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The lust ::;€SSlOn of the u·terrogallol1 (Ourse 'neg.lI1

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Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques
164. ~
one event in tne ear y mon s of
Agency activity in
that involved the use of interrogation techniques that.
DoJ and Headquarters had not approved. Agency personnel
reported a range of improvised actions that interrogators and
debriefers reportedly used at that time to assist in obtaining
information from detainees. The extent of these actions is illustrative
of the consequences of the lack of clear guidance at that time and the
Agency's insufficient attention to interrogations ~
165.
two incidents:
and the death of a detainee at a military base in Northeast
Afghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192). These two cases
presented facts that warranted criminal investi ations. Some of the
techniques discussed below were used wi
and will be
further addressed in connection with a Repor
In other cases of undocumented or unauthorized techniques, the facts
are ambiguous or less serious, not warranting further investigation.

Some actions discussed below were taken by employees or
contractors no longer associated with the Agency. Agency
management has also addressed administratively some of the actions.
Pressure Points

166.

In July 2002

operalions officer, participated with another
o erations officer in a custodial interro ation of a detainee_
reportedly
used a "pressure oint" techni ue: with both of his hands on the
detainee's neck,
manipulated his fingers
to restrict the detainee's carotid artery.

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167.~

howas
facing the shackled detainee, reportedly watched his eyes to the point
that the detainee would nod and start to pass out; then, the
shook the detainee to wake him. This
process was re ealed for a total of three applications on the detainee.
The
acknowledged to OIG that he laid hands
on the detainee and rna have made him think he was going to lose
consciousness. Th
also noted that he ha_
years of experience debriefing and interviewing people and until
recently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations.
168. iS7!'NE) CTC management is now aware of this reported
incident, the severity of which was disputed. The use of pressure
oints is not, and had not been, authorized, and CTC has advised the
at such actions are nol authorized.
Mock Executions
169. ~ Thedebri~oyed the
handgun";d ~ Al-Nas~dvisedthat
those actions were predicated on a technique he had artici ated in
~he debriefer slated that when he wa
~ember and October 2002,
offered to
fire a handgun outside the interrogation room w . e I e debriefer
was interview~was thought 10 be witllholding
information. 68 - - , t a g e d the incident, which included
screaming and yelling outside the cell by other OA officers
guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the interrogation
room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee,
lying motionless on the ground, and made to appear as if he had
been shot to death.

an.

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170. ~ The debriefer claimed he did not think
he needed to report this incident because th~d
openly discussed this pl~several~ and
after the incident. When the debriefer was late~d
believed he needed a non-traditional technique to induce the
detainee to cooperate, he told~ewanted to wave a handgun
in front of the detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not
believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique,
citing the earlier, unreported mock executio~
171. ~A senior o~ons office
recounted that around September 2002_ _eard that the debriefer
had staged a mock execution.
not present but understood it
went b~t was transparenny:'r use and no benefit was derived
from it.~bservedthat there is a need to be creative as long as it is
not considered torture. _tated that if such a proposal were made
now, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begin
wi
management and would include erC/Legal,

-"'as

172. ~ The
admitted staging a "mock
as open. According to the
execution" in the first days tha
the technique was his idea but was not effective
because it came across as being staged. It was based on the concept,
from SERE school, of showing something that looks real, butis not.
The
recalled that a particular erc interrogator later
told him about employing a mock execution technique.
_
did not know when this incident occurred or if it was
successful. He viewed this technique as ineffective because it was not
believable.

