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Office of Inspector General Department of Homeland Security - ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards , 2019

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ICE Does Not Fully Use
Contracting Tools to Hold
Detention Facility
Contractors Accountable
for Failing to Meet
Performance Standards

January 29, 2019
OIG-19-18

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention
Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet
Performance Standards


January 29, 2019

Why We
Did This
Inspection
U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement
(ICE) contracts with 106
detention facilities to
detain removable aliens.
In this review we sought
to determine whether ICE
contracting tools hold
immigration detention
facilities to applicable
detention standards, and
whether ICE imposes
consequences when
contracted immigration
detention facilities do not
maintain standards.

What We
Recommend
We made five
recommendations to
improve contract oversight
and compliance of ICE
detention facility
contractors.
For Further Information:

What We Found
Although ICE employs a multilayered system to manage and
oversee detention contracts, ICE does not adequately hold
detention facility contractors accountable for not meeting
performance standards. ICE fails to consistently include its quality
assurance surveillance plan (QASP) in facility contracts. The QASP
provides tools for ensuring facilities meet performance standards.
Only 28 out of 106 contracts we reviewed contained the QASP.
Because the QASP contains the only documented instructions for
preparing a Contract Discrepancy Report and recommending
financial penalties, there is confusion about whether ICE can
issue Contract Discrepancy Reports and impose financial
consequences absent a QASP.Between October 1, 2015, and June
30, 2018, ICE imposed financial penalties on only two occasions,
despite documenting thousands of instances of the facilities’
failures to comply with detention standards.
Instead of holding facilities accountable through financial
penalties, ICE issued waivers to facilities with deficient conditions,
seeking to exempt them from complying with certain standards.
However, ICE has no formal policies and procedures to govern the
waiver process, has allowed officials without clear authority to
grant waivers, and does not ensure key stakeholders have access
to approved waivers. Further, the organizational placement and
overextension of contracting officer’s representatives impede
monitoring of facility contracts. Finally, ICE does not adequately
share information about ICE detention contracts with key officials.

ICE Response
ICE officials concurred with all five recommendations and
proposed steps to update processes and guidance regarding
contracting tools used to hold detention facility contractors
accountable for failing to meet performance standards.

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at
(202) 981-6000, or email us at
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov

www.oig.dhs.gov



OIG-19-18

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

-DQXDU\

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 Ronald D. Vitiello
Deputy Director and Senior Official Performing the
Duties of Director
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
FROM: 	

John V. Kelly
Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
Inspector General

SUBJECT:	

ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold
Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to
Meet Performance Standards

Attached for your information is our final report, ICE Does Not Fully Use 

Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to

Meet Performance Standards. We incorporated the formal comments from the 

ICE Office of the Chief Financial Officer in the final report. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will 

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will 

post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Jennifer Costello, 

Deputy Inspector General, or Tatyana Martell, Chief Inspector, 

at (202) 981-6000. 

Attachment 


OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


Table of Contents
Background ................................................................................................... 3 

Results of Inspection ...................................................................................... 7 

ICE Does Not Consistently Use Contract-Based Quality Assurance Tools
and Impose Consequences for Contract Noncompliance ......................... 7
ICE’s Waiver Process May Allow Contract Facilities to Circumvent
Detention Standards and May Inhibit Proper Contract Oversight ........... 9
Organizational Placement and Overextension of CORs Impede Monitoring
of Detention Facilities .......................................................................... 12
Lack of Direct Access to Important Contract Files Hinders CORs’ and
DSMs’ Ability to Monitor Detention Contracts ...................................... 14
Conclusion ................................................................................................... 15 

Recommendations ......................................................................................... 15 


Appendixes
Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology .................................. 21
Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ..................... 22
Appendix C: Facility Listing and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
Status……………………. ....................................................................... 27
Appendix D: Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major
Contributors to This Report ................................................................. 31
Appendix E: Report Distribution .......................................................... 32

Abbreviations
ADP
CDF
CFR
COR
DIGSA
DSM
ERO
FAR
ICE
IGA

average daily population
contract detention facility
Code of Federal Regulations
contracting officer’s representative
dedicated inter-governmental service agreement
Detention Service Manager
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Federal Acquisition Regulation
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
inter-governmental agreement

www.oig.dhs.gov

OIG-19-18




OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


IGSA
NDS
ODO
OIG
PBNDS
QASP

www.oig.dhs.gov

inter-governmental service agreement
National Detention Standards
Office of Detention Oversight
Office of Inspector General
Performance-Based National Detention Standards
quality assurance surveillance plan

2



OIG-19-18

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


Background
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Office of Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO) confines detainees in civil custody for the
administrative purpose of holding, processing, and preparing them for removal
from the United States. While ICE owns five detention facilities, it has executed
contracts, inter-governmental service agreements (IGSA), or inter-governmental
agreements (IGA) with another 206 facilities for the purpose of housing ICE
detainees.1 Table 1 lists the types and numbers of facilities ICE uses to hold
detainees as well as the average daily population (ADP) at the end of fiscal year
2017.
Table 1: Types of Facilities ICE Uses for Detention
Facility Type

Description

Service Processing
Center

Facilities owned by ICE and
generally operated by contract
detention staff

5

3,263

Contract Detention
Facility (CDF)

Facilities owned and operated
by private companies and
contracted directly by ICE

8

6,818

Intergovernmental
Service Agreement
(IGSA)

Facilities, such as local and county
jails, housing ICE detainees (as well
as other inmates) under an IGSA
with ICE

87

8,778

Dedicated Intergovernmental
Service Agreement
(DIGSA)

Facilities dedicated to housing
only ICE detainees under an IGSA
with ICE

11

9,820

U.S. Marshals
Service Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA)

Facilities contracted by U.S.
Marshals Service that ICE also
agrees to use as a contract rider

100

6,756

211

35,435

Source: ICE data

Number
of
Facilities

Total:

FY 17 End
ADP


Unless otherwise indicated, in this report we use the term “contract” in reference to the
contract, IGSA, or IGA instrument used to establish a relationship between ICE and the
detention facility and the term “contract facility” to describe any detention facility operated
under a contract, IGSA, or IGA.
www.oig.dhs.gov
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


