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California Counts
population trends and profiles

Vo l u m e 9 N u m b e r 3 • F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 8

Hans P. Johnson, editor

Crime, Corrections, and
California
What Does Immigration Have to Do with It?
By Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl
with research support from Jay Liao

Summary

Few issues are as contentious as immigration and crime. Concern
over the effects of immigration on crime is longstanding, and bans
against criminal aliens constituted some of the earliest restrictions
on immigration to the United States (Kanstroom, 2007). More
recently, policies adopted in the mid-1990s greatly expanded the
scope of acts for which noncitizens may be expelled from the United States. Even so, many
calls to curtail immigration, particularly illegal immigration, appeal to public fears about
immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities.
	 Are such fears justified? On the one hand, immigration policy screens the foreign-born
for criminal history and assigns extra penalties to noncitizens who commit crimes, suggesting that the foreign-born would be less likely than the U.S.-born to be involved in criminal
enterprises. On the other hand, in California, immigrants are more likely than the U.S.-born
to be young and male; they are also more likely to have low levels of education. These characteristics are typically related to criminal activity, providing some basis for concern that immigrants may be more criminally active than the U.S.-born.
	 In this issue of California Counts, we examine the effects of immigration on public safety
in California. In our assessments, we use measures of incarceration and institutionalization as
proxies for criminal involvement. We find that the foreign-born, who make up about 35 percent of the adult population in California, constitute only about 17 percent of the adult prison

California Counts
. . . in California,
U.S.-born men have
an institutionalization
rate that is 10 times
higher than that of
foreign-born men
(4.2% vs. 0.42%).

2

Crime, Corrections, and California

population. Thus, immigrants are underrepresented in California prisons
compared to their representation in the overall population. In fact, U.S.born adult men are incarcerated at a rate over two-and-a-half times greater
than that of foreign-born men.
	 The difference only grows when we expand our investigation. When
we consider all institutionalization (not only prisons but also jails, halfway
houses, and the like) and focus on the population that is most likely to
be in institutions because of criminal activity (men ages 18–40), we find
that, in California, U.S.-born men have an institutionalization rate that
is 10 times higher than that of foreign-born men (4.2% vs. 0.42%). And
when we compare foreign-born men to U.S.-born men with similar age
and education levels, these differences become even greater. Indeed, our
evidence suggests that increasing educational requirements in the provision
of visas would have very little effect in the criminal justice arena.
	 But immigrants may affect public safety in ways other than direct
involvement in criminal activity. For example, immigrants may induce
more criminal activity among the U.S.-born by displacing the work opportunities of the U.S.-born; in other words, immigrants may “take away”
legal jobs, possibly leading to more crime among natives. To measure
underlying criminal activity more broadly, we also investigate crime rates
in California cities. We find that on average, between 2000 and 2005,
cities that had a higher share of recent immigrants saw their crime rates
fall further than cities with a lower share. This finding is especially strong
when it comes to violent crime.
	 Finally, even if immigrants are less likely to engage in criminal activity
than the average native, the criminal activity of their U.S.-born children is
also of interest. Therefore, we briefly discuss current evidence on later generations, finding continued low levels of criminal activity.
	 Taken together, our findings suggest that spending additional dollars
to reduce immigration or to increase enforcement against the foreign-born
will not have a high return in terms of public safety. The foreign-born in
California already have extremely low rates of criminal activity.

California Counts
Immigration and
Crime: A Complex
Relationship

D

o immigrants add to the
crime risk in the population? Like any form of population
growth, immigration is likely to
add to the total number of crimes
committed. However, if immigrants are less criminally active
than the U.S.-born, then immigration will lead to lower overall
crime rates and lower likelihoods
of any given individual becoming
a crime victim. Of course, some
crimes, by their very nature, are
committed only by immigrants—
for example, illegally entering
the country or working without
a proper visa. In the analysis presented here, we focus on criminal
activity that both the U.S.-born
and foreign-born are at risk of
committing and that arguably
is a more direct threat to public
safety. With that focus in mind,
we assess the relative crime rates
among the foreign-born and the
U.S.-born.
	 Theories about the causes of
crime operate at several levels:
individual-level causes; family,
peer, or neighborhood influences;
labor market conditions; and
the influences of alcohol, drugs,
guns, and gangs. Some explanations emphasize the interactions of
potential offenders and potential
victims; others look at the physical
environment in which the crime

Crime, Corrections, and California

occurs. In addition, several theories about crime are particular to
immigrants. Sellin (1938) emphasized the “culture conflict” faced
by immigrants as they adjust to
a new set of behavioral norms.
Others have examined whether,
at the aggregate level, immigration increases the criminal activity
of the U.S.-born by displacing
natives from work, promoting
urbanization, and increasing “the
variety of patterns of behavior”
(Sutherland, 1924).1
	 Many of these explanations for
criminal activity—for example,
high levels of poverty—predict
that immigrants would have
elevated crime rates. However, it
is also possible that immigration
reduces crime—for instance, those
born abroad may be less likely to
be involved in substance abuse,
gang life, and violent culture,
which drive so much of serious
American crime.
	 Currently, U.S. immigration
policy provides several mechanisms that are likely to reduce the
criminal activity of immigrants.
Legal immigrants are screened
with regard to their criminal
backgrounds. In addition, all noncitizens, even those in the United
States legally, are subject to deportation if convicted of a criminal
offense that is punishable by a
prison sentence of a year or more,
even if that sentence is suspended.
Furthermore, those in the country illegally have an additional
incentive to avoid contact with

Currently, U.S.
immigration policy
provides several
mechanisms that are
likely to reduce the
criminal activity of
immigrants.

law enforcement—even for minor
offenses—since such contact is
likely to increase the chances that
their illegal status will be revealed.
	 To answer our initial question—are the foreign-born more
likely than the U.S.-born to commit crimes—we would need a
complete set of information on
individuals’ criminal activities,
regardless of whether they are ever
caught, tried, convicted, or sentenced for these activities, and a
complete set of individual characteristics, including for the foreignborn the conditions under which
they entered the country. As with
most studies, we do not have ideal
data. This lack of data restricts
the questions we will be able to
answer. In particular, we cannot
focus on the undocumented population explicitly.
3

California Counts
	 However, we are able to distinguish between the foreign-born
and the U.S.-born when we study
incarceration in California and to
compare the incarceration rates of
those with similar education levels and equal ages. Furthermore,
we can analyze the incarceration
experience of immigrants by country of birth. And, as mentioned,
we can compare the crime rates
in cities to learn how crime varies with the rate of immigration.
These analyses provide insights
into the relationship between
crime and immigration—insights
that ought to be central to the
policy debate but that are not
widely understood.

