
youth services, including the departments of mental health,
alcohol and drug programs, social services and education, and
provide guidance to counties on opportunities to leverage funding
sources.

9

Provide juvenile justice policy recommendations to the governor
and the Legislature.

‰ Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs, with
positions shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority Planning
and Programs Division, to:
9

Oversee county juvenile offender programs funded through
annual state General Fund allocations to ensure that evidencebased programs are implemented.

9

Oversee and analyze county outcome reports and provide an
annual report on juvenile justice performance measures to the
governor and the Legislature.

9

Administer state and federal juvenile offender grants.

9

Be advised by the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention as federally required for the federal
juvenile offender grants, shifted from the Corrections Standards
Authority to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice.

‰ The new office should develop, in connection with the Corrections
Standards Authority, standards and enforcement mechanisms to
guide the transfer of the juvenile offender population to county and
regional facilities.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Recommendation 2: To ensure the success of juvenile justice realignment, the governor
and the Legislature must bolster the accountability and oversight of the Youthful
Offender Block Grant by consolidating it with the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act
funding and the Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding program into one dedicated
funding stream for local juvenile justice programs and services. Specifically, they must:
‰ Consolidate the state’s three major juvenile offender grant programs,
using existing formulas, into one stable annually dedicated General
Fund allocation tied to performance-based outcomes overseen by the
Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice.
‰ Require counties to provide an annual outcome report and streamline
reporting requirements to match the outcomes currently required by
the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act.
‰ Strengthen the statutory code to prevent counties from supplanting
juvenile offender funding.

Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice
Governor

Governor’s Office /
Chief of Staff

Office of Juvenile Justice
Director

State Commission
on Juvenile Justice

(former Chief Deputy Secretary of
Juvenile Justice)

Division of Juvenile Justice Policy
Provide leadership, technical
assistance and guidance to
counties.
Conduct research and analysis to
provide a Web-based
clearinghouse of best practices.
Coordinate with other state
entities that have a role in youth
services.
Provide policy recommendations
to the governor and Legislature.

(moved from CDCR Divisions of Juvenile
Facilities, Programs and Parole)

Division of Juvenile Justice
Planning and Programs
Oversee of county juvenile
offender programs funded by
the General Fund (formerly
grant programs).
Analyze county reports on
outcome measures and
annually report to the
governor and Legislature.
Administer other state and
federal juvenile offender
grants.
(moved from CSA, Division of
Corrections Planning & Programs)

vii

Advisory
Committee on
Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency
Prevention
(moved from CSA)

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Recommendation 3: The governor and the Legislature should extend the sunset of the
State Commission on Juvenile Justice until January 2010 and charge it with assisting
counties in implementing the recommendations in its master plan and providing
oversight of the realignment process. The commission should:
‰ Serve as an advisory body to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile
Justice.
‰ Develop training and technical assistance for counties to assist in the
implementation of the recommendations in the Juvenile Justice
Operational Master Plan and report on progress implementing the
recommendations in January 2010.
‰ Develop recommendations to improve and expand data elements
reported to the California Department of Justice Juvenile Court and
Probation Statistical System.

Juvenile Offenders Remaining at the State Level
State policy shifts and the overall reduction in youth crime in California
have led to a significant reduction in the number of youth supervised in
state facilities and on state parole. Despite the significant reduction in
the state-supervised youth population, costs have continued to climb.
The state spent $344 million on youth offenders in state facilities in
1996, when the population peaked at 10,000 wards. In 2008, California
will spend an estimated $554 million on a population a fifth the size of
the 1996 population.7 That amount includes an allocation for nearly
4,000 positions in 2008-09 to manage operations and supervise the
nearly 2,000 youth offenders in state facilities and approximately 2,300
youth on state parole.8
Costs of implementing reforms the state agreed to in the Farrell consent
decree are one reason the spending for juvenile offenders has risen. The
state agreed to a major overhaul in six areas: education, medical
treatment, access for wards with disabilities, sex offender treatment,
mental health treatment and overall safety and welfare.
The reduction in the number of youth in state facilities coupled with a
significant boost in spending to meet the requirements of the consent
decree equates to more than a quarter million dollars spent each year for
each youth in state custody. Plaintiffs in the Farrell lawsuit say that
despite the increased spending and the commitment to reform by top
officials in the state’s juvenile justice divisions, there has been little
progress. Some of the youth facilities have experienced a reduction in
violence as well as other improvements, including an increasing number
of youth attending and graduating from high school and other
measurable outcomes, though overarching reforms to the entire system

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
have not occurred consistently. The plaintiffs have asked the court to
appoint a receiver to take over implementation of the required reforms.
When the Commission reviewed the governor’s plan to reorganize the
Youth and Adult Corrections Agency into the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation in 2005, youth offender advocates warned
that placing what was then the fairly autonomous California Youth
Authority under the larger corrections organization would be detrimental
to implementing the necessary reforms. In a combined system, the
attention would be focused mainly on the department’s 170,000 adult
offenders.
In testimony for this study, these advocates told the
Commission that the reorganization has in fact impeded progress as they
predicted.
Witnesses have said that Bernard Warner, the chief deputy secretary of
juvenile justice, who was appointed shortly after the reorganization, and
his staff are committed to implementing the agreed upon reforms. But
the 2005 reorganization blunted their early efforts and since then, they
have only made as much progress as the system would allow. The
realignment further complicated the situation, despite its positive overall
impact, by significantly reducing the previously projected juvenile
offender population, requiring new plans for consolidation and speeding
the closure of some of the state’s out-dated juvenile facilities.
Seven of the state’s eight juvenile facilities were built 40 or more years
ago. The state’s newest facility, built in 1991, was designed more like a
mini-prison than the modern rehabilitative model structures that other
states have designed and built successfully. The Legislative Analyst and
the CDCR have written that the existing facilities are physically obsolete
and are not designed to meet the rehabilitative needs of the current
population of youth offenders.9 Building new facilities or adapting
existing structures is likely to be prohibitively expensive.
Given the shrinking youth offender population, the state’s dismal track
record in providing effective rehabilitative programs, the costs of
responding to the Farrell lawsuit and California’s crumbling juvenile
facilities, the state should continue the process started with the 2007
realignment and embark on a path to turn all youth offender supervision
over to the counties.
This recommendation is by no means a reflection of the efforts of the
dedicated and professional staff working hard to comply with the courts
and bring about long-overdue reform. Under difficult circumstances,
signs of progress are beginning to emerge. Unfortunately, compliance
and reform come at a price that the state cannot afford to pay.

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Other states have decentralized youth corrections, improving public
safety and programs and services for youth offenders, and did so at a
much lower cost. Missouri – often cited as a successful example of
decentralization – shifted from a punitive system with two central
facilities to a regionally-based rehabilitative approach with 42 facilities
spread across the state. The annual cost per bed is about $47,000, or
one-fifth what California spends.10
Missouri and other states can provide models for how decentralized
youth corrections should look and function, though any attempt to do so
should recognize that California is one of just two states where local
government is the primary source of probation funding.11 Additionally,
two small groups of youth offenders in state facilities – those beyond age
21 and those who will transfer to adult prison with long or life sentences
– would require policy-makers to review and possibly revise state
jurisdictional policies for youth offenders.
County probation departments are in no position to immediately take on
the remaining serious, violent and older youth offender population, as
they are still adjusting to the abrupt implementation of the 2007
realignment legislation as well as the uncertainty of state funding given
California’s estimated $15 billion deficit for 2008-09.12 Counties could,
however, take on this responsibility, given time and resources to plan,
develop and contract for programs; adequate time to establish regionallybased facilities; and, given a dedicated source of money to pay for these
programs and facilities.
The Commission has recommended that the state establish a Governor’s
Office of Juvenile Justice to provide leadership and oversight of the
state’s juvenile justice system to improve public safety and to ensure the
success of the realignment.
The current leadership of the state’s
divisions of juvenile facilities, programs and parole should be
consolidated and transferred into this new office. The new office should
be outside the organizational structure of the CDCR and should guide
and oversee the development of joint state-local juvenile justice
strategies. These strategies should include multi-county consortiums
and build-lease arrangements for regional facilities. Simultaneously, the
state should develop and implement a plan to close all existing state-run
juvenile facilities and eliminate all state supervision of youth offenders.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Recommendation 4: The state should eliminate its juvenile justice operations by 2011.
As previously described, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate all programs
and services for juvenile offenders into a Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. In
addition to the responsibilities described previously, the office should:
‰ Guide, facilitate and oversee the development of new regional
rehabilitative facilities or the conversion of existing state juvenile
facilities into regional rehabilitative facilities for high-risk, high-need
offenders to be leased to and run by the counties.
‰ Provide counties with sustained, dedicated funding to establish
programs and services for regional facilities.
‰ As regional facilities become fully operational, the state should:
9

Eliminate state juvenile justice operations, including facilities,
programs and parole and the Youthful Offender Parole Board.
All juvenile offender release decisions should be made by
presiding juvenile court judges.

9

Provide guidance and oversight of the regional juvenile
facilities and administer dedicated funding to counties to
manage the regional juvenile offender programs and services
tied to performance-based outcomes.

xi

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

xii

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA

Juvenile Justice in California

O

n any given day, more than 100,000 youth are under some form
of supervision in the juvenile justice system in California.13
Responses to juvenile crime in California are divided between
state and local governments, with county probation carrying the heaviest
workload, supervising more than 95 percent of all youth that enter the
juvenile justice system. The state supervises a smaller, but much more
serious, violent and older juvenile offender population.14

Youth follow varied paths into the juvenile justice system. Most are
under 18 years old, have committed a misdemeanor or felony crime and
have been arrested by local law enforcement.
The continuum of
responses to juvenile crime includes everything from releasing a youth to
family to informal or formal probation; placement in a group home or
residential treatment facility; confinement in a juvenile camp or ranch;
or, in more serious and violent cases, commitment to a state juvenile
facility. Additionally, for the most serious cases, charges can be filed in
an adult court, which could lead to a prison sentence.
Generally, law enforcement and probation have more flexibility in
determining responses for lower level felony and misdemeanor offenses
as well as status offenses. “Status offenses,” or activities that are
considered an offense because the offender is a minor, include truancy,
running away from home, curfew violations and incorrigibility.15 Youth
committing status offenses most likely receive intervention services that
do not lead to an out-of-home placement immediately.
At the other end of the spectrum, responses to the most serious and
violent offenses are dictated more specifically by laws. Proposition 21:
The Juvenile Crime Initiative, passed with the support of 62 percent of
voters in 2000, requires an adult trial for juveniles 14 or older who are
charged with murder or specific sex offenses. Additionally, the law gives
prosecutors the option to move a juvenile case to adult court for certain
other serious crimes, an action often referred to as a “direct file.” For
lower level crimes not covered by Proposition 21, prosecutors can request
a fitness hearing to determine whether a youth offender should be tried
in juvenile or adult court with a judge making the decision.
Of all the youth referred to probation in recent years, less than one-third
become a ward of the court. Of these, more than half are supervised on

1

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
probation but are placed in their own home or with a relative. Most of
the rest are committed by the court to a county facility, with a small
fraction committed to a state facility.16

Continuum of Responses to Youth Crime
A continuum of graduated responses to juvenile crime is not uniformly
available statewide. The most common county-level intervention is
community supervision. This typically is prescribed for lower-level
offenses when the home environment is fairly stable. It may include
participation in short-term programs or counseling, community service
or restitution or regular probation supervision. More serious youth
offenders may be placed on intensive supervision, which may include day
reporting or day treatment, participation in drug or mental health courts,
house arrest or short-term detention.

Rise and Fall of California Juvenile Justice
California once was the national model for juvenile justice. The Legislature adopted the Youth Corrections Authority
Act in 1941, essentially creating what was until recently known as the California Youth Authority (CYA). Lawmakers
at the time recognized that youth offenders were different from adult offenders and should be housed separately.
Youth corrections put the emphasis on education and rehabilitation. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the authority rose
to national prominence for its programs, research and effectiveness in helping youth offenders turn their lives around.
During this period, the CYA was led by three directors. Multiple factors together with the cumulative impact of many
isolated decisions since the 1970s, led to a dramatic decline in the state’s juvenile justice system, culminating in a
2003 lawsuit alleging illegal and inhumane conditions.
Where leadership once had been stable, turnover became the rule. Since 1976, there have been a dozen directors –
six during the 1990s – many with backgrounds in local law enforcement or state bureaucracy, not rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders. Outside factors influenced the CYA decline as well. The 1990s gave rise to the criminalization of
what once was considered youthful misbehavior. Influential experts coined such terms as “super-predators” and
predicted a new breed of “severely morally impoverished” youth would flood the country as the teenage population
grew rapidly.
Despite the hysteria, and the new laws that came with it adding stiffer penalties for a broad range of youthful
misconduct, the youth crime wave never materialized and juvenile arrests decreased dramatically. Yet, 47 states
passed laws making it easier to try children as adults, resulting in harsher, more punitive outcomes. In California,
voters adopted Proposition 21 in 2000, which made prosecution of youth as young as 14 in an adult court
mandatory for certain offenses and gave prosecutors the flexibility to directly file charges in adult court against
juvenile offenders for other specified crimes. Within the CYA, some subtle and not-so-subtle changes occurred, with
correctional officers – who once wore civilian clothing – now uniformed and armed with pepper spray and tear gas.
The focus moved toward custody and use of force to control wards, and away from education and rehabilitative
programs. Conditions inside state facilities deteriorated and were marked by unprecedented levels of violence and
lengthy facility lockdowns leading to suicides as youth were confined to their cells 23-hours a day, for months at a
time. Youth considered dangerous were caged for educational programs.
As judges became aware of the deplorable conditions, they committed fewer youth to state facilities. Pressured by
lawsuits and reports from its own experts, the state acknowledged the need to reform and re-emphasize
rehabilitation. Reforms, stipulated in a consent decree, are now slowly being implemented.
Sources: Barry Krisberg, Ph.D., President, National Council of Crime & Delinquency. October 22-23, 2007. “Current State of California’s Youth
Corrections.” Presentation at Critical Juncture – Innovative Solutions for Addressing the Impact of Youth and Adult Incarceration in Our
Communities.” Also, Barry Krisberg, Ph.D., December 23, 2003. General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority. Also, CDCR
Web site: About the DJJ – History. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/DJJ/About_DJJ/History.html. Also, John J. DiIulio. November 27,
1995. “The Coming of the Super-Predators.” The Weekly Standard.

2

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
For youth offenders who pose a greater risk, present a higher need for
services or who have failed with less intensive supervision, a judge may
order placement outside the home.
Community-based placement
includes foster care or group homes and unlocked facilities that provide
such services as mental health or substance abuse treatment. Nearly
half of all California counties have camps or ranches for more serious
juvenile offenders that provide educational and vocational programs

Involvement in State & Local Juvenile Justice Interventions
Interventions
PROBATION SUPERVISION
Early Intervention
Regular
Intensive
Aftercare
OUT-OF-HOME PLACEMENT
All Placement
Foster Care
Group Homes – RCL 11 or less
Group Homes – RCL 12 or more
COUNTY DETENTION
All Detention
Pre-disposition
Ordered Confinement
Post-disposition
Camps, Ranches, Other Residential
STATE LEVEL
Juvenile Facilities
Juvenile Parole Supervision
YOUTH IN ADULT SYSTEM
Adult Prison / INS / Other
TOTAL COUNT

Youth Offenders
Involved

Statewide Proportions
(Percent of Total Count)

14,207
57,210
9,861
7,298

13.1%
52.8%
9.1%
6.7%

3,977
(408)
(1,389)
(2,110)

3.7%

6,375
(4,051)
(853)
(1,267)
3,991

5.9%

2,390
2,708

2.2%
2.5%

315
108,332

0.3%
100.0%

3.7%

Note: The data in this table capture a point-in-time count of California’s juvenile justice population
based on surveys distributed from April through October 2006. Involvement in the various levels,
particularly at the state level, may have diminished due to the changes introduced in SB 81. Group
home rate classification levels, or RCLs, are used to rate all group homes based on a 14-point scale that
compares the level of care and services they provide. The higher the level of serves needed, the higher
the RCL score.
Sources: Karen Hennigan, et. al, University of Southern California Center for Research on Crime. April 18, 2007.
“Juvenile Justice Data Project: Summary Report.” Los Angeles, CA. Pages 8-9 and 36. Also, California Department of
Social Services. “Overview of the Group Home Rate Classification Levels.”
http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/Res/pdf/OverviewClassificationLvls.pdf. Accessed June 19, 2008.

3

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
often in a rural setting. Counties that do not operate camps or ranches
can contract for bed space from counties that have these facilities and
programs. Solano and Colusa counties, for example, operate the Fouts
Springs Youth Facility under a joint powers agreement, which not only
provides educational and vocational programs in a rural camp setting for
youth offenders from those counties but also for youth from neighboring
counties that contract for bed space.17
All but a few counties in California operate juvenile halls, which are
designed for short-term stays, typically for pre-disposition youth or postdisposition youth awaiting placement in a camp, ranch or group home.
Additionally, judges sometimes order short-term or weekend-only
confinement in a juvenile hall as a sanction. Juvenile halls provide
educational services but are not designed for long-term commitments
and often lack adequate counseling, mental health or drug treatment
programs.
The most extreme response to youth crime is a commitment to a state
facility. Youth sent to state facilities are the most serious and violent
offenders as well as those with high needs – such as severe mental health
issues – that counties cannot serve.
Until the 2007 realignment
legislation was enacted, lower-level offenders who either had failed locally
based, less restrictive programs or came from counties that did not have
a broad continuum of responses also were sent to the state.

Shift in State Juvenile Offender Population
The youth offender population in state facilities has fallen 80 percent to
less than 2,000 from more than 10,000 youth in 1996 as a result of
policy changes, an overall decline in youth crime rates as well as a
growing body of evidence that revealed that state facilities were overly
violent and not adequately providing legally required educational and
rehabilitative services.18

Policy changes. In an effort to discourage counties from sending the
state low-level, non-violent offenders, in 1996, the Legislature changed
state policy by raising the cost to counties to send offenders to state
facilities. Previously, counties paid the state $25 a month for each youth
sent to a state facility. The 1996 law raised the monthly fee to $150 for
the most serious offenders and implemented an inverse sliding scale for
the others, requiring counties to pay from 50 to 100 percent of the actual
cost of confinement, the higher fees assigned to the least serious
offenders.19 In July 2003, the Legislature raised the minimum monthly
fee to $176 and set the maximum annual cost at $36,504 for the least
serious offenders. Future increases in costs were tied to increases in the

4

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
California Consumer Price Index.20
Additionally, as a means of
counterbalancing the expanded punitive measurers implemented
through Proposition 21, state lawmakers enacted the Schiff-Cardenas
Crime Prevention Act of 2000, later renamed the Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act, which provided a significant boost in money for county
probation departments to expand and enhance juvenile crime prevention
and intervention tactics to further reduce commitments to state
facilities.21

Declining arrests. Another major factor contributing to the decline in the
youth offender population has been the overall decrease in juvenile
arrests. From 1997 to 2006, youth felony arrests fell 21 percent in
California to 65,189 from 82,748. The decline has been steady since the
late 1990s, though the past few years have seen a slight increase in
juvenile arrests. However, even with the increase, arrests are still
significantly lower than a decade ago even as the state’s overall
population of youth ages 10-17 swelled to 4.5 million from 3.8 million.
The percentage of felony arrests for violent offenses has remained stable
over this time period, at a rate of 26 percent of all juvenile felony arrests.
Property offenses, on the other hand, have declined to 39 percent of all
juvenile felony offenses from 51 percent.22

The Farrell Lawsuit and the Fiscal Effect of Compliance
In 2003, the Prison Law Office filed a lawsuit on behalf of Margaret
Farrell alleging that the state’s treatment of youth offenders was illegal
and inhumane. The lawsuit alleged violations in six areas: education,
medical treatment, access for wards with disabilities, sex offender
treatment, mental health treatment and overall safety and welfare. The
California attorney general responded to the allegations by hiring
independent experts to investigate. The experts found unprecedented
levels of violence, substantial use of force by correctional officers against
wards and a lack of educational and counseling programs. In some
instances, youth offenders were locked up 23 hours a day for months at
a time.23 As juvenile court judges became aware of the deplorable
conditions, they sent fewer youth offenders to state facilities.
In
response to the lawsuit and the experts’ findings, in November 2004,
state officials signed a consent decree agreeing to reform what was then
called the California Youth Authority to bring its practices into
compliance with state and federal laws.
As part of the Farrell consent decree, the state agreed to oversight by a
court-appointed special master and to develop remedial plans to address
the six problem areas. The state’s plans outlined hundreds of steps to
reduce the culture of violence in the state facilities, to significantly
expand programs and to increase staff to ward ratios. Although plaintiffs

5

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
in the Farrell lawsuit alleged the state “has demonstrated a longstanding, severe and damaging inability to comply with court orders,” the
state has continued to expand programs and staff, increasing the budget
for youth offender programs and services, even as the population of
youth offenders continues to decline.24 By the time lawmakers were
negotiating the 2007-08 budget, the annual costs for each ward in a
state facility had soared to $218,000.25
As the youth population
continues to fall, costs per ward for 2008-09 are projected to rise to
$252,000.26 The escalating costs significantly influenced policy-makers’
decision to enact the realignment as part of 2007’s summer budget
negotiations.
According to advocates involved with negotiating the
realignment, lawmakers concluded California could not afford to comply
with the Farrell consent decree and took steps to cut the population at
the state level in an attempt to contain and reduce the escalating costs.

