by David Kim

The Supreme Court of California unanimously held that the rule established in People v. Vargas, 328 P.3d 1020 (Cal. 2014), requiring a trial court to dismiss one strike when two prior strike convictions arise from a single criminal act, applies equally when the defendant’s single act harmed multiple victims. Because the defendant’s two prior vehicular manslaughter convictions stemmed from one act of intoxicated driving, the Court concluded that imposing a third-­strike indeterminate life sentence would contravene the voters’ understanding that “no one can be called for two strikes on just one swing.”

Background

In December 2020, officers discovered defendant Troy Lee Shaw unconscious behind the wheel of a vehicle stopped in the middle of a road with its engine running. Shaw admitted having taken methamphetamine earlier that day, and officers observed indicators of impairment. A search revealed methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, and marijuana, and blood tests confirmed the presence of amphetamine and methamphetamine. Shaw was charged with felony driving under the influence of a drug and various possession offenses. A jury found him guilty.

For sentencing purposes, Shaw admitted two prior convictions for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Both convictions arose from a 2002 incident in which Shaw drove under the influence, ran a red light, and struck a vehicle with three occupants, killing a 21-­year-­old mother and her 23-­month-­old son. These two prior homicide convictions rendered Shaw eligible for a third-­strike indeterminate term of 25 years to life.

Shaw moved to dismiss one of the prior strikes under Penal Code § 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996), arguing that dismissal was required under Vargas because both convictions arose from a single criminal act. The trial court denied the motion and imposed a third-­strike sentence of 25 years to life on the driving under the influence charge.

The Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion, relying on People v. Rusconi, 236 Cal. App. 4th 273 (2015), to hold that the trial court had not abused its discretion because, unlike in Vargas, Shaw’s prior criminal act had harmed two victims rather than one. In Rusconi, the Court of Appeal held that Vargas’ mandatory strike-­dismissal rule applies only when a single act against a single victim produces multiple strike convictions and does not apply when a single act harms multiple victims. The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed.

Analysis

The Court began by reviewing the Three Strikes law enacted by the Legislature and electorate in 1994 as an alternative sentencing scheme prescribing longer sentences for felony defendants previously convicted of serious or violent felonies. Under the statutory framework, defendants with one prior strike face doubled sentences, while those with two or more prior strikes may face indeterminate life terms under certain circumstances. The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 narrowed third-­strike eligibility but maintained this tiered distinction.

The Court discussed its prior decisions addressing how strikes should be counted when multiple convictions stem from related underlying acts. In People v. Fuhrman, 941 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1997), the California Supreme Court held that prior qualifying convictions need not have been brought and tried separately to count as separate strikes, based on the statute’s plain language treating each “prior conviction” of a serious or violent felony as a strike without further qualification. In People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998), the Supreme Court held that crimes arising from the same set of facts qualify as separate strikes even if so closely connected that one sentence was stayed under Penal Code § 654. However, the Court noted that in a footnote, Benson reserved whether “there are some circumstances in which two prior felony convictions are so closely connected – for example, when multiple convictions arise out of a single act by the defendant as distinguished from multiple acts committed in an indivisible course of conduct – that a trial court would abuse its discretion under section 1385 if it failed to strike one of the priors.”

The Court stated that Vargas answered the unanswered question. In Vargas, the defendant’s two prior strikes for robbery and carjacking were “based on the same act of taking the victim’s car by force.” The Supreme Court concluded that “when faced with two prior strike convictions based on the same act,” a trial court is “required to dismiss one of them.” Central to this holding was the ballot argument accompanying the Three Strikes initiative, which described a tiered system where “a third felony conviction, with two serious/violent prior felonies,” triggers the harshest penalty. The Supreme Court reasoned that “the voting public would reasonably have understood the ‘Three Strikes’ baseball metaphor to mean that a person would have three chances – three swings of the bat, if you will – before the harshest penalty could be imposed. The public also would have understood that no one can be called for two strikes on just one swing.”

