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Senate Select Comiiiittee on Infelligeoee
Committee Study ofthe CentralIntelligence Agmcy 's Detention and
Interrogation Program

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Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Bianne Feinstein
Findings and Concliisioiis
Executive Summary

Approved Deeember 13,,2012
Updatedfor Release April 3, 2014

Deciassificatiori Revisions December 3, Ml 4
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Foreword

On April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted to send the
Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary of its final Study on the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the President for declassification
and subsequent public release.

This action marked the culmination ofa monumental effort that officially began
with the Committee's decision to initiate the Study in March 2009, but which had
its roots in an investigation into the CIA's destruction of videotapes of CIA
detainee interrogations that beganin December 2007.

The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages, remains classified
but is now an official Senate report. The full report has been provided to the White
House, the CIA, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the

Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the
hopes that it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the
management of other covert action programs.
As the Chairman of the Committee since 2009,1 write to offer some additional

views, context, and history.

I began my service on the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2001. I
remember testimony that summer from George Tenet, the Director of Central
Intelligence, that warned of a possible major terrorist event against the United
States, but without specifics on the time, location, or method of attack. On

September 11, 2001, the world learned the answers to those questions that had

consumed the CIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community.^
I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of
innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape
the fire. The images, and the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below,
will remain with me for the rest of my life.

It is against that backdrop - the largest attack against the American homeland in
our history - that the events described in this report were undertaken.
' For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11, 2001, see the Final Report ofthe National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon theUnited States (9/11 Commission) and Office of theInspector General
Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks.

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Nearly 13 years later, the Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions of
this report are being released. They are highly critical of the CIA's actions, and
rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy to forget the context in which the program
began - not that the context should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for
the future.

It is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the
threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks, powdered anthrax was sent
to various news organizations and to two U.S. Senators. The American public was
shocked by news of new terrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat
level of the Homeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks
against the nation.

I have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the nation and to the CIA
workforce from the attacks of September 11, 2001. I can understand the CIA's
impulse to consider the use of every possible tool to gather intelligence and remove

terrorists from the battlefield,^ and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and
the public to do whatever it could to prevent another attack.
The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence agencies to act
quickly in response to threats and world events.
Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist plots do not
justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by individuals or organizations in
the name of national security. The major lesson of this report is that regardless of
the pressures and the need to act, the Intelligence Community's actions must
always reflect who we are as a nation, and adhere to our laws and standards. It is
precisely at these times of national crisis that our government must be guided by
the lessons of our history and subject decisions to internal and external review.
Instead, CIA personnel, aided by two outside contractors, decided to initiate a
program of indefinite secret detention and the use of brutal interrogation
techniques in violation of U.S. law, treaty obligations, and our values.

This Conomittee Study documents the abuses and countless mistakes made
between late 2001 and early 2009. The Executive Summary of the Study provides
^It is worth repeating that the covert action authorities approved bythe President in September 2001 didnotprovide
any authorization or contemplate coercive interrogations.

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a significant amount ofnew information, based on CIA and other documents, to

what has already been made public by the Bush and Obama Administrations,' as

well as non-governmental organizations and the press.

The Committee's full Study is more than ten times the length of the Executive

Sununary and includes comprehensive and excruciating detail. The Study
describes the history ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program from its
inception to its termination, including a review of each of the 119 known
individuals who were held in CIA custody.

The full Conmiittee Study also provides substantially more detail than what is
included in the Executive Summary on the CIA's justification and defense of its
interrogation program on the basis that it was necessary and critical to the
disruption of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. While the
Executive Summary provides sufficient detail to demonstrate the inaccuracies of

each of these claims, the information in the full Committee Study is far more
extensive.

I chose not to seek declassification of the full Committee Study at this time. I
believe that the Executive Summary includes enough information to adequately
describe the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the Committee's
Findings and Conclusions cover the entirety of the program. Seeking
declassification of the more than six thousand page report would have significantly
delayed the release of the Executive Summary. Decisions will be made later on the
declassification and release of the full 6,700 page Study.
In 2009, when this effort began, I stated (in a press release co-authored with the
Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Kit Bond) that "the purpose is to review
the program and to shape detention and interrogation policies in the future." The
review is now done. It is my sincere and deep hope that through the release of
these Findings and Conclusions and Executive Summary that U.S. policy will
never again allow for secret indefinite detention and the use of coercive

interrogations. As the Study describes, prior to the attacks of September 2001, the
CIA itself determined from its own experience with coercive interrogations, that
such techniques "do not produce intelligence," "will probably result in false
answers," and had historically proven to be ineffective. Yet these conclusions

were ignored. We cannot again allow history to be forgotten and grievous past
mistakes to be repeated.

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President Obama signed Executive Order 13491 in January 2009 to prohibit the
CIA from holding detainees other than on a "short-term, transitory basis" and to
limit interrogation techniques to those includedin the Army Field Manual.
However, these limitations are not part of U.S. law and could be overturned by a
future president with the stroke of a pen. They should be enshrined in legislation.
Even so, existing U.S. law and treaty obligations should have prevented many of
the abuses and mistakes made during this program. While the Office of Legal
Counsel found otherwise between 2002 and 2007, it is my personal conclusion
that, under any common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also
believe that the conditions of confinement and the use of authorized and

unauthorized interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhuman, and
degrading. I believe the evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.
While the Conmiittee did not make specific recommendations, several emerge
from the Committee's review. The CIA, in its June 2013 response to the
Committee's Study from December 2012, has also already made and begun to
implement its own recommendations. I intend to work with Senate colleagues to
produce recommendations and to solicit views from the readers of the Committee
Study.

I would also like to take this opportunity to describe the process of this study.
As noted previously, the Committee approved the Terms of Reference for the
Study in March 2009 and began requesting information from the CIA and other
federal departments. The Committee, through its staff, had already reviewed in
2008 thousands of CIA cables describing the interrogations of the CIA detainees
Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, whose interrogations were the
subject of videotapes that were destroyed by the CIA in 2005.
The 2008 review was complicated by the existence of a Department of Justice
investigation, opened by Attorney Geiieral Michael Mukasey, into the destruction
of the videotapes and expanded by Attomey General Holder in August 2009. In
particular, CIA employees and contractors who would otherwise have been
interviewed by the Committee staff were under potential legal jeopardy, and
therefore the CIA would not compel its workforce to appear before the Committee.
This constraint lasted until the Committee's research and documentary review
were completed and the Committee Study had largely been finalized.

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Furthermore, given the volume and internal nature ofrelevant CIA documents, the
CIA insisted that the Committee enter into an arrangement where our staff would

revie^ocuments and conduct research at aCIA-leased facility |
rather than at the Committee's offices on Capitol Hill.
From early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staffreviewed the more

than six million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence
reports, internal memoranda and emails, briefing materials, interview transcripts,
contracts, and other records. Draft sections of the Study were prepared and
distributed to the full Committee membership beginning in October 2011 and this
process continued through to the Committee's vote to approve the full Committee
Study on December 13,2012.

The breadth of documentary material onwhich the Study relied and which the
Committee Study cites is unprecedented. While the Committee did not interview

CIA officials in the context of the Committee Study, it had access to and drew

from the interviews ofnumerous CIA officials conducted by the CIA's Inspector
General and the CIA Oral History program on subjects that lie at the heart of the
Committee Study, as well as past testimony to the Committee.

Following the December 2012 vote, the Committee Study was sent to the President
and appropriate parts ofthe Executive Branch for comments by February 15, 2013.
The CIA responded in late June 2013 with extensive comments on the Findings
and Conclusions, based in part on the responses of CIA officials involved in the
program. At my direction, the Committee staffmet with CIA representatives in
orderto fully understand the CIA's comments, and then incorporated suggested
edits or comments as appropriate.

The Committee Study, including the now-declassified Executive Summary and
Findings and Conclusions, as updated is now final and represents the official views
of the Committee. This and future Administrations should use this Study to guide
future programs, correct past mistakes, increase oversight of CIA representations
to policymakers, and ensure coercive interrogation practices are not used by our
government again.

Finally, I want to recognize the members of the staffwho haveendured years of
long hours poring through the difficult details of one of the lowest points in our
nation's history. They have produced the most significant and comprehensive
oversight report in the Committee's history, and perhaps in that of the U.S. Senate,
and their contributions should be recognized and praised.
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Daniel Jones has managed and led the Committee's review effort from its

inception. Dan has devoted more than six years to this effort, has personally
written thousands of its pages, and has been integrallyinvolved in every Study
decision. Evan Gottesman, Chad Tanner, and Alissa Starzak have also played
integral roles in the Committee Study and have spent considerable years
researching and drafting specific sections of the Committee Study.
Other Comumittee staff members have also assisted in the review and provided
valuable contributions at the direction of our Committee Members. They include,
among others, Jennifer Barrett, Nick Basciano, Michael Buchwald, Jim Catella,
Eric Chapman, John Dickas, Lorenzo Goco, Andrew Grotto, Tressa Guenov, Clete
Johnson, Michael Noblet, Michael Pevzner, Tonmiy Ross, Caroline Tess, and
James Wolfe. The Conmiittee's Staff Director throughout the review, David
Grannis, has played a central role in assisting me and guiding the Conmiittee
through this entire process. Without the expertise, patience, and work ethic of our
able staff, our Members would not have been able to complete this most important
work.

Dianne Feinstein

Chairman

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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Senate Select Committee on IntelHgence
Committee Study ofthe CIA*s Detention and Interrogation Program
Findings! and Conclusions

Approved December 13, 2012
Updatedfor Release April 3, 2014

Deelassiftcatipri Revisions December 3, 2014
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The Committee makes the following findings and conclusions:
#1: The CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of
acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.

The Committee fmds, based on a review of CIA interrogation records, that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques was not an effective means of obtaining accurate information
or gaining detainee cooperation.

For example, according to CIA records, seven of the 39 CIA detainees known to have been

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced no intelligence while in CIA

custody.* CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
were usually subjected to the techniques immediately after being rendered to CIA custody.
Other detainees provided significant accurate intelligence prior to, or without having been
subjected to these techniques.

While being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and afterwards, multiple
CIA detainees fabricated information, resulting in faulty intelligence. Detainees provided
fabricated information on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the
CIA identified as its highest priorities.

At numerous times thi'oughout the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, CIA personnel
assessed that the most effective method for acquiring intelligence from detainees, including from
detainees the CIA considered to be the most "high-value," was to confront the detainees with
information already acquired by the Intelligence Community. CIA officers regularly called into
question whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the
use of the techniques failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence.

#2: The CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques rested on
inaccurate claims of their effectiveness.

The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of
Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure
of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific
terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific terrorists captured as a result of the use of the techniques.
The CIA used these examples to claim that its enhanced interrogation techniques were not only
effective, but also necessary to acquire "otherwise unavailable" actionable intelligence that
"saved lives."

The Committee reviewed 20 of the most frequent and prominent examples of purported
counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed to the use of its enhanced interrogation
techniques, and found them to be wrong in fundamental respects. In some cases, there was no
relationship between the cited counterterrorism success and any information provided by
detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In the
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remaining cases, the CIA inaccurately claimed that specific, otherwise unavailable information
was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the

CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA
detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee
prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The examples provided by the
CIA included numerous factual inaccuracies.

In providing the "effectiveness" examples to policymakers, the Department of Justice, and
others, the CIA consistently omitted the significant amount of relevant intelligence obtained
from sources other than CIA detainees who had been subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques—leaving the false impression the CIA was acquiring unique
information from the use of the techniques.

Some of the plots that the CIA claimed to have "disrupted" as a result of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques were assessed by intelligence and law enforcement officials as being
infeasible or ideas that were never operationalized.

#3: The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA
represented to policymakers and others.

Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, Abu Zubaydah, and continuing with numerous others,
the CIA applied its enhanced interrogation techniques with significant repetition for days or
weeks at a time. Interrogation techniques such as slaps and "wallings" (slamming detainees
against a wall) were used in combination, frequently concurrent with sleep deprivation and
nudity. Records do not support CIA representations that the CIA initially used an "an open, non-

threatening approach,"^ or that interrogations began with the "least coercive technique possible"^
and escalated to more coercive techniques only as necessary.

The waterboarding technique was physically harmful, inducing convulsions and vomiting. Abu
Zubaydah, for example, became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open,
full mouth.'"^ Internal CIA records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as

evolving into a "series of near drownings."^
Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in
stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. At least five detainees
experienced disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at least two of
those cases, the CIA nonetheless continued the sleep deprivation.

Contrary to CIA representations to the Department of Justice, the CIA instructed personnel that

the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would take "precedence" over his medical care,^ resulting in
the deterioration of a bullet wound Abu Zubaydah incurred during his capture. In at least two
other cases, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques despite warnings from CIA
medical personnel that the techniques could exacerbate physical injuries. CIA medical personnel

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treated at least one detainee for swelling in order to allow the continued use of standing sleep
deprivation.

At least five CIA detainees were subjectedto "rectal rehydration" or rectal feeding without
documented medical necessity. The CIA placed detainees in ice water "baths." The CIA led

several detainees to believe they would never be allowed to leave CIA custody alive, suggesting
to one detainee that he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box.^ One interrogator told another
detainee that he would never go to court, because "we can never let the world know what I have

done to you."^ CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees withharm to theirfamilies—
to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a
detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat."^

#4: The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had

represented to policymakers and others.

Conditions at CIA detention sites were poor, and were especially bleak early in the program.
CIA detainees at the COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly
shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste.
Lack of heat at the facility likely contributed to the death of a detainee. The chief of

interrogations described COBALT as a "dungeon."^^ Another seniorCIA officer stated that
COBALT was itself an enhanced interrogation technique.^'
At times, the detainees at COBALT were walked around naked or were shackled with their

hands above their heads for extended periods of time. Other times, the detainees at COBALT
were subjected to what was described as a "rough takedown," in which approximately five CIA
officers would scream at a detainee, drag him outside of his cell, cut his clothes off, and secure

him with Mylar tape. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long
corridor while being slapped and punched.

Even after the conditions of confinement improved with the construction of new detention
facilities, detainees were held in total isolation except when being interrogated or debriefed by
CIA personnel.

Throughout the program, multiple CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques and extended isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues,
including hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation.
Multiple psychologists identified the lack of human contact experienced by detainees as a cause
of psychiatric problems.

#5: The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice,
impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
From 2002 to 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice relied
on CIA representations regarding: (1) the conditions of confinement for detainees, (2) the
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applicationof the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, (3) the physical effects of the
techniques on detainees, and (4) the effectiveness of the techniques. Those representations were
inaccurate in material respects.

The Department of Justice did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the
information it received from the CIA. The department warned, however, that if the facts
provided by the CIA were to change, its legal conclusions might not apply. When the CIA
determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA
rarely informed the department.

Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life
of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on
the CIA's claim that the techniques were necessary to save lives. In late 2001 and early 2002,
senior attorneys at the CIA Office of General Counsel first examined the legal implications of
using coercive interrogation techniques. CIA attorneys stated that "a novel application of the
necessity defense" could be used "to avoid prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain

information that saved many lives."^^^
Having reviewed information provided by the CIA, the OLC included the "necessity defense" in
its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House counsel on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation. The OLC determined that "under the cun*ent circumstances, necessity or selfdefense may justify interrogation methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against
torture.

On the same day, a second OLC opinion approved, for the first time, the use of 10 specific
coercive interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah—subsequently referred to as the CIA's
"enhanced interrogation techniques." The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about
Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu
Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA's
representations to the OLC about the techniques were also inconsistent with how the techniques
would later be applied.

In March 2005, the CIA submitted to the Department of Justice various examples of the
"effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that were inaccurate. OLC
memoranda signed on May 30, 2005, and July 20, 2007, relied on these representations,

determining that the techniques were legal in part because they produced "specific, actionable
intelHgence" and "substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence" that saved lives.

#6: The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.
The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been
approved and used. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional
information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the
Committee in Januai-y 2003. The CIA subsequently resisted efforts by Vice Chairman John D.

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Rockefeller IV, to investigate the program, including by refusing in 2006 to provide requested
documents to the full Committee.

The CIA restricted access to information about the program from members of the Committee
beyond the chairman and vice chairman until September 6, 2006, the day the president publicly
acknowledged the program, by which time 117 of the 119 known detainees had already entered
CIA custody. Until then, the CIA had declined to answer questions fi"om other Committee
members that related to CIA inteiTogation activities.

Prior to September 6, 2006, the CIA provided inaccurate information to the leadership of the
Committee. Briefings to the full Conmiittee beginning on September 6, 2006, also contained
numerous inaccui*acies, including inaccurate descriptions of how interrogation techniques were
applied and what information was obtained from CIA detainees. The CIA misrepresented the
views of members of Congress on a number of occasions. After multiple senators had been
critical of the program and written letters expressing concerns to CIA Director Michael Hayden,
Director Hayden nonetheless told a meeting of foreign ambassadors to the United States that
every Committee member was "fully briefed," and that "[t]his is not CIA's program. This is not

the President's program. This is America's program."^^ The CIA also provided inaccurate
information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of
Justice.

A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee
considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using
only interrogation techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. That legislation was
approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in Febniary 2008, and was vetoed by
President Bush on March 8, 2008.

#7: The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision-making.
The CIA provided extensive amounts of inaccurate and incomplete information related to the
operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the White
House, the National Security Council principals, and their staffs. This prevented an accurate and
complete understanding of the program by Executive Branch officials, thereby impeding
oversight and decision-making.

According to CIA records, no CIA officer, up to and including CIA Directors George Tenet and
Porter Goss, briefed the president on the specific CIA enhanced interrogation techniques before
April 2006. By that time, 38 of the 39 detainees identified as having been subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques had already been subjected to the techniques.The CIA did
not inform the president or vice president of the location of CIA detention facilities other than
Country
At the direction of the White House, the secretaries of state and defense - both principals on the
National Security Council - were not briefed on program specifics until September 2003. An

internal CIA email from July 2003 noted that "... the WH [White House] is extremely concerned
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[Secretary] Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going on."^^
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage complained that he and Secretary Powell were "cut out" of

the National Security Council coordination process.^®
The CIA repeatedly provided incomplete and inaccurate information to White House personnel
regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
This includes the provision of inaccurate statements similar to those provided to other elements
of the U.S. Government and later to the public, as well as instances in which specific questions
from White House officials were not answered truthfully or fully. In briefings for the National
Security Council principals and White House officials, the CIA advocated for the continued use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, warning that "[tjermination of this program will

result in loss of life, possibly extensive."^^
#8: The CIA's operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases
impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.
The CIA, in the conduct of its Detention and Interrogation Program, complicated, and in some
cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI). The CIA withheld or restricted information relevant to these
agencies' missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees, and provided inaccurate
information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to these agencies.

The use of coercive interrogation techniques and covert detention facilities that did not meet
traditional U.S. standards resulted in the FBI and the Department of Defense limiting their
involvement in CIA interrogation and detention activities. This reduced the ability of the U.S.
Government to deploy available resources and expert personnel to interrogate detainees and
operate detention facilities. The CIA denied specific requests from FBI Director Robert Mueller
III for FBI access to CIA detainees that the FBI believed was necessary to understand CIA

detainee reporting on threats to the U.S. Homeland. Information obtained from CIA detainees
was restricted within the Intelhgence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA
officers that Hmitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism
analysis.
The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign
policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of
state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications
related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of
host countries were generally informed of their existence. Moreover, CIA officers told U.S.
ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the
ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention
facilities in the countries in which they served.
In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in
the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the

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countries to host the detention sites. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new
CIA detention facilities were taking place,the CIA told local government officials not to
inform the U.S. ambassadors.

The ODNI was providedwith inaccurate and incomplete information about the program,
preventing the director of national intelligencefrom effectively carrying out the director's
statutory responsibility to serve as the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters.
The inaccurate information provided to the ODNI by the CIA resulted in the ODNI releasing
inaccurate information to the public in September 2006.

#9; The CIA impeded oversight by the CIA's Office of Inspector General.
The CIA avoided, resisted, and otherwise impeded oversight of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program by the CIA's Office oHnspector General (OIG). The CIA did not brief
the OIG on the program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at
least 22 detainees at two different CIA detention sites. Once notified, the OIG reviewed the

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and issued several reports, including an important
May 2004 "Special Review" of the program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies.
During the OIG reviews, CIA personnel provided OIG with inaccurate information on the
operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The inaccurate information was
included in the final May 2004 Special Review, which was later declassified and released
publicly, and remains uncorrected.

In 2005, CIA Director Goss requested in writing that the inspector general not initiate further
reviews of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program until reviews already underway were
completed. In 2007, Director Hayden ordered an unprecedented review of the OIG itself in
response to the OIG's inquiries into the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

#10: The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including
inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.
The CIA's Office of Public Affairs and senior CIA officials coordinated to share classified

information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to select members of the media to
counter public criticism, shape public opinion, and avoid potential congressional action to restrict
the CIA's detention and inteiTogation authorities and budget. These disclosures occurred when
the program was a classified covert action program, and before the CIA had briefed the full
Committee membership on the program.

The deputy director of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center wrote to a colleague in 2005, shortly
before being interviewed by a media outlet, that "we either get out and sell, or we get hammered,
which has implications beyond the media. [C]ongress reads it, cuts our authorities, messes up
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our budget... we either put out our story or wegeteaten. [T]here is no middle ground."^ The
same CIA officer explained to a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York Tjimes
quotes 'senior intelligence official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa [CIA's Office of
Public Affairs].

Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention
and Interrogation Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced inteiTogation techniques was
inaccurate and was similar to the inaccurate information provided by the CIA to the Congress,
the Department of Justice, and the White House.

#11: The CIA was unprepared as it began operating its Detention and Interrogation
Program more than six months after being granted detention authorities.
On September 17, 2001, the President signed a covert action Memorandum of Notification
(MON) granting the CIA unprecedented counterterrorism authorities, including the authority to
covertly capture and detain individuals "posing a continuing, serious threat of violence or death
to U.S. persons and interests or planning terrorist activities." The MON made no reference to
interrogations or coercive interrogation techniques.
The CIA was not prepared to take custody of its first detainee. In the fall of 2001, the CIA
explored the possibility of establishing clandestine detention facilities in several countries. The
CIA's review identified risks associated with clandestine detention that led it to conclude that

U.S. military bases were the best option for the CIA to detain individuals under the MON
authorities. In late March 2002, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah prompted the CIA to
again consider various detention options. In part to avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah to the
International Committee of the Red Cross, which would be required if he were detained at a U.S.
militaiy base, the CIA decided to seek authorization to clandestinely detain Abu Zubaydah at a

facility inCountry |—a country that had not previously been considered as a potential host for a
CIA detention site. A senior CIA officer indicated that the CIA "will have to acknowledge

certain gaps in ourplanning/preparations,""^ butstated that this plan would be presented to the
president. At a Presidential Daily Briefing session that day, the president approved CIA's

proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country |.
The CIA lacked a plan for the eventual disposition of its detainees. After taking custody of Abu
Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he "should remain incommunicado for the remainder of
his life," which "may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country.
The CIA did not review its past experience with coercive interrogations, or its previous statement
to Congress that "inhumane physical or psychological techniques are counterproductive because

they do not produce intelligence and will probably result in false answers."-^ The CIA also did
not contact other elements of the U.S. Government with interrogation expertise.

In July 2002, on the basis of consultations with contract psychologists, and with very limited
internal deliberation, the CIA requested approval from the Department of Justice to use a set of
coercive interrogation techniques. The techniques were adapted from the training of U.S.

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military personnel at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE)
school, which was designed to prepare U.S. military personnel for the conditions and treatment
to which they might be subjected if taken prisoner by countries that do not adhere to the Geneva
Conventions.

As it began detention and interrogation operations, the CIA deployed personnel who lacked
relevant training and experience. The CIA began interrogation training more than seven months
after taking custody of Abu Zubaydah, and more than thi'ee months after the CIA began using its
"enhanced inteiTogation techniques." CIA Director George Tenet issued formal guidelines for
interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time
40 of the 119 known detainees had been detained by the CIA.

#12: The CIA's management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program
was deeply flawed throughout the program's duration, particularly so in 2002 and early
2003.

The CIA's COBALT detention facility in Country | began operations inSeptember 2002 and
ultimately housed more than half of the 119 CIA detainees identified in this Study. The CIA
kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. Untrained CIA officers at
the facility conducted frequent, unauthorized, and unsupervised interrogations of detainees using
harsh physical interrogation techniques that were not—and never became—part of the CIA's

formal "enhanced" interrogation program. The CI^)laced ajunior officer with no relevant
experience in charge of COBALT. On November jf, 2002, adetainee who had been held
partially nude and chained to a concrete floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility.
At the time, no single unit at CIA Headquarters had clear responsibility for CIA detention and
interrogation operations. In interviews conducted in 2003 with the Office of Inspector General,
CIA's leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of
operations at COBALT, and some believed that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used
there.

Although CIA Director Tenet in January 2003 issued guidance for detention and interrogation
activities, serious management problems persisted. For example, in December 2003, CIA
personnel reported that they had made the "unsettling discovery" that the CIA had been "holding
a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "very litde" at multiple detention sites in

Country i.-'
Divergent lines of authority for interrogationactivities persisted through at least 2003. Tensions
among interrogators extended to complaints about the safety and effectiveness of each other's
interrogation practices.

The CIA placed individuals with no applicable experience or training in senior detention and
interrogation roles, and providedinadequate linguistic and analytical support to conduct effective
questioning of CIA detainees, resulting in diminished intelligence. The lack of CIA personnel
available to question detainees, which the CIA inspector general referred to as "an ongoing
problem,persisted throughout the program.
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In 2005, the chief of the CIA's BLACK detention site, where many of the detainees the CIA
assessed as "high-value" were held, complained that CIA Headquarters "managers seem to be
selecting either problem, underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or

whomever seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time," resulting in "the production
of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence.
Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problems—including
histories of violence and records of abusive ti'eatment of others—that should have called into

question their suitability to participatein the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their
employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. In nearly all
cases, these problems were known to the CIA prior to the assignment of these officers to
detention and interrogation positions.

#13: Two contract psychologists devised the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and
played a central role in the operation, assessments, and management of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. By 2005, the CIA had overwhelmingly outsourced
operations related to the program.

The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate, and assess its interrogation
operations. The psychologists' prior experience was at the U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion,
Resistance and Escape (SERE) school. Neither psychologist had any experience as an
interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in
counterterrorism, or any relevant cultural or linguistic expertise.
On the CIA's behalf, the contract psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on

"learned helplessness,"^^ and developed the list of enhanced inteiTogation techniques that was
approved for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees. The psychologists
personally conducted interrogations of some of the CIA's most significant detainees using these
techniques. They also evaluated whether detainees' psychological state allowed for the
continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including some detainees whom
they were themselves interrogating or had interrogated. The psychologists carried out inherently
governmental functions, such as acting as liaison between the CIA and foreign intelligence
services, assessing the effectiveness of the interrogation program, and participating in the
interrogation of detainees in held in foreign government custody.
In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their
work with the CIA. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced vktually all aspects of the program.
In 2006, the value of the CIA's base conti"act with the company formed by the psychologists with

all options exercised was in excess of $180 million; the contractors received $81 million prior to
the contract's termination in 2009. In 2007, the CIA provided a multi-year indemnification
agreement to protect the company and its employees from legal liability arising out of the

program. The CIA has since paid out more than $1 million pursuant to the agreement.

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In 2008, the CIA's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group, the lead unit for detention and

interrogation opera^ns at the CIA, had atotal of
staff officers and

positions, which were filled with | CIA

contractors, meaning that contractors made up 85% of the workforce for

detention and interrogation operations.

#14: CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been
approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters.
Prior to mid-2004, the CIA routinely subjected detainees to nudity and dietary manipulation.
The CIA also used abdominal slaps and cold water dousing on several detainees during that
period. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice.
At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without
authorization from CIA Headquarters. Additionally, multiple detainees were subjected to
techniques that were applied in ways that diverged from the specific authorization, or were
subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques by interrogators who had not been authorized to
use them. Although these incidents were recorded in CIA cables and, in at least some cases were
identified at the time by supervisors at CIA Headquarters as being inappropriate, corrective
action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved.

#15: The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of
individuals it detained, and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for
detention. The CIA's claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its
enhanced Interrogation techniques were inaccurate.

The CIA never conducted a comprehensive audit or developed a complete and accurate list of the
individuals it had detained or subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA statements
to the Committee and later to the public that the CIA detained fewer than 100 individuals, and

that less than a third of those 100 detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, were inaccurate. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA

detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.
Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention
standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). These included an
"intellectually challenged" man whose CIA detention was used solely as leverage to get a family
member to provide information, two individuals who were intelligence sources for foreign
liaison services and were former CIA sources, and two individuals whom the CIA assessed to be

connected to al-Qa'ida based solely on information fabricated by a CIA detainee subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Detainees often remained in custody for months after
the CIA determined that they did not meet the MON standard. CIA records provide insufficient
information to justify the detention of many other detainees.

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CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention
facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The host

country had no independent reason to hold the detainees.

A full accounting of CIA detentions and interrogations may be impossible, as records in some
cases are non-existent, and, in many other cases, are spai'se and insufficient. There were almost
no detailed records of the detentions and interrogations at the CIA's COBALT detention facility
in 2002, and almost no such records for the CIA's GRAY detention site, also in Country

At

CIA detention facilities outside of Country
the CIA kept increasingly less-detailed records of
its interrogation activities over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

#16: The CIA failed to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation
techniques.

The CIA never conducted a credible, comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of its enhanced
interrogation techniques, despite a recommendation by the CIA inspector general and similar
requests by the national security advisor and the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Internal assessments of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program were conducted by CIA
personnel who participated in the development and management of the program, as well as by
CIA contractors who had a financial interest in its continuation and expansion. An "informal
operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the
CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects" regarding human experimentation. The CIA officers,
whose review relied on briefings with CIA officers and contractors running the program,
concluded only that the "CIA Detainee Program" was a "success" without addressing the

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^
In 2005, in response to the recommendation by the inspector general for a review of the
effectiveness of each of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA asked two
individuals not employed by the CIA to conduct a broader review of "the entirety of the

"rendition, detention and interrogation program."^"^ According to one individual, the review was
"heavily reliant on the willingness of [CIA CounterteiTorism Center] staff to provide us with the
factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions." That individual acknowledged lacking
the requisite expertise to review the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques, and concluded only that "the program," meaning all CIA detainee reporting
regardless of whether it was connected to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation

techniques, was a "great success."^'' The second reviewer concluded that "there is no objective
way to answer the question of efficacy" of the techniques.
There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the
"effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence
cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced

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interrogation techniques. Nor did the reviews seek to confirm whether the intelligence cited by
the CIA as being obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was
unique and "otherwise unavailable," as claimed by the CIA, and not previously obtainedfrom
other sources.

#17: The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious and
significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systemic and individual management
failures.

CIA officers and CIA contractors who were found to have violated CIA policies or performed
poorly were rarely held accountable or removed from positions of responsibility.
Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals
who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques
against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not
result in appropriate, effective, or in many eases, any corrective actions. CIA managers who
were aware of failings and shortcomings in the program but did not intervene, or who failed to
provide proper leadership and management, were also not held to account.

On two occasions in which the CIA inspector general identified wrongdoing, accountability
recommendations were ovennled by senior CIA leadership. In one instance, involving the death
of a CIA detainee at COBALT, CIA Headquarters decided not to take disciplinary action against
an officer involved because, at the time, CIA Headquarters had been "motivated to extract any

and all operational information" from the detainee.^^ In another instance related to a wrongful
detention, no action was taken against a CIA officer because, "[t]he Director strongly believes
that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty," and "the Director
believes the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against

those thatunder connect them."^^ In neither case was administrative action taken against CIA
management personnel.

#18: The CIA marginalized and ignored numerous internal critiques, criticisms, and
objections concerning the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.

Critiques, criticisms, and objections were expressed by numerous CIA officers, including senior
personnel overseeing and managing the program, as well as analysts, interrogators, and medical
officers involved in or supporting CIA detention and interrogation operations.
Examples of these concerns include CIA officers questioning the effectiveness of the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques, interrogators disagreeing with the use of such techniques
against detainees whom they determined were not withholding information, psychologists
recommending less isolated conditions, and Office of Medical Services personnel questioning
both the effectiveness and safety of the techniques. These concerns were regularly overridden by
CIA management, and the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing the
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program. At times, CIA officers were instructed by supervisors not to put their concerns or
observations in written communications.

In several instances, CIA officers identified inaccuracies in CIA representations about the

program and its effectiveness to the Office of Inspector General, the White House, the
Department of Justice, the Congress, and the American public. The CIA nonetheless failed to
take action to correct these representations, and allowed inaccurate information to remain as the
CIA's official position.
The CIA was also resistant to, and highly critical of more formal critiques. The deputy director
for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to

the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,"^^ while the CIA general
counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picmre" of

the program.'^^ A February 2007 report from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), which the CIA acting general counsel initially stated "actually does not sound that far
removed from the realitywas also criticized. CIA officers prepared documents indicating
that "critical portions of the Report are patently false or misleading, especially certain key factual
claims..CIA Director Hayden testified to the Committee that "numerous false allegations of
physical and threatened abuse and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the [ICRC] report

undermine its overall credibility.'"^^
#19; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was inherently unsustainable and
had effectively ended by 2006 due to unauthorized press disclosures, reduced cooperation
from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns.

The CIA required secrecy and cooperation from other nations in order to operate clandestine
detention facilities, and both had eroded significantly before President Bush publicly disclosed
the program on September 6, 2006. From the beginning of the program, the CIA faced
significant challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention sites. These
challenges became increasingly difficult over time. With the exception of Country
the CIA
was forced to relocate detainees out of every country in which it established a detention facility
because of pressure from the host government or public revelations about the program.
Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of
Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. By 2006, the
CIA admitted in its own talking points for CIA Director Porter Goss that, absent an
Administration decision on an "endgame" for detainees, the CIA was "stymied" and "the

program could collapse of its own weight.""^
Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention
facilities caused recunring problems. The refusal of one host country to admit a severely ill
detainee into a local hospital due to security concerns contributed to the closing of the CIA's
detention facility in that country. The U.S. Department of Defense also declined to provide
medical care to detainees upon CIA request.

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In mid-2003, a statement by the president for the United Nations International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture and a pubHc statement by the White House thatprisoners in U.S. custody are
treated "humanely" caused the CIA to question whether there was continued policy support for
the program and seek reauthorization from the White House. In mid-2004, the CIA temporarily
suspended the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques after the CIA inspector general
recommended that the CIA seek an updated legal opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel. In
early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court decision to grant certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush
prompted the CIA to move detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
In late 2005 and in 2006, the Detainee Treatment Act and then the U.S. Supreme Couit decision
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldcaused the CIA to again temporarily suspend the use of its enhanced
interrogation techniques.

By 2006, press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention
sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA's ability to operate clandestine
detention facilities.

After detaining at least 113 individuals through 2004, the CIA brought only six additional
detainees into its custody: four in 2005, one in 2006, and one in 2007. By March 2006, the
program was operating in only one country. The CIA last used its enhanced interrogation
techniques on November 8, 2007. The CIA did not hold any detainees after April 2008.

#20; The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the United States'
standing in the world, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs.
The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Pi-ogram created tensions with U.S. partners and allies,
leading to formal demarches to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral
inteUigence relationships.

In one example, inJune 2004, the secretary ofstate ordered the U.S. ambassador inCountry | to

deliver ademarche to CounteyB/li^ssence demanding [Country | Government] provide full

access to all [Country |
detainees" to the International Committee ofthe Red
Cross. At the time, however, the detainees Country | was holding included detainees being held
in secret at the CIA's behest."^^

More broadly, the program caused immeasurable damage to the United States' public standing,
as well as to the United States' longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the
prevention of torture in particular.

CIA records indicate that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program cost well over $300
million in non-personnel costs. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain

detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly $| million that were never used, in
part due to host country political concerns.

To encourage governments to clandestinely host CIA detention sites, or to increase support for
existing sites, the CIA provided millions of dollars in cash payments to foreign government
1(11

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r;-'

officials. CIA Headquaiters ciicQiira^^
financial assistance to

Stations to eonstruct "wish lists" of iproposedi
I[enttties of foreign govemments|, iand to

"thinlc bigf' in terms of that assistance.'*^

m'iOFmm

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' As measured by the number ofdisseminated intelligence reports. Tlierefore, zero intelligence reports were
disseminated based on information provided by seven of the 39 detainees known to have been subjected to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

- May 30,2005, Memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from Steven G. Bradbiury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice, re; Application of United States Obligations UnderArticle 16of tlie Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

^Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006.
This episode was not described in CIAcables, but was described in internal emails sent by personnel in the CIA
Office of Medical Services andtheCIAOffice ofGeneral Counsel. A review of the videotapes of the interrogations
of Abu Zubaydahby the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not note the incident. A review of the catalog
of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hourperiod, which included two waterboarding sessions, were
missing.

from

to

cc: ^H|||HHIiHilH>

More.

