by David Kim

The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a buccal swab collected from a criminal defendant pursuant to a district court discovery order under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.02, subdivision 2(1)(f), rather than a search warrant, constituted an unconstitutional search requiring suppression of the resulting DNA evidence. On a separate issue, the Court determined that accomplice statements made during unsworn jail phone calls and text messages do not constitute “testimony” under Minnesota Statutes § 634.04, and thus the defendant was not entitled to an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction.

Background

In December 2020, C.J. was shot multiple times in a Duluth apartment. Although he survived, C.J. sustained significant injuries and could not identify his assailant. When investigators later located C.J.’s car outside the Gateway Towers apartment building, Seneca Warrior Steeprock and A.C., both suspects in the shooting, exited the building and approached the vehicle. Upon seeing investigators, Steeprock fled and was apprehended at the bottom of a snowy hill. A.C. was arrested in the parking lot with a handgun in her purse. Investigators subsequently discovered a second handgun buried in a snowbank near where Steeprock had been apprehended. Forensic analysis revealed that A.C.’s gun fired seven of 15 cartridge casings collected from the shooting scene, while the gun from the snowbank fired the remaining eight.

As part of the investigation, investigators obtained a search warrant authorizing collection of buccal swabs from Steeprock and A.C. for DNA testing. After A.C. challenged the warrant’s validity under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (permitting defendants to suppress evidence obtained with a warrant if they show that the affidavit contained intentional or reckless false statements that were necessary to establish probable cause), the State stipulated in Steeprock’s case that it would not use any evidence obtained pursuant to the challenged warrant.

Rather than seeking a new search warrant, the State moved the district court to order Steeprock to provide a DNA sample under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.02, subdivision 2(1)(f), which allows a court to order, “subject to constitutional limitations,” discovery procedures that “will materially aid in determining whether the defendant committed the offense charged.” Over Steeprock’s constitutional objection, the district court granted the motion. Investigators collected a buccal swab from Steeprock while he was in custody.

DNA analysis revealed that the gun from the snowbank contained a mixture of DNA from at least four individuals, including a profile consistent with Steeprock’s DNA. At trial, the State presented this DNA evidence and introduced recordings of jail phone calls and text messages between A.C. and her brother discussing the shooting and referencing Steeprock. The district court admitted A.C.’s statements under the statement-against-interest hearsay exception and denied Steeprock’s request for an accomplice-corroboration jury instruction.

The jury convicted Steeprock of attempted first degree premeditated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. The court of appeals unanimously reversed, concluding the warrantless buccal swab violated Steeprock’s constitutional rights and that the error was not harmless. The State petitioned for review.

Analysis

The Court began by discussing the constitutional principles governing its analysis. Both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, with their primary purpose being “to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Constitutional protections extend to bodily intrusions, the Court observed, noting that “a compelled physical intrusion” into a person’s body to collect evidence “implicates an individual’s most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).

The Court stated that a search occurs when the government intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy to obtain information. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145 (Minn. 2024). Under Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013), the parties agreed that the buccal swab constituted a search. Because a warrantless search is “presumptively unreasonable unless it is conducted under a valid warrant or a specific exception to the warrant requirement applies,” State v. McNeilly, 6 N.W.3d 161 (Minn. 2024), the burden was on the State to justify the warrantless collection, State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2003). Nevertheless, a warrantless search may be considered constitutionally reasonable if it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2008).

None of the recognized exceptions applied in the present case, according to the Court. Consequently, the State urged the Court to recognize a new exception for “limited” investigatory searches of charged defendants, citing decisions from other jurisdictions permitting collection of identification evidence pursuant to court orders. The Court declined for four reasons.

First, the law distinguishes between routine booking procedures – such as the DNA collection upheld in King – and searches to discover evidence of wrongdoing. “When law enforcement seeks to conduct a search to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, reasonableness typically requires law enforcement to obtain a judicial warrant,” the Court stated, quoting State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016).

Second, although the immediate physical intrusion of a buccal swab is minimal, forensic DNA technology permits retention of samples that “put into the possession of law enforcement authorities a sample from which a wealth of additional, highly personal information could potentially be obtained.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016).

