by Douglas Ankney

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Government breached its plea agreement with Dehaven Darnell Craig when it successfully argued for sentencing enhancements based on “total relevant conduct” to which the parties had not stipulated in the plea agreement.

Background

Craig was indicted on two drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) based upon police recovering a .380 caliber pistol, .8 grams of cocaine base, and narcotics packaging. In an ensuing plea agreement, the Government agreed to drop the drug charges, move for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and recommend a sentence within the Guidelines range in exchange for Craig’s guilty plea to the gun charge. Paragraph nine of the plea agreement provided that:

Pursuant to Sections 6B1.4 and 1B1.3 of the Guidelines, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that on April 26, 2018, in Jefferson County, in the Northern District of West Virginia, … Craig knowingly possessed a firearm in and affecting commerce…. Defendant possessed the firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … Defendant possessed the firearm knowing he had been convicted of such a crime.

The plea agreement also provided that the Government reserved the right to provide the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia and probation office with relevant information regarding Craig’s background and crimes, and to correct any inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report (“PSI”).

At a plea hearing before a magistrate judge, the Government stated that paragraph nine “contains the parties’ stipulation to [Craig’s] total relevant conduct” and then repeated the paragraph verbatim. And the magistrate asked Craig “[d]o you understand that under our concept known as relevant conduct, the Court may take into account any conduct, circumstances, and injuries relevant to the crimes to which you are pleading guilty?” Craig responded that he understood. The magistrate then asked:

Do you understand that under the terms of the plea agreement, you and the government have stipulated and agreed that the total relevant conduct of the defendant with regard to the superseding indictment is [as set forth in paragraph nine]? Sir, do you understand that to be the relevant conduct stipulation set forth in your plea agreement?

Craig again responded that he understood. The Government then called an officer to provide testimony as to the facts in support of Craig’s guilty plea. During cross-examination, the officer testified there was “some evidence” that the gun was stolen. The magistrate accepted the guilty plea and ordered that a PSI be prepared.

The probation office calculated Craig’s Guidelines range at 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment. But the Government objected and sought a two-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) (based on the gun being stolen) and a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because the gun was connected with a felony drug offense. The enhancements increased Craig’s Guidelines range to 100 to 120 months’ imprisonment.

Craig objected to the enhancements, arguing they relied on conduct beyond the “total relevant conduct” stipulated in paragraph nine of the plea agreement. The Government countered that paragraph nine only detailed facts sufficient to establish guilt for the firearm charge and did not preclude additional relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. The District Court sided with the Government, applied the enhancements, and sentenced Craig to a 100-month term of imprisonment. Craig timely appealed, arguing that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for enhancements based on conduct not stipulated in paragraph nine.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by addressing the interpretation of plea agreements, emphasizing that while traditional contract law principles guide the process, plea agreements warrant heightened scrutiny due to their implication of a defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678 (4th Cir. 2016). The Court noted that this scrutiny imposes a greater degree of responsibility on the Government for any imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986). Courts interpret the plain language of a plea agreement in its ordinary sense, United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007), and give effect to each term, consistent with standard contract interpretation, United States v. Johnson, 119 F.4th 343 (4th Cir. 2024). The Court explained that this approach ensures that the defendant’s reasonable expectations under the agreement are honored, safeguarding the fairness of the plea process.

The Court’s analysis focused on paragraph nine of the plea agreement, which cited U.S.S.G. §§ 6B1.4 and 1B1.3 as the basis for the parties’ stipulation. To provide context, the Court examined these Guidelines sections. Section 6B1.4, titled “Stipulations (Policy Statement),” provides that a plea agreement may include a written stipulation of facts relevant to sentencing, which must set forth the relevant facts and circumstances of the actual offense conduct and offender characteristics and identify any disputed facts. The commentary to § 6B1.4 clarifies that stipulations must fully and accurately disclose all factors relevant to the determination of sentence and identify areas of agreement, disagreement, and uncertainty, ensuring that sentencing courts have a complete factual basis for determining an appropriate sentence. Section 1B1.3, titled “Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range),” outlines how a defendant’s sentencing range is calculated by considering all acts and omissions committed by the defendant that are part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction. The Court noted that “relevant conduct” has a specialized meaning under the Guidelines, encompassing conduct beyond the offense of conviction, including uncharged or dismissed offenses. United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2002).

Given the context of §§ 6B1.4 and 1B1.3, the Court concluded that the most reasonable interpretation of paragraph nine’s prefatory clause was that the parties stipulated to all facts relevant to Craig’s sentencing, not merely facts sufficient to establish guilt, as the Government argued. The Court rejected the Government’s contention that paragraph nine was limited to supporting Craig’s guilty plea, noting that such an interpretation would ignore the explicit reference to Guidelines sections governing sentencing. Adopting the Government’s position would require disregarding the prefatory clause, which is inconsistent with the principle of giving effect to all terms in a plea agreement. Johnson.

The Court noted that its interpretation was further supported by statements made during the plea hearing, where the Government explicitly stated that paragraph nine “contains the parties’ stipulation to [Craig’s] total relevant conduct.” The magistrate judge also asked Craig whether he understood that the parties had stipulated and agreed to the facts in paragraph nine to be the relevant conduct stipulation set forth in the plea agreement, to which Craig responded affirmatively. The Court stated that the Government did not object to the magistrate’s characterization of paragraph nine as encompassing the total relevant conduct, reinforcing the conclusion that paragraph nine was intended to define the full scope of relevant conduct for sentencing purposes, binding the Government to that stipulation.

The Government argued that its duty of candor to the District Court, combined with paragraph 11 of the plea agreement, which reserved the right to correct inaccuracies in the PSI, obligated it to seek sentencing enhancements based on evidence that the firearm was stolen and connected to another felony, specifically possession of cocaine base and intent to rob a stash house. The Court acknowledged the Government’s duty to provide accurate information to the sentencing court, including disclosing evidence of additional conduct. However, it ruled that the Government crossed the line by advocating for enhancements based on conduct outside the stipulated relevant conduct in paragraph nine, thereby breaching the plea agreement.

The Court cited United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2019), to articulate the balance between the Government’s duty of candor and its obligation to honor plea agreements. In Edgell, the Government stipulated to a specific drug quantity but later advocated for a higher sentencing range based on lab findings, breaching the plea agreement. The Edgell Court ruled that the Government must balance its duty of candor with its equally solemn duty to honor plea commitments by making necessary disclosures to the court while continuing to advocate for the agreement’s terms. Similarly, in the present case, the Government’s disclosure of the stolen firearm and felony drug offense was permissible, but its advocacy for enhancements based on that conduct violated the plea agreement’s stipulation, according to the Court. It also cited United States v. Munoz, 408 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2005), to reinforce that the Government cannot use its duty of candor to advocate a position that contradicts its plea agreement promises.

Conclusion

The Court concluded that the Government breached the plea agreement by seeking enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) for a stolen firearm and U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for a firearm connected to another felony based on facts not included in paragraph nine’s total relevant conduct stipulation. This breach deprived Craig of the benefit of his bargain because the enhancements increased his Guidelines range from 57 to 71 months to 100 to 120 months.

Accordingly, the Court vacated Craig’s 100-month sentence and, because Craig sought specific performance of the plea agreement, remanded the case for resentencing before a different judge. See: United States v. Craig, 142 F.4th 192 (4th Cir. 2025).  

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