Throughout the Committee Study, last names in all capitalized letters are pseudonyms.
^ ALEC
(182321Z JUL 02)

^Atthe time, confining a detainee in a box with tlie dimensions of a coffin was an approved CIA enhanced
interrogation technique.

8[REDACTED] 1324 a61^Z SEP 03), referring to Hambali.
^Interview of

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of theInspector General, June 17,

2003

In one case, interrogators informed a detainee that hecould earn a bucket ifhecooperated.
" Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,

April 7,

2003, p. 12.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,

May 8,

2003, p. 9.

November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile InteiTogations: Legal Considerations for CIA
Officers," at 1.

May 30, 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior DeputyGeneral Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of tlie Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. July 20, 2007, Memorandum
for John A. Rizzo, ActingGeneral Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, fi-om StevenG. Bradbury, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of War Crimes
Act, the DetaineeTreatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May
be Used by tlie CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

The CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Studyof the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
states that these limitations were dictated by the White House. The CIA's June 2013 Response then acknowledges

that the CIA was^|comfortable" with this decision.

DIRECTOR ••

(152227Z MAR 07)

The Committee's conclusion is basedon CIA records, including statements from CIA DirectorsGeorge Tenet and
PorterGoss to the CIA inspector general, that the directors had not briefed the president on the CIA's interrogation
program. According to CIA records, when briefed in April 2006, the president expressed discomfort with the
"image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." The

CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute the CIA records, but states that "[w]hile Agencyrecords on the subject
are admittedly incomplete, fonner President Bushhas stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program,
including the use of enhanced techniques, withthen-DCIA Tenetin 2002, prior to application of the techniques on
Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved tlie techniques." A memoir by fonner Acting CIA General Counsel John
Rizzo disputes this account.
CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in

Counti-ies

|, | and |. Itis less clear whether policymakers were aware ofthe detention facilities in Country |

and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. TlieCIA requested that country names and infonnation directly or indirectly

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identifying countries be redacted. The Study therefore lists the countries by letter. The Study uses the same

designations consistently, so "Country J," forexample^|efers tothe same country throughout the Study.
July 31, 2003, email from John Rizzo to

re Rump PC on interrogations.

Lotus Notes message from Chief ofthe CIA Station inCountiy | toD/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from
I to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED],
|, subj: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage, date9/23/2004, at 7:40:43 PM
Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003
" No CIA detention facilities were established in these two countries.

U.S. law (22 U.S.C. § 3927) requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and cuirently infonned with
respect to all activities and operations of the Government witliin tliat country," including tlie activities and
operations of the CIA.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and

April 13, 2005.

Sametime communication, betweenJohnRN^dd

jVlarch 29,2002, email from

ALEC

April 13, 2005.

to ^^^^^^lireA^ Interrogation Plan.

(182321Z JUL 02)

Januai-y 8,1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressiona^^irs, toVice Chairman William S.
Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on

at 7-8.

[REDACTED] 1528 (191903Z DEC 03)

Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of
Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14, 2006.

April 15, 2005, email f^ [REDACTED] (Chief ofBase of DETENTION SITE BLACK), to
m, imillll, reGeneral Comments.
"Learned helplessness" in this context was the theory that detainees might become passive and depressed in
response to adverse or uncontrollable events, and would thus cooperateand provide information. Memo from
Grayson SWIGERT,Ph.D., February 1, 2003, "Qualifications to providespecial mission interrogation consultation."

They also concluded that the CIA "should not bein the business of running prisonsor^tempora^detention
facilities.'" May 12, 2004, Memorandumfor Deputy Dkector for Operationsfrom
Chief,
Infonnation Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division via Associate Deputy
Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program."
March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Diiector for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI
Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation Programs.

September2, 2005, Memorandum from

to DirectorPorterGoss, CIA, "Assessment of EITs

Effectiveness."

September 23, 2005, Memorandum from
to The Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, "Response to request from Director for Assessmentof EIT effectiveness."

Febmary 10, 2006, Memorandum for [|Hill^^^^H

OFFICER 1], CounterTerrorist Center, National

Clandestine Service, from Executive Director re: Accountability Decision.

Congressional notification, CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of
German Citizen Khalid al-Masri, October 9, 2007.

Memorandum for Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to
Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: Februaiy
27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterten-orism Detention and
Interrogation Activities.

Februaiy 24, 2004, Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Inten'ogation
Program Special Review (2003-7123-IG).
November 9, 2006, email from John A. Rizzo, to Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, cc: Michael Morell,
subject: Fw: 5 December 2006 Meeting with ICRC Rep.
CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on tlie Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA
Custody."
Senate Select Committee on Litelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007.

DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President,re: Way Forwai'don Counterterrorist
Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Program.
HEADQUARTERS
JUN 04)
[REDACTED] 5759
03); ALEC

03); ALEC
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Senate Select Committee oii Inteffigeiice

Committee Study ofthe CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program

Executive Summary

Approved December 13, 2012
Updatedfor Release April 3, 2014
Declassification Revisions Deceniber 3, 2014
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Table of Contents
I.

Background on the Committee Study

II.

Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

A.

8

September 17,2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Autliorizes theCIA to Capture andDetain a
Specific Category of Individuals

1.

11

After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military

Bas^f^h^'Best Option'; the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in
••••
2.

11

The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees
Wrongly Detained

B.

11

14

The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques

1.

2.

3.
4.

17

Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were
"Counterproductive" and "Ineffective"; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible
Legal Defensefor Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective
Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience
17
The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without InterAgency Deliberation

21

Tensions with Host CountryLeadership and Media AttentionForeshadow Future Challenges
FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; Abu

23

Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as
"Important" and "Vital"

24

5.

While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation

6.

New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuseson AbuZubaydalis "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily
Barredfrom the Questioning of AbuZubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days

7.

Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the
Development of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the

8.

The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approvalfor Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA

9.

The CIA Uses the Waterboardand Other Enhanced Interrogation TechniquesAgainst Abu Zubaydah
! 40
A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation ofAbu

Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

25

Without Questioning

27

Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures"
Does Not Brief the Presiden t

10.
11.

C.

31
37

Zubaydah

47

The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah

48

Interrogation in Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines

49

7.

The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge

2.
3.

CIA Records Lack Information onCIA Detainees andDetails ofInterrogations in Country^
50
CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Countiy | Use the CIA ^Enhanced

4.

Death ofGul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Leam of UnreportedCoercive Interrogation
Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General ReviewReveals Lack of Oversight

49

Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar

of the Detention Site

51

54

5.

The CIA Begins TrainingNew Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the

6.

Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to AdequatelyScreen Potential
Interrogators in 2002 and 2003

58

7.

Bureau of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site

59

Department ofJustice Included in the Training Syllabus

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8.

The CIA Places CIA Detainees inCountry | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON
Standardfor Detention

9.

61

DCI Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal

Consolidation ofProgram Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements
Among CIA Personnel

D.

The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
1.

62

66

2.

CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation;
Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
66
CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator

3.

CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against

Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill

68

Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [AlNashiri] Over The Edge Psychologically," Refers to the CIA Program Aj' a "Train Wreak [sic]
Waiting to Happen"
70

E.

Tensions with Country | Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival ofNew Detainees

73

F.

The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

75

1.

2.
3.
4.

Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition
to CIA Custody
75
Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with
Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Templatefor Future Detainees
76
CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use ofthe CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite
Interrogators' Assessment That RamziBin Al-Shibh WasCooperative
78
Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody ofa Foreign Government
Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed A.v "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of
Stomach Pain

G.

79

The Detention and Intenogation of IGialid Shaykh Muhammad
L

81

KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at
DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation

2.

Techniques
81
The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His
Arrival

H.

83

3.

The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated

4.

Information
85
After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues
to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information
93

Tlie Growth of tlie CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

96

1.

Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003

96

2.

The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country | and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in
Country^
97

3.

At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA
Headquarters Authorization
99
CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing WithoutDepartment ofJustice Approval; Application of
Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding
105
Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques
108
After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions
Detention ofDetainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and
Held for An Additional Four Years
109

4.
5.
6.

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IIIIII III! I

7.

A YearAfter DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery That We
Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little"
110

8.

CIA Detention Sites in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the
Interrogations of Detainees

I.

J.

Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues

Ill

1.

CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care

Ill

2.

CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues

113

The CIA Seeks Reaffmiiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
1.

2.

K.

HI

115

Administration StatementsAbout the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at the CIA
About Possible Lack ofPolicy Supportfor CIA Interrogation Activities
115
The CIA ProvidesInaccurate Information to SelectMembers of the NationalSecurityCouncil,
Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life, Possibly Extensive";
Policymakers Reauthorize Program
117

Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004; ICRC, InspectorGeneral, Congress, and the U.S.
Supreme Court

1.

119

ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department of Defense Official Informs the CIA that the
U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to Disappear"; the CIA Provides
Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the Department of Defense
119

2.

CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Imbalanced and
Inaccurate," Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Reviewof the CIA's

3.

Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General
The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special ReviewRecommendation to Assess the
Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

4.

The CIA Wrongfully Detains KhalidAl-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountabilityfor Officer

5.

Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—IncludingInformation on a Key UBLFacilitator-

6.

Prior to the CIA's Use ofEnhanced Interrogation Techniques
Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced

Involved

121

124
128

130

Interrogation Techniques; CIA OfficerTestifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything
Like What YouHave Seen" in Abu Ghraib Photographs

L.

133

7.

The CIA Suspends the Useof its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques
on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information
134

8.

Country ^petahis Individuals on the CIA's Behalf

9.

U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case ofRasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detaineesfrom

Guantanamo Bay to Country^j/^

139

140

The Pace of CIA OperationsSlows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal,
Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"
143

M.

Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005

145

1.

Department of Justice Renews Approvalfor the Useof the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

2.

Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Departmentof
Justice Memorandumon U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu
Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's EnhancedInterrogation Techniques When He Complains of Hearing

in May 2005

145

Problems

146

3.

CIA Acquires Two Detaineesfrom the U.S. Military

148

4.

The CIA Seeks "End Game"for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From Liaison

5.

Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result in the

Partners

149

Closing ofCIA Detention Facilities in Countries | and^
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6.

N.

I III! (Ill II

The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee
Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
157

The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and tlie End of the CIA's Detention and Jntenogation Program... 159
1.

3.
4.

President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program
159
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their
Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006
160
The CIA Considers Future ofthe Program Following the Military CommissionsAct
161
The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military

5.

Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's Enhanced

6.

Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence
163
CIA After-Action Review ofRahim Interrogation Callsfor Study ofEffectiveness ofInterrogation

7.
8.

Interrogations
CIA Contracting E.xpenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR
The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends

2.

Commissions Act

162

Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques in Fu ture CIA

167
168
170

III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectivenessof the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques to Multiple Constituencies
172

A.

Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations

172

B.

Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

178

C.

The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques As Having"Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists"

179

D.

CIA Representations About the Effectivenessof Its EnhancedInterrogation Techniques Against Specific
CIA Detainees

204

1.

Abu Zubaydah

204

2.

Khalid SliaykhMuhammad (KSM)

210

E.

CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"

216

F.

The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations—tlie Use of the CIA's Enhanced Intenogation
Techniques "Enabled the CIA to DisruptTeiTorist Plots" and "Capture AdditionalTerrorists"

217

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

G.

The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/TallBuildings Plot and the Capture ofJose Padilla
225
The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots
239
The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discoveryof the Al-Ghuraba Group
246
The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa
al-Hindi

258

The Identification, Capture, and Arrest oflyman Faris
The Identification, Capture, and Arrest ofSajid Badat
The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary WharfPlotting
The Capture ofHambali

276
284
294
301

CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and
Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidencefor the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

311

The Identification ofKlialid Sliaykh Mohammad {KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11, 2001,
Attacks

312

The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias
The Capture ofRamzi bin al-Shibh
The Capture ofKhalid Sliaykh Mohammad(KSM)
The Capture ofMajid Khan

315
316
326
334

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6.

The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting

7.

TheAssertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to EnhancedInterrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA
Sources

342

8.
9.

The Identification and Arrests of Uihair and Saifullah Paracha
Critical IntelligenceAlerting the CIA to Jajfar al-Tayyar

352
358

10.
11.
12.

The Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri
The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan
Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation

366
368
378

IV. Overview of CIA Representations to tlie Media While the Program Was Classified

A.

336

401

The CIA Piovides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists
Who then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories
401

B.

Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior
to the Full Committee Being Briefed

C.

402

CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the
CIA

D.

404

The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an InaccurateAccount of the Interrogation of Abu
Zubaydah

V.

405

Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice

409

A.

August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah

B.

The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the
Memorandum; Intenogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge from the CIA's
Representations to the OLC

C.

409

411

Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Inten'ogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains
Approval from the OLC for die InteiTogationof Three Individual Detainees

413

D.

May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation
Process, the CIA's Enhanced Intenogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness of the Techniques
419

E.

After Passage of the DetaineeTreatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of Confinement,
Withdraws Draft Opinionon the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques After the U.S. SupremeCourt
Case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

F.

428

July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA Interrogations and
the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views
to the Department of Justice

431

VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress

437

A.

After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the Committee Will Be Notified

of Every Individual Detained by the CIA

B.

437

The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Mtikes No Reference to Coercive
Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Chairman After die Use of the CIA's

EnhancedInterrogation Techniques; the CIA Discusses Sti-ategy to Avoid the Chairman's Request for More
Information

437

No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer
Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials

439

D.

Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation

441

E.

In Response to DetaineeTreatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from
SenatorLevin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the CIA to Destroy

C.

Interrogation Videotapes

443

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F.
G.

CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA
Declines to Answer Questions for the Record

Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Intenogation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged

on September 6,2006
H.

444

446

Tlie CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate;

Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army
Field Manual

I.

449

President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by tlie CIA; CIA DecUnes to Answer
Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program
452

VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for

Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA's Detentionand Interrogation Program

455

VIII.Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

457

IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002- 2008

458

X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee-April 12,2007

462

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I.

M III I

Background on the Committee Study

(U) On December 11, 2007, the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence ("the Committee")
initiated a review of the destruction of videotapes related to the interrogations of CIA detainees
Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri after receiving a briefing that day on the matter by
CIA Director Michael Hayden. At that briefing, Director Hayden stated that contemporaneous
CIA operational cables were "a more than adequate representation of the tapes," and he agreed to
provide the Committee with limited access to these cables at CIA Headquarters.
(U) On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented with a staff-prepared summary of
the operational cables detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri, the
Committee began considering a broader review of the CIA's detention and interrogation
practices. On March 5, 2009, in a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved Terms of Reference
for a study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^
(U) The Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is a lengthy, higlily
detailed report exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 footnotes. It is divided
into three volumes;

I.

History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This
volume is divided chronologically into sections addressing the establishment,
development, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. It
includes an addendum on CIA Clandestine Detention Sites and the Arrangements Made
with Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

II.

Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. This volume addresses the intelligence the CIA

attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,
specifically focusing on CIA representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program was operated and managed. It includes sections on CIA representations to the
media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress.
ni.

Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This volume addresses the detention

and interrogation of 119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on September
17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture,
detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive

information on the CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day operation of its
Detention and Interrogation Program.

(U) On December 13, 2012, the Senate Select Committee on InteUigence approved the
Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program ("Committee Study") by a
bipartisan vote of 9-6. The Committee Study included 20 findings and conclusions. The
' See Appendix 1: "Terms of Reference, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence
Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program."
nil

I (III I

Page 8 of 499
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Committee requested that specific executive branch agencies review and provide comment on
the Committee Study prior to Committee action to seek declassification and public release of the
Committee Study. On June 27, 2013, the CIA provided a written response, which was followed
by a series of meetings between the CIA and the Committee that concluded in September 2013.
Following these meetings and the receipt of Minority views, the Committee revised the findings
and conclusions and updated the Committee Study. On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 113, the Committee agreed to send the revised findings and conclusions, and the updated Executive
Summary of the Committee Study, to the president for declassification and public release.

(U) The Committee's Study is the most comprehensive review ever conducted of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA has informed the Committee that it has provided

the Committee with all CIA records related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^
The document production phase lasted more than three years, produced more than six million
pages of material, and was completed in July 2012. The Committee Study is based primarily on
a review of these documents,^ which include CIA operational cables, reports, memoranda,
intelligence products, and numerous interviews conducted of CIA personnel by various entities
within the CIA, in particular the CIA's Office of Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History

Program, as well as internal email"^ and other communications.^
(U) The Executive Summary is divided into two pai'ts. The first describes the establishment,
development, operation, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The
second part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and InteiTogation
Program, to include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; as well as CIA representations on the
effectiveness and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the
Department of Justice, and the Congress. The Executive Summary does not include a
^ The Committee did not have access to approximately 9,400 CIA documents related to the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program that were withheld by the White House pending a determination and claim of executive

privilege. The Committee requested access to these documentsover several years, including in writing on January
3, 2013, May 22, 2013, and December 19,2013. The Committee received no response from the White House.
^ From January 2, 2008, to August 30, 2012, the Department of Justice conducted a separate investigation into
various aspects of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, witli tlie possibility of criminal prosecutions of
CIA personnel and contractors. On October 9, 2009, the CIA informed the Committee that it would not compel CIA
personnel to participate in interviews with the Committee due to concerns related to the pending Department of
Justice investigations. (See DTS #2009-4064.) While the Committee did not conduct interviews with CIA
personnel during the course of this review, the Committee utilized previous interview reports of CIA personnel and
CIA contractors conducted by tlie CIA's Office of the Inspector General and the CIA's Oral History Program. In
addition to CIA materials, the Committee reviewed a much smaller quantity of documents from the Department of
Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, as well as documents that had separately been
provided to the Committee outside of this review. Inconsistent spellings found within the Committee Study reflect
the inconsistencies found in the underlying documents reviewed.
The CIA informed tiie Committee that due to CIA record retention policies, the CIA could not produce all CIA

email communications requested by the Committee. As a result, in a few cases, the text of an email cited in the
Study was not available in its original format, but was embedded in a larger email chain. For tliis reason, the
Committee, in some limited cases, cites to an email chain that contains the original email, ratlier than the original
email itself.

The report does not review CIA renditions for individuals who were not ultimately detained by tlie CIA, CIA
interrogation of detainees in U.S. military custody, or tlie treatment of detainees in the custody of foreign
governments, as these topics were not included in the Committee's Terms of Reference.

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I 1 III I

description of the detention and interrogations of all 119 known CIA detainees. Details on each
of these detainees are included in Volume in.

(U) Throughout this summary and the entire report, non-supervisory CIA personnel havebeen
listed by pseudonym. The pseudonyms for these officers are used throughout the report. To
distinguish CIA officers in pseudonym from those in true name, pseudonyms in this report are
denoted by last names in upper case letters. Additionally, the CIA requested that the names of
countries that hosted CIAdetention sites, or with which the CIA negotiated the hosting of sites,
as well as information directly or indirectly identifying such countries, be redacted from the
classified version provided to Committee members. The report therefore lists these countries by
letter. The report uses the same designations consistently, so "Country J," for example, refers to
the same country throughout the Committee Study. Further, the CIA requested that the
Committee replace the original code names for CIA detention sites with new identifiers.^

^On April 7,2014, the Executive Summary ofthe Committee Study ofthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program wasprovided to theexecutive branch fordeclassification andpublic release. On August 1,2014, theCIA
returned to the Committee the Executive Summary with its proposed redactions. Overthe ensuing months, the
Committee engaged in deliberations with the CIA and the White House to ensure that the Committee's narrative—

andsupport for the Committee's findings andconclusions—remained intact. Significant alterations havebeen made
to the Executive Summary in order to reach agreement on a publicly releasable versionof the document. For
example, theCIA requested that in select passages, the Committee replace specific dates with more general time
frames. The Committee also replaced the true names of some senior non-undercover CIA officials with
pseudonyms. The executive branchthen redacted all pseudonyms for CIA personnel,and in some cases the titles of

positions held by theCIA personnel. Further, while the classified Executive Summaiy and full Committee Study
lists specific countries by letter (for example "Country J"), and uses thesame letter to designate the specific country

throughout the Committee Study, the letter^iav^eei^edacte^^ieexecuti^ branch for this public release.
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II.

Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program

A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to
Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals
1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a
U.S. Military Base Is the "Best Option": the CIA Delegates "Blanket" Detention
Approvals to CIA Ojficers in

September 17, 2001, six days after the teiTorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action Memorandum of
Notification (MON) to authorize the director of central intelligence (DCI) to "undertake

operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of

violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities."^
Although the CIA had previously been provided limited authorities to detain specific, named
individuals pending the issuance of formal criminal charges, the MON provided unprecedented
authorities, granting the CIA significant discretion in determining whom to detain, the factual

basis for the detention, and the length of the detention.^ The MON made no reference to
interrogations or interrogation techniques.^

On Septemberl4^00Mhrcj days before the issuance ofthe
MON, the chief ofoperations ofthe CIA's
based on an urgent requh^ent from
the chief ofthe Counterterrorism Center (CTC), sent an email to CIA Stations in HI seeking
input on appropriate locations for potential CIA detention facilities.

Over the courseoftiie

next month, CIA officers considered at least four countries in |||||||||| and one in HHHB as
possible hosts for detention facilities and

at least three proposed sitelocations. ^^

September 26, 2001, senior CTC personnelji^ to discuss the

capture and detain authorities in the MON. On September 28, 2001, [^^^HCTC Legal,
sent an email describing the meeting and a number of policy decisions. The

^ September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re.

Rm^So^?7iratparag^^
igress
®Attachment 5 to May 14, 2002, letter from Stanley Moskowitz, CIA Officeof Congressional
Affairs, to A1

Cumming, Staff Director,
Din
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, transmitting the^| Memoranda ofNotification
(DTS #2002-2175).

®September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification, for Members of the National Security Council, re.

(DTS #2002-0371)^a^aragraph4.
DIRECTOR
(IBiHIH); email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject; Cable re
Country |; date: January 29, 2009.
" Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Duector of Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Militaiy Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists."
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email stated that covert facilities would be operated "in a manner consistent with, but not
pursuant to, the formal provision of appropriately comparable Federal instructions for the

operation of prison facilitie^n^he incarceration of inmates held under the maximum lawful
security mechanisms." I^H^I's email recognized the CIA's lack ofexperience in nmning
detention facilities, and stated that the CIA would consider acquiring cleared personnel from the
Department of Defense or the Bureau of Prisons with specialized expertise to assist the CIA in
operating the facilities.On September27, 2001, CIA Headquarters informed CIA Stations that
any future CIA detention facility would have to meet "U.S. POW Standards.
early November 2001, CIA Headquarters further determined
that any future CIA detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards and that CIA
detention and interrogation operations should be tailored to "meet the requirements of U.S. law
and the federal rules of criminalprocedure," adding that "[s]pecific methods of interrogation
w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with commonly accepted practices
deemed lawful by U.S. courts.The CIA's search for detention site locations was then put on
hold and an internal memorandum from senior CIA officials explained that detention at a U.S.
military base outside of the United States was the "best option."'^ The memorandum thus urged
the DCI to "[pjress DOD and the US military, at highest levels, to have the US Military agree to
host a long-term facility, and have them identify an agreeable location," specifically requesting
that the DCI "[s]eek to have the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay designated as a long-term
detention facility.

Addressing the risks associated with the CIA maintaining a

detention facility, the CIA memorandum warned that "[a]s captured terrorists may be held days,
months, or years, the likelihood of exposure will grow over time," and that "[m]edia exposure
could inflame public opinion against a host government and the U.S., thereby threatening the
continued operation of the facility." The memorandum also anticipated that, "[i]n a foreign
country, close cooperation with the host government will entail intensive negotiations."^^ The
CIA memorandum warned that "any foreign country poses uncontrollable risks that could create

incidents, vulnerability to the security of the facility, bilateral problems, and uncertainty over
maintaining the facility."^^ The memorandum recommended the establishment of a "short-term"
facility in which the CIA's role would be limited to "oversight, funding and responsibility." The
Email from:

to: [REDACTED]; subject: EYES ONLY- Capture and Detention; date:

September 28, 2001, at 09:29:24 AM.

'3 DIRECTOR
(272119ZSEP 01)
November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogation." See also Volume I.
Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Directorfor Operations and Associate Directorof Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled,"Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Terrorists."
Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Directorof Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, ExecutiveDirector,Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facilityfor Terrorists."

" Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director ofCounterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director,Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Teixorists."
Memorandum for DCI from J. CoferBlack, Director of Counterterrorism, via DeputyDirectorof Central
Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central

Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "ApprovaltoEstablisl^Deten^^

for Terrorists."

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CIA would "contract out all other requirements to other US Government organizations,

commercial companies, and, as appropriate, foreign governments."'^
October 8, 2001, DCI George Tenet delegated the management

and oversight of the capture and detention authorities provided by the MON to the CIA's deputy
director for operations (DDO), James Pavitt, and the CIA's chief of the Counterterrorism Center,
Cofer Black.^^ The DCI also directed that all requests and approvals for capture and detention be

documented in writing. On December 17, 2001, however, the DDO rescinded these^^^^

requirements and issued via aCIA cable "blanket approval" for CIA officers in jHHH to
"determine [who poses] the requisite 'continuing serious threat of violence or death to US

persons and interests orwho are planning terrorist activities.'"^' By March 2002, CIA
Headquarters had expanded the authority beyond the language of the MON and instructed CIA
personnel that it would be appropriate to detain individuals who might not be high-value targets
in their own right, but could provide information on high-value targets.

On April 7, 2003, ^^IHCTC Legal,
sent a cable to CIA Stations and Bases stating that "at this stage in the war [we] believe there is
sufficient opportunity in advance to document the key aspects of many, if not most, of our

capture and detain operations.cable also provided guidance as to who could
be detained under the MON, stating:
"there must be an articulable basis on which to conclude that the actions of a

specific person whom we propose to capture and/or detain pose a 'continuing
serious threat' of violence or death to U.S. persons or interests or that the person
is planning a terrorist activity.

.. .We are not permitted to detain someone merely upon a suspicion that he or
she has valuable information about teiTorists or planned acts of ten'orism....
Similarly, the mere membership in a particular group, or the mere existence of a
particular familial tie, does not ncccssarily connote that the threshold of

'continuing, serious threat' has been satisfied."^"^

Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central

Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, DeputyDirector for Operations and Associate Director of Central
Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Tenorists."
Memorandum from George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to Deputy Director for Operations, October 8,
2001, Subject: (U) Delegations of Authorities.

2' DIRECTORHljimUlOZDEC01)
22 WASHINGTOnHIH (272040Z MAR 02)
23 DIRECTOR {{^•(072216Z APR 03)

2'* DIRECTOR

(072216Z APR 03). In alater meeting with Committee staff, Hi^HCTC Legal,

stated that the prospect that the CIA "could hold [detainees] forever" was "teiTifying," adding, "[n]o
one wants to be in a position of being called back from retirement in however many years to go figure out what do
you do with so and so who still poses a tlueat." See November 13, 2001, Transcript of Staff Briefing on Covert
Action Legal Issues (DTS #2002-0629).
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2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than It Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA
Detainees Wrongly Detained

While the CIA has represented in public and classified settings that
it detained "fewer than one hundred" individuals,-^ the Committee's review of CIA records
indicates that the total number of CIA detainees was at least 119.^^ Internal CIA documents

indicate that inadequate record keeping made it impossible for the CIA to determine how many
individuals it had detained. In December2003, a CIA Station overseeing CIA detention

operations in Country | informed CIA Headquarters that ithad made the "unsettling discovery"
that the CIA was "holding a number of detainees about whom" it knew "very little,"^^ Nearly
five years later, in late 2008, the CIA attempted to determine how many individuals the CIA had
detained. At the completion of the review, CIA leaders, including CIA Director Michael
Hayden, were informed that the review found that the CIA had detained at least 112 individuals,

and possibly more.^^ According to an email summarizing the meeting, CIA Director Hayden
CIA Director Hayden typicallydescribed the program as holding "fewer than a hundred" detainees. For example,
in testimony before the Committee on February 4, 2008, in response to a question from Chairman Rockefeller
during an open hearing, Hayden stated, "[i]n the life of the CIA detention program we have held fewer than a
hundred people." {See DTS #2008-1140.) Specific references to "98" detainees were included in a May 5, 2006,
House Permanent Select Committee on IntelUgence (HPSCI)report on Renditions, Detentions and Interrogations.
See also Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central IntelligenceAgency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof LegalCounsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of

the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques

that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation oniigl^alu^l Qaeda Detainees. Other examples ofthis CIA
representatioi^nclu^ a statement
to the HPSCI on February 15, 2006, and a
statement by ^^^CTC Legal B^H^HtotheSSO^ June 10, 2008. See DTS #2008-2698.
The Committee's accountingof the numberof CIA detainees is conservative and only includes individuals for
whom there is clear evidence of detention in CIA custody. The Committee thus did not count, among the 119

detainee^ix ofthe 31 individuals listed in amemo entitled "Updated List of Detainees In |
attached to a March 2003 email sent byDETENTION SITE COBALT sitemanager |

[CIA OFFICER 1], because they were no^xplicitl^esc^ed as CIA detainees andbecausethe^idnoto^

appea^i^IA record^(5^^mail from: ^HH|||Hm[CIAOFnCER 1]; to:|||m^^, HH

and

subjectr^^^HP^^^^I DETAINEES; date: March 13, 2003.) An

additional individual is the subjectof CIA cablesdescribing a plannedtransferfrom U.S. military to CIA custody at
DETENTION SITE COBALT. He was likewise not included among the 119 CIA detainees because of a lack of
CIA records confiraiing either his transfer to, or his presence at, DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed in this

summary, in December 2008, the CIA attempted to identify the total number ofCIA detainees^nag^h prepared

for CIA leadership, the CIA repre^nted the number of CIA detainees as "112+ ?" See {HHIHUHM 12417
(101719Z OCT 02); ALEC

(232056Z OCT 02);

190159 (240508Z OCT 02); and ALEC l l l l

(301226ZOCT 02).
27

As of June 27, 2013, when the CIA provided its Response to the Committee Study of tlie CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program (hereinafter, the "CIA's June 2013 Response"), the CIA had not yet made an independent
determination of the number of individuals it had detained. The CIA's June 2013 Response does not address the
numberof detainees determined by the Committee to be held by the CIA, other than to assert that the discrepancy
between past CIA representations, that there were fewer than 100 detainees, and the Committee's determination of

there being at least 119 CIA detainees, was not "substantively meaningful." The CIA's June 2013 Response states
that the discrepancy "does not impact the previously known scale of the program," and that "[i]t remains true that

approximately 100 detainees were pjirt of the program; not 10 and not 200." The CIA's June 2013 Response also
states that, "[t]he Studyleaves unarticulated what impactthe relatively small discrepancy might have had on
policymakers or Congressional overseers." The CIA's June 2013 Response further asserts that, at the time Director
Hayden was representing there had been fewer than 100 detainees (2007-2009), the CIA's internal research
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instructed a CIA officer to devise a way to keep the number of CIA detainees at the same number

the CIA had previously briefed to Congress. The email, which the briefer sent only to himself,
stated:

"I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI"^
numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 ~ pick

whatever date i [sic] needed to make that happen but the number is 98."^^
While the CIA acknowledged to the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in February 2006 that it had wrongly detained five
individuals throughout the course of its detention program, a review of CIA records indicates

"indicate[d] the total number of detainees could have been as high as 112," and that "uncertainty existed within CIA

about whether a group of additional detainees were actually part of the program, partially because some of tliem had
passed tlirough [DETENTION SITE COBALT] prior to the formal establishment of tlie program under CTC
auspices on 3 December 2002" (emphasis added). This June 27, 2013, CIA statement is inaccurate: the CIA's
determination at the time was that there had been at least 112 CIA detainees and that the inclusion of detainees held

prior to December 3, 2002, would make that number higher. On December20, 2008, a CTC officer informed the
chief of CTC that "112 were detained by CIA since September 11, 2001," noting "[t]hese revised statistics do not
include any detainees at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] (other than Gul Rahman) who departed [DETENTION

SITE COBA^Jprior to RDG assuming authority of[DETENTION SITE COBALT] as of03 Deceiver 2002."

{See "||||^^mH|||||||numbersbri£fdoc/*at^he^^inaiHiromJ||||^^^|||||^^
|, [REDACTED],

to: IHl

Revised Rendition and Detention

Statistics; date: December 20, 2008.) By December 23, 2008, CTC had created a giaph that identified the total
number of CIA detainees, excluding Gul Rahman, "Post 12/3/02" as 111. The graph identified the total number
including Gul Rahman, but excluding otlier detainees "pre-12/3/02" as "112+ ?." (See CIA-produced PowerPoint
Slide, RDG Numbers, dated December 23, 2008.) Witli regard to the Committee's inclusion of detainees held at
DETENTION SITE COBALT prior to December 3, 2002, the CIA does not dispute that they were held by the CIA
pursuant to the same MON authorities as detainees held after that date. Moreover, the CIA has regularly counted
among its detainees a number of individuals who were held solely at DETENTIONSITECOB ALT prior to

December 3,2002, as well as several who were held exclusively at Country ^^^m||m|p:'acilities on behalf of
the CIA. In discussing the role of DETENTION SITE COBALT in the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program,

tlien Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt told the CIA Office of Inspector General in August 2003 that
"there are those who say that [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, but that is 'bullshit.'" (See
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, James Pavitt, August 21,
2003.)

The "Renditions and Inteirogations Group," is also referred to as the "Renditions Group," the "Rendition,

Detention, and Intenj^gatiot^roi^ "RDI/^n^|RD^ in CIA records.
Email from;

subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: Januaiy 5,

2009. According to tlie CIA's June 2013 Response, "Hayden did not view the discrepancy, if it existed, as
particularly significant given that, if true, it would increase the total number by just over 10 percent."

They include Sayed Habib, who was detained duetofobrications made by KSM wliile_KSM_was_beinf subiected
to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques

1281 (130801Z JUN 04)

3031

2817

Saeed Awadh, the subject of mistaken identity (ALEC |
ModinNik

Muhammed, whom the CIA determinedhadbeenpu^sefiil^ misidentified b^^ourc^u^^i blood feud
143701

DIRECTOR

152893
Khalidal-Masri, whose"prolonged detention" was determined by the CIA
Inspector General to be "unjustified" (CIA Officeof Inspector General, Reportof Investigation, The Rendition and

Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-MasrH200^60^[G)^ul^6^007^ 83); and Zarmein, who was one of
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that at least 21 additional individuals, or a total of 26 of the 119 (22 percent) CIA detainees
identified in this Study, did not meet the MON standard for detention.^" This is a conservative
calculation and includes only CIA detainees whom the CIA itself determined did not meet the
standard for detention. It does not include individuals about whom there was internal

disagreement within the CIA over whether the detainee met the standard or not, or the numerous

detainees who, following their detention and interrogation, were found not to "pose a continuing
threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests" or to be "planning terrorist activities" as
required by the September 17, 2001,
With one known exception, there ai'e no CIA
'a number of detainees about whom" the CIA knew "veiy httle" (|

1528

They include Abu Hudhaifa, who was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation
before being released because the CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be
(WASHINGTON

51303

Muhammad Khan, who, like

Zarmein, was among detainees about whom the CIA acknowledged knowing "very little"
1528
another case of mistaken identity (HEADQUARTERS llim
); Shaistah Habi^llahKl^^
his brother, Sayed Habib, was the subject of fabrications

by KSM (HEADQUARTER^^^^HH^^^^^^^^I); Hai^Ghalgi^lKM^is detained as "useful leverage"

against a family member
Naz^ir Ali, an "intellectually
challenged" individual whose taped crying was used as leverage against his family member
13065

xivment of $||||| mil

|iillii i iiiin in I

liiiiiii ( ml ii'liii was released with a

~ \

33693

33265

33693 HHIIII^^^^^^ft^Hayatullal^^

whom theCIAdeterm^ "may have been in the

wrong place the wrong time^jflBHI^I^^BH 33322

Jan, whowasde^

for using a satellite phone, traces on which "revealed no derogatory information^jlHH 1542
two individuals

—Mohammad al-Shomaila and Salah Nasir Salim Ali—on

whom derogatory information was "speculative" (email from: [REDACTED]Uo: [REDACTEDl, 1REDACTED],

and [REDACTED]; subjety: Backgrounders; date: April 19, 2006;|^^^^^| 17411

ALEC

|; undated document titled. "Talking Points for HPSCI about Former CIA Detainees");
two individuals who were discovered to be foreign government sources prior to being rendered to CIA custody, and

later determined to be former CIA

2185 ([REDACTED]); ALEC|

([REDACTED]); HEADQUARTERS B||H(IrS)ACTED])); seven individuals

thought to be travelling to Iraq to join al-Qa'ida who were detained based on claims that were "thin but cannot be

ignore£^en^^

to: [REDACTED|; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];

subject: Request Chief/CTC Approval to Apprehend and Detain Individuals Departing Imminently for Iraq to Fight

Against US Forces; date: September 16, 2003); and Bismullah, who was mistakenly arrested |

and later released with $H[ and told not to speak about his experience

46620

For example, the Committee did not include among the 26 individuals wrongfully detained: Dr. Hikmat Nafi
Shaukat, even though it was determined that he was not involved in CBRN efforts and his involvement with al-

QaMda members was limited to perst)nal relationships with former neighbors
DIRECTOR

wererai^ within theCIAaboiU
IHIIII^H 27931

30414

Karim, cika Asat Sar Jan, about whom

uiestions

he may have been slandered by arival tribal faction (|
[REDACTED] Memo,
SUBJECT: getting ahandle on

detainees); Arsala Khan, who suffered disturbinghallucinations after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, after

which the CIA determined thath^|doefuiot^^

l^M^e^<>;ineU^cilities" (^^^IHIHlliiiHH

the subject involved in... cuiTent plans or activities against

(20I006Z OCT 03); HEADQUARTERS UtM

(lll^mmillllllll); and Janat Gul, who also suffered "frightful" hallucinations following sleep deprivation and
about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, "[t]here simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to that
would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul] at a site such as [DETENTION SITE BLACK]"
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records to indicate that the CIA held personnel accountable for the detention of individuals the
CIA itself determined were wrongfully detained.
occasions, the CIA used host country detention

sites in Country | to detain individuals on behalf of the CIA who did not meet the MON
standard for capture and detention. ALEC Station officers at CIA Headquarters explicitly
acknowledged that these detainees did not meet the MON standard for detention, and
recommended placing the individuals in host country detention facilities because they did not
meet the standard. The host country had no independent reason to detain these individuals and

held them solely at the behest of the CIA.^^
B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were
''Counterproductive " and "Ineffective After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys
Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA
Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No
Relevant Experience

At the time of the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MONwhich, as noted, did not reference interrogation techniques—the CIA had in place long-standing
formal standards for conducting interrogations. The CIA had shared these standards with the
04); email

1530
04);
1537
04)
from: [REDACTED] (COB [DETENTIONSITEBLACK]); to:

|; subject: re

date: April 30,2005).