California Division of Juvenile Facilities
Institutional Cost per Ward per Year: 1996 – 2008

$200,000

$218,000

Farrell consent decree

$252,000

$178,000

$150,000

$100,000

$115,000
$92,545
$83,223

$50,000
$36,118 $39,425

$56,247

$63,961

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

$0

$40,528 $43,565

$49,111

Sources: David Steinhart, Director, Commonweal Juvenile Justice Program. October 26, 2007.
Conference presentation. Juvenile Justice Reform: Forty Years After Gault. Berkeley Law School
Criminal Justice Center. Also, the 2008 figures are based on projections from the Governor’s Budget
2008-09, January 2008.

Realignment Legislation
The decline in the state youth population culminated with the August
2007 passage of juvenile justice realignment legislation through a budget

6

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
trailer bill, SB 81, and a subsequent clean-up
bill, AB 191. This codified a historic policy
reform that had been advocated for years by
experts and oversight panels, including the
Little Hoover Commission. SB 81 prevents
counties from sending all but the most serious
and violent offenders and certain classes of sex
offenders to the state, and at the same time,
provides grant money for counties to use for
programs and services for youth that no longer
can be sent to the state.
SB 81 prohibits counties from committing
youth offenders to the state for any offense not
listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section
707(b) – the list of serious crimes that make
youth eligible for trial in the adult system or
for sex offenses listed in Penal Code section
290 (d)(3).27 Additionally, the bill established
the Youthful Offender Block Grant Program to
provide counties with money for programs and
placement for youth who will no longer be
committed to state corrections facilities.

707(b) Offenses Defined
SB 81, the realignment legislation, prevents counties
from sending youth offenders to a state facility unless
they have committed an offense listed in section 707(b)
of the California Welfare & Institutions Code. AB 191,
which further clarified SB 81, added sex offenses in
Penal Code 290 (d)(3) to the list of offenses that
counties could commit a youth offender to a state
facility. In general, 707(b) offenses are the most
serious and violent offenses, including murder, rape,
kidnapping, serious assaults, robbery, armed
carjacking, drive-by shootings and arson. A complete
list of all the offenses that can lead to commitment to a
state juvenile facility is included as Appendix B.
While a significant portion of wards sent to state
facilities prior to realignment had committed 707(b)
offenses, nearly 20 percent of the current ward
population committed non 707(b) offenses, primarily
burglary or theft, auto theft or drug crimes.
Sources: California Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 707 (b),
731 and 1731.5. Penal Code Section 290(d)(3). Penal Code Section
290(d)(3) was deleted by Senate Bill 172 (2007). Crimes listed in
former Penal Code 290(d)(3) are now listed in Penal Code Section
290.008(c). Also, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. September 2007.
“Characteristics of Population.”

Under SB 81, county probation departments
became responsible for non 707(b) youth
offenders released from state facilities after September 1, 2007. Another
change: non 707(b) youth offenders under state parole supervision prior
to September 1, 2007 who violate a condition of parole cannot be
returned to a state facility and instead are turned over to county
probation officials.
Counties also have the option of recalling youths on an individual basis
from state facilities who were not committed under a 707(b) offense. As
of May 2008, six counties had recalled a total of 14 youth offenders and
370 youth offenders were eligible for recall.28

Youthful Offender Block Grant
The Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG) provides money to counties to
“enhance the capacity of county probation, mental health, drug and
alcohol, and other county departments to provide appropriate
rehabilitative and supervision services” for the youthful offenders who
become the responsibility of the county under SB 81.29

7

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
The state released approximately $23 million to county supervisors in
September 2007 for the 2007-08 fiscal year. The grants will grow to $93
million by 2010-11 as the number of youth under county supervision
grows and the population remaining in state facilities continues to
decline.30
The total state grant amount is calculated by the Department of Finance,
which determines the average daily state ward and parole violator
population who, if not for the 2007 law, would have been in a state
facility. This average daily population is multiplied by $117,000. The
total state grant amount also includes the average daily population of
wards released to county supervision who previously would have been
supervised by state parole staff.
This average daily population is
multiplied by $15,000. Out of this grant amount, counties are allocated
money by formula, with 50 percent of the award based on the total
county population of juveniles aged 10 to 17. The remaining 50 percent
is based on the number of felony juvenile court dispositions reported to
the Department of Justice in the prior year. All counties receive a
minimum of $58,500.31 Relief from the sliding scale fees adds additional
value for counties.
The grant formula was devised so that counties such as Orange, San
Luis Obispo, Santa Cruz, San Francisco and others that previously had
opted to send fewer offenders to state facilities would not be penalized for
their earlier efforts to expand local services.32

Juvenile Justice Development Plans
The realignment legislation required counties to submit a Juvenile
Justice Development Plan for youthful offenders to the Corrections
Standards Authority (CSA) by January 1, 2008. By statute, each plan
had to include three elements:
9

A description of the programs, placements, services or strategies
to be funded by the Youthful Offender Block Grant allocation.

9

A description of any regional agreements or arrangements to be
supported by the block grant allocation.

9

A description of how these new programs would coordinate with
Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) block grant
funding.33

The CSA developed a grant application to standardize how counties
reported their plans. Counties were asked to specify, in both a narrative
and budgetary form, how they would spend the YOBG money for each of
seven possible uses identified in SB 81. The application also provided an

8

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
option for counties to describe if and how they
would use the grant money for programs or
services outside the scope of the options listed
in the legislation.
The county plans are as diverse as the
counties themselves.
In general, larger
counties spread the money across a number of
the use categories, while smaller counties
focused spending on fewer categories.
A
significant number of counties are using the
grant money to implement risk and needs
assessment tools.
While witnesses who testified before the
Commission indicated that there was a
significant need for regional partnerships, only
nine of the 58 counties indicated that they
plan to use YOBG funds to establish or
enhance joint ventures for programs and
placements.
A number of counties lack
juvenile detention or commitment facilities.
Instead of building a local commitment facility,
these counties have opted to enhance existing
regional partnerships.
Many counties lack
services and programs to treat older and
potentially more violent returnees. Some of
these counties plan to lease additional bed
space from partner counties, while others said
they planned to form new partnerships to fill
the gaps.

Youthful Offender Block Grant Options
Senate Bill 81 specified that counties could allocate
Youthful Offender Block Grants for the following
purposes:
A. Risk and needs assessment tools and evaluations
to assist in the identification of appropriate
youthful offender dispositions and re-entry plans.
B. Placements in secure and semi-secure youthful
offender rehabilitative facilities and in private
residential care programs, with or without foster
care waivers, supporting specialized programs for
youthful offenders.
C. Nonresidential dispositions such as day or
evening treatment programs, community service,
restitution, and drug-alcohol and other
counseling programs based on an offender’s
assessed risks and needs.
D. House arrest, electronic monitoring, and
intensive probation supervision programs.
E.

Re-entry and aftercare programs based on
individual aftercare plans for each offender who
is released from a public or private placement or
confinement facility.

F.

Capacity building strategies to upgrade the
training and qualifications of juvenile justice and
probation personnel serving the juvenile justice
caseload.

G. Regional program and placement networks,
including direct brokering and placement
locating networks to facilitate out-of-county
dispositions for counties lacking programs or
facilities.
H. Other programs, placements, services, or
strategies to be funded by the block grant
allocation.

Nearly half of the counties have indicated that,
in addition to spending in the seven categories
identified in SB 81, they intend to use some of
their block grant money to purchase “other
programs, placements, services or strategies.”34 A spreadsheet detailing
the total grant award to each county, the juvenile population, the
number of youth returning from state facilities and the intended use of
the grants by category is included as Appendix C.

9

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

Youthful Offender Rehabilitative Facility Construction
The realignment legislation included up to $100 million in lease revenue
bond proceeds to pay for the expansion of local juvenile justice
rehabilitation facilities. The bond revenue proceeds are to be disbursed
through the CSA. The authority formed an executive steering committee
to oversee the grant process. A draft request for proposals for the local
Youthful Offender Rehabilitative Facilities Construction Funding Program
was released for public comment in June 2008. Once CSA releases a
final request for proposals, counties will have until January 2009 to
submit proposals. The executive steering committee anticipates awards
will be made at the March 2009 CSA meeting.35

The State’s Role in Juvenile Justice
Although approximately 95 percent of juvenile offenders are under
supervision at the county level, several state
agencies have roles in juvenile justice through
What’s In a Name: DJJ or DJF?
programs and services for juvenile offenders
The 2005 reorganization of the Youth and Adult
spanning multiple departments and agencies,
Correctional Agency into the California
including the California Department of Corrections
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the Health & Human
created the Divisions of Juvenile Facilities,
Programs and Parole reporting to a chief deputy
Services Agency and the California Department of
secretary of juvenile justice. Many commonly
Education.36
Additionally,
the
California
refer to these divisions as the division of
Department of Justice is responsible for the
juvenile justice or DJJ and this is how it is listed
Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System,
on the CDCR Web site and on other official
the state’s primary information system for juvenile
documents.
crime. While not the focus of this study, it is
While the statutes that abolished the California
important to note that there are many other
Youth Authority in 2005 identified a chief
juvenile crime prevention programs and services
deputy secretary of juvenile justice, they do not
that target youth spread across even more agencies
refer to any division by that name. The
reorganization legislation provided that all
and departments, including such key entities as the
references to the California Youth Authority in
Department of Justice Crime and Violence
the dozens of code sections that were not
Prevention Center and the recently established
amended as part of the legislation now refer to
Governor’s Office on Gang and Youth Violence
the CDCR Division of Juvenile Facilities.
Policy. Within the CDCR, juvenile justice policy is
Because the division of juvenile justice does not
primarily informed by: the chief deputy secretary of
exist in the California code, in this report, the
Commission follows the Government Code and
juvenile justice and the divisions overseen by the
uses the Divisions of Juvenile Facilities,
secretary; the Corrections Standards Authority
Programs and Parole, except when quoting
Planning and Programs Division; and, the Advisory
sources that use “DJJ.”
Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Source: Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Juvenile Court
Prevention. Additionally, the State Commission on
Judge, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento.
Juvenile Justice has a role in juvenile justice policy.
February 28, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission.
Also, California Government Code section 12838, 12838.3
and 12838.5 and 1000.

10

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
CDCR chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice. Several divisions under
the direction of the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice within the
CDCR have a role in juvenile justice. The Division of Juvenile Facilities
and the Division of Juvenile Programs house and provide programs and
services for approximately 2,000 youth offenders committed to state
facilities.
The Division of Juvenile Parole Operations provides
supervision for 2,300 youth offenders who have been released from state
facilities to parole.37 Under the realignment, state parole will now only
supervise offenders released from state facilities who have committed a
707(b) offense. The Juvenile Parole Board also is overseen by the chief
deputy secretary of juvenile justice. The board conducts hearings for
juveniles in state facilities and determines when a juvenile offender is
ready for release.

Corrections Standards Authority

Corrections Standards Authority.

The Corrections
Standards Authority (formerly the Board of
Corrections) is a 19-member board chaired by the
secretary of the CDCR with four additional CDCR
representatives and 14 other members – primarily
local law enforcement officials – appointed by the
governor.
The CSA develops and maintains
standards for the construction and operation of
local jails and juvenile detention facilities and for
the selection and training of state and local
corrections personnel. The CSA also inspects local
adult and juvenile detention facilities and
administers facility construction grant programs.
In addition, the CSA administers three major state
juvenile justice grant programs – the Youthful
Offender Block Grant, the Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act and the Juvenile Probation and
Camps Funding – as well as other smaller state
grant programs. The authority also administers
and oversees federal juvenile justice grants and is
advised by the federally-required state advisory
group, the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, whose responsibilities
were added when the Legislature abolished the
Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP) in
2003.38

The Corrections Standards Authority (formerly
the Board of Corrections) has 19 members:
9

Secretary of CDCR (serves as chair).

9

4 CDCR officials who report to the
secretary, one who must be a manager or
administrator of an adult prison and one
who must be a manager or administrator of
a state juvenile facility. The other 14
members are appointed by the governor,
with advice from the CDCR secretary and
with advice and consent of the Senate.
2 sheriffs.
2 chief probation officers.
1 county supervisor or administrative
officer.
1 administrator of a county detention
facility.
1 administrator of a community-based
correctional program.
2 public members, including one
representing the interests of crime victims.
1 representative of a community-based
youth service organization.
4 rank and file members including a
juvenile probation officer, a sheriff’s
deputy, a parole officer and someone
working in a state correctional facility.

9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

Source: California Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority Web site.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/Admin/About
_us/CSA_Major_Duties_And_Responsibilities.html.

11

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The
federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act requires every state to form
an advisory body in order to qualify for federal Delinquency Prevention &
Intervention Program (Title II) grants. The Advisory
Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
State Commission on Juvenile Justice
Prevention (ACJJDP), an executive steering committee
The purpose of the State Commission on Juvenile
of the CSA, serves this purpose in California. Under
Justice is “to provide comprehensive oversight,
federal guidelines, the advisory committee must have
planning and coordination of efforts, which
at least 15 members appointed by the governor. In
enhance the partnership and performance of state
California, the governor has delegated responsibility to
and local agencies in effectively preventing and
responding to juvenile crime.” The Commission
the secretary of CDCR for making recommendations
includes 12 members:
for committee appointments. Federal law requires the
advisory committee to develop a three-year juvenile
• Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice,
CDCR (Tri-chair).
justice plan, focusing on core federal goals, and to
review grant applications for the federal programs.39
• County representative, designated by the
statewide organization representing
counties (Tri-chair).
• Chief probation officer, designated by the
statewide chief probation officers
organization (Tri-chair).
• County sheriff, designated by the statewide
sheriffs association.
• Manager or administrator of a county local
detention facility for juveniles (appointed
by the Governor).
• Rank and file representative from state or
local juvenile corrections (appointed by the
Speaker of the Assembly).
• Representative from a community-based
organization serving at-risk youth
(appointed by Senate Rules Committee).
• Crime victim advocate (appointed by the
Speaker of the Assembly).
• Juvenile court judge (appointed by the chair
of the Judicial Council).
• Director of a county human services agency
(appointed by the statewide organization
representing county welfare directors).
• Attorney with expertise in juvenile justice
policy (appointed by Senate Rules
Committee).
• Director of a county mental health agency,
appointed by the statewide organization
representing county mental health directors.
Source: Welfare & Institutions Code 1798.5.

State Commission on Juvenile Justice.

Prior to the
2007 realignment legislation, the state had two
juvenile justice advisory commissions, beyond the
ACJJDP, that had existed mostly on paper. The most
recent commission was established through the 2005
legislation that enacted the CDCR reorganization, but
it existed only in statutory code as commissioners had
never been appointed. In 2007, SB 81 revived and
reconstituted the State Commission on Juvenile
Justice.
SB 81 left the statutory purpose of the commission
intact: “to provide comprehensive oversight, planning,
and coordination efforts, which enhance the
partnership and performance of state and local
agencies in effectively preventing and responding to
juvenile crime.”40
SB 81 slightly changed the membership of the
commission and reduced the number of members
appointed by the governor and gave appointment
authority
to
organizations
representing
local
government officials. SB 81 also gave the commission
a key role in the realignment. The commission was
charged with producing a statewide Juvenile Justice
Operational Master Plan by January 1, 2009. A
required interim report documenting the commission’s
progress and initial strategies was due on May 1,
2008 and was released to the Legislature in June
2008.

12

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
Other State Agencies with a Role in Juvenile Justice
Health & Human Services Agency. The California Health & Human Services Agency provides grants and
programs that can be used for services for juvenile offenders. The Department of Mental Health Services
oversees Proposition 63: Mental Health Services Act grants that can be used to provide services to juvenile
offenders. The Department of Social Services oversees group homes serving youth involved in either the
juvenile dependency or delinquency systems. The Department of Health Services provides health care to
eligible youth, through Medi-Cal or Healthy Families, though only to those youth who are not in a state or
local detention facility. The Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs oversees state and federal grants that
can be used for a variety of substance abuse treatment programs for youth, including programs in juvenile
detention facilities, aftercare programs for youth released from detention facilities as well as for juvenile drug
courts.
California Department of Education. The Department of Education funds and sets education
requirements for educational and some vocational programs provided to youth in state and local detention
facilities. It also oversees various prevention programs for at-risk youth and early intervention programs for
youth on informal probation or in diversion programs.
California Department of Justice. The California Department of Justice (DOJ), Criminal Justice Statistics
Center is charged with collecting juvenile justice data through the Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical
System. Counties report juvenile arrest and disposition data to the Department of Justice, which collects and
analyzes the data and publishes an annual report. Within DOJ, the Crime and Violence Prevention Center
provides a clearinghouse for information on youth crime and violence prevention and provides training,
technical assistance and tools for local communities.

For the Juvenile Justice Operational Master Plan, the commission is to
“develop and make available for implementation by the counties” a set of
strategies for risk and needs assessment, juvenile justice data collection
elements common to all counties and a continuum of evidence-based
programs.41 Unless reauthorized by the Legislature, the commission
sunsets on January 1, 2009. The commission was given $600,000 to
hire consultants and experts to assist in carrying out its mission. It has
met monthly since January 2008.

Juvenile Justice Funding
California currently spends nearly $1 billion annually on juvenile justice
programs, services and supervision. The 2007-08 budget included
approximately $580 million for state level juvenile justice operations,
programs, health care and parole supervision. Beyond custody costs,
when youth become wards of the state, the state is required to provide
educational programs, adequate health and mental health care and other
rehabilitative services. Out of the $580 million spent on state juvenile
justice operations, more than $23 million was included for the Youthful
Offender Block Grants that were distributed to the counties as part of the
realignment. The estimated budget for state juvenile justice programs,
services and supervision in 2008-09 will decline to $554 million due to

13

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
the decrease in the population. Of this amount, $66 million will be
allocated to counties as part of the new block grant program to pay for
local programs and services.42
In 2007-08, the state allocated more than $340 million in additional
money from the General Fund for other juvenile justice grant programs
administered by the CSA to fund county juvenile probation programs:
9

Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) – $119 million.