For this review, we focused on the 106 CDF, IGSA, and DIGSA facilities2 for
which ICE has primary contracting authority.3 In FY 2017, these 106 facilities
held an average daily population of more than 25,000 detainees. Since the
beginning of FY 2016, ICE has paid more than $3 billion to the contractors
operating these 106 facilities.
Key ICE Offices Involved in Contract Management and Facility Oversight
ICE spreads duties for planning, awarding, and administering contracts for
detention management and overseeing contract facilities between Management
and Administration and ERO, resulting in a multilayered system. Figure 1
provides the organizational structure for the key offices involved in managing
contracts and overseeing contract facilities.
Figure 1: Offices Responsible for Contract Management and Oversight
ICE Deputy
Director

Management and
Administration
Executive Associate
Director

ERO Executive
Associate Director

Custody
Management

Operations Support

Field Operations

Detention
Management
Division

Fiscal Management
Division

Domestic
Operations Division

Detention
Standards
Compliance Unit

Budget Execution
Unit

Domestic
Operations East

Detention Planning
and Acquisitions

Contract
Management Unit

Domestic
Operations West

ICE Health Services
Corps

Acquisitions
Management

Acquisition Service
Division

Detention
Compliance and
Removal

Office of Chief
Financial Officer

Office of Budget
and Program
Performance

Office of Financial
Management

Detention
Monitoring Unit

Source: Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of ICE data


See Appendix C: Facility Listing and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan Status for a listing 

of the 106 facilities reviewed.

3 We did not review contracts from the 100 detention facilities for which the U.S. Marshals 

Service has primary contracting authority. ICE executed IGAs (contract riders) with the U.S. 

Marshals Service to house ICE detainees at these facilities.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


Within ERO, the Custody Management Division (Custody Management)
manages ICE detention operations and oversees the administrative detainees
held in detention facilities. Custody Management has a Detention Standards
Compliance Unit, which monitors oversight inspections to evaluate compliance
with ICE’s national detention standards. As part of ICE ERO’s development of a
Detention Monitoring Program in 2010, Custody Management assigned
Detention Service Managers (DSM) to cover 54 contract facilities to monitor
compliance with detention standards. Custody Management also analyzes
operational bed space needs and initiates requests for additional contract
facilities to the Office of Acquisitions Management (Acquisitions Management),
within Management and Administration.
Acquisitions Management is responsible for preparing, executing, and
maintaining the contracts for detention facilities and for processing any
modifications to contracts. Acquisitions Management contracting officers have
signature authority to execute and modify contracts for detention facilities.
Contracting officers also appoint contracting officers’ representatives (COR) to
oversee the day-to-day management of each contract facility, but retain
ultimate authority for enforcing the terms of the contract.
ICE has 26 principal COR positions physically located at the 24 ERO Field
Offices to function as liaisons between field operations and contracting. CORs
report to Field Office management and are responsible for ensuring the
contractor complies with the terms of the contract. CORs generally conduct
detention facility site visits and should have first-hand knowledge of detention
facility operations in order to approve invoices for payment and to address
instances of noncompliance, such as by pursuing contractual remedies. The
Field Operations Division provides guidance to and coordination among the 24
national ERO Field Offices. The Field Office Directors are chiefly responsible for
the detention facilities in their assigned geographic area.
Detention Contracts and Standards Compliance
Each detention facility with an ICE contract must comply with one of three sets
of national detention standards: National Detention Standards, 2008
Performance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS), or 2011 PBNDS.
These standards (1) describe a facility’s immigration detention responsibilities,
(2) explain what detainee services a facility must provide, and (3) identify what
a facility must do to ensure a safe and secure detention environment for staff
and detainees.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


ICE monitors facility compliance with the applicable detention standards
through triennial Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) inspections,4 annual
contractor-led compliance inspections by Nakamoto Group, Inc., and the
assignment of Custody Management DSMs to cover 54 contract facilities.
Inspectors and DSMs report deficiencies to the facility, the ERO Field Office
responsible for the facility, and ICE headquarters. To correct these deficiencies,
ICE’s Detention Standards Compliance Unit, which works independent of the
contract offices, prepares and sends uniform corrective action plans to the ERO
Field Offices and works with them to ensure the deficiencies get resolved. As we
previously reported, this process is not as effective as intended.5
Another path for correcting deficiencies is through the contracts. Though not
required, detention contracts may include a quality assurance surveillance
plan (QASP). The QASP is a standard template that outlines detailed
requirements for complying with applicable performance standards, including
detention standards, and potential actions ICE can take when a contractor fails
to meet those standards. When facilities are found to be noncompliant, CORs
may submit a Contract Discrepancy Report (Discrepancy Report), which
documents the performance issue.
After CORs submit Discrepancy Reports, facilities are responsible for correcting
deficiencies or at least preparing a corrective action plan by the identified due
date. If the facility is not compliant, a Discrepancy Report may include a
recommendation for financial penalties, such as a deduction in or withholding
of ICE payment to the contractor.6 For example, the QASP states that a
deduction may be appropriate when an egregious event or deficiency occurs,
such as when a particular deficiency is noted multiple times without correction
or when the contractor failed to resolve a deficiency about which it was
properly and timely notified. A withholding may be appropriate while the
contractor corrects a deficiency. The contracting officer must approve any
withholdings or deductions.
We initiated this review to determine whether ICE is effectively managing
detention facility contracts for its 106 CDF, IGSA, and DIGSA facilities. This
report addresses (1) ICE’s failure to use quality assurance tools and impose
consequences for contract noncompliance; (2) the use of waivers, which may
circumvent detention standards specified in contracts; (3) how the CORs’
organizational placement hinders their ability to monitor contracts; and

ODO conducts compliance inspections at detention facilities housing detainees for greater
than 72 hours with an average daily population greater than 10. ODO is under ICE’s Office of
Professional Responsibility.
5 ICE’s Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or
Systemic Improvements, OIG-18-67, June 2018
6 Detention facilities cannot recoup a deduction, but can recoup a withholding when they
correct a deficiency.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


(4) CORs’ and DSMs’ lack of direct access to important contract files.