The CIA's June 2013 Response "acknowledge[s] that there were cases in which errors were made," but points
only to the case of Khalid al-Masri, whose wrongful detention was the subject of an Inspector General review. The
CIA's June 2013 Response does not quantify the number of wrongfully detained individuals, other than to assert that
it was "far fewer" than the 26 documented by the Committee. The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that
"the Agency frequently moved too slowly to release detainees," and that "[o]f the 26 cases cited by the Study, we
adjudicated only three cases in less than 31 days. Most took tliree to six months. CIA should have acted sooner."
As detailed in the Study, there was no accountability for personnel responsible for the extended detention of

individuals determined by the CIA tohave been wmng^l^etained^^^^^

ALEC ^^•J^^B^^H^IRECTOR ••••••I;

DIRECTOR

B; ALEC^^Ifm^^^^Hi. Despite the CIA's conclusion that these individuals did not meet the
standard for detention, these individuals were included in tlie list of 26 wrongfully detained if they were released,

but not if they were transferred to the custody of another country. The list thus does not include Hamid Aich,

although CIA Headquartereiecognize^hat Aich did not meet the threshold for unilateral CIA custody, and sougl^

to place him in Country ||||||^g|g||||||m custody where the CIA could still debrief him. {See DIRECTOR mH

Hamid Aich was transferred to Country ^m||||^n|||m custod^i^pn^B^003^nd

transferred to ^^^rtifanother country's] custody more than a month later. (See

36682

38836 HIIIHIi^HH)- ^helist also does not include
Mohammad Dinshah, despite a detemiination prior to his capture that the CIA "does not view Dinshah as meeting
the 'continuing serious threat' threshold required for this operation to be conducted pursuant to [CIA] authority,"
and a detennination, after his capture, that "he does not meet the strict standards requiredto^ to [DETENTION

SITE COBALT]." {See DlRECTOR^^lHEADQUAKrERS_H|UHiiHil^B)-

Dinshali was transferred to IHIii^^^V^tody. See HEADQUARTERS

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Committee. In January 1989, the CIA informed the Committee that "inhumane physical or
psychological techniques are counterproductive because they do not produce intelligence and

will probably result in false answers."^^ Testimony of the CIA deputy director of operations in
1988 denounced coercive interrogation techniques, stating, "[pjhysical abuse or other degrading
treatment was rejected not only becauseit is wrong, but because it has historically proven to be

ineffective."^^ By October 2001, CIA policy was to comply with the Department of the Army
Field Manual "Intelligence Interrogation."^^ A CIA Directorate of Operations Handbook from
October 2001 states that the CIA does not engage in "human rights violations," which it defined
as: "Torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without
charges or trial." The handbook further stated that "[i]t is CIA policy to neither participate
directly in nor encourage interrogation which involves the use of force, mental or physical
torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an
aid to interrogation."^^
(U) The CIA did, however, have historical experience using coercive forms of interrogation. In
1963, the CIA produced the KUBARK Counterintelligence InteiTogation Manual, intended as a
manual for Cold War inteiTogations, which included the "principal coercive techniques of
interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or
similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis
and induced regression."'^® In 1978, DCIStansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John
Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko"^^ using
the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing."^^ In
Hart's testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations on September 15, 1978,
he noted that in his 31 years of government service:

"It has never fallen to my lot to be involved with any experience as unpleasant
in every possible way as, first, the investigation of this case, and, second, the
necessity of lecturing upon it and testifying. To me it is an abomination, and I

January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressionalA^irs, to Vice Chairman William S.
Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on HHii> ^-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Transcript of Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations,Central
Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), p. 15 (DTS #1988-2302).
Attachment to Memorandum entitled, "Approval to Establish a Detention Facility for Tenorists," CTC:

1026(138)701 from J. Cofer Black, Directorof DCICounterterrorist Center,to Directorof Central Intelligence via
multiple parties, October 25, 2001; Draftof Legal Appendix, "Handling Interrogations."
Directorate of Operations Handbook, 50-2, Section XX(l)(a), updated October 9,2001.
KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation, July 1963, at 85.

According to public records, in the mid-1960s, the CIA imprisoned and interrogated Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet KGB
officer who defected to the U.S. in early 1964,for three years (April 1964 to September 1967). Senior CIA officers
at the time did not believe Nosenko was an actual defectorand orderedhis imprisonment and interrogation.
Nosenko was confined in a specially constructed "jail," with nothing but a cot, and was subjected to a series of
sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing.

Among other documents, see CIA "FamilyJewels" Memorandum, 16 May 1973, pp. 5, 23-24, available at

www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222^rail^ewel^^all^crpdf
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am happy to say that... it is not in my memory typical of what my colleagues

and I did in the agency during the time I was connected with it.'"^^
Notwithstanding the Hart investigation findings, just five years
later, in 1983, a CIA officer incorporated significant portions of the KUBARK manual into the
Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) Training Manual, which the same officer used to provide

interrogation training in Latin America in the early 1980s, and which was used to mjovid^^^^
interrogation training to the
1981."^ CIA officer
was involved in the HRE training and conducted interrogations. The CIA inspector general later

recommended that he be orally admonished for inappropriate use of interrogation techniques.'^^
In the fall of 2002,

became the CIA's chief of interrogations in the CIA's Renditions

Group,the officer in charge of CIA interrogations."^^
Despite the CIA's previous statements that coercive physical and

psychological interrogation techniques "result in false answers'"^^ and have "proven to be
ineffective,'"^^ as well as the aforementioned eai'ly November 2001 determination that "[sjpecific
methods of interrogation w[ould] be permissible so long as they generally comport with

commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by U.S. courts,"^^ by the end of November 2001,
CIA officers had begun researching potential legal defenses for using interrogation techniques
that were considered torture by foreign governments and a non-governmental organization. On
November 26, 2001, attorneys in the CIA's Office of General Counsel circulated a draft legal
memorandum describing the criminal prohibition on torture and a potential "novel" legal defense
for CIA officers who engaged in torture. The memorandum stated that the "CIA could argue that
the torture was necessary to prevent imminent, significant, physical harm to persons, where there
is no other available means to prevent the harm," adding that "states may be very unwilling to

call the U.S. to task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives,"^^ An August 1,
"Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Hearings before the Select Committee on
Assassinations of U.S. House of Representatives, 95"^ Congress, Second Session, September 11-15, 1978.

Testimony ofJohn Hart, pp. 487-536 (Septeml^ 15, 1978) (DTS #Q04761).
Transcript of Committee Hearing on

Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988,pp. 3-4 (DTS #1988-2302).

April 13, 1989, Memorandum from CIA Inspecto^eneral William F. Donnelly to Jim Currie and John Nelson,

SSCI Staff, re: Answers to SSCI Questions on^^|^|, attachment Mto Memorandum to Chairman and Vice
Chairman, re: Inquiry into

Interrogation Training, July 10, 1989 (DTS # 1989-0675). See also

|H|l984^Meniorandum for Inspector General from [REDACTED], Inspector, via Deputy Inspector General, re:
IO-III84.
As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and Interrogations
Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."

December 4, 2002, Training ReportjRevise^ersion, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE)
Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 ("[HUH] was recently assigned to tlie CTC/RG to manage the HVT
Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) mission, assuming tlie role as HVT interrogator/Team Chief.").

January 8, 1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director ofCongressionalA^irs to Vice Chairman William S.
Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence re: SSCI Questions on ^H||||||, at7-8 (DTS #1989-0131).
Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence, Transcriptof Richard Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations,Central
Intelligence Agency (June 17, 1988), at 15 (DTS #1988-2302).

50 November 7, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Handling Intenogation." See also Volume I.
November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers."
The draft memo cited the "Israeli example" as a possible basis for arguing that "torture was necessary to prevent
imminent, significant, physical hann to persons, where there is no other available means to prevent the harm."

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2002, OLC memorandum to the White House Counsel includes a similar analysis of the
"necessity defense" in response to potential charges of torture.^^
January 2002, the National Security Council principals began to
debate whether to apply the protections of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 ("Geneva") to the conflict with al-Qa'ida and the Taliban.

A letter drafted for DCI Tenet to the president urged that the CIA be exempt from any
application of these protections, arguing that application of Geneva would "significantly hamper
the ability of CIA to obtain critical threatinformation necessary to save American lives."^^ On
February 1, 2002—approximately two months prior to the detention of the CIA's first detainee—
a CIA attorney wrote that if CIA detainees were covered by Geneva there would be "few
alternatives to simply asking questions." The attorney concluded that, if that were the case,
"then the optic becomes how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the
convention, but ultimately saves lives.

On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum stating
that neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners of war under Geneva, and that
Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a conflict, did not
apply to al-Qa'ida or Taliban detainees.^^
From the issuance of the MON to early 2002, there are no

indications in CIA records that the CIA conducted significant research to identify effective
interrogation practices, such as conferring with experienced U.S. military or law enforcement
interrogators, or with the intelligence, military, or law enforcement services of other countries
with experience in counterten-orism and the interrogation of terrorist suspects.Nor are there
CIA records referencing any review of the CIA's past use of coercive interrogation techniques
and associated lessons learned. The only research documented in CIA records during this time
on the issue of interrogation was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President,re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Like the November 26, 2001, draft memo, the OLC memorandum addressed the Israeh
example.

-'3 Email fromj^^H||^^H; to: [REDACTED] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose
Rodi-iguez, ^^^^^••^[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED]; subject: For OOB Wednesday - Draft Letterto the President; date: January 29, 2002. No records
have been identified to indicate that this letter was or was not sent.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

[REDACTED]; subject: POW's and Questioning; date:

Februaiy 1, 2002, at 01:02:12 PM.

February 7, 2002, Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, chief of staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for
NationalSecurity Affairs, and Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re. Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees.

After the CIA was unsuccessful in acquiring information from its lastdetainee, Muhammad Rahim, using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, an after-action review in April 2008 suggested that the CIA conduct a
survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to

develop effective interrogation techniques. See undated CIA Memorandum, titled H^H|| After-Action Review,
author [REDACTED], and undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment,

with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification

ofSleep Deprivation and Reinstatement ofWallin^^i^IT^Foradditionalinfor^^
ini' 'iii( III

see Volume I.

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initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation. This report was
commissioned by the CIA's Office of Technical Services (OTS) and drafted by two CIA

contractors, Dr. Grayson SWIGERT and Dr. Hammond DUNBAR.^^
Both SWIGERT and DUNBAR had been psychologists with the
U.S. Air Force Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school, which exposes select

U.S. military personnel to, among other things, coercive interrogation techniques that they might
be subjected to if taken prisoner by countries that did not adhere to Geneva protections. Neither
psychologist had experience as an interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of alQa'ida, a background in terrorism, or any relevant regional, cultural, or linguistic expertise.
SWIGERT had reviewed research on "learned helplessness," in which individuals might become

passive and depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable events.^^ He theorized that
inducing such a state could encourage a detainee to cooperate and provide information.^^
2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval
Without Inter-Agency Deliberation
March 2002, Pakistani government authorities, working
with the CIA, captured al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Zubaydah in a raid during which Abu Zubaydah
suffered bullet wounds. At that time, Abu Zubaydah was assessed by CIA officers in ALEC
Station, the office within the CIA with specific responsibility for al-Qa'ida, to possess detailed

knowledge of al-Qa'ida terrorist attack plans. However, as is described in greater detail in the
full Committee Study, this assessment significantly overstated Abu Zubaydah's role in al-Qa'ida

and the information he was likely to possess.^®

Grayson SWIGERTand HammondDUNBAR, Recognizing and Developing Countenneasures to A1 Qaeda
Resistance to Intenogation Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective (undated). See also Memorandum for
the Record, November 15, 2007, SSCI Staff Briefing with Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR (DTS
#2009-0572).

See, for example,

Memo from Grayson SWIGERT,subject, "Qualifications to provide special

mission intenogation consultation"; Undated^mtitle^iem^tating^^^^ollowin^nf^^
telephone

by a

[REDACTED],

|, Interrogator Training, Lesson Plan, Title: AScientific Approach to Successful Intenogation; DIR
1(031227Z APR 02).
See, for example, Memo from Grayson SWIGERT,

subject: "Qualifications to provide special

mission intenogation consultation."

See detainee review of Abu Zubaydah in Volume III. See also CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006,
"Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001." The document states: "Khaldan
Not Affiliated With Al-Qa'ida. A common misperception in outside articles is tliat Khaldan camp was mn by alQa'ida. Pre-11 September 2001 reporting miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant,' which led to the

inference tliat the I^aldan camp he was administering was tied to Usama bin Laden. The group's flagsliip camp, alFaruq, reportedly was created in the late 1980s so tliat bin Laden's new organization could have a training
infrastructure independent of 'Abdullah Azzam's Maktab al-Kliidamat, the nongovernmental organization that
supported Khaldan. Al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group and Khaldan was not
overseen by bin Laden's organization. There were relations between the al-Qa'ida camps and Klialdan. Trainees,
particularly Saudis, who had finished basic training at Klialdan were refened to al-Qa'ida camps for advanced

courses, and Khaldan staff observed al-Qa'idatraining^Ti^w^roupsJ^
nil

I ( III I

did not exchange trainers."
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On the day that Abu Zubaydah was captured, CIA attorneys
discussed interpretations of the criminal prohibition on torture that might permit CIA officers to

engage in certain interrogation activiti^®' An attorneyinCTC^sos^ an email with the
subject line "TorUire Update" to

Legal

listing, without

commentary, the restrictions on interrogation in the Geneva Conventions, the Convention

Against Torture, and the criminal prohibition on torture.^March 2002, anticipating its eventual custody of Abu
Zubaydah, the CIA began considering options for his transfer to CIA custody and detention

under the MON. The CIA rejected U.S. military custody ^H|||||||H, in large part because of
the lack of security and the fact that Abu Zubaydah would have to be declared to the

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).^^ The CIA's concerns about custody at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, included the general lack of secrecy and the "possible loss of control to

US military and/or FBI."^"^ Rendition to Country | was rejected because ofthe perception that
the results of that country's recent interrogations had been disappointing, as well as the intense
interest in Abu Zubaydah from CIA leadership. As ALEC Station wrote, the CIA needed to
participate directly in the interrogation, "[n]ot because we believe necessarily we can improve on

[Country |] performance, but because the reasons for the lack of progress will be transparent
and reportable up die line."^^
Over the course of four days, the CIA settled on a detention site in

Country | because of that country's
and the lack of U.S. court jurisdiction. The only disadvantages identified by the CIA with

detention in Country | were that it would not be a "USG-controlled facility" and that
"diplomatic/policy decisions" would be required.^^ As a March 28, 2002, CIA document

acknowledged, the proposal to render Abu Zubaydah to Country | had not yet been broached
with that country's officials. The document also warned: "[w]e can't guarantee security. If AZ's

presence does become known, not clear what the impactwould be."^^
The decision to detain Abu Zubaydah at a covert detention facility

in Country | did not involve the input ofthe National Security Council Principals Committee,
the Department of State, the U.S. ambassador, or the CIA chief of Station in Country

On

March 29, 2002, an email from the Office of the Deputy DCI stated that "[w]e will have to
March 29, 2002, email from [REDACTED]
cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject, NEW INFO; A-Z Interrogation Plan ("I have thought about the 18 USC
sect. 2340 issues we briefly discussed yesterday.").

Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

subject; Torture Update; date: March 28, 2002, at 11:28:17

AM.

19595 (281106Z MAR02). PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27,
2002.

^ PowerPoint presentation, Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. PowerPoint presentation,
Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.

ALEC IHI (282105Z MAR 02)
^ PowerPointpresentation. Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah,March 27, 2002.
PowerPoint presentation. Options for Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 28, 2002.

Email from: [REDACTED] BHH;

Pavitt; subject; DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE

GREEN] Briefing for Armitage; date: Septembe^6^002^IRECTO|^^^H
1(11' 'iM III I

MAR 02).

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acknowledge certain gaps in our planning/preparations, but this is the option the DDCI will lead

with for POTUS consideration."^^ That morni^, the president approved moving forward with
the plan to transfer Abu Zubaydah to Country
During the same Presidential Daily Brief
(PDB) session, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld suggested exploring the option of putting Abu
Zubaydah on a ship; however, CIA records do not indicate any further input from the

)rincipals7^ That day, the CIA Station in Country | obtained the approval ofCountry |'s
officials for the CIA detention site7^ The U.S. deputy chief of mission in

Country |, who was notified by the CIA Station after Country B's leadership, concurred in the
absence of the ambassador,

Shortly thereafter, Abu

Zubaydah was rendered from Pakistan to Country^ where he was held at the first CIA
detention site, referred to in this summary as "DETENTION SITE GREEN."^"^ CIA records

indicate that Country | was the last location ofa CIA detention facility known to the president
or the vice president, as subsequent locations were kept from the principals as a matter of White

House policy to avoid inadvertent disclosures of the location of the CIA detention sites.^^
3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future
Challenges

(TS//H[^^(^HB||^^J^^^h^a^fte^h^2ndition of Abu Zubaydah to DETENTION
III (il' II I I 11II
which was responsible for the security of
the detention facility, linked its support for the CIA's detention site to a request for

support fronrtheCIAjjU^^^^HI^^^^H^^^^H^I. The CIA eventually provided the
requested ^^^^^|support7
According to CIA cables and internal documents.

Email from:

HIIIHHHI' subject: A-Z Inteirogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002.

POTUS is an abbreviation for President of the United States.

Email fiom: [REDACTED]; to:

subject: NEW INFO: A-Z Intenogation Plan; date: March 29,

2002.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

[REDACTED]

ilHHIilll^l> subject: A-Z Interrogation Plan; email from:

to: James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN^n^ng for

Armitage; date: September 26, 2002. After the PDB session, the assistant secretary of state
was
briefed. The assistant secretary indicated that he would brief the secretary and deputy secretary of state. An internal

CIA email stated that at the NSC, only National Security Advisor Rice and Deputy National SecurityAdvi^r

Hadley were briefed. See DIRECTOR

(|||^||| MAR 02); email froin: [REDACTED]

to:

James Pavitt; date: September 26, 2002.
^2 [REDACTED] 69132
MAR 02)
^3 [REDACTED] 69132
MAR 02)
For additional infonnation on the rendition of Abu Zubaydah and the estabhsliment of DETENTION SITE
GREEN, see Volume I.
[REDACTED]; HEADQUARTERS
CIA records
HEADQUARTERS

indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of tlie presence ofCIA detention facilities in Countries
|
and It is less clear whether policymakers were aware ofthe detention facilities in Country | and atGuantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
See, for example, [REDACTED] 70240 (300614Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70112 (250929Z APR 02);

[REDACTED] 70459 (080545Z MAY 02); Congressional Notification: Intelligence Support to|
ll|
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM:

|;SUBJECT: Your meet^with |

12002; coverpag^ate^
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to replace

romoted

individuals responsible for supporting
the CIA's detention facilityThose officials were replaced by different officials whom the CIA

believed were not supportive of the CIA's detention site7^ Despite considerable effort by the

C^l^tation in Counti'^^^etaii^upport for DETENTION SITE GREEN from its new
partners,

called for the closing of the CIA detention facility

within three weeksContinued lobbying by the chief of Station, however, eventually led

Country | to reverse this decision, allowing DETENTION SITE GREEN to remain
operational.^^

On April

2002, the CIA Station inCountry | attempted to list

the number ofCountry | officers who, "[t]o the best ofStation's knowledge," had "knowledge
of the presence of Abu Zubaydah" in a specific city in Country

individuals^jef^^

personnel

The list included eight

"staff of|H

and concluded "[djoubtless many others."^^ By April B, 2002,

a media organization had learned that Abu Zubaydah was in Country |, prompting the CIA to
explain to the media organization the "security implications" of revealing the information.^^ The

CIA Station in Country | also expressed concern that press inquiries "would do nothing for our
liaison and bilateral relations, possibly diminishing chances that [the

of Country

|] will permit [Abu Zubaydah] to remain in country or that he would accept other [Abu
Zubaydah]-like renderees in the future."^-^ In November 2002, after the CIA learned that a major

U.S. newspaper knew that Abu Zubaydah was inCountry |, senior CIA officials, as well as Vice

President Cheney, urged the news^per not to publish the information.^"^ While the U.S.
newspaper did not reveal Country | as the location ofAbu Zubaydah, the fact that it had the
information, combined with previous media interest, resulted in the decision to close
DETENTION SITE GREEN.^^

4. FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to
Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Infonnation the
CIA Later Describes as "Important" and "Vital"
(TS/.
on March

'm¥-) After Abu Zubaydah was rendered to DETENTION SITE GREEN
2002, he was questioned by special agents from the Federal Bureau of

See, for example. [REDACTED] 74636
[REDACTED] 76975
[REDACTED] 77115
[REDACTED] 77281

The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks
detailing the program began to emergethat foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.'

As described, however, the tensions with Country | were unrelated to public revelations about the program.
[REDACTED] 69626

Email from: William Harlow, Directorof the CIA Office of PubUc Affairs; to: John McLaughlin, Buzzy
Krongard, John Moseman, John Rizzo, James Pavitt, [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz; subject: [REDACTED]
call Re: Abu Zubaydah; date: April 25, 2002,12:06:33 PM.
83 [REDACTED] 701681

^ ALEC

April 6,2006, Interview,

Chief, Renditions and

Detainees Group.

DIRECTOR •
TOP SECRET/.

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Investigation (FBI) who spoke Arabic and had experience interrogating members of al-Qa'ida.
Abu Zubaydah confirmed his identity to the FBI officers, informed the FBI officers he wanted to
cooperate, and provided background information on his activities. That evening, Abu
Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated rapidly and he required immediate hospitalization.
Although Abu Zubaydah was largely unable to communicate because of a breathing tube, he
continued to provide information to FBI and CIA officials at the hospital using an Arabic
alphabet chart. According to records, the FBI officers remained at Abu Zubaydah's bedside
du'oughout this ordeal and assisted in his medical care. When Abu Zubaydah's breathing tube
was removed on April 8, 2002, Abu Zubaydah provided additional intelligence and reiterated his

intention to cooperate.^^
During an April 10, 2002, debriefing session, conducted in the
hospital's intensive care unit, Abu Zubaydah revealed to the FBI officers that an individual
named "Mukhtar" was the al-Qa'ida "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah identified
a picture of Mukhtar provided by the FBI from the FBI's Most Wanted list. The picture was of
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM), who had been indicted in 1996 for his role in Ramzi
Yousef's terrorist plotting to detonate explosives on 12 United States-flagged aircraft and destroy

them mid-flight over the Pacific Ocean.^^ Abu Zubaydah told the interrogators that "Mukhtar"
was related to Ramzi Yousef, whom Abu Zubaydah said was in an American jail (Yousef had
been convicted for the aforementioned terrorist plotting and was involved in the 1993 World

Trade Center terrorist attack).^^
Zubaydah told the FBI officers that "Mukhtar" trained the

9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include diat
KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 yeai*s old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida

operations outside of Afghanistan.^^ Subsequent representations on the success of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program consistently describe Abu Zubaydah's identification of
KSM's role in the September 11, 2001, attacks, as well as his identification of KSM's alias

("Mukhtar"), as being "important" and "vital" information.^'^ A review of CIA records found
that this information was corroborative of information already in CIA databases.^^
5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive
Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah

10005 (092316Z APR 02). See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume HI for additional
information.

See United States Court ofAppeals^ugus^^n, 2001, U.S. vRamzi Ahmed Yousef, and DIRECTOR
HJAN 02). See also ••••••ciA
MAR 02).
10022 (121216Z APR 02). CIA records include the variant spelling, "Muhktar." KSM was placed on

the FBI's public "Most Wanted Terrorist" list on October 10,2001. See also U.S. Department of Justice materials
related to Ramzi Ahmed Yousef.

•m

10022 (I21216Z APR 02);

18334 (261703Z MAR 02)

See, for example. President Bush's September 6, 2006, speech, based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA,
which stated tliat Abu Zubaydah provided "quite important" infomiation and "disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
or KSM, was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks and used the alias Muklitar. This was a vital piece of the

puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM."
See information later in tliis summary and Volume II for additional details.
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While Abu Zubaydah was still hospitalized, personnel at CIA

Headquarters began discussing how CIA officers would interrogate Abu Zubaydah upon his
return to DETENTION SITE GREEN. The initial CIA interrogation proposal recommended that
the interrogators engage with Abu Zubaydah to get him to provide information, and suggested

that a"hard approach," involving foreign gov^jjmen^ersonnel, be t^cei^|onlyasala£
resort."^^ At a meeting about this proposal, ^H^^hCTC Legal,
recommended that a psychologist working on contract in the CIA's Office of Technical Services
(OTS), Grayson SWIGERT, be used by CTC to "provide real-time recommendations to

overcome Abu Zubaydahl^^sistan^ to interrogation."^^ SWIGERT had come to
attention through
who worked in OTS. Shortly thereafter, CIA
Headquarters formally proposed that Abu Zubaydah be kept in an all-white room that was lit 24
hours a day, that Abu Zubaydah not be provided any amenities, that his sleep be disrupted, that
loud noise be constantly fed into his cell, and that only a small number of people interact with
him. CIA records indicate that these proposals were based on the idea that such conditions

would lead Abu Zubaydah to develop a sense of "learned helplessness."^"^ CIA Headquarters

then sent an interrogation team to Country |, including SWIGERT, whose initial role was to
consult on the psychological aspects of the interrogation.^^
DCI Tenet was provided an update on the Abu Zubaydah

interrogation plans on April 12, 2002. The update stated that the CIA team was preparing for
Abu Zubaydah's transfer back to DETENTION SITE GREEN, and noted the CIA interrogation
team intended to "set the stage" and increase control over Abu Zubaydah.^^ The update stated:
"Our [CIA] lead interrogator will require Abu Zubaydah to reveal the most
sensitive secret he knows we are seeking; if he dissembles or diverts the
conversation, the interview will stop and resume at a later time.... In

accordance with the strategy, and with concurrence from FBI Headquarters,
the two on-site FBI agents wiU no longer directly participate in the
interview/debriefing sessions."^^
Attachment to email from: [REDACTED

Strategy, Powerpoint on

REDACTED]; to:
subject: Interrogation
[Abu Zubaydah] Interrogation Strategy, 01 April 2002; date: March

31, 2002.

Email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc:
April 1,2002, re: POC for [Grayson
SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting thatCTC/LGL

woul^jea^out to SWIGERT). According to tlie email, after the meeting, HBillUCTC Legal,

HIHH' provided SWIGERT's contact information to ALEC Station officers, noting that it was SWIGERT
who composed an OTS assessment on al-Qa'ida resistance techniques.

On the evening ofApril 1, 2002, "at the request ofCTC/OP^nd ALEC" Station, acable from OTS with a
proposed interrogation strategy was sent to Country | (HHI178955 (012236Z APR 02). The information in
this cable was consistent with a subsequent cable, which was coordinated with SWIGERT, that proposed "several
environmental modifications to create an atmosphere thatenhances thestrategic interrogation process." Thecable
noted, "[t]he deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to causepsychological disorientation, and
reduced psychological wherewithal forthe interrogation," as well as "tlie deliberate establishment of psychological
dependence upon the interrogator," and "an increased senseof learned helplessness." (See [REDACTED] 69500
(070009Z APR 02).) For detailedinfonnation,see Volume I and the Abu Zubaydahdetainee review in Volume HI.

DIRECTOR ••

APR 02)

CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation," dated 12 April 2002, "1630Hours."

CIA Sensitive Addendum "Update on th^Abi^ubayd^^peration/^^
I 111

I (III I

Page 26 of 499
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The FBI special agents questioning Abu Zubaydah at the hospital
objected to the CIA's plans. In a message to FBI Headquarters, an FBI special agent wrote that
the CIA psychologists had acquired "tremendous influence.The message further stated:
"AZ's health has improved over the last two days and Agency[CIA]is ready

to move [Abu Zubaydah] out of the hospital and back toUH^^Ion
in an elaborate plan to change AZ's environment. Agency [CIA]
advised this day that they will be immediately changing tactics in all future AZ
interviews by having only there [sic] [CIA officer] interact with AZ (there will
be no FBI presence in interview room). This change contradicts all
conversations had to date.... They believe AZ is offering, 'throw away
information' and holding back from providing threat information (It should be
note [sic] that we have obtained critical information regarding AZ thus far and
have now got him speaking about threat information, albeit from his hospital
bed and not [an] appropriate interview environment for full follow-up (due to
his health). Suddenly the psychiatric team here wants AZ to only interact with
their [CIA officer, and the CIA sees this] as being the best way to get the threat
information.... We offered several compromise solutions... all suggestions
were immediately declined without further discussion. .. .This again is quite
odd as all information obtained from AZ has come from FBI lead interviewers

and questioning.... I have spent an un-calculable amount of hours at [Abu
Zubaydah's] bedside assisting with medical help, holding his hand and
comforting hum through various medical procedures, even assisting him in
going [to] the batliroom.... We have built tremendous report [sic] with AZ and
now that we are on the eve of 'regular'' interviews to get threat information, we
have been 'written out' of future interviews.

6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI
Temporarily Barredfrom the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed
in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning
On April 13, 2002, while Abu Zubaydah was still at the hospital,

the CIA implemented the "new interrogation program."^®" This initial meeting was held with
just one interrogator in the room and lasted 11 minutes. A cable stated that the CIA interrogator

was coached by the "psychological team."'^^ The CIA interrogator advised Abu Zubaydah that
he (Abu Zubaydah) "had a most important secret that [the interrogator] needed to know."
According to the cable, Abu Zubaydah "amazingly" nodded in agreement about the secret, but
Federal Bureau of Investigationdocuments pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligenceby cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).

Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidali" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).

10026 (131233Z APR 02)
10026 (131233Z APR 02)

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"did not divulge any information, as [the interrogation team] expected."'^- A cable further
explained that Abu Zubaydah indicated that he understood that the key question was about
"impending future terrorist plans against the United States,"'^'' and that the CIA officer told Abu
Zubaydah to signal for him "when he decides to discuss that 'one key item he knows he is
keeping from the [interrogator]."'^^ The FBI officers provided a similar account to FBI
Headquarters, adding that: "We spent the rest of the day in the adjoining room with [the CIA
officer] and one of the psychiatrists [REDACTED] waiting for [Abu Zubaydah] to signal he was
ready to talk. [Abu Zubaydiili] apparcnt[y went to sleep... they did not approach [Abu
Zubaydah] the rest of the day."'"'' In their communications with FBI Headquarters, the FBI
officers wrote that they explained their rapport-building approaches to the CIA interrogation
team and "tried to explain that we have used this approach before on other Al-Qaeda members

with much success (al-Owhali,^"^ KKM, Jandal, Badawi etc.). We tried to politely suggest that
valuable time was passing where we could attempt to solicit threat information...."''^^
Ori April 15, 2002, per a scripted plan, the same CIA interrogator
delivered what a CIA cable described as "the pre-move message" to Abu Zubaydah; that "time is
mnning out," that his situation had changcd, and that the interrogator was disappointed that Abu

Zubaydah did not signal "to discuss the one thing he was hiding."^"®^ Abu Zubaydiih was sedated
and moved from the hospital to DETENTION SITE GREEN. When Abu Zubaydah awoke at
11:00 PM, four hours after his arrival, he was described as surprised and disturbed by his new
situation. An April 16, 2002, cable states the "objective is to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah] is at
his most vulnerable state."

a cable described Abu Zubaydah's cell as white with no natural

lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell."" An air conditioner was
also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The
interrogation cell had three padlocks. Abu Zubaydah was also provided with one of two chairs
that were rotated based on his level of cooperation (one described as more comfortable tlian the
other). Security officers wore all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and
goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah

"from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or

dialogue with.""' The security officers communicated by hand signals when they were with
10026(131233Z APR 02)
10029 (131505Z APR 02)
10029 (131505Z APR 02)

Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence by cover leUer dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).

See Intelligence Science Board "Intelligence Interviewing: Teaching Papers and Case Studies" for additional
details on the FBI's interrogation of Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali.

Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidiili" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).

10043 (151614Z APR 02)
10047 (161406Z APR 02)
10116 (250731Z APR 02)

HHB 10053 (162029Z APR 02)
nil

Mill

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Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud
rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah's "sense of

hopelessness."'^^ Abu Zubaydah was typically kept naked and sleep deprived.'
An April 16, 2002, cable explained that the interrogation strategy
had shifted since Abu Zubaydah's medical condition prevented "total isolation as originally
planned." According to the cable, a 24-hour interrogation strategy was now "deemed to be the
best approach" for acquiring information. As a result, the FBI officers were once again allowed

to question Abu Zubaydah.''"^ On April 17, 2002, an FBI officer met with Abu Zubaydah for six
hours.'FBI records state that Abu Zubaydah had "not seen the interviewing (FBI) agent" since

April 11, 2002, butthatAbu Zubaydah greeted the agent by name.''^ During the questioning
Abu Zubaydah denied any knowledge related to specific tai*gets for a pending attack and
"advised that many of the brothers on the front lines (nfi) [no further information] talked about
all types of attacks against America but that for the most part this was usually just talk and that

[the United States] should not be concerned about this type of talk,""^ Abu Zubaydah provided
information on al-Qa'ida, KSM, his past ti-avel to the United States, as well as general
information on extremists in Pakistan."^
Zubaydah continued to provide information to interrogators
thi'oughout April 2002, but not information on pending attacks against the United States. On the
evening of April 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers about two men who approached
him with a plan to detonate a uranium-based explosive device in the United States. Abu
Zubaydah stated he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the names of the two

individuals, but provided physical descriptions of the pair.''^ This information was acquired
after Abu Zubaydah was confronted with emails indicating that he had sent the two individuals

to KSM.'^® The CIA would later represent that this information was acquired "as a result" of the
use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques, and that the information acquired resulted in

10116 (25073IZ APR 02). CIA recoi^sindic^ tliat Abu Zubaydah was nude, butgiven a towel to

cover himself when interrogated. See, for exampleJ|BB||||H| 10080 (200735Z APR 02).

'1310053 (162029Z APR 02);H1BBh10094(21 1905Z APR02). As detailed in Volume III, the FBI

Special Agents only questioned Abu Zubaydah when he was covered with a towel. Sleep deprivation during this
period also differed from how sleep deprivation was implemented after the Department of Justice approved the
CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques in August 2002. Ratlier than being placed in a stress position during sleep
deprivation, Abu Zubaydah was kept awake by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI intenogators.
Records further indicate that during breaks in the interrogations at this time, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly

sleep. See, for example, •••I

10116 (25073IZ APR 02).

10047 (161406Z APR 02)
10058 (171904Z APR 02)

Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the intenogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu
Zabaidah" and provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS
#2010-2939).

10058 (171904Z APR 02)
See Abu Zubaydali detainee review in Volume III for additional information.