Th'-

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~~Four
~ho

were interviewed admitted to either participating in
. e inci e
h rin about them.

described staging a mock execution of a detainee.
Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the ''body'' in the aftermath of
the ruse "sang like a bird."
174.
revealed that a roximately
four days before his interview with OIG, th
stated he
had conducted a mock executio
. October or
November 2002. Reportedly, the . earm was discharged outside of
the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly
possessed critical threat information
stated that he told
not to d~e stated that he has not heard
the
of a similar act occurring _ i n c e then.
Use of Smoke

revealed that
cigarette smoke was once used as an interrogation technique in
October 2002. Re ortedly, at the request o f _
an interrogator, the of~t
smoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/cigar in the detainee's
face for about five minutes. The detainee started talking so the
smoke ceased.
heard that a different
officer had used smoke as an interrogation techni~
questioned numerous personnel who had work~bout
the use of smoke as a technique. None reported any knowledge of
the use of smoke as an interrogation technique.
176.~
dmitted that he has personally used smoke
inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point
where they would start to "purge." After this, in a weakened state,

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'th
inforrriation?O
denied ever physically
abusing detainees or knowing anyone who has.
Use of Cold

Physical Comfort Level Deprivation: With use of a window -air
conditioner and a judicious provision! deprivation of warm
clothing!bl<mkets, believe we can increase [the detainee's] physical
- discomfort level to the point where we may lower his
mental/trained resistance abilities.

eTC/Legal responded and advised, "[C]aution must be used when
employing the air conditioning/blanket deprivation so that [the
detainee's] dis.comfort does not lead to a serious illness or worse,"

70 ~'This was substantiated in part by the etA officer who participated in this act with the

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183. ~Many of the officers interviewed about
the use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water heater was
inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold showers.
However,
xplained that if a detainee was
.
cooperative, he would be given a warm shower. He stated that when
a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two
goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower with the
unpleasantness of a cold shower.

cable
reported that a detainee was left in a cold room, shackled and naked,
until he demonstrated cooperation.
185. ~ When asked in~03, if cold
was used as an interrogation technique, the~esponded,
"not per se." He explained that physical and environmental
discomfort was used to encourage the detainees to improve their
environment.
bserved that cold is hard to define. He
asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cold is life threatening?"
He stated that cold water was still employed
however,
showers were administered in a heated room. He stated there was no
specific guidance on it from Head~d~as left to its
Own discretion in the use of cold. ~dded there is a cable
from_documenting the use of "manipulation of the
environment."

186. ~Although the DO Guidelines do not
mention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft OMS
Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee
Interrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably cool
environment" as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F.)
The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe
temperature ranges, including the safe temperature range when a
detainee is wet or unclothed.

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Water Dousing
and
187.
. According to
"water dousing" has been used
others who have worked
since early 2003 when
officer introduced
this technique to the facility. Dousing involves laying a detainee
down on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to
15 minutes. Another officer explained that the room was maintained
at 70 degrees or more; the guards used water that was at room
temperature while the interrogator questioned the detainee.
188.
A review
from April and
May 2003 revealed tha
sought permission from
CT~to employ specific techniques for a number of detainees.
lncluded in the list of requested techniques was water dousing. n
Subsequent cables reported the use and duration of the techniques by
detainee per interrogation session." One certified interrogator,
noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique,
requested CTC to confirm guidelines on water dousing. A return
cable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towel or sheet,
may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the air
temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried
immediately.
189. ~The DC! Guidelines do not mention
water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2003 draft OMS
Guidelines, however, identify "water dousing" as one of 12 standard
measures that OMS listed, in ascending degree of intensity, as the
11th standard measure. OMS did not further address "water
dousing" in its guidelines.

eported water dousing as a teduUque used, but
in a later paragraph used the term ~cold water bath."

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ard Takedown

191.
According to
the hard
takedown was use 0 ten in interrogations a
as "part of the
atmospherics." For a timet it was the standard procedur for moving
a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. It was done f r h ck and
psychological impact and signaled the transition to an ther phase of
the interrogation. The act of putting a detaine into diaper can
cause abrasions if the detainee struggles becau th floor of the
tated he did n t i cu the
facility i concrete. The
hard takedown with
anagers, but he thou hl the
understoo wh t techniques were being u ed at
ed recent!
tated that the hard takedown had not be
er taking the interrogation das ,he lUlder tood that if

he was going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to
Headquarters. Although the DCI and 0 S Guidelines address
physical techniques and treat them as requiring advance
Headqu ters approval, they do not otherwise specifically address
the ard takedown."
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192.
stated that he was generally
familiar with the technique of hard takedo ns. He asserted that they
are authorized and believed they had been used one or more times at
. order to intimidate a detainee.
stated that he
auld not necessarily know if they have been used and did not
consider it a serious enough handling technique to require
Headquarters approval. Asked about the possibility that a detainee
may have been dragged on the ground during the course of a hard
takedown
esponded that he was unaware of that and did
not understand the point of dragging someone .along the corridor in