Results of Inspection
Although ICE employs a multilayered system to manage and oversee detention
contracts, ICE does not adequately hold detention facility contractors
accountable for not meeting performance standards. ICE fails to consistently
use contract-based quality assurance tools, such as by omitting the QASP from
facility contracts. In fact, only 28 out of 106 contracts we reviewed included the
QASP. Because the QASP contains the only documented instructions for
preparing a Discrepancy Report and recommending financial penalties, there is
confusion about whether ICE can issue Discrepancy Reports and impose
financial consequences absent a QASP.Between October 1, 2015, and June 30,
2018, ICE imposed financial penalties on only two occasions, despite
documenting thousands of instances of the facilities’ failures to comply with
detention standards. Instead of holding facilities accountable through financial
penalties, ICE issued waivers to facilities with deficient conditions, seeking to
exempt them from having to comply with certain detention standards. However,
ICE has no formal policies and procedures about the waiver process and has
allowed officials without clear authority to grant waivers. ICE also does not
ensure key stakeholders have access to approved waivers. Further, we
determined that the organizational placement and overextension of CORs
impede monitoring of facility contracts. Finally, ICE does not adequately share
information about ICE detention contracts with key officials, such as CORs and
DSMs, which limits their ability to access information necessary to perform
core job functions.

ICE Does Not Consistently Use Contract-Based Quality
Assurance Tools and Impose Consequences for Contract
Noncompliance
As noted, there are two paths for correcting deficiencies: the facilities
inspection process and the quality assurance tools in the facilities contracts
themselves. With respect to the inspection process, we previously reported that
ICE does not adequately follow up on identified deficiencies or consistently hold
facilities accountable for correcting them.7 During our current work, we found
similar problems with ICE’s use of contract-based quality assurance tools.
Specifically, ICE did not consistently include the QASP in the facility contracts
we reviewed, which has led to confusion among CORs about how to issue
Discrepancy Reports. These problems are compounded because ICE does not

ICE’s Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or
Systemic Improvements, OIG-18-67, June 2018
www.oig.dhs.gov
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


track these reports and rarely imposes financial consequences, even when
identified deficiencies present significant safety and health risks.
Out of 106 contracts we reviewed, only 28 contained the QASP.8 The QASP is
especially important because it contains the only documented instructions for
preparing a Discrepancy Report and recommending financial penalties, when
informal resolution is not practicable.9 Consequently, when contracts do not
contain the QASP, CORs and contracting officers are left confused as to what
actions they can take when deficiencies are identified. For example, of the 11
CORs we interviewed, 5 told us they could issue a Discrepancy Report to a
facility that did not have the QASP, while 2 said they could not. Two others
said they could issue a Discrepancy Report without the QASP, but they could
not seek financial penalties for noncompliance. The two remaining CORs told
us they did not know whether they could issue a Discrepancy Report without a
QASP.
Even where ICE does issue Discrepancy Reports, ICE does not track their use
or effectiveness. No office within ICE could provide any data on how many
Discrepancy Reports are issued to facilities and for what reasons. An ICE
official from Acquisitions Management explained that his office would have to
review the individual contract files to see whether Discrepancy Reports were
issued and why. The Discrepancy Reports we reviewed involved serious
deficiencies such as significant understaffing, failure to provide sufficient
mental health observation, and inadequate monitoring of detainees with
serious criminal histories. However, we have no way of verifying whether any of
these deficiencies have been corrected.
Furthermore, ICE is not imposing financial penalties, even for serious
deficiencies such as those we found in the Discrepancy Reports. In addition to
the issues flagged by these Discrepancy Reports, from October 2015 to June
2018 various inspections and DSMs found 14,003 deficiencies at the 106
contract facilities we focused on for this review. These deficiencies include
those that jeopardize the safety and rights of detainees, such as failing to notify
ICE about sexual assaults and failing to forward allegations regarding
misconduct of facility staff to ICE ERO. Despite these identified deficiencies,
ICE only imposed financial penalties twice. ICE deducted funds from one
facility as a result of a pattern of repeat deficiencies over a 3-year period,
primarily related to health care and mental health standards. The other
deduction was made due to a U.S. Department of Labor order against the

Specifically, all 8 CDF and 10 of the 11 DIGSA facilities had a QASP in place, but only 10 of
87 non-dedicated IGSA facilities had a QASP.
9 The QASP directs the COR to send a Discrepancy Report documenting the deficiencies to the
facility. The facility is required to respond to the Discrepancy Report by a specified date,
indicating that either the deficiencies have been corrected or a corrective action plan is in
place.
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


contractor for underpayment of wages and was not related to any identified
deficiency. Our review of the corresponding payment data identified about $3.9
million in deductions, representing only 0.13 percent of the more than $3
billion in total payments to contractors during the same timeframe. ICE did not
impose any withholdings during this timeframe.

ICE’s Waiver Process May Allow Contract Facilities to
Circumvent Detention Standards and May Inhibit Proper
Contract Oversight
Instead of holding facilities accountable through financial penalties, ICE
frequently issued waivers to facilities with deficient conditions, seeking to
exempt them from having to comply with certain detention standards.10
However, we found that ICE has no formal policies and procedures to govern
the waiver process and has allowed ERO officials without clear authority to
grant waivers. We also determined that ICE does not ensure key stakeholders
have access to approved waivers. In some cases, officials may violate Federal
Acquisition Regulation requirements because they seek to effectuate
unauthorized changes to contract terms.
Lack of Guidance on the Waiver Process Potentially Exempts Contract Facilities
from Complying with Certain Detention Standards Indefinitely
Generally, waiver requests result from ICE’s inspections or DSMs’ monitoring.
After completing an inspection, inspectors brief the facility on the deficiencies
they find and issue inspection reports. The Detention Standards Compliance
Unit then issues uniform corrective action plans to the ERO Field Offices and
DSMs. The Field Offices forward the uniform corrective action plans to the
facilities, work with the facilities to correct the identified deficiencies, and
report those corrective actions to the Detention Standards Compliance Unit.
DSMs monitor compliance on a daily basis and report deficiencies to the
facilities, to local ICE Field Offices, and through weekly reports to Custody
Management.
As ICE ERO works with the contractor to resolve the deficiencies, a facility can
assert that it could not remedy the deficiency because complying with the
standard can create a hardship, because of a conflict with a state law or a local
policy, a facility design limitation, or another reason. In these cases, the Field
Office Director may submit a waiver request to Custody Management, which
approves or denies the request. We analyzed the 68 waiver requests submitted