10090 (210703Z APR 02). As described in more detail in Volume II, Abu Zubaydah did provide
kimyas for the pair.

llllllflllllim 10063 (180515Z APR 02). As described in detail in Volume II and Volume III, as well as more
briefly in this summary, Abu Zubaydah providedthisinfori^^
III!

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I nil mil I

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the thwarting of the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla.^^^ However, the chief of
the Abu Zubaydah Task Force stated that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find

them," while another CIA officer stated that the CIA was already "alert" to the threat posed by
Jose Padilla, and that the CIA's "suspicion" was only "enhanced during the debriefings of Abu

Zubaydah."^^^ Additional information on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and the capture of Jose Padilla
is provided later in this summary.
During the month of April 2002, which included a period during
which Abu Zubaydah was hospitalized, on life support, and unable to speak, the CIA

disseminated 39 intelligence reports based on his interrogations.'^^ At the end of April 2002, the
DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team provided CIA Headquarters with three
interrogation strategies. CIA Headquarters chose the most coercive interrogation option, which

was proposed and supported by CIA contractor SWIGERT.^^"^ This coercive interrogation
option—which included sensory deprivation—was again opposed by the FBI special agents at

the detention site.'^^ The interrogation proposal was to engage in "only a single-minded,
consistent, totally focused questioning of currentthreat information." '^^ Once implemented, this
approach failed to produce the information CIA Headquarters believed Abu Zubaydah
possessed: threats to the United States and information about al-Qa'ida operatives located in the

United States. Nonetheless, Abu Zubaydah continued to provide other intelligence. In May
2002, the CIA disseminated 56 intelligence reports based on the interrogations.
In early June 2002, the CIA interrogation team recommended that

Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members departed
the facility "as a means of keeping [Abu Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed
time off for a break and to attend to personal matters

as well as to discuss "the

endgame" ofAbu Zubaydah jjjjHIH with officers from CIA Headquarters.'^^ As a result, from
June 18, 2002, through August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah spent 47 days in isolation without being
See information in this summary and Volume II for additional details on the CIA's representations on the

effectiveness of the CW^nhancedh^rrogationtech^
CIA email from:

to:

makers and the Depaitment ofJustice.
subject: AZ information; date: July 10, 2002, at

01:18:50 PM. The email states: "The only way we put thistogedieris^at Paki liaison mentioned to
the arrest oftwo individuals (one being an American) and jKIHmi put two and two together. Therefore, AZ's
info alone would never have allowed us to find them." See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated
June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which a CIA officer states, "the Pakistani liaison felt it was important to bring
[Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids...there was enough infoiTnation indicating that his travel was
suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion wasenhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which
occurred on 21 April."

^2^ee analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the
Hjjjdatabase. The titles ofspecific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are
listed in the Abu Zubaydahdetainee review in Volume III.

ALEC

•••

MAY 02)

See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multipleccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in
the AZ Interrogations; date: April 30, 2002, at 12:02:47 PM.

See email exchange from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; with multipleccs; subject: Turning Up the Heat in
the AZ Intenogations; date: April 30,2002, at 12:02:47 PM.
analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by the CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the

database. The titles of specificintelligence reports resultingfrom information provided by Abu Zubaydah are
listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

'28

10424 (070814Z JUN 02)
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11 III I

Page 30 of 499
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asked any questions. Despite the fact that Abu Zubaydah was in isolation for nearly half of the
month, the CIA disseminated 37 intelligence reports based on the interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah in June 2002.
The CIA would later represent publicly—as well as in classified
settings—that during the use of "established US Government interrogation techniques," Abu
Zubaydah "stopped all cooperation" in June 2002, requiring the development of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records do not support this assertion.
Prior to Abu Zubaydah's 47-day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah

provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to
information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes,
training, and tactics.As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, Abu
Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and

operatives in the United States served as the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah
was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use
of what would later be known as the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" to become

"compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. Abu Zubaydah
never provided this information, and CIA officers later concluded this was information Abu
Zubaydah did not possess.

After Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation, the Abu Zubaydah

iiiliiiii| iliiiiili III!

[depaited Country |]. Security and medical

personnel remained at the detention site. The FBI special agents did not return to DETENTION
SITE GREEN.

7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques
Leads to the Development of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA
Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative
Medical Procedures "

See analysis provided to the Committee on April 18, 2011, by tlie CIA, based on CIA searches in 2011 of the

IIB database. The titles ofspecific intelligence reports resulting from information provided by Abu Zubaydah are

listed in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III of the Committee Study.
See Presidential Speech on September 6,2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel. See also
ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some
information tliat he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh
Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Muklitar.' Tliis identification allowed us to
comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to tliis tenorist plotter—leads that
eventually resulted in liis capture. It was clear to his intenogators tliat Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of
information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed
a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also CIA Director Michael Hayden,
Classified Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation
Program, April 12,2007 (DTS #2007-1563) ("...FBI and CIA continuedunsuccessfully to try to glean information
from Abu Zubaydah using established US Government intenogation techniques....").
' See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu
Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Tlie same information is included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared
on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume HI for additional details.

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In early July 2002, CIA officers held several meetings at CIA

Headquarters to discuss the possible use of "novel interrogation methods" on Abu Zubaydah.'^"^
During the course of those meetings SWIGERT proposed using techniques derived from the U.S.
military's SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape) school.SWIGERT provided a
list of 12 SERE techniques for possible use by the CIA: (1) the attention grasp, (2) walling, (3)
facial hold, (4) facial slap, (5) cramped confinement, (6) waU standing, (7) stress positions, (8)
sleep deprivation, (9) waterboard, (10) use of diapers, (11) use of insects, and (12) mock
burial.SWIGERT also recommended that the CIA enter into a contract with Hammond

DUNBAR, his co-author of the CIA report on potential al-Qa'ida interrogation resistance
training, to aid in the CIA interrogation process.Like SWIGERT, DUNBAR had never
participated in a real-world interrogation. His interrogation experience was limited to the paper
he authored with SWIGERT and his work with U.S. Air Force personnel at the SERE school.
See CIA document dated, July 3, 2002, 1630Hours, titled, "CIA Operational Update Memorandum for CIA

Leadership, SENSITIVE ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and | m | Raid

"

For more information on the SEREprogram, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiryinto the
Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin on the inquiry,
December 11, 2008; "SERE training is intended to be used to teach our soldiers how to resist interrogation by
enemies that refuse to follow the Geneva Conventions and international law. In SERE school, our troops who are at
risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution- to techniques adapted
from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the CommunistChinese during the Korean
War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity,use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until
recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste
of what they might be subjected to if capturedby a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they wouldbe better prepared to
resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody. As one [Joint Personnel
Recovery Agency (JPRA)] instructorexplained, SERE training is based on illegal exploitation (under the rules listed

in the 1949 GenevaConvention RelativetotheTreati^nt of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50years."
Email from:

subject: Description of Physical Pressures; date: July 8,

2002, at 04:15:15 PM.

ALEC ••

(051724Z JUL 02)

See Resume, Hammond DUNBAR, submitted to the CIA in March 2003. In a section on "Interrogation and
Debriefing Experience," DUNBAR's 2003 resume noted that he had been a "debriefer for all USG DOD and
Civilian

|.)." All other experience in the section related to his

interrogation experience as acontractor for the Cl^beginningin^
participated in an interrogation training course in

DUNBAR's resume did state that he had
1992, and that he had taken a one-week

Defense Interrogation Courseat some point in 2002, although his resume does not indicate whether this wasprior to,
or after, the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the Committee Study was
"incorrect... in asserting that thecontractors selected had no relevant experience." The CIA's June 2013 Response
notes SWIGERT and DUNBAR's experience at the Department of Defense SERE school, and SWIGERT's

"academic research" and "research papers"on "such topics as resistancetraining,captivity familiarization, and
learned helplessness - all of which were relevant to the development of the program." The CIA's June 2013
Responsedoes not describe any experience related to actual interrogations or counterterrorism, or any relevant
cultural, geographic, or linguistic expertise. TheCIA's June 2013 Response provides tliefollowing explanation:

"Drs. [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] had theclosest proximate expertise CIAsought at the beginning of the program,
specificallyin the area of non-standard meansof interrogation. Expertson traditional interrogation methods did not
meet this requirement. Non-standard interrogation methodologies were not an area of expertiseof CIA officersor of
the US Government generally. We believe their expertise was so unique that we would have been derelict had we
not sought them out when it became clear that CIA would be heading into the uncharted territoryof the program"
(italics and emphasis in original). As noted above, the CIA did not seek out SWIGERT and DUNBAR after a

decision was made to use coercive interrogation techniques; rather, SWIGERT and DUNBAR played a role in
convincing the CIA to adopt such a policy.
111!

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In May 2003, a senior CIA interrogator would tell personnel from
the CIA's Office of Inspector General that SWIGERT and DUNBAR's SERE school model was
based on resisting North Vietnamese "physical torture" and was designed to extract "confessions

for propaganda purposes" from U.S. airmen "who possessed little actionable intelligence." The
CIA, he believed, "need[ed] a different working model for interrogating terrorists where

confessions are not the ultimate goal."^^^

^/NF) After the July 2002 meetings, the CIA's |^^|CTC Legal,
|, drafted a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft asking the Department of
Justice for "a formal declination of prosecution, in advance, for any employees of the United
States, as well as any other personnel acting on behalf of the United States, who may employ
methods in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah that otherwise might subject those individuals to

prosecution."^"^® The letterfurther indicated that "the interrogation team had concluded" that
"the use of more aggressive methods is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the
critical information we need to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women and
children within the United States and abroad." The letter added that these "aggressive methods"
would otherwise be prohibited by the torture statute, "apart from potential reliance upon the

doctrines of necessity or of self-defense."^"^^ This letter was circulated internally at the CIA,
including to SWIGERT; however, there are no records to indicate it was provided to the attorney
general.

On July 13, 2002, HI^HCTC Legal,
and the CIA's acting general counsel, John Rizzo, met with attorneys from the National Security
Council and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), as well as with Michael
Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and Daniel Levin, the chief of
staff to the FBI director, to provide an overview of the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques
and to ask for a formal, definitive DOJ opinion regarding the lawfulness of employing the
specific CIA inten'ogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
The CIA attorneys described the 12 proposed interrogation

techniques and told the Department of Justice and National Security Council attorneys that Abu
Zubaydah continued to withhold critical intelligence on the identities of al-Qa'ida personnel in
the United States and planned al-Qa'ida attacks. The CIA attorneys also told the gi-oup that CIA
officers were complemented by:

"expert personnel retained on contract who possess extensive experience,
gained within the Department of Defense, on the psychological and physical

Interview of
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October
22, 2003. The senior interrogator had participated in die use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques with
SWIGERT and DUNBAR.
Email from:
Email from;
Email from:

'"3 DIRECTOR

I; to:

I; to:
|; to:

subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.
subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.
; subject: EYES ONLY- DRAFT; date: July 8, 2002.

|(031357Z AUG 02
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methods of interrogation and the resistance techniques employed as
countermeasures to such interrogation."^"^
According to the CIA cable describing the meeting, the
representatives from the OLC, including Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, advised
that the criminal prohibition on torture would not prohibit the methods proposed by the
interrogation team because of the absence of any specific intent to inflict severe physicalor

mental pain or sufferingJ"^^ On July 13,2002, Yoo sent an unclassified letter to the CIA's acting
general counsel describing his interpretation of the statute.
Despite the initial view expressed by Yoo that the use of the

proposed CIA interrogation techniques would be lawful, on July 17, 2002, National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice requested a delay in the approval of the interrogation techniques for
Abu Zubaydah's interrogation until the attorney general issued an opinion.The following
day. Rice and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley requested that the Department
of Justice "delay the approval of the memo detailing the next phase of interrogations" until the
CIA provided specific details on its proposed interrogation techniques and "an explanation of
why the CIA is confident these techniques will not cause lasting and irreparable harm to Abu

Zubaydah."'"^'^ Rice asked the CIA to provide the OLC with a description ofeach of the planned
interrogation techniques, and to "gather and provide any available empirical data on the reactions
and likelihood of prolonged mental harm from the use of the 'water board' and the staged
burial."'^^

On July 15, 2002, a cable providing details on the proposed
interrogation phase stated that only the DETENTION SITE GREEN chief of Base would be
allowed to interrupt or stop an inteiTogation in process, and that the chief of Base would be the
final decision-making authority as to whether the CIA's interrogation techniques applied to Abu
Zubaydah would be discontinued. ^^® The CIA officers at the detention site added:
"If [Abu Zubaydah] develops a serious medical condition which may involve a
host of conditions including a heart attack or another catastrophic type of
condition, all efforts will be made to ensure that proper medical care will be
provided to [him]. In the event [Abu Zubaydah] dies, we need to be prepared
to act accordingly, keeping in mind the liaison equities involving our hosts.

DIRECTOR lim (031357Z AUG 02)
DIRECTOR m
(031357Z AUG 02)
July 13, 2002, Letter from John Yoo, Deputy AssistantAttorneyGeneral to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,
CL\.

Memorandumfor the Record from John H. Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 17, 2002.

July 19, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandim for CI^L^ership, SENSITIVE
ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and

Raid

July 21, 2002, 1630 Hours, CIA Operational Update Memorandi^ for CI^L^ership, SENSITIVE
ADDENDUM: Update on the Abu Zubaydah Operation and mH Raid HH10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
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To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were

to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated.The interrogation team closed the cable
by stating:

"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in
light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we
need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation
and incommunicado for the remainder of his life,"^^^

Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the
interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation team
was correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over
preventative medical procedures."ALEC Station further observed:

"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment witiiin HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will
never be placed in a siaiation where he has any significant contact with others
and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss
specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu
Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This
may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but
a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be
made."^^^

^ result of the request by National Security Advisor Rice for
additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel
contacted individuals at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA),
the agency that administers the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the
techniques in training exercises.According to CIA officer
who had

mill joined the CIA's OTS after (j

at JPRA, an individual with SERE school

experience commented that "information gleaned via harsh treatment may not be accurate, as the
prisoner may say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations
conducted in the permanent phase of capture may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds of
questioning. "157
Pursuant to National Security Advisor Rice's request, CIA
Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team—particularly

ALEC

10536 (151006ZJUL 02)
10536 (151006Z JUL 02)
(182321Z JUL 02)

'55 ALEC ^•(182321ZJ^02)
'5''Email
ACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002;
July 24, 2002, faxfrom^^|J||^H|^HtoJohi^^ an^REDACTED^roviding information from the
OTS/OA^T^hologistsTemail^omr^^Blj^^l; to:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002.

'5'^ Email &omr|j||||H

to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA infonnation; date: July 19, 2002.

Records indicatethat|||||||||||^|^ notes were not provided to the Department ofJustice. In November 2002,

along with Chief of InterrogationsH^BH^B;l£dthefirstCI^nterrogator training course.
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SWIGERT and DUNBAR—aboutthe psychologicaleffects of the use of the waterboard and
mock burial. The chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN responded by cable noting that:
"We are a nation of laws and we do not wish to parse words. A bottom line in
considering the new measures proposed is that [Abu Zubaydah] is being held
in solitary confinement, againsthis will, without legal representation, as an
enemy of our country, our society and our people. Therefore, while the
techniques described in Headquarters meetings and below are administered to
student volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no measurable impact
on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here
for a man forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this
is the future course of the remainder of his life. Station, [DETENTION SITE
GREEN chief of Base] and [DETENTION SITE GREEN] personnel will make
every effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not permanently physically
or mental harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there
is no risk."^^^

As former psychologists for the United States Air Force,
SWIGERT and DUNBAR had no direct experience with the waterboard, as it was not used in

Air Force SERE training. Nonetheless, they indicated that the waterboard—which they
described as an "absolutely convincing technique"—was necessary to overwhelm Abu

Zubaydah's ability to resist.^^^ They also responded that they were aware that the Navy—which
used the waterboard technique in training—had not reported any significant long-term
consequences on individuals from its use. Unlike the CIA's subsequent use of the waterboard,
however, the Navy's use of the technique was a single training exercise and did not extend to
multiple sessions. SWIGERT and DUNBAR wrote:

"any physical pressure applied to exti'emes can cause severe mental pain or
suffering. Hooding, the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling
darkness and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions taken to
extreme can have the same outcome. The safety of any technique lies
primarily in how it is applied and monitored.'^^^
On July 24, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the use
of 10 interrogation techniques, which included: the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the
facial slap (insult slap), cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation,
use of diapers, and use of insects.The interrogation team, however, indicated that they
intended to wait for the approval to use the waterboard before proceeding with their
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. On July 26, 2002, the attorney general verbally approved the

[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02)

•^•110568

(261 lOlZ JUL 02)

[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02)

DIRECTOR ••

(251609Z AUG 02
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use of the waterboardJ^^ The OLC finalized its classified writtenlegal opinion on August 1,
2002. The earlier CIA request to conduct a mock burial was not formally considered by the
OLC. The approved interrogation techniques, along with other CIA interrogation techniques
that were subsequently identified and used by the CIA, are referred to as the CIA's "enhanced
interrogation techniques," or more commonly by the CIA as "EITs."
course of seeking approval to use the techniques, CIA

Headquarters advised the Depaitment of Justice and the national security advisor that "countless
more Americans may die unless we can persuade AZ to tell us what he knows." CIA
Headquarters further represented that the DETENTION SITE GREEN interrogation team
believed "Abu Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information," and "that in order to
persuade him to provide" that information, "the use of more aggressive techniques is
required."^^^ The cable to DETENTION SITE GREEN from CIA Headquarters documenting
the information CIA Headquarters had provided to the Department of Justice warned that "[t]he
legal conclusions are predicated upon the determinations by the interrogation team that Abu

Zubaydah continues to withhold critical threat information."^^"^ According to cables, however,
the CIA interrogators at the detention site had not determined that "the use of more aggressive
techniques was required" to "persuade" Abu Zubaydah to provide threat information. Rather,
the interrogation team believed the objective of the coercive inten-ogation techniques was to
confirm Abu Zubaydah did not have additional information on threats to the United States,
writing:

"Our assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high degree
of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information
concerning threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has

already provided."^^^
described in this summary, and in more detail in the full
Committee Study, the interrogation team later deemed the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques a success, not because it resulted in critical threat information, but
because it provided further evidence that Abu Zubaydah had not been withholding the
aforementioned information from the interrogators.

8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques:
The CIA Does Not Brief the President

Email from:

[ [REDACTED];

Rodriguez, [REDACTED],

subject: EYES ONLY- Where we stand re: Abu Zubaydah; date: July 26, 2002. See also

10568

(261101ZJUL 02).

DIRECTOR IHIII (031357Z AUG 02)
DIRECTOR

(031357Z AUG 02)

'65 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) and email from:
to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], and
subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN], [REDACTED]
73208 (231043Z JUL 02); date: July 23, 2002, at 07:56:49 PM.
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

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As described, CIA officers represented to National Security
Advisor Rice that Abu Zubaydah was withholding information on pending attacks and operatives
in the United States. On July 31, 2002, Rice informed Deputy DCI John McLaughlin that, in
balancing the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the possible
loss of American lives, she would not object to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques if
the attorney general determined them to be legal.
louring the month of July 2002, the CIA anticipated diat the
president would need to approve the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques before
they could be used. Therefore, in late July 2002, the CIA prepared talking points for a briefing
of the president. These draft talking points indicated that the CIA was planning to use
inteiTogation techniques beyond what was normally permitted by law enforcement, and included
a brief description of the waterboard interrogation technique. On August 1, 2002, based on
comments from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the talking points were revised to
eliminate references to the waterboard.CIA records indicate, however, that the talking points
were not used to brief the president. On August 2, 2002, the National Security Council legal
advisor informed the DCI's chief of staff that "Dr. Rice had been informed that there would be

no briefing of the President on this matter,but that the DCI had policy approval to employ
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
records state that prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah in 2002, the CIA did not brief Secretary of State
Colin Powell or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, two members of the National Security
Council, on the techniques.The Committee, including the chairman and vice chairman, was

also not briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques prior to their use.'^^
Approximately a year later, on July 31, 2003, senior CIA personnel
believed the president had still not been briefed on the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.In August 2003, DCI Tenet told the CIA Office of Inspector General that "he had
never spoken to the President regarding the detention and interrogation program or EITs, nor was

Memorandum for the Record from John Moseman, Chief of Staff, re: NSC Weekly Meeting, July 31, 2002.
July 26, 2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation; July 31,
2001, DCI Talking Points with the President- Next Phase of the Abu Zubaydah Interrogation. Note that the draft
document lists the incorrect year.
CIA records do not indicate who informed National Security Advisor Rice "that there would be no briefing of the
President on this matter."

Email from: John Moseman; to: John McLaughlin, Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], John Rizzo, [REDACTED];

subject: Abu-Z Interrogation; datejAueust2j2002.
Email from: John Rizzo; to:
subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 31, 2003.
See Volume II for additional information on congressional briefings.
An email from CIA Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo stated that "the President will be briefed as part
of the regular annual [covert action] review. Briefing (by Rice or VP or Counsel to the President or some
combination thereof) will describe the interrogation program, the fact that some aggressive but AG-approved
techniques have been used, but will not apparently get into the details of the techniques themselves." See email

from: John Rizzo; to: HHHH; subject^um^^orMnte^oeations^^ July 31, 2003.
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he aware of whether the President had been briefed by his staff,"^^"^ The May 2004 CIA
Inspector General Special Review included a recommendation for the DCI to:
"Brief the President regarding the implementation of the Agency's detention
and inten-ogation activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any
other authorities, including the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have

died. This Recommendation is significant."^^^
In transmitting the Special Review to the Committee, DCI Tenet
responded to the recommendation, noting only that "[t]he DCI will determine whether and to

what extent the President requires a briefing on the Program."^^^ On April 6, 2006, CIA
Inspector General Helgerson responded to a request from Committee Vice Chairman John D.
Rockefeller IV on the status of con-ective actions taken in response to the Special Review
recommendations. With regard to a briefing for the president, Helgerson wrote: "Consistent
with this recommendation, DCI Tenet, before he left office, and Director Goss, shortly after

taking office, both advised me that they had made requests to briefthe President."^^^ Prepared
"Questions and Answers" for the National Security Council principals in connection with the
disclosure of the program in September 2006 and subsequent media outreach also suggest that
the president was not briefed at the outset about the CIA's interrogation techniques. In response
to the potential question: "What role did the President play.. .Was he briefed on the interrogation
techniques, and if so when?" the proposed answer did not assert that the president was briefed,
but rather that the "President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations including who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - these decisions are
made or overseen by CIA Directors.
'''• Office of General Counsel Comments on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program Special Review,
at 23 C'[i]n August 2003, the DCI advised OIG..."); CIA Office of Inspector General, Interview of George Tenet,
memorandum dated 8 September 2003, Subject; 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogation for Countertemorism
Purposes.
Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001October 2003), May 7, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
Letter from George J. Tenet to Chairman Pat Roberts, June 22, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).
Helgerson then added, "Additionally, public disclosure of many of these activities ensured wide awareness. In
light of tliese developments, I consider the matter closed." The Helgerson letter does not indicate to whom Directors
Tenet and Goss, who met regularly with the President, submitted requests to brief the President about the program.
See letter from John L. Helgerson to Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, April 5, 2006 (DTS #2006-1564). The
CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute these records. It states, however, that "[w]hile Agency records on the
subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the

program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques
on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A subsequent memoir by former CIA Acting General
Counsel John Rizzo (published January 7, 2014) states, "The one senior U.S. Government national security official
during this time—from August 2002 through 2003—who I did not believe was knowledgeable about the E.I.T.s was
President Bush himself. He was not present at any of the Principal Committee meetings ... and none of the
principals at any of the E.I.T. sessions during this period ever alluded to the President knowing anything about
them."

Included in the packet of CIA infomiation was tlie following: "Question: 'What role did the President play in
authorizing this program? Did he select detainees held by CIA or direct their intenogation? Was he briefed on the
interrogation techniques, and if so when?' Answer: 'In the days after 9/11, the President directed that all the
instruments of national power, including tlie resources of our intelligence, military, and law enforcement

communities, beemployed tofight and winthewaragamstalQaedaandi^^
Page 39 of 499
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(TS/f^HlfllHIIIIII^/NF) CIA records indicate that the first CIA briefing for the president on
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques occurred on April 8, 2006.^^^ CIA records state that
when the president was briefed, he expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained
to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself."^^'^
9. The CIA Uses the Waterboardand Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against
Abu Zubaydah

On August 3, 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the interrogation
team at DETENTION SITE GREEN that it had formal approval to apply the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, including the waterboard, against Abu Zubaydah. According to CIA
records, only the two CIA contractors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, were to have contact with Abu

Zubaydah. Other CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN - including CIA medical
personnel and other CIA "interrogators with whom he is familiar" - were only to observe.
From August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, the CIA subjected

Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced inteiTogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. After
Abu Zubaydah had been in complete isolation for 47 days, the most aggressive interrogation

phase began at approximately 11:50 AM on August 4, 2002.^^- Security personnel entered the
cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his towel (Abu Zubaydah was then
naked). Without asking any questions, the interrogators placed a rolled towel around his neck as
a collar, and backed him up into the cell wall (an interrogator later acknowledged the collai' was

This included important, new roles for CIA in detaining and questioning terrorists. [He was periodically updated by
CIA Directorson significantcaptures of tenorists, and information obtained that helped stop attacks and led to
capture of other terrorists.] [The President was not of course involved in CIA's day to day operations- including
who should be held by CIA and how they should be questioned - thesedecisions are made or overseen by CIA
Directors]."' See Draft Questions and Proposed Answers, attached to Memorandum from National Security Advisor
Stephen J. Hadley; for; the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, Director of
National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; cc: chief of staff to the President, Counsel to the

President, Assistant to the President for National Security, WhiteHouseSpokesman, dated September2, 2006.
Brackets in the original.

See April 16, 2008, CIA "Backgrounder: Chronology of Interrogation Approvals, 2001-2003" (noting that "CIA
documentation and discussions withPresidential briefers and individuals involved with the interrogation program at
the time suggest that details on enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) were not shared with the President" in the
2001-2003 timeframe); CIA Q&A, Topic: Waterboarding ("The information we have indicates the President was not
briefed by CIA regarding the specificinterrogation techniques until April 2006, and at that time DCIA Goss briefed

himon the seven EITsproposed at thattime for the post-Detainee Treatment ActCIAinterrogation program."). As
described, in the April 2006 briefing the President "expresseddiscomfort" with the "image of a detainee, chained to

the ceiling, clothed in adiaper^n^or^d to go to the bathroom on himself." See email from: Grayson SWIGERT;
to: [REDACTED]; cc:
subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc:
subject: Dr. SWIGERT's 7 June
meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.

Increased Pressure in theNext PhaseoftheAbuZuba^ah Interrogations, Attachment to email from:
[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc:

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED^^I; subject: Increased Pressure Phase - forDCI Sensitive Addendum; date: July 10, 2002.
10586 (041559Z AUG 02)
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used to slam Abu Zubaydah against a concrete wall).'^^ The interrogators then removed the
hood, performed an attention grab, and had Abu Zubaydah watch while a large confinement box
was brought into the cell and laid on the floor.A cable states Abu Zubaydah "was unhooded
and the large confinement box was carried into the interrogation room and paced [sic] on the

floor so as to appear as a coffin."^^^ The interrogators then demanded detailed and verifiable
information on terrorist operations planned against the United States, including the names, phone
numbers, email addresses, weapon caches, and safe houses of anyone involved. CIA records
describe Abu Zubaydah as appearing apprehensive. Each time Abu Zubaydah denied having

additional information, the interrogators would perform a facial slap or face grab.^^^ At
approximately 6:20 PM, Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded for the first time. Over a two-and-ahalf-hour period, Abu Zubaydah coughed, vomited, and had "involuntary spasms of the torso and

extremities" during waterboarding.^^^ Detention site personnel noted that "throughout the
process [Abu Zubaydah] was asked and given the opportunity to respond to questions about
threats" to the United States, but Abu Zubaydah continued to maintain that he did not have any
additional information to provide,In an email to OMS leadership entitled, "So it begins," a
medical officer wrote:

"The sessions accelerated rapidly progressing quickly to the water board after
large box, walling, and small box periods. [Abu Zubaydali] seems very
resistant to the water board. Longest time with the cloth over his face so far
has been 17 seconds. This is sure to increase shortly. NO useful information
See email from: [REDACTED]; to:

subject: Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of

today; date: March 28, 2007, at 04:42 PM, which states Abu Zubaydahclaims "a collar was used to slam him
against a concrete wall. While we do not have a record that this occurred, one inteiTogator at the site at the time
confirmed that tliis did indeed happen. For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at the site
after the walling on the concrete wall."
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

10586 (041559Z AUG 02)

10586 (041559Z AUG 02); •••

10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

10586 (041559Z AUG 02). CIA contractor DUNBAR later told the CIA OIG that "[tjheir
instRictions from [chief of Base] were to focus on only one issue, that is, Zubaydah's knowledge of plans to attack

tlie U.S." According to the OIG's record of the interview, "[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT] could ask that question in
a number of ways, but it was the only theme they were authorized by [chief of Base] to use with [Abu] Zubaydah."
{See February 10, 2003, interview report of Hammond DUNBAR, Office of the Inspector General.) The acting

chief ofStation inCountry |, in an interview with the CIA OIG, stated that "there were days at [DETENTION
SITE GREEN] when the team had no requirements from Headquarters," and that CTC did not give the chief of Base

(COB) the "flexibility as COBtoaskotherques^

besides those related to threats tothe United States. {See May

28, 2003, interview report of||||||m||||m|, Office of tlie Inspector General.) The chief of Support

Services at the CIA Station stated that "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR] were fmstrated that they kept beating

Zubaydah up on th^am^uestioi^Wl^etting the same physiologic response from him." {See May 21, 2003,
interview report of

Office of the Inspector General.) Other interviewees described how

analytical assumptions about Abu Zubaydah drove the interrogation process. {See May 22, 2003, inter^w report of

|, Office ofthe Inspector General; and February 27, 2003, interview report ofm
|, Office of theInspector General.) ChiefofCTC, Jose Rodriguez, toldthe OIG that "CTC subject
matter experts" pointed to intelligence that they said indicated that Abu Zubaydah knew more than he was admitting
and thus disagreed with the assessment from DETENTION SITE GREEN that Abu Zubaydah was "compliant."
According to the OIG's record of die Jose Rodriguez interview, "disagreement between the analysts and
interrogators can be healthy, but in this case Rodriguez believes that the analysts were wrong." {See interview of

Jose Rodriguez, Office of tlie Inspector General^March6j2003^^^^^^^^^
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so far.. ..He did vomit a couple of times during the water board with some
beans and rice. It's been 10 hours since he ate so this is surprising and
disturbing. We plan to only feed Ensure for a while now. Fm head[ing] back
for another water board session."^^^

//NF) The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesincluding "walling, attention grasps, slapping, facial hold, stress positions, cramped confinement,
white noise and sleep deprivation"—continued in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day" for 17

straight days, through August 20, 2002}^^ When Abu Zubaydah was left alone during this
period, he was placed in a stress position, left on the waterboard with a cloth over his face, or

locked in one of two confinement boxes. According to the cables, Abu Zubaydah was also
subjected to the waterboard "2-4 times a day...with multiple iterations of the watering cycle
during each application."'^^
The "aggressive phase of interrogation" continued until August 23,

2002.^^^ Over the course ofthe entire 20 day "aggressive phase of interrogation," Abu Zubaydah
spent a total of 266 hours (11 days, 2 hours) in the large (coffin size) confinement box and 29

hours in a small confinement box, which had a width of 21 inches, a depth of 2.5 feet, and a
height of 2.5 feet. The CIA interrogators told Abu Zubaydah that the only way he would leave
the facility was in the coffin-shaped confinement box.'^^
According to the daily cables from DETENTION SITE GREEN,
Abu Zubaydah frequently "cried," "begged," "pleaded," and "whimpered," but continued to
deny that he had any additional information on current threats to, or operatives in, the United
States,

August 9, 2002, the sixth day of the interrogation period, the
interrogation team informed CIA Headquarters that they had come to the "collective preliminary
assessment" that it was unlikely Abu Zubaydah "had actionable new information about current
threats to the United States."On August 10, 2002, the interrogation team stated that it was

"highly unlikely" that Abu Zubaydah possessed the information they were seeking,On the
same day, the interrogation team reiterated a request for personnel from CIA Headquarters to
Emphasis in the original. Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED]; subject: Re: So
it begins; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM. CIA Director Hayden informed the Committee in 2007 that "in tlie

section [of the ICRC report] on medical care,thereport omits key contextual facts. For example, Abu Zubaydali's
statement that he was given only Ensure and water for two to three weeks fails to mention the fact that he was on a

liquid diet quite appropriate because he was recoveringfrom abdominal surgery at the time."

10644 (201235Z AUG 02). Forthe first 17 days, the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were
used against Abu Zubaydah in "varying combinations, 24 hours a day." The "aggressive phase," as defined by the
CIA, continued for an additional three days. TheCIAcontinued to use its enhanced interrogation techniques against
Abu Zubaydah until August 30,2002.
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

10667 (231206ZAUG 02);|
10615
10644
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10607

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02)
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travel to the detention site to view the interrogations. A cable stated that the team believed that a
"first-hand, on-the-ground look is best," but if CIA Headquarters personnel could not visit, a
video teleconference would suffice.DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also informed
CIA Headquarters that it was their assessment that the application of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques was "approach[ing] the legal limit."^^^ The chiefof CTC, Jose
Rodriguez, responded:

"Strongly urge that any speculative language as to the legality of given
activities or, more precisely, judgment calls as to their legality vis-a-vis
operational guidelines for this activity agreed upon and vetted at the most
senior levels of the agency, be refrained from in written traffic (email or cable

traffic). Such language is nothelpful."^^^
detention SITE GREEN cables describe Abu Zubaydah as

"compliant," informing CIA Headquarters that when the interrogator "raised his eyebrow,
without instructions," Abu Zubaydah "slowly walked on his own to the water table and sat

down."^®'^ When the inten'ogator "snappedhis fingers twice," Abu Zubaydah would lie flat on
the waterboard.^®^ Despite the assessment of personnel at the detention site that Abu Zubaydah
was compliant, CIA Headquarters stated that they continued to believe that Abu Zubaydah was
withholding threat information and instructed the CIA interrogators to continue using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.

times Abu Zubaydah was described as "hysterical"^^^ and
"distressed to the level that he was unable to effectively communicate."-^ Waterboarding
sessions "resulted in immediate fluid intake and involuntary leg, chest and arm spasms" and
"hysterical pleas.In at least one waterboarding session, Abu Zubaydah "became completely

10607 (100335Z AUG 02). On August

2002, a video-conference between DETENTION SITE

GREEN and CIA Headquaiters occuned, which included an interrogation video described by the inteirogation team
as "quite graphic" and possibly "disturbing to some viewers." After tlie video-conference, CIA Headquarters
instructed DETENTION SITE GREEN to continue the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques against

Abu Zubaydah, but agreed to send two CIA Headquarters officers to the detention site to obsei-ve the interrogations

first-hand. On August

2002, a team from CIA Headquarters, including ^^^|CTC Legal

and Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
visited DETENTION SITE GREEN and observed tlie use
ressive phase of intenogation"
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. The

ended

after the arrival of the officers from CIA Headqua^rs. See

02); ALECHH(im AUG 02); •••I

02)j_and^^^B(l067^40229Z AUG 02).

10643 (•••

10616

AUG 02);

AUG

10667 (231206Z AUG

10607 (100335Z AUG 02)

Email from: Jose Rodi'iguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTIONSITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002,
with attachment of earlier email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED].
10614 (111633Z AUG 02)
10614 (111633Z AUG 02)
202 See, for example, ALEC^^H (101728 AUG 02); ALEC •
(130034Z AUG 02); ALEC

i^G 02); and

10700 (280820Z AUG 02).

10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10643 (191518Z AUG 02)
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unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth."^*^^ According to CIA records,
Abu Zubaydah remained unresponsive until medical intervention, when he regained
consciousness and expelled "copious amounts of liquid." This experience with the waterboard
was referenced in emails, but was not documented or otherwise noted in CIA cables.^^^ When

two CIA Headquarters officers later compared the Abu Zubaydah interrogation videotapes to the
cable record, neither commented on this session. A review of the catalog of videotapes,
however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions,
were missmg.

208

CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN reported being

disturbed by the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
CIA records include the following reactions and comments by CIA personnel:
•

August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a
place he's ever been before in his medical career...It is visually and psychologically
very uncomfortable."^®^

•

August 8, 2002: "Today's first session.. .had a profound effect on all staff members
present.. .it seems the collective opinion that we should not go much
further.. .everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue.. .we cannot
guarantee how much longer."-^®

•

August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected.. .some to the point of
tears and choking up."-"

The description of the episode stated that "on being righted, he failed to respond until the interrogators gave him

a xyphoid thrust (with our medi^folks edcin^owai^tl^room)." This passage was included in multiple emails,
to include emails from the ||^^|OMS,
to; [DETENTION
SIT^BLj^] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from:

mm, OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^i^ect: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures;
date: March 7, 2003, at 8:22 PM; email from:

OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED];

subjec^Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM; and email from:
to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject:

Discussion with Dai^evin-A^date: October 26, 2004, at6:09 PM.

