by David Kim

The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, unanimously reversed a second-degree murder conviction, holding that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel during a Perkins operation (an undercover tactic in which law enforcement operatives pose as fellow detainees to elicit information from a jailed suspect) and a known law enforcement officer subsequently employs “stimulation” tactics that constitute custodial interrogation, the suspect’s resulting incriminating statements are inadmissible. The Court reasoned that although undercover questioning generally falls outside Miranda’s scope, the deputy’s actions in the present case – conducting a fake lineup, falsely informing the defendant a witness identified him, and announcing murder charges within earshot of undercover operatives – created a police-dominated atmosphere designed to elicit incriminating statements. Because the defendant had already asserted his right to counsel and never waived it, admitting his subsequent confession violated both Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).

Background

Justin Triplett was killed on September 22, 2014. Approximately one year later, while Jason Johnomar Zapata was in custody on unrelated charges, a Riverside County Sheriff’s deputy orchestrated a Perkins operation targeting Zapata as a suspect. The deputy placed Zapata in a holding cell for roughly 3 hours and 20 minutes with two law enforcement agents posing as detainees, recording and monitoring the operation while contacting Zapata approximately three times to “stimulate” conversation.

Initially, Zapata denied involvement when the undercover agents questioned him about Triplett’s murder. Midway through the operation, the deputy removed Zapata for a fabricated lineup, falsely telling him a witness had identified him as the killer. The deputy then asked whether Zapata wished to discuss the murder. Zapata invoked his right to counsel, stating he wanted a lawyer before any further questioning.

Rather than providing an attorney, the deputy returned Zapata to the holding cell while announcing he was charging Zapata with murder. The undercover agents overheard this announcement and immediately pressed Zapata about the killing. Zapata ultimately confessed, admitting he shot Triplett at his apartment during the day using his .40 caliber Smith & Wesson, which he later discarded and reported stolen.

Zapata moved to exclude his statements, arguing the operation violated Miranda. The trial court denied the motion and admitted the confession. A jury convicted Zapata of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life plus 10 years for a firearm enhancement. Zapata timely appealed.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by noting that when reviewing suppression motions involving Miranda, appellate courts accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations if supported by substantial evidence while independently determining from established facts whether statements were illegally obtained. People v. Jackson, 1 Cal. 5th 269 (2016).

The Miranda-Perkins
Framework

The Court then set forth the governing legal principles. Under Miranda, prosecutors cannot introduce a suspect’s statements unless the suspect received proper advisements regarding the right to remain silent and to counsel. The Court observed that Miranda’s protections apply only during “custodial interrogation” because such circumstances “contain inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist.” People v. Orozco, 32 Cal. App. 5th 802 (2019). As clarified in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), interrogation encompasses “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”

The Court observed that Edwards established that once a suspect invokes Miranda rights, “further police-initiated custodial interrogation” is prohibited unless counsel is present or the suspect initiates communication. Waivers of counsel must be voluntary and constitute “a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Id.

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), addressed undercover operations, holding that officers posing as fellow prisoners need not provide Miranda warnings before asking potentially incriminating questions. The rationale is that absent awareness of police involvement, suspects face no coercive atmosphere: “When a suspect considers himself in the company of cellmates and not officers, the coercive atmosphere is lacking.” Id.

Application to
Stimulation Tactics

Significantly, the Court noted that while Perkins did not directly address police stimulation techniques, it spoke to their limits. The Perkins Court stated that “[p]loys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s concern.” The inverse follows: ploys rising to that level remain subject to Miranda’s protections. In fact, the Court explained that “obtaining a confession by ‘trickery,’ including false lineups, was among the police tactics criticized in Miranda.”

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court concluded that the deputy’s conduct transformed the operation into a custodial interrogation. After monitoring conversations that produced no useful information, the deputy removed Zapata, conducted the lineup ruse, and – even after Zapata expressly requested counsel – returned him to the cell while announcing murder charges within the undercover agents’ hearing. This tactic was intended to pressure Zapata into speaking. As the deputy testified, the lineup stratagem “caused [Zapata] to want to talk to, he thought, [ ] other inmates about how to prepare for this.”

The Court determined this situation “cannot be fairly characterized as an environment free of a ‘police-dominated atmosphere.’” See Perkins. Law enforcement’s recurring presence, combined with the elaborate lineup ruse, placed substantial pressure on Zapata. Importantly, announcing the murder charge before the undercover operatives “was ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’” under Innis, according to the Court. Because Zapata lacked “impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery” when he subsequently incriminated himself, the deputy’s actions elevated the operation to custodial interrogation, triggering Miranda and Edwards protections, the Court determined.

The Court also distinguished prior Perkins cases in which police “stimulations” did not amount to custodial interrogation, explaining that those decisions involved suspects who did not make incriminating statements to any known officer and later confessed only during conversations they believed were with fellow detainees. Here, by contrast, the deputy’s staged lineup and his announcement of the murder charge in the undercover operatives’ presence were “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response” under Innis, and the Court reasoned that “a stimulation’s coercive effect will continue to be present even when the officer is not.” For that reason, the Court rejected any bright-line focus on whether the stimulating officer was physically present at the moment of confession and instead treated the degree and nature of known law-enforcement involvement as the dispositive distinction.

Prejudice

The Court applied Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), requiring reversal unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Observing that confessions “often operate ‘as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense,’” the Court concluded that Zapata established prejudice. Without Zapata’s confession, the case largely depended on witness credibility, and the jury partially resolved conflicting evidence in Zapata’s favor by acquitting him of first-degree murder and deadlocking on the personal firearm use allegation, the Court explained.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. See: People v. Zapata, 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 88 (2026).

Editor’s Note: Anyone interested in Perkins operations is encouraged to read the Court’s full opinion.  

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