ICE’s Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance
or Systemic Improvements, OIG-18-67, June 2018
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


between September 2016 and July 2018. Custody Management approved 96
percent of these requests, including waivers of safety and security standards.11
Despite this high approval rate, ICE could not provide us with any guidance on
the waiver process. Key officials admitted there are no policies, procedures,
guidance documents, or instructions to explain how to review waiver requests.
The only pertinent documents that ICE provided were examples of memoranda
that Field Office Directors could use to request waivers of the detention
standards’ provisions on strip searches. However, the memoranda did not
acknowledge the important constitutional and policy interests implicated by a
facility’s use of strip searches. ICE officials did not explain how Custody
Management should handle such waiver requests when a contrary contractual
provision requires compliance with a strip search standard.
Further, contract facilities may be exempt from compliance with otherwise
applicable detention standards indefinitely, as waivers generally do not have an
end date and Custody Management does not reassess or review waivers after it
approves them. In our sample of 65 approved waiver requests, only three had
identified expiration dates; the 62 others had no end date.
The Chief of the Detention Standards Compliance Unit within ICE ERO
Custody Management has drafted written guidance on the waiver submission
and approval process, but has not finalized that document. Without formal
waiver guidance and review processes, ICE may be indefinitely allowing
contract facilities to circumvent detention standards intended to assure the
safety, security, and rights of detainees. A facility’s indefinite exemption from
certain detention standards raises risks to detainee health and safety that ICE
could reduce by enforcing compliance with those standards. For example,
Custody Management granted a waiver authorizing a facility (a CDF) to use 2chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS gas) instead of the OC (pepper) spray authorized
by the detention standard. According to information contained in the waiver
request, CS gas is 10 times more toxic than OC spray.12 Another waiver allows
a facility (a DIGSA) to commingle high-custody detainees, who have histories of
serious criminal offenses, with low-custody detainees, who have minor, nonviolent criminal histories or only immigration violations, which is a practice the
standards prohibit in order to protect detainees who may be at risk of
victimization or assault.13

PBNDS 2008 and PBNDS 2011 organize standards by seven topics: safety, security, order, 

care, activities, justice, and administration and management. NDS 2000 organizes standards 

by three topics: detainee services, health services, and safety and control. 

12 ICE PBNDS 2011, Part 2 – Security, 2.15 Use of Force and Restraints Section (V)(G)(4) states, 

“The following devices are not authorized […] mace, CN, tear gas, or other chemical agents, 

except OC spray.” 

13 ICE PBNDS 2011, Part 2 – Security, 2.2 Custody Classification System requires facilities to

avoid commingling low-custody detainees, who have minor, non-violent criminal histories or 

www.oig.dhs.gov
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


ERO Officials without Clear Authority Are Granting Waivers That May
Undermine Contract Terms
ICE’s practice for issuing waivers could violate the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR), which establishes policies and procedures that executive
agencies, including DHS, must use for acquisitions, unless other legal
authority removes an acquisition from the FAR’s coverage. Under the FAR,
“only contracting officers acting within the scope of their authority are
empowered to execute contract modifications.”14 To prevent others from
exercising authority expressly reserved for contracting officers, the FAR
explains that other Federal personnel shall not “[a]ct in such a manner as to
cause the contractor to believe that they have authority to bind the
Government.”15 ICE asserts that only its CDFs, not its DIGSAs or IGSAs, are
acquisitions governed by the FAR. However, Acquisitions Management
procurement guidance stipulates that, in handling DIGSA and IGSA issues,
contracting officers “should utilize applicable FAR principles and clauses that
are in the Government’s best interest to the maximum extent possible.”16
Despite these FAR provisions and this guidance, a senior official told us that
the Assistant Director for Custody Management has the authority to act on
waiver requests. The Assistant Director has, in turn, orally delegated authority
to decide waiver requests to the Deputy Assistant Director for Custody
Management. However, Custody Management did not provide any
documentation of this authority, delegated or otherwise, to grant waivers.
According to the same official, the detention standards are ICE policies and the
current waiver approval process is sufficient. This position does not
acknowledge that ICE contractually requires facilities to comply with detention
standards, and that only the contracting officer — not the Assistant Director or
the Deputy Assistant Director — can modify those contract terms.
Through their approval of waivers, ERO officials without the authority to
modify contracts have sought to remove certain detention standards from
oversight, even though those standards are part of the contract for the
detention facility. In reviewing waivers approved for CDFs, we found that ICE
issued two waivers between October 2016 and July 2018 for aspects of ICE’s
2011 PBNDS that are part of ICE’s contracts for these facilities. Through these
waivers, ICE allowed facilities to deviate from PBNDS 2011 requirements.

only immigration violations, with high-custody detainees, who have histories of serious 

criminal offenses. 

14 48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 43.102(a) 

15 Id. § 43.102(a)(2)

16 ICE Acquisitions Management, Procurement Guide 18-02, Inter-governmental Service 

Agreements (IGSA) (Apr. 20, 2018)

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security


ICE Staff Responsible for Management and Oversight of Facility Contracts Do
Not Receive Information on Approved Waivers
Custody Management does not share information on approved waivers with
Acquisitions Management, which is responsible for administering detention
contracts. Acquisitions Management contracting officers told us that most of
them did not know that Custody Management had issued waivers after a
facility entered into a detention contract with ICE. The Detention Standards
Compliance Unit’s draft guidance for the waiver process does not require
Custody Management to share waiver requests or approvals with Acquisitions
Management. Because Acquisitions Management does not receive information
on approved waivers, it cannot determine whether the waiver contradicts
contract terms or violates the FAR or other procurement requirements.
Further, Acquisitions Management cannot ensure that contracting officers and
CORs know about Custody Management’s waiver decision, which undermines
their ability to monitor their assigned contracts.