Email from:

OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ubiect: Re: Acceptable lower

ambient temperatures; date; March 7,2003, at 8:22 PM; email from: HHSfeHII' OMS; to: [REDACTED]

and [REDACTED]^ubie^Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004, at 10:22 AM;
email from: •HHIHI; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
and [REDACTED]; subject: Re; Discussions with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004, at 6:09 PM.

CIA Inspector General's Special Reviewon Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities issued on
May 7, 2004.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5,

2002, at 05:35AM.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], ||||||^|^m, and [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date:
August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to; [REDACTED],
August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
11II

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•

August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from
the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques.^
•

August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced
strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the

pressure." Per viewing the tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously."^^^
After the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques

ended, CIA personnel at the detention site concluded that Abu Zubaydah had been truthful and
tliat he did not possess any new terrorist threat information.
As noted, CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided
the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were justified and
approved: information on the next terrorist attack and operatives in the United States.
Furthermore, as compared to the period prior to August 2002, the quantity and type of

intelligence produced by Abu Zubaydah remained largely unchanged during and after the August

2002 use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^'^ Nonetheless, CIA Headquarters
informed the National Security Council that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used
against Abu Zubaydah were effective and were "producing meaningful results.A cable from
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

August 9, 2002, at 10:44:16 PM.
213 Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

at 09:45 AM.
See, forexample, •••

and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date:

and [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002,

10672 (240229Z AUG 02).

2'-'' See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for detailson Abu Zubaydah's intelligence production. As
noted, Abu Zubaydah was taken into CIA custodyon March
2002, and was hospitalized until April 15, 2002.
During the months of April and May 2002, which included a periodduring which Abu Zubaydahwas on life support
and unable to speak, the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah produced 95 intelligencereports. Abu Zubaydah spent
much of June 2002 and all of July 2002 in isolation, without being asked any questions. The CIA reinstituted
contact with Abu Zubaydah on August 4, 2002, and immediately began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—including the waterboard. During the months of August iuid September 2002, Abu Zubaydah produced
91 intelligence reports, four fewer than the first two months of his CIA detention. CIA records indicate tliat the type
of intelligence Abu Zubaydah provided remained relatively constant prior to and after the use of the CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques. According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities,
plans, capabilities,and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure,including personalities,
decision-making processes, tiaining, and tactics." See also CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005,

as well as "Abu Zubayd^iBio|^dorament, "Prepare^)r^^ugus^006."
On August 30, 2002,
l-^egal,
^SC Legal Adviser John Bellinger to
discuss Abu Zubaydah's interrogation. See email fi:om: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC
Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002; ALEC
(052227ZSEP 02). In his email documenting the meeting,
'noted that we had employed the walling techniques, confinement box, waterboaid, along witli some of
the otlier methods which also had been approved by the Attorney General," and "reported that while the experts at
tlie site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the recent sessions, it did appear that the current
phase was producing meaningful results." (See email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with
NSC Legal Adviser; date: August 30, 2002.) The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described
to Bellinger with respect to either the use of the techniques or the "results" of the inten ogation. It is unclear from
CIA records whether the CIA ever informed the NSC Legal Adviser or anyone else at the NSC or the Department of
Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide information about futme attacks against the United States or operatives
tasked to commit attacks in the U.S. during or after the use of tlie CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques.
nil

null

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DETENTION SITE GREEN, which CIA records indicate was authored by SWIGERT and
DUNBAR, also viewed the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah as a success. The cable
recommended that "the aggressive phase at [DETENTION SITE GREEN] should be used as a
template for future interrogation of high value captives,"^'^ not because the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques produced useful information, but rather because their use confirmed that

Abu Zubaydah did not possess the intelligence that CIA Headquarters had assessed Abu
Zubaydah to have. The cable from the detention site stated:

"Our goal was to reach the stage where we have broken any will or ability of
subject to resist or deny providing us information (intelligence) to which he
had access. We additionally sought to bring subject to the point that we
confidently assess that he does not/not possess undisclosed threat information,
or intelligence that could prevent a terrorist event."~"^

The cable further recommended that psychologists—a likely
reference to contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR — "familiar with interrogation, exploitation
and resistance to interrogation should shape compliance of high value captives prior to
debriefing by substantive experts."-^^
From Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002, to his transfer

to Department of Defense custody on September 5, 2006, infomiation provided by Abu
Zubaydah resulted in 766 disseminated intelligence reports."^^ According to CIA documents,
Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and
relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership structure, including personalities,
decision-making processes, training, and tactics."-'^ As noted, this type of information was
provided by Abu Zubaydah before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. At no time during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
According to CIA records, on September 27, 2002, the CIA briefed the chairman and the vice chairman of the

Committee, Senators Graham andShelby, as well as the Committee staffdirectors, on AbuZubaydiili's
interrogation. The CIA's memorandum of the briefing indicates that the chairman and vice chairman were briefed

on "the enhanced techniques that had been employed," as well as "die nature and quality of reporting provided by
Abu Zubaydah." See (DIRECTOR

•••

(252018Z OCT 02).

10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)
10644 (201235Z AUG 02)

The Committee uses sole-source intelligence reporting in this summary. While CIA multi-source intelligence
reports are included in the full Committee Study, the focus of the Committee analysisis on sole-source intelligence
reporting, as these reports were deemed to more accurately reflect useful reporting from individual CIA detainees.
As background, multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. For example,
a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA detainees at

a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees wereor were not able to identify
or provide infomiation on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS
(202255Z JUN
06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hanibali was "used in the

dissemination of three intelligence reports, twoof which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Baydetainees," and
the third of which "detailed [Hambali's] statement that he knew of no threats or plots to attack any world sporting
events." Sole-source reports, by contrast, are basedon specific information provided by one CIA detainee.
CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Same information included in an "Abu Zubaydah
Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
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did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United
States.

10. A CIA Presidential Daily BriefProvides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of
Abu Zubaydah

Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed
that Abu Zubaydah was compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a
Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflect[ed]

the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date."-^^ The
October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withliolding "significant threat information,"
including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu "Zubaydah resisted
providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the

hope of improving his living conditions.""^'^ The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team

indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information.^^^
documents identified the "key intelligence" acquired from

Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam
Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and
information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the
alias "Mukhtar."^^^ All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu

Zubaydah's capture.^^^
The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated
that the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For
example, the CIA informed the OLC that:

"As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques,
'brothers who are captured and interrogated aie permitted by Allah to provide
Sec Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

223 ALEC |||i|f(181439Z OCT 02)
224 ALEC

(181439Z OCT 02)

22'' Among other documents,

10667 (231206Z AUG 02); •••

10672 (240229Z AUG 02); and

email from: [REDACTED] (j^^^HclSof Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN); to: CIA Headquarters; subject:
"Assessment to Date" of Abu Zubaydah; date: October 6,2002, at 05:36:46 AM.

22'' See "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KSM," dated February 2008, updated for
briefings on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to Director Leon Panetta, as well as the "Effectiveness
Memo" provided to the Department of Justice, testimony provided by CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other
documents discussed in detail in Volume 11. For example, see ODNI September 2006 press release stating: "During
initial inteiTogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was
important,however,including that Khalid ShaykhMohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the
moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names,
opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventuallyresulted in his capture. It was clear to his
intenogators that Abu Zubaydali possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped
all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe,
effective, and legal."

22^ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

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information when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to
withhold it' in the face of psychological and physical hardships.
As is described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, CIA
records do not support the CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah made these statements.^^^ CIA
records indicate that Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always intended to talk and never

believed he could withhold information from interrogators.^^'^ In February 2003, Abu Zubaydah
told a CIA psychologist that he believed prior to his capture that every captured "brother" would
talk in detention and that he told individuals at a terrorist training camp that "brothers should be
able to expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when
someone with knowledge is captured.""^'
11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah
I" contrast to relatively open communications that the CIA had

with the Committee following the issuance of the September 17, 2001, MON, the CIA
significantly limited its communications with the Committee on its detention and interrogation

activities after Abu Zubaydah's capture on March 28, 2002.^^^ In responses to three different
sets of Committee Questions for the Record addressed to the CIA regarding the MON authorities
in the spring and summer of 2002, the CIA provided no indication that the CIA had established
DETENTION SITE GREEN, or was using, or considering using, coercive interrogation
techniques.'-^^

On September 27, 2002, CIA officials provided a briefing on Abu
Zubaydah's interrogation only to Committee Chairman Bob Graham, Vice Chairman Richard
Shelby, and their staff directors. After this briefing Chairman Graham made multiple and
228

Memorandumfor John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central IntelligenceAgency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re; Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the InteiTogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11). This OLC mejiiorandum
citesCIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from

HHI' HI Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist
Interrogation Techniques."

^^Mj^iU^her^re no records of Abu Zubaydah making these statements, the deputy chief of ALEC Station,
told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [tlie CIA] received on

how tohandle die [CIA] detainees came from a wallc-in [a source ^
to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were

underestimating Al-Qa'ida. Thedetainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial.
When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so they talked. Allah apparently
allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the
U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of." See

Memorandum for the Record;

subject^^ting with deputy chief, CounterteiTorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.
10496 (1620I4Z FEB 03)^or more information, see a March 7, 2005, cable describing Abu

Zubaydah|^xplanations more fully (|^| 2166 (070647Z MAR 05)).

|M^Hi0496 (162014Z FEB 03) For additional details on this matter, see Volume D, specifically the section

on information provided by the CIA to the Department of Justice.

The information providedby the CIA to the Committee on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program is
summarized later in this document, and described in greater detail in Volume IL
See Volume 11, specifically the section on CIA representations to Congress.
11II I (III 11
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specific requests for additional information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
Internal CIA emails include discussion of how the CIA could "get... off the hook on the cheap"

regarding Chairman Graham's requests for additional information.^-^"^ In the end, CIA officials
simply did not respond to Graham's requests prior to his departure from the Committee in
January 2003.

C. Interrogation in Country | and the January 2003 Guidelines
1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour
Officer in Charge

for a specialized CIA detentionfaciHtym Country | began

in April 2002, with the intention that itwould be "totally under [|^^^^H]/Station
Control.On June 6, 2002, CIA Headquarters approved more than $200,000 for the

construction of the facility, identified in this summary as "DETENTION SITE COBALT."^^^ In
a 2003 interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, Associate Deputy Director for

Operations ^n|||^^m|||| described his views ofthis facility and "stated that [DETENTION

SITE COBALT] wasopened^cause there needed to be adetention site in [Country |] for those

detainees enroute

[DETENTION SITE GREEN]. It was not a place for the use

ofEITs."^^^

DETENTION SITE COBALT, constructed with CIA funding,

opened in Country | in September 2002.^^^ According to CIA records, the windows at
DETENTION SITE COBALT were blacked out and detainees were kept in total darkness. The

guards monitored detainees using headlamps and loud music was played
constantly in the facility. While in their cells, detainees were shackled to the wall and given
buckets for human waste. Four of the twenty cells at the facility included a bar across the top of

the cell.^^^ Later reports describe detainees being shackled to the bai" with their hands above

their heads, forcing them to stand, and therefore not allowing the detainees to sleep.^"^^
Email from: Stanley Moskowitz; to: John H. Moseman; cc: Scott Mtiller and James Pavitt; subject: [attached
document] Re: Graliam request on interrogations; date: December 9, 2002, at 05:46:11 PM.

By June 2002 the CIA had taken custody offive detainees who were captured outside ofCountry H and placed
detention facilities. The detainees were held at the Country B facilities at

these CIA detainees in Country

21147

the request of the CIA and the CIA had unlimited access to them. See

236 DIRECTOR

(062212Z JUN 02)

23'' Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,
September 9, 2003.
238 For additional information on DETENTION SITE COBALT, see Volume I and Volume HI. Tlie specific date
has been generalized at the request of the CIA.
23^
28246

2'*° For additional information on DETENTION SIT^COBALT^ce Volume I an^Volum^U^n^mon^ther

documents:

31118

DIRECTO^|^^^J|^Hp[|B|||||||B email

from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], I^^^HB^BIREDACTED];

subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureauof Prisons;date: December 4,2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December5, 2002; Special Review,

Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTOgation Activities (Septembe^OO^^cto^r 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7,

2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director o^perations^romHHB||^^^^H|, January 28, 2003, Subject:
III!

11 III I

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\fm¥} The CIA officer in charge ofDETENTION SITE COBALT,
[CIA OFFICER 1], was a junior officer on his first overseas assignment with

no previous experience or training in handling prisoners or conducting interrogations.
[CIA OFFICER 1] was the DETENTION SITE COBALT manager during the period in which a
CIA detainee died and numerous CIA detainees were subjected to unapproved coercive

interrogation techniques.-"^^ A review ofCIA records found that priorto

[CIA

OFFICER I's] deployment and assignment as the CIA*s DETENTION SITE COBALT
manager, other CIA officers recommended
[CIA OFFICER 1] not have continued

access to classified information due to a"lack ofhone^, judgment, and maturity."^"^"
According to records, "the chief ofCTC told [Hi^l [CIA OFFICER 1]] that he would not
want [him] in his overseas station."^"^^ A supervising officer assessed that

[CIA

OFFICER 1]:

"has issues with judgment and maturity, [and his] potential behavior in the

field is also worrisome. [The officer] further advised that [|||[|||||[| [CIA
OFFICER 1]] was only put into processing for an overseas position so that
someone would evaluate all of the evidence of this situation all together. [The

officer further noted that [|^H|| [CIA OFFICER 1]] might not listen to his
chief of station when in the field.

2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details ofInterrogations in

Country |

Detainees held in Country | were detained under the authority of
the MON; however, CIA officers conducted no written assessment of whether these detainees

DeaO^n^stigation - Gul RAHMAN; and CIA Inspector General, Reportoflnvestigation, Death of aDetainee |
Hmi (2003-7402-10), April 27, 2005. One senior interrogator,

told the CIA OIG that

"literally, a detainee could go for days or weeks without anyone looking at him," and that his team found one
detainee who, "'as far as we coulddetermine,' had been chained to the wallin a standing positionfor 17 days."
According to the CIA interrogator, someof the CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT "'literally looked
like a dog that had been kenneled.' When the doors to their cells were opened, 'they cowered.'" {See Interview

Report, 2003-7123-IG, Revie\^nnte^ogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, M^^llilllllii> April 30, 2003.)

The chief of interrogations,

told the CIA OIG that "[DETENTION SITE COBALT] is good for

interrogations because it is the closest thing hehas seen toa dungeon, facilitating the displacement ofdetainee

Kions." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,||^|
April 7, 2003.) An analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT told the CIA

OIG that "[DETENTION SITECOBALT] is an EIT." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of

Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ^|B|||||B, May 8, 2003.)
See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee

April 7, 2005, Memorandum for John Helgerson, Inspector General, from Robert Grenier, Subject: Comments on
Draft Report of Investigation: Death of a Detainee

(2003-7402-IG).
, Subject:

[CIA OFFICER 1].

[CIA OFFICER 1]|

[CIA OFFICER I]|
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"pose[d] a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or...
[we]re planning terrorist activities." The CIA maintained such poor records of its detainees in

Country | during this period that the CIA remains unable to determine the number and identity
of the individuals it detained. The full details of the CIA interrogations there remain largely
unknown, as DETENTION SITE COBALT was later found to have not reported multiple uses of
sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation, extended isolation,
reduced quantity and quality of food, nudity, and "rough treatment" of CIA detainees.

3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country | Use the
CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar

Ridha al-Najjar was the first CIA detainee to be held at

DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Najjar, along with Hassan Muhammad Abu Bakr an^a
number of other individuals, was arrested in Karachi, Pakistan, after raids conducted

t>y

^^^mPakistan^^^l in late May 2002.^"^^ Al-Najjar was identified by the CIA as a
former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden,^"^^ and was rendered with Abu Bakr to CIA custody at a

Counti-y I

detention facility on June |, 2002.^'^^ Ridha al-Najjar was transferred

to DETENTION SITE COBALT on September B, 2002.^^^
While the CIA was describing to the Department of Justice why it
needed to use the CIA's enhanced inten*ogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, a parallel
internal discussion at the CIA was taking place regarding Ridha al-Najjar. An ALEC Station
cable from a CTC officer stated that, on June 27, 2002:

"ALEC/HQS held a strategy session regarding the interrogation of high

priority

detainee Ridha Ahmed al-Najjar in [Country |]. The

goal of the session was to review the progress of the interrogation to date and

to devise a general plan as to how best to proceed once the new [Country |
HH] detention/debriefing facility [i.e., DETENTION SITE COBALT] is
completed."250
The meeting participants included individuals who were also

involved in discussionsrelatedtoAbi^ub^
ALEC Station,

interrogatiojMncludin^e^ chief of
LegA

The full Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Wliile
tliere are no records of the CIA using the waterboard at COBALT, the waterboard device in tlie photograph is
surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a
watering can resting on the wooden beams of the waterboard. In meetings between tlie Committee Staff and the
CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain tlie details of the photograph, to include the buckets,
solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at COBALT.
11357

11443

^^^•11542^^^
250 II I BMl " '

2^054

"" 02). Although the plans at the time were for DETENTION SITE COBALT to be

owned and operated by the Country | government, the detention site was controlled and overseen by tlie CIA and
its officers from the day it became operationalinSeptember2002^^^^^^^
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2002, to the CIA Station in Country
against Ridha al-Najjar, including:

//NOFORN

A cable followed on July 16,
suggesting possible interrogation techniques to use

utilizing "Najjar's fear for the well-being of his family to our benefit," with the cable
explicitly stating that interrogators could not "threaten his family with imminent death";

using "vague threats" to create a "mind virus" that would cause al-Najjar to believe that
his situation would continue to get worse until he cooperated;^^^
manipulating Ridha al-Najjar's environment using a hood, restraints, and music; and

•

employing sleep deprivation through the use of round-the-clock interrogations.253

The cable went on to note that the "possibility that [al-Najjar] may
have current threat or lead information demands that we keep up the pressure on him."^^"^ With
the exception of a brief mention of "diminished returns from the most recent interviews of al-

Najjar," and references to the detainee's complaints about physical ailments, the cable offers no
evidence al-Najjar was actively resisting CIA interrogators."^^

Ten days later, on July 26, 2002, CIA officers in Country |, none
of whom had been trained in the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, proposed

putting al-Najjar in isolation^^^ and using "sound disorientation techniques," "sense of time
deprivation," limited light, cold temperatures, and sleep deprivation.^^^ The CIA officers added
that they felt they had a "reasonable chance of breaking Najjar" to get "the intelligence and
locator lead information on UBL and Bin Ladin's family.The plan for al-Najjar was
circulated to senior CIA officers as part of the Daily DCI Operations Update.-^^

ALEC

162135Z JUL 02). The deputy chiefof ALEC Station,

Legal,

and H||^^^|CTC

would later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
The term "mind virus" first appeared in the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. See

10086 (201900Z

APR 02).

25^ Referenced July 16, 2002, cable is ALEC HII (162135Z JUL 02).
ALEC

255 ALEC ••

(162135Z JUL 02)

(162135Z JUL 02)

At this time, July 26, 2002,Abu Zubaydah was in isolation at DETENTION SITEGREEN. Abu Zubaydah was
placed in isolation on June 18, 2002,and remained in isolation for 47 days, until the CIA begansubjecting him to its

enhance^nteiTogat^^
2-'^

on August 4, 2002.
25107 (260903Z JUL 02)
25107 (260903Z JUL 02)

259 Email from: [REDACTEDjUo^uzz^rongard, John O. Brennan, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], John H.
Moseman, [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^H||||^H,

Mudd, •••••,

Rodriguez^^^m^^^^Kjohn P.

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
III!

I (nil

i

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August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation
using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA
Headquarters autliorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud
music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss),
worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and

hooding.^^^
More than a month later, on September 21, 2002, CIA interrogators
described al-Najjar as "clearly a broken man" and "on the verge of complete breakdown" as
result of the isolation.^^^ The cable added that al-Najjarwas willing to do whatever the CIA
officer asked.

In October 2002, officers from the U.S. military conducted a short

debriefing of al-Najjar at DETENTION SITE COBALT and subsequently expressed an interest

in a more thorough debriefing.^^^ On November

2002, a U.S. military legal advisor visited

DETENTION SITE COBALT and described itas a"CIA detentioi^acility/^ioting that "while
CIA is the only user of the facility they contend it is a [Country

facility."^^"^

The U.S. military officer also noted that the junior CIA officer designated as warden of the
facility "has little to no experience with interrogating or handling prisoners." With respect to alNajjar specifically, the legal advisor indicated that the CIA's interrogation plan included
"isolation in total darkness; lowering the quality of his food; keeping him at an uncomfortable
temperature (cold); [playing music] 24 hours a day; and keeping him shackled and hooded." In
addition, al-Najjar was described as having been left hanging—which involved handcuffing one
or both wrists to an overhead bar which would not allow him to lower his ai*ms—for 22 hours

each day for two consecutive days, in order to "'break' his resistance." It was also noted alNajjar was wearing a diaper and had no access to toilet facilities.
niilitary legal advisor concluded that, because of alNajjar's treatment, and die concealment of the facility from the ICRC, military participation in

al-Najjai*'s interrogation would involve risks for the U.S. military HHm. The legal advisor
reconmiended briefing the CIA's detention and interrogation activities to U.S.
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: ABU ZUBAYDAH - SENSITIVE ADDENDUM TO DCl DAILY 1630
OPS UPDATE -26 JULY; date: July 26,2002.

DIRECTOR BIHI (052309Z AUG 02). The OLC opinion that reviewed and approved the use ofCIA's
enhanced inteiTogation tecliniques, signed on August 1, 2002, was specific to Abu Zubaydali. The Office of Legal
Counsel did not produce legal opinions for al-Najjar or other detainees held by or for the CIA until August 2004.
2^' [REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP 02)
[REDACTED] 27297 (210713Z SEP
November

2002, Memorandum for

Subject: Legal Analysis ofJU Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in

[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITECOBA^TX^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
November

2002, Memorandum for

Subject: Legal Analysis of

Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in

[REDACTED] (aka"[DETENTION SITECOBAL22i_^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_
November

2002, Memorandum for

Subject: Legal Analysis ofHI Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in
[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]'
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[combatant command] to alert the command of the risks prior to the U.S. military

being involved in any aspect of the interrogation of al-Najjar.-^^ According to the CIA
inspector general, the detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar "became the model" for
handling other CIA detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^^ The CIA disseminated one

intelligence report from its detention and interrogation of Ridha al-Najjar,^^^
4. Death of Gul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive
Interrogation Techniques at DETENTIONSITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General
Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site
In November 2002, ALEC Station officers requested that CIA

contract interrogator Hammond DUNBAR, one of the two primary interrogators of Abu
Zubaydah in August 2002, travel to DETENTION SITE COBALT to assess a detainee for the

possible use ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogationtechni^^

While DUNBAR was present at

DETENTION SITE COBALT, he assistedfl^^HllB [CIA OFFICER I] in the

interrogations of Gul Rahman, a suspected Islamic extremist. As reported to CIA Headquarters,
this interrogation included "48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness,
isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment." CIA Headquarters did not approve these
interrogation techniques in advance. Upon receipt of these cables, however, officers at CIA
Headquarters responded that they were "motivated to extract any and all operational information
on al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from Gul Rahman" and suggested that "enhanced measures"
might be needed to gain Gul Rahman's compliance. CIA Headquarters also requested that a

psychological assessment of Rahman be completed.^^^ Prior to DUNBAR's departure from the

detention site on November | , 2002, [a few days before the death ofGul Rahman] DUNBAR
proposed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on other detainees and offered

suggestions to

[CIA OFFICER 1], the site manager, on the use of such techniques.^^^

On November!, 2002,

[CIA OFFICER 1] ordered that

Gul Rahman be shackled to the wall of his cell in a position that required the detainee to rest on
the bare concrete floor. Rahman was wearing only a sweatshirt, as
[CIA OFFICER 1]
had ordered that Rahman's clothing be removed when he had been judged to be uncooperative

during an earlier interrogation. The nextday, the guards found Gul Rahman's dead body. An
internal CIA review and autopsy assessed that Rahman likely died from hypothermia—in part
November

2002, Meinor^um for

Subject: Legal Analysis ofdHPersonnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in
[REDACTED] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").

^^^A^ording to tlie IG report, "in late July or early August 2002, asenioroperationsofficer^ TDY to |
HH interrogated aparticularly obstinate detainee [Ridha al-Najjar] at
detention facility
that was used before [COBALT] wasopened. Theofficer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately,

becam^h^mjj®'

[COBALT]." See April 27, 2005, report by the CIA Inspector General, Death ofaDetainee |

llllllllllllllll^^^l (2003-7402J[G)^e^fe^nt^iew Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Inten'ogations for
Counterterrorism Purposes, ^^^BHH||^Pnn0^003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of
Interrogations for Counterterrorism Pu^posesTlt^^^^^l, April 2, 2003.
See Volume II and Volume III for additional information.

26' ALEC
ALEC
271 H I H

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from having been forced to sit on the bare concrete floor without pants.^^^

[CIA

OFFICER I's] initial cable to CIA Headquarters on Rahman's death included a number of
misstatements and omissions that were not discovered until internal investigations into Rahman's
death.^^^
death of Gul Rahman resulted in increased attention to CIA

detention and interrogation activities inCountry | by CIA Headquarters. The CTC formally
designated the CTC's Renditions Group^^"^ as the responsible entity for the management and
maintenance of all CIA interrogation facilities, including DETENTION SITE COBALT, in early

December 2002.-^^ Despite this change, many of the sameindividuals within the CIA—
including DUNBAR, officers at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and officers within ALEC
Station who had recommended the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against
Gul Rahman—^remained key figures in the CIA inteiTogation program and received no reprimand
or sanction for Rahman's death. Instead, in Maich 2003, just four months after the death of Gul

Rahman, the CIA Station in Country |recommended that^^^^fm^^^^I^OFFICER 1]

receive a "cash award" of $2,500 for his "consistently
ikii wini " t ^ l I A
OFFICER 1] remained in his position as manager of the detention site until July 2003 and
continued to be involved in the interrogations of other CIA detainees. He was formally certified
as a CIA interrogator in April 2003 after the practical portion of his training requirement was

waived because of his past experience with interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^^
Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from
January 28, 2003, Subject: Death
Investigation - Gul RAHMAN. Otlier contributing factors were identified as dehydration, lack of food, and

iiTiraobilit^u^^|shor^^
30211

See Volume

and 111 for additional details.

As noted, the Renditions Group was also known during the program as the "Renditions and InteiTogations
Group," as well as the "Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Group," and by the initials, "RDI" and "RDG."

2'"nil 11 nil

DEC02)

27^ DIRECTOrI^^I^^I^I^^^I^ In late 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the
actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman's death. The board recommended that the executive director "impose a 10

day suspension without pay" on I^BUI |CIA OFFICER 1], and noted that this action would "strike the
appropriate balance between: I) the fact that [miil^l
OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made
decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman's death, and 2) the significant weight the Board
attached to the mitigating factors at play in this incident." {See Memorandumfor Executive Director from

HI, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re: Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability
Board Regarding the Death ofAfghar^etainee Gul Rahman.) On February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive
Director K.B. Foggo notified ||[H|H [CIA OFFICER 1] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against
liim. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: "Wliile not condoning your actions, it is
imperative, in my view, that they... be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Raliman's
detention. Cable traffic reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was awaie of, and

Bosed no objections to, the confinement conditions and interrogation techniques beii^ imposed on Rahman as late as
I November. On that date. Headquarters notified [the CIA Station in COUNTRY |]... that it was 'motivated to

extract any and all operational information' from Rahman, that it rated achieving Rahman's cooperation to be of
'great importance' and that it acknowledged that Ralunan 'may need to be subjectedtoenhancedm

measures to induce him to comply." (See February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [^HI^HHH

OFFICER

1]], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director, re; "Accountability Decision.")
Witli regard to the death of Gul Raliman, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Most egregiously, we believe that
CIA leaders erred in not holding anyone formally accountable for the actions and failure of management related to
the death of Gul Raliman at [COBALT] in 2002. We understand the reasoning underlying CIA management's
decision to overturn an accountability board recommendation that would have imposed sanctions on the least

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Later investigations of DETENTION SITE COBALT conducted

by tlie CIA inspector general and the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul
Rahman found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and other coercive
interrogation techniques—was more widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA
cables. Specifically, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included

standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee's arms were shackled above his head, nudity,
dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in
at least two instances, the use of mock executions

NovembeM8^002^taf^min the CIA's Office ofInspector
Oeneralcontacted^^^^miCTC Legal,
to indicate their interest in being
briefed by CTC on the detention facility in Country

At their meeting with the DDO and the

chief ofCTC on November | , 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that counti'y on a
separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to "war crimes"

and "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this
information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event

concerning Gul Rahman"—his death, which occurred on November H, 2002.^^^

experienced officer involved. The mostjunior in the chain of command should not have to bear the full weight of
accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are tlmist into difficult battlefieldsituationsby
their supervisors and given a risky and difficult task and littlepreparation or guidance. Still,it is hard to accept that
a CIA officer does not beai'at least some responsibility for his or her actions, even under trying circumstances."
Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003)

(2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004;Memorandum for Deputy Directorof Operations, from

January

28, 2003, Subiect^^thInvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report ofInvestigation, Death of a
Detainee
(2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA
debriefer indicated that, "[d]uring the two weeksof interrogation training, she heaid stories of [COBALT] detainees
being 'hung for days on end,' not beingfed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being

repeatedly choked/^Thesenio^
at [COBALT]

also informed the Office ofInspector General tliat, "[s]he heard that while
aka "CIA OFFICER 2"] had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes

barely touchin^h^round." {See interview report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for Counterterrorism
Purposes,
April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a "rough takedown" following the death of Gul
Raliman at COBALT. "According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions
team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door
of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his
clothes and securedhim with Mylartape. Theycovered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long

corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him andpunched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it
was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As
they ran him along the corridor, a couple of timeshe fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of
the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a numberof abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothingthat required
medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a
number of surface abrasions on his shoulders,pelvis, arms, legs, and face.) At this point, Rahman was returned to

his cell and secured. [DUNBAR] stated that [tl^HIHrih [CIA OFFICER 1]] [the CIA officer in charge of
DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what

[HHI [CIA OFFICER 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after sometliing like this is done, interrogators should
speak tothe prisone^o^givethen^om
Operations,from

tothink about.'" {See Memorandum forDeputy Director of
January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.)

See Notes ofNovember
lOI

2002, meetin^A^REDACTE^
'iM III I

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In January 2003, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson began a
formal review of the death of Gul Rahman and began a separate review of the entire CIA
Detention and Interrogation Program. The resulting Special Review of Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities ("Special Review") found that there were no guidelines
for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT
prior to December 2002, and that interrogators, some with little or no training, were "left to their
own devices in working with detainees.

The Inspector Generars Special Review also revealed the lack of
oversight of DETENTION SITE COBALT by CIA leadership. DCI Tenet stated that he was

"not very familiar" with DETENTION SITE COBALT and "whaUh^I^s doing with medium
value targets,"^^^ Associate Deputy Director of Operations

stated that he was

unaware that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were being used there.^^^ In August
2003, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller relayed that he was under the impression that
DETENTION SITE COBALT was only a holding facility and that he had "no idea who is

responsible for [COBALT].Senior Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo informed the OIG
that he knew little about DETENTION SITE COBALT and that his focus was on DETENTION

SITE GREEN and DETENTION SITE BLUE.-^^ CTC Chief ofOperations ••
stated that he had much less knowledge of operations at DETENTION SITE
COBALT, and that the CIA's GREEN and BLUE detention sites were much more important to

him.^^^ Finally, Chief of CTC Jose Rodriguez stated thathe did not focus on DETENTION
SITE COBALT because he had "other higher priorities."^^^
5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewedby
the Department ofJustice Included in the Training Syllabus

See Office of Inspector General Special Review of CounterterrorismDetention and Interrogation Activities
(September2001-October 2003), May 7, 2004, p. 52. According to an OIG interview witli an analyst who
conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, "indicative of the lack of intenogators was the fact that

[^1^1 [CIA OFFICER 1]] enlisted a [REDACTED] case officer friend... toconducUnteirogation
[DETENTION SITE COBALT] after he completed his [REDACTED] business in

{See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review ofInterrogations for CounterteiTorisrnPurposesTHHBBBI'
8, 2003.) Inspector General records of an interview with a senior CIA debriefer indicate that the debriefer, "heard
prior to taking the [intenogator] training that people at [COBALT] had debriefed detainees on tlieir own, sometimes
going out to the site at night." {See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Reviewof Inteixogations for CounterteiTorism
Purposes,
April 5, 2003.) As describedelsewhere, DCI Tenet issued formal intenogation guidelines
for the program on January 28, 2003. {See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential
Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence,
January 28, 2003.)

Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, memorandum

dated, Septembe^^003^^^
Interview of
Office of tlie Inspector General, September 9, 2003.
283 Interview of Scott MuUer, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector
General, August 20, 2003.

Interview of John Rizzo, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,

August 14, 2003^^^^^^^^^^
Interview of
Office of the Inspector General, February 11, 2003.
286 Interview of Jose Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12,
2003.

im

MUM

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The CIA's CTC Renditions Group began preparing for the first

CIA interrogator training course in August 2002—during the period in which Abu Zubaydah was

being interrogate^jsing the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesatDETENTTON SITE
GREEN.
the CIA's chief ofinterrogations,andf^^l^^l^mi, the CIA
officer with OTS who had spent | years as a SERE Instructor with JPRA, led the interrogation
training. The first interrogation training, conducted with the assistance of JPRA personnel,

occurred from November 12, 2002, to November 18, 2002.^^^ The class included eight students
who were seeking to become CIA interrogators and three students seeking to support the CIA
interrogation process.The CIA training program involved 65 hours of instruction and training
on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including at least two interrogation techniques
whose legality had not been evaluated by the Department of Justice: the "abdominal slap" and
the "finger press." Although a number of personnel at CIA Headquarters reviewed the training
materials, there are no CIA records of any CIA officer raising objections to the techniques being
included in the syllabus.-^®
6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen
Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003

On NovemberH^002^f^ the completion of the first formal

tminin^lass7^^^^^|CTC Legal,

asked CTC attorney

to "[m]ake it known that from now on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are

enrolled in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated with - the class."^^^
added:

"Moreover, we will be forced to Disapprove [sic] the participation of specific
personnel in the use of enhanced techniques unless we have ourselves vetted

December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogatior^n^xploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 No^^pilo^unning) at 4. See also email from:
to: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],
subject: Formation of a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial
training plan and requirements); date: August 30,2002, at 8:30 AM.

December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running).

December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running), at 15.
See, for example, email from:

to:

[REDACTED]; subject: HVT training

date: October 10, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to:
|HHiiHif>
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HVT trainine^ate^cto^r 10, 2002; November 1, 2002,
Memorandum for: Director, DCI CounterterroristCenter, from
Chief, Renditions Group,
CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation Course, REFERENCE: Memo for

D/CTC from C/RG/CTC^lt^^M^2, Same Subject.

2^' Email from: |^H||HH^HypCTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],EYES ONLY; date: November B|, 2002, at03:13:01 PM. As
described above, Gul Rahmai^ikel^ro^ to death atDETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of
November

2002.

email, hov^ever, appears to have been drafted before the guards had

found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211

describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November | , 2002. Gul
Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least
to provide the impetus for
email.

's email. No records could be identified

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them and are satisfied with their qualifications and suitability for what are
clearly unusual measures that are lawful only when practiced correctly by
personnel whose records clearly demonstrate their suitability for that role. The
vetting process will not be that dissimilar from the checks that are provided by
the OIG, OS, etc. in certain cases before individuals are promoted or receive
awards, and the selection and training of aggressive interrogators certainly
warrants a similar vetting process.

UN¥) The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez, objected to this approach.

(TS//
stating;

"I do not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get into the business of
vetting participants, observers, instructors or others that are involved in this
program. It is simply not your job. Your job is to tell all what are the
acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogations per the authorities

obtained from Justice and agreed upon by the White House,"^^^

(T!8^^mi|||||H//NF) Contrary to statements later made by CIA Director Michael
Hayden and other CIA officials that "[a]ll those involved in the questioning of detainees are
carefully chosen and screened for demonstrated professional judgment and maturity,CIA
records suggest that the vetting sought by
did not take place. The Committee
reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers and contractors involved in the CIA's

Detention and Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. The Committee
identified a number of personnel whose backgrounds include notable derogatory information
calling into question their eligibility for employment, their access to classified information, and
their participation in CIA interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, the derogatory information
was known to the CIA prior to the assignment of the CIA officers to the Detention and
Interrogation Program. This group of officers included individuals who, among other issues, had
engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had workplace anger management issues, and
had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.