9

Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding (JPCF) – $201.4 million.

9

Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction Program (MIOCR) – $22.3
million.

The CSA also administers various federal programs for juvenile offenders
that total approximately $14 million.43

State Budget and Budgeted Positions for Youth Offenders in
Major Juvenile Justice Grant Programs
State Facilities or on Parole, FY 2007-08 (in millions)
FY 2007-08 (in millions)

Education,
Vocations and
Offender
Programs
$205
(1,583 positions)

Parole
$39
(171 positions)

Local Assistance YOBG
$23.7

Operations
$189
(1,290 positions)

JJCPA
$119

Health Care
$123
(886 positions)

MIOCR
$22.3

JPCF
$201.4

Total: $342.7 million

Total: $580 million

Note: Operations includes juvenile security, support, facilities administration, reception and diagnosis
and local assistance funds, which include the Youthful Offender Block Grant and transportation. Health
Care includes medical, mental health and dental. Source: Governor’s Budget 2008-09.

It is unclear how much money the state will provide counties for juvenile
offenders as lawmakers wrangle with a budget shortfall estimated at $15
billion for 2008-09.44 The governor’s January budget proposed across
the board cuts of 10 percent for all the state juvenile justice grant
14

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
programs – except the new Youthful
Offender Block Grant.
In the May
budget
revision,
the
governor
maintained the 10 percent cuts.45
Meanwhile,
the
Senate
Budget
Subcommittee No. 4 in May 2008
denied all of the approximately $340
million
in
state-funded
juvenile
offender grant programs, leaving only
the new YOBG funding intact for the
2008-09 budget.46
These cuts to
juvenile offender grant programs will
exceed what the new block grant adds.
The Budget Conference Committee in
July 2008 restored $281 million to the
state-funded juvenile offender grant
programs, an amount close to that
proposed in the Governor’s 2008-09
Budget.47 As of July 14, 2008, it was
not known if this would be the level of
funding for these grants in 2008-09 as
the final budget bill had not approved
by the Legislature. The May action,
however, underscores the vulnerability
of local youth offender funding and the
uncertainty that complicates county
efforts to plan programs and services
for youth offenders.

Proposition 6: Criminal Penalties and Laws.
Public Safety Funding.
A November 2008 ballot initiative, if enacted by voters,
could significantly affect California’s 2007 juvenile justice
realignment. Cited as the Safe Neighborhoods Act, the
measure re-writes a portion of the statutory code
established through the realignment legislation
eliminating mental health, alcohol and drug treatment and
other departments from the list eligible for the new block
grant funding and directing all funds toward probation,
which would still have the option to contract with these
other departments with the grant money for services.
The measure also permanently locks approximately $500
million annually to fund juvenile probation and other
local law enforcement efforts. The measure would
eliminate the uncertainty of this funding that local
governments currently face, however, it also would
eliminate state control over this allocation and incentives
for counties to achieve outcome measures. The 32-page
initiative also includes numerous other changes including
increasing penalties for various crimes that potentially
would expand the need for state facilities to incarcerate
additional juvenile and adult offenders at a cost the
Legislative Analyst estimates will be in the hundreds of
millions. The measure does not include new revenue to
pay for the expanded fiscal outlay.
Sources: Full text of the ballot measure is available on the Secretary of
State’s Web site:
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i765_07-0094_a1s.pdf.
The Legislative Analyst’s Office fiscal analysis of the ballot measure is
available on the LAO Web site:
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2007/070919.pdf.

Proposition 6, a November 2008 ballot
measure would permanently lock in
money from the General Fund for local probation departments to pay for
programs, services and supervision for juvenile offenders.48 The measure
also would change the law established by SB 81, deleting “mental health,
drug and alcohol and other county departments” from the list of agencies
eligible for Youthful Offender Block Grant money, leaving probation as
the only authorized grant recipient.49
This initiative also would
permanently allocate additional money to local law enforcement and
lengthen sentences for some offenders. The Legislative Analyst’s Office
estimates the initiative, if enacted, would increase state outlays by a half
billion dollars annually in dedicated funding to local law enforcement
and potentially hundreds of millions of dollars more in increased state
prison costs.50
Beyond the major grant programs, counties cobble together money to pay
for programs and services for youth offenders from various other state

15

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
and federal funding sources. A list of the major sources of funding is
included as Appendix D. In addition to these and other programs, a
small but significant percentage of the local juvenile probation budget
comes from county general funds.

Juvenile Population Remaining at the State Level
Once realignment is fully implemented, the CDCR projects a steady
population of less than 1,500 youth will remain in state facilities.51
Barring additional legislative changes, by 2012, CDCR estimates there
will be 1,365 male and 62 female youth offenders in state facilities. The
CDCR estimates that SB 81 will result in 230 to 240 fewer juvenile court
admissions a year. The state will have 200 fewer parole violators in
2007-08 than in 2006-07, according to CDCR estimates, and this
downward parole supervision and violation trend will continue as the
state juvenile offender population declines. Also contributing to the
decline is the projected decline in California’s overall juvenile population
and the trend toward fewer juvenile arrests.52
Most of the 1,500 youth in state facilities will be committed by juvenile
courts for 707(b) or sex offenses. Several hundred of the youth who will
remain in state facilities were convicted in adult courts and ordered to
serve time in a juvenile facility or housed in DJF through an
interdepartmental agreement within the CDCR. The interdepartmental
agreement primarily is used to ensure that youth convicted in adult
courts receive legally required educational services, which are not widely
available in adult prisons. Those with long or life sentences may serve
their time at a youth facility until age 18, then graduate to an adult
prison.
With lower-level offenders no longer entering state juvenile facilities, the
characteristics of the population remaining in state facilities is changing.
Parole violators and offenders convicted of burglaries, thefts and drug
crimes are shrinking as an overall percentage of the population, while the
proportion of offenders convicted of assaults, robberies, homicides and
sex offenses is increasing. Eventually, as all lower level offenders are
released, the state will house only the most serious offenders.53

16

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA

State Juvenile Justice Facilities
Youth Offenders Remaining in DJF

Currently, youth offenders are housed in six
juvenile justice facilities and one camp
operated by the CDCR’s Division of Juvenile
Facilities. As a result of the realignment
legislation, the CDCR is in the process of
closing two youth facilities – the DeWitt
Nelson Youth Facility in Stockton and El
Paso de Robles Youth Correctional Facility
in Paso Robles. The remaining DJF facilities
are out of date and would require millions of
dollars to be updated.54

As of March 2008, there were 2,077 youth in state juvenile
facilities. Nearly 94 percent were committed by a juvenile
court while the remaining six percent were committed by a
criminal court. Approximately 84 percent (1,642) of the
youth offenders were first commitments, while 16 percent
were parole violators (330).
Gender:
Male
Female

1,980
97

95.3%
4.7%

440
1,329
308

13.6%
65.7%
14.8%

Race/Ethnicity:
Hispanic
1,103
African American
653
White
243
Asian
38
Native American
18
Other
22

53.1%
31.4%
11.7%
1.8%
.9%
1%

Age:
Under 18
18-21
22 or older

In 1996, when the state juvenile offender
population peaked and facilities bulged
beyond capacity, the state operated three
additional detention facilities and three
additional camps. As the juvenile offender
population declined, the state closed three
facilities and three of four fire camps it
operated in cooperation with the California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

Commitment Offenses:
Assault
659
31.7%
Robbery
626
30.1%
Other sex offenses
244
11.7%
Burglary
180
8.7%
Homicide
109
5.2%
Other offenses
61
2.9%
Rape
55
2.6%
Auto theft
38
1.8%
Theft (except auto)
30
1.4%
Narcotics and drugs
30
1.4%
Kidnap/extortion
27
1.3%
Arson
18
.9%
Total
2,077
99.7%

Status of Closed Facilities
Of the various closed youth facilities, only
one has a new use. The Northern Youth
Correctional
Center
and
Clinic
in
Sacramento, was transferred to nearby
California State University, Sacramento,
which demolished unusable structures and
plans to use the land to develop affordable
housing for faculty and students.
The
Department of General Services listed the
75-acre Fred C. Nelles Youth Correctional
Facility in Whittier for sale and received 13
purchase offers.55 While a sale to the city of
Whittier was pending in 2006, the CDCR
requested that the Department of General
Services pull the property off the market in
order to re-evaluate all CDCR properties in
response to the governor’s corrections
proposals to add more prison beds.56

Elsewhere in the report we cite the DJF population at 1,896
as of June 2008. As of publication, a detailed demographic
breakdown is not yet available to reflect the smaller June
2008 population.
Source: California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Division
of Juvenile Justice. March 2008. “Characteristics of Population.” Also,
CDCR. Monthly Population Report. June 30, 2008.

17

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
The state has proposed converting El Paso de Robles into an adult
facility, housing lower-level offenders age 50 and older and adding an
adult offender fire camp. The state held local public meetings to present
these ideas and gain feedback in April 2008. Such a conversion could
help ease overcrowding in adult facilities and allow the state to avoid
spending some of the money the Legislature and governor previously
authorized in 2007 through AB 900 to expand the adult system.
Constructing a re-entry facility on the property also has been discussed.

Comparison of Youth Offenders in State Facilities 1996, August 2007 and June 2008
Facility

Year
Opened

Design
Capacity

Population
1996

Population
8-31-07

Population
5-31-08

Preston Youth Correctional Facility (Ione)

1950

720

968

365

368

DeWitt Nelson Youth Correctional Facility*

1967

433

633

303

0

O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility

1966

379

545

232

195

N.A. Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility

1991

600

967

225

211

Karl Holton (Closed 2003)

1968

388

524

0

0

Paso de Robles Youth Correctional Facility (Paso Robles)*

1953

690

911

176

0

Fred C. Nelles Youth Correctional Facility (Whittier)
(Closed 2004)

1945

650

948

0

0

Ventura Youth Correctional Facility (Camarillo) (Female)

1962

295

377

129

86

Ventura Youth Correctional Facility (Camarillo) (Male)

1962

381

468

74

171

Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility (Chino)

1959

1,200

2,024

689

524

Southern Youth Correctional Reception Center and
Clinic (Norwalk)

1954

350

210

258

Pine Grove Youth Conservation Camp (Pine Grove)

1980

80

77

83

2,480

1,896

Northern California Youth Correctional Center (Stockton):

Conservation Camps (total for all 4)
(3 camps closed 2004/2005)

483

Total

6,166

10,112

*Scheduled for closure July 2008. The Northern Youth Correctional Center and Clinic in Sacramento is not included as the
facility no longer exists and the land is now owned by the California State University system. Facilities shown in italics are
either closed or scheduled to be closed.
Sources: Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of the California Youth Authority’s Infrastructure.” Also, CDCR. 2004. “A
Comparison of the Youth Authority’s Institution and Parole Populations, June 30, 1995 through June 30, 2004.” This annual report does not
provide data on wards in the north or south reception center for 1996. These wards are included in the count of other facilities. Also, CDCR.
Monthly Population Reports as of August 31, 2007 and June 30, 2008.

18

JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
A facilities master plan detailing the CDCR’s future plans for youth
facilities is long overdue.57
At one time, state officials told the
Commission that a plan was under consideration to demolish the
shuttered Karl Holton Youth Correctional Drug and Alcohol Treatment
Facility at the Stockton youth complex and replace it with a new
prototype facility designed for youth rehabilitation. Additionally, the
court-appointed receiver for adult inmate health care reportedly is
considering building a hospital for adult offenders at the Ventura Youth
Correctional Facility, which potentially would result in the closure of the
youth facility.58 The receiver also has proposed razing the Karl Holton
Youth Facility to build an adult inmate medical facility.59

19

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

20

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT

Realignment Leadership and
Oversight
Despite nearly a billion in outlays for the various agencies, commissions
and committees involved in juvenile justice programs and services and
grants to local government, the state requires little accountability as to
how this money is spent or what goals are expected, much less achieved.
Through realignment, an increasing portion of the billion dollar budget is
going directly to counties with even less state oversight. No state entity
has been given the mission or authority to provide overall leadership to
guide program development or to oversee how public money is spent.
The shift in population from state facilities to county supervision began
in the late 1990s. Lawmakers enacted fiscal policies to deter counties
from sending youth to state facilities. Courts lost faith in the state’s
ability to carry out its mission of rehabilitating youth offenders and kept
more offenders under local supervision. Still, the present realignment is
historic in two ways. First, the state specifies in law which offenders can
be sent to state facilities, and more important, the state dedicates money
to counties to develop programs and services for youth who are no longer
sent to the state.
Youth advocates and expert panels, including the Little Hoover
Commission, long had recommended that the state provide expanded
resources for counties to expand their role providing programs and
services for youth offenders. Over the past decades, costs for the state
system had spiraled upward – particularly in attempting to comply with
the Farrell consent decree – and counties were proving to be more
capable of providing effective programs and services for youth. Despite
initial snags resulting from the abrupt implementation requirement – the
law was signed by the governor August 24, 2007 and became effective
September 1, 2007 – most experts and advocates agree realignment was
the right thing to do. However, many said important improvements can
be made to the realignment legislation to ensure ongoing success.

Weak State Leadership Structure
The realignment legislation transferred responsibility to counties to
supervise higher risk and higher need youth offenders and provided a

21

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
significant new funding source to accomplish this difficult task. At the
time, however, lawmakers did not designate any entity at the state level
to provide overall leadership and guidance to ensure that a continuum of
proven responses to juvenile crime is consistently available statewide.
The structural leadership vacuum is not new. The Commission, in its
1994 review of juvenile crime as well as in its 2005 assessment of the
governor’s plan to reorganize corrections, identified the lack of a focal
point at the state level to provide juvenile justice leadership as a serious
problem.60 It recommended the state establish a mechanism to ensure
an integrated state and local continuum of juvenile justice programs and
services. This did not happen and remains a weakness.
Legislative budget consultants who negotiated the details of SB 81 told
the Commission that the law was written to prevent the state from
micromanaging how counties spent their block grant allocations and to
provide counties flexibility in spending decisions.61
Youth advocates have expressed concerns that the new money will not be
spent on programs and services for the intended population, and as time
passes, memories in Sacramento will fade, and it will become less clear
to lawmakers why a separate, dedicated fund exists for offenders “who
used to go” to state facilities. County officials and advocates said that
the realignment only will be successful if funding is maintained, the
money is spent wisely and counties are held accountable for outcomes.
While many counties outperform the state in providing effective programs
and services to youth offenders, some counties – particularly those that
formerly relied most heavily on state juvenile facilities – have not
demonstrated the capacity to establish effective local programs for
juvenile offenders. Disparities between counties are well-documented.
Some counties, such as San Francisco, Orange, San Diego and Santa
Cruz, historically committed very few youth to state facilities, while other
counties, including Monterey, San Bernardino and Riverside, have sent a
high number of juveniles to state facilities.62 There are reasons for this
disparity. Santa Cruz and Orange County, for example, have invested
time, money and resources for programs and local interventions. Both
counties have made a significant effort to get various partners –
including mental health, alcohol and drug programs and education as
well as probation – to work together. Those counties that sent more
youth to state facilities chose not to invest in local programs and services
and are ill-prepared to do so now. Youth advocates fear that without
state guidance and oversight, some counties simply will expand juvenile
hall space, rather than invest in mental health, substance abuse,
education or other interventions that have proven effective in turning
young lives around.

22

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT
Orange County Juvenile Justice Continuum
Orange County provides a model from which the state and other California counties can learn. As part of this review,
the Commission’s subcommittee met with Orange County officials that provide services for youth offenders and toured
some of the facilities serving the most serious and highest need youth offenders. Orange County officials across and
throughout departments expressed a clear sense of mission that the goal is “helping kids.” The system emphasizes
collaborative efforts between the courts, juvenile probation, education, mental health and law enforcement in addition
to partnerships with community-based organizations. This partnership is reinforced by the Orange County juvenile
court, which has authorized multidisciplinary departments to share information.
The continuum of programs and services includes a secure juvenile hall for pre-disposition youth offenders and those
who have been committed to a facility or program and are awaiting placement, as well as a 120-bed non-secure facility,
the Youth Leadership Academy, which provides a residential program for youth offenders with mental health services.
Orange County also runs a Youth Guidance Center, an unlocked facility with space for 125 youth. Youth live in
housing units with up to 25 other offenders, with one housing unit dedicated for young women. In addition to
attending high school, youth participate in various counseling and substance abuse treatment programs. Orange
County also has two camps in rural settings and a secure housing facility for the most serious offenders – those who will
be charged as adults – in a module of the adult jail facility.
Beyond facilities and programs for high-risk, high-need youth offenders, Orange County also is known for its early
intervention programs, particularly its “8% Early Intervention Program.” Various studies of Orange County youth
offenders revealed that a small number of youth offenders (8 percent) in the county are responsible for more than half of
all repeat crime offenses. To target this small, but high-risk youth offender population, Orange County combined local
resources from various departments with state grants to implement the “8% program” which provides various services
for these youth and their families. An assessment of the program showed numerous outcome improvements in the
youth participating in the program versus a control group. The knowledge gained has been used to assist other counties
and also changed Orange County’s overall approach to juvenile offender supervision.
Sources: Commission site visit to Orange County. November 29, 2007. Also, Orange County Probation Department. September 2002. Repeat
Offender Prevention Project – 8% Early Intervention Project.” Also, Superior Court of California, County of Orange. December 21, 2001.
“Authorization for the Sharing of Information Through Orange County Multidisciplinary Teams.”

Witnesses identified the structural leadership void as the biggest obstacle
to successful realignment implementation. They elaborated that the lack
of leadership is not an indictment of state juvenile justice officials or
departments, but rather policy-makers’ reluctance to identify and
authorize an entity to provide statewide leadership over juvenile justice
policy and how state dollars are spent at the state and local level.
Even among those with direct connections to juvenile justice, none have
definitive leadership over the system.
Some entities have partial
oversight, others have overlapping areas of responsibility but none
provide overall leadership. These include:
9

CDCR Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice and the
Division of Juvenile Facilities, the Division of Juvenile Programs
and the Division of Juvenile Parole Operations.

9

State Commission on Juvenile Justice.

9

CDCR Corrections Standards Authority.

23

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
9

Advisory Committee
Prevention.

on

Juvenile

Justice

and

Delinquency

CDCR Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice. The CDCR chief deputy
secretary of juvenile justice manages the Division of Juvenile Facilities,
Division of Juvenile Programs and Division of Juvenile Parole Operations.
California code authorizes these divisions to operate and manage
facilities housing youthful offenders, provide comprehensive programs
and rehabilitative services and to supervise re-entry into the
community.63 But the mission of the divisions focuses on the wards
under state supervision, not providing leadership or oversight to ensure a
statewide continuum of responses for youth offenders, most of which are
supervised at the local level. Witnesses told the Commission the chief
deputy secretary is committed to moving forward on the reforms required
by the Farrell consent decree. The experts hired to assist the state in
developing the remedial plans for the Farrell lawsuit highlighted the
competency of the staff in a March 2006 report: “the Division of Juvenile
Justice has many good people working for it – hard working, dedicated,
and well-meaning. The current leadership is professional, knowledgeable
and committed to reform.”64
County officials told the Commission that the state’s juvenile justice
divisions are working cooperatively with county probation staff to ensure
successful transition of offenders released from state facilities to county
courts and probation. Beyond facilitating a smooth transition, however,
the chief deputy secretary of juvenile justice and the juvenile divisions
within CDCR do not have the responsibility nor the authority to lead or
oversee the realignment implementation.