Abuse
Program

at Other Locations Outside of the CTC

193.
Althou h not within the scope of the
eTC Program, two other incidents
were reported in
2003.

As noted above, one
resulte~ in the death of a detainee at Asadabad Base 76

CS7'tNElIn

194.
June 2003, the U.S. military sought an Afghan
citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint U.s.
Army and CIA position in Asadabad located in ortheast
Afghanistan. On 18 June 2003, this individual appeared at Asadabad
Base at the urging of the local Governor. The individual was held in
a detention facility guarded by U.S. soldiers from the Base. During
76

Por more than a year, CIA referred to Asadabad Base as

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the four days the individual was detained, an Agency independent
contractor, who was a pirramilitary officer, is alleged to have severely
beaten the detainee with a large metal flashlight and kicked him
during interrogation sessions. The detainee died in custody on
21 Jtme; his body was turned over to a local cleric and returned to his
family on the follOWing date without an autopsy being performed.
Neither the contractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been
trained or authorized to conduct interrogations. The Agency did not
renew the independent contractor's contract, which was up for
renewal soon after the incident. OIG is investigating this incident in
concert with DoJ17

The objective was to determine if anyone at
e s 001 a . ormation about the detonation of a remotecontrolled improVised explosive device that had killed eight border
guards several days earlier.
196. (StfJ>lEl A teacher being interviewed
re ortedl smiled and lau hed inappropriately,
whereupon
used the butt stock of his rifle
to strike or "buttstroke" the teacher alleast twice in his torso,
followed by several knee kicks to his torso. This incident was
witnessed by 200 students. The teacher was reportecl1y not seriously
injured. In res onse to his actions, Agency management returned the
to Headquarters. He was counseled and
given a domestic assignment.

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ANALYTICAL SllPPOHT TO INfERROGATIO.\fS

204. ~ DirectorJte of lntelUgence anal\'sts
assigned to eTC pro\'ide analytICal support to interrogation teams in
the field. AJ1al~'sts are responsIble tor dC'\"(~Jopi..ng requirement.:; ior
the queshonin of detai.nees as well as conduchn debrielin s U1
some cases.

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~

Analvsts, however, do not
participate in the application of ll,terrogation teclU1iques .

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205. ~ According to a number of those
interviewed for this Review, the Agency's intelligence on Al-Qa1da
was limited prior to the initiation of the ere Interrogation Program.
The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts and
had very little hard knowledge of what particular Al-Qa1da
leaders-who later became detainees-knew. This lack of knowledge
led analysts to speculate about what a detainee "should know," vice
information the anal st could ob'ectivel demonstrate the detainee
did know.

a detainee did not respond to a question posed to him, the
assumption at Headquarters was that the detainee was holding back
and knew more; consequently, Headquarters recommended
resumption of EITs.

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generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to continue use of
the Errs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use
of the waterboard on Abu Zuba dah was made b senior officers of
the DO
to assess Abu Zubaydah's compliance and witnessed the
final waterboard session, after which, they reported back to
Headquarters that the Errs were no longer needed on Abu
Zubaydah.

EFFECITVENESS

211. ~ The detention of terrorists has prevented
them from engaging in further terrorist activity, and tljeir
interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the
identifica tion and apprehension of other terrorists, warned of
terrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world,
and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence
publications for senior policymakers and war fighters. In this regard,
there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the
effectiveness of Errs, however, is a more subjective process and not
without some concern.
212. ~ When the Agency began capturing
terrorists, management 'ud ed the success of the effort to be ettin
them off the streets

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t e capture 0 terronsts w 0 a access to mu more
significant, actionable information, the measure of success of the
Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the
detainees.
1