Some Useful Terms

When it comes to immigrants,
clear definitions are crucial (see
Text Boxes 1 and 2). The legal
status of any foreign-born person
is complicated, with many separate and potentially overlapping
categories. In public discourse, the
group “criminal aliens subject to
deportation” is often confounded
with the groups “illegal aliens” and
“undocumented workers.” In fact,
these groups are quite distinct and
do not necessarily overlap.
	 Attention to definitions is
important for several reasons.
First, understanding the rules
about the ways individuals with
different legal status are treated if
they are apprehended for a crime
gives us insight into the incentives
of various groups to avoid criminal
4

Crime, Corrections, and California

Text Box 1. Key Definitions
Criminal alien—A noncitizen who has been convicted of a crime.
Foreign-born—Anyone born outside the United States (excluding
those born abroad of U.S.-born parents or born in a U.S. outlying
area). We mainly focus on the foreign-born in this report.
Illegal immigrant or illegal alien—Someone who is in the United
States illegally. This group is composed of those who crossed the
border without inspection and those who entered legally but who
have overstayed the terms of their entry visa.
Immigrant—Someone who comes to the United States with the
intention of staying. Often used interchangeably with “foreignborn.”
Naturalized citizen—A foreign-born person who has successfully
gone through the process to become a U.S. citizen.
Noncitizen—A foreign-born person who is not a naturalized U.S.
citizen. Noncitizens may be in the country legally on a permanent
or temporary visa (tourist, business, or student) or may be in the
country illegally.
Permanent legal resident—A foreign-born person who has a permanent resident visa. These individuals are on a path to become
eligible for citizenship.
Removable/deportable alien—A noncitizen who has been found
to be without legal status and eligible for removal. Conviction of a
qualifying crime makes a noncitizen deportable, even if he or she
is a legal (but not naturalized) resident.
Undocumented worker—A foreign-born person who either is in
the country illegally or who entered legally but is engaged in work
that is not allowed under the terms of his or her visa.

California Counts

Crime, Corrections, and California

Text Box 2. What Makes a Person Deportable?
Illegal immigrant—Deportable if status is revealed. Apprehension
for any criminal activity may lead to investigation of status.
Naturalized citizen—In general, naturalized citizens cannot be
deported.
Permanent legal resident—Deportable for conviction of an “aggravated felony.” The list of “aggravated felonies” was expanded several
times after the introduction of the term in the 1988 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act. It now includes any crime for which the individual is
sentenced to more than a year, even if the sentence is suspended.
These rules are retroactive—even if one committed a crime before
the legislation that marked it as a deportable offense, one is subject
to deportation.
Temporary visa holder—Any criminal activity may lead to nonrenewal of visa or to revocation.

apprehension and conviction. If
convicted of a crime, immigrants
serve their sentences in correctional institutions before being
adjudicated for deportation.
	 For permanent legal residents
who are noncitizens, the penalty
for a criminal conviction of an
aggravated felony is the sentence,
plus any additional time waiting
for deportation procedures to be
completed, plus the final penalty
of deportation. It is important to
emphasize that even if someone
comes to the United States legally,
a conviction of an aggravated
felony qualifies that person for
deportation, unless he or she is a
naturalized citizen.2 This means
that the number of immigrants

deported for criminal activity will
include individuals who were in
the country legally.
	 For those who are not in the
country legally, deportation is a
potential penalty of apprehension
for a minor crime and is more
likely for conviction of a serious one.3 If one is in the country
illegally—either by illegal entry
or by abusing a visa—then one
is deportable even without criminal activity. But criminal activity
makes it more likely that one’s
illegal status will come to the
attention of authorities.
	 Second, our data do not allow
us to examine criminal activity by
legal or illegal visa status. Although
it would be interesting to know

. . . even if someone
comes to the United
States legally, a
conviction of an
aggravated felony
qualifies that person
for deportation,
unless he or she is a
naturalized citizen.

visa status, the more important
question is whether in totality the
foreign-born represent a higher
level of risk to public safety than
do the U.S.-born. We would like
to understand the relationship
between foreign birth and criminal
activity in general, whether or not
the individuals are permanent legal
residents; naturalized citizens; business, tourist, or student visa holders; or the proverbial illegal entrant
who evaded the border patrol.
	 This focus better allows us to
assess whether the combination of
immigration and criminal justice
policies that govern the foreign-born
yields a foreign-born population
that adversely affects public safety.
In most of this report, we focus on
the totality of the foreign-born population, but we also provide information on important subgroups.

Demographics and Crime

There are many reasons to assume
that the foreign-born may be
more likely than the U.S.-born
5

California Counts

Figure 1. Age Distribution of California Men, 2000
14.0
12.0

Foreign-born
U.S.-born

10.0
Percentage

In California, foreignborn men ages 18–40
have lower educational
attainment levels than
U.S.-born men in the
same age group.

Crime, Corrections, and California

8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0

6

+
65

Age group

Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2000 U.S. Census.

Figure 2. Educational Attainment of California Men
Ages 18–40
40.0
35.0
30.0
Percentage

to be involved in criminal activity. In particular, the foreign-born
in California have demographic
characteristics that are often correlated with criminal activity and
incarceration. Figure 1 shows that
the foreign-born are more likely
than the U.S.-born to be young
adults. The late teenage years
and early 20s are associated with
higher rates of criminal offending,
and the 20s and 30s are associated
with higher rates of incarceration.4
In addition, among those ages
15–34, the foreign-born are more
likely to be male.5 Since criminal
offenses are more frequently committed by young men, we might
expect more criminal activity
among the foreign-born. Finally,
throughout the United States,
criminal activity and incarceration are associated with low levels
of education. Figure 2 shows that,
in California, foreign-born men
ages 18–40 have lower educational

5–
9
10
–1
4
15
–1
9
20
–2
4
25
–2
9
30
–3
4
35
–3
9
40
–4
4
45
–4
9
50
–5
4
55
–5
9
60
–6
4

<

5

0

Foreign-born
U.S.-born

25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
2.0
0

<5

5–8

9–11

Some
college
Educational attainment, years

Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2000 U.S. Census.

12

College +

California Counts
attainment levels than U.S.-born
men in the same age group. Thus,
judging solely by demographic
characteristics, one might expect
that the foreign-born would be
more likely than the U.S.-born to
engage in criminal activity.
	 However, as stated above,
there are also reasons to believe
that immigrants may be less likely
than the U.S.-born to be involved
in crime. First, the foreign-born
who enter legally are screened for
past criminal activity. Second, all
noncitizens face greater consequences for criminal conviction
than do the U.S.-born, which
may provide some incentive to
stay away from criminal activity.
In the next section, we examine
the evidence on incarceration and
institutionalization rates in California and compare those of the
foreign-born to the U.S.-born.

Incarceration and
Institutionalization:
Foreign-Born vs.
the U.S.-Born

I

n this section, we document
the incarceration and institutionalization rates among the
foreign-born and the U.S.-born.
“Incarceration” here refers to a
sentence served in the California
state prison system, known as the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).

Crime, Corrections, and California

“Institutionalization” is a broader
measure that includes anyone
housed in an institution in California, including county jails as
well as state prisons, at the time
of the 2000 Census.6
	 First, we examine incarceration
rates. Figure 3 uses data from the
CDCR to calculate the percentage

of incarcerated adults (ages 20 or
older), for the foreign-born (citizen
and noncitizen) and the U.S.-born.7
In 2005, there were 28,279 foreignborn adults and 139,419 U.S.-born
adults in California prisons. When
we compare these figures to the
population of foreign-born and
U.S.-born adults in the state, we

Text Box 3. Noncitizens and the State and Federal
Prison Systems
Information on noncitizens incarcerated in the federal prison
system is often used inaccurately to imply that noncitizens are
overrepresented among the U.S. prison population and thus overrepresented in the criminally active population. At midyear 2005,
there were 35,285 noncitizens in federal prisons, constituting 19
percent of federal inmates (Harrison and Beck, 2006). Since noncitizens constitute less than 19 percent of the U.S. population, this
statistic is often cited as an indication of the criminality of the
immigrant population generally and as a criticism of current U.S.
immigration policy (Leonhardt, 2007).
	 However, it is critical to note that immigration violations are
prosecuted under federal jurisdiction. For obvious reasons, noncitizens are disproportionately at risk for violations of immigration
law. Furthermore, inmates in the federal prison system constitute
only about 8 percent of all prison inmates in both the federal and
state systems; in other words, the federal system houses a much
smaller number of inmates than the state systems do. Thus, one
would not want to conclude that noncitizens are disproportionately
criminally active from their representation in federal prisons alone.
	 State jails and prisons are much more likely to be representative of the criminally active population. And California prisons
contain 30 percent of all noncitizen inmates in state prisons
nationwide. Therefore, analysis of immigrant representation in the
state prison system in California provides insight into this state’s
experiences, but it also likely reflects the nation as a whole.