State Commission on Juvenile Justice. Lawmakers involved with the
realignment legislation recognized and responded to the lack of
leadership in California’s juvenile justice system by reviving and
reconstituting the State Commission on Juvenile Justice and giving it an
important, if temporary, role in the realignment effort.
Under SB 81, the 12-member commission is required to produce a
statewide Juvenile Justice Operational Master Plan by January 1, 2009
to include a set of strategies for risk and needs assessment, juvenile
justice data collection elements common to all counties, and a
continuum of evidence-based programs.65
An interim report
documenting the commission’s progress and strategies it has identified
was due May 1, 2008. The report was submitted to the governor’s office,
although such review is not required in the statute; there is only one
state official serving on the commission; and, only one of the 11 other
members is a governor appointee. The interim report was submitted to
the Legislature in June 2008.

24

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT
While the commission has potential it also has shortcomings
that may prevent it from filling the leadership and oversight
roles envisioned for it:
9

The commission sunsets on January 1, 2009.

9

It has no dedicated staff.

9

Not all commissioners were appointed promptly. One
appointment, designated for a victim’s rights
advocate, had not been made as of June 2008.

9

Some stakeholders, including district attorneys,
public defenders and education officials, are not
represented on the commission.

The commission was given $600,000 in 2007-08 to hire
consultants to assist in fulfilling its central mission of
developing the operational master plan. The commission
began meeting monthly in January 2008 and appears to be
on track to meet its final report deadline. It is not clear,
however, whether the commission will live up to the broader
mission originally envisioned by the Legislature – providing
oversight, planning and coordination among state and local
agencies that respond to juvenile crime. In May 2008, Senate
Budget Subcommittee No. 4 adopted budget language to
extend the life of the commission through January 2010. As
of July 2008, this was still under consideration by the
Legislature.

CDCR Corrections Standards Authority. The Legislature gave

Missed Opportunity to Lead
Many counties plan to use Youthful
Offender Block Grant money to
implement risk and needs assessment
tools. In its April 2007 report, the
Juvenile Justice Data Project found that
of 55 California counties participating in
a survey, 26 counties had no risk
assessment tool and 9 others used a risk
assessment tool that had not been
validated. Researchers have found that
youth placed inappropriately can lead to
more crime, instead of less. The report
found that “this is an area where a large
part of the California juvenile justice
system is currently not taking advantage
of the best practices available.
Supporting counties in their efforts to
select and adopt a valid risk assessment
tool and to train staff to use it is a
necessary and critical goal if the system
is to take advantage of evidence-based
practices in juvenile justice intervention
to improve outcomes for juveniles in the
state.”
While it is a step in the right direction for
counties to implement assessment tools,
it also marks a missed opportunity for the
state to lead by providing guidance and
technical support. DJF is currently
implementing a risk and needs
assessment tool for juvenile offenders.
Before counties independently adopt and
implement assessment tools, the state
could have guided counties to ensure
future compatibility. The State
Commission on Juvenile Justice has been
tasked with providing guidance on a risk
and needs assessment tool in its report
due January 1, 2009. This may be too
late to influence counties using their
2007-08 block grants to implement these
tools.

the CSA some oversight authority for the Youthful Offender
Block Grant and CSA staff have shown the capacity for
leadership beyond what was identified in the realignment
legislation in managing the first year of the block grant. The
CSA also is responsible for developing the request for
proposals for the Local Youthful Offender Rehabilitative
Facilities Construction Program grants and will evaluate the
responses and award the grants. The executive director of
the CSA indicated the authority would have a limited role in
oversight of the realignment implementation beyond review
Sources: County Juvenile Justice Development
and approval of the county plans submitted as part of the
Plans. Also, Juvenile Justice Data Project. April
first year of the grant process. In written testimony to the
2007. “Phase 1: Survey of Interventions and
Programs – A Continuum of Graduated Responses
Commission, the executive director wrote that “the only
for Juvenile Justice in California.
potential oversight role CSA has once the plans are approved
is the monitoring and/or inspection of facilities or programs.
CSA assumes that any services or facilities provided or obtained through
use of the block grant funds should match what was specified in each

25

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
county’s respective plans, however this is not actually spelled out in the
legislation. Again, CSA’s oversight is only authorized and NOT required
and will unlikely be implemented without additional resources.”66
While the CSA has proven adept at grant management, it also has been
sued for lax oversight of juvenile facilities and does not have the mission
or the authority to provide statewide juvenile justice leadership.67

Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The
state established the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (ACJJDP), an executive steering committee of the
CSA, to fulfill a requirement of the federal Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Act. As part of its federal mandate, it develops a three-year
juvenile justice plan prescribed by federal requirements.
Federal rules require all ACJJDP members to be appointed by the
governor. Federal rules also dictate the make-up of the 15 member
committee, the focus of the three-year plan and the role of the committee
in oversight and distribution of federal juvenile justice grants. In
contrast, the State Commission on Juvenile Justice members are
appointed by both the governor and the Legislature and state not federal
lawmakers determined the make-up and the role of
the commission.
Through the realignment,
California Department of Justice
lawmakers could have expanded the role of the
The California Department of Justice collects
ACJJDP to develop the Juvenile Justice Operational
county data on juvenile arrests, dispositions and
Master Plan, but rightly chose not to.
crime trends and publishes an annual report.
However, counties are not required to provide
outcome data, which could better measure
statewide performance in improving juvenile
offender outcomes. Researchers involved with the
Juvenile Justice Data Project have recommended
expanding key data elements included in the DOJ
Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System
(JCPSS) to include checklists based on current
practices and evidence-based practices. Other
recommendations for improving data elements in
the JCPSS include updating the out-of-date method
of recording race and ethnicity to conform to the
U.S. Census; adding a check-off to indicate the first
entry for the juvenile offender; and, adding a data
field to facilitate the linkage of records for youth in
multiple county systems.
Source: Karen Hennigan, Kathy Kolnick and Siva Tian, Center
for Research in Crime, Center for Urban Youth, University of
Southern California. February 27, 2008. “Juvenile Justice
Project Phase 2 Report: Longitudinal Outcome Indicators for
Juvenile Justice Systems in California.”

During the past few years, the ACJJDP has
struggled as only eight members had been
appointed and it did not meet regularly. However,
as of February 2007, all 15 members had been
appointed and the committee has been meeting
more frequently.
The State Commission on
Juvenile Justice in April 2008 voted to make an
update on ACJJDP activities a standing agenda
item so the two entities can potentially work in
concert and avoid duplication of efforts.
Each state entity in California’s juvenile justice
system plays an important role but no single
division or commission provides overarching
statewide leadership and oversight. Other states
and California counties provide models that can
serve as useful examples for the state.

26

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT

Models to Emulate
California has adopted a light-handed approach
to directing and guiding local program
implementation.
Washington State provides
another model of how the state can provide
direction and guidance while still leaving local
officials sufficient autonomy.
In 1997, the
Washington Legislature passed the Community
Juvenile Accountability Act which made state
funding available to local juvenile courts to select
and implement juvenile offender programs from a
state-adopted list.
The Washington State
Institute for Public Policy studied the outcomes
of the local program implementation and found
that, when competently delivered, the programs
reduced crime and saved the state thousands of
dollars in the long run. The institute found, for
example, that for every dollar spent on
Functional Family Therapy, an evidence-based
program that includes intensive in-home shortterm counseling for youth and their families, the
state saved nearly $32,000.
The expected
corresponding reduction in crime was nearly 16
percent. However, the institute also found that
the programs only reduced recidivism and saved
the state money when delivered competently and
delivered poor results when staff were not
adequately trained or did not effectively replicate
the program. Washington continues to use state
General Fund money to fund its local juvenile
programs and has expanded its list of evidencebased programs.68

Restructuring Juvenile Justice in Washington
In 1997, the Washington Legislature embarked on a
path to restructure juvenile justice by providing
funding to local juvenile courts to expand programs
and services. Local courts that wanted the funding
were required to implement programs identified on a
list established by the Legislature. Key elements of the
restructuring included:
9

A state-adopted evidence-based list coupled with
local government choice from the list.
Washington’s list includes:
ƒ

Functional Family Therapy

ƒ

Aggression Replacement Training

ƒ

Multi-Systemic Therapy

ƒ

Family Integrated Transitions

ƒ

Coordination of Services

ƒ

Restorative Justice – Victim Offender
Mediation

9

A research and development funding level set by
the state for local initiatives; state outcome
evaluation.

9

Formal coordinated statewide assessment tools to
align the programs and participants.

9

Program quality assurance provided by the state.

9

Funding formulas (state/local mix) based on lifecycle avoided cost calculation.

Sources: Steve Aos, Assistant Director, Washington State Institute for
Public Policy. February 28, 2008. Testimony to the Commission.
Also, Washington State Institute for Public Policy. June 2007.
“Evidence-Based Juvenile Offender Programs: Program Description,
Quality Assurance and Cost.”

Several California counties also provide model systems for juvenile
offenders. As part of this study, the Commission visited juvenile justice
facilities and met with local officials in Orange and San Mateo counties.
Orange County, despite having the third largest youth population in the
state, has sent relatively few youth offenders to state facilities, because
the county has established a broad continuum of responses to juvenile
crime. This continuum exists because the county taps into a variety of
funding sources and various county departments collaborate to provide
mental health, substance abuse treatment, and educational and
vocational programs for youth offenders in a range of facilities overseen
by probation staff.

27

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
In San Mateo County, the presiding juvenile court judge recognized a
void in placement options for young female offenders, tapped federal
grant funding and implemented G.I.R.L.S. (Gaining Independence and
Reclaiming Lives Successfully).
G.I.R.L.S. is a gender responsive
program that includes 180 days in an unlocked camp setting followed by
community-based supervision relying on collaborations with community
partners. San Mateo County monitors the outcomes of participants in
the G.I.R.L.S. program and continues to improve the program based on
data. The state could learn from what these and other counties are
doing and promote the transfer of knowledge and use of proven practices
among California counties.
California has a collection of divisions, commissions and committees
with overlapping responsibilities, but this collection does not add up to
consistent or comprehensive oversight and no single entity is in charge.
To improve public safety and the outcomes for youth offenders, the state
needs focused leadership and accountability, a single identifiable entity
with the authority to ensure that taxpayer money is effectively and
efficiently spent at both the state and local level and that a consistent
continuum of responses is available statewide.

Realignment Issues and Concerns
Witnesses told the Commission that the weak leadership and
accountability structure raises significant concerns about how the
realignment will be implemented. SB 81 established the Youthful
Offender Block Grant (YOBG) to help counties expand programs and
services for juvenile offenders. Approximately $23 million was given to
counties in 2007-08. This amount will grow to $66 million in 2008-09
and will reach nearly $100 million every year thereafter. Despite this
significant new investment, the state requires very little accountability
for this money. Witnesses have identified several issues and concerns
with the block grant in particular and the realignment in general.

Potential for Supplanting.

The Welfare and Institutions Code section
created by SB 81 lacks language to prevent counties from supplanting
existing spending with the YOBG money. While the law requires the
money be used to “enhance the capacity” of programs and services for
youthful offenders, nothing prevents counties from reducing juvenile
offender funding in other areas.69

Limited, Short-Term Planning. SB 81 required counties to submit a plan
explaining how they would use the new money in the initial year.
Counties were given a very short time frame – four months – to develop
their plans. Money that would have helped counties develop the plans

28

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT
was eliminated through a line-item veto in the budget. SB 81 did not
require counties to develop plans for future years.

No Expenditure Reports or Outcome Data. Counties are not required to
report how the grant money is spent, what outcomes are expected, or the
level of performance in meeting those outcomes. With no reporting
requirements it will be difficult, if not impossible, to monitor whether or
not the money is used on programs that improve public safety and assist
youthful offenders in turning their lives around. With no outcome data,
it will be impossible to know which programs are effective and should be
expanded and replicated and which programs should be adjusted or
eliminated. Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4, in an April 17, 2008
hearing on the realignment, adopted budget trailer bill language that will
require an annual report from the counties, including a report on
outcome measures currently tracked for the Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act grants. The bill language also recommends combining the
reporting for both grants.
Limited Oversight. The CSA was given limited oversight of the new block
grant under SB 81: “the Corrections Standards Authority may monitor
and inspect any programs or facilities supported by block grant
funds…and may enforce violations of grant requirements with
suspensions or cancellations of grant funds.”70 As of February 2008, all
counties had submitted their one-time plans. The CSA approved the
majority of the plans at its March 2008 meeting and the remaining plans
at its May 2008 meeting. While limited oversight responsibility was given
to CSA, the funding for the grants is determined by the Department of
Finance and is distributed to counties by the State Controller’s Office.
CSA would need to coordinate with these two entities if it determined
that grant funds should be withheld.

Multiple Grants, Multiple Reporting Requirements. In addition to the new
Youthful Offender Block Grant, the CSA oversees two other major grants
– the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) and the Juvenile
Probation and Camps Funding (JPCF) program – that also target juvenile
offenders and require counties to report on various outcome measures.
Of the two, the JJCPA, is lauded for its requirement that counties report
six outcome measures:
arrest rate; incarceration rate; probation
violation rate; probation completion rate; restitution completion rate;
and, community service completion rate.71
Opportunities exist to
consolidate and streamline the major juvenile offender grant programs.
In February 2008, the Legislative Analyst’s Office recommended that the
state consolidate funding for JJCPA and the JPCF programs and
projected administrative savings of about $16 million.72

29

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Major Sources of Funding for California’s Juvenile Justice System73
Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act (JJCPA)

Juvenile Probation and Camps
Funding (JPCF)

Youthful Offender Block
Grant (YOBG)
Enhance the capacity of local
communities to implement an
effective continuum of
response to juvenile crime
and delinquency. Grant
money intended to fund the
population shifted through
realignment.
FY 2007-08:
$23.7 million

Enhance and build
programs designed to
reduce juvenile crime.

Support a broad range of services
for at-risk youth and juvenile
offenders and their parents or
family members; additional funding
to support county juvenile camp
facilities.

FY 2007-08:
$118.7 million

FY 2007-08:
$201.4 million

FY 2008-09 (Governor’s
proposed budget):
$106.8 million

FY 2008-09 (Governor’s proposed
budget):
$181.3 million

Distribution of
grant:

Grant funds distributed to
counties on a per capita
basis.

Program money distributed based
on allocations established in statute;
camps money distributed based on
county reporting of the annual
number of occupied camp/ranch
beds.

Grantee:

County probation
departments and other
government agencies
through a multi-agency
committee chaired by a
chief probation officer.

County probation departments

County probation, mental
health, drug and alcohol or
other county departments.

Reporting
requirements:

Funded programs must be
modeled on evidencebased strategies.
Counties are statutorily
required to report data for
program expenditures and
six outcomes: arrest rate;
incarceration rate;
probation violation rate;
probation completion rate;
restitution completion
rate; and community
service completion rate.

Counties submit semi-annual
progress reports to CSA for noncamp programs. Report includes
amount of JPCF grant and, if
applicable, other grants used to
support program; number
entered/exited program; reason for
exit; number of family members
served; program setting; services
provided; types of other agencies
involved and number of
community-based organizations
under contract to provide program
services.

The Legislature is considering
legislation that would require
counties to report the same six
outcomes as required for
JJCPA.

Purpose of
grant:

Funding
amount:

Half based on the number of
felony juvenile court
dispositions reported to the
DOJ in the prior year.

Counties must submit Juvenile
Justice Development Plan to
CSA in initial year only (FY
2007-08).

Application
requirements:
Statute /
Enabling
legislation:

FY 2008-09 (Governor’s
proposed budget):
$66 million
Half based on the total county
population of juveniles age
10-17.

Crime Prevention Act of
2000; Chapter 353,
Statutes 2000.

AB 139; Chapter 74, Statutes 2005.

30

SB 81; Chapter 175, Statutes
2007.

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT
Uncertain Funding. Witnesses told the Commission the only way that
realignment will be successful is for the state to continue to provide
funding for the shifted population and provide oversight to ensure the
money is spent wisely. While the Youthful Offender Block Grant by 2010
will provide nearly $100 million per year, in a May 2008 budget hearing,
Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4 denied funding for approximately
$340 million in funding in the 2008-09 budget for other grants that
target juvenile offenders, including the JJCPA and JPCF. In recent
years, the JJCPA program has been cut in early budget negotiations only
to be restored in the final budget, creating fiscal uncertainty and
planning challenges for probation departments. In July 2008, the
Budget Conference Committee restored $281 million of the funding for
the JJCPA and JPCF for 2008-09. This reduction almost completely
reduces the net gain – $66 million in 2008-09 – that counties anticipated
from the new Youthful Offender Block Grant.
The state should
consolidate all three funds – YOBG, JJCPA and JPCF and using existing
formulas, make the funding one dedicated annual General Fund
allocation. Counties should be required to report outcomes in the six
areas currently required for the JJCPA grant. If the ballot initiative that
would make youthful offender funding for county probation departments
permanent is enacted by voters in the November 2008 election, the state
can continue to require counties to report outcomes, but there will be
little opportunity for oversight as the money will be perpetually allocated
no matter how efficiently or effectively it is spent.

Priorities Need to Be Established to Fill Statewide Gaps. Recent research
has identified gaps in local juvenile offender programs, but there is no
mechanism to ensure the new state funding will be prioritized to fill the
gaps.74
Because the realignment occurred rather abruptly, many
counties do not have programs or supervision alternatives for the more
serious offenders who otherwise would have been sent to the state but
are now under county supervision. The block grant will help smaller
counties purchase program space from sister counties with established
programming. But representatives from larger counties have indicated
the need for regional collaboration for certain hard-to-place offenders, an
effort that will take time to establish and will require assistance from the
state.

Lack of Local Options to Respond to Serious Offenders. Some counties
previously sent a disproportionate number of youth offenders to state
facilities – typically small counties or counties that did not develop
adequate local responses – while many counties sent only offenders who
had exhausted all local options, regardless of whether or not they
committed a serious offense.
These might include offenders with
multiple vehicle thefts or burglaries or other lower level crimes who
repeatedly ran away from local placements.
They also frequently

31

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
included offenders with severe mental health problems that many
counties are ill-equipped to treat. Witnesses told the Commission that
very few, if any, counties have sufficient case numbers in a single year to
support building new facilities or programs on a local level and that
regional facilities are the only feasible answer to this problem. Regional
collaboration not only will take time, but also will take a great deal of
political will from agencies and governments in different counties that
may not have a current working relationship.75 The state could play a
role in facilitating and fostering regional collaborative efforts or providing
incentives for counties to work together to respond to hard-to-place
juvenile offenders, but currently there is no state entity that can fulfill
this role.

Sacramento County’s Mix of Juvenile Offenders in State Facilities
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Total
% of Total

W&I 707(b)
Serious/Violent
18
16
25
16
16
10
12
5
8
11
137
33.8%

PC 290(d)(3)
Sex Offense
2
8
7
4
14
8
5
2
1
8
59
14.6%

Other

Total

12
37
32
26
41
25
12
10
11
3
209
51.6%

32
61
64
46
71
43
29
17
20
22
405

Source: Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Superior Court of California, County of
Sacramento. Sacramento, CA. February 5, 2008. Testimony to the Commission.