213. ~ Quantitatively, the DO has significantly
increased the munber of counterterrorism intelligence reports with
the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody. Between
9/11 and the end of April 2003, the Agency produced over 3,000
intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reports came from
intelli ence prOVided by the high value detainees at
214.
ere frequently uses the
information from one detainee, as well as other sources, to vet the
information of another detainee. Although lower-level detainees
provide less information than the high value detainees, information
from these detainees has, on many occasions, supplied the
information needed to robe the hi h value detainees further.
the triangulation of
intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities than
would be possible from a single detainee. For example, Mustafa
Alunad Adam al-Hawsawi, the Al-Qa'ida financier who was
captured with Khalid Shaykh M11hammad, rovided the Agency's
another
first intelligence pertaining to
Hawsawi's
participant in the 9/11 terrorist plot.
information to obtain additional deta.ils about
role from
Khalid Sha kh Muhammad

215.
Detainees have provided
information on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist gro~
note includes: the modus operandi of A l - Q a ' i d a , _
errorists who are capable of mounting attacks in the

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216. (
Detainee inform,ation has assisted in the
identification of terrorists. For example, information from Abu
Zubaydah helped lead to the identification of Jose Padilla and
Binyam Muhammed-<Jperatives who. had plans to detonate a
uranium-topped dirty bomb in either Washington, p.C., or ew:
York City. Riduan "Hambali" Isomuddin provided iniorq-tation·that
led to the arrest of previously unknown members of an Al-Qa'ida cell
in Karachi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack
inside the United States. Many other detainees, including lower-level
detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan, have provided leads to
other terrorists, but probably the most prolific has been Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad. He provided information that helped lead to
th arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair
Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh uhammad planned to
use to smuggle explosives into the United State; Saleh Almari, a
sleeper operati e in ew York; and Majid Khan, an operati e who
could enter the United States easil and was tasked to research
attacks
Khalid Shaykh uhamrnad's
information also led to the investigation and pro ecution of !'trn"'''''ro
Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio.

217. (
Detainees, both planners
and operatives, have also made the Agency aware of several plots
planned for the United States and around the world. The lots
~plansto

_attack the US. Consulate in Karachi. Pakistan; hi'ack aircraft
loosen
to fly into Heathrow Airport
track s ikes in an attern t to derail a train in the United States'
blow up several
U.S. gas stations to create panic and havoc; hijack and fly an airplane
into the tallest building in California in a west coast version of the
World Trade Center attack; cut the lines of suspension bridges in
New York in an effort to make them colla se;

This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots

were imminent. Agency senior managers believe U,at lives have been
saved as a result of the capture and lntenogation of terrorists who
were planning attacks, in particular Khaud Shaykl' Muhammad, Abu
Zubaydal1, Hambali, and AJ-Nashiri.
218.
detainees as one of the most in1
intelligence.
viewed
analysts' knowledge of the terrorist target as having much more
depth as a result of information from detainees and estimated that
detainee reporting is used in all counterterronsm articles roduced
for the most senior olic akers.

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said he believes the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable
in obtaining enormous amounts of critical threat information from
detainees who had otherwise believed they ere safe from any harm
in the hands of Americans.

220.
Inasmuch as EITs have been used only
since August 2002, and they have not.all been used with every high
value detainee, there is limited data on which to assess their
individual effectiveness. This Review identified concerns about the
use of the waterboard, specifically whether the risks of its use were
justified by the results, whether it has been unnecessarily used in
some instances, and whether the fact that it is being applied in a
manner different from its use in SERE training brings into question
the continued applicability of the Do} opinion to its use. Although
th waterboard is the most intrusive of the ElTs, the fact that
prec utions have been taken to provide on-site medical oversight in
th use of all E Ts is evidence that their use poses risks.
221.
Determining the effectiveness of each
EIT is important in facilitating Agency management's decision as to
w .ch techniques should be used and for how long. easuring the
ov rall effectiveness of EITs is challenging for a number of reasons
including: ( ) the Agency cannot deter . e with any certainty the
totality of the intelligence the detainee actually possesses; (2) each
detainee has different fears of and tolerance for EITs; (3) the
application of the same Errs by different interrogators may have

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222. ~ The waterboard has been used on three
detainees: Abu Zuba dah, Al-Nashiri, and Khalid Sha kh
Muhammad.

e
e at ea 0
e ee etainees
possessed perishable information about imminent threats against the
United States.

