by Sagi Schwartzberg

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion was timely, concluding that the one-­year statute of limitations does not begin to run from an initial judgment that defers restitution but from the subsequent amended judgment that finalizes the restitution amount. The Court reasoned that a judgment of conviction is not “final” for the purposes of § 2255(f)(1) until the defendant’s complete sentence, including restitution, has been imposed.

Background

On May 28, 2020, during a protest in Minneapolis in connection with the death of George Floyd, Montez Lee Jr. entered a Max It Pawn shop that had been previously looted and set the building on fire. Two months later, law enforcement found the body of a man, O.L.S., in the charred rubble. Lee was subsequently charged with arson on property used in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and pleaded guilty in July 2021.

Prior to sentencing, there was a dispute as to whether Lee’s arson caused O.L.S.’s death and, in turn, whether he should receive a 14-­level cross-­reference enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Days before the sentencing hearing, Lee’s attorney stipulated that the enhancement applied.

Lee was sentenced on January 14, 2022. The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota applied the cross-­reference, resulting in a Guidelines range of 235 to 240 months but varied downward and sentenced Lee to a 120-­month term of imprisonment. During the hearing, the District Court noted that restitution was mandatory but would be imposed at a later date because no victim had yet requested it. In response, the Government indicated that O.L.S.’s family would be requesting $842. The District Court agreed to “hold the matter open” for two weeks to finalize the restitution amount.

On January 19, 2022, an initial judgment was entered against Lee, explicitly deferring a “determination of restitution … until January 28, 2022.” A few days later, the parties filed a joint motion noting that “Defendant has agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $842.” However, this stipulation was not reflected in Lee’s judgment until April 13, 2022, when the District Court entered an amended judgment adding the restitution obligation.

Lee did not file a direct appeal of either judgment. On April 27, 2023 – one year and 14 days after the amended judgment was entered – Lee filed a motion to vacate his sentence under § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he claimed that his attorney stipulated to the 14-­level enhancement without his consent and despite knowing of evidence that O.L.S. did not die because of the fire Lee started.

On the Government’s motion, the District Court dismissed Lee’s motion, concluding that it was untimely. The District Court reasoned that the one-­year statute of limitations began to run two weeks after the entry of the initial deferred-­restitution judgment, and thus his conviction became final on February 2, 2023. The District Court denied Lee’s requests for reconsideration and for a certificate of appealability.

The Eighth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to address whether Lee’s amended judgment affected the beginning of the limitations period for his § 2255 claim.

Analysis

The Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal of Lee’s § 2255 motion, concluding that the motion was timely filed. Its analysis focused exclusively on when Lee’s “judgment of conviction bec[ame] final” for the purposes of the 1-­year statute of limitations under § 2255(f)(1).

The Court began its analysis by discussing the statute, which requires a motion to be filed within one year of “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” § 2255(f)(1). The Court noted that “in a criminal case … [t]he sentence is the judgment,” Burton v. Stewart,549 U.S. 147 (2007) (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937)), and therefore, the limitations period does not begin until both the “conviction and sentence” become final. Burton. In the postconviction context, “finality” is defined as “the conclusion of the availability of direct review.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003). Because Lee filed his motion one year and 14 days after his amended judgment was entered – the exact window for seeking direct review – the case turned on which judgment marked the start of that period, the Court stated.

The Court observed that this issue has divided the circuits. While the Ninth Circuit has held that an initial judgment of incarceration with unspecified restitution is “final,” the Second and Tenth Circuits have concluded that the § 2255 clock does not run until the restitution order becomes final. United States v. Anthony, 25 F.4th 792 (10th Cir. 2022); United States v. Gilbert, 807 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2015); Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2015).

Agreeing with the Second and Tenth Circuits, the Court held “that Lee’s judgment of conviction only became final for purposes of § 2255’s statute of limitations once his judgment was amended to add restitution.” The Court explained that its conclusion was based first on the fact that restitution is indisputably part of the criminal sentence. See Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. 116 (2017). The Court placed significance on the Supreme Court’s statement in Manrique that “[b]y deferring restitution, the court is declining to announce a sentence.” Because the “sentence is the judgment” under Burton, the Court reasoned that Lee’s judgment was “incomplete” and thus not “final” until the restitution component was added.

The Court further determined that Lee’s right to seek direct review of his underlying conviction did not expire after the initial judgment. This conclusion was based upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169 (1963), and Manrique. In Corey, which involved a two-­stage sentencing statute, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant could choose to appeal the initial judgment or “wait to take an appeal” until the final sentence was imposed, recognizing a “defendant’s right to await the imposition of final sentence before seeking review of the conviction.” The Court explained that while Manrique held that “deferred restitution cases involve two appealable judgments,” it explicitly left the Corey holding “undisturbed.” Manrique.Synthesizing these cases, the Court concluded that Corey and Manrique “together … instruct that Lee could have waited to appeal his conviction (and custodial sentence) until after his amended judgment was filed.” Because the trial court proceedings had “not actually terminated,” Lee’s right to seek direct review remained open, meaning the judgment was not “final,” the Court stated.

The Court then turned to the Government’s counter-­arguments, rejecting each. The Government first contended that because the initial judgment was “immediately appealable” under Manrique, it was “final” for § 2255(f)(1) purposes. The Court stated that this “wrongly assumes that the definition of ‘finality’” is identical for direct appeal and postconviction relief, two contexts Clay recognized are distinct. The Court adopted the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning that “while there can be multiple judgments … for direct appeal purposes, only one final judgment exists for § 2255(f)(1) purposes.” Anthony. The Government also argued the restitution order was a non-­substantive, “ministerial” change, citing United States v. Campbell, 971 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2020). The Court distinguished Campbell, which involved clerical errors, stating, “the imposition of the new restitution obligation revised the judgment in a way that itself invited appeal. See Manrique.

The Court likewise rejected the Government’s reliance on Dyab v. United States, 855 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2017), a case concerning “second or successive” motions under § 2255(h). The Government used Dyab to argue that only a “plenary resentencing” constitutes a material change. The Court determined this argument failed, first, because it improperly imported standards from § 2255(h) to define finality under § 2255(f)(1), and second, because Dyab was factually distinguishable because the amendment there “did not alter the amount of Dyab’s restitution obligation.” Whereas, “the opposite is true in Lee’s case.” Finally, the Court was unpersuaded by the Government’s policy argument that the ruling would upset finality. The Court noted that any delay in imposing restitution is controlled by Congress or victims, not the defendant, and that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act “did not seek to end every possible delay at all costs.” Anthony.

Conclusion

Thus, the Court concluded that Lee’s “judgment of conviction bec[ame] final” under § 2255(f)(1) 14 days after the amended judgment adding restitution was entered. Because his motion was filed exactly one year from that date, it was timely.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case. See: Lee v. United States, 149 F.4th 981 (8th Cir. 2025).  

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