Issues to Watch
Other issues warrant continued monitoring. As more youth offenders are
kept at the county level, it is more important than ever to ensure
conditions in local facilities are safe, legal and humane.
Several
witnesses said that realignment will fail if it only results in counties
replicating the state conditions that led to the Farrell consent decree.
CSA is charged with setting standards, monitoring local juvenile facilities
and enforcing standards compliance, but history suggests its efforts have
not been sufficient. In the past several years, the federal Department of
Justice has led two investigations, in Los Angeles and Santa Clara
counties, and the Prison Law Office has filed two lawsuits on facility
conditions in San Joaquin and Sacramento counties.76
32

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT
The problems that led to the investigations and lawsuits were wellknown, but they have not been quickly resolved, in part because CSA
historically has not used its authority to enforce compliance to improve
local facilities. The CSA – whose membership is dominated by county
probation officials, sheriffs and state and local detention facility officials –
in the past has chosen to work more collaboratively with sister counties,
allowing extended timelines to reach facility compliance. Additionally,
many problems have been allowed to persist because the Attorney
General has taken the position that state juvenile facilities regulations
are unenforceable.77
In 2006, the Prison Law Office sued the CSA for failing to exercise its
authority to require counties to improve unsafe and inhumane
conditions in some juvenile facilities. The lawsuit alleged that the CSA
had not required counties to meet legally prescribed deadlines for
correcting identified problems. In January 2008, the state agreed to
accept a court order requiring the CSA to enforce deadlines for local
juvenile halls to file and implement plans to correct problems. The
agreement should bolster CSA’s ability to enforce improvements, and, if
it does not, the agreement will make it easier for advocates to request
action from the courts.78
Youth advocates testified to the Commission that the state should
reassess the standards set for juvenile facilities and consider moving the
enforcement authority from the CSA and suggested the Office of the
Inspector General might be more capable of fulfilling this role.79 County
probation officials testified that they would welcome stronger state
licensing requirements and stricter enforcement, indicating it would
strengthen their ability to gain local support for improving programs,
services, staffing and facilities for youth offenders.80
As part of this study, the Commission did not further explore whether
the state should revise its standards for juvenile facilities and whether or
not the CSA should continue to monitor and enforce standards in county
juvenile facilities. The state agreed to the consent order in January 2008
and the court issued the final consent order in March 2008, and as a
result, it is too early to tell whether or not the CSA’s acceptance of the
court order will resolve the enforcement challenges. This issue warrants
further monitoring and the Legislature should review CSA’s ability to
enforce standards and potentially consider shifting this responsibility to
a more capable entity in the future.
Another issue that warrants monitoring is the potential increase in the
number of youth tried as adults. Youth advocates expressed concerns
that district attorneys might file more serious charges than they would
have in the past or increase the use of the “direct file” option – where a

33

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
district attorney can choose to file a criminal charge against a youth
directly in adult court. Additionally, district attorneys might drop new
charges, if they were less serious than a prior charge, so that the most
serious offense can be the basis for a resultant commitment to a state
facility.
Judges and district attorneys told the Commission that they assess each
case on its own merit and that they will continue to file charges and
commit youths in whatever manner best protects public safety and
benefits the youth. State law requires that “no ward of the juvenile court
shall be committed to the Youth Authority unless the judge of the court
is fully satisfied that the mental and physical conditions and
qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will
be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment
provided by the Youth Authority.” Additionally, case law requires that
the court must believe less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or
inappropriate.81 In written testimony to the Commission, one presiding
juvenile court judge wrote that “the findings of ‘benefit’ in committing the
minor to the state and [the findings] that there are no ‘less restrictive’
local options are not easily or lightly made.”82
Additionally, serious crimes which typically lead a district attorney to
direct file a case to adult court are typically 707(b) charges, which under
realignment, still allow a judge to commit a youth to a state facility,
reducing the likelihood of an increase in direct files, witnesses said. If
anything, there could be an increase in fitness hearings, in which a
district attorney requests a judge to consider moving a lower-level offense
case to adult court, but in these cases, the decision to move the case to
adult court lies with the judge and not the district attorney.83 However,
any spike in juvenile offender commitments should be monitored and
analyzed as this would affect the cost savings the state expects through
the realignment.
Finally, the State Commission on Juvenile Justice has the potential to
provide leadership and oversight, but its temporary existence may
prevent it from fulfilling its mission. It is too early to tell how successful
the commission will be as its final report is not due until
January 1, 2009 – the day the commission is scheduled to sunset.
Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4 in May 2008 voted in favor of
extending the life of the commission an additional year and to continue
to use the $600,000 allocated in 2007-08 to fund the consultants hired
by the commission through January 1, 2010.
The fact that the commission’s interim report was given to the
Legislature late because it was under review by the governor’s office calls
into question its ability to independently advise lawmakers and counties.

34

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT
There is no requirement in the statute that the governor’s office review
the report and the majority of the commission members are appointed by
associations representing local government agencies.

Summary
The state has no structure in place to provide leadership and
accountability for the $1 billion it spends on programs, services and
supervision of youth offenders at the state and local level. Its collection
of divisions, commissions and committees, despite the important role
each plays, do not add up to state leadership and oversight. The
governor and lawmakers should move existing state resources in the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to establish an
entity that can provide the leadership to ensure that an evidence-based
continuum of responses are available statewide for youth offenders and
that the money the state provides to counties is tied to performancebased outcomes.
The realignment legislation was an important step in the right direction,
but the legislation leaves room for improvement. Lawmakers should
align the new block grant with the state’s other major grant programs
that target youth offenders and bolster and streamline the reporting of
outcome measures.
Policy-makers should ensure that the state
maintains the funding for the youth offender population shifted through
the realignment process and for the two other major programs targeting
juvenile offenders. Policy-makers should closely monitor CSA to ensure
it successfully monitors and enforces standards in county juvenile
facilities.
Finally, lawmakers should support the budget language adopted by
Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4 that briefly extends the life of the
commission so that it can advise and assist counties in implementing the
recommendations in its final report and to give the commission an
opportunity to prove whether or not it can fulfill its broader mission of
leadership and oversight. If the commission proves effective in this role,
policy-makers should consider further extending the sunset date of the
commission.

35

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Recommendation 1: To improve public safety and provide statewide leadership on
juvenile justice policy, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate programs and
services into a streamlined Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice outside of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, to develop a strategy for a
comprehensive, statewide juvenile justice system that includes a complete and consistent
continuum of evidence-based services for youth and to oversee county programs funded
by state General Fund allocations. Specifically, the Office of Juvenile Justice should:
‰ Be led by a director, formerly the chief deputy secretary of juvenile
justice, who is appointed by the governor and reports directly to the
governor’s office.
‰ Have two divisions that coordinate and collaborate: the Division of
Juvenile Justice Policy and the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning
and Programs.
‰ Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Policy, consisting of positions
shifted from the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, including officials from the Divisions of Juvenile
Facilities, Programs and Parole, to:
9

Provide leadership, technical assistance and guidance to help
counties implement and expand evidence-based programs for
juvenile offenders to improve outcomes, to set priorities for filling
identified gaps and to lead and guide counties in developing
regional consortiums and regional juvenile offender facilities.

9

Conduct research and analysis on best practices and provide a
Web-based information clearinghouse.

9

Coordinate with other state entities that have a role in providing
youth services, including the departments of mental health,
alcohol and drug programs, social services and education, and
provide guidance to counties on opportunities to leverage funding
sources.

9

Provide juvenile justice policy recommendations to the governor
and the Legislature.

‰ Require the Division of Juvenile Justice Planning and Programs, with
positions shifted from the Corrections Standards Authority Planning
and Programs Division, to:
9

Oversee county juvenile offender programs funded through
annual state General Fund allocations to ensure that evidencebased programs are implemented.

9

Oversee and analyze county outcome reports and provide an
annual report on juvenile justice performance measures to the
governor and the Legislature.

9

Administer state and federal juvenile offender grants.

36

REALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND OVERSIGHT
9

Be advised by the Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention as federally required for the federal
juvenile offender grants, shifted from the Corrections Standards
Authority to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice.

‰ The new office should develop, in connection with the Corrections
Standards Authority, standards and enforcement mechanisms to
guide the transfer of the juvenile offender population to county and
regional facilities.

Recommendation 2: To ensure the success of juvenile justice realignment, the governor
and the Legislature must bolster the accountability and oversight of the Youthful
Offender Block Grant by consolidating it with the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act
funding and the Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding program into one dedicated
funding stream for local juvenile justice programs and services. Specifically, they must:
‰ Consolidate the state’s three major juvenile offender grant programs,
using existing formulas, into one stable annually dedicated General
Fund allocation tied to performance-based outcomes overseen by the
Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice.
‰ Require counties to provide an annual outcome report and streamline
reporting requirements to match the outcomes currently required by
the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act.
‰ Strengthen the statutory code to prevent counties from supplanting
juvenile offender funding.

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Commission’s Proposed Organizational Structure for an Office of Juvenile Justice
Governor

Governor’s Office /
Chief of Staff

Office of Juvenile Justice
Director

State Commission
on Juvenile Justice

(former Chief Deputy Secretary of
Juvenile Justice)

Division of Juvenile Justice Policy
Provide leadership, technical
assistance and guidance to
counties.
Conduct research and analysis to
provide a Web-based
clearinghouse of best practices.
Coordinate with other state
entities that have a role in youth
services.
Provide policy recommendations
to the governor and Legislature.

(moved from CDCR Divisions of Juvenile
Facilities, Programs and Parole)

Division of Juvenile Justice
Planning and Programs
Oversee of county juvenile
offender programs funded by
the General Fund (formerly
grant programs).
Analyze county reports on
outcome measures and
annually report to the
governor and Legislature.
Administer other state and
federal juvenile offender
grants.

Advisory
Committee on
Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency
Prevention
(moved from CSA)

(moved from CSA, Division of
Corrections Planning & Programs)

Recommendation 3: The governor and the Legislature should extend the sunset of the
State Commission on Juvenile Justice until January 2010 and charge it with assisting
counties in implementing the recommendations in its master plan and providing
oversight of the realignment process. The commission should:
‰ Serve as an advisory body to the Governor’s Office of Juvenile
Justice.
‰ Develop training and technical assistance for counties to assist in the
implementation of the recommendations in the Juvenile Justice
Operational Master Plan and report on progress implementing the
recommendations in January 2010.
‰ Develop recommendations to improve and expand data elements
reported to the DOJ Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System.

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JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL

Juvenile Offenders Remaining at
the State Level
California spends more than $500 million a year on approximately 2,000
youth offenders housed in state facilities.
The Governor’s Budget
projects that the cost per youth for the 2008-09 fiscal year will total
$252,000, more than 30 times what the state spends educating lawabiding high school students and six times the cost of institutionalizing
adult offenders.84 The projected outlays per ward have increased six-fold
from an average of $36,000 in 1996, the year the Legislature enacted the
sliding scale fees.85
As more youth offenders remain at the local level, the number of youth in
state facilities will decline further. Although overall expenditures for the
state facilities also are projected to decline, the amount spent per youth
will rise as the state serves an increasingly smaller number of youth in a
system designed for thousands more.
With California spending more than a quarter million dollars a year for
each ward, taxpayers and other citizens can reasonably ask what return
they are getting on this significant investment and whether alternative
investments would deliver better returns in the form of improved public
safety and youth offender rehabilitation.
Once an international leader in juvenile justice, California’s juvenile
justice system fell into decay over the past three decades. Juvenile
justice experts who provided the system with consistent and high-quality
leadership over long tenures gave way to a carousel of appointees who
lacked the experience and vision to guide and drive change as juvenile
justice evolved. The culture of the system changed as well.
The law that created the former California Youth Authority states its role
is to “provide comprehensive education, training, treatment, and
rehabilitative services to youthful offenders under the jurisdiction of the
department, that are designed to promote community restoration, family
ties, and accountability to victims, and to produce youth who become
law-abiding and productive members of society.” The law did not
change, yet the system’s culture increasingly became defined by punitive
measures as the state and the nation adopted a “tough on crime”
mentality.86
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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, California’s state facilities for juvenile
offenders found themselves in the media spotlight for the violence and
brutality inside their walls and the lack of programs and services for the
youth offenders in their care. In 2003, plaintiffs in the Farrell case
alleged that the state’s treatment of its youth offenders violated state
laws. In November 2004, state officials signed a consent decree in which
the state agreed to reform its juvenile justice system.
Two months later, in January 2005, the governor proposed a
reorganization of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency into the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The Little
Hoover Commission, charged with reviewing all governor’s reorganization
plans, reviewed the plan and recommended that the Legislature allow the
plan to go forward, but expressed concerns about certain aspects of the
plan, particularly placing the fairly autonomous California Youth
Authority under a correctional organization whose primary focus is on its
much larger adult offender population. In approving the plan, the
Commission also recommended that the governor, the Legislature and
the secretary of the new department continue to work with stakeholders
to develop a statewide strategy for juvenile justice and address the need
to ensure a continuum of facilities for youth offenders and stable source
of funding for counties.87
The Commission’s most serious concerns centered on the placement of
the California Youth Authority (CYA) within the larger CDCR organization
dominated by adult corrections. Several youth advocates who testified at
the Commission’s 2005 hearing on the reorganization told the
Commission that the plan should not be implemented because the
reorganization would be extremely detrimental to the CYA, the wards in
its care and the implementation of the reforms required in the Farrell
consent decree.
The Commission shared these concerns, but determined that the
reorganization plan overall was a step in the right direction for the state’s
troubled corrections system. At that time, the Commission committed to
ongoing oversight of the implementation of the plan and twice held
roundtable discussions on the reorganization progress and juvenile
justice reforms. In August 2007, when lawmakers enacted the juvenile
justice realignment, the Commission committed not only to review the
realignment but also to return to its oversight of the implementation of
juvenile justice reforms, with a specific focus on the effects of the
population reductions on the Farrell consent decree implementation and
other state-level reforms.

40

JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL

Reorganization Delays Reforms
As part of this study, youth advocates told the Commission that their
concerns expressed prior to the reorganization had been realized – that
implementing the reforms required by the consent decree would be
overshadowed by the enormity of the challenges in the adult correctional
system. The 2005 reorganization buried the state’s juvenile justice
divisions in a correctional bureaucracy primarily focused on its 170,000
adult offenders, a system plagued by overcrowded conditions, multiple
lawsuits, including a federal receivership for inmate health care, and
significant turnover at the secretary level – four secretaries in three
years.88
Since the initial reorganization, an additional layer of
management has been added, further marginalizing the juvenile justice
divisions in the organizational chart. In 2005, the chief deputy secretary
of juvenile justice reported directly to the secretary of CDCR. Now the
position reports to an undersecretary of operations – currently a 25-year
veteran of the adult prison system – who oversees the massive adult
operations and the much smaller juvenile justice operations.89
The reorganization became effective in July 2005. Shortly thereafter, the
governor appointed Bernard Warner as chief deputy secretary to lead the
juvenile justice divisions. Mr. Warner brought experience from juvenile
justice leadership positions in other states. Youth advocates have
praised the efforts of Mr. Warner – now entering his third year in the
position – and his commitment to the tough reform agenda. But despite
the efforts of Mr. Warner and his staff, reform progress has been slow.
They have only made as much progress as the bureaucracy and
organizational structure would allow.
By August 2006, the state had filed six remedial plans that detailed the
changes that needed to occur to comply with the Farrell consent decree.
All involved agreed that fixing the severely broken juvenile justice system
would require considerable time and resources. The expert panel hired
to assist the state in developing the remedial plans in a 2006 report
wrote that the state’s juvenile justice divisions can be fixed, “but it will
take great effort, money and lots of time. We know of no other state that
has undertaken such a major reform that has finished in as short a time
(four years) as DJJ proposes. Failure by DJJ to meet a deadline now and
then should not be interpreted as failure to reform.”90
More than three years after entering into the consent decree, the Farrell
plaintiffs contend little progress has been made. In an October 2007
report to the court, the Farrell special master indicated that true
systemic reform had not taken place and that this was in part “due to
DJJ’s conversion from its relative autonomy as the California Youth

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
CDCR Organizational Chart 2006

CDCR Organizational Chart 2008

42

JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL
Authority to being a unit of the much larger California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. Although this conversion took place
several years ago, it continues to act as a barrier to implementation of
the remedial plan.”91 Citing the report, the plaintiffs asked the court to
appoint a receiver to oversee four areas: hiring, contracts, policy
development and information technology.
In February 2008, the plaintiffs expanded their request and asked the
court to appoint a receiver to provide overall leadership and oversight of
the implementation of the Farrell reforms. In their request, the plaintiffs
stated that “the primary reason DJJ gives for its chronic, severe failures
regarding contracts is ‘growing pains’ from the nearly two-and-a-halfyear-old reorganization of CDCR.”92 Additionally, the document states,
“this is not a matter of a few missed deadlines. DJJ is not simply late – it
is incapable of reform.”93

Recent Signs of Progress
Despite the plaintiff’s claims, the state has begun to show progress in
several areas, overcoming some of the hurdles created by the
organizational structure and rapid change in the make-up of the
population due to the realignment. An increasing number of youth
offenders in state facilities are graduating from high school and earning
GEDs and vocational certificates. A massive effort is underway to train
staff on proven practices such as motivational interviewing and safe
interventions and conflict resolutions. Staff vacancies have been reduced
at central headquarters and in facilities.94
A March 2008 report submitted by the court-appointed special master in
the Farrell case stated that “numerous individuals are working diligently
to move DJJ forward toward the goals of the remedial plans with some
significant progress and successes. For example, O.H. Close (Youth
Correctional Facility) has been singled out as exemplary by a consensus
of the experts, where youth are benefiting from its substantial progress
toward compliance with the remedial plans. Some of the experts have
reported that the Southern Youth Correctional Reception Center and
Clinic may be making comparable progress under the remedial plans,
with comparable benefits for youth.”95
The special master cautioned, however, that the “successes appear to be
the result of the exceptional efforts and skillfulness of some individuals
and do not appear to be reliably sustainable and replicable. DJJ’s
largest facility with over 600 youth, Heman G. Stark, still is characterized
by endemic racial violence that, among other things, greatly limits school
attendance. By consensus, the experts believe that deficiencies in

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
management effectiveness and/or systems capacity issues are seriously
impeding DJJ’s progress in implementation of the remedial plans.”96
In a January 2008 site visit to the Stark facility, the Commission met
with various staff and were impressed with the dedication of the teachers
as well as the impressive array of equipment for hands-on learning in
career technical education courses, from welding to printing to
warehouse management and forklift driving.
However, of the 600
offenders housed at the Stark facility on the day of the visit, the
Commission saw few youth participating in these programs.
Whether or not the Farrell case will lead to another costly and timeconsuming receivership for CDCR is yet to be determined.
Case
management conferences on the request for receivership were held in
April and May 2008. Final arguments on the receivership are scheduled
to be heard on July 21, 2008.

The Price of Reform
The state’s progress in reform has not come without substantial cost.
The state has injected a significant amount of money to expand juvenile
programs and staff.
While the state juvenile offender population
declined, spending to meet the Farrell requirements increased. The
2007-08 budget for the juvenile justice divisions was $580 million and
the state currently houses 1,949 offenders – about the same number of
youth at an urban high school. Approximately 2,300 are under state
parole supervision.97
Annual Costs Per Juvenile Offender Housed in a State Facility
2007-08
(Average Daily Population = 2,294)
Operations Security
$37,490

Education,
Vocations and
Offender Programs
$89,420

Operations Support
$29,250

Health Care
$53,450

Source: Governor’s Budget 2008-09.