Organizational Placement and Overextension of CORs Impede
Monitoring of Detention Facilities
COR placement under the Field Office raises concerns about the CORs’ ability
to perform their primary functions of monitoring detention facilities and
enforcing contract terms. They may not be able to fulfill these functions
because the Field Office pressures them to do things outside of protocol and
assigns them additional duties. In some cases, CORs have unachievable
workloads that inhibit their ability to provide consistent and appropriate
oversight. Overall, these issues may allow facility violations of contract terms
and noncompliance with performance standards to go unaddressed and may
lead to dangerous detention conditions.
Reporting to Field Offices May Compromise a COR’s Independent Oversight
Efforts
When the COR program was initially developed in 2009, CORs were located at
Field Offices, but the COR Program Manager at headquarters served as their
first-line supervisor. Field Office Directors provided input for CORs’
performance work plans and ratings, but did not directly supervise them. This
supervisory chain allowed the COR to remain independent from the Field Office
and detention facility operations. However, after a year under this supervisory
structure, the COR supervisory chain was changed by making the assigned
Field Office responsible for COR supervision.
An email to Field Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors announcing
the transition gave four reasons for the initial alignment of CORs reporting to
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headquarters.17 In contrast, the only justification ICE provided for the
realignment was that the current organizational reporting relationship was
“proving to be cumbersome and sub-optimal.” During interviews, ICE officials
could not provide any additional explanation for why ICE moved supervision of
CORs from headquarters to the Field Offices. Most CORs we interviewed who
held those positions during the transition explained that this organizational
realignment was detrimental to their duties and independence. For example,
two CORs said they were hesitant to identify instances of noncompliance or
issue Discrepancy Reports on contracts they oversee because they feared
retaliation from Field Office management.
The contracting officers we spoke with had similar concerns regarding the
CORs’ ability to do their jobs independently. Some contracting officers noted
that CORs might be reluctant to disagree with their Field Office supervisors,
who complete their performance appraisals. For example, one contracting
officer identified a time when, at the request of the Field Office supervisor, a
COR was authorizing payment for transport of ICE detainees on a contract that
did not allow transportation. However, this COR lacked the authority to
approve such contract additions because only the contracting officer can
modify contracts.
The current COR position descriptions permit CORs to complete “other duties
as assigned,” which allows Field Offices to task CORs with duties outside of
contracting oversight and management. During interviews with 11 CORs we
heard that Field Office managers have tasked CORs with collateral duties to
the detriment of their primary function. These tasks included supervising
mission support personnel; acting as the interim DSM; processing background
investigations for all employees; and developing requirements for contracts on
projects unrelated to detention, like retirement planning and finding office
space for employees.
Furthermore, inconsistent support from the Field Office can create an
environment that impedes CORs’ oversight of detention contracts. According to
the ERO Contracting Officer’s Representative Supplement, dated October 2015,
the COR work plan template identifies site visits as a possible monitoring
technique for contracts, but not all CORs are encouraged to conduct these
visits. Three Field Offices restricted CORs from traveling to detention facilities,
which impedes proper evaluation of facilities’ compliance with contract terms.

The May 26, 2010 email from ERO’s Assistant Directors for Field Operations and Mission
Support announcing the transition of CORs (formerly COTRs) from headquarters to Field
Offices stated, “While the COTR positions were established in the field, they reported directly to
Headquarters (HQ) primarily to (1) provide the COTR with the ability and autonomy to ensure
that contracts are properly established and administered; (2) ensure that the COTR’s primary
duty is contract monitoring and administration; (3) establish and standardize best practices
across the DRO enterprise; and (4) enhance dialogue with HQ regarding field office acquisition,
contract administration, and facility project management issues.”
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According to a senior official, ICE is working with the Office of Personnel
Management to adjust the current COR position descriptions; expected
changes include removing the “other duties as assigned” language and
providing clearer guidance on COR responsibilities.
Overextending CORs May Weaken Contract Oversight
Although some CORs are assigned additional work, others are overtasked with
detention contracts. CORs tasked with overseeing many facility contracts and
invoices, as well as non-detention contracts supporting the functions of a Field
Office, told us they were overextended. For example, of the 11 CORs we
interviewed:
• Four CORs oversee 10 or more facilities, with 2 overseeing 16 and 22 

contracts, respectively, across multiple states. 

• One COR has been assigned as the primary Project Manager for a new 

processing center that will be used by four Federal agencies, while also 

being a COR for three detention contracts. 


• Five CORs also oversee large transportation contracts, which require CORs
to spend substantial time reviewing and approving invoices.
In one Field Office covering multiple states, Field Office leadership allowed
CORs to develop a network of assistants to aid oversight efforts. Other Field
Offices use mission support personnel to support CORs with administrative
tasks, such as reconciling invoices.

Lack of Direct Access to Important Contract Files Hinders
CORs’ and DSMs’ Ability to Monitor Detention Contracts
CORs are integral to ICE’s efforts to monitor its detention contracts, a process
in which DSMs are also heavily involved. However, CORs and DSMs lack
consistent access to all pertinent contracts and modifications. Although DHS
requires ICE to maintain an official file folder for each contract, which should
contain the contract and all modifications to it, this system does little to ensure
all key stakeholders have access to pertinent contract documents.
Acquisitions Management places contracts and modifications in an electronic
database called PRISM, to which several members of Contract Management
have access but neither CORs nor DSMs have access. Acquisitions
Management also places contract documents, including modifications, on the
“Q Drive,” an electronic library that will eventually replace PRISM as the official
repository for detention contracts. However, CORs and DSMs do not have
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access to the Q Drive either. Acquisitions Management also has some historical
paper-only files for active contracts initiated around 2005 or earlier, but does
not give CORs automatic access to these documents.
CORs must maintain their own file, which is part of the official contract file,
and which should include a copy of the contracts and modifications that CORs
oversee. One interviewee noted that CORs should receive contracts and
modifications from contracting officers or contract specialists, but this practice
is not consistent. Absent access to contracts and modifications through
Acquisitions Management, CORs in the field must obtain these documents on
their own, which can be time consuming and inefficient. When one COR began
her position, she had to create her own electronic drive of documents, where
she maintains copies of all contracts and modifications.