7. Bureau ofPrisons "WOW'ed" by Level ofDeprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site
In December 2002, the CIA's Renditions Group sent a team of

recently trained interrogators to DETENTION SITE COBALT to engage in inteiTogations. The
interrogation plans proposed by that team for at least three detainees at DETENTION SITE

TC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED],

Email from:

[REDACTED],
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to:
[REDACTED], [REDACTED],

: EYES ONLY; date: November ft 2002, at03:13:01 PM.
|, HCTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
subject: EYES ONLY; date: November ft 2002, at 04:27

iect:

PM.

Transcript of hetmng, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).

The information |

is described at length in the Committee Study in

Volume III.

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COBALT included the use of interrupted sleep, loud music, and reduction in food quality and
quantity. Less than a month after the death of Gul Rahman from suspected hypothermia, the
plans also called for detainees' clothes to be removed in a facility that was described to be 45
degrees Fahrenheit. CIA Headquarters approved the proposals for these detainees, whom the
CIA described as "Medium Value."-^^

Prior to this, in November 2002, a delegation of several officers
from the Federal Bureau of Prisons conducted an assessment of DETENTION SITE COBALT.

Following the November B, 2002, through November 2002, visit,^^^ CIA officers in Countiy
I remarked that the Federal Bureau ofPrisons assessments, along with recommendations and
training, had "made a noticeable improvement on how the day to day operations at the facility
are performed," and made the detention site a "more secure and safer working environment for
officers."'^^

On December 4, 2002, officers at CIA Headquarters met with
individuals from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to learn more about their inspection of

DETENTION SITE COBALT and their training ofmH|| security staff.During that
meeting, the Federal Bureau of Prisons personnel described DETENTION SITE COBALT and
stated that there was "absolutely no talking inside the facility," that the guards do not interact

with the prisoners, and that "[e]verything is done in silence and [in] the dark."^®® According to a
CIA officer, the Federal Bureau of Prisons staff also commented that "they were 'WOW'ed'" at
first by the facility, because:

"They have never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived,
i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in tiie dark, with the guards
wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an
interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and
the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars). There is nothing like this in the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. They then explained that they understood the
mission and it was their collective assessment that in spite of all this sensory
deprivation, the detainees were not being treated in humanely [sic]. They
explained that the facility was sanitary, there was medical care and the guard
force and our staff did not mistreat the detainee[s]."^®^
By the end of December 2002, the CIA Renditions Group that had
visited DETENTION SITE COBALT had concluded that the detention facility's initial "baseline
conditions" involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact
31118

296

DIRECTOR ••

CIA detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit
to the CIA detention site.

[REDACTED] 30589 (271626Z NOV 02)

299 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002.

300 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002.

3°' Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date:
December 5, 2002.

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on the inten'ogations. The team thus recommended that "experts and authorities other than the
individuals who crafted the process" review the interrogation process and conditions, and that a

legal review be conducted.^®^ CIA Headquarters does not appear to have taken action on these
recommendations.

8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country | Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the
MON Standardfor Detention

^

spring of 2003, the CIA continued to hold detainees at

facilities in CountryB who were known not to meet the MON standard for detention. CIA

officer

[CIA OFFICER 1] described the arrangement he had with Country |

officers in an email, writing:

|. They also happen to have 3 or 4 rooms where they can lock up people
discretely [sic]. I give them a few hundred bucks a month and they use the
rooms for whoever I bring over - no questions asked. It is vei7 useful for
housing guys that shouldn't be in [DETENTION SITE COBALT] for one
reason or another but still need to be kept isolated and held in secret
detention."^®^
cables indicate that CIA officers transferred at least four

detainees to these Country | facilities because they did not meet the standard for CIA detention
under the MON.^^^

In total, four CIA detention facilities were established in Country
CIA records indicate that DETENTION SITE COBALT held a total of 64 detainees during

the period of its operation between Septem^r 2002 anc^^H2004, while DETENTION SITE
GRAY held eight detainees between

2003 and

^003. The CIA later

established two other Cl^acilities in^Countr^B: DETENTION SITE ORANGE, which held
34 detainees between |^^^004 and
DETENTION SITE BROWN, which
held 12 detainees between^^B 2006 and 2008.^®^

CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT,
Detainee/Prisoner management, December 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this
recommendation.

[CIA OFFICER 1]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Thanks and Query re: List of

I^^IH^^I^HdETAINEES; date: March 14, 2003.
The cables did not explain any legal basis for detaining individuals who did not meet the detention requirements

of the September 17, 2001, MON. HEADQUARTERS
I
36682
38836(B^^^^^M); HEADQUARTERS|

_ 41204 dHl^^KALEC ••

See Volume III for additional information.

Page 61 of 499
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K M' ii (III I

IIIIII III 11

9. DCI TenetEstablishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation;
Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not
Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel
In late Januaiy 2003, in response to the death of CIA detainee Gul

Rahman and the use of a gun and a drill in the CIA interrogations of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
(described later in this summary), DCI Tenet signed the first formal interrogation and
confinement guidelines for the program."*^^ In contrast to proposals from late 2001, when CIA
personnel expected that any detention facility would have to meet U.S. prison standards, the
confinement guidelines signed in January 2003 set forth minimal standards for a detention
facility. The confinement guidelines required only that the facility be sufficient to meet basic
health needs, meaning that even a facility like DETENTION SITE COBALT, in which detainees
were kept shackled in complete dai-kness and isolation, with a bucket for human waste, and
without notable heat during the winter months, met the standard.^^^^
The guidelines also required quarterly assessments of the
conditions at the detention facilities. The first quarterly review of detention facilities covered the
period from January 2003 to April 2003, and examined conditions at DETENTION SITE

COBALT, as well as at DETENTION SITE BLUE in a different country. Country
At that
time, DETENTION SITE BLUE, which was initially designed for two detainees, was housing
five detainees. Nonetheless, the site review team found that conditions at DETENTION SITE

BLUE —including the three purpose-built "holding units"—met "the minimum standards set by
the CIA" in the January 2003 guidance. Detainees received bi-weekly medical evaluations,
bmshed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a
week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading
materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee's degree of
cooperation with interrogators.
The first quarter 2003 review also found that conditions at

DETENTION SITE COBALT satisfied the January 2003 guidance, citing "significant
improvements" such as space heaters and weekly medical evaluations. The review noted that a

new facility was under construction in Country |[ to replace DETENTION SITE COBALT, and

that this new detention facility, DETENTION SITE ORANGE, "will be a quantum leap
forward" because "litj will incorporate heating/air conditioning, conventional plumbing,

appropriate
)propri
lighting, shower, and laundry facilitles."^^^ DETENTION SITE ORANGE opened

in 1^(12004. Although some of the cells at DETENTION SITE ORANGE included plumbing,
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17

September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.

^"'Guidelineson Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17
September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, Januaiy 28, 2003.

CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May
22,2003.

CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditionsfor CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May
22, 2003.

^'®CIA document titled. Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May
22,2003.

nil

11111

11'I'I "I I

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detainees undergoing interrogation were kept in smaller cells, with waste buckets rather than
toilet facilities.^

The DCl's January 2003 interrogation guidelines listed 12
"enhanced techniques" that could be used with prior approval of the director of CTC, including
two—use of diapers for "prolonged periods" and the abdominal slap—that had not been
evaluated by the OLC. The "enhanced techniques" were only to be employed by "approved
interrogators for use with [a] specific detainee." The guidelines also identified "standard
techniques"—including sleep deprivation up to 72 hours, reduced caloric intake, use of loud
music, isolation, and the use of diapers "generally not to exceed 72 hours"—that required
advance approval "whenever feasible," and directed that their use be documented. The "standard
techniques" were described as "techniques that do not incorporate physical or substantial
psychological pressure." The guidelines provided no description or further limitations on the use

of eitherthe enhanced or standard interrogation techniques.^^^
Although the DCl interrogation guidelines were prepared as a
reaction to the death of Gul Rahman and the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques on
*Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, they did not reference all interrogation practices that had been
employed at CIA detention sites. The guidelines, for example, did not address whether

interrogation techniques such as the "rough take down,"^^^ the use of cold water showers,^^'^ and
prolonged light deprivation were prohibited. In addition, by requiring advance approval of
"standard techniques" "whenever feasible," the guidelines allowed CIA officers a significant
amount of discretion to determine who could be subjected to the CIA's "standard" interrogation
techniques, when those techniques could be applied, and when it was not "feasible" to request
advance approval from CIA Headquarters. Thus, consistent with the interrogation guidelines,
throughout much of 2003, CIA officers (including personnel not trained in interrogation) could,
at their discretion, strip a detainee naked, shackle him in the standing position for up to 72 hours,

and douse the detainee repeatedly with cold water^^^—without approval from CIA Headquarters
if those officers judged CIA Headquarters approval was not "feasible." In practice, CIA
personnel routinely applied these types of interrogation techniques without obtaining prior

approval.^

311

3741

Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17
September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.

For a description ofthe "rough takedown," see Memorandum for Deputy Director ofOperations, from HHI
Januai-y 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.
One cold water shower was described by a CIA linguist; "Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the
guards at
[CIA OFFICER l]]'s direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias.
According to [tlie on-site linguist], the entire process lasted no more tlian 20 minutes. It was intended to lower
Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one

oftlie four sleep deprivation cells where hewas left shivering for hours oroveniiglUwitlUii^and chained over his
head." See CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee

(2003-7402-IG),

April 27, 2005.

Water dousing was not designated by the CIA as a "standard" interrogation technique until June 2003. In
January 2004 water dousing was recategorized by the CIA as an "enhanced" inteiTogation technique.
See Volume III for additional information.

mi i( III IiiU^jj|^JJUUii|ii(iiimiiii
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The DCI interrogation guidelines also included the first
requirements related to recordkeeping, instaicting that, for "each interrogation session in which
an enhanced technique is employed," the field prepare a "substantially contemporaneous
record... setting forth the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of
those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable.In practice, these
guidelines were not followed.

There were also administrative changes to the program. As noted,
on December 3, 2002, CTC's Renditions Group formally assumed responsibility for the
management and maintenance of all CIA detention and interrogation facilities.^^^ Prior to that

time^h^nterrogation program was "joined at the hip" with CTC's ALEC Station, according to
I^H^IcTC Legal, although another CTC attorney who was directly involved in the
program informed the CIA OIG that she "was never sure what group in CTC was responsible for
interrogation activities.Even after the formal designation of the CIA's Renditions Group, 321
tensions continued, particularly between CTC personnel who supported SWIGERT and
DUNBAR's continued role, and the Renditions Group, which designated
as the

3'^ DIRECTOR ••

(302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR

(311702Z JAN 03). Despite the formal record

keeping requirement, the CIA's June 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques at CIA detention sites was not necessary, stating: "First, the decline in reporting over time
on the use of enhanced techniques, which the Study characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually
reflects the matiuation of the program. In early 2003, a process was put in place whereby interrogators requested
permission in advance for interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for
reporting in extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approvedplan."
As detailed in the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 explicitly required record keeping,
including "the nature and duration of each such techniqueemployed, the identities of those present, and a citation to
the required Headquarters approval cable." That requirement was never revised.
Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques listed the techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those
techniques were employed, nor did they integrate the specific techniques into narratives of the interrogations. As the
CIA interrogation program continued, descriptions of the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation techniques were
recorded in increasingly summarized form, providing little infomiation on how or when the techniqueswere applied
during an interrogation. There aie also few CIA records detailing the rendition process for detainees and their
transportation to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee comments on their rendition

experiences and photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the
photographs, detainees transported by the CIA by aircraft were typically hooded with their hands and feet shackled.
The detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, and these headsets were typically affixed to a
detainee's head with duct tape that ran the circumferenceof the detainee's head. CIA detainees were placed in
diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either
strapped into seats during the flights, or laid down and strapped to the floor of the plane horizontally like cargo. See
CIA photographs of renditions among CIA materials provided to the Committee pursuant to the Committee's
document requests, as well as CIA detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information on the transport of CIA
detainees.

DIRECTORlllllllll^^
^20 Interview of HHHHH'

03)
[REDACTEDUREDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector

General, August 20,2003. Interview of
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the
Inspector General, February 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was
Office
handled by the Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, 2003, interview report of
of the Inspector General.
As noted, the CIA's Rendition Group is variablyknown as the "Renditions Group," the "Renditions and

Detainees Group," the "Renditions, DetentionSjan^nterroeation^roi^^
I(II

M

III

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CIA's chief interrogator.^^- As late as June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR, operating outside
of the direct management of the Renditions Group, were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE

to both interrogate and conduct psychological reviews of detainees.^^^ The dispute extended to
interrogation practices. The Renditions Group's leadership considered the waterboard, which
Chief of Interrogations
was not certified to use, as "life threatening," and
complained to the OIG that some CIA officers in the Directorate of Operations believed that, as a

result, the Renditions Group was "running a 'sissified' inten'ogation program."^^"^ At the same

time, CIA CTC personnel criticized the Renditions Group and^|^H for their use of painful
stress positions, as well as for the conditions at DETENTION SITE COBALT.-^^''

(i:!8y'^|||||[|H|||HH||||//NF) There were also concerns about possible conflicts ofinterest
related to the conti'actors, SWIGERT and DUNBAR. On January 30, 2003, a cable from CIA

Headquarters stated that "the individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques
is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of record," and that only a staff

psychologist, nota contractor, could issue an assessment of record."^^^ In June 2003, however,
SWIGERT and DUNBAR were deployed to DETENTION SITE BLUE to interrogate KSM, as
well as to assess KSM's "psychological stability" and "resistance posture.As described later
in this summary, the contractors had earlier subjected KSM to the waterboard and other CIA
enhanced interrogation techniques. The decision to send the contract psychologists to
DETENTION SITE BLUE prompted an OMS psychologist to write to OMS leadership that

Interview of

by [REDACTE^^n^^DACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, April

3, 2003. Febniaiy 21, 2003, interview report,
Office of the Inspector General. Hanunond
DUNBAR told the Office of Inspector General that there was "intiigue" between the RDG and him and SWIGERT,
and "there were emails coming to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] that questioned [his] and [SWIGERT]'s
qualifications." See Interview of Hammond DUNBAR, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the

Inspector GeneraljFebruary4^^
Email from:

to:

cc:^^^

mm, IIIIII^^^HiHB^lHll^^Hrsubje^Re: ^||RDGTa^ng for IC Psychologists
[DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT]; date: June 20, 2003, at 5:23:29 PWrji^^^HOMS expressed concern that "no
professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR|sUatmudgiTient^^sycho^

assess^ the

subjects of their enhanced measures." (See email from:

cc:

;subject: Re:f^|RDG

Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20,2003, at 2:19:53 PM.) Tlie CIA's June 2013
Response states that CIA "Headquarters established CTC's Renditions and Detentions Group CTC/RDG as the
responsible entity for all CIA detention and interrogation sites in December2002, removing any latent institutional
confusion."

Interview ofHmmiH, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General,
February 21, 2003. The chief of interrogations,
told the Inspector General that the waterboard was
overused with Abu Zubaydah and KSM and was ineffective in tlie interrogations of KSM. (See Interview of

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ofthe Office ofthe Inspector General, Marcl^, 2003.) One doctor
involved in CIA interrogations using the waterboard intenogation technique stated that ||^^| "has ahuge bias
against the waterboard b/c he's not approved to use it. Tlie reverse is tm^nh^ontrac^^guy^SWIGER^and
DUNBAR] who have a vested interest in favor ofit." See email from: ||||||||||||||^||||||||||||||m.

cc: [REDACTED]; subject: re: More; date^prim^003, at 08:11:07 AM.
March 10, 2003, interview report of

Office ofthe Inspector General. Interview ofHIH

n,by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 27, 2003. Interview
of

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. March

24, 2003, interview report of

DIRECTOR ••11 (301835Z JAN 03)

327

Office of tlie Inspector General.

12168 (301822Z JUN 03)

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"[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as

interrogators will always be suspect."^-^

then informed the management of

the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and

DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced
measures."
At the end of theirdeployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided

their assessment of KSM and recommended thathe should be evaluated on a monthly basis by
"an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and
"remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating."-^^^ In his
response to the draft Inspector General Special Review,

noted that "OMS

concerns about conflict of interest... were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the
same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ,judged both its
effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique - at
a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not
use the technique."^^'
D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

7. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Levelof
Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques

'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,^^- assessed by the CIA to be an alQa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS
Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United

Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002.-^^-^ He provided information while in the custody of a
foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf,^^"^ and was then rendered by the
The email, whichexpressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere withon-site psychologists,
stated that, "[a]lthough these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and

responsibilitie^efor^h^-arroganc^n^iarc^isi^volv^ntounpro^

from:

to:

contlic^ the field." See email

subject: ^i|||RDG

Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM.
Email from:

to:

I; subject: Re:

SWIGER^ate: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.

Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBARand

12168(301822ZJUN 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "In practice, by April 2003, [CIA]
staff psychologists had taken over almost all of the provisions of support to the RDI program. As it concerned
[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because
they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated"
(emphasis added). The CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and
DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they had interrogated.

Memorandum for Inspe^r General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from

[REDACTED], M.D., |||||||||Medical Services

•

re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and

Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13.
For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III.

333 alec^M"
See i^H36595

11357 (021242ZDEC^^^B36710|
36726

For disseminated intelligence, see

alec

lA

For other reportini

from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see

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CIA to DETENTION SITE COBALT inCountry | on November 2002, where he was held
for H days before being transferred to DETENTION SITE GREEN on November 2002.*^^^
At DETENTION SITE GREEN, al-Nashiri was interrogated using the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, including being subjected to the waterboard at least three times.In
December 2002, when DETENTION SITE GREEN was closed, al-Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah
were rendered to DETENTION SITE BLUE.^^^

(T8^^H|||||mi||||||/^NF) In total, al-Nashiri was subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques during at least four separate periods, with each period typically ending

with an assessment from on-site interrogators that al-Nashiri was compliant and cooperative.^^^

Officers atCIAHeadquai^ disagreed with these assessments, with the deputy chief ofALEC
Station,
commenting that DETENTION SITE BLUE interrogators should
not make "sweeping statements" in cable traffic regarding al-Nashiri's compliance.Officers
at CIA Headquarters sought to reinstate the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
based on their belief that al-Nashiri had not yet provided actionable intelligence on imminent
attacks.

Shortly after al-Nashiri arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE, CIA
interrogators at the detention site judged al-Nashiri's cooperation and compliance by his
engagement and willingness to answer questions, while CIA Headquarters personnel judged his
compliance based on the specific actionable intelligence he had provided (or the lack thereof).
For example, in December 2002, interrogators informed CIA Headquarters that al-Nashiri was
"cooperative and truthful," and that the "consensus" at the detention site was that al-Nashiri was

70866

For disseminated intelligence, see

70870

29768 (^^HNOV02);

335

See, for example, m|||^^|ll24^^|^^k|NOV 02); |
11263
NOV02)[M|^|Ti270^^H|NOV02)
11294 HI^MnOV^^••^^^^3
02); ••^•iJ352|^Hd^02)~^HH
11359
NO:V02)[^^Bi 11344^H|PI NOV 02).

[NOV 02)
1NOV 02); I
112841
INOV 02);
111322
NOV
|NOV 02); I
1113221
IDEC 02); I

11243 (I

112581

78275 (M^HdEC 02)

Al-Nashiri's time at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records. As described

elsewhere, standard operating procedure at COBALT at the time included total light deprivation, loud continuous
music, isolation, and dietary manipulation. Based on CIA records, the other four "enhanced interrogation" periods
of al-Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December5-8, 2002; December 27, 2002 - January 1,

2003; January 9-10, 2003; and January 15-27, 2003. See•••l^O

(211733Z DEC 02)^^^^Bi0140 (q31727ZJAf^rALi^^

339 Email from:

to: •••M,

(111541Z DEC 02);

(191729Z JAN 03).

10078

[REDACTED]; cc;

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] follow-up; date: December 15,

2002.

See, for example, ALEC]||H(072315Z DEC 02); ALEC

(130352Z DEC 02); ALEC Jjj^l

(180247Z DEC 02); ALEC HBI(191729Z JAN 03); CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation:
Unauthorized Interrogation Tecliniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003. See
also CIA Office of InspectorGeneral report, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September

2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), released on May 7, 2004.
1(11

I (III I

IKIII III 11

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"a compliant detainee" who was not "withholding important thi'eat information."^'^^ Officers
from the CIA's ALEC Station at CL\ Headquarters responded:
"it is inconceivable to us that al-Nashiri cannot provide us concrete leads....
When we are able to capture other terrorists based on his leads and to thwart
future plots based on his reporting, we will have much more confidence that he
is, indeed, genuinely cooperative on some level."^"^^
Later, after multiple follow-up debriefings, DETENTION SITE

BLUE officers again wrote that they had "reluctantly concluded" that al-Nashiri was providing
"logical and rational explanations" to questions provided by CIA Headquarters and therefore
they recommended "against resuming enhanced measures" unless ALEC Station had evidence
al-Nashiri was lying.^"^^ A cable from the detention site stated:
"without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding, however, we
believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show
[al-Nashiri] that he will be punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding
any remaining desire to continue cooperating.... [The] bottom line is that we
think [al-Nashiri] is being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and
prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance he will either fold up and
cease cooperation, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by
the statute. Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must be

grounded in fact and not general feelings."^"^
2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations;
Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill
After the DETENTION SITE BLUE chief of Base sent two

interrogators back to the United States because of "prolonged absences from family" and the

"facUha^nhan^d measures are no longer required for al-Nashiri," CIA Headquarters sent

lllimillll^^HI [CIA OFFICER 2], aCIA

officer who had not been trained or qualified

as an interrogator, to DETENTION SITE BLUE to question and assess al-Nashiri.

3^2 alec

10030 (111541Z DEC 02)
(180247Z DEC 02)
10085 (230906Z DEC 02)
10085 (230906Z DEC 02)

10040 (122122Z DEC02^rior to

[CIA OFFICER 2's] deployment, CIA records

included numerous concerns about |BHH [CIA OFFICER 2's] anger management,
information on BHH [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CIA personnel in the
program with similar alarming issues in their background, see Vohime III. The CIA's June 2013 Response states

that: "I
some of the |

officers mentioned in the S t u d y — h a v e been

exclude^^Tiucl^^hed^^

information was not in fact available to senior managers making assignments |
" Notwithstandin^h^IA's June 2013 assertion, as detailed in Volume III, senior

managers were aware of concerns related toH|^^H[CIA0FFICER2]priOT to his deployment.
I Ml' Ml II || I

I K 111 III! I

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In late December 2002, following a meeting at CIA Headquarters

to discuss resuming the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri,

the chief of RDG^"^^—^theentimhat managed the CIA's Detention and

InteiTogation Program—objected to sending l^lHi

OFFICER 2]tothed^ntion site

because he "had not been through the interrogation training" and because

"had

heard from some colleagues that [|H^H[C1A0FFICER 2]] was too confident, had a
temper, and had some securityjssues7^_^^^B^^B later learned from other CIA officials that
"[CTC chief of operations

OFFICER 2]] at

[DETENTION SITE BLUE] over the holidays." HIHHtoldtiie Office of Inspector
General that "his assessment is that the Agency management felt that the [RDG] interrogators

were being too lenient with al-Nashiri and that lUlBl [CIA OFFICER 2]] was sent to
[DETENTION SITE BLUE] to 'fix' the situation.

BLUE on December

[CL\ OFFICER 2] anived at DETENTION SITE
2002, and the CIA resumed the use of its enhanced interrogation

techniques on al-Nashiri shortly thereafter, despite the fact tiiat

[CIA OFFICER 2]

had not been trained, certified, or approved to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
[CIA OFFICER 2] wrote in a cable to CIA Headquarters that "[al]-Nashiri responds
well to harsh treatment" and suggested that the interrogators continue to administer "various
degrees of mild punishment," but still allow for "a small degree of 'hope,' by introducing some
'minute rewards.

//NF) It was later learned that during these interrogation sessions,
[CIA OFFICER 2], with the permission and participation of the DETENTION SITE

BLUE chief ofBase, who also had not been trained and qualified as an intemjgato^sed a series
of unauthorized interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri. For example,
OFFICER 2] placed al-Nashiri in a "standing stress position" with "his hands affixed over his

head" for approximately two and ahalfdays^^^M^ater, during the course of al-Nashiri's
debriefings, while he was blindfolded, |H|||||[|H [CIA OFFICER 2] placed apistol near alNashiri's head and operated a cordless drill near al-Nashiri's body.^^^ Al-Nashiri did notprovide

any additional threat information during, or after, these interrogations.^^^
As described, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also refened to as the "Renditions Group," the
"Rendition, Detention, and Intenogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records.
Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes,
February 23, 2003.

IBB 10140 (031727Z JAN 03)
email from:

subject: EYES ONLY - [HHBHH] ONLY

- MEMORANDUM FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22,2003. In an April 12, 2007, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence hearing. Senator Carl Levin asked the CIA Directorif the CIA disputed allegations in an International
Committee of the Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[pjrolonged stress standing

position, naked, arm[s] chained above the head...."The CIADirector responded, "Not above the head. Stress
positionsare part of the EITs, and nakedness were part of the EITs,Senator." See Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Hearing Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
See, for example, CIA Office of Inspector General, Reportof Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation
Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003; email from: [DETENTION SITE

BLUE] COB

to:

subject: EYES ONLY - [••BHll

MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.
For additional details, see Volume III.
Mil
M III I

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Based on a report from CTC, the CIA Office of Inspector General
conducted a review of these interrogation incidents, and issued a report of investigation in the

fall of 2003.^^^ The Office ofInspector General later described additional allegations of
unauthorized techniques used against al-Nashiri by

[CIA OFFICER 2] and other

interrogators, including slapping al-Nashiri multiple times on the back of the head during
inten'ogations; implying that his mother would be brought before him and sexually abused;
blowing cigar smoke in al-Nashiri's face; giving al-Nashiri a forced bath using a stiff brush; and
using improvised stress positions that caused cuts and bruises resulting in the intervention of a
medical officer, who was concerned that al-Nashiri's shoulders would be dislocated using the

stress positions.^^^ When interviewed by the Office of Inspector General, the DETENTION
SITE BLUE chief ofBas^t^d he did not object to using the gun and drill in the interrogations
because he believed
[CIA OFFICER 2] was sent from CIA Headquarters "to resolve
the matter of al-Nashiri's cooperation" and that he believed
[CIA OFFICER 2] had
permission to use the interrogation techniques.^^'^ The chief of Base added that his own on-site
approval was based on this and "the pressure he felt from Headquarters to obtain imminent threat

information from al-Nashiri on 9/11-style attacks.In April 2004, m | | | | [CIA OFFICER
2] and the chief of Base were disciplined.^^^
3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional
Techniques Might "Push [Al-Nashiri] Over TheEdge Psychologically, " Refers to the
CIA Program As a "Train Wreak[sic] Waiting to Happen "

CIA Office of InspectorGeneral, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.

CIA Officeof Inspector General, Special Review - Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program,
(2003-7123-IG), May 2004.

CIA Officeof Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.

CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unautliorized InteiTogation Techniques at
[DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29,2003.

[CIA OFFICER 2] received a one-year Letter of Reprimand, was suspended for five days without pay,
and wasprohibited from promotions, within-grade step increases, quality step increases, or permanent salary

increases during that one-year period. The decision did not affect IHHH [CIA OFFICER 2's] eligibility to
receive
Exceptional Performance Awards, bon^^^^^^M^^to^^MT|^^^^g^ition. See\
CIA OFFICER 2] retired from the CIA on

June 20, 2005, the CIAdirector of transnational issues, aware of

2004. {See
I.) On

[CIA OFFICER 2's] problematic

background, approved
[CIA OFFICER 2's] employment on a CIA contract because the project was
"mission critical" and "no other contractorwith the needed skills was available.'
The chief of Base received a two-year Letter of

Reprimand and a ten-day suspension without pay,and was prohibited from receiving any bonus awards from the
2003,prior to the implementation of theprohibitions, this
CIA duringthe periodof reprimand. On
individual retired from the CIA. See \

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On January
2003, CIA contractor DUNBAR arrived at
DETENTION SITE BLUE to conduct a "Psychological Interrogation Assessment" to judge alNashiri's suitability for the additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and
develop recommendations for his interrogation. The resulting interrogation plan proposed that
the interrogators would have the "latitude to use the full range of enhanced exploitation and

interrogation measures," adding that "the use of the water board would require additional support
from" fellow CIA contractor Grayson SWIGERT. According to the interrogation plan, once the
interrogators had eliminated al-Nashiri's "sense of control and predictability" and established a
"desired level of helplessness," they would reduce the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation

techniques and transition to a debriefing phase once again.^^^

(T!S^|H||H^^^^^^JF)After receiving the proposed interrogation plan for al-Nashiri on
January2l720037^HHBBB' CIA's chief of interrogations—whose presence had

previously prompted al-Nashiri to tremble in fear^^"^—emailed CIA colleagues to notify them that

he had "informed the front office of CTC" that he would "no longer be associated in any way

with the interrogation progi'am due to serious reservation[s] [he had]abo^he current state of
affairs" and would instead be "retiring shortly." In the same email,

wrote, "[t]his is a

train wreak [sic] waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell offthe train before it happens."^^^
HH drafted a cable for CIA Headquarters to send to DETENTION SITE BLUE raising a
number of concerns that he, the chief of interrogations, believed should be "entered for the
record." The CIA Headquarters cable—which does not appear to have been disseminated to
DETENTION SITE BLUE—included the foUowing:

"we have serious reservations with the continued use of enhanced techniques
with [al-Nashiri] and its long term impact on him. [Al-Nashiri] has been held

for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally. It
is the assessment of the prior inteiTOgators that [al-Nashiri] has been mainly
truthful and is not withholding significant information. To continue to use
enhanced technique[s] without clear indications that he [is] withholding
important info is excessive and may cause him to cease cooperation on any
level. [Al-Nashiri] may come to the conclusion that whether he cooperates or
not, he will continually be subjected to enhanced techniques, therefore, what is

the incentive for continued cooperation. Also, both C/CTC/R^^hief ofCTC

RDG

and HVT Inter^ator [|^H^^H] who

departed [DETENTION SITE BLUE] in J[(january, believe continued

enhanced methods may push [al-Nashiri] over the edge psychologically."^^®

102671
According to a December 12, 2002, CIA cable, al-Nashiri "visibly and markedly trembles with fear every time he
sees

10038 (122119Z DEC 02).

Email from:

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: date: January 22, 2003.

Despite this notificationT^^HI^^Bdid not imr^diately resign from the interrogation program.
Email from:

[REDACTED], |

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subiect^CON^NS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR
NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. |BH[iiH> referenced in the passage as a"HVT Interrogator," was tlie chief
of interrogations.
Kll

I 1 III I

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The draft cable from

also raised "conflict of

responsibility" concerns, stating:

"Another area of concern is the use of the psychologist as an interrogator. The
role of the ops psychologist is to be a detached observer and serve as a check
on the interrogator to prevent the interrogator from any unintentional excess of

pressure which might cause permanent psychologicalharm to the subject. The
medical officer is on hand to provide the same protection from physical actions
that might harm the subject. Therefore, the medical officer and the
psychologist should not serve as an interrogator, which is a conflict of

responsibility. We note that [th^ropose^lan] contains a psychological
interrogation assessment by
psychologist [DUNBAR] which
is to be carried out by interrogator [DUNBAR]. We have a problem with him
conducting both roles simultaneously."^^'
Rather than releasing the cable that was drafted by
CIA
Headquarters approved a plan to reinstitute the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against al-Nashiri, beginning with shaving him, removing his clothing, and placing
him in a standing sleep deprivation position with his aims affixed over his head.^^^ CIA cables
describing subsequent interrogations indicate that al-Nashiri was nude and, at times, "put in the

standing position, handcuffed and shackled."^^^ According to cables, CIA interrogators decided
to provide al-Nashiri clothes to "hopefully stabilize his physiological symptoms and prevent

them from deteriorating,"^^ noting in a cable the next day that al-Nashiri was suffering from a
head cold which caused his body to shake for approximately ten minutes during an
interrogation. 365
Beginning in June 2003, the CIA transferred al-Nashiri to five

different CIA detention facilities before he was transferred to U.S. military custody on

September 5, 2006.^^^ In the interim, he was diagnosed by some CIA psychologists as having
"anxiety" and "major depressive" disorder,^^^ while others found no symptoms of either
illness.He was a difficult and uncooperative detainee and engaged in repeated belligerent
acts, including attempts to assault CIA detention site personnel and efforts to damage items in his
Email fiom:

to:

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CONCERNS OVER REVISED INTERROGATION PLAN FOR
NASHIRI; date: January 22, 2003. As noted above, personnel from CIA's Office of Medical Services raised the
same concerns about medical and psychological personnel serving both to assess the health of a detainee and to

participate in the interrogation process.
3^2 director

(201659Z JAN 03 DIRECTOR ••

(230008Z JAN 03)

10289 (241203Z JAN 03);
10296 (251U3Z JAN 03),
10306 (261403Z JAN 03)
10309 (261403Z JAN 03)
10312 (270854Z JAN 03)
HEADQUARTERS ~^*(031945Z SEP 06);
1242 (050744Z SEP 06); HEADQUARTERS
(051613Z SEP 06)
See, for example,
11247 (14132IZ APR 03);
1959(111700ZDEC04);
2038
2169 (251133Z MAR 05);
11701 (191640ZMAY 03);
1756 (190800Z SEP 03).
(021841Z AUG 04); •••
2709 (271517Z APR 06);
3910 (241852Z JAN 06);
(271517Z APR 06)
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Over a period of years, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff of drugging or poisoning his

food, and complained of bodily pain and insomnia.^^^ At one point, al-Nashiri launched a short
lived hunger strike that resulted in the CIA force feeding him rectally.^^^
October 2004, 21 months after the final documented use of the

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract
interrogator DUNBAR and another CIA interrogator concluded that al-Nashiri provided
"essentially no actionable information," and that "the probability that he has much more to
contribute is low."^^^ Over the course of al-Nashiri's detention and interrogation by the CIA, the
CIA disseminated 145 intelligence reports based on his debriefings. Al-Nashiri provided
information on past operational plotting, associates whom he expected to participate in plots,
details on completed operations, and background on al-Qa'ida's structure and methods of

operation.^^^ Al-Nashiii did notprovide the information that the CIA's ALEC Station sought
and believed al-Nashiri possessed, specifically "perishable threat information to help [CIA]

thwart future attacks and capture additional operatives."-^^'^

E. Tensions with Country | Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival ofNew
Detainees

//NE) According to CIA records, three weeks after|

(TS//

and political leadership ofCountry | agreed to host a CIA detention facility, the CIA
informed the U.S. ambassador, because, as was noted in a cable, by not doing so, the CIA was

See, for example,
(111600ZAUG 04);
(291750Z JUN 06);

1142 (041358Z AUG 06);
3051 (301235Z SEP 05);
2673 (02145IZ AUG 05);

1029 (291750Z JUN 06);
1716(180742ZSEP 04);
2474 (251622Z JUN 05);

1716(180742Z SEPO^
See, for example,

1959(111700Z DEC 04); |

1880 (140917Z NOV 04);

1356 (011644ZJUL04);
1962 (121029Z DEC 04);

2038 (211558Z JAN 05);

1266 (052309Z JAN 04); •[^••H^^m63T(271^0Z

1959 (111700ZDEC04);

1091 (031835Z NOV 03);

MAR 04).

1203 (231709ZMAY04)r|HHH 1^02(231644Z MAY 04)

3^2

1343 (271356Z Od 04). in the final years of al-Nashiri's detention, most of the intelligence

requirements for al-Nashiri involved showingal-Nashiriphotographs. In June 2005, the DETENTION SITE
BLACK cliief of Base suspended even these debriefings because it was "the very, very rare moment" that al-Nashiri
wouldrecognize a photogi*aph, and because the debriefings often were the "catalyst" for his outbursts. See

j^ml 2474 (251622Z JUN 05).