44

Operations Facilities
Administration
$13,930
Operations - Other
$1,980

JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL
The governor’s budget projects that expenditures will decline to $554
million in 2008-09, of which $66 million will be sent to the counties as
part of the SB 81 realignment.
This translates to approximately
$252,000 per youth in state facilities for the 2008-09 fiscal year, a per
ward increase from $218,000 in 2007-08.98 The state anticipates the
population will eventually fall to under 1,500 and will stabilize, barring
any changes in law or local commitment practices.99

Crumbling Infrastructure
Most agree that the state’s juvenile facilities – for the most part designed
to house truants and runaway teens in the mid-twentieth century – are
inappropriate for today’s youth offenders and are crumbling as a result of
years of deferred maintenance. New facilities will be needed to meet the
reform requirements of the Farrell consent decree.100
In a May 2004 assessment of state juvenile facilities, the Legislative
Analyst found the state’s juvenile facilities to be “functionally and
physically obsolete.”101 In a preliminary facilities master plan published
in November 2005, CDCR asserted that “these facilities have exceeded
their useful life and have not been properly maintained ... in general,
they lack flexibility, are inappropriate in terms of size, and were not
designed to address the risk and treatment needs of today’s more
sophisticated population of youth offenders.”102
As previously described, the state has shut down facilities and
consolidated the youth offender population, however, as the population
continues to shrink, the state has yet to lay out plans for continued
closures and consolidations. A facilities master plan is long overdue to
the Legislature.103
In an April 2008 Senate budget subcommittee
hearing, CDCR officials briefly discussed the planned closures of the
DeWitt Nelson Youth Correctional Facility and El Paso de Robles Youth
Correctional Facility in July 2008, and indicated a more detailed
proposal detailing any further consolidation or closures would be
forthcoming.104

Should Juvenile Justice Operations be Moved or
Eliminated?
Given the difficulty and significant expense of moving forward on reforms
to comply with the Farrell lawsuit, improve public safety and help youth
offenders become self-sufficient, law-abiding adults, Commissioners
asked witnesses at its public hearings for this study whether the state’s
juvenile justice facilities and programs should be removed from the
umbrella of the CDCR. Commissioners also raised the question of

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
whether the state should exit the business of housing juvenile offenders
entirely, given its track record, the costs of responding to the Farrell
lawsuit, its shrinking juvenile offender population and its crumbling
infrastructure.
Witnesses told the Commission that the juvenile justice divisions are still
adjusting to the 2005 reorganization; another reorganization at this point
would further slow progress implementing the Farrell reforms. And while
some witnesses suggested the state’s juvenile justice operations could be
more closely aligned with other youth related programs and services if
the divisions were placed within the Health & Human Services Agency or
the Department of Social Services, others suggested that juvenile justice
would be equally buried in those organizations.
Other witnesses
suggested that the most effective and efficient organization would be to
follow the lead of 16 other states and establish a separate juvenile justice
agency or department. This type of department would promote policies
for juvenile justice system improvement, provide technical assistance,
help counties leverage funding opportunities and manage state and
federal grants. The Ohio Department of Youth Services, for example, not
only oversees state facilities, it also funds and provides oversight for
community correctional facilities and administers RECLAIM Ohio, a
program which provides funding for juvenile courts to develop or
purchase a range of community-based options for juvenile offenders.105

Organization of State Delinquency Institutions in Other States
Juvenile Corrections Agency (16 states):
Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia
Social or Human Services Agency (16 states):
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania,
Utah, Washington
Adult Corrections Agency (10 states):
California, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin
Child Protection/Juvenile Corrections Agency (8 states):
Connecticut, Delaware, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Wyoming
Other (1 state):
New Jersey (Department of Law and Public Safety)
Source: Patrick Griffin and Melanie King. 2006. “National Overviews.” State Juvenile Justice Profiles.
Pittsburg, PA: National Center for Juvenile Justice.

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JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL
Several witnesses, particularly local officials, asserted that California will
continue to need state facilities and programs for the small number of
serious youth offenders who either pose a high risk for violence or have
needs beyond what counties can provide. Counties have indicated that
these offenders are such a small percentage of the youth offender
population from each county, that counties, individually, can not provide
them with efficient or effective custody, treatment, rehabilitation and
education.
Counties, already under pressure to absorb more youth offenders
through the realignment, and destabilized by the uncertainty of state
funding for juvenile offender programs in the 2008-09 budget, currently
are not in a position to absorb the most serious and violent offenders and
sex offenders, particularly those who will serve longer term sentences.
Most county programs are designed for youth under 18 years of age and
the program duration in county facilities is typically 90 days or a year,
for even the most serious offenders.
Counties, however, could plan and develop or contract with community
partners for appropriate programs, and hire and train staff, if given
adequate time and ongoing dedicated funding.106 As counties implement
new programs and services through the new block grant money and
establish expanded rehabilitative facilities, particularly regional facilities,
the state should embark on a path to eliminate its juvenile justice
operations. State policy should be directed toward joint state-local
strategies such as encouraging multi-county consortiums and
establishing build-lease arrangements for facilities. Existing law already
authorizes the state to “establish, maintain, or facilitate the development
of regional centers, which may be available on a contract basis to
counties for the placement of wards.” Additionally, the law provides that
counties may jointly develop regional centers.107
As the state transfers responsibility for all juvenile offenders to counties,
the duties of the Juvenile Parole Board – which currently decides when
wards in state facilities are ready for release – will no longer be required.
Currently, presiding juvenile court judges – advised by probation officials
– set goals and requirements for offenders in local facilities and
determine when juvenile offenders are ready for release from detention or
probation.
As a result of SB 81, juvenile court judges now are
conducting re-entry disposition hearings to set probation requirements
for non 707(b) offenders released from state juvenile facilities.108 As all
juvenile offenders eventually are kept at the local level, juvenile court
judges will have jurisdiction over probation requirements and release
dates for all juvenile offenders. To improve public safety and outcomes
for offenders, counties could consider establishing juvenile re-entry
courts for older and more serious offenders.

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
It is important to point out that two categories of offenders will continue
to pose challenges, even if the state provided dedicated resources and
gave counties time to plan and implement programs targeting the longerterm, more serious youth offender population.

Older Youth Offenders. California is one of four states that allow
juvenile court jurisdiction of offenders through age 25. The other three
states are Montana, Oregon and Wisconsin. The vast majority, 33 states,
retain juvenile court jurisdiction through age 20.109 In the 2004-05
Governor’s Budget, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed reducing
the age of jurisdiction in state juvenile facilities from 25 to 22 although
the proposal was not adopted. The Governor’s Juvenile Justice Working
Group, convened in 2004 to advise the governor on various issues,
discussed jurisdictional age and members concluded that the age should
remain at 25. The governor’s proposal in part was based on the hope
that changing the age of jurisdiction would save the state money, but the
number of young adults above age 22 in juvenile facilities was and
remains fairly small, and changing the jurisdictional age would not
generate significant savings.
The Commission did not specifically look at the state’s policy on
supervising youth offenders until age 25 as part of this study, though the
issue did come up at one of the Commission’s prior roundtable meetings
on juvenile justice.110 Some at the meeting said that having youth
languish in state facilities for so many years at significant cost to the
state, often without participating in programs or services, provided no
benefit. However, they said one alternative – housing them in an
overcrowded adult prison, where programs and services are even less
frequently available and where the primary goal of incarceration is
punishment as opposed to rehabilitation – was worse.
Another
alternative – releasing offenders at a younger age – would mean shorter
sentences for serious crimes, an option that was not acceptable to
district attorneys or crime victims. One participant on the Governor’s
Juvenile Justice Working group said that prosecutors and defenders
agreed that housing youth offenders in juvenile facilities through age 25
was a sentencing option that should not be discarded, even if California
is unlike other states in this respect.111
Many states have adopted blended sentencing schemes where a juvenile
court can combine a juvenile disposition with a suspended criminal
sentence. Blended sentencing encourages and rewards good behavior
and often requires youth offenders to participate in various programs
and achieve specific goals – such as high school graduation, earning a
GED or successfully completing a drug treatment program. Youth are
given the opportunity to succeed in the juvenile system and if they do
not, can be transferred to an adult prison at age 18 or 21, depending on

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JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL
the state. Many other states have criminal blended sentencing laws that
allow criminal courts to impost sanctions normally ordered in a juvenile
court, also providing an opportunity for a youth to remain in the juvenile
system on a conditional basis.112
If California were to consider
implementing some form of blended sentencing option, such a policy
would require that programs and services be available to youth so that
they could achieve identified goals. It also would require a reduction in
violence in the facilities that have led to ongoing lockdowns and prevent
offenders from participating in treatment and education programs.
The Legislature should hold public hearings on whether the state should
lower the jurisdictional age for youth offenders to be more in line with
practices in other states and to determine whether all youth offenders
should have the opportunity to be released from confinement should they
achieve specified goals or be moved to a state prison after age 21.
In the meantime, two state juvenile facilities house youth aged 18 to 25 –
the Heman G. Stark Youth Correctional Facility in Chino, and the N.A.
Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility in Stockton. A joint powers
authority could be established to supervise these older offenders or the
state could lease its existing facilities housing older offenders to multiple
willing counties and provide funding for county-run programs and
services for the older youth offender population. Ideally, appropriate
regional facilities should be built by the state and leased to and operated
by the counties. Additionally, counties could develop or contract with
community-based providers to provide re-entry programs for the final
months of confinement for older offenders who have served longer
sentences.

Youth Serving Lengthy or Life Sentences. A small number of offenders in
state youth facilities have been convicted of serious crimes in adult
courts and are serving very long terms or, in some cases, life sentences
in prison, but are too young to be transferred to an adult prison where
legally required educational programs may not be available. Currently,
there are approximately 245 youth offenders convicted in adult criminal
courts serving time in state youth facilities.113 Those who will complete
their sentence and parole before age 21 can remain in a juvenile facility
up until age 21. Those who will not complete their term before turning
21 will graduate directly from youth facilities at age 18 to adult prisons
to continue their terms.114 Counties currently do not have programs
geared toward providing these offenders with the skills needed to survive
a long or a life sentence in an adult prison.
While both categories of offenders – older offenders and those sentenced
to long or life sentences – are relatively small, special consideration

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
would need to be given to them as far as appropriate housing, should the
state eventually turn supervision of all youth offenders over to counties.

Summary
Costs to run the state’s juvenile justice operations have sky-rocketed as
the state has attempted to comply with the reforms it agreed to in the
Farrell consent decree. The realignment legislation eased the state’s
burden by significantly reducing the population. But the state’s annual
costs per ward will continue to increase as the state supervises an
increasingly smaller number of youth in facilities and simultaneously
supports a system designed for many more. The majority of the state’s
youth facilities are more than 40 years old and have not been
consistently or adequately maintained.
Despite some progress in
implementing the reforms required by the Farrell consent decree, the
plaintiffs in the case have asked the court to consider appointing a
receiver – a move that would put control of the juvenile justice divisions
and their budgets under the court and not the state’s elected officials.
In the previous chapter, the Commission recommended that the state
establish a Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice to provide statewide
leadership on juvenile justice. The Commission recommended that this
office provide technical assistance and guidance to help counties
implement evidence-based programs and provide oversight of statefunded local programs and grants.
With assistance from the counties, the Governor’s Office of Juvenile
Justice should analyze the types of programs and services needed for the
most serious offenders. It should guide and facilitate the development of
county consortiums and joint powers authorities to develop regional
facilities for the most serious offenders. These facilities could be built by
the state but leased to and run by the counties. The Youthful Offender
Parole Board should be eliminated, with release decisions turned over to
presiding juvenile court judges.
Closing the state’s current juvenile justice facilities and operations would
result in substantial savings, some of which should be used to pay for
county-run regional facilities. Additionally, key state officials and staff
involved with developing and implementing the state-level reforms should
be shifted from CDCR to the Office of Juvenile Justice to guide statewide
juvenile justice policy and to facilitate and oversee the establishment of
state-local build-lease regional facilities, joint powers authorities or other
state and local partnerships.

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JUVENILE OFFENDERS REMAINING AT THE STATE LEVEL
Recommendation 4: The state should eliminate its juvenile justice operations by 2011.
As previously described, the governor and the Legislature must consolidate all programs
and services for juvenile offenders into a Governor’s Office of Juvenile Justice. In
addition to the responsibilities described previously, the Office should:
‰ Guide, facilitate and oversee the development of new regional
rehabilitative facilities or the conversion of existing state juvenile
facilities into regional rehabilitative facilities for high-risk, high-need
offenders to be leased to and run by the counties.
‰ Provide counties with sustained, dedicated funding to establish
programs and services for regional facilities.
‰ As regional facilities become fully operational, the state should:
9

Eliminate state juvenile justice operations, including facilities,
programs and parole and the Youthful Offender Parole Board. All
juvenile offender release decisions should be made by presiding
juvenile court judges.

9

Provide guidance and oversight of the regional juvenile facilities
and administer dedicated funding to counties to manage the
regional juvenile offender programs and services tied to
performance-based outcomes.

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LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

52

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

C

alifornia has entered a new era of juvenile justice. In 2007
policy-makers took the historic step of turning responsibility for
all but the most serious and violent youth offenders over to the
counties and provided counties with resources to handle the expanded
population.
This realignment was overdue, had long been advocated by many, and
marks a critical juncture – policy-makers awakening to the reality that
the state can no longer afford its failed juvenile justice system.
While the realignment represents substantial savings, the state will
continue to spend half a billion dollars per year on fewer than 2,000
youth offenders in state facilities, approximately $252,000 per youth
offender. These youth are the highest risk to public safety and rarely are
sent to the state without a long list of prior offenses. They have extensive
mental health and substance abuse issues which require intensive
counseling and often highly-specialized intervention programs –
expensive whether they are provided at the state or local level.
During the past decades, the state has not shown the will or the
capability to provide the programs and services to help the youth in its
care become self-sufficient, law-abiding adults. This was not always the
case. In the 1970s, California’s juvenile justice system was a national
model. Its slide into mediocrity and eventually utter failure did not
happen overnight. The culture inside the walls and fences – fed by fear
and false prophesies of rampant teenage crime on the outside – became
more punitive than rehabilitative. Reform schools became mini-prisons.
Violence and lockdowns became the order of the day. Gang leaders
called the shots, not counselors or correctional officers. Though these
youth are in state facilities because they committed serious offenses –
leaving countless victims in their wake – the vast majority will return to
the community. Most will commit new crimes.
No one planned for the state’s juvenile justice system to go from national
leader to where we are today. If performance measures were in place, the
state could have tracked where it was headed and evaluated whether or
not it wanted to spend half a billion dollars on juvenile justice policies
that tear at the social fabric of California communities and divert
resources from education, health care and other critical needs.

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The enormous cost in terms of lives and dollars leads to important
questions. What is the goal of the system? What are Californians getting
for this significant investment and what is the state accomplishing?
The goal of the juvenile justice system is grounded in California law:
When juvenile offenders become wards of the court, the court must
“consider the safety and protection of the public, the importance of
redressing injuries to victims, and the best interests of the minor.”115
Answers to the other questions are more elusive. The state cut back on
its highly acclaimed juvenile justice research department. Data the state
collects can tell policy-makers how many offenders are in state facilities,
where they came from, the category of crime they committed and other
facts, but it cannot tell policy-makers what programs are working. The
state must track what is working by measuring how many offenders
returning to the community remain free from crime and substance
abuse, get jobs or return to school, or other identifiable outcomes.
If not for this data void, perhaps policy-makers would have seen and
responded to the systemic problems before lawyers and the courts
became involved. Counties saw the problems and expanded intervention
and local detention programs realizing that the youth they were sending
to the state eventually would be coming back to their communities.
Many counties took note that they were coming back more violent and
disturbed than when they left. But youth offender programs are costly
and not all counties chose to make the investment, leading to disparities.
Forced by the courts, the state has slowly begun to turn its system
around, but the road to reform is long and expensive. Unfortunately, it
is too late and the price of reform is too steep.
The Commission could come to no other conclusion than to recommend
that the state set course for turning all offenders, together with the
necessary resources, over to the counties. The cost for the highest risk,
highest need offenders is significant. Resources can be re-directed from
state savings, but must be dedicated and stable so that counties can
build the programs and infrastructure to do what the state could not.
As the state moves toward this end, leadership to ensure a statewide
continuum of juvenile justice programs and services, and oversight to
ensure that counties spend new money wisely, will be more important
than ever. To accomplish this, the Commission recommends the state
establish an Office of Juvenile Justice to ensure the new era of juvenile
justice in California is one that results in improved public safety and
public spending. Californians must get the highest possible return on
their investments in juvenile justice policies and programs.

54

THE COMMISSION’S STUDY PROCESS

The Commission’s Study Process

T

he Commission previously examined juvenile justice in its 1994
study, “The Juvenile Crime Challenge: Making Prevention a
Priority” and again in its 2001 study, “Never Too Early, Never Too
Late to Prevent Youth Crime and Violence.” It also reviewed Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s reorganization plan creating the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in its 2005 report,
“Reconstructing Government: A Review of the Governor’s Reorganization
Plan Reforming California’s Youth and Adult Corrections Agency.”
The Commission initiated this study in the fall of 2007 to review the
realignment of California’s juvenile justice system, through the
examination of both the shift in responsibility from the state to the
counties for the majority of juvenile offenders and the role and
responsibilities of the state for the most serious and violent juvenile
offenders. This study also served as an opportunity for the Commission
to return to the oversight role that it committed to following its 2005
review of the reorganization plan creating CDCR.
In pursuing its study, the Commission convened two public hearings and
a number of site visits.
At the first public hearing, held in November 2007, youth advocates
discussed the major events that led up to the realignment as well as the
challenges and opportunities that the shift presented. The Commission
also heard from a panel of chief probation officers who shared their
perspectives on implementation, as well as from the chief deputy
secretary of juvenile justice from the CDCR and the executive director of
the Corrections Standards Authority who discussed the roles of each
organization in the realignment.
The second hearing, in February 2008, brought together a national
expert who discussed evidence-based corrections practices for juvenile
offenders; a researcher who specializes in data collection and analysis of
California juvenile justice programs; representatives of key local officials,
including judges, district attorneys and county officials; and, two
members of the State Commission on Juvenile Justice.
In addition to the public hearings, the Commission’s Juvenile Justice
Subcommittee visited county-run juvenile justice facilities in Orange

55

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
County in November 2007 and in San Mateo County in January 2008.
The subcommittee also visited the state-run Heman G. Stark Youth
Correctional Facility in Chino in January 2008. Commission staff also
visited Sacramento County’s juvenile facilities in December 2007.
Commission staff received valuable feedback from a number of experts
representing various components of California’s juvenile justice system
as well as from experts in other states.
Hearing witnesses are listed in Appendix A. The Commission greatly
benefited from the contributions of all who shared their expertise, but
the findings and recommendations in this report are the Commission’s
own.
All written testimony submitted electronically for each of the hearings,
and this report is available online at the Commission Web site,
www.lhc.ca.gov.