223.
Prior to the use of EITs, Abu Zubaydah
provided information fo
intelligence reports. Interrogators
applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during
August 2002. During the period between the end of the use of the
waterboard and 30 April 2003, he provided information for
approximatel_additional reports. It is not possible to say
definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah's
increased production, or if another factor, such as the length of
detention, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboard
however, Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative

rn._

With respect to Al-Nashiri';ep~terboardsessions in November 2002, after
w IC
e psychologist/interrogators determined that Al-Nashiri
was com liant. However, after bein mov

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Al-Nashiri was thought to be withholding
information. Al-Nashiri subsequently received additional EITs,
but not the waterboard. The Agency then
determined Al-Nashiri to be "compliant." Because of the litany of

techniques used by different interrogators over a relatively short
period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why Al-Nashiri
became more willing to provide information. However, following
the use of EITs, he provided information about his most current
operational planning and
as opposed to
the historical information he provided before the use ofEITs.
On the other hand, Khalid Shaykh
225.
uhammad, an accomplished resistor, provided only a few
intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard, and analysis of
that information revealed that much of it was outdated, inaccurate, or
incomplete. As a means of less active resistance, at the beginning of
their interrogation, detainees routinely provide information that they
know is already known. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad received 183
a lications of the waterboard in March 2003

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENTION
AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM

226.
The EITs used by the Agency under the
eTC Program are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the
United States has taken regarding human rights. This divergence has
been a cause of concern to some Agency per ormel involved with the
Program.

Policy Considerations
227. (D I I FOVO) Throughout its history, the Uni~ed States has
been an international proponent of hwnan rights nd has voiced
opposition to torture and rnistreatInent of prisoners by foreign
cOlllltries. This position is based upon fundamental principles that are
deeply embedded in the American legal structure and jurisprudence.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, for
example, require due process of law, while the Eighth Amendment
bars "cruel and unusual punishments.
II

228. CU/ IFOUO) The President advised the Senate when

submitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the United
States would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Convention
to 'undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other
acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which
do not amount to torture" as "roughly equivalent toll and "coextensi e
with the Constitutional guarantees against cruel, unusual, and
inhumane treatment."81 To this end, the United States submitted a
reservation to the orture Con ention stating that the United States
considers itself bound by Article 16 "only insofar as the term 'cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel,
unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the
5th, 8th and/ or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States." Although the Torture Convention expressly provides that no
exceptional circumstances whatsoever; including war or any other
public emergency, and no order from a superior officer, justifies
torture, no similar provision was included r garding acts of "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatm t or punishment."

81 (VIIFOUO) See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-20, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 15, May 23,1988; Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Executive Report 101-30, August 30, 1990, at 25, 29, quoting summary and analysis
submitted by President Ronald Reagan.. as revised by President George H.W. Bw;h.

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229. (VIIFOUO) Annual U.S. State Deparbnent COWlt:ry
Reports on Human Rights Practices have repeatedly condemned
harsh interrogation teclmiques utilized by foreign governments. For
example, the 2002 Report, issued in March 2003, stated:
[The United Stales] have been given grealer opportunity to make
good on our commibnenl to uphold standards of human digruty
and liberty .... [N]o country isexernpl from scrutiny. and all
countries benefit from constant striving to identify their
weaknesses and improve their performance. . .. [Tlhe Reports

serve as a gauge for our international human rights efforts,
pointing to areas of progress and drawing our attention to new and
continuing challenges.

In a world marching toward democracy and respect for human
rights, the United States is a leader, a partner and a contributor.
We have taken this responsibility with a deep and abiding belief
that human rights are universal. They are not grounded
exclusively in American or western values. But their protection
worldwide serves a core U.S. national interest.