7

California Counts

Crime, Corrections, and California
i

Figure 3. Percentage Incarcerated in California, by Age
and Place of Birth
3.0
Foreign-born women
U.S.-born women
Foreign-born men
U.S.-born men
All foreign-born
All U.S.-born

Percentage

2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
20–29

30–39

40–49

50–59

60+

Total

Age group

Source: Authors’ calculations from California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Data, 2005.
Note: Does not include federal inmates.

see that the foreign-born have an
incarceration rate that is less than
half that of the U.S.-born (0.3%
vs. 0.8%). This comparison does
not take into account any of the
demographic differences between
the U.S.-born and foreign-born
noted above. And yet the foreignborn still have much lower incarceration rates than the U.S.-born.
Given that the foreign-born have
lower levels of education than the
U.S.-born and are more likely to
be young adult males, this is a
striking finding.
	 Differences in incarceration
rates by age are also striking. Figure 3 shows that U.S.-born men
have incarceration rates that are
2.6 times higher than those of
foreign-born men. And for some
age groups, the difference is even
8

that for crimes against persons in
2005, the foreign-born were incarcerated at a rate of 161 per 100,000
people and that the U.S.-born were
incarcerated at a rate of 259 per
100,000. The rate of incarceration
for drug crimes was 54 per 100,000
for the foreign-born and 114 per
100,000 for the U.S.-born.8

greater. For example, among men
ages 30–39, incarceration rates for
the U.S.-born are 3.3 times higher
than for the foreign-born.
	 Women have incarceration
rates that are less than a tenth of
men’s. And foreign-born women’s
incarceration rates are particularly
low. U.S.-born women overall
have incarceration rates that are
nearly four times that of foreignborn women and, again, the differences are particularly large for
those ages 30–39.
	 The types of crimes committed by the foreign-born are slightly
different from those of the U.S.born. However, even across different categories of crimes, we find
that incarceration rates among the
foreign-born are lower than among
the U.S.-born. For example, we find

The Criminal Justice
Funnel

T

hese findings are noteworthy,
but it is important to keep in
mind that interpreting differences
in incarceration as a direct representation of differences in underlying
criminal activity can be problematic. We must also take into account
the processes of law enforcement
that mediate the relationship
between crime and incarceration.
These processes, sometimes known
as the criminal justice “funnel,”
are represented in Figure 4. The
sequence goes like this: Before
becoming incarcerated, those who
engage in criminal activity must
first be apprehended and arrested.
Among those arrested, some fraction is charged and prosecuted.
Of those prosecuted, a fraction is
convicted. Of those convicted, the
sentence must be severe enough to
warrant a term of incarceration for
an individual to appear in data on
incarceration and institutionalization. These intervening steps require
that caution be used when inferring

California Counts

Crime, Corrections, and California

Figure 4. Criminal Justice System Schematic: The Funnel

Criminal activity
Apprehend
Charge

U.S.-born men have
incarceration rates
that are 2.6 times
higher than those of
foreign-born men.

Arrest
Prosecute

Some
falsely
accused

Convict
Sentence
Incarcerate

Institutionalization
of Men Ages 18–40

F

criminal activity from observations
about the end point—incarceration
or institutionalization.
	 If the foreign-born and the
U.S.-born are equally likely to
engage in criminal activity and
are treated equally at each juncture in the criminal justice funnel, then we should see equal
incarceration and institutionalization rates. However, it may
be that the foreign-born and the
U.S.-born have different probabilities of proceeding from one part
of the funnel to the next. If, for
example, the U.S.-born are better able than the foreign-born to
aid in their own defense or have
more resources to devote to their
defense, then the foreign-born
may be more likely to advance
toward incarceration after appre-

hension. The U.S.-born may be
more likely to be placed on probation or in an alternative institution (for mental illness or drug
rehabilitation, for example).9
	 Looking at incarceration as a
measure of criminal activity has
another limitation: Prison is generally reserved for serious crimes. In
California, as in many states, less
serious crimes, called misdemeanors, are adjudicated by counties,
and terms of confinement, if any,
are served in county jails. Felonies—more serious crimes—are
punishable by terms in the state
CDCR. Therefore, focusing only
on incarceration in the state prison
system may miss an important part
of the story. In the next section, we
focus on a broader measure of incapacitation: institutionalization.

ocusing on institutionalization has both benefits and
problems. One benefit is our rich
data source: individual-level data
from the 2000 Census.10 These
data contain a broad array of individual characteristics, including
country of origin, citizenship status, age, educational attainment,
race, and ethnicity. In addition,
“institutions” captures jails as well
as prisons. Finally, because some
individuals are placed in mental
hospitals or rehabilitation facilities
instead of being incarcerated, this
measure captures individuals who
may have engaged in criminal
behavior but who have received
markedly different sentences. Since
our focus is on public safety, using
institutionalization as a measure—
which captures as broad a segment
of the criminally active population
as possible—significantly expands
our analysis of the relationship
between immigration and crime.
9

California Counts
	 Of course, “institutions” also
includes mental hospitals and
nursing homes in which people
live because of their health rather
than any criminal behavior. Thus,
in this section, we shift our focus
to men ages 18–40. For this population, a large majority of those
who are institutionalized are in a
correctional setting.11 Focusing on
this group captures the population
that is disproportionately likely
to be engaged in criminal activity
and institutionalized for it.
	 Overall, U.S.-born men ages
18–40 have institutionalization
rates that are 10 times higher than
those of foreign-born men in the
same age group (4.2% vs. 0.42%).
Thus, this broader measure, which
captures those housed in jails for
lesser offenses, also shows remarkably low relative outcomes for the
foreign-born.
	 Figure 5 breaks down institutionalization rates by age. For
U.S.-born men, these rates follow
a pattern that is well-known to
criminologists. Institutionalization
rises during the late teens and
early 20s as men are criminally
active and accruing records that
then command a term of incarceration. In the late 20s and early
30s, institutionalization rates tend
to level off. Then institutionalization rates begin to decline as individuals finish serving their time
and age out of the period of their
lives when they are most likely to
be criminally active. In contrast,
for foreign-born men, institution10

Crime, Corrections, and California

alization rates by age appear relatively flat.12 And, of course, the
most striking feature of the graph
is that, for any age, the institutionalization rates of the foreignborn are relatively very low.
	 In general, educational attainment is quite strongly negatively
correlated with incarceration and
institutionalization. In Figure 6,
we present institutionalization rates
by educational attainment for
foreign-born and U.S.-born men
ages 18–40. Again, we see that for
the U.S.-born, a familiar pattern
emerges: Those with low levels of
educational attainment are much
more likely to be institutionalized
than those with 12 years of education or more.13 For the foreignborn, again, we see much less
correlation between institutionalization and educational attainment.
Institutionalization rates are low
for all levels of education among
the foreign-born. Indeed, among
the U.S.-born, only those with a
college degree or above have institutionalization rates below those
of any educational group among
the foreign-born.
	 This finding may have important implications for immigration policy as it pertains to those
who are admitted as permanent
residents. Visas to become a permanent resident alien are currently
allocated largely based on family ties to U.S. citizens or family
ties to those who already have
permanent resident status. Over
the years, there have been many

appeals to revamp this system to
draw in a more highly skilled class
of immigrants—for example, by
emphasizing educational attainment in the allocation of visas.
To be sure, those advocating
such changes generally argue that
improving educational attainment
among immigrants would lead
to better labor market outcomes
for them, and this might be so.
But insofar as institutionalization
captures criminal activity, the
evidence here suggests that using
higher educational attainment as
a selection criterion for permanent
resident visas would have little
effect on public safety, because all
the foreign-born, regardless of educational attainment, already have
very low institutionalization rates.