56

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendices & Notes
9 Public Hearing Witnesses
9 List of 707(b) Offenses
9 Summary of County Juvenile Justice Development Plans
9 Major Sources of Funding for California’s Local Juvenile
Justice Programs and Services
9 Selected Acronyms
9 Notes

57

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

58

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix A
Little Hoover Commission Public Hearing Witnesses
Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Public Hearing on Juvenile Justice, November 15, 2007

Kim Barrett, Chief Probation Officer, San
Luis Obispo County and President, Chief
Probation Officers of California

Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center
on Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Don Specter, Executive Director, Prison
Law Office

Donald H. Blevins, Chief Probation Officer,
County of Alameda

Verne Speirs, Chief Probation Officer,
Sacramento County

Sue Burrell, Staff Attorney, Youth Law
Center

Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary for
Juvenile Justice, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation and TriChair, State Commission on Juvenile
Justice

C. Scott Harris, Executive Director,
Corrections Standards Authority

Witnesses Appearing at Little Hoover Commission
Public Hearing on Juvenile Justice, February 28, 2008
Steve Aos, Assistant Director, Washington
State Institute for Public Policy

Rick Lewkowitz, Supervising Deputy
District Attorney, Sacramento County
District Attorney’s Office, Juvenile Division

Penelope Clarke, Administrator,
Countywide Services Agency, County of
Sacramento and Tri-Chair, State
Commission on Juvenile Justice

The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson,
Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Superior
Court of California, County of Sacramento

Karen Hennigan, Director, Center for
Research on Crime and Social Control,
Department of Psychology, University of
Southern California

David Steinhart, Director, Juvenile Justice
Program, Commonweal, and Member, State
Commission on Juvenile Justice

59

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

60

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix B
List of 707(b) Offenses
Eligibility for Commitment
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF)
Welfare and Institutions Code § 1731.5(a)(1)
Offenses listed in W&I § 707(b) and PC § 290(d)(3)
By Senate Bill 81 and Assembly Bill 191
LISTED NUMERICALLY BY CODE SECTION
Qualifying §
707(b)(19)
707(b)(21)
707(b)(1)
707(b)(30)
707(b)(24)
707(b)(23)
290(d)(3)©
707(b)(11)
290(d)(3)©
707(b)(26)
707(b)(9)
707(b)(10)
290(d)(3)©
707(b)(27)
707(b)(3)
707(b)(25)
290(d)(3)(A)
Qualifying §
707(b)(14)
707(b)(13)
707(b)(15)
290(d)(3)(B)
707(b)(4)
290(d)(3)(B)

Crime

Crime Code §

Witness intimidation
Violent gang felony
Murder
Manslaughter, voluntary
Mayhem, aggravated
Torture
Kidnap with intent to commit rape, sodomy,
child molest, oral copulation or penetration
with a foreign object
Kidnap with bodily harm
Kidnap by enticement to molest
[No such section]
Kidnap for ransom
Kidnap for robbery
Kidnap with intent to commit rape, sodomy,
child molest, oral copulation or penetration
with a foreign object
Kidnapping for carjacking
Robbery
Carjacking while armed with weapon
Assault with intent to commit specified sexual
offenses
Crime
Assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury
Assault with firearm
Shooting into inhabited building
Rape of victim incapable of consent
Rape by force or violence or threat of great
bodily harm

61

136.1, 137 PC
186.22(b) PC + 667.5 PC
187 PC
192(a)
205 PC
206, 206.1 PC
207(a) PC + sexual purpose
207(a) PC + bodily harm
207(b) PC
208(d) PC
209(a) PC
209(b)(1) PC
209(b)(1) PC
209.5 PC
211 PC
215 PC + “armed” with
weapon
220 PC
Crime Code §
245(a)(1) PC
245(a)(2) PC
246 PC
261(a)(1) PC
261(a)(2) PC

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
707(b)(5)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
707(b)(6)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
707(b)(7)
290(d)(3)(B)
290(d)(3)(B)
707(b)(8)
290(d)(3)(B)
707(b)(2)
290(d)(3)(B)
707(b)(12)
707(b)(22)
707(b)(16)

Rape of intoxicated victim
Rape of unconscious victim
Rape by threat of future retaliation
Sexual offense in concert
Sexual assault by false pretenses
Abduction of minor for prostitution
Sodomy with minor
Sodomy of child under 14, 10 years younger
Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace or
threat of great bodily harm
Sodomy in concert
Child molest of child under 14
Child molest by force, violence, duress, menace
or fear of great bodily harm
Child molest of 14-15 year old child
Continuous child molest
Oral copulation with child under 18
Oral copulation of child under 14, 10 years
younger
Oral copulation by force, violence, duress,
menace or threat of great bodily harm
Oral copulation in concert
Penetration with a foreign object
Arson
Annoy/molest child under 18
Attempted murder
Escape from juvenile hall/ranch by force with
great bodily injury on employee
Robbery with great bodily injury on elderly or
disabled victim; or attempt; or attempt

62

261(a)(3) PC
261(a)(4) PC
261(a)(6) PC
264.1 PC
266c PC
267 PC
286(b)(1) PC
286©(1) PC
286©(2) PC
286(d) PC
288(a) PC
288(b) PC
288©(1) PC
288.5 PC
288a(b)(1) PC
288a©(1) PC
288a©(2) PC
288a(d) PC
289(a) PC
451(a) or (b) PC
647.6 PC
664/187 PC
871(b) PC + 12022.7 PC
1203.09(a)(2), 211 PC

APPENDICES & NOTES

Qualifying §
707(b)(16)
707(b)(16)
707(b)(16)
707(b)(16)
707(b)(16)
707(b)(28)
707(b)(13)
707(b)(29)
707(b)(20)

Crime

Crime Code §

Burglary with great bodily injury on elderly or
disabled victim; or attempt
Rape by force, violence, duress, menace or fear
of bodily injury of spouse with great bodily
injury on elderly or disabled victim; or attempt
Rape or rape of spouse by threat of retaliation
with great bodily injury on elderly or disabled
victim; or attempt
Assault with intent to commit robbery or
sodomy with great bodily injury on elderly or
disabled victim; or attempt
Carjacking with great bodily injury on elderly
or disabled victim; or attempt
Shoot from a vehicle at another who is not in a
vehicle
Assault with destructive device
Explode a device with intent to murder
Manufacturing or selling ½ ounce or more of
Schedule II drug (opiates, cocaine,
methamphetamine, PCP)

1203.09(a)(5), 459 PC
1203.09(a)(6), 261(a)(2),
262(a)(1) PC
1203.09(a)(6), 261(a)(6),
262(a)(4) PC
1203.09(a)(7), 220 PC
1203.09(a)(8), 215 PC
12034© PC
12303.3, 12308, 12309,
12310 PC
12308 PC
11352, 11379, 11379.6 H&S
(11055 H&S)

SPECIAL SITUATIONS:
707(b)(18)
707(b)(17)

Use of prohibited weapon in any felony,
personal
Use of a firearm

12020(a) PC
12022.5, 12022.53 PC

Note: Penal Code section 290(d)(3) was deleted by Senate Bill 172, chaptered October 13, 2007. The crimes
listed in the former Penal Code section 290(d)(3) are now listed in Penal Code section 290.008(c). However,
the sections that provide for commitment to the Division of Juvenile Facilities (Welfare and Institutions Code
sections 731(a)(4), 733(c) and 1731.5(a)(1)) were not amended and still refer to the now deleted Penal Code
section 290(d)(3). This list was submitted to the Commission by the Honorable Judge Kenneth G. Peterson,
Presiding Juvenile Court Judge, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, as part of his testimony to
the Commission on February 28, 2008.

63

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

64

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix C
Summary of County Juvenile Justice Development Plans
County

Los Angeles
San Diego
Orange
San
Bernardino
Riverside
Santa Clara
Sacramento
Alameda
Fresno
Contra
Costa
Kern
Ventura
San Joaquin
Stanislaus
San Mateo
Tulare
Sonoma
Solano
Monterey
Santa
Barbara
San
Francisco
Placer
Merced
San Luis
Obispo
Santa Cruz
Butte
Marin
Imperial

Population
Projection
Ages 10-17
for Fiscal
Year
2006-07

Total
Expected
Returnees
(through
2009)

YOBG
Allocations to
Counties
(2007-08)

YOBG Funds Used For The Following Programs &
Services
(0=No, 1=Yes)

Totals

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

1,348,528
370,356
364,624
293,055

131
34
30
51

$5,460,396
$1,434,647
$1,539,093
$1,648,906

6
5
4
8

1
0
0
1

1
1
1
1

0
1
0
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
0
1

1
1
1
1

0
0
0
1

1
0
1
1

291,380
196,166
177,021
160,548
125,334
122,084

33
13
28
27
43
9

$1,814,310
$790,663
$1,103,062
$730,128
$689,807
$443,277

7
4
1
5
4
2

1
0
0
0
1
0

1
0
0
1
1
1

1
0
0
1
1
0

1
1
0
0
1
0

1
1
0
1
0
1

1
1
1
1
0
0

0
0
0
1
0
0

1
1
0
0
0
0

112,517
100,513
98,630
75,547
70,226
61,646
53,756
51,930
50,827
47,708

34
27
18
11
14
31
5
3
21
7

$849,966
$389,123
$602,322
$278,735
$363,742
$260,455
$261,015
$409,064
$185,697
$259,089

6
6
7
5
8
7
6
2
3
5

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0

1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1

0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1

0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

41,785

1

$287,150

3

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

1

41,177
36,774
26,164

3
31
1

$147,000
$236,877
$100,274

6
3
3

0
0
1

1
0
0

1
1
0

1
0
1

1
1
0

1
1
0

0
0
0

1
0
1

25,742
23,903
23,604
22,554

1
7
0
3

$94,752
$119,232
$103,118
$74,364

3
2
3
5

0
0
1
1

1
1
0
1

0
0
1
1

1
0
0
1

1
0
0
1

0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0

0
1
0
0

65

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

County

Yolo
El Dorado
Shasta
Madera
Kings
Napa
Humboldt
Sutter
Nevada
Yuba
Mendocino
San Benito
Tehama
Lake
Tuolumne
Siskiyou
Calaveras
Glenn
Amador
Lassen
Del Norte
Colusa
Plumas
Inyo
Mariposa
Trinity
Mono
Modoc
Sierra
Alpine
Total

Population
Projection
Ages 10-17
for Fiscal
Year
2006-07

22,261
21,812
21,548
20,469
19,617
15,384
13,125
12,617
10,746
10,501
9,700
8,193
7,520
6,546
5,132
4,786
4,651
3,789
3,749
3,623
3,115
2,895
2,110
2,062
1,749
1,590
1,420
1,182
348
101
4,656,440

Total
Expected
Returnees
(through
2009)

2
1
8
11
5
3
0
1
0
1
1
1
5
5
0
3
0
2
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
670

YOBG
Allocations to
Counties
(2007-08)

$102,919
$94,387
$90,595
$101,441
$96,499
$92,250
$58,851
$58,568
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$58,500
$22,658,771

YOBG Funds Used For The Following Programs &
Services
(0=No, 1=Yes)

Totals

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

6
3
7
7
5
3
1
6
3
3
1
4
1
3
6
2
8
1
3
5
7
4
4
3
1
1
3
5
3
3

1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
34

0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
37

1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
35

1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
38

1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
31

1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
30

0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9

1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
27

Sources: Number of Total Returnees from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. "Non
707(b) Commitments in DJJ Facilities, as of October 14, 2007." Also, Department of Finance. "Population By County Ages 10-17 Projections
For Fiscal Year 2006-2007." Data provided by Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit. Also, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. County Juvenile Justice Development Plans.

66

APPENDICES & NOTES

Youthful Offender Block Grant (YOBG) Fund Categories
Totals: The total number of spending categories identified in County Juvenile Justice Development Plans
A: Risk and needs assessment tools and evaluations to assist in the identification of appropriate youthful offender
dispositions and reentry plans.

B: Placements in secure and semi-secure youthful offender rehabilitative facilities and in private residential care
programs, with or without foster care waivers, supporting specialized programs for youthful offenders.
C: Nonresidential dispositions such as day or evening treatment programs, community service, restitution, and
drug-alcohol and other counseling programs based on an offender's assessed risks and needs.

D: House arrest, electronic monitoring, and intensive probation supervision programs.
E: Reentry and aftercare programs based on individual aftercare plans.
F: Capacity building strategies to upgrade the training and qualifications of juvenile justice and probation
personnel serving the juvenile justice caseload.
G: Regional program and placement networks, including direct brokering and placement locating networks to
facilitate out-of-county dispositions for counties lacking programs or facilities.
H: Other programs, placements, services, or strategies to be funded by the county's block grant allocation.

67

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

68

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix D
Major Sources of Funding for California’s Local Juvenile Justice
Programs and Services
Source
State
Juvenile Justice Crime
Prevention Act
Juvenile Probation and Camps
Funding
Youthful Offender Block Grant
Juvenile Mentally Ill Offender
Crime Reduction Program
Juvenile Justice Community
Reentry Challenge Grant
Program
Proud Parenting Program

Pupil Retention Block Grant

Comprehensive Drug Court
Implementation Act

Mental Health Services Act

Proposition 98

Purpose
Supports local government to reduce juvenile crime.
Supports programs for at-risk youth and juvenile offenders
and their families; additionally supports counties that
operate juvenile camps or ranches.
Funding to counties to support realignment.
Supports local efforts to reduce recidivism and promote
long-term stability among juvenile mentally ill offenders.
Supports counties or nonprofit organizations that provide
reentry services for juvenile parolees. Awarded to 5
counties for use during 2007-2009.
Supports community-based organizations and other local
agencies to teach parenting skills to at-risk youth and
youth reentering the community from state juvenile
facilities.
Provides funds to county offices of education and school
districts to provide a variety of programming, including
after-school programs for students who have been
incarcerated or who are first-time offenders and are on
probation. All counties, except for Alpine, are eligible to
receive these funds.
Provides funds to support a variety of drug court systems,
including those for juvenile offenders. The Judicial
Council and the California Department of Alcohol and
Drug Programs administer the program. 13 counties
support juvenile drug courts with funding from this act.
Funds a broad continuum of public mental health
services. Prohibits spending on offenders in state facilities
or on parole, but allows spending on offenders in juvenile
detention facilities or on probation.
Education services are funded through Proposition 98,
including services for juveniles in correctional institutions.
State Total

69

Amount Available
2007-08
$119 million116
$201.4 million117
$23.7 million118
$22.3 million119
$9.5 million120

$.837 million121

$95.5 million122

$.809 million123

unknown124
unknown125
> $473 million

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

Federal
Juvenile Accountability Block
Grant
Neglected and Delinquent
State Agency and Local
Educational Agency Program
(Title I-D)
Delinquency Prevention &
Intervention Program
(Title II)
Federal Payments for Foster
Care and Adoption Assistance
(Title IV-E)
Community Prevention Grants
Program (Title V)

Provides states with funds to support accountability-based
improvements in state and local juvenile justice systems.
Provides formula grants to state education agencies for
education services for incarcerated youth.
Supports state and local efforts to prevent and reduce
delinquency and to improve the juvenile justice system.
Only 13 counties received this grant funding.
County probation departments receive administrative
funding for a variety of activities including determining
eligibility for foster care, conducting assessments, training,
court-related functions and case management.
Supports activities that keep at-risk youth and first-time
non-serious offenders from entering the local juvenile
justice system.
Federal Total
Combined Total

$4.02 million126
$2.52 million127

$6.6 million128

$193 million129

$0.75 million130
> $206.9 million
> $679.9 million

Note: This table is meant to document a point-in-time assessment of some of the major funding sources
available to California’s counties for juvenile justice programs and services. However, it is not exhaustive for
a number of reasons. The amounts of grant awards may change from year to year depending on both federal
and state budget climates—what is listed for FY 2007 may not accurately reflect the funding available in FY
2008. The focus of this table is on local grants, but some federal grants fund both state and local programs
and services. Additionally, some of the grants listed here are only available to a limited number of counties.
The focus also is on funds for youth in the juvenile justice system, but some grants listed also target youth
who are at-risk of entering the juvenile justice system. Finally, counties are very creative in tapping into
various other grant programs that may not be listed here.

70

APPENDICES & NOTES

Appendix E
Selected Acronyms
ACJJDP – Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
CDCR – California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
CSA – Corrections Standards Authority
CYA – California Youth Authority
DJF – Department of Juvenile Facilities
DJJ – Division of Juvenile Justice (a commonly-used acronym for two divisions in the
Department of Juvenile Facilities)

DOJ – Department of Justice
JCPSS – Juvenile Court and Probation Statistical System
JJCPA – Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (formerly the Schiff-Cardenas Crime Prevention
Act of 2000)

JPCF – Juvenile Probation and Camps Funding
MIOCR – Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction Program
OCJP – Office of Criminal Justice Planning
Proposition 21 – The Juvenile Crime Initiative of 2000
Proposition 63 – The Mental Health Services Act
YOBG – Youthful Offender Block Grant

71

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION

72

APPENDICES & NOTES

Notes
1.

California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget 2008-09.” Sacramento,
CA. Also, California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Division of
Juvenile Justice. “Monthly Population Report as of June 30, 2008.”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/SAG/Index.html. Accessed
July 11, 2008. Also, Karen Hennigan, et al, University of Southern California
Center for Research on Crime. April 18, 2007. “Juvenile Justice Data Project:
Summary Report.” Los Angeles, CA.

2.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. “Summary of Adult and
Juvenile Per Capita Costs and Staff Ratios.”

3.

Brandon Bailey and Griff Palmer. October 17, 2004. “Where Hope is Locked
Away: High Re-arrest Rate: Three-Fourths of Wards Released Over 13 Years
Held on New Charges.” San Jose Mercury News. According to the news article,
in 2004, what was then the California Youth Authority conducted a
computerized review of Department of Justice Arrest records for more than
28,000 wards who were released from CYA institutions from 1988 through 2000.
The study counted any ward arrested on a new criminal charge, but excluded
those sent back to CYA for technical parole violations. Other research, with
varying time frames and definitions of recidivism have shown rates varying from
91 to 47.3 percent. Cited in Michele Byrnes, Daniel Macallair and Andrea D.
Shorter. August 2002. “Aftercare as an Afterthought: Reentry and the
California Youth Authority.” Prepared for the California State Senate Joint
Committee on Prison and Construction Operations.

4.

Barry Krisberg, President, National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
December 23, 2003. “General Corrections Review of the California Youth
Authority.” http://prisonlaw.com/pdfs/CYA5.pdf. Accessed June 10, 2008.
This report was filed with the court in February 2004.

5.

Consent Decree. Farrell v. Allen. Filed November 19, 2004. Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda. http://prisonlaw.com/pdfs/farrellcd2.pdf.
Accessed June 10, 2008.

6.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. The total 2007-08 budget for
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation was slightly more
than $10 billion. Approximately $580 million was allocated for juvenile
operations, programs, health care, parole and the Youthful Offender Block
Grant. Another approximately $343 million was allocated for other juvenile
offender grants programs for local government through the Corrections
Standards Authority, also within the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

7.

California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget 1998-99” and
“Governor’s Budget 2008-09.” Sacramento, CA. Also, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Department of the Youth Authority. 2005. “A
Comparison of the Youth Authority’s Institution and Parole Populations June 30
Each Year, 1996-2005.” Also, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. “Monthly Population Report as of
June 30, 2008.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html.
Accessed July 11, 2008.

8.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice. “Monthly

73

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Population Report as of June 30, 2008.” Also, April 2008. Monthly Population
Trends. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html.
Accessed July 11, 2008.
9.

Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of California Youth
Authority’s Infrastructure.” Also, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. November 30, 2005. “Reforming California’s Juvenile
Corrections System. Farrell v. Hickman. Safety & Welfare Remedial Plan.”

10.

Associated Press. “Missouri Set Example in Juvenile Rehabilitation.” December
30, 2007. Columbia Herald Tribune. Also, Mark D. Steward, director, Missouri
Youth Services Institute. January 20, 2008. Meeting with Commission staff.
Sacramento, CA.

11.

California Administrative Office of the Courts and California State Association of
Counties. June 2003. “Probation Services Task Force: Final Report.” Page 2.

12.

California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Revised Budget 2008-09.”
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/Revised/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary
.pdf. Accessed June 20, 2008. Also, Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 19, 2008.
“Overview of the 2008-09 May Revision.”
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2008/bud/may_revise/may_revise_051908.pdf.
Accessed June 20, 2008. The Governor’s May Revision indicates a budget gap of
$17.2 billion but includes a reserve of $2 billion. The Legislative Analyst’s
review states that there is a remaining budget shortfall of $15 billion and
generally agrees with the overall revenue and expenditure estimates outlined in
the Governor’s May Revision.

13.

Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1.

14.

Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1.

15.

California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center. “Juvenile
Justice in California 2005.”

16.

California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center. See
endnote 15.

17.

Solano County. “Department Description and Functionality.”
http://www.solanocounty.com/Department/Department.asp?NavID=85.
Accessed June 18, 2008.