The State Deparbnent Report identified objectionable practices in a
variety of cOWltries including, for example, patterns of abuse of
prisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as "suspension from bars by
handcuffs, and threats against family members, ... [being] forced
constantly to lie on hard floors [and] deprived of sleep .... " Other
reports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked.
230. (V/ I FOUO) In JWle 2003, President Bush issued a
statement in observance of "United Nations International Day in
Support of Victims of Torture:" The statement said in part:
The United States declares its strong solidarity with torture victims
across the world. Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity
everywhere. We are committed to building a world where human

rights are respected and protected by the rule of law.

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Freedom ITom torture is an inalienable hlunan right. _.. Yet
torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue
regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush
the human spirit . . _.
Notorious human rights abusers . .. have sought to shield their
abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions
and denying access to international human rights monitors . ...

The United States is corrunitted to the worldwide elimination of
torture and we are leading this fight by example. I caU on all
governments to join with the United States and the community of
law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting
all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and
unusual punislunent ....

Concerns Over Participation in the

erc Program

231. (S7fNEl.. During the course of this Review, a number of
Agency officers expressed unsolicited concern about the possibility of
recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in the
CTC Program. A number of officers expressed concern that a human
Ii ts ou mi ht ursue them for activities
Adclitionally, they feared that the Agency
would not stand behind them if tllis occurred.
232. ~ One officer expressed concern that one day,
Agency officers will wind up on some "wanted list" to apiar before
the World Court for war crimes stemming from activities
Another said, "Ten years from now we're going to be sorry
we're doing this ... [but) it has to be done." He expressed concern
that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news meclia and cited
particular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak.

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237. ~ The number of detainees in CIA custody
is relatively small by companson with those in U.s. military custody.
Nevertheless, the Agency, like the military, has an interest Ul the
disposition of detainees and particular interest in those who, if not
kept in isolation, would likely divulge information about the
circumstances of their detention.

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CONCLUSIONS
250. ~ The Agency's detention and
interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled
the identification an,d apprehension of other terrorists and warned of
terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world,
The CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in the
issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic
products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of U.S.
policymakers and military commanders. The effectiveness of
particular interrogation techniques in eliciting information that might
not otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured,
however.
251. ~ After 11 September 2001, numerous
Agency components and individuals invested immense time and
effort to implement the CTC Program qUickly, effectively, and within
the law. The work of the Directorate of Operations, Counterterrorist
Center (CTC), Office of General Counsel (OGC), Office of Medical
Services (OMS), Office of Technical Service (OTS)
_ h a s been especially notable, In effect, they began with
almost no foundation, as the Agency had discontinued virtually all
involvement in interrogations after encountering difficult issues with
earlier interrogation programs in Central America and the Near East.
Inevitably, there also have been some problems with current
activities.
, 252, (St-fWEl. OGC worked closely with Do} to determine the
legality of the measures that came to be known as enhanced
interrogation techniques (EITs). OGC also consulted with White
House and National Security Council officials regarding the
proposed techniques, Those efforts and the resulting Do} legal
opinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented, That legal opinion
was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience
and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning
whether long-term psychological effects would result from use of the
proposed techniques.

TO

253. ~ The Dol legal opinion upon which the Agency
relies is based upon technical definitions of "severe" treatment and
the "intent" of the interrogators, and consists of finely detailed
analysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency officers properly
carrying out BITs would not violate the Torture Convention's
prohibition of torture, nor would they be subject to criminal
prosecution under the U.S. torture statute. The opinion does not
address the separate question of whether the application of standard
or enhanced techniques by Agency officers is consistent with the
undertaking, accepted conditionally by the United States regarding
Article 16 of the Torture Convention, to prevent "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
254. (
Periodic efforts by the Agency to elicit
reaffirmation of Administration policy and Do} legal backing for the
, Agencyfs use of BITs-as they have actually been employed-have
been well advised and successful. However, in this process, Agency
officials have neither sought nor been provided a written statement
of policy or a formal signed update of the Do] legal opinion,
including suCh important determinations as the meaning and
applicability of Article 16 of the Torture Convention. In July 2003, the
DCI and the General Counsel briefed senior Administration officials
on the Agency's expanded use of EITs. At that time, the Attorney
General affirmed that the Agency·s conduct remained well within the
scope of the 1 August 2002 DoI legal opinion.

