by Richard Resch

In a case presenting an issue of first impression in the Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a presidential commutation of a defendant’s sentence does not render moot the defendant’s pending challenge to the original judicial sentence, addressing a question that has divided the Circuits. Addressing the merits, the Court further held that under current Eighth Circuit precedent, the defendant’s Arkansas cocaine convictions under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-401 do not qualify as the predicate “felony drug offense” convictions that triggered the mandatory-life enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2010), because the Arkansas statute criminalizes a broader range of cocaine isomers than federal law encompasses.

Background

In 2012, a jury convicted Jonathan Russell Wright of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Because Wright had three prior cocaine-related convictions under Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-64-401, he was subject to a sentence enhancement requiring mandatory life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A).

Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018, which prospectively reduced mandatory minimum sentences for certain federal drug offenses but did not make these reductions retroactive. Had Wright been sentenced after the statute’s enactment, his mandatory minimum would have been 25 years rather than life. The First Step Act also permitted certain incarcerated individuals to seek sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) upon a showing of extraordinary and compelling circumstances.

Wright filed a motion for sentence reduction in 2024, arguing that intervening legal developments created a gross disparity between his life sentence and the sentence he would receive today. He identified two changes: (1) the First Step Act’s reduction of mandatory minimums and (2) Eighth Circuit precedent suggesting his Arkansas convictions no longer qualified as predicate offenses. Without qualifying predicates, Wright’s mandatory minimum, even before the First Step Act, would have been 10 years rather than life.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas concluded that Wright was eligible for a reduction based on the First Step Act but rejected his argument regarding the predicate offenses. Citing its own prior order in an unrelated case, the District Court declined to reconsider whether Arkansas cocaine convictions remained valid predicates. It reduced Wright’s sentence to 420 months plus 10 years of supervised release.

Wright timely appealed, arguing the District Court abused its discretion by failing to consider that his prior convictions no longer qualified as predicates. In January 2025, after Wright filed his appeal, President Biden commuted his sentence to 330 months.

Analysis

The Court first addressed whether President Biden’s commutation rendered Wright’s appeal moot. Although both parties agreed the case remained live, the Court examined the question independently because jurisdictional issues are essential to the court’s constitutional authority. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971).

The Court observed that a circuit split exists on whether courts possess authority to modify a commuted sentence. In Blount v. Clarke, 890 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2018), the Fourth Circuit concluded that courts cannot disturb a presidentially commuted sentence, even to reduce it further. The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Dennis v. Terris, 927 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2019), reasoning that executive commutation modifies only the execution of a judgment while leaving the underlying judicial sentence intact, thereby permitting courts to correct errors in the original sentence. Other Circuits, including the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, have treated challenges to commuted sentences as live controversies without analyzing the underlying separation-of-powers question. See United States v. Sanders, 133 F.4th 341 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Davis, 130 F.4th 1272 (11th Cir. 2025).

Siding with the Sixth Circuit’s approach, the Court determined that President Biden’s commutation did not moot Wright’s appeal. It explained that presidential commutation authority derives from the Article II power to grant reprieves and pardons, and a commutation restricts enforcement of a judgment without transforming it into an executive sentence. The Court reasoned that commutation “abridges the enforcement of a judgment, but does not alter it qua judgment.” United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931). The judicial power over sentences remains distinguishable from executive clemency powers. Id.

The Court reasoned that permitting commutations to extinguish judicial review would enable a President to wield clemency opportunistically, insulating unlawful sentences from correction and nullifying congressional provisions enabling defendants to challenge their sentences. Because Wright challenged his underlying judicial sentence rather than the commutation itself, his appeal remained justiciable.

The Categorical Approach
and Arkansas’ Cocaine Statute

Turning to the merits, the Court reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in resentencing Wright. He received his sentence enhancement for having two or more prior felony drug offense convictions. Determining whether a state conviction qualifies as a federal predicate offense requires application of the categorical approach, which examines the statutory definition of the prior offense rather than the underlying conduct. See United States v. Oliver, 987 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2021). When a state offense criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition encompasses, the conviction cannot serve as a predicate. United States v. Vanoy, 957 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 2020); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013).

The Court concluded that § 5-64-401 sweeps too broadly to qualify as a federal felony drug offense. See United States v. Owen, 51 F.4th 292 (8th Cir. 2022) (violation of a drug statute that criminalizes even “one additional isomer” of cocaine cannot serve as a predicate felony drug offense). The Arkansas statute criminalizes controlled substances including narcotic drugs. Arkansas law defines narcotic drugs in two ways: (1) as substances designated by the director of the Arkansas Department of Health and (2) as substances appearing on an enumerated statutory list. The director’s definition encompasses cocaine and all its isomers without limitation. In contrast, federal law criminalizes only cocaine’s optical and geometric isomers, the Court stated.

The Court rejected the Government’s contention that the narrow statutory prohibition on optical and geometric isomers should supersede the director’s broader language. Relying on United States v. Heard, 62 F.4th 1109 (8th Cir. 2023), the Court explained that isomers falling within either the statutory list or the director’s definition are prohibited under Arkansas law, meaning the statute unambiguously covers all cocaine isomers. Because a drug statute criminalizing even one additional isomer beyond federal law cannot produce a valid predicate, Wright’s Arkansas convictions no longer qualified. See Owen.

Thus, the Court ruled that because the District Court declined to consider Wright’s argument that his prior convictions no longer qualified as predicates, relying instead on its own order from an unrelated case, its resentencing decision rested on an erroneous legal conclusion and constituted an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated Wright’s sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with its decision. See: United States v. Wright, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 33882 (8th Cir. 2025).  

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