Whether Vargas Applies
to Multi-­Victim Scenarios

The question now before the Court was whether the Court of Appeal correctly identified Vargas’ reach. That is, does Vargas apply only in the circumstances there presented, in which the defendant had suffered multiple convictions stemming from a single act against a single victim? Or does Vargas also apply where, as here, the same act caused harm to multiple victims?

The Court observed that Vargas’ reasoning strongly suggested the answer. The Court explained that although Vargas noted at the outset that the underlying facts concerned a single act against a single victim, “our opinion ascribed no particular significance to the single-­victim aspect of the case.” Instead, Vargas “repeatedly described the issue before us as ‘whether the trial court should have dismissed one of defendant’s two prior felony convictions, alleged as strikes under the Three Strikes law, where both convictions were based on the same act.’” The dispositive point was that “‘[u]nlike those rightfully subject to a third strike sentence,’ a person who has ‘committed but one prior qualifying act’ has ‘had only two swings of the bat,’” the Court stated.

The Attorney General argued that Vargas should be limited to single-­victim facts because when a prior criminal act harms multiple victims, not every reasonable person would agree that multiple-­strike sentencing falls outside the Three Strikes law’s spirit. The Attorney General emphasized that the law permits separate convictions and punishments for violent acts harming multiple victims, and voters should be presumed to have understood that a single criminal act with multiple victims might yield multiple strikes.

The Court rejected that argument. While Vargas addressed a situation where multiple convictions were imposed for the same underlying act, the Vargas Court concluded that “multiple convictions alone were not sufficient to support third strike sentencing.” The Court acknowledged that Vargas did not squarely address situations where multiple punishments are authorized for the same act but noted it had “ascribed little significance to the point, characterizing it as ‘further evidence’ of relevant legislative intent, but ‘not dispositive.’” The dispositive consideration remained that both convictions stemmed from a single act, according to the Court.

More fundamentally, the Court explained, “the Attorney General’s argument fails because it misses the point of a recidivist sentencing law like the Three Strikes law.” While an act harming multiple people is more serious and may be punished accordingly, “the purpose of Three Strikes sentencing is not (and, for double jeopardy reasons, cannot be) to impose additional punishment for prior criminal acts that have already been punished. The purpose is instead to fix the appropriate punishment for the defendant’s current offense – an offense the law considers ‘to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’”

Application to the Present Case

The Court recognized that Shaw’s 2002 intoxicated driving was undeniably more serious because it claimed two lives rather than one, as reflected in his conviction on two counts of vehicular manslaughter and the longer sentence for that incident. “But it does not follow, as the Attorney General supposes, that the voters and legislators who enacted the Three Strikes law intended to authorize imposing an indeterminate life term on Shaw for his current offense – even though his two prior strikes stemmed from just one criminal act – while merely doubling the term of another defendant who had previously engaged in identical conduct,” the Court reasoned.

The Court distinguished Benson, which involved “multiple criminal acts (albeit committed in a single course of conduct) and not, as here, multiple criminal convictions stemming from the commission of a single act.” Where multiple convictions stem from a single act, imposing a third-­strike indeterminate life term “would contravene the voters’ ‘clear understanding of how the Three Strikes law was intended to work’” and “authorize a third strike, indeterminate life sentence even when a ‘defendant has had only two swings of the bat.’” Vargas.

The Court emphasized that its holding does not diminish the seriousness of Shaw’s conduct. As a second-­strike offender, Shaw remained subject to a doubled sentence – “itself a serious penalty.” The Court explained that the question was limited to whether the law permits a third-­strike indeterminate life term when the defendant committed only one prior qualifying act. Recognizing that the law does not permit such sentencing “is not to allow the defendant to escape the consequences of his actions. It is only to ensure that his punishment respects the ‘tiered penalty structure’ the voters and legislators enacted.”

Conclusion

Thus, the Court held that the rule established in Vargas, requiring dismissal of a strike when two prior strikes result from the same act, applies in cases where the defendant’s single act harmed multiple victims. Additionally, the Court expressly disapproved of Rusconi.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded for resentencing consistent with its opinion. See: People v. Shaw, 2025 Cal. LEXIS 8249 (2025).  

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