255.
A number of Agency officers of various
grade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation
activities are concerned that they may at some future date be
vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that the
U.S. Government will not stand behind them. Although the current
detention and interrogation Program has been subject to DoI legal
review and Administration political approval, it diverges sharply
from previous Agency policy and practice, rules that govern
interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers,

statements of U.S. policy by the Departme~t of State, and public
101

T

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statements by very senior U.S. officials, including the President, as
well as the policies expressed by Members of Congress, other
Western governments, international organizations, and human rights
groups. In addition, some Agency officers are aware of interrogation
activities that were outside or beyond the scope of the written Dof
opinion. Officers are concerned that future public revelation of the
CTC Program is inevitable and will seriously damage Agency
officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and
effectiveness of the Agency itself.

In particular, CTC did a commendable ·ob in directin the
interrogations of high value detainees at
At these foreign locations, Agency personnel-with one notable
exception described in this Review-followed guidance and
procedures and documented their activities well.
257. ('rs,(
By distinction, the Agency-especially
in the early months of the Program-failed to provide adequate
staffing, guidance, and support to those involved with the detention
and interro ation of detainees in

258. ~Unauthorized, improvised, inhumane,
and undocumented detention and interro ation techni ues were
used

-

subject of a se
General.
tmau onze tee ques were use m t e Interrogation 0 an
individual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation by
an Agency contractor in June 2003. A i i iofficers
'enc
did not normally
conduct interrogations at that location
the Agency
officers involved lacked timely and adequa e gUl ance, training,
experience, supervision, or authorization, and did not exercise sound
judgment.

259. ~ The Agency failed to issue in a timely
manner comprehensive written guidelines for detention and
provided to
interrogation activities. Although ad hoc guidance
many ofiicers through cables and briefings in the early months of
detention and interrogation activities, the DO Confinement and
Interrogation Guidelines were not issued until January 2003, several
months after initiation of interrogation activi and after man of the
unauthorized activities had taken lace.

was

260. ~ Such written guidance as does exist to
address detentions and interrogations undertaken by Agency officers
's inadequate. The
Directorate of Operations Handbook contains a sin Ie ara ra h that
is intended to uide officers
Neither this dated guidance nor general
Agency guidelines on routine intelligence collection is adequate to
instruct and protect Agency officers involved in contemporary
interro ation activities

.'I
.,

261. ~ During the interrogations of two
detainees, the waterboard was used in a manner inconsistent with the
written DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002. DoJ had stipulated that

its advice was baseq upon certain facts that the Agency had.
submitted to Dol, observing, for example, that ", .. you (the Agency)
have also orally infonned us that although some of these techniques
may be used with more than once [sic], that repetition will not be
substantial because the techniques generally lose their effecti eness
after several repetitionS." One key Al- a'ida terrorist was sub'eeted
to the waterboard at least 183 times
d was denied sleep for a period of 180 hours.
In this and another instance, the technique of application and volume
of water used differed from the DoJ opinion.

OMS did not issue formal medical guidelines
until April 2003. Per the advice of eTC/Legal, the OMS Guidennes
were then issued as "draft" and remain so even alter being re-issued
in September 2003.

264.
Agency officers report that reliance on
analytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence
may have resulted in the application of Errs without justification.
Some participants in the Program, particular y field interrogators,
judg that ere assessments to the effect that detainees are
Withholding information are not always supported by an objective
104

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evaluation of available information and the evaluation of the
interrogators but are too heavily based, instead, on pre umptions of
h t the individual might or should know.

266.
The Agency faces potentiall serious
long-term political and legal challenges as result of the ere
Detention and Interrogation Program, particularl its use of Ell's and
the inability of the U.S. Government to decide hat it" ill ultimatel
do ith terrorists detaine~ by the Agency.

:

,

D

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