by Matthew Clarke

Addressing an issue of first impression, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a defendant held on a probation detainer after posting bail on new charges is entitled to credit for that time against his new sentence where the detainer was triggered by the same conduct underlying the new charges. The Court reasoned that under the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1), such confinement is “a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based,” even if that conduct also constituted a violation of a prior probationary sentence.

Background

Andrew Michael Phillips, Jr. pleaded guilty to DUI and resisting arrest in 2015 and was sentenced to three to six months incarceration for DUI followed by two years’ probation for resisting arrest. Several months later, Phillips violated probation, and on September 22, 2016, the trial court resentenced him to three to six months of imprisonment, again followed by two years of probation.

In mid-May 2018, while serving this probationary term, Phillips was arrested and charged with aggravated assault. Shortly thereafter, his mother posted bail, but due to Phillips’ probationary status, a detainer was lodged against him, and he was not released. In November 2018, while still incarcerated, Phillips pleaded guilty to the aggravated assault charge.

While awaiting sentencing, Phillips filed a motion to lift the probation detainer and revoke bail, which the court granted on January 17, 2019. On September 10, 2019, the court sentenced Phillips to 27 to 72 months of incarceration for aggravated assault but did not award him any credit for presentence confinement.

On the same day, the court revoked Phillips’ probation in the 2015 case and resentenced him to a consecutive two-year period of probation on the resisting arrest conviction, imposing no term of incarceration. Phillips filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition in the 2015 case alleging entitlement to credit for time served prior to sentencing pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760. Court-appointed counsel filed a no-merit letter and motion to withdraw, which the court granted before dismissing the petition.

At the same time, Phillips filed a direct appeal in his 2018 case, but the Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence in 2020. Subsequently, he filed a pro se PCRA petition in that case. Court-appointed counsel filed an amended petition claiming Phillips was entitled to time-served credit for 481 days. The PCRA court granted partial relief, awarding credit for 237 days – the period from January 17, 2019 (when the detainer was lifted) to September 10, 2019 (when sentence was imposed) – but denied credit for the period between May 19, 2018 (when bail was posted) and January 17, 2019, concluding that incarceration during that time was solely the result of the probation detainer in the 2015 case.

Phillips timely appealed both PCRA court orders, resulting in consolidation of the cases.

Analysis

The Court framed the issue as one of first impression with broad implications: “whether a defendant, held on a probation detainer after he was arrested on new charges and posted bail, can have his pre-sentence time spent on the detainer credited to his new sentence.”

The Court began its analysis by outlining the principles governing statutory interpretation under the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599 (Pa. 2022). The Court observed that, “the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly,” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), and such intent “is best expressed through the plain language of the statute.” Commonwealth v. Stotelmyer, 110 A.3d 146 (Pa. 2015). Importantly, “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Thus, “[i]f the statute’s plain language is unambiguous, we must apply it without employing familiar canons of construction and without considering legislative intent.” Dubose v. Quinlan, 173 A.3d 634 (Pa. 2017). Only where the words are ambiguous will courts examine other factors to determine legislative intent. Commonwealth v. Kingston, 143 A.3d 917 (Pa. 2016); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).

The relevant provision, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1), “provides that credit shall be given against the maximum term and any minimum term … for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.” This credit encompasses “time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.” Id.

The Court focused on the phrase “conduct on which such a charge is based.” Focusing on the terms “conduct,” “charge,” and “based” – none of which are defined in the statute – the Court consulted dictionary definitions to ascertain their plain meaning. It noted that undefined terms do not automatically render a statute ambiguous. Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2022). Instead, courts may consult dictionaries to determine a term’s plain meaning. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 162 A.3d 384 (Pa. 2017); Gamby, 283 A.3d 298.

Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court defined “conduct” as “[p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or inaction”; a “charge” (or criminal charge) as “[a] formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to prosecution”; and “based (on)” as “[d]erived from, and therefore similar to, an earlier work.”

Applying these definitions, the Court determined that nothing in the plain reading of the statutory language is unclear or ambiguous. Ursinus Coll. v. Prevailing Wage Appeals Bd., 310 A.3d 154 (Pa. 2024). It agreed with Phillips that § 9760(1) mandates time credit in two distinct scenarios. The word “or” in the statute is disjunctive, meaning “one or the other of two or more alternatives.” In re Paulmier, 937 A.2d 364 (Pa. 2007). The first scenario involves time spent in custody due to the criminal charge for which the prison sentence was imposed. The second requires credit for time spent incarcerated “as a result of actions from which the criminal charges, resulting in imprisonment, derived.” Importantly, the phrase “such a charge” in the second scenario “plainly relates to ‘the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed,’” the Court stated. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1).

Application to the Facts

The PCRA court had awarded Phillips credit for 237 days, i.e., the period between January 17, 2019, (when the detainer was lifted) and September 10, 2019, (when he was sentenced). Neither party contested this award, which clearly fell within the first scenario: “all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1).

The contested period was Phillips’ incarceration between May 19, 2018, (when bail was posted) and January 17, 2019, (when the detainer was lifted). The Court determined that the lower courts erred in concluding this time could not be credited to Phillips’ 2018 sentence.

The Court examined the probation detainer, which indicated Phillips had violated the condition of his probation requiring compliance with “all Municipal, State, and Federal Criminal laws.” The violation petition confirmed that Phillips violated this condition when he was charged in the 2018 case. The Court reasoned that “had [Phillips] not committed the conduct that led to charges being filed in the 2018 case, i.e., assaulted his wife, a probation detainer would have never been lodged.” While the detainer was related to his previous probationary sentence, “it was premised on his new charges, which triggered a violation of his probation.”

The Court addressed the fact that the detainer could be attributed to more than one action. It ruled that “the use of the indefinite article, ‘a result,’ encompasses non-exclusive causes, like the conduct that precipitated the violation and his detainer, which is the same conduct that led to the 2018 charges.” Phillips’ assault on his wife was “the conduct that led to the 2018 charges and the probation detainer, as he would not have been charged in the 2018 case, and thus confined on a detainer, but for the fact that he assaulted his wife.”

The Court expressly rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that Phillips’ original conduct in resisting arrest, the basis for his probation, was what resulted in his incarceration on the detainer, rather than his later assault. It determined that there is “no language in Section 9760(1) suggesting the conduct must result exclusively from the charges that resulted in the prison sentence.” Accepting the Commonwealth’s interpretation “would require us to insert restrictive language, permitting presentence confinement to be credited only if the conduct constituted the sole cause of the confinement,” the Court explained.

The Court stressed that it is “not this Court’s function to read a word or words into a statute that do not actually appear in the text where … the text makes sense as it is, and the implied reading would change the existing meaning or effect of the actual statutory language.” Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 863 A.2d 432 (Pa. 2004). Courts must presume “that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain,” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 207 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2019); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2), and must not disregard plain, unambiguous statutory language “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).

Conclusion

Thus, the Court held that the Superior Court erred in concluding that Phillips’ sentence was not illegal. Because Phillips’ presentence confinement on the probation detainer resulted from the same conduct on which the 2018 charges were based, he was entitled to credit for that time against his 2018 sentence.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Superior Court upholding the PCRA court’s decision. See: Commonwealth v. Phillips, 344 A.3d 360 (Pa. 2025).  

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login