While still in the custody of a foreign government, prior to liis rendition to CIA custody, al-Nasliiri provided
details on multiple terrorist plots in which he was involved prior to his detention, including the attacks against the
USS Cole and the MVLimburg, plans to sink oil tankers in the Strait of Honnuz, plans to attack warships docked at
ports in Dubai and Jeddah, and his casing of a Dubai amusement park. This information was disseminatedin
36726

36595

intelli

For disseminated intelligence, see

ia[
ja|

custod

of a foreisn ;overnment, see

For other re

70879_^^^
70870

from al-Nashiri while he was in the

70866
. For disseminated

intelligence, see
374 ALEC

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"risking that he hear of this initiative" from Country | officials.^^^ As was the case inother host

countries, the ambassador in Country | was told by the CIA not to speak with any other State
Department official about the arrangement,^^^
of the CIA detention facility in Country

|CTC Legal,

^

warned of possible legal actions against CIA

employees in countries that "take a different view of the detention and interrogation practices

employed by [th^I^V^^^I^lirthe^^commendedagain^^

CIA facilities

in countries that

378

advice was not heeded and, in December 2002, the two individuals then being

detained by the CIA in Country | (Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) were
transferred to Country

The agreement to host a CIA detention facility in Country [

crea^ multiple, ongoing difficulties between Country | and the CIA. Country |'s||t||

mm proposed a written "Memorandum ofUnderstanding" covering the relative roles and
responsibilities of the CIA and

Fou^TTonthsaftCT

which the CIA ultimately refused to sign.^®^®

site began hosting CIA detainees. Country | rejected the transfer

of

which included Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. The decision was

reversed only after the U.S. ambassador intervened with the political leadership ofCountry | on

th^CIA|^chal^^ The following montlMh^CI^^ovided $| million to CountryB's
which

officials,

for

Country | political leadership, indicated that Country | was now flexible with regard to the
number of CIA detainees at the facility and when the facility would eventually be closed.^^^ The
facility, which was described^ the CIA as "over capacity," was nonetheless closed, as had been
previously agreed, in
[the fall of] 2003.^^'^

|//NP) According to CIA cables, years later,
reacted with "deep shock and regret'

officials in

was

[[Country |] officials were "extremely upset"^^^ at the
CIA's inability to keep secrets and were "deeply disappointed" in not having had more warning

3" [REDACTED] 84200
DIRECTOR

3"•••

10640j

The CIA insisted

be redacted in the CommitteeStudy prior to the Study

beinerelocatedtothe U.S. Senate from the off-site research facility.

78275^^^1 DEC 02)

[REDACTED] 1888 ["
[REDACTED] 2666J

3^2 HEADQUARTERS

[REDACTED] 3280

According to the cable, the CIA Station speculatedthat the change of

position was "at least somewhat attribut£ible... toour gift of$H million...."
See Volume I for additional details.

[REDACTED] 7526 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])

[REDACTED] 7849 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]^^^^^^^^^
11II

MUM

IIIIM UN I

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of President Bush's September 200^ubli^cknowledgmen^nh^IA program.^^^ The CIA
Station, for its part, described the

^ "serious blow*' to the

bilateral relationship.^^^
F. The Detention and InteiTogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior
to Rendition to CIA Custody
September 15, 2001, Ramzi bin al-Shibh was assessed
by the CIA to be a facilitator for the September 11, 2001, attacksand an associate of the 9/11

hijackers.^^^ While targeting another terrorist, Hassan Ghul, Hjj^l Pakistani officials

unexpectedly captured bin al-Shibh during raids in Pakistan on Septemberll^2002.^^® On
September |||, 2002, bin al-Shibh was rendered to aforeign government,
Approximately five months later, on February |, 2003, bin al-Shibh was rendered from the

custody of

to CIA custody, becoming the 41®' CIA detainee.^^^

As with Abu Zubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, personnel at
CIA Headquarters- -often in ALEC Station—overestimated the information bin al-Shibh would
have access to within al-Qa'ida, writing that bin al-Shibh "likely has critical information on

upcoming attacks and locations of senior al-Qa'ida operatives."^^^ Later, after bin al-Shibh was
interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for an estimated 34 days, the
CIA's ALEC Station concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida and was

not in a position to know details about al-Qa'ida's plans for future attacks.In another parallel,
officers at CIA Headquarters requested and directed the continued use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against bin al-Shibh when CIA detention site personnel recommended

ending such measures.^^^

38'' [REDACTED] 9210 (231043Z SEP 06)
388 [REDACTED] 7839 ([REDACTED]). Email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: BOMBSHELL;
date: [REDACTED]. Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: CIA Prisons in

[Country ll; date: [REDACTED]. EmaU from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: I think

389 alec
390 ALEC

|] had to react [REDACTED],

date: [REDACTED].

(222334Z SEP 01); ^^192^ (15SEP 01)
(292345Z AUG 02)'ALEclm (lUSSlZ SEP 02). Tlie CIA represented to policymakers

and others—inaccurately—tliat "as a result of the use of EITs" Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin
al-Shibh that played a "key role in the ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh." See section of this summary on the
"Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh" and Volume II for additional details.

See

225081
See also

10406

20744

22694

2695
10407

393 ALEC

(130206ZSEP 02 ALEC

(222334Z SEP 01); |

92557 (15SEP01); ALEC

(270132Z JUL 02);
97470 (281317Z MAR 02)
394 alec
(302240Z JUN 05)
395 ALEC
(131444ZFEB 03)

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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was initially interrogated by a foreign

government,^^^ While officers at CIA Headquarters were dissatisfied with the intelligence
production from his five months of detention in foreign governmentcustody, CIA officers in that
country were satisfied with bin al-Shibh's reporting.^^^ Those CIA officers wrote that bin alShibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including
information on potential fiiture threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow

Airport an^^Nashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula. The CIA
officers

[in-country] also noted that they found bin al-Shibh's information to be generally

accurate and that they "found few cases wherehe^enly/clearly misstated facts.In a cable
to CIA Headquarters, the CIA officers in IHHH
country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was
being held] concluded, "overall, he provided what was needed." The same cable stated that bin

al-Shibh's interrogation was similar to other interrogations they had participated in, and that the
most effective interrogation tool was having information available to confront him when he tried

to mislead or provide incomplete information.^^^ Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in
2005 that the most significantintelligence derived from bin al-Shibh was obtained during his
detention in foreign government custody, which was prior to his rendition to CIA custody and
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation technique

2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and
Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Templatefor Future Detainees
Despite the aforementioned assessments from CIA officers in

conce^ng bin al-Shibh's cooperation, officers atCIA Headquarters decided the CIA
should obtain m custody ofbin al-Shibh and render him to DETENTION SITE BLUE in
Country
On February |, 2003, in anticipationofbinal-Shi^ arrival, inten-ogators at the
detention site, led by the CIA's chief interrogator,

prepared an interrogation plan

for bin al-Shibh.'^®^ The plan became a template, and subsequent requests to CIA Headquarters
to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against other detainees relied upon near

identical language."^^^

ALEC ^^B(111551ZSEP02)

DIRE^^OR^^H

DEC 02)

22888 (240845Z FEB 03)
22888 (240845Z FEB 03)

According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the "mostsignificant" reporting from Ramzibin al-Shibh on potential
future attacks was background information related to al-Qa'ida's plans to attack Heathrow Airport. According to the
CIA, Ramzi bin al-Shibhprovided "useful intelligence," including an "overview of the plot" that was then used in

400

the interrogation of other detainees. {See ALEC HlHI (302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided the
majority ofthis information in mid-October 2002, while in foreign government custody. See CIA f
10406

. See also

22694

22695

10407

' 02
10361
^°^nii^ncluded Khaled Shaykh Mohammed (^H||^Hl065^030904Z MAR 03)); Hambali I

Yasir al-Jaza'iri (||H^^Hl0990j||^^^^HH||||B Abd al-Latif alBarql^^^Hl2348 •^•il^^AjHambaliandujlie^^^HII^HHIHl^^ (132049Z AUG
Kll

M III I '

I

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The interrogation plan proposed that immediately following the
psychological and medical assessments conducted upon his arrival, bin al-Shibh would be

subjected to "sensory dislocation.'"^^ The proposed sensory dislocation included shaving bin alShibh's head and face, exposing him to loud noise in a white room with white lights, keeping
him "unclothed and subjected to uncomfortably cool temperatures," and shackling him "hand
and foot with arms outstretched over his head (with his feet firmly on the floor and not allowed

to support his weight with his arms).'""^'' Contrary to CIA representations made later to the
Committee that detainees were always offered the opportunity to cooperate before being
subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the plan stated that bin al-Shibh would
be shackled nude with his arms overhead in a cold room prior to any discussion with

interrogators or any assessment of his level of cooperation."^*^^ According to a cable, only after
the interrogators determined that his "initial resistance level [had] been diminished by the

conditions" would the questioning and interrogation phase begin."^^^
The interrogation phase described in the plan included near
constant interrogations, as well as continued sensory deprivation, a liquid diet, and sleep
deprivation. In addition, the interrogation plan stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques would be used, including the "attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial
slap... the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep
deprivation beyond 72 hours, and the waterboard, as appropriate to [bin al-Shibh's] level of
resistance.

»»408

Based on versions of this interrogation plan, at least six detainees
were stripped and shackled nude, placed in the standing position for sleep deprivation, or
subjected to other CIA enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an

inteiTogator in 2003."^®^ Five of these detainees were shackled naked in the standing position
with their hands above their head immediately after their medical check.'^^® These interrogation

; Hassan Ghiil (

1267
and AL-TURKI

JAN 04)); Adnan al-Libi
2179

10361
10361

See Volume 11 for detailed information on CIA representations to

10361

Congress.
10361

10361
This included AsaduUaMDIRECTOR

03);

135558

FE|^3))^bi^fasi^Wa^'iri

mar03)); Suleiman Abdullali•^•^^^^^^•35787^^H|MAR

Abu Hudhaifa^HiHHIiH^H^^'7<^

\M^ 03)); Hambali^Hljl^^^^^^lmin^

AUG 03)); and Majid Khan

146471 (241242rMAY03rHHHHHHH39077 (271719ZMAY03)).

For additional infonnation, see Volume III. In an April 12,2007, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
hearing, Senator Levin asked the CIA Director if the CIA disputed allegations in an International Committee of the
Red Cross report that suggested CIA detainees were placed in "[p]rolonged stress standing position, naked, arm[s]
chained above the head..." The CIA Director responded, "Not above the head. Stress positions are part of the EITs,
and nakedness were part of tlie EITs, Senator." Senate Select Committee on InteUigence, Hearing Transcript, dated
April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
I III

11 III I

I III! I III 11

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plans typically made no reference to the information the interrogators sought and why the
detainee was believed to possess the information."*^'

3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Was
Cooperative

When CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE BLUE assessed

that bin al-Shibh was cooperative and did not have additional knowledge of future attacks,
CIA Headquarters disagreed and instructed the interrogators to continue using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques, which failed to elicit the information sought by CIA

Headquarters.'*^^ On February 11, 2003, interrogators asked CIA Headquarters for questions that
ALEC Station was "85 percentcertain [bin al-Shibh ] will be able to answer," in order to verify
bin al-Shibh's level of cooperation.'*^'* The interrogators stated that information from Abu
Zubaydah and al-Nashiri suggested that bin al-Shibh would not have been given a new
assignment or trusted with significant information given his high-profile links to the September

11, 2001, attacks."*^^ They further stated that bin al-Shibh had "achieved substantial notoriety
after 11 September," but was still unproven in al-Qa'ida circles and may have "been privy to
information more as a bystander than as an active participant."'*^^
The CIA's ALEC Station disagreed with the assessment of the

detention site personnel, responding that it did not believe the portrayals of bin al-Shibh offered
by Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were accurate and that CIA Headquarters assessed that bin alShibh must have actionable information due to his proximity to KSM and CIA Headquarters'
belief that bin al-Shibh had a history of withholding information from interrogators. ALEC
Station wrote:

"As base [DETENTION SITE BLUE] is well aware, Ramzi had long
been deliberately withholding and/or providing misleading information to
his interrogators in [a foreign government].... From our optic, it is
imperative to focus Ramzi exclusively on two issues: 1) What are the
next attacks planned for the US and 2) Who and where are the operatives
inside the United States.'"*'^

' See Volume Til for additional information.

-"2 ||[^^H^52 (121723Z FEB 03)
-•'3

(131444Z FEB 03)

|^^^BHfl0446 (1 li754Z FEB 03). The Committee was informed that the CIA's standard practice during
coercive interrogations was to ask questions to whichinteiTogators alreadyknew the answers in order to assess the
detainee's level of cooperation. Hie Committee was further informedthat only after detainees were assessedto be
cooperative did inteiTogators askquestions whose answers were unknown to the CIA. See, for example, Transcript

ofSSCni^ng, April 12, 2007 (testimony of CIA Director Michael Hayden) (DTS #2007-3158).

HH 10452 (121723Z FEB 03). In June 2002, Ramzi bin al-Shibl^^icipated with KSM in an interview
(112136Z SEP 02).
'»'®^^^^0452 (121723Z FEB 03)
with the al-Jazeera television network on the 9/11 attacks. DIRECTOR

ALEC^IH (131444Z FEB 03). Contrary to the statement in the CIA cable, as described, CIA officers in the

country where Ramzi bin al-Shibh was held prior to being rendered to CIA custody wrote that Rainzi bin al-Shibh
had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential
Kir 'iM III' I i i k i m u m i

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The ALEC Station cable stated that bin al-Shibh had ''spent
extensive time with [KSM]," and "must have heard discussions of other targets." The cable

added that "HQS strongly believes that Binalshibh was involved in efforts on behalf of KSM to
identify and place operatives in the West." The February 13, 2003, cable concluded:
"We think Binalshibh is uniquely positioned to give us much needed
critical information to help us thwart large-scale attacks inside the United
States, and we want to do our utmost to get it as soon as possible. Good
luck."4i8
CIA officers at DETENTION SITE BLUE therefore continued to

use the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques against bin al-Shibh for approximately three
additional weeks after this exchange, including sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation,

facial holds, attention grasps, abdominal slaps, facial slaps, and walling.'^^^ Bin al-Shibh did not
provide the information sought on "operatives inside the United States" or "large-scale attacks
inside the United States.""^^^

4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody ofa Foreign
Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the
CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir"
and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain

CIA records indicate that the CIA interrogators at DETENTION

SITE BLUE questioning Ramzi bin al-Shibh were unaware ofthe intelUgencebh^l^^
)reviouslv provided in foreign government custody, even though
and the intelligence from those interrogations had been disseminated by
the CIA. On multiple occasions, personnel at the detention site drafted intelligence reports that
contained information previously disseminated from interrogations of bin al-Shibh while he was
in foreign government custody, under the faulty understanding that bin al-Shibh was providing
new information."^^^

future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow aiiport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential
operations in tlie Arabian Peninsula. The
CIA officers in that country also noted that tliey found Ramzi bin
al-Sliibh's information to be ceneralW accurate, and that they "found few cases where he openly^learly misstated
facts." The CIA officers in

concluded, "overall, [Ramzi bin al-Shibh] provided what was needed." See

22888 (240845Z FEB 03).

ALEC M

(131444Z FEB 03)

See, for example, •••

10525 (200840Z FEB 03) and I^Hi 10573 (241143Z FEB 03). For further

detail, see the detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume III.

See detainee review of Ramzi bin al-Shibh in Volume IE for additional information.

See, for example, CIA |

[^Siyjll^l^^^^^BCdescribing the foreign government's interrogators' "plan
to ask Binalshibh toclarify his statements that Mohamed Atta, Marwan el-Shehhi, andZiadJ^ah could not agree

on the wisdom of targetincnuclea^cilitieO^^H^^Bl0568(23^
•; CIA

CIA
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Ramzi bin al-Shibh was subjected to interrogation techniques and

conditions of confinement that were not approved by CIA Headquarters. CIA inten-ogators used
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for behavior adjustment purposes, in response to
perceived disrespect, and on several occasions, before bin al-Shibh had an opportunity to
respond to an inten'ogator's questions or before a question was asked. The CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques were applied when bin al-Shibh failed to address an interrogator as
"sir," when inteiTogators noted bin al-Shibh had a "blank stare" on his face, and when bin al-

Shibh complained of stomach pain.'^^^ Further, despite CIA policy at the time to keep detainees
under constant light for security purposes, bin al-Shibh was kept in total darkness to heighten his
sense of fear."^^^

CIA psychological assessments of bin al-Shibh were slow to

recognize the onset of psychological problems brought about, according to later CIA
assessments, by bin al-Shibh's long-term social isolation and his anxiety that the CIA would
return to using its enhanced inten"ogation techniques against him. The symptoms included

visions, paranoia, insomnia, and attempts at self-harm."^^"^ In April 2005, a CIA psychologist
stated that bin al-Shibh "has remained in social isolation" for as long as two and half years and
the isolation was having a "clear and escalating effect on his psychological functioning." The
officer continued, "in [bin al-Shibh's] case, it is important to keep in mind that he was previously
a relatively high-functioning individual, making his deterioration over the past several months

more alarming.'"^^^ The psychologist wrote, "significant alterations to RBS'[s] detention
environment must occur soon to prevent further and more serious psychological disturbance.
On September 5, 2006, bin al-Shibh was transferred to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba."^^^ After his arrival, bin al-Shibh was placed on anti-psychotic medications.'^"'^
The CIA disseminated 109 intelligence reports from the CIA

interrogations of Ramzi bin al-Shibh."^^^ ACIA assessment, which included intelligence from his

10582 (242026Z FEB 03); HIBI10627 (281949Z FEB 03)
10521 (191750Z FEB 03). The cable refeiTed to keeping bin al-Shibh in darkness as a "standard

interrogation technique." Thesame cable states that during the night of Febniary 18,2003, the light went out in bin
al-Shibh's cell and that "[w]hen security personnel anived to replace the bulb, bin al-Shibh was cowering in the
comer, sliivering. Security personnel noted that he appeared relieved as soon as Hie light was replaced."

1759 (021319Z OCT 04); HEADQUARTERSBHlm40023Z NOV 05); •HHlSOO

(171225Z NOV 04);(140915ZNOV 04); •^••1930
2207(111319Z APR 05)rHBH[2210a41^7Z APR

(061620Z DEC04)^^^^^B
2535(051^5Z JUL 05);

2589 (120857ZJlJl705)nBiHH 2830 (291304Z AUG 05); HliH 1890 (171225Z NOV

04

1893

20083IZ NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, P

141507Z APR 05); HH|M|25^(051805Z JUL 05); ||m|^|| 2210

(141507Z APR05);(051805Z JULoH)!!}^^^2830 (291304Z AUG 05);
1930 (061620Z DEC

2210 (141507Z APR 05)

2210(141507Z APR 05)

|2210(141507Z APR 05)

HEADQUARTERS HHi (031945Z SEP 06
-^28

SITE DAILY REPORT - 24 MAY 07:

8904(182103Z APR 08)

See Volume 11 for additional information.

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time in foreign government custody, as well as his reporting in CIA custody before, during, and

after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,'^^® concluded that:
"Much of [bin al-Shibh's] statements on the 11 September attacks have been

speculative, and many of the details could be found in media accounts of the
attacks that appeared before he was detained. In the few instances where his
reporting was unique and plausible, we cannot verify or refute the
information... he has been sketchy on some aspects of the 9/11 plot, perhaps in
order to downplay his role in the plot. His information on individuals is non
specific; he has given us nothing on the Saudi hijackers or others who played a

role... The overall quality of his reporting has steadily declined since 2003.'"^^^
G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

7. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody
at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques
The capture of KSM was attributable to a single CIA source who

first came to the CIA's attention in the spring of 2001."^^^ The source
led the CIA and Pakistan authorities directly to KSM. KSM was held in Pakistani

custody from the time ofhis capture on March 1, 2003, to March |, 2003, and was interrogated
by CIA officers and Pakistani officials. According to CIA records, while in Pakistani custody,
KSM was subjected to some sleep deprivation, but there are no indications of other coercive

interrogation techniques being used.'^^^ While KSM denied knowledge of attack plans and the
locations of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,'^^'^ he did provide limited information on
various al-Qa'ida leaders and operatives who had already been captured. KSM's willingness to
discuss operatives when confronted with information about their capture—behavior noted by
CIA officers on-site in Pakistan—was a recurring theme throughout KSM's subsequent detention
and inten-ogation in CIA custody

Less than two hours after KSM's capturc^nticipa^g KSM's
arrival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, the chief ofinterrogations, BHIHI' sent an email
to CIA Headquarters with the subject line, "Let's roll with the new guy." The email requested

permission to "press [KSM] for threat info right away.'"^^^ Later thatday, CIA Headquarters
authorized

to use a number of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against

Ramzi bin al-Shibh was immediately subjected to die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION
SITE BLUE.

"31 ALEC ••

(302240Z JUN 05)

For more details, see section of this summary on the capture of KSM and additional information in Volume IL

141403 (020949Z MAR 03)
[41484 (0313I5Z MAR 03)

|4I564 (041307ZMAR03);i^^HH41592 (051050Z MAR 03). For details on KSM's

detention in Pakistani custody, see the KSM detainee review in Volume IlL

Email from: [REDACTED]; to;

jj^HIII^Hii' subject: Let's Roll with the new guy;

date: March 1, 2003, at 03:43:12 AM.

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KSM. The cable from CIA Headquarters did not require that non-coercive inten*ogation

techniques beused first."^^^ On March

2003, two days before KSM's arrival at the detention

site, CIA Headquarters approved an interrogation plan for
According to CIA records, interrogators began using the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT a "few minutes" after the

questioning of KSM began. KSM was subjected to facial and abdominal slaps, the facial grab,

stress positions, standing sleep deprivation^wi^ihisl^ atorabove head level), nudity, and
water dousing."^^^ Chief ofInterrogations |^|m|||[ also ordered the rectal rehydration of
KSM without a determination of medical need, a procedure that the chief of interrogations would
later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee.'"^® At the
end of the day, the psychologist on-site concluded that the interrogation team would likely have
more success by "avoiding confrontations that allow [KSM] to transform the interrogation into

battles of will with theinterrogator.'"^^ KSM's reporting during his first day in CIA custody
included an accurate description of a Pakistani/British operative, which was dismissed as having
been provided during the initial "'throwaway' stage" of information collection when the CIA
believed detainees provided false or worthless information.'^012240Z MAR 03)

DIRECTOR

34354 (•§•

438

MAR 03); DIRECTOR |

MAR 03)

34491 (051400Z MAR 03)

34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of |

I, by [REDACTED] and

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003.
34575

"Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguardof Lies," IICT,

April 3,2003. KSM also named three individuals who, he said, worked on an al-Qa'ida ant^ax program that was

still in its "earliest stages." Tliey were led, he said, b^|Omar|^h^iadbeena^
The group also included Abu Bakr al-Filistini. (See

inthecountr£of^H

34475

would later state that "Yazi£Me^l-Qa'ida's anthraxefifotir(5ec^^|^fo769 (120937Z MAR 03).) Yazid

Sufaat, who had been in

[foreign government] custody since 2001, had long been suspectedof

articipating in al-Qa'ida chemical and biological activities. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to:

_mii^^^iimiHcc:
, II I II I II III
II I II I II III II I II I II III [REDACTED], [REDACTED];
subject: FOR COORD by noon please: Yazid Sufaat PDB; date: March 14, 2003, at 09:05 AM; email from:
[REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re:
RESPONSE - INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED TO
USAMA BIN LADIN ASSOCIATE YAZID SUFAAT; date: March 6, 2003, at 12:50:27 PM;
email from:
to: [REDACTED]; SUBJECT: Re: KSM on WMD; date: March 12, 2003, at

08:28:31 AM.) Adraft PDB prepared on March 17, 2003, states that "Sufaat's own clauiis to ||||||||||^| [foreign
government] authorities and personal background tracks with KSM's assertions." (See "KSM Guarding Most
SensitiveInformation," labeled "For the President Only 18 March 2003," stamped0319 ksmupdate.doc 17 March
2003.) On April 3, 2003,an IICT analysis stated thatKSM "likelyjudges that information related to Sufaatabeady
has been compromised since his arrest." (See "KhalidShaykh Muhammad's Tlireat Reporting - Precious Truths,

Sur^nded by a Bodyguard ofLies," IICT, April 3, 2003.) CIA analysis from 2005 stated that
[a foreign government holding Sufaat] was likely to have known details of Yazid's involvement in al-

Qa'ida's anthrax program by early 2002," although that information was not provided at the time to the CIA. (See

CIA Duectorate ofIntelligence; "Al-QaMd^^nthra^^Program

Emerge in a Key Reporting Stream; New

Insights into Yazid Sufaat's Credibility
#2005-3264).) Al-Filistini was later
captured and detained by the CIA. Whilebeing subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques he
changed his description of al-Qa'ida's anthrax efforts multiple times. On August 1, 2003, Abu Bakr al-Filistini, also
known as Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that "we never made anthrax." At the time, he was being subjected
to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he "told

the truth." According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said "I made the anthrax." Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said
111!

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March 5, 2003, and March 6, 2003, while he was still at

DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM was subjected to nudity and sleep depnvation^On March
5, 2003, KSM was also subjected to additional rectal rehydration,"^"^^ which I^^^HOMS,
described as helping to "clear a person's head" and effective in getting KSM

to talk."^ On March 6, 2003,
^ "'softer Mr. Rogers' persona" after the
interrogation team concluded that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques had caused KSM

to "clamup.'"^"^^ During this session KSM was described as "more cooperative," and the day's

interrogation was deemed the "best session held to date" by the interrogation team."*^^ During
this period KSM fabricated information on an individual whom he described as the protector of
his children."^^ That information resulted in the capture and CIA detention of two innocent
individuals.'^^

2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTIONSITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard
Prior to His Arrival

Within hours of KSM's capture, ALEC Station successfully argued
that CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR should take over the interrogation of KSM upon

KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE.^^ On March 3, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved
an interrogation plan indicating that KSM "will be subjected to immediate interrogation
techniques," and that "the interrogation techniques will increase in intensity from standard to
that he was. After CIA intenogators "demonstrated the penalty for lying," al-Barq again sUitedth^'I made the
anthrax" and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made anthrax. {See
1015 (012057Z
AUG 03).) Two days later, al-Barq stated that he had lied about the anthrax production "only because he thought

thatwaswhatintenjoga^

^^•••^••11^4575
I

I li III

5ee^^^^HlOn (030812Z AUG 03).

to: [REDACTED]; cc; [REDACTED],

subject: Re:

Departure; date: March 6, 2003, at 7:11:59 PM; email from: |m|||||||||^|||||rto; [REDACTED]; cc: H|H|
t: Re: Update; date: March 6, 2003, at 4:51:32 PM.

34573 (061751Z MAR 03);

.34614 (071551Z MAR 03)

34573 (061751Z MAR 03);

34614 (071551Z MAR 03)

In June 2004, KSM described his reporting as "all lies."

34569 (061722Z MAR 03);

1281 (I30801Z JUN 04).

The two individuals, Sayed Habib and Shaistah Habibullali Khan, entered Cl/^ustod^t^pri^n^uW 2003
respectively, and were released inAugustandFebiiiary20

(See

5712

|; email from:
to:
[REDACTED]^REDACTED]^u^ct:
planned release of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; ||||||m|||||||||||^^^^^^^^m.

CIA document, "Additional Details for DCIA on Sayed Habib's Arrest and Detention.") The CIA's June 2013
Response states tliat tlie detention of the two individuals "can only be considered 'wrongful' after the fact, not in the
light of credible information available at tlie time and in a context in which plot disruption was deemed an urgent
national priority." Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response furtlier states that KSM's reporting on March 6, 2003, was
"credible" because, at tlie time, "[CIA] assessed that Khalid Shaykli Muhammad (KSM) had moved to a more
cooperative posture as his interrogation progressed." A review of CIA records indicates that the CIA subjected
KSM to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques the following day. The use of the techniques continued until

March 25,2003, and included 183 applications oftlie waterboard. See im^m 10711

Interview of||||H||HH

[REDACTED] and [REDACreDj^ffic^f the Inspector General, April 3,

to:^^^^^^^^H|||M^^^^^Hp|H^rom^^H|||||PHm^c^RED^TED],

[REDACTED],[REDACTED],

[REDACTED],

[REDACrED]^subjectJCSN^^
Page 83 of 499
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March I, 2003, at 07:07:33 AM.

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enhanced techniques commensurate with [KSM's] level of resistance, until he indicates initial

cooperation."^'^^ On March |, 2003, the day ofKSM's amval atDETENTION SITE BLUE, the
on-site medical officer described the use of the waterboard on KSM as inevitable;

"[T]he team here apparently looks to use the water board in two different

contexts. One is as a tool of regression and control in which it is used up front
and aggressively. The second is to vet information on an as needed basis.

Given the various pressures from home vs what is happening on the ground, I
think the team's expectation is that [KSM] will [be] getting treatment
somewhere in between. I don't think they believe that it will be possible to
entirely avoid the water board given the high and immediate threat to US and
allied interests. It is an interesting dynamic because they are weU aware of the
toll it will take on the team vs. the detainee. The requirements coming from
home are really unbelievable in terms of breadth and detail.'"^^^
Meanwhile, OMS completed draft guidelines on the use of the

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically addressing the waterboard interrogation
technique. These guidelines were sent to the medical personnel at the detention site. The
guidelines included a warning that the risk of the waterboard was "directly related to number of
exposures and may well accelerate as exposures increase," that concerns about cumulative

effects would emerge after three to five days, and that there should be an upper limit on the total
number of waterboard exposures, "perhaps 20 in a week." CIA records indicate that, as of the
day of KSM's arrival at DETENTION SITE BLUE, the interrogation team had not reviewed the

draft OMS guidelines."^^KSM arrived at DETENTION SITE BLUE at approximately 6:00

PM local time on March |, 2003, and was immediately stripped and placed in the standing sleep
deprivation position."^^^ At6:38 PM, after the medical and psychological personnel who had
traveled with KSM from DETENTION SITE COBALT cleared KSM for the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, the detention site requested CIA Headquarters' approval to begin the

interrogation process."^^"^ The detention site received the approvals at 7:18 PM,"^^^ at which point
the interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM."^^^

Between March

2003^n^March^2003, contractors

SWIGERT and DUNBAR, and a CIA interrogator,
the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against KSM, including nudity, standing sleep deprivation, the attention
450

10654 (030904Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR

SWIGERT and CIA interro

2003. DIRECTOR
"*5' Email from: [REDACTED];

I(041444Z MAR 03). The initial approval was for

The authorization was extended to DUNBAR on March |,
cc:

I; subject: Technique; date: March

cc:

|; subject: Re: Technique; date:

1 2003, at3:51:09 AM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

March j 2003, at 3:22:45 PM.
10711

10705

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grab and insult slap, the facial grab, the abdominal slap, the kneeling stress position, and

walling."^^^ There were no debriefers present. According to the CIA interrogator, during KSM's

first day at DETENTION SITE BLUE^WIGERTan^UNBAR first began threatening KSM's
c h i l d r e n . l a t e r told the inspector general that

these threats were legal so long as the threats were "conditional.'"^^^ On March 9, 2003, KSM
fabricated information indicating that Jaffar al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together"^^^
because, as he explained on April 23, 2003, he "felt some pressure to produce information about

operations in the United States in the initial phases ofhis interrogation.'"^^

On March

2003^DeputyChiefof ALEC Station

and a second ALEC Station officer,

arrived at DETENTION SITE

BLUE to serve as debriefers. The detention site also reportedly received a phone call ft^om CIA
Headquarters conveying the views of the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations James Pavitt on

the inteiTOgation of KSM.'^^^ Pavitt latertold the inspector general that he "did notrecall
specifically ordering that a detainee be waterboarded right away," but he "did not discount that
possibility." According to records of the interview, "Pavitt did recall saying, 'I want to know
what he knows, and I want to know it fast,""^^^ The on-site medical officer later wrote in an
email that the CIA interrogators "felt that the [waterboard] was the big stick and that HQ was

more or less demanding that it be used early and often.'"^^'^
3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant
Fabricated Information

On March 10, 2003, KSM was subjected to the first of his 15

separate waterboarding sessions. The first waterboarding session, which lasted 30 minutes (10
more than anticipated in the Office of Legal Counsel's August 1, 2002, opinion), was followed
by the use of a horizontal stress position that had not previously been approved by CIA
Headquarters.The chief of Base, woiTied about the legal implications, prohibited the on-site

10732

10725

10711

10741 (100917Z MAR 03)

10731

^ [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of tlie Inspector General, April 30,

Interview of|

I by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,

2003. Interview of I
October 22, 2003.

CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorisra Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG),
January2004.

-*^0

10740 (092308Z MAR 03), disseminated as

10741 (100917Z MAR

03)

••••
11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as |
Interview of|BHHIIIIIH< [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, 30 April
2003.

"

Interview of James Pavitt, by

[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21,

2003.

|; subject: More; date: April

from:

10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM.
10752 (i02320Z MAR 03)

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medical officer from reporting on the interrogation directly to OMS outside of official CIA cable
traffic^^^

March 12, 2003, KSM provided information on the Heathrow
Airport and Canary Wharf plotting. KSM stated that he showed a sketch in his notebook of a
building in Canary Wharf (a major business district in London) to Ammar al-Baluchi.'^^^ He also
provided statements about directing prospective pilots to study at flight schools,and stated that
Jaffar al-Tayyar was involved in the Heathrow Plot."^^^ KSM retracted all of this information

laterin his detention.'^^^ There are no CIA records indicating that these and other retractions
were assessed to be false.

The March 12, 2003, reporting from KSM on the Heathrow Airport
plotting was deemed at the time by CIA interrogators to be an effort by KSM to avoid discussion
of plotting inside the United States and thus contributed to the decision to subject KSM to two

waterboarding sessions that day."^^' During these sessions, KSM ingested a significant amount of
water. CIA records state that KSM's "abdomen was somewhat distended and he expressed water

when the abdomen was pressed.'"^^^ KSM's gastric contents were so diluted by water that the
medical officer present was "not concerned about regurgitated gastric acid damaging KSM's
esophagus.The officer was, however, concerned about water intoxication and dilution of

electrolytes and requested that the interroga^s use saline in future waterboarding sessions.

The medical officer later wrote to ^^H^I^MS that KSM was "ingesting and aspiration [sic]
a LOT of water," and that "[i]n the new technique we are basically doing a series of near

drownings.'"^^^ During the day, KSM was also subjected to the attention grasp, insult slap,
abdominal slap, and walling."^^^
March 13, 2003, after KSM again denied that al-Qa'ida had

operations planned for inside the United States, CIA interrogators decided on a "day of intensive

I; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP

Email fiom: [REDACTED]; to:
3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM.
10798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as
10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as

10778 (121549Z MAR 03)jdis^minated as
12141 (272231ZJUN 03);

22939 (031541Z JUL 04);

10883 (182127Z MAR 03),

disseminated as

HHHI10787 (130716Z MAR 03). The CIA would later represent that the information KSM provided on the

Heathrow plotting was an example of the effectiveness of the waterboard interrogation technique, listing the

Heathrow Plot as one of the "plots discoveredas a result of ElTs" in a briefing on the waterboard for the President
in November 2007. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated

Novembe^ 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation forPOTUS meeting."

"^2

10800(131909^AR 03)

Interviewof

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Officeof the InspectorGeneral,May 15,

2003.

10800 (131909Z MAR 03); Interview of

Office ofthe Inspecto^eneral^/Iay 15, 2003.

from: ||||||H||||||^^

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED],

cc:

10, 2003, at 5:59:27 PM. Emphasis in the original.
476

10787 (130716Z MAR 03)

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waterboard sessions.'"^^^ During the first of three waterboarding sessions that day, interrogators
responded to KSM's efforts to breathe during the sessions by holding KSM's lips and directing

the water at his mouth."^^^ According to a cablefrom thedetention site, KSM "would begin
signaling by pointing upward with his two index fingers as the water pouring approached the
established time limit." The cable noted that "[t]his behavior indicates that the subject remains

alert and has become familiar with key aspects of the process.CIA records state that KSM
"yelled and twisted" when he was secured to the waterboard for the second session of the day,
but "appeared resigned to tolerating the board and stated he had nothing new to say" about

terrorist plots inside the United States."^^^
Prior to the third waterboard session of that calendar day, the onsite medical officer raised concerns that the waterboard session—which would be the fourth in

14 hours—would exceed the limits included in draft OMS guidelines that had been distributed

the previous aftemoon."^^^ Those draft guidelines stated that up to three waterboard sessions in a
24-hour period was acceptable.'^'^^ At the time, KSM had been subjected to more than 65
applications of water during the four waterboarding sessions between the afternoon of March 12,
2003, and the morning of March 13, 2003. In response to a request for approval from the chief
of Base, CTC attorney
assured detention site personnel that the medical officer

"is incorrect that these guidelines have been approved and/or fully coordinated.""^^^
sent an email to the detention site authorizing the additional waterboai*ding session."^^"^ Despite
indications from
that the detention site personnel would receive a formal authorizing
cable, no such authorization from CIA Headquarters was provided. At the end of the day, the

medical officer wrote ^HmOMS that "[tjhings are slowly evolving form [sic] OMS being
viewed as the institutional conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are dedicated to
maximizing the benefit in a safe manner and keepingeveryone's butt out of trouble." The

medical officer noted that his communication with jl^HlOMS was no longer "viewed with
suspicion.On the afternoon of March 13, 2003, KSM was subjected to his third waterboard
session of that calendar day and fifth in 25 hours. CIA records note that KSM vomited during
and after the procedure.
477

10804 (140710Z MAR 03);

Interview of••••I,

10790 (130946Z MAR 03)

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office oftlie Inspector General, April 30,

2003. The interviewee was a CIA interrogator for KSM at the CIA detention site.
10790 (130946Z MAR 03)
10791 (131229Z MAR 03)

[REDACTED]; to:

cc:

Jose

Rodriguez; subject^rejEyesOnly - Legal and Political Quandyr7^ateJMard^3, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM.
Email from:

to: [REDACTED]; cc:

subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP

3/10; date: March 12,2003, at 2:09:47 PM.
h'om:
to: [REDACTED]; cc:

Rodriguez; subjectJleJEYE^NLY - Legal and Political Quandary; date^larcM3^003^8^0^n AM.
Email from:

to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, jjjBBHlHHIi' I^HI
subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13,

2003, at 08:28 AM.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

cc:

subject: Re: State cable; date:

March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written thar|]^iT^oin^h^^ra mile to
try to handle this in a non confrontational manner.'* Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

•HjjjHH; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM.