Institutionalization
and Population
Subgroups

T

he analysis above generally
described the foreign-born
relative to the U.S.-born. Here, we
look more specifically at population subgroups that are of particular interest in California.

Countries of Origin

We begin with countries of origin.
About 37 percent of men ages 18–
40 in California are foreign-born,
and 20 percent of this group
were born in Mexico. Other wellrepresented regions include Central

California Counts

Crime, Corrections, and California

Figure 5. California Institutionalization Rate of Foreign-Born
and U.S.-Born Men Ages 18–40, by Age
Foreign-born
U.S.-born

6.0

Percentage

5.0
4.0

About 37 percent of
men ages 18–40 in
California are foreignborn, and 20 percent
of this group were
born in Mexico.

3.0
2.0
1.0
0
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Age

Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2000 U.S. Census.

Figure 6. California Institutionalization Rate of Foreign-Born
and U.S.-Born Men Ages 18–40, by Educational Attainment
16.0
14.0

Foreign-born
U.S.-born

Percentage

12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0

<5

5–8

9–11

Some
college
Educational attainment, years

Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2000 U.S. Census.

12

College +

America (3.5%), the Philippines
(1.9%), Vietnam (1.7%), India
(1.0%), China (0.8%), and all
other Asian countries (3.9%).14
	 Figure 7 presents institutionalization rates for men ages 18–40
born in these countries or regions.
The overall U.S.-born and foreignborn institutionalization rates are
included for comparison. Among
the foreign-born, men born in
Mexico and Central America have
slightly higher institutionalization
rates than the foreign-born overall, but these rates are clearly still
much lower than those of U.S.born men. Men born in India,
China, the Philippines, Vietnam,
and other Asian countries have
particularly low institutionalization rates.15
11

California Counts

Figure 7. California Institutionalization Rate of U.S.-Born
and Foreign-Born Men Ages 18–40, by Place of Birth
4.5
4.0
3.5
Percentage

. . . institutionalization
rates of the foreignborn with less than a
high school diploma
are extremely low.

Crime, Corrections, and California

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5

m
O

th

co e r A
un si
t r an
ie
s

na
et

in

Ph

ili

pp

In

A

Vi

es

a
di

a
in
Ch

Ce

Fo

12

Place of birth

Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2000 U.S. Census.

Figure 8. California Institutionalization Rate of U.S.-Born and
Noncitizen Foreign-Born Men Ages 18–40, by Place of Birth
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5

Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2000 U.S. Census.

O

th

co e r A
un si
t r an
ie
s

m
na
et

in
pp

Ph

ili

In

Place of birth

Vi

es

a
di

a
in
Ch

m nt
er ra
ic l
a

A

Ce

o
ic
ex
M

nig
Fo

re

.S

.- b

bo

or

n

rn

0

U

In press coverage on immigration and crime, illegal immigrants
are frequently the focus of attention. In California, the undocumented are estimated to make up
28 percent of the foreign-born
population (Hoefer, Rytina, and
Campbell, 2007). Unfortunately,
our data do not reveal the precise
immigration status of the foreignborn. However, we do know
whether someone is naturalized
or a noncitizen. Because illegal
immigrants are noncitizens, we are
thus able to provide some insight
into whether institutionalization
rates for illegal immigrants are
likely to be higher than they are
for the foreign-born overall.
	 Among men in California ages
18–40, 27 percent are foreign-born
noncitizens. In Figure 8, we present
institutionalization rates for this
group according to the country and
region-of-origin groups analyzed

Percentage

Noncitizens

m nt
er ra
ic l
a

o
ic
ex
M

re

U

ig

.S

n-

.- b

bo

or

n

rn

0

California Counts

35
30
25
20
15
10
5

m
e
co r A
un si
t r an
ie
s

na

O

th

et

es
in
pp
ili

Vi

a
in
Ph

Ch

.- b
b l orn
a
U ck
.S
H .- b
is o
p
F o an rn
ic
re
ig
nbo
rn
M
ex
ic
o
Ce
A
m nt
er ra
ic l
a

.S
U

.- b

or

n

0

.S

As we saw in Figure 2, the foreignborn are much more likely than
the U.S.-born to have low education levels. The foreign-born from
Mexico are often cited as having
particularly low levels of education, and some researchers have
found that even these levels may

of education is only slightly lower,
at 12.9 percent. For U.S.-born
blacks with less than a high school
diploma, this rate climbs to 30.5
percent.16
	 As we discussed above, institutionalization does not have the
same correlation with educational
attainment among the foreign-born
as it does among the U.S.-born.
Perhaps, then, it is unsurprising
that institutionalization rates of
the foreign-born with less than a
high school diploma are extremely
low. Overall, and for each of our
subgroups, institutionalization
rates for the foreign-born with low
levels of education are quite similar to institutionalization rates for
the foreign-born, without regard
to education level.

Figure 9. California Institutionalization Rate of Men
Ages 18–40 with Less Than a High School Diploma,
by Place of Birth

U

Educational Attainment

be overstated in the Census data
(Ibarraran and Lubotsky, 2007).
Many have expressed concern
about the inflow of immigrants
with low levels of education, since,
for many groups, low education
levels are correlated with worse
labor market outcomes, worse
health, and worse social outcomes
in general, including crime.
	 Figure 9 presents institutionalization rates for men ages 18–40
with less than a high school diploma.
The dominant feature of these charts
is the high institutionalization rates
for U.S.-born men with low levels
of education. Over 13 percent of all
U.S.-born men (ages 18–40) with
less than a high school diploma are
in institutions. The rate for U.S.born Hispanic men with low levels

Percentage

above. These rates are nearly identical to those in Figure 7. Indeed,
institutionalization rates for noncitizens born in Mexico—a group
much more likely than the foreignborn overall to include illegal immigrants—are (very slightly) lower
for noncitizens than for all men
ages 18–40 born in Mexico. Institutionalization rates for noncitizens
are dramatically lower than for
the U.S.-born, as were the rates for
the foreign-born overall. Indeed,
U.S.-born institutionalization rates
are almost 10 times higher.
	 A different way to look at this
issue is to ask what percentage of
those institutionalized in California fall into a given nativity and
citizenship group. Again, let us
look at the Mexican-born. Among
noninstitutionalized men ages 18–
40, 21 percent are Mexican-born,
and 17.2 percent of that group are
noncitizens. Among institutionalized men in this age group, 3.6
percent are Mexican-born, and
2.9 percent are Mexican-born noncitizens. However one measures it,
Mexican-born men are dramatically underrepresented in California
prisons and other institutions.