Conclusion
From October 2015 to June 2018, ICE paid contractors operating the 106
detention facilities subject to this review more than $3 billion. Despite
documentation of thousands of deficiencies and instances of serious harm to
detainees that occurred at these detention facilities, ICE rarely imposed
financial penalties. ICE should ensure that detention contracts include terms
that permit ICE to hold contractors to performance standards and impose
penalties when those standards are not maintained. ICE needs to finalize
policies and procedures for the waiver process to ensure that officials do not
circumvent contract terms. ICE also needs to develop or enhance policies and
procedures to ensure that those responsible for contract oversight have access
to information necessary to do their jobs and receive adequate guidance about
the actions available to them when contract performance standards are not
met. Further, ICE should ensure CORs in the field are unencumbered in their
ability to manage and oversee detention contracts. Finally, ICE should
strengthen the ability of CORs and DSMs to access documents related to
pertinent detention contracts.

Recommendations
We recommend the Executive Associate Director for Management and
Administration:
Recommendation 1: Develop a process to decide when to seek to include a
QASP in existing contracts and IGSAs that are not subject to a QASP and all
future detention contracts and IGSAs. For each contract and IGSA that
remains without a QASP, document the reason(s) why a QASP could not be
included and summarize the actions available to contracting officers and CORs
when contractors fail to meet applicable detention standards.
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Recommendation 2: Develop protocols to guide CORs and contracting officers
in issuing Discrepancy Reports and imposing appropriate financial penalties
against detention facility contractors in response to contract noncompliance.
The protocols should include:
1. clear guidance for determining when to issue a Discrepancy Report;
2. instructions for issuing and approving a Discrepancy Report;
3. clear guidance for determining when to impose a financial penalty and
what type of financial penalty to impose;
4. instructions for imposing a financial penalty; and
5. a process to track all Discrepancy Reports issued and financial penalties
imposed by ICE, to include data regarding the final resolution of the
issue that led to the Discrepancy Report or financial penalty.
We recommend the Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and Removal
Operations:
Recommendation 3: Develop protocols to ensure that all existing and future
waivers are:
1. approved by ICE officials with appropriate authority;
2. distributed to key stakeholders, such as contracting officers, CORs, and
DSMs, who need the waivers to perform core job functions;
3. consistent with contract terms; and
4. compliant with FAR requirements, as applicable.
Recommendation 4: Develop a staffing plan for detention CORs, to permit
adequate contract oversight and ensure an achievable workload. Evaluate the
organizational placement of CORs. If CORs remain under Field Office
supervision, develop safeguards to prevent Field Office supervisors from
interfering with CORs’ ability to fulfill their contract oversight duties.
We recommend the Executive Associate Director for Management and
Administration:
Recommendation 5: Develop protocols to ensure that CORs and DSMs have
full and expedient access to the contract documentation they need to perform
core job functions.

Management Comments and OIG Analysis
We have included a copy of ICE’s Management Response in its entirety in
appendix B. We also received technical comments from ICE and incorporated
them in the report where appropriate. We consider all recommendations to be
resolved and open. A summary of ICE’s responses and our analysis follows.

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ICE concurred with all five recommendations but disagreed with some of the
report’s conclusions. As a result, we will be closely monitoring all actions ICE
takes in reponse to the reccomendatiosn to ensure compliance. Specifically,
ICE purports that it “already has practices in place to maintain and distribute
waivers to appropriate stakeholders” (emphasis added). However, ICE did not
provide DHS OIG with documentation supporting its claim that it has practices
in place to distribute waivers to appropriate stakeholders; rather, the evidence
indicates only that ICE makes approved waivers accessible to stakeholders
upon request. Providing access to waivers upon request is not the same as
distributing approved waivers to appropriate stakeholders. Compounding the
issue, we determined that ICE did not provide notification of approved waivers
effectively. For instance, we determined that CORs and a DSM were not notified
of approved waivers, and contracting officers confirmed that most of them did
not know that Custody Management had issued waivers.
ICE also stated that the report does not discuss actions it took to resolve “noncompliance issues” at facilities, including removing detainees from a facility,
scaling back its usage of a facility, and terminating agreements. However, ICE
failed to provide specific examples of corrective action at particular facilities,
thereby limiting DHS OIG’s ability to evaluate whether the actions were
effective means by which to hold contractors accountable. Moreover, the
objectives of this review focused on whether ICE uses contracting tools to
ensure facilities meet applicable detention standards. ICE’s purported removal
of detainees from a facility, or diminished use of a facility, are not relevant to
review of its use of contracting tools to drive contractor accountability. ICE’s
assertion that it terminated facility agreements for unspecified “noncompliance issues” at other, unnamed facilities is also irrelevant to our review.
Our review focused on ICE’s efforts to use contracting tools to ensure
compliance with applicable detention standards at 106 CDF, IGSA, and DIGSA
facilities (see appendix C). Based on the information provided by ICE during the
review, ICE’s facility contracts for these facilities were not terminated because
of a failure to meet applicable detention standards.

ICE also stated it uses a “layered approach to monitor detention conditions at
facilities, with processes in place to implement corrective actions in instances
where non-compliance with ICE detention standards is found.” We determined
that the processes in place do not ensure consistent compliance with detention
standards. Not only does ICE not fully use contracting tools to hold detention
facility contractors accountable for failing to meet performance standards, our
previous work has determined that ICE’s inspections and onsite monitoring do
not ensure consistent compliance with detention standards or promote
comprehensive deficiency corrections.18 We identified serious incidents of

