by Richard Resch

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a divided Mississippi Supreme Court decision, holding that under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a trial court may not deny a defendant his right to face-to-face confrontation with a child witness simply because a state statute mandates screening. The Court reaffirmed that before authorizing screening in child-abuse cases, a trial court must “hear evidence” and make a “case-specific” finding of necessity, a requirement that cannot be satisfied by pointing to a state statute premised on generalized legislative findings.

Background

Jeffrey Pitts was charged with sexually abusing A.G.C., his daughter, following a May 2020 visit. At the time of trial, A.G.C. was four years old. The State moved to place a screen between A.G.C. and Pitts, citing a Mississippi statute providing that child witnesses “shall have the … righ[t]” to a screen obscuring the child’s view of the defendant. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-43-101(2)(g) (2020). Pitts objected, arguing the statute’s mandatory terms must yield to the Sixth Amendment’s requirements.

The trial judge granted the motion, reasoning that the “statute … appears to be mandatory” and expressing concerns about failing to follow it. Although the prosecution represented that A.G.C.’s guardian believed testimony would be difficult, it expressly rejected any need “to put on any proof,” relying instead on the claimed statutory “right” to screening.

After conviction, Pitts timely appealed. A divided Mississippi Supreme Court rejected his arguments, attempting to distinguish Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), on various grounds before holding that Mississippi’s mandatory statute provided sufficient authority. Pitts sought certiorari.

Analysis

The Court observed that ordinarily, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause “guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” Coy. In child-abuse cases, however, a court may screen a child witness when “necessary to protect [the child] from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate.” Craig. The Court noted that before invoking this procedure, the trial court must “hear evidence” and make a “case-specific” finding of necessity. Simply pointing to a state statute premised on “generalized finding[s]” is not sufficient. Coy.

The Court then addressed and rejected each distinction provided by the Mississippi Supreme Court as to why Coy and Craig do not govern. First, although Mississippi’s Constitution authorizes the legislature to enact laws protecting victims’ rights, when state law conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, the latter controls, the Court stated. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

Second, Mississippi argued its mandatory statute differed from Iowa’s discretionary statute in Coy. However, the Court explained that this distinction cuts against Mississippi: “if anything, the fact that Mississippi’s statute is mandatory – and thus never requires a case-specific finding of necessity – renders it ‘more constitutionally problematic than the statute at issue in Coy, not less so.’”

Third, the Court rejected the argument that A.G.C.’s young age justified screening, noting Craig involved a six-year-old witness yet still required case-specific findings.

Fourth, the Court determined that the Confrontation Clause right applies regardless of whether identity is disputed.

Finally, the Court concluded that whether screening occurs via closed-circuit television (as in Craig) or physical barrier, both approaches deviate from face-to-face confrontation and require case-specific necessity findings.

Alternatively, the State argued the trial court did make sufficient findings. The Court disagreed, explaining that the prosecution’s representation about the guardian’s belief, combined with its express rejection of any obligation to “put on any proof” and the trial court’s reliance on the statute’s mandatory nature, “fall well short of the procedures and findings Coy and Craig require,” according to the Court.

The Court noted that constitutional errors are sometimes subject to harmless-error analysis and do not require a new trial if the prosecution can show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). On remand, the Court instructed that the State remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free to consider, whether the error warrants a new trial under this standard.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court granted certiorari, reversed the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Pitts v. Mississippi, 223 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2025) (per curiam).  

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