Crime, Corrections, and California

Place of birth

Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2000 U.S. Census.

13

California Counts
Both incarceration
in state prisons and
the broader measure
of institutionalization
show remarkably
low rates among
the foreign-born in
California.

	 In addition, the comparisons
in Figure 9 are the same if we
examine institutionalization rates
for only the noncitizens in our
subgroups. Thus, even among
noncitizens with low education
from Mexico—the most likely
candidates for having entered the
U.S. illegally—institutionalization
rates are very low.

Length of Time in the
United States

Does it matter that the foreignborn population is composed of
people who have been in the United
States for different lengths of time?
Theories differ. Spending more time
in the United States may “assimilate” the foreign-born to higher
rates of criminal activity. Or it may
simply give them more time to get
caught for criminal activity and
accumulate a serious enough record
to earn jail or prison time. Assimilation implies that underlying
criminal activity changes with time
14

Crime, Corrections, and California

spent in the country.17 The second
explanation—“exposure time”—
merely involves more time at risk
for apprehension. Since our data do
not allow us to follow individuals
and examine how their criminal
involvement changes over time, we
cannot distinguish between these
hypotheses. Nonetheless, we might
worry, for example, that the low
rates of institutionalization among
noncitizens is simply a consequence
of their not having been in the
country long enough to either go
through the naturalization process
or to have accumulated a criminal
record warranting jail or prison.
	 However, when we examine
institutionalization rates by time
spent in the United States, all
groups have rates that are an order
of magnitude lower than rates of
the U.S.-born. Although it is the
case that those who have been in
the United States for fewer than
five years have the lowest institutionalization rates (0.24%), those
who have been in the United States
for 21 years or more have rates that
are only slightly higher than the
overall rate for the foreign-born
(0.48% vs. 0.43%). Neither assimilation nor exposure time appears
to close the gap in institutionalization between the U.S.-born and
the foreign-born.

Overview

In sum, both incarceration in
state prisons and the broader
measure of institutionalization
show remarkably low rates among

the foreign-born in California.
These low rates hold true across
region-of-origin and education
subgroups. From a perspective of
public safety, then, there would be
little reason to limit immigration,
to try to increase the education
levels of immigrants, or to increase
punishments to deter noncitizens
from committing crimes.

Does Deportation
Matter?

I

f incarceration and institutionalization rates have the same
relationship with criminal activity for the foreign-born and the
U.S.-born—that is, if both groups
are treated equally in the criminal justice system—then the data
presented here indicate that the
foreign-born have remarkably
low rates of criminal offending in
California. Of course, there are
a number of reasons to wonder if
the relationship between institutionalization and criminal activity
is the same for the foreign-born
and the U.S.-born. Differences in
treatment between the foreignborn and the U.S.-born at any
juncture in the criminal justice
system may lead to differences
in institutionalization rates for a
given level of criminal activity.
	 Such differences could skew
our findings in either direction,
by inflating the institutionalization
rates of either the foreign-born or
the U.S.-born. For example, the

California Counts
U.S.-born may be better able
to aid in their own defense and
thus have lower probabilities of
conviction or shorter sentences
conditional on conviction.18 At
the same time, if the foreign-born
are swiftly deported for criminal
activity, then their institutionalized numbers will be low relative
to their actual criminal activity.
	 How much does deportation
matter? Unfortunately, neither the
federal nor the state government
provides data on the numbers of
deported prisoners in sufficient
detail for us to assess fully the role
of deportation on institutionalization rates of the foreign-born.19
However, a brief examination
of the current deportation processes will allow us to make some
educated guesses. Of course, we
cannot fully analyze here the complicated ways in which deportation rules interact with state and
local law enforcement; instead, we
will simply provide an overview.
	 As noted above, noncitizens
may be subject to deportation
for many reasons. For our purposes, we are simply interested
in whether this means that their
institutionalization rates will be
comparatively low relative to rates
of the U.S.-born. This may be a
particularly important issue in
California, since the state has a
high rate of recidivism, meaning that the prison population is
disproportionately made up of
returning offenders.20 If the U.S.born recidivate, but many of the

Crime, Corrections, and California

foreign-born do not (because of
deportation), then relative institutionalization rates may understate
the criminal activity levels of the
foreign-born.
	 The effect of deportation on
the very low rates of institutionalization of the foreign-born depends
in large part on the speed and
thoroughness with which deportation for criminal involvement takes
place.21 The process works like this:
As mentioned above, the foreignborn serve their full sentence in
the CDCR, after which they are
determined eligible for deportation.
During the prison term, CDCR
officials alert Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to
the identity of any inmate they
believe may be a noncitizen. ICE
investigates and places a “hold”
on inmates designated for further
immigration enforcement action.
This designation places some
restrictions on the CDCR. For
example, a foreign-born inmate
with an ICE hold on his or her
record cannot be paroled and may
be disqualified from rehabilitative
prison programs.
	 In previous research, Butcher
and Piehl (2000) found that
inmates in California prisons with
ICE holds (called “INS holds” at
the time) served about 10 percent
longer than comparable inmates
with comparable sentence lengths.
We speculated at the time that
the finding may have been due
to time lags in developing the
systems to manage deportable

inmates. A recent report by the
Department of Homeland Security Inspector General’s office
found that current staffing levels
at ICE are insufficient to screen
and process criminal offenders for
deportation (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2006). Furthermore, even those with deportation orders do not necessarily
leave the country as scheduled and
many areas report that those who
are deported manage to reenter
the country (Berestein, 2007).22
	 Although we do not have
data on deportation numbers, we
suspect that time lags and restrictions on placement mean that
deportation requirements may
inflate the institutionalization
rates of the foreign-born relative to
their underlying criminal activity.
For these reasons, we think that
the low institutionalization rates
of the foreign-born in California
reflect low rates of criminal activity among the foreign-born rather
than the effects of deportation.

Immigration and
City Crime Rates

I

n this section, we turn to direct
evidence on crime. Here, we
examine city-level crime rates in
California and analyze their correlation with the rates of arriving immigrants to see if they are consistent
with our findings on incarceration
and institutionalization rates.
15

California Counts

16

Figure 10. Rise and Fall of Property Crime Rates,
1960–2005

Crime rate (per 100,000 population)

8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
California property crime rate
U.S. property crime rate

2,000
1,000
0
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Figure 11. Rise and Fall of Violent Crime Rates, 1960–2005
1,200
Crime rate (per 100,000 population)

	 Since the early 1990s, crime
rates have fallen—in both California and the nation as a whole—to
levels not seen since the 1960s. Figures 10 and 11 graph the property
and violent crime rates per 100,000
in population for both California
and the nation, from 1960 through
2005.23 Note that the scales are
different for the two graphs, as
the overall incidence of property
crime is roughly 10 times that of
violent crime. The graphs show
that California has typically had
higher crime rates than the rest of
the nation, although that gap has
narrowed in recent years. Also, for
California and for the nation as a
whole, there has been a precipitous
drop in both property and violent
crime rates since the early 1990s.
This was a period of particularly
high immigration, as well as many
other changes in society and the
economy. The backdrop of declining crime rates in the nation and in
the state is relevant for our examination of more recent changes in
crime rates.
	 Examining city-level crime
rates complements the individuallevel data used above. For example,
if the foreign-born are able to commit crimes without being caught,
then we might find that they have
low incarceration rates and low
institutionalization rates but that
crime rates are high in places with
a large numbers of immigrants.24
Additionally, if the foreign-born
displace the U.S.-born from legal
employment—that is, if they “take