18.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Department of the
Youth Authority. 2005. “A Comparison of the Youth Authority’s Institution and
Parole Populations June 30 Each Year, 1996-2005.” Also, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice.
“Monthly Population Report as of June 30, 2008.”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html. Accessed July
11, 2008.

19.

SB 681 (Alquist, Campbell and Hurtt), Chapter 6, Statutes of 1996.

20.

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Sections 912-912.5.

21.

AB 1913 (Cardenas), Chapter 353, Statutes of 2000. Bill text. Also, AB 1913
(Cardenas), Chapter 353, Statutes of 2000. Bill analysis. March 23, 2000.
Page 5. Author’s Statement.

22.

Office of the Attorney General. California Department of Justice. Criminal
Justice Statistics Center. “Juvenile Felony Arrests by Gender, Offense and
Arrest Rate Statewide.” May 29, 2008. Written communication. On file.

74

APPENDICES & NOTES
23.

Barry Krisberg, President, National Council on Crime and Delinquency. October
21, 2007. “Current State of California’s Youth Corrections.” Conference
presentation. Critical Juncture – Innovative Solutions for Addressing the Impact
of Youth and Adult Incarceration in Our Communities. Also, Barry Krisberg.
December 2003. “General Corrections Review of the California Youth Authority.”
http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/CYA5.pdf. Accessed October 22, 2007.

24.

Sara Norman, Prison Law Office. October 26, 2007. “Plaintiff’s Amended Case
Management Conference Statement.”

25.

SB 77 (Ducheny), Chapter 171, Statutes of 2007.

26.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1.

27.

SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review), Chapter 175, Statutes of 2007.
Also, The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson, Presiding Juvenile Court Judge,
Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. Written testimony to the
Commission. February 28, 2008. In his written testimony, Judge Peterson
points out that Penal Code Section 290 (d)(3), referred to in Welfare and
Institutions Code 733 which was amended by SB 81, no longer exists. The
offenses formerly listed in Section 290 (d)(3) are now listed in Penal Code
290.008(c).

28.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice. June 26, 2008. “SB81/AB191 Status Update.” Written materials
provided at the June 26, 2008 State Commission on Juvenile Justice meeting.
Sacramento, CA.

29.

SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27.

30.

Amy L. Jarvis, Principal Program Budget Analyst, Department of Finance.
January 30, 2008. Written communication. On file.

31.

Amy L. Jarvis. See endnote 30.

32.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Non 707(b)
Commitments in DJJ Facilities, Anticipated Parole Board Date as of October 14,
2007.” Document provided to the Commission by Rachel Rios at the October
2007 hearing. (29 counties had either one or zero Non 707(b) offenders.) Also,
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. September 30, 2007.
“Characteristics of Population.”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/research/SEP2007CHARACTERISTICS.pdf. Accessed June 20, 2008. As of September 30, 2007,
shortly after SB 81 was enacted, the total number of juvenile offenders in state
facilities from these three counties was as follows: San Francisco, 11; San Luis
Obispo, 6; and, Santa Cruz, 6.

33.

SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27. Article 2.
Sec. 1961.

34.

Juvenile Justice Development Plans. Submitted to Corrections Standards
Authority by 58 California counties and provided to the Commission by the
Corrections Standards Authority.

35.

Executive Steering Committee SB 81 Local Youthful Offender Rehabilitative
Facility Construction Funding Program. June 9, 2008. Meeting discussion.

36.

Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1. 95 percent of all juvenile offenders are
supervised at the county level.

37.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice. “Monthly Population Report as of May 31, 2008.” Also, April 2008.
75

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Monthly Population Trends.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/research_tips.html. Accessed June
20, 2008.
38.

AB 1757 (Budget Committee), Chapter 229, Statutes of 2003.

39.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “State Advisory
Committee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (SACJJDP/SAG).”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/SAG/Index.html. Accessed
June 10, 2008.

40.

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 1798.5. Also, SB 737
(Romero), Chapter 10, Statutes of 2005.

41.

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 1960.5.

42.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1.

43.

JABG $4.02 million; Title I-D $2.52 million; Title II $6.6 million and Title V $.75
million. Also, California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, AB 1913
(Cardenas). See endnote 21. Also, Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2008-09
Analysis. Major Issues: Judicial & Criminal Justice. Also, AB 139. Chapter 74,
Statutes of 2005. Also, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Corrections Standards Authority. “JPCF Program Overview.” Also, SB 81
(Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27. Also, Todd Jerue,
Program Budget Manager and Amy Jarvis, Principal Program Budget Analyst,
Department of Finance. January 23, 2008. Written communication. Also,
Senate Budget Subcommittee 4. Public hearing. April 17, 2008. Also,
Corrections Standards Authority. June 3, 2008. Written communication to the
Commission.

44.

California Department of Finance. May 14, 2008. “Governor’s Budget May
Revision 2008-09.” Also, Legislative Analyst Office. May 19, 2008. “Overview of
the 2008-09 May Revision.”

45.

California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget 2008-09.” and
“Governor’s Budget May Revision 2008-09.” Sacramento, CA.

46.

Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4. May 8, 2008. Budget Hearing.
Sacramento, CA.

47.

2008 Conference Committee Actions. July 8, 2008.
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/newcomframeset.asp?committee=4. Accessed
July 11, 2008. Also, California Department of Finance. “Governor’s Budget
2008-09.”

48.

Criminal Penalties and Laws. Public Safety Funding. Statute. Cited as the “Safe
Neighborhoods Act: Stop Gang, Gun, and Street Crime.”
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_j.htm. Accessed June 20, 2008.

49.

David Steinhart, Director, Juvenile Justice Program, Commonweal. February
28, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission.

50.

Elizabeth Hill, Legislative Analyst. January 29, 2008. Letter to Attorney
General Jerry Brown. Review of proposed initiative cited as the “Safe
Neighborhoods Act: Stop Gang, Gun, and Street Crime.”

51.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice. February 2008. “Spring 2008 Juvenile Institution and Parole
Population Projections.”

76

APPENDICES & NOTES
52.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice. February 2008. “Spring 2008 Juvenile Institution and Parole
Population Projections.” Also, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Office of Research, Juvenile Justice Branch. September 2007.
“Fall 2007 Juvenile Population Projections.”

53.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice. September 2007, December 2007 and March 2008. “Characteristics of
Population.”

54.

Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of the California Youth
Authority’s Infrastructure.”

55.

SB 575 (Calderon), 2007-08 Session. Bill Analysis. July 9, 2007. Senate
Committee on Governmental Organization.

56.

Senator Ron Calderon. August 25, 2006. “Residents Speakout Over Nelles
Prison Plan: A Prisoner in Its Home.” Whittier Daily News. Also, SB 575
(Calderon). See endnote 54. Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.

57.

Budget Act of 2005-06, 5225-001-0001, Item 29 (A). (Required CDCR to submit
quarterly status reports to the Legislature including a preliminary facilities
master plan due in December 2005, which was submitted to the Legislature and
a detailed facilities master plan due in March 2006.)

58.

Zeke Barlow. May 24, 2008. “Adult Prison Hospital a Possibility: It Could
Replace Youth Facility Near Camarillo.” Ventura County Star.

59.

Scott Smith. June 17, 2008. “2 Prison Hospitals for San Joaquin.” Stockton
Record.

60.

Little Hoover Commission. September 1994. “The Juvenile Crime Challenge:
Making Prevention a Priority.” Also, Little Hoover Commission. February 2005.
“Reconstructing Government: A Review of the Governor’s Reorganization Plan
Reforming California’s Youth & Adult Correctional Agency.”

61.

Craig Cornett, Consultant, Assembly Appropriations Committee; Diane
Cummins, Consultant, Office of the President Pro Tempore; and, Geoff Long,
Consultant, Assembly Appropriations Committee. November 28, 2007.
Sacramento CA. Personal communication.

62.

Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice.
November 15, 2007. Written testimony to the Commission. Also, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice.
September 2007 “Characteristics of Population.”

63.

California Welfare and Institutions Code 1705.

64.

Farrell v. Hickman Safety & Welfare Planning Team. Christopher Murray, Chris
Baird, New Loughran, Fred Mills and John Platt. March 31, 2006. “Safety and
Welfare Plan: Implementing Reform in California.”

65.

California Welfare and Institutions Code 1960.5.

66.

C. Scott Harris. Executive Director, Corrections Standards Authority.
November 15, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission.

67.

Waters v. CSA. http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/CSAComplaint2.pdf. Accessed
June 25, 2008.

68.

Steve Aos, Assistant Director, Washington State Institute for Public Policy.
February 28, 2008. Written testimony to the Commission. Also, Washington
Institute for Public Policy. October 2006. “Evidence-Based Public Policy
77

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
Options to Reduce Future Prison Construction, Criminal Justice Costs and
Crime Rates.” http://www.wsipp.wa.gov. Accessed June 25, 2008.
69.

California Welfare and Institutions Code 1951.

70.

California Welfare and Institutions Code 1962 b.

71.

AB 1913 (Cardenas). See endnote 21.

72.

Legislative Analyst’s Office. February 20, 2008. Analysis of the 2008-09 Budget
Bill.
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/cj_anl08002.aspx#zzee_link
_1_1202846137.

73.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, AB 1913 (Cardenas).
See endnote 21. Also, Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2008-09 Analysis. Major
Issues: Judicial & Criminal Justice. Also, AB 139 (Committee on Budget),
Chapter 74, Statutes of 2005. Also, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Corrections Standards Authority. “JPCF Program Overview.”
Also, SB 81 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review). See endnote 27. Also,
Todd Jerue, Program Budget Manager and Amy Jarvis, Principal Program
Budget Analyst, Department of Finance. January 23, 2008. Written
communication. Also, Senate Budget Subcommittee 4. Public hearing. April
17, 2008. Also, Corrections Standards Authority. June 3, 2008. Written
communication to the Commission.

74.

Karen Hennigan, et al. See endnote 1. Also, Karen Hennigan, et al, University
of Southern California Center for Research on Crime. February 14, 2008.
“Juvenile Justice Data Project: Phase 2 Report: Longitudinal Outcome Indicators
for Juvenile Justice Systems in California.” Also, Administrative Office of the
Courts, Center for Families, Children & the Courts and Judicial Council of
California, Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee. April 2008. “Juvenile
Delinquency Court Assessment: Probation Officer Report.”
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/resources/publications/JuvenileD
elinquency.htm. Accessed June 18, 2008.

75.

The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27. Also, Donald H. Blevins,
Chief Probation Officer, County of Alameda and Verne Speirs, Chief Probation
Officer, Sacramento County. November 15, 2008. Testimony to the
Commission.

76.

Sue Burrell, Staff Attorney, Youth Law Center. November 15, 2007. Written
testimony to the Commission.

77.

Sue Burrell. See endnote 76.

78.

Michael Rothfeld, Staff Writer. March 13, 2008. “Judge Acts on Juvenile Hall
Conditions.” Los Angeles Times. Also, Don Specter, Executive Director, Prison
Law Office. June 5, 2008. Written communication.

79.

Sue Burrell. See endnote 76.

80.

Kim Barrett, Chief Probation Officer, San Luis Obispo County and President,
Chief Probation Officers of California, Donald H. Blevins, Chief Probation Officer,
County of Alameda, and Verne Speirs, Chief Probation Officer, Sacramento
County. Testimony to the Commission. November 15, 2007.

81.

The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27. Page 2. (Also see
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 734 and In re Teofilio A. (1989)
210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.)

82.

The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27.
78

APPENDICES & NOTES
83.

The Honorable Kenneth G. Peterson. See endnote 27.

84.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, Edsource. February
2008. “California Rankings 2005-06.”
http://www.edsource.org/sch_rankings.cfm. Accessed April 8, 2008.
(California Average per Pupil Expenditure: $8,486).

85.

David Steinhart, Director, Commonweal Juvenile Justice Program. October 26,
2007. Conference presentation. “Juvenile Justice Reform: Forty Years After
Gault.” Berkeley Law School Criminal Justice Center. Citing California state
budgets, California Department of Finance, California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities. ($36,118 – cost per ward in
1996). Also, California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. ($252,000,
projected cost per ward in 2008-09).

86.

California Welfare and Institutions Code 1700.

87.

Little Hoover Commission. February 2005. “Reconstructing Government: A
Review of the Governor’s Reorganization Plan: Reforming California’s Youth &
Adult Correctional Agency.”

88.

Since the July 2005 implementation of the reorganization, there have been four
secretaries of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
Roderick Hickman led the reorganization effort in 2005. He resigned in
February 2006. Jeanne Woodford served as secretary in March and April 2006.
James Tilton served as interim secretary and then secretary from April 2006
through May 2008. Matthew Cate was appointed secretary in May 2008.

89.

Office of the Governor. October 12, 2007. “Governor Schwarzenegger
Announces Appointments.”

90.

Barry Krisberg, President, National Council on Crime and Delinquency. March
31, 2006. “Safety & Welfare Plan: Implementing Reform in California.”

91.

Farrell v. Tilton. “Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause Re: Appointment
of Receiver and Compliance with Consent Decree and Remedial Plans.”
February 11, 2008. Referring to Farrell v. Tilton. “Fifth Report of the Special
Master.” Appendix E. October 23, 2007.

92.

Farrell v. Tilton. See endnote 89. Page 37.

93.

Farrell v. Tilton. See endnote 89. Page 41.

94.

Farrell v. Tilton. “Defendant’s Response to Order to Show Cause Re:
Appointment of Receiver and Compliance with Consent Decree and Remedial
Plans.” April 14, 2008.

95.

Seventh Report of Special Master. March 28, 2008. Farrell v. Tilton.

96.

Seventh Report of Special Master. See endnote 93.

97.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1. Also, California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Juvenile Justice Division. “Monthly
Population Report as of May 31, 2008.” Also, “Monthly Population Report as of
April 30, 2008.”

98.

California Department of Finance. See endnote 1.

99.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Spring 2008 Juvenile
Institution and Parole Population Projections Fiscal Years 2007-08 through
2011-12. February 2008. CDCR projects the population by the end of fiscal
year 2008-09 would be 1,731 and the parole population will be 1,758. With no
additional changes in law or significant changes in local commitment practices,
79

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
CDCR anticipates the juvenile offender population supervised at the state level
will slowly decrease to 1,427 in facilities and 1,240 on parole.
100.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice. March 31, 2006. “Safety and Welfare Plan: Implementing Reform in
California.” Pages 1 and 38.

101.

Legislative Analyst’s Office. May 2004. “A Review of the California Youth
Authority’s Infrastructure.”

102.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. November 30, 2005.
“Reforming California’s Juvenile Corrections System. Farrell v. Hickman. Safety
and Welfare Remedial Plan.”

103.

Budget Act of 2005-06, 5225-001-0001, Item 29 (A). (Required CDCR to submit
quarterly status reports to the Legislature including a preliminary facilities
master plan due in December 2005, which was submitted to the Legislature and
a detailed facilities master plan due in March 2006.)

104.

Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary of Juvenile Justice, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. April 17, 2008. Testimony to
Senate Budget Subcommittee No. 4.

105.

Ohio Department of Youth Services. www.dys.ohio.gov. Accessed June 25,
2008.

106.

Dan Macallair, Executive Director, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice.
November 15, 2007. Written testimony to the Commission. Suggests counties
could contract with community-based providers for highly specialized programs.
Also, some counties send very few or no offenders to state facilities, thus
exhibiting the ability to provide programs and services to a full range of youth
offenders. El Dorado County has no youth in state facilities. San Francisco has
10, Santa Cruz has 5, San Luis Obispo has 6 and Yolo has 3. Also, California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. “Characteristics of Population.”
March 2008. Table 2, Page 1.

107.

California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1000.1.

108.

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 1766.

109.

National Center for Juvenile Justice. State Juvenile Justice Profiles.
www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews.extendedage.asp. Accessed March 28,
2008. (Other states are Montana, Oregon and Wisconsin. Also, Colorado,
Hawaii and New Jersey extend juvenile jurisdiction until the full term of the
dispositional order.)

110.

Little Hoover Commission. November 15, 2006. Corrections Oversight Meeting.

111.

David Steinhart, Director, Juvenile Justice Program, Commonweal. May 9,
2008. Written communication.

112.

Patrick Griffin. 2007. “National Overviews.” State Juvenile Justice Profiles.
Which States Have Blended Sentencing Laws? Pittsburgh, PA. National Center
for Juvenile Justice. www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles. Accessed June 19, 2008.

113.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Division of Juvenile
Justice. February 2008. “Sprint 2008 Juvenile Institution and Parole
Population Projections Fiscal Years 2007-08 through 2011-12.”

114.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Division of Juvenile
Justice Research and Information Systems. May 27, 2008. Written
communication. On file.

80

APPENDICES & NOTES
115.

California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 202.

116.

Legislative Analyst’s Office. “Analysis of the 2008-09 Budget Bill. Judicial &
Criminal Justice.” Page D-21.
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/crimjust_anl08.pdf.
Accessed on May 15, 2008.

117.

Corrections Standards Authority, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. “JPCF Program Overview.”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/JPCF/Docs/Overv
iew_of_JPCF_Program.pdf. Accessed on May 15, 2008.

118.

Office of the Governor. September 12, 2007. Press Release GAAS:722:07.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/YOBG/Docs/YOB
G_County_Funding_Awards.pdf. Accessed on May 15, 2008.

119.

Corrections Standards Authority California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. “Mentally Ill Offender Crime Reduction Grant Program.”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/MIOCR/MIOCRG.
html. Accessed on May 15, 2008.

120.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile
Justice. January 16, 2007. “The Juvenile Justice Community Reentry
Challenge Grant Program.” Page. 2.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/DJJ/RFP/docs/RFP.pdf.

121.

Aaron Long. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. April 8,
2008. Personal communication.

122.

California Department of Education. Pupil Retention Block Grant 2007 Funding
Results. “Schedule of the First Apportionment.”
http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/fo/r14/documents/prbg07apptsch1.xls. Accessed
May 15, 2008.

123.

California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs. June 12, 2008. Written
communication. Counties may be supporting additional juvenile drug courts
with other state, federal, county or private funding.

124.

Department of Mental Health staff. December 21, 2007. Sacramento, CA.
Personal communication. Some portion of the Mental Health Services Act
(MHSA) funding (totaling $1.5 billion in 2007-08) is used for juvenile offender
programs, although the exact amount is unknown. The Department of Mental
Health allocated $320.4 million to the Community Services and Supports and
$115 million to the Prevention and Early Intervention components of the MHSA
in fiscal year 2007-08. While both components can be used for juvenile
offenders, the PEI component targets youth in or at-risk of entering the juvenile
justice system.

125.

Proposition 98 funds educational services, including services for juveniles in
correctional institutions. The amount of Proposition 98 funding that is
dedicated to serving incarcerated youth is unknown.

126.

Lisa Wagoner, Research Associate. Justice Research and Statistics Association.
March 6, 2008. Written communication.

127.

U.S. Department of Education. March 2008. “Fiscal Year 2001-2009 State
Tables for the U.S. Department of Education: State Tables by State.” Page 11.
http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/statetables/index.html#update.
Accessed on April 4, 2008.

81

LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION
128.

Corrections Standards Authority, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. Title II Delinquency Prevention & Intervention Program.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/CPP/Grants/TitleII/TitleIIProje
ctDescriptions.html. Accessed on May 15, 2008.

129.

Probation Business Managers Association. “PBMA Annual Revenue Survey
2006-2007: Title IV-E Administrative Cost Revenue.” Accessed on May 1, 2008.
http://www.cpoc.org/Data/PBMA0607/t4einfo.php. Accessed on May 15,
2008. The amount available is an estimate from Probation Business Managers
Association Annual Revenue Survey 2006-2007.

130.

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of the General
Counsel. Washington, D.C. May 15, 2008. OJP FOIA No. 08-00210.

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