ICE’s Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance
or Systemic Improvements, OIG-18-67, June 2018
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noncompliance during our own unannounced inspections of ICE detention
facilities19 and the more than 14,000 deficiencies identified by various
inspections and DSMs from October 2015 to June 2018 suggest room for
improvement in the current processes for addressing noncompliance with ICE
detention standards.
ICE Response to Recommendation 1: ICE concurred with the
recommendation. ICE will ensure that all CDF, service processing centers, and
DIGSA facilities will have a QASP. ICE will develop a process to evaluate
whether to include a QASP in the remaining contracts or IGSAs. For each
contract and IGSA that remains without a QASP, ICE will document the reason
why a QASP was not included. ICE will provide training and issue procurement
guidance to summarize the actions available to contracting officers and CORs
when contractors fail to meet applicable detention standards. ICE anticipates
completing these actions by March 31, 2019.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,
which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when we
receive documentation showing that ICE has: (1) included a QASP for all CDFs,
service processing centers, and DIGSA facilities; (2) implemented a process to
evaluate whether to include a QASP in all remaining and future detention
contracts or IGSAs; (3) documented the reason why a QASP was not included
for each contract or IGSA that remains without a QASP; and (4) completed
training and issued procurement guidance summarizing the actions available
to contracting officers and CORs when contractors fail to meet applicable
detention standards.
ICE Response to Recommendation 2: ICE concurred with the
recommendation. ICE has already begun providing additional training to all
ERO CORs responsible for detention contracts, consisting of six training
sessions that cover various aspects of COR duties. The training includes
sessions that cover various methods to ensure contract compliance, monitoring
and inspections, and dealing with unsatisfactory contractor performance. ICE
will also provide more specific training on monitoring and inspections and
dealing with unsatisfactory performance to Acquisitions Management
contracting officers responsible for detention contracts. 


Management Alert – Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in
Adelanto, California, OIG-18-86, September 2018; Concerns About ICE Detainee Treatment and
Care at Detention Facilities, OIG-18-32, December 2017; and Management Alert on Issues
Requiring Immediate Action at the Theo Lacy Facility in Orange, California, OIG-17-43-MA,
March 2017
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ICE will also develop and issue procurement guidance that will provide
protocols for Discrepancy Reports, which will address when to issue a
Discrepancy Report, instructions for issuing and approving a report, when to
impose a financial penalty, what type of financial penalty to impose, and
instructions for imposing a financial penalty. The procurement guidance will
also include a process to track all Discrepancy Reports issued and financial
penalties imposed. ICE anticipates completing all actions responsive to this
recommendation by March 31, 2019.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,
which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when we
receive documentation showing that: (1) all ERO CORs have completed the
specified training covering methods to ensure contract compliance, monitoring
and inspections, and dealing with unsatisfactory contractor performance; (2) all
Acquisitions Management contracting officers have completed the specified
training covering monitoring and inspections and dealing with unsatisfactory
performance; and (3) ICE has developed and issued procurement guidance
providing protocols for Discrepancy Reports, which addresses when to issue a
Discrepancy Report, instructions for issuing and approving a report, when to
impose a financial penalty, what type of financial penalty to impose,
instructions for imposing a financial penalty, and a process to track all
Discrepancy Reports issued and financial penalties imposed.
ICE Response to Recommendation 3: ICE concurred with the
recommendation. ICE will document the waiver process in a policy or standard
operating procedure (SOP) that is accessible to stakeholders, such as
contracting officers, CORs, and on-site DSMs. The policy or SOP will clearly
address when waivers need to be incorporated via contract modification. ICE
will also review all current waivers to determine continuing applicability and, if
appropriate, cancel any waivers that are no longer needed. ICE will also ensure
that the annual or more frequent review of approved waivers by appropriate
personnel is included in its documented waiver process. Finally, ICE will
ensure stakeholders have access to approved waivers and expand waiver
distribution to DSMs, contracting officers, CORs, and other staff who monitor
detention conditions or contract performance, in addition to theERO Field
Office personnel and facility management staff who already receive the waivers.
ICE anticipates completing these actions by April 30, 2019.

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OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,
which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when we
receive the waiver policies or SOP addressing when waivers need to be
incorporated via contract modification, requiring annual or more frequent
review of approved waivers by appropriate personnel, and ensuring access to
and distribution of waivers to stakeholders, along with documentation showing
that current waivers were reviewed to evaluate whether they were approved by
ICE officials with the authority to do so, are consistent with contract terms,
comply with FAR requirements, and continue to be applicable.
ICE Response to Recommendation 4: ICE concurred with the
recommendation. ICE will review the workload of its detention facility CORs,
and determine an ideal staffing level to oversee its existing contracts. ICE will
consider the operational placement of CORs under Field Office supervisors. If
CORs remain under Field Office supervision, ERO leadership will ensure Field
Office managers are fully aware of the importance of the CORs’ responsibilities
and allowing them sufficient time and resources to complete their contract
oversight duties. ICE anticipates completing these actions by September 30,
2019.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,
which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when we
receive documentation showing ICE completed a review of the workload of
detention facility CORs and determined an ideal staffing level to oversee its
existing contracts, evaluated the operational placement of CORs, and, if CORs
remain under Field Office supervision, ensured Field Office managers are made
fully aware of the importance of the CORs’ responsibilities and allowing them
sufficient time and resources to complete their contract oversight duties.
ICE Response to Recommendation 5: ICE concurred with the
recommendation. ICE now requires that every contract document be available
electronically on a shared drive. ICE will give CORs and DSMs read-only access
to this system to allow them efficient access to contract documentation. ICE
anticipates completing this action by June 30, 2019.
OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation,
which is resolved and open. We will close this recommendation when we
receive adequate supporting documentation that CORs and DSMs have full and
expedient access to the contract documentation they need to perform core job
functions.

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Appendix A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
DHS OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law
107ï296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. In this review,
we sought to determine whether ICE contracting tools hold immigration
detention facilities to applicable detention standards; and whether ICE imposes
consequences when contracted immigration detention facilities do not maintain
standards.
To answer the objective, we evaluated the policies and procedures governing
ICE detention contract execution, amendment, and oversight and conducted a
walkthrough of contract files with ICE Acquisitions Management to obtain an
understanding of the detention contracting process. We reviewed a judgmental
sample of current contracts, which included CDF, IGSA, and DIGSA facilities,
and obtained and reviewed payment and penalty data for the 106 facilities
within the scope of this review. We collected and analyzed data regarding
detention facility inspections and calculated the number of deficiencies
identified by ICE. We reviewed all of the proposed waivers submitted for
detention facilities subject to this review and evaluated the waiver process and
ICE’s authority to issue waivers. We interviewed contracting officers, CORs,
and DSMs, along with ICE representatives from several components, including
Acquisitions Management, Office of Contract Management, ERO’s Budget
Office, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Detention Management Division,
Burlington Finance Center, and Office of Detention Policy and Planning. We
also interviewed Field Office leadership from ICE’s Baltimore Field Office.
We conducted this review between January and October 2018 pursuant to the
Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency. The evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our objectives.