^^86^HB^03(131929ZMAR03)

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Shortly thereafter, CIA Headquarters began reevaluating the use of
the waterboard interrogation technique. According to a March 14, 2003, email from an
interrogator who was not at DETENTION SITE BLUE, but was reviewing cable traffic, the
"[ojverall view seems to be" that the waterboard "is not working in gaining KSM['s]

compliance.'"^^^ The deputy chief of the CIA interrogation program responded in agreement,
adding that "[a]gainst KSM it has proven ineffective," and that "[t]he potential for physical harm
is far greater with the waterboard than with the other techniques, bringing into question the issue
of risk vs. gain...." The deputy chief further suggested that the waterboard was
counterproductive, stating that "[w]e seem to have lost ground" with KSM since progress made
at DETENTION SITE COBALT, and as a result, the CIA should "consider the possibility" that
the introduction of the waterboard interrogation technique "may poison the well.""^^^ The email
in which these sentiments were expressed was sent to
the CTC attorney
overseeing the interrogation of KSM. Despite these reservations and assessments, the

waterboarding of KSM continued for another 10 days.'^'^^
On March 15, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm
references in signals intercepts on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain "nuclear suitcases.
Subsequent signals intercepts and information from a foreign government would later indicate
that the nuclear suitcase threat was an orchestrated scam."^^^ KSM was waterboarded a second

time that day after failing to provide information on operations against the United States or on al-

QaMda nuclear capabilities."^^^ During the waterboarding sessions that day, the application of the
interrogation technique further evolved, with the interrogators now using their hands to maintain
a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and mouth in an effort to make it impossible

for KSM to ingest all the water being poured."^^^ At one point, SWIGERT and DUNBAR waited
for KSM to talk before pouring water over his mouth.

from: •^^•1;

to;

cc:

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED]; subject: re Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14,
2003, at 10:44:12 AM.

^^^EmaiHronr

to:

cc:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED],

BBBBBBBtsu^ectTreSummary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of1000 HRS 14 MAR 03; date: March
14, 2003, at 02:02:42 PM.

5eedet^d review of these sessions in Volume III.

10831 (151510ZMAR 03); ^^11 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); ^••110849
03); Interviewof

(161058Z MAR

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the InspectorGeneral,

May 15, 2003.

The original reporting, that al-Qa'ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be
based on an effort by unknown Yemenis to sell "suitcase weapons" to al-Qa'ida. Al-Qa'ida operatives concluded
that the offer was a scam. See
74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated as
HEADQUARTERS
(092349Z DEC 04).

"^2 HHi 10841 (152007Z MAR 03);

10831 (151510Z MAR 03)

Email from: [REDACTED]; to:

subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15;

date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 A.M. Interviewof||||^^^|^^^WREDACTED] and [REDACTED],
Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003. See also interviewof^B||||tH|^|, by [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The descriptions of the use of the waterboard

interrogation techniqu^gaii^
Interview of

were provided by these two on-site medical officers.
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,

2003.

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11 III I

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March 17, 2003, and into the morning of

Marchl8720037^^|HilHH,

exchanged emails with the medical officer

at DETENTION SITE BLUE on the waterboarding of KSM. According to

the

waterboard inten'ogation technique had "moved even further from the SERE model.'"^^^
also wrote:

"Truthfully, though, I don't recall that the WB [waterboard] produced anything
actionable in AZ [Abu Zubaydah] any earlier than another technique might
have. This may be different with KSM, but that is still as much a statement of
faith as anything else - since we don't seem to study the question as we go...
it's been many more days of constant WB repetitions, with the evidence of
progress through most of them not being actionable intel but rather that 'he
looks like he's weakening.' The WB may actually be the best; just don't like

to base it on religion.'"^^^
On March 18, 2003, KSM was confronted with the reporting of

Majid Khan, who was then in thecustody of a foreign government,"^^^ regarding plotting against
gas stations inside the United States, information that KSM had not previously discussed. In
assessing the session, DETENTION SITE BLUE personnel noted that "KSM will selectively lie,
provide partial truths, and misdirect when he believes he will not be found out and held
accountable." On the other hand, they wrote that "KSM appears more inclined to make accurate

|; subject: Re: Medical limitations ofWB - draft tlioughts; date:

"95 Email to: [REDACTED]; from:

March 17, 2003, at 01:11:35 PM.
Email from:
to: [REDACTED]; cc:
2003, at 10:52:03 AM.

|; subject: Oct 18; date: Maich 18,

Majid Khan, who was arrested on March 5, 2003, provided extensive infonnation prior to being rendered to CIA
custody. This included information on lyman Paris, Uzhair (Paracha) and his fatiier, Aafia Sidiqqi, his transfer of
al-Qa'ida funds to a Bangkok-based Zubair, and his discussions with KSM regarding various proposed plots. Majid
Khan also provided assistance to the CIA in its efforts to locateAmmar al-BaluchiJncludm

al-

Pakistani. (See MW 13697 (080730Z MAR 03);

••^•13765

144244 (161423Z APR^3)-MW^M44684 (250633Z APR 03);

03);

13678 (070724Z MAR 03); ••••m85
13826 (190715Z MAR

•||^^^Hn^^Hn908 (26025IZ MAR
(200454Z MAR 03X^^^Mn8901

13686 (071322Z MAR03)?^HH 13932 (271244Z MAR^^^BI^I 13710

(081218Z MAR 03).) After being rendered to CIA custody, Majid Khan was subjected by the CIA to sleep

deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation^andmayhavebeens^
to an ice water bath. (See \
139077 (271719Z MAY 03);
39099 (281 lOlZ MAY 03); |
I Briefing for tlie Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 14, 2008;

|41772(121230ZJUL 03); ••^•||||||||^H^42025^^^^^^p;
|, [REDACTED]7^^^^^^^^|, and

email

subject, "Re: ihope the

approvals for enhanced comes through quickly for tliis guy... this does not look good"; date: June 30, 2003.) A
June 2006 CIA email stated that Majid Klian said he "fabricated a lot of his early [CIA] interrogation reporting to
stop... what he called 'torture.'" According to the email, Klian stated that he was "hung up" for approximately one

day in a sleep deprived position and thaMieprovided "ever^^

the^ante^^iea^^et out ofthe situation."

(See email from: [REDACTED]
••C0bJH|H||||H|, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], |m|^H|^^|P^ibjectr|||Hfre^est for prozac; date: June 16, 2006.) As

detailed in this summary and in more detail in Volume 11, the CIA inaccurately attributed information provided by
Majid Khan in foreign government custody to tlie CIA interrogations of KSM.
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11 III I

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disclosures when he believes people, emails, or other source material are available to the USG
for checking his responses.
The same day, KSM provided additional information on the

Heathrow Airport plotting, much of which he would recant in 2004."^^^ KSM also discussed
Jaffar al-Tayyar again, prompting the detention site personnel to refer to the "all-purpose" alTayyar whom KSM had "woven... into practically every story, each time with a different

role."^°° After KS^^iad included al-Tayyar in his discussion of Majid Khan's gas station plot,

KSM debriefer
in email that "[t]oday [al-Tayyar's] working with Majid
Khan, yesterday the Londoncrowd, the day before Padilla - you get the point."^^^ Beginning the
evening of March 18, 2003, KSM began a period of sleep deprivation, most of it in the standing
position, which would last for seven and a half days, or approximately 180 hours.^®On March 19, 2003, the interrogators at the detention site decided

to waterboard KSM due to KSM's inconsistent information about Jaffar al-Tayyar's passport.^^^
According to CIA cables, after assuming his position on the waterboard, KSM "seemed to lose
control" and appeared "somewhat frantic," stating diat he "had been forced to lie, and ma[k]e up
stories about" Jaffar al-Tayyar because of his interrogators.KSM then stated that his
reporting on al-Tayyar's role in Majid Khan's plotting was a "complete fabrication" and that alTayyar had been compromised as an operative and that as a result, al-Tayyar could not be used

for a terrorist operation.^"^ In response, the interrogators told KSM that they only wanted tohear

hin^p^ ifhe was revealing information on the next attack.^®^ Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
later told the inspector general that it was around this time that contract interrogator
DUNBAR stated that "he had not seen a 'resistor' [sic] like KSM, and was 'going to go to school

on this guy.'"^^^ According to CIA records, the interrogators then "devote[d] all measures to
pressuring [KSM] on the single issue of the 'next attack on America,"' including attention grabs,
insult slaps, walling, water dousing, and additional waterboard sessions.

(^¥8/J|||||||||||mi|^^^|//NF) On March 20, 2003, KSM continued to be subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques throughout the day, including a period of "intense questioning

10884 (182140Z MAR 03)

10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as

HI ^^^39 (031541Z JUL 04). CIA

records indicate that CIA officers believed that KSM's recantations were credible. See KSM detainee review in
Volume ni.

500

10884 (182140Z MAR 03)
Email from: [REDACTED], OFFICE:

I; to: [REDACTED]; subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March

18,2003, at 08:16:07 PM.

-'"^^^M|10884 (182140Z MAR 03);
03)'^^^H 10969 (240950Z MAR 03)
|^^Hi0892 (191503Z MAR 03);
10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10894 (191513Z MAR 03);
10902 (201037ZMAR 03)

Interview of

10888 (190805Z MAR 03);

10999 (260835Z MAR

10902 (201037Z MAR 03)
10902 (201037Z MAR 03)

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3,

2003.
508

10902 (201037Z MAR 03);

10900 (191907Z MAR 03);

10896 (191524Z MAR

03)

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and walling."^®^ KSM was described as "[t]ired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins,
and wrists, as well as on the back of his head.^'® He also suffered from pedal edema resulting
from extended standing.^^^ Afterhaving concluded that there was "no further movement" in the
interrogation, the detention site personnel hung a picture of KSM's sons in his cell as a way to

"[heighten] his imagination concerning where they are, who has them, [and] what is in store for
them."^^2

The waterboarding of KSM on March 21, 2003, and March 22,
2003, was based on a misreading of intelligence provided by Majid Khan bvDeputyChief of
ALEC Station
According to a cable from the CIA's
Khan,
who was in foreign government custody, had stated that KSM wanted to use "two to three
unknown Black American Muslim converts who were currently training in Afghanistan," to
"conduct attacks" on gas stations in the United States, and that "KSM was interested in usin^
anyone with US status to assist with this operation.Upon receipt of this reporting,
wrote in an email "i love the Black American Muslim at AQ camps in Afghanuistan [sic] ...

Mukie [KSM] is going to be hatin' life on this one."^^"^ However, her subsequent questioning of
KSM was not based on Khan's actual reporting, which was about potential operatives already in
Afghanistan, but rather something Khan had not said—that KSM directed him to make contact

with African-American converts in the United States.^^^ According to CIA records, in a
"contentious" session that lasted for hours and involved the use of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, KSM "flatly denied" any efforts to recruit African-American Muslim

converts, KSM was then waterboarded.^'^ Later in the day, facing the threat of a second
waterboarding session, KSM "relented and said that maybe he had told Khan that he should see
if he could make contact with members of the Black American Muslim convert community."

The CIA interrogators then returned KSM to the standing sleep deprivation position without a

second waterboarding session.^^^
The next day, March 22, 2003, interrogators subjected KSM to
"intense" questioning and walling, but when KSM provided no new information on AfricanAmerican Muslim converts or threats inside the United States, he was subjected to additional

10916 (210845Z MAR 03);
10916 (210845Z MAR 03)
10909 (201918Z MAR 03)

10921 (211046Z MAR 03)

Interviewof^^HjjjimiH, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October
22,2003j|||^Bl0917(^907Z MAR 03).
13839 (201434Z MAR 03)

Email to:
from: [REDACTED] OFFIC&^HH^[DETENTION SITE BLUE]; subject: Re:
Majid Khan; date: March 20, 2003, at 03:40:17 PM. The ^^^(cabl^as formally sent to DETENTION SITE
BLUE via ALEC
(210015Z MAR 03).
10932 (212132Z MAR 03)

10932 (212132Z MAR 03);|

10922 (211256Z MAR 03)

10932 (212132Z MAR 03)
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waterboarding.^^^ An hour later, KSM stated that he was "ready to talk."^^^ He told the CIA
interrogators that he had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American

Muslim converts, a mission he said had been prompted by discussions with a London-based

shaykh whose bodyguards had families in Montana.^^® KSM also stated that he tasked Majid
Khan with attending Muslim conferences in the United States to "spot and assess potential
extremists" who would assist in the gas stationplot.^^^ In June 2003, KSM admitted that he
fabricated the story about Abu Issa al-Britani and Montana, explaining that he was "under
'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he

thought they wanted to hear."^^^ In August 2003, KSM reiterated that hehad no plans torecruit
or use "black American Muslim" converts operationallyIn December 2005, he denied ever
asking Majid Khan to recruit converts or attend Islamic conferences.^^"^
On March 24, 2003, KSM underwent his fifteenth and final

documented waterboarding sessiondue to his "intransigence" in failing to identify suspected
Abu Bakr al-Azdi operations in the United States, and for having "lied about poison and

biological warfare programs."^^^ KSM was described in the session as being "composed, stoic,
and resigned."^^^
That evening, the detention site received two reports. The first
recounted the reporting of Majid Khan, who was still in the custody of a foreign govermnent, on
Uzhair, who ran the New York branch of his father's Karachi-based import-export business, and

on Uzhair's father/''-^ According to Khan, his meetings with the two were facilitated by Ammar
al-Baluchi.^^^ The second report described the reporting of lyman Paris, who was in FBI
custody, on a plot to cut the suspension cables on the Brooklyn Bridge and exploration of plans
to derail trains and conduct an attackin Washington, D.C.^-^ KSM, whomdetention site

personnel described as "boxed in" by the new reporting,^^® then stated that Uzhair's father, Sayf
al-Rahman Paracha, had agreed to smuggle explosives into the United States.^^^ As described
10941 (221506Z MAR 03); •••

10950 (222127Z MAR 03). One cable from DETENTION

SITE BLUE hypothesized that KSM was lying in order to force the CIA interrogators to apply the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques: "[T]he enhanced measures resulting from his lying in [sic] details could be a resistance
strategy to keep the interrogation from threatening issues... [KSM's] apparent willingness to provoke and incur the
use of enhanced measures mayrepresent a calculated strategy to either: (A) redirect the courseof the interrogation;
or (B)toattempt to cultivate some doubt that he hadknowledge of any current or future operations against the US."

SeeJ^g^ 10950 (222127Z MAR 03).

^^^Fi0950 (222127Z MAR 03)

5201094^221610^MAR 03), disseminated as

10948 (222101Z MAR 03),

disseminated as

10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as
12095 (222049Z JUN 03)

12558 (04I938Z AUG 0^
31148 (171919Z DEC 05);
10983 (242321Z MAR 03);
10974 (241834ZMAR 03);

31147 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as

10972 (241122Z MAR 03)
10983 (242321Z MAR 03)
See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah

Paracha.
13890
529 WHDC
530

10984 (24235IZ MAR 03)

I(242226ZMAR^3)?B|^Hi^83 (242321Z MAR 03)
10983 (242321ZMAR 03)

10984 (24235IZ MAR 03), disseminate^^
I(II' 'ii ( III'

'I

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elsewhere in this summary, the purported parties to the agreement denied that such an agreement

existed.''^^ In confirming Paris's reporting, KSM exhibited what the Interagency Intelligence
Committee on Terrorism would later describe as an effort to "stay obvious/general" and "provide
little information that might enable the US to thwart attacks.

With the exception of sleep deprivation, which continued for one

more day, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogationtechniques against KSM stopped abruptly
on March 24, 2003.^^"^ There are no CIA records directing the interrogation team to cease using
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, nor any contemporaneous

documentation explaining thedecision.^^^
4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the
CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information

On April 3, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Ten'orism produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded
by a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding or lying about
terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States. It also identified contradictions
between KSM's reporting on CBRN and other sources.
24, 2003, PBI Director Robert Mueller began seeking
direct PBI access to KSM in order to better understand CIA reporting indicating threats to U.S.

cities.^^^ Despite personal commitments from DCI Tenet to DirectorMueller that access would
be forthcoming, the CIA's CTC successfully formulated a CIA position whereby the FBI would

According to one cable, KSM did not volunteer the purported smugglingplot, but rather was asked about it by

interrogators. (See ALEC

(052230Z MAY 03). All partiesto^epurported plot - Paracha and Amma^-

Balucht - denied any agreement had been reached. DIRECTOR m[(^^29Z JUN 03), disseininated as H
39239 (301600Z MAY03)il^B 13588 (171505Z JUL 03);

mill nil MIBrrT^^PZ JUN 03), disseminated as

39239

(301600Z MAY 03); ALEC HH (012248Z APR 03).) With regard tothe explosives smuggling reporting, the
former chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email; "again, anotlier ksm op worthy of the lamentable

knuckleheads... why 'smuggle' in explosives when you can get tliem here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular
Id got
explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks an^ot
m:Bi
everything he needed right here, this may be tme, but itjust seems damn odd to me." See email from:
m

|; subject: see

|; to:

highlight: again, anotlier ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.

-''33 •••

10985 (242351Z MAR 03). "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths,

Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," ITCT, April 3, 2003.

Sleep deprivation was extended for an additional day, although it was intemipted by "catnapping." See \
10999 (260835Z MAR 03).
^35 For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume 111.

536 "Khaiid Shaykh Muhammad's Tlireat Reporting - PreciousTruths, SuiTounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," IICT,
April 3, 2003.

^3^ Email fi'om: HHjjjjjjjH

L. Pavitt; HHUBH; John H. Moseman;

Jose Rodriguez;^||||||||||||||||^^BHrand||||i|||BlllHH' subject: Mueller's Interest in FBI Access to KSM;
date: April 24, 2003, at 10:59:53 AM.
III!
I Mil I

III! nllN

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not be provided access to KSM until his anticipated transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Neither
the CIA nor the FBI knew at the time that the transfer would not occur until September2006.^^^
Between April 2003 and July 2003, KSM frustrated the CIA on a

number of fronts. On May 7, 2003, after more than two months of conflicting reporting, ALEC
Stationconcluded that KSM "consistently wavers" on issues of UBL's location, protectors, and
hosts, and that his information "conveniently lack[s] sufficient detail [to be] actionable

intelligence.On June 12, 2003, CIA Headquarters indicated that it "remain[ed] highly
suspicious that KSM is withholding, exaggerating, misdirecting, or outright fabricating

information on CBRN issues."^'^'' At the end of April 2003, KSM was shown pictures of the
recently captured Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, after which he provided additional

information related to their plotting in Karachi.^"^^ ALEC Station wrote in a May 20, 2003, cable
that "[w]e consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this] information to be a serious concern,
especially as this omission may well have cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been

diligent in following up on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash,
and other probable operatives involved in the attack plans."^'^^
May and June 2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash

provided reporting that contradicted KSM's statements about the Heathrow Airport plotting and
included information that KSM had not provided.^"^^ After KSM was confronted with this
reporting, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station

wrote in an email, "OK, that's it...

yet again he lies and ONLY ADMITS details when he knows we know them from someone
Memorandum for: James L. Pavitt;
Jose Rodriguez;
from:
subject: Update: Director Mueller - DCI Tenet Conversation on KSM; date: June 4, 2003,

at05j4^2 PM. Note for: James L. Pavitt; f r o m ; c c :

Jose Rodriguez,Bi

subject: Director Mueller Plans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In
addition to the FBI, senior CIA officers, including CTC's representatives to the FBI, complained about the

limitations on the dissemination of intelligence derived fromCIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had
on counterterrorism analysis. The CTC's representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as a "serious concern."
He stated that the compartmentation of interrogation information
resulted in
delays in dissemination that could result in information being "missed." He also stated that the CIA's

compartmentation ofinformation preventedhimfrompi^ding totl^^
insight into the value/credibility
ofintelligence reports." (See interview ofIBIHBH' t>y IHHHil' Office ofthe Inspector General,
August 18, 2003.) Among the otherCIAofficers expressing theseconcerns were the deputy chief of CTC's Al-

Qa'ida Department, who told the OIG that limited acces^^operational traffic "has had an impact on [analysts'] full
knowledge of activities, and thus their analysis." (See
Memorandum for the Record; subject:
Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism CenterAl-Qa'ida Department; July 28, 2003.) The Directorof
Analysis at CTC described analysts' limited access to information as a "continuing problem." (See August 18,
2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, Director of Analysis, Office of the
Inspector General.) The CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of

operational information prevented the "fiill cadre of analysts" from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result,

"we^losing analytic ability to look at [foreign intelligence] in atimely manner." See interview of[
m , by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12, 2003.
ALEC^HH(072002ZMAY 03)

DIRECTOR^BH (121550Z JUN 03)

^^•^^34 (30I710Z APR 03);

11448 (301141Z APR 03)

ALEC]BH (022012Z MAY 03). See information in diis summaiy and Volume II on the "Karachi Plot" for

additional information.

See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on

the reporting the detainees provided.

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On April 19, 2003, KSM was questioned for the first time about summer 2002
reporting from Masran bin Arshad, who was in the custody of a foreign government, regarding
the "Second Wave" plot. Informed that bin Arshad had been detained, KSM stated, "I have

forgotten about him, he is notin my mind at all."^"^^ In response, ALEC Station noted that it
"remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent

where it counts most, in relation to threats to US interests, especially inside CONUS."^"^^ In June
2003, almost three months after the CIA had stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques

against KSM, senior ALEC Station and RDG officers met at least twice to discuss concerns

about KSM's lack of cooperation.^"^^ As an ALEC Station cable noted at the time, "KSM's
pattern of behavior over the past three months, trying to control his environment, lying and then
admitting things only when pressed that others have been caught and have likely admitted the

plot, is a cause for concem."^'^^ In an email, one CIA officer noted that "what KSM's doing is
fairly typical of other detainees... KSM, Khallad [bin Attash], and others are doing what makes
sense in their situation - pretend cooperation."'''^^
In the fall of 2003, after KSM's explanations about how to decrypt

phone numbers related to British operative Issa al-Britani (KSM did not identify the operative as
"Issa al-Hindi," or by his true name, Dhiren Barot) yielded no results, and after KSM
misidentified another individual, known not to be Issa, as Issa, Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
stated in an email that KSM was "obstructing our ability to acquire good

information," noting that KSM "misidentifie[s] photos when he knows we are fishing" and
"misleads us on telephone numbers.Later, after KSM's transfer to DETENTION SITE
BLACK, ALEC Station wrote that KSM "may never be fully forthcoming and honest" on the

topic of UBL's whereabouts.^^^ Despite repeated challenges, KSM maintained thathe lacked
information on UBL's location.^^-

for;

from:

subject:

Action detainee branch; date: June 12, 2003 (emphasis in tlie original).

(191445Z APR 03), disseminated as |
5"^ IHmilL
ALEC^H|(222153ZA^03)
Email

to

cc;

^^•[^^^^n^^HHjREDA^DUREDACTEDJ, [REDACTED], |

L[REDACTED],

[RHDACTED],

[REDACTED];subject: Khallad & KSM DetaineeCase Discussion; date: June 18, 2003, at 10:09 AM;

ALEC ^^•0p2258Z JUN 03).

ALEC^BH(302258Z^ 03)

Email

to:

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], |

[REDACTED]; subject: Re: KSM's passive restraint - please let me know if you

have comments for a memo to the DCI^ate^un^4^003^^27|0^M^^

^^^mai^om^^H|PH||||||HuoJ^PI||||^^m,

||^m^^|[[^^^|!|^^H^||H|^|7[REDACT^]rccr^^|^^^|; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues;
date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM.

55' ALECMB(111932ZNOV 03)

552
10400 (161754Z NOV 03). KSM, who was with Ayman al-Zawaliiri the day befor^^ March 1,
2003, capture, first informed the CIA oftliis fact more than a month later, on April 3, 2003. See m||||m|| 11139
(051956Z APR 03).
I (11

IM III I

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KSM was transferred to DETENTION SITE

|, 2005,^^^ to DETENTION SITE BROWN on March

on

2006,^^"^ and to U.S. military detention

at Giiantanamo Bay, Cuba, on September 5, 2006.^"^^ The CIA disseminated 831 intelligence
reports from the interrogations of KSM over a period of 3.5 years. While KSM provided more
intelligence reporting than any other CIA detainee (nearly 15 percent of all CIA detainee
intelligence reporting), CIA records indicate that KSM also received the most intelligence
requirements and attention from CIA interrogators, debriefers, analysts, and senior CIA
leadership. Further, as noted, a significant amount of the disseminated intelligence reporting
from KSM that the CIA identified as important threat reporting was later identified as
fabricated.^^^

H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

I. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
While the CIA held detainees from 2002 to 2008, early 2003 was
the most active period of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Of the 119 detainees
identified by the Committee as held by the CIA, 53 were brought into custody in 2003, and of the
39 detainees the Committee has found to have been subjected to the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, 17 were subjected to such techniques between January 2003 and
August 2003. The CIA's enhanced interrogations during that time were primarily used at
DETENTION SITE COBALT and DETENTION SITEBLUE.^^^ Otherinterrogations using the

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques took place at a CIA

in Country |, at which

at least one CIA detainee was submerged in a bathtub filled with ice water.^^^
In 2003, CIA interrogators sought and received approval to use the
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against at least five detainees prior to their arrival at a
CIA detention facilityIn two of those cases, CIA Headquarters approved the use of the CIA's

|; HEADQUARTERS

2218

12214 (050539Z SEP 06)
See KSM detainee review in Volume TIL

For more information, see detainee reviews and reports in Volume III for Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Muhammad Umar
'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah, Abu Khalid, Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Abu Yasir
al-Jaza'iri, Suleiman Abdullah, Abu Hazim, Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash,
Laid Ben Dohman Saidi aka Abu Hudhaifa, Majid Khan, Mohd Farik bin Amin aka Abu Zubair, Samr Hilmi Abdul
Latif al-Barq, Bashir bin Lap aka Lillie, and Riduan bin Isomuddin aka Hambali.
For example, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to this technique at the safehouse. {Seeemail from: [REDACTED];

to: [REDACTEDl^ubiect^^emo; date^[arct^5^004.) The incident wa^^portedtottieCIAinspectorgeneral.

See

from:

to:

[REDACTED], illriHiHiilH'

subiect^u^elcon^t^a^ 17, 2004, at 11:24 AM. See also claims related to the treatment of
Majid Khan. See
Briefmgfor the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence,
Implementation of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detentionand Interrogation Program, March 14, 2008.

559 director

(012214ZMAR 03); DIRECTOR ••

(252003Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR
mi

M

(040049Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR ••{

(162224Z MAY 03); HEADQUARTERS ••
III I

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enhanced interrogation techniques before they were requested by CIA personnel at the detention
sites.

560

2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country' | and DETENTION SITE
VIOLET in Country |

The CIA entered into an agrcemen^^ the

in Country | to host aCIA detention facility itj|^^^m||2002.^^'

^3,

CIA Headquarters invited the CIA StationinCoun^ | to identify ways to support the
in Country | to "demonstrate to

and the highest levels ofthe [Country |]

government that we deeply appreciate their cooperation and support" for the detention

)rogram.^^^ The Station responded with an $| million "wish list"
CIA Headquarters provided the Station with $| million more than was

requested for the purposes of the |||^| subsidy.^^ CIA detainees were transferred to
DETENTION SITE BLACK inCountry | in the fall of2003.^^^

In August 2003, the U.S. ambassador in Country | sought to
contact State Department officials to ensure that the State Department was aware of the CIA

detention facility and its "potential impact on our policy vis-a-vis the [Country |]
govemment."^^ The U.S. ambassador was told by the CIA Station that this was not possible,
and that no one at the State Department, including the secretary of state, was informed about the

CIA detention facility in Country |. Describing the CIA's position as "unacceptable," the
ambassador then requested a signed document from "at least the President's National Security
Advisor" describing the authorities for the program, including a statement that the CIA's
interrogation techniques met "legal and human rights standards," and an explicit order to him not

to discuss the program with the secretary of state.^^^ CIA Headquarters then sought the
intervention of Deputy Secretary of State Richaid Armitage, who called the U.S. ambassador.
Deputy Secretary Armitage told the CIA to keep him and the secretary of state informed so that
they would not be caught unaware when an ambassador raised concerns.
Nearly a year later, in May 2004, revelations about U.S. detainee
abuses at the U.S. military prison in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, prompted the same U.S. ambassador in

Country | to seek information on CIA detention standards and interrogation methods.-''^'' In the
fall of2004, when |Bi U.S. ambassador to Country | sought documents authorizing the
program, the CIA again sought the intervention of Deputy Secretary Armitage, who once again

5^0 DIRECTOR ••
(012214Z MAR 03); DIRECTOR
[REDACTED] 60040j
*>^2 HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED]

(040049Z MAR 03)

03]

HEADQUARTERS [
According to a cable from CIA Headquarters,

detainees arrived in Country

^•,2003. HEADQUARTERS |
[REDACTED]

568 £,Y^ail from: II^II^BIII^Ktor^^llllllllllllllll^^ subject; Re; DDCI-Armitage call on [Country |]
Detention Facility; date: August®, 2003.
5'^' [REDACTED] 6762 (BIBmAY 04)
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made "strong remarks" to the CIA about how he and the secretary of state were "cut out of the
NSC [National Security Council] clearance/coordination process" with regard to the CIA
program. According to CIA records, Armitage also questioned the efficacy of the program and
the value of the intelligence derived from the program.^^^ Whileit is unclearhow the
ambassador's concerns were resolved, he later joined the chief of Station in making a

presentation to Country |'s ||H^| on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The
presentation talking points did not describe the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but
represented that "[w]ithout the full range of these interrogation measures, we would not have

succeeded in overcoming the resistance of [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad] and other equally
resistant HVDs." The talking points included many of the same inaccurate representations'^^
made to U.S. policymakers and others, attributing to CIA detainees critical information on the
"Karachi Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," the "Second Wave Plot," and the "Guraba Cell"; as well as

intelligence related to Issa al-Hindi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, Hambali, Jose Padilla, Binyam
Mohammed, Sajid Badat, and Jaffar al-Tayyar. The presentation also noted that the president of
the United States had directed that he not be informed of the locations of the CIA detention

facilities to ensure he would not accidentally disclose the information.'^^

a separate country, Country |, the CIA obtained the approval of
the
and the political leadership to establish a detention facility before
informing the U.S. ambassador.'^^ As the CIA chief of Station stated in his request to CIA

Headquarters to brief the ambassador. Country |'s
)robablv would ask the ambassador about the CIA detention facility.'^"^ After!
delayed briefing the

for

months, to the consternation oftheCIAStation^whichwa^ political approval prior to the

arriva^^l^detainees^'^^rh^^^^^^^Hj^^^^HI^ICountry |ofhcial outside of
the

the

was described as

"shocked," but nonetheless approved.'^^

(TS/fl||||^^||||||||H||||/^^^) By mid-2003 the CIA had concluded that its completed, but still
unused "holding cell" in Country | was insufficient, given the growing number ofCIA detainees
in the program and the CIA's interest in interrogating multiple detainees at the same detention
site. The CIA thus sought to build a new, expanded detention facility in the countryThe CIA
Lotus Notes message from Chief of Station

to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from:

I; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],

|;subject: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec ArmitageTdateT^^^lll^^ljjlat7:40:43 PM.
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that"witli regard to the Study's claims that the State Department was 'cut out'
of information relating to theprogram, therecord shows that the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of State...
wereawareof the sites at die time they were operational." As detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA
records indicate the secretary of statewas notinformed of theCIAdetention sitelocations. During meetings witli
theCIA in thesummer of 2013, the Committee requested, but was notprovided, documentaiy evidence to support
the assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response.
See relevant sections of this summary and Volume II for additional details.

"2 HEADQUARTERS ••[REDACTS]

[REDACTED] 64105^B^H|||P
[REDACTED] 30296

See Volume I for additional details.

[REDACTED] 4076 [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] 32266 [REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS W

KM' 'iiTiiiir^|jBBB[[|^BJBJ|iiiii(ii (iiiiii
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also offered $| million to the

to "show appreciation" for the

support for

the program.^^^ According to a CIA cable, however, the

I»579
expanded facility was approved by the

plan tp construct the

of Count

developed complex mechanisms to

in order to provide the $| million
580

in Coun

complicated the arrangements

r^uested an update on planning for the CIA
inaccurately—that the planning had been

when the Coun

detention site, he was told

discontinued.^^^
when thefacilityrcc^ed its first CIA detainees,
informed the CIA^^I^^^Il that the
of Country | "probably has an
incomplete notion[rcgardingtl^^
actual function, i.e., he probably believes that itis
some sort of

center.

m582

3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
Without CIA Headquarters Authorization
cables from the spring of 2003 and afterwards describe

multiple examples of interrogation practices at CIA detention sites that were inconsistent with

the CIA's detention and interrogation guidelines. CIA officer^^ETENTION SITE
COBALT—led principally by Chief ofInterrogations ^ — a l s o described a number
of interrogation activities in cables that were not approved by CIA Headquarters, CIA
Headquarters failed to respond, inquire, or investigate:
•

Cables revealing that the CIA's chief of interrogations used water dousing against
detainees, including with cold water and/or ice water baths, as an interrogation technique
without prior approval from CIA Headquarters

HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 4088
See Volume I for additional details.

*^8' [REDACTED] 5293
582 [REDACTED] 5417

See also FREDACTEDl 5327
. See Volume 111 for additional

details on detainees in Count

MAY 03);
39042
39582 (041743Z JUN 03);
38597 (201225Z MAY 03);

38596 (201220Z MAY 03);
38557 (191641ZMAY 03);

39101 •••

Water dousing was categorized as a "standard|^interTOgatioiUecl^^
III!

11 III I

I nil I III 11

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Cables and records indicating that CIA detainees who were undergoing or had undergone
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were subjected to rectal rehydration,
without evidence of medical necessity, and that others were threatened with it;^^"^
Cables noting that groups of four or more interrogators, who required practical
experience to acquire their CIA interrogation "certification," were allowed to apply the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a group against a single detainee;^^^ and

See
34491 (051400Z MAR 03); Interview of
[REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, Maich 27, ^2003;

REDACTED] and

34575

;email from:
to: [REDACTED]; cc: ^^H^^^Hj^^^^^^ubiectjRejUpdate; date:
at 4:51:32PMr^^^| 12385 (222045Z JUL03)!^^HFo415|H|||H||. In

addition to the rectal rehydration or feeding of al-Nashiri, KSM and Majid Klian, describedelsewhere, there is at

leas^n^^ord ofAb^ubayd^^^eiving "rectal fluid resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids." {See

|B|||^^|i0070

Marwan al-Jabbur was subjected to whatwasoriginallyrefe^

cabl^^i^|enei^," but was later acknowledged to berectal rehydration. {See

email from:

to: ^•^^•••jR^ACTED],

a

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - PvTHj^^Bd^March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.)
Ramzi bin al-Sliibh, Khallad bin Attash and Adnan al-Libi were threatened with rectal rehydration. {See

10415^PHHB|;•••12385

(222045Z JUL 03);

from: •••IHIH;

to:

iiii|i II I li ilii il Evaluation/Update J|||(047); date: March2004.) CIA medical officers discussed
rectal rehydration as a means of behavior control. As one officer wrote, "[w]hile IV infusion is safe and effective,

we were impresse^witluh^ncillat^ffectivenes^^ectann^sion on endin^tfi^waterrefijsaiinas^ case."
{See
froinJI^^^B^BII; to
subject: Re:
(048);

date: February ^7200^) The same officer provided adescription of the procedure, writing that "[r]egarding the

rectal tube, if you place it and open up the IV tubing, the flow will self regulate, sloshingup the large intestines."
Referencing the experience of the medical officerwho subjected KSM to rectal rehydration, the officer wrote that,
"[w]hat I infer is that you get a tube up as far as you can, then open the IV wide. No need to squeeze the bag - let

work." (5e^mail from
to
^Hi
^ntl [REDACTED], February 27, 2004, Subject: Re^^^J(048)^The same