Crime, Corrections, and California

1,000
800
600
400
California violent crime rate
U.S. violent crime rate

200
0
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

California Counts

Figure 12. Property Crime Rates Tended to Decrease in
California Cities with Large Inflows of Recent Immigrants,
2000–2005

Change in property crime rate
(per 100,000 population)

2,000
Bakersfield
Modesto

1,000

Stockton

San
Riverside
Moreno Valley Bernadino
Pomona Costa Mesa
Santa Clarita
El Monte
Corona
Orange
San Francisco
Santa Ana
Anaheim
Huntington Beach
Irvine
Thousand Oaks
Inglewood
Sacramento
Glendale
Burbank
Ontario
Pasadena
Los Angeles
Long Torrance
Oxnard
Beach

0

–1,000

Norwalk

Fresno

–2,000
1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

11.0

12.0

Percentage foreign-born in the United States less than 5 years (in 2005)

Notes: Coefficient = –71.99, t-statistic = –1.02.

Figure 13. Violent Crime Rates Tended to Decrease in
California Cities with Large Inflows of Recent Immigrants,
2000–2005
600
Change in violent crime rate
(per 100,000 population)

away” jobs from natives—then
even if the foreign-born themselves
have low rates of criminal offending, and thus low institutionalization rates, their presence could
induce more criminal activity
among the U.S.-born.25
	 We used the 2000 U.S.
Census and the 2005 American
Community Survey to calculate
the percentage of a city’s population that is foreign-born. In the
results reported here, we focus in
particular on the percentage of a
city’s foreign-born population that
arrived between 2000 and 2005,
as this captures the foreign-born
inflow.26 We merged this information with city-level violent and
property crime rates (per 100,000
people) from the Uniform Crime
Reports for 2000 and 2005.27 The
resulting analysis is for the 29
cities in California that are identified in the 2000 and 2005 data
and have large enough samples of
recently arrived immigrants.28
	 Figures 12 and 13 are scatter
plots comparing the change in a
city’s crime rate with the percentage of recently arrived immigrants
in that city, for property and violent crime, respectively. Each point
represents one of the 29 cities. For
example, in Figure 12, the point
labeled “Bakersfield” in the top left
indicates that Bakersfield’s property crime rate increased by about
1,500 crimes per 100,000 people
between 2000 and 2005 and that
its percentage of recently arrived
immigrants was 2–3 percent, low

Crime, Corrections, and California

Sacramento

400

Stockton

Bakersfield
Huntington Beach

200

Modesto

San Bernadino

Pasadena
Santa Clarita
Corona
Thousand Oaks

0
–200

Long Beach

Irvine
Fresno Orange

Ontario
Moreno Valley

–400

San Francisco
Anaheim

Oxnard

Pomona
Inglewood

Costa Mesa
Burbank

Torrance
Riverside

Santa Ana

Norwalk

Glendale
El Monte

Los Angeles

–600
1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

11.0

12.0

Percentage foreign-born in the United States less than 5 years (in 2005)

Notes: Coefficient = –43.72, t-statistic = –2.51.

17

California Counts
We find that the
foreign-born have low
rates of incarceration
and institutionalization,
and that these rates
hold true across
education and regionof-origin subgroups.

compared to the immigrant inflow
rates of other cities in California.
	 The line in each figure represents the average relationship
between the change in the crime
rate and the percentage of recently
arrived foreign-born.29 For property crimes, the correlation is
slightly negative. This means that
the higher the share of recently
arrived foreign-born population,
the more property crime rates fell
over the five-year period, on average. This relationship is not statistically significant, meaning that
the relationship is consistent with
there being no correlation between
immigrant inflows and change in
property crime. For violent crime
rates, however, the relationship is
negative and statistically significant. In this case, we see stronger
evidence that crime rates fell more
18

Crime, Corrections, and California

in cities with a larger newly arrived
foreign-born population.
	 We do not claim that these
simple correlations represent the
true, causal effect of an increase
in immigration on city crime
rates in California. In reality,
the determinants of crime are
multiple and the relationship to
immigration complex. Nonetheless, these results for California are
entirely consistent with national
studies that adopt statistical techniques that plausibly point to the
causal relationship between the
two. These studies find either no
impact of immigration on crime
rates or a slightly negative one
(Butcher and Piehl, 1998a, 2007).
	 The earlier analysis of incarceration and institutionalization
rates suggests low rates of criminal
involvement for the foreign-born.
This analysis of city-level crime rates
bolsters our confidence that our
results represent the true underlying
criminal activity of the foreignborn in California and not merely
differences in treatment within the
criminal justice process.

What About
the Children of
Immigrants?

O

ur analysis here has focused
on the effects of the foreignborn on public safety in California. Of course, one of the profound ways in which immigrants

affect the state is through the
activities of their children and
their children’s children. We do
know that U.S.-born adults have
higher incarceration and institutionalization rates than foreignborn adults, and that many
U.S.-born adults are second- or
third-generation descendants of
earlier immigrants. Perhaps the
added punishments and threats
that affect noncitizens convicted of
criminal activity serve as a deterrent to these activities and perhaps,
without such threats, their U.S.born children will have higher rates
of criminal activity. Or it may be
that the immigrant generation itself
is particularly noncriminal.30
	 Unfortunately, the census data
that we use here to examine institutionalization rates do not provide
information on the birthplaces of
individuals’ parents and grandparents, so we cannot conduct a parallel analysis for later generations.
However, to give some insight into
how these groups might fare, we
can examine the institutionalization rates of those who came to
the United States at very young
ages. These people are sometimes
referred to as the “1.5 generation,”
since they were “nearly” born in
the United States, will likely speak
unaccented English, receive their
education in the United States,
and for most intents and purposes
will be difficult to distinguish
from their U.S.-born siblings.
	 Among those immigrants who
arrived when they were age one or

California Counts
younger, the institutionalization
rate is 0.8 percent.31 Although this
is higher than for the foreign-born
overall,32 it is much lower than for
the U.S.-born. Recall that these are
also the foreign-born who have had
the longest “exposure time” and
the longest time to assimilate.33
	 Perhaps those who are naturalized citizens among the 1.5 generation come closest to being like
second-generation immigrants,
since they too would be free of the
threat of deportation if involved
in criminal activity. Among this
group, institutionalization rates
are somewhat lower (0.6%) than
for the overall 1.5 generation.
Direct evidence on criminal activity of the second generation is
limited but corroborates these
findings. For example, Sampson Morenoff, and Raudenbush
(2005) surveyed youth in Chicago
neighborhoods, finding that the
foreign-born have the lowest rates
of violence, but those reporting
to be children of immigrants also
report lower rates of violence than
those with U.S.-born parents.
	 In addition, other evidence on
the children of the foreign-born
suggests that they have relatively
good outcomes in the United
States. For example, Butcher and
Hu (2000) found that those with
at least one foreign-born parent
have lower rates of receiving social
welfare than those with two U.S.born parents. In addition, Card
(2005) found that children of
immigrants have higher education

Crime, Corrections, and California

levels and wages than do the children of the U.S.-born.34 Although
these findings are not directly
related to criminal activity, among
the U.S.-born, higher education
and wages and low levels of welfare use correlate with lower levels
of criminal activity. This evidence,
albeit somewhat circumstantial,
suggests that the children of the
foreign-born are likely to have
lower rates of criminal activity
than are the U.S.-born, on average, although perhaps not as low
as the foreign-born themselves.