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Appendix B
Management Comments to the Draft Report

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Appendix C
Facility Listing and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan Status
Detention Facility

Facility
Type

QASP Included in
Contract

BROWARD TRANSITIONAL CENTER
DENVER CONTRACT DETENTION
FACILITY
ELIZABETH CONTRACT DETENTION
FACILITY
HOUSTON CONTRACT DETENTION
FACILITY
NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL
CENTER (YOUNGSTOWN CDF)
NORTHWEST DETENTION CENTER
OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER (SAN
DIEGO CDF)
SOUTH TEXAS DETENTION COMPLEX
ADELANTO ICE PROCESSING CENTER
ELOY FEDERAL CONTRACT FACILITY
FOLKSTON ICE PROCESSING CENTER (D.
RAY JAMES)
IMMIGRATION CENTERS OF AMERICA
FARMVILLE
IMPERIAL REGIONAL DETENTION
FACILITY
JENA/LASALLE DETENTION FACILITY
MESA VERDE DETENTION FACILITY
OTERO COUNTY PROCESSING CENTER
PINE PRAIRIE CORRECTIONAL CENTER
PRAIRIELAND DETENTION FACILITY
STEWART DETENTION CENTER
ALLEGANY COUNTY JAIL
ALLEN PARISH PUBLIC SAFETY
COMPLEX
BAKER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
BALDWIN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER
BEDFORD MUNICIPAL DETENTION
CENTER
BRISTOL COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
BURNET COUNTY JAIL
BUTLER COUNTY JAIL

CDF
CDF

YES
YES

CDF

YES

CDF

YES

CDF

YES

CDF
CDF

YES
YES

CDF
DIGSA
DIGSA
DIGSA

YES
YES
YES
YES

DIGSA

YES

DIGSA

YES

DIGSA
DIGSA
DIGSA
DIGSA
DIGSA
DIGSA
IGSA
IGSA

YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO

IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO

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CABARRUS COUNTY JAIL
CALDWELL COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER
CALHOUN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER
CARVER COUNTY JAIL
CHASE COUNTY DETENTION FACILITY
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY JAIL
CHIPPEWA COUNTY SSM
CHRISTIAN COUNTY JAIL
CIBOLA COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER
COBB COUNTY JAIL
COLLIER COUNTY NAPLES JAIL CENTER
DALE G. HAILE DETENTION CENTER
DAVIDSON COUNTY SHERIFF
DEARBORN POLICE DEPARTMENT
DOUGLAS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
EL PASO COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CENTER
ELGIN POLICE DEPARTMENT
ESSEX COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY
EULESS CITY JAIL
FAIRFAX COUNTY ADULT DETENTION
CENTER
FREDERICK COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER
FREEBORN COUNTY ADULT DETENTION
CENTER
GARVIN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
GASTON COUNTY JAIL
GLADES COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
GLENDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT
GRAND FORKS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY
HALL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
HARDIN COUNTY JAIL
HOWARD COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER
JAMES A. MUSICK FACILITY
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IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA

NO
YES

IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO

IGSA

YES
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JEFFERSON COUNTY JAIL
JOE CORLEY DETENTION FACILITY
JOHNSON COUNTY CORRECTIONS
CENTER
KENT COUNTY JAIL
LINCOLN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
LONOKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
MINICASSIA DETENTION CENTER
MOFFAT COUNTY JAIL
MONROE COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
MONROE COUNTY DETENTION-DORM
MONTGOMERY CITY JAIL
MONTGOMERY COUNTY JAIL
MORGAN COUNTY ADULT DETENTION
CENTER
MORROW COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY
NAVAJO COUNTY SHERIFF
NEW HANOVER COUNTY JAIL
NOBLES COUNTY JAIL
NORTHERN OREGON CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY
OLDHAM COUNTY JAIL
ORANGE COUNTY INTAKE RELEASE
FACILITY
ORANGE COUNTY JAIL
PIKE COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
PLATTE COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
PLYMOUTH COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY
POLK COUNTY ADULT DETENTION
FACILITY
PULASKI COUNTY JAIL
RIO COSUMNES CORRECTIONAL
CENTER
RIO GRANDE COUNTY JAIL
ROANOKE CITY JAIL
ROLLING PLAINS DETENTION CENTER
SAINT CLAIR COUNTY JAIL
SAINT TAMMANY PARISH JAIL
SENECA COUNTY JAIL
SHAWNEE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS
STRAFFORD COUNTY CORRECTIONS
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IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
YES
YES

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO
NO

IGSA
IGSA

NO
YES

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO
NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO

IGSA

NO
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SUFFOLK COUNTY HOUSE OF
CORRECTIONS
TAYLOR COUNTY ADULT DETENTION
FACILITY
TELLER COUNTY JAIL
THEO LACY FACILITY
TULSA COUNTY JAIL (DAVID L. MOSS
JUSTICE CENTER)
WAKE COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT
WAKULLA COUNTY JAIL
WHITFIELD COUNTY JAIL
WORCESTER COUNTY JAIL
YAVAPAI COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
YORK COUNTY PRISON
YUBA COUNTY JAIL

IGSA

NO

IGSA

NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
YES
NO

IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA
IGSA

NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO

Source: ICE Data (as of June 7, 2018)

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Appendix D
Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major Contributors to
This Report
Tatyana Martell, Chief Inspector
Inez Jordan, Lead Inspector
Christopher Zubowicz, Assistant Counsel
Jason Wahl, Senior Inspector
Erika Algeo, Inspector
James Johnson, Inspector
Ryan Nelson, Independent Referencer

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Appendix E
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
ICE Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committee

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Additional Information and Copies
To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at:
www.oig.dhs.gov.
For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General 

Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig. 


OIG Hotline

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click
on the red "Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at
(800) 323-8603, fax our hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at:
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305

 

 

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