Third, the State offered no persuasive federal precedent, and the cited decisions from other states were unavailing. Fourth, Rule 9.02, subdivision 2(1)(f), by its plain terms, operates “subject to constitutional limitations” and thus does not dispense with warrant requirements, the Court concluded.

The Court also rejected the State’s contention that the district court’s discovery order was functionally equivalent to a warrant. The standard for probable cause to charge is distinct from the standard for probable cause to search, the Court explained. Additionally, under both constitutions, a search warrant affiant must provide information under oath, a requirement the State failed to satisfy when it submitted only the prosecutor’s unsworn statements. Thus, the Court concluded that the search was unreasonable.

The Exclusionary Rule

Turning to remedies, the Court addressed whether exceptions to the exclusionary rule permitted admission of the DNA evidence despite the constitutional violation.

Regarding inevitable discovery, the State argued that because DNA never changes, it could always be lawfully obtained with a warrant. The Court rejected this reasoning as contrary to Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), which requires reliance on “demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification” rather than speculation. The Court reaffirmed State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 2011): “The State may not show inevitable discovery by claiming that if it had not searched illegally, it would have done so legally.”

The Court acknowledged that its earlier decision in J.W.K. applied contrary reasoning, permitting inevitable discovery where investigators “presumably would have sought and obtained a warrant.” Determining J.W.K. “clearly in conflict” with Nix and Diede, the Court overruled it. Because the State’s sole argument was that it could have applied for a warrant but did not, the inevitable discovery exception failed.

The good-faith exception also did not apply, according to the Court. Under Minnesota law, this exception is limited to circumstances where “law enforcement officers obtain evidence in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent that specifically authorizes the police conduct at issue.” State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566 (Minn. 2024). The Court reasoned that even assuming Rule 9.02, subdivision 2(1)(f), constitutes binding appellate precedent, the rule does not specifically authorize warrantless DNA collection because it expressly operates “subject to constitutional limitations.” Thus, the Court ruled that because no exception to the exclusionary rule applied, Steeprock’s DNA must be suppressed.

Constitutional errors require reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. McNeilly. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that the verdict was “surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Johnson, 915 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 2018). The Court concluded that the DNA evidence was “a substantial component of the State’s case” and “highly damaging to the defense” because it constituted strong evidence that Steeprock handled the gun that shot C.J. The prosecutor referenced the DNA evidence numerous times during closing argument. Because the evidence was potent proof of guilt that the State fully exploited, the Court could not conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accomplice-Corroboration Instruction

The Court noted that the present case provided it with an opportunity to resolve an unsettled question about Minnesota’s accomplice-corroboration statute, Minn. Stat. § 634.04. That statute provides that a conviction cannot rest solely on the “testimony” of an accomplice. The Court stated that it has not previously squarely defined what “testimony” means in this provision and used this case to announce a definitive construction.

Applying the standard canons of statutory interpretation, the Court concluded that “testimony” in § 634.04 is a technical legal term that refers to statements made under oath or affirmation in a formal proceeding – such as in-court testimony, a deposition, or a sworn affidavit. The Court reached this conclusion by looking to the text of § 634.04, its placement within chapter 634 (which governs evidence and witnesses), and legal dictionary definitions. With that understanding, the Court concluded that unsworn, out-of-court statements by an accomplice, even when admitted at trial as substantive evidence under a hearsay exception, are not “testimony” within the meaning of § 634.04 and therefore do not trigger the statute’s corroboration requirement.

Because A.C.’s incriminating jail calls and text messages were unsworn statements admitted as statements against penal interest, the Court ruled that they fall outside § 634.04. As a result, the Court ruled that the district court correctly refused Steeprock’s request for an accomplice-corroboration instruction. Additionally, the Court reaffirmed that when an accomplice actually testifies under oath, § 634.04 still requires an instruction warning jurors that they may not convict based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony.

Conclusion

The Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision reversing Steeprock’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. See: State v. Steeprock, 2025 Minn. LEXIS 683 (Minn. 2025).  

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