Summary and Policy
Implications

T

his California Counts presents
evidence on individual institutionalization rates and city-level
crime rates. We find that the foreignborn have low rates of incarceration
and institutionalization, and that
these rates hold true across education and region-of-origin subgroups.
	 Even for those immigrants
with demographic characteristics
that, among the U.S.-born, are
positively correlated with jail and
prison time, we find low rates of
institutionalization. For example,
among foreign-born men ages
18–40 with less than a high school
diploma, the institutionalization
rate is 0.5 percent. Among the
U.S.-born with less than a high
school diploma, the rate is 13.4
percent. In fact, only U.S.-born

men ages 18-40 with a college
degree or higher have lower institutionalization rates than the average among the foreign-born.
	 On city-level crime rates—a
broad measure of public safety—
our evidence suggests that, between
2000 and 2005, cities with higher
rates of newly arrived immigrants
had, if anything, a greater decline
in crime rates than cities with lower
rates of newly arrived immigrants.
	 Altogether, this evidence suggests that immigrants have very
low rates of criminal activity in
California. Note that this finding
is consistent with national studies
on immigration and crime, which
also find low rates of criminal activity for the foreign-born. Indeed,
a review of the literature (Mears,
2002) noted that the published
academic literature on the criminal
activity of the foreign-born does not
contain a counter claim.
	 Immigration policy reform
must take into account many factors in addition to the public safety
issues addressed here. However,
our results suggest that several
of the reforms currently under
consideration would do little to
improve public safety. In particular, from a public safety standpoint, there would be little reason
to further limit immigration, to
favor entry by high-skilled immigrants, or to increase penalties
against criminal immigrants. ◆

19

California Counts
Notes
Note that whether immigration affects
the criminal activity of the U.S.-born is the
subject of current research activity. Borjas,
Grogger, and Hanson (2006) found evidence
that U.S.-born blacks are more likely to be
institutionalized if they are in skill groups
that are likely to compete with immigrants
for jobs, but U.S.-born whites are not.
However, Butcher and Piehl (1998a) found
no direct evidence that immigration has an
effect on city crime rates.

1

When the Anti-Drug Abuse Act passed in
1988, “aggravated felonies” were defined as
murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking in firearms. By now, the list of activities
for which a noncitizen can be deported is
long, complicated, and can be added to, by
both Congress and the Attorney General.
Under current law, petty larceny and simple
assault—misdemeanors under criminal law—
can be classified as “aggravated felonies” for
the purposes of immigration law if, for example, the person plea-bargains for a suspended
sentence of a year or greater. See Kanstroom
(2007), pp. 227–228, 243, for details.

2

Investigation of the legal status of those
apprehended for minor crimes differs by
jurisdiction. There are programs in Los
Angeles County and federal jurisdictions
to “fast track” to deportation.

3

Data are from the Integrated Public Use
Microdata Samples (www.ipums.org). These
data are from the 2000 U.S. Census 5%
sample.

4

For example, for those ages 15–24, about
51 percent of the U.S.-born population is
male, but 54 percent of the foreign-born
population is male.

5

The measure “institutionalized” does not
include those living in noninstitutional group
quarters such as college dormitories and military barracks. It includes people under formally authorized, supervised care or custody
in institutions at the time of enumeration.
For example, inmates in correctional institutions or patients at hospitals for the chronically ill are included in the institutionalized
population, but staff who live on the grounds
are not (http://factfinder.census.gov).

6

20

Crime, Corrections, and California

7

Data on incarceration are only for the
CDCR and do not include federal inmates.
The population numbers used as denominators to create incarceration rates are from
State of California (2006), Table 25.

residents would be undercounted by using
incarceration as a measure of criminal activity,
since presumably U.S. citizens and legal residents have little to fear from reporting crimes
against themselves.

Note that these incarceration rates are
based on prison populations at a single point
in time and therefore emphasize longer sentences (since the stock of inmates at a point
in time will be disproportionately composed
of those who are in for longer periods of
time). Point-in-time data do not correspond
well to the question, “what crimes did they
commit?” because of this bias toward those
with longer sentences. For example, in these
point-in-time data, a higher percentage of
the foreign-born than the U.S.-born were
incarcerated on a “crimes against persons”
charge (57% vs. 48%). However, as the
per-population calculations make clear, the
foreign-born were much less likely than the
U.S.-born to be incarcerated for this type
of crime. A better way to answer the question, “what crimes were they convicted of?”
is to examine an admission cohort—all new
entrants to prison at a given point. Although
we did not have access to an admission
cohort sample for this report, Butcher and
Piehl (2000) examined an admission cohort
for men in the California prison system in
1996 and calculated that about 46 percent
of the foreign-born were entering prison for
drug offenses, compared to about 32 percent
of the U.S.-born. The percentage of foreignborn entering for property crimes was lower
than for the U.S.-born (18% vs. 29%), as was
the percentage entering for assault offenses
(18% vs. 22%). The percentage of foreignborn entering for manslaughter charges was
slightly higher than for the U.S.-born (2.8%
vs. 2.5%), and the percentage entering for sex
offenses was not statistically significantly different for the two groups (4.7% vs. 4.2%).

10 See Butcher and Piehl (2007) for a description of Census enumeration procedures in
institutionalized settings.

8

Alternatively, if the undocumented do not
report crimes committed against them and
the undocumented are likely victims of criminals who are themselves undocumented, then
crimes committed against the undocumented
may be particularly unlikely to lead to an
arrest, conviction, and term of incarceration.
For criminal activity against the undocumented, examining an endpoint outcome such as
incarceration may be a particularly poor gauge
of underlying criminal activity. That does not
mean, however, that criminal activity by the
undocumented toward U.S. citizens or legal

9

11 The 2000 Census reported that in California, about 245,000 men ages 18–64 were
institutionalized and over 90 percent were
in correctional institutions (http://factfinder.
census.gov). Note that the summary statistics that allow one to know in which type
of institution individuals are housed do
not allow a breakdown of the information
by individual characteristics such as nativity or by finer other-age categories. Butcher
and Piehl (1998b) calculated that in the
1980 Census—the last time that types of
institutions were separately identifiable in
the microdata—over 70 percent of institutionalized men ages 18–40 overall were in
a correctional setting. A somewhat higher
fraction—77 percent—of institutionalized
immigrants ages 18–40 was incarcerated.
12 Young U.S.-born men may be disproportionately likely to engage in criminal
activity for many reasons, ranging from
the economic (low opportunity cost) to the
psychological (poor impulse control). But if
immigration selects those with low criminal
tendencies and immigrants face harsher
penalties for criminal activity, there is ample
reason for the age patterns to be different
for foreign-born men. Consider the possibility, for example, that young foreign-born
men plan to work in the United States for
40 years to recoup the considerable costs of
immigration. For them, the opportunity cost
of committing a crime may be higher than
that for an older immigrant. Thus, the age
patterns may be different in the foreign-born
and U.S. born populations.
13 Calculated using the educational attainment recodes available in IPUMS (integrated
public use microdata series, see www.ipums.
org) data. No distinction is made between
those with a high school diploma and those
with a general equivalency degree (GED).
14 The “other Asian countries” include Korea,
Iran, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, South Korea, Indonesia,

California Counts
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Indochina
(not specified), Malaysia, Singapore, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.
15 Controlling for age does not substantially
change these comparisons.
16 Note that U.S.-born blacks make up about
6.3 percent of the overall population of men
ages 18–40 in California. Among institutionalized men ages 18–40 in California,
however, U.S.-born blacks make up 27 percent of the population.

Assimilation might lead to more criminal
activity if, for example, it takes time to learn
the best opportunities for theft and to make
contacts that allow one to dispose of stolen
property.

17

18 On a more technical note, the “undercount” in the Census is much more likely to
affect the noninstitutionalized population
than the institutionalized population, since
the latter are enumerated from administrative records. For those outside institutions,
the undercount is likely higher for the
foreign-born than for the U.S.-born. This
means that the denominator used to calculate the fraction institutionalized is too low
for the foreign-born relative to the U.S.born, which will overstate the fraction of
foreign-born institutionalized.

Some suggestion of the possible magnitude
of the effect of deportation comes from comparing the representation of the foreign-born
among new admissions to state prisons rather
than among recidivists. For men (ages 20 and
up) in California state prisons, the overall
percentage foreign-born is 17 percent. Among
new admissions to prison, the percentage
foreign-born is higher (23%). This is consistent with a higher rate of reoffending among
the U.S.-born, possibly because of the deportation of noncitizens after their first term of
incarceration. However, it is also consistent
with noncitizens being sentenced for lesser
crimes and receiving commensurately lighter
sentences (Butcher and Piehl, 2000). And
note that for the population in California
overall, the percentage foreign-born among
men ages 20 and up is about 36 percent, thus
the 17 percent foreign-born among the new
admissions to prison is very low.

19

Within three years of release, two-thirds
of California prisoners are returned to prison
20

Crime, Corrections, and California

or jail. This rate, which is higher than that
in other large states, can be explained by the
high rate of technical violations of parole.
More than half of those returned to prison
or jail do so because they have violated the
conditions of their parole rather than committing a new crime. See Fisher (2005).

all change in the foreign-born population in
a city in the same five-year period. With this
“inflow rate,” we examine whether those cities that received more new arrivals (as a percentage of the overall population) had worse
crime rates than equivalent cities with lower
inflows of immigrants.

Note that determining the deportability of
the foreign-born who have been convicted of
criminal activity, and detaining them while
they wait for deportation, imposes additional
costs on law enforcement.

27

21

22 The challenges to repatriation include failure of aliens to obey orders to appear, high
absconding rates of those with final orders
to depart, failure of receiving countries to
issue travel documentation (or the refusal to
accept deportees), and recent Supreme Court
decisions mandating the release of aliens if
orders cannot be executed promptly. See U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (2006)
for details.
23 Data are from the Uniform Crime Reports
collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (See http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm.)
These represent crimes in four categories of
property crimes (burglary, larceny, motor
vehicle theft, and arson) and four categories
of violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery,
and aggravated assault).
24 If, for example, the foreign-born cross the
border undetected, commit crimes, and then
return to their country of origin undetected,
then we might see high crime rates without
seeing high institutionalization rates. It is
important to note, however, that comparisons of border and nonborder cities reveal
that border cities (with larger immigrant
populations) do not have higher crime rates
than nonborder cities (Hagan and Palloni,
1999). Thus, there is little empirical evidence
to support the idea that the foreign-born are
committing crimes in the United States and
evading detection by crossing the border.

Note, however, that recent work on the
effect of immigration on the wages and
employment of the U.S.-born in California
shows little evidence of a negative labor market effect (Peri, 2007).

25

The percentage of a city’s population that
arrived in the United States between 2000
and 2005 is highly correlated with the over-

26

Crime rate data at the city level are often
noisy. We have also conducted this analysis
using three-year averages of the crime rate
data (1999–2001 and 2004–2006). These
calculations are very similar to those presented here.

28 Note that some large cities, notably San
Diego, are not identified in the Census and
American Community Survey data. This has
to do with the Census definitions for being
within a “city.” San Diego is identified as
a metropolitan area but not as a “city.” In
addition, we require that there be at least
30 recently arrived (in the last five years)
foreign-born in the city to have a statistically
reliable measure of the inflow of immigrants.

The line is estimated using ordinary least
squares, weighted by the square root of the
city population in 2005. Los Angeles is
shown on the scatter plot but was not used
to estimate the fitted line as changes in the
crime rate data collection procedures rendered the statistics noncomparable across the
two points in time. The results here are quite
similar even if we include Los Angeles or
estimate the relationship without weighting.

29

Butcher and Piehl (2007) argued that
migrants appear to be particularly responsive
to incentives and less likely to engage in
criminal activity.

30

31 The percentage is almost identical if we
define the 1.5 generation as those arriving
when they are age 5 or younger.
32

This difference is not statistically significant.

33 Separating assimilation from age-at-arrival
effects is complicated and requires more
than one cross-section of data. See Friedberg
(1992) for a discussion.
34 The finding is based on national data for
adults ages 21–64, with controls for age differences between the groups.

21

California Counts
References
Berestein, Leslie, “Deported Criminals Slip
Back into the U.S.: Long-Term Effectiveness
of Policies Questioned,” San Diego UnionTribune, September 17, 2007.
Borjas, George J., Jeffrey Grogger, and Gordon H. Hanson, “Immigration and AfricanAmerican Employment Opportunities: The
Response of Wages, Employment, and Incarceration to Labor Supply Shocks,” National
Bureau of Economic Research working paper
12518, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2006.
Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison
Piehl, “Cross-City Evidence on the Relationship between Immigration and Crime,”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
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Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison
Piehl, “Recent Immigrants: Unexpected
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Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison
Piehl, “The Role of Deportation in the Incarceration of Immigrants,” in George Borjas,
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Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison
Piehl, “Why Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective
Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation,”
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working paper 13229, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007.
Butcher, Kristin F., and Luojia Hu, “Use of
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Card, eds., Finding Jobs: Work and Welfare
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Irvine Center for Evidence-Based Corrections
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Crime, Corrections, and California

Friedberg, Rachel, “The Labor Market
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California Counts

Crime, Corrections, and California

About the Authors
Kristin F. Butcher is an associate professor of economics at Wellesley College.
Anne Morrison Piehl is an associate professor of economics and faculty affiliate in criminal justice at
Rutgers University.
Jay Liao is a research associate at PPIC. He holds a B.A. in economics from Northwestern University.

Contributors
Jay Liao provided valuable assistance with data analysis. The authors would like to thank Hans
Johnson, Deborah Reed, Lynette Ubois, Phil Martin, Paul Golaszewski, Dan Carson, Sarah Bohn,
Gary Bjork, and PPIC seminar participants for many helpful comments. We are grateful to PPIC
for hosting us and providing many forms of support during the summer of 2007 without which this
project would not have been possible.

Thomas C. Sutton, Chair
Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Pacific Life Insurance Company

Donna Lucas
Chief Executive Officer
Lucas Public Affairs

Mark Baldassare
President and Chief Executive Officer
Public Policy Institute of California

Leon E. Panetta
Director
The Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for
Public Policy

Linda Griego
President and Chief Executive Officer
Griego Enterprises, Inc.
Edward K. Hamilton
Chairman
Hamilton, Rabinovitz & Associates, Inc.
Gary K. Hart
Former State Senator and Secretary of
Education
State of California
Walter B. Hewlett
Director
Center for Computer Assisted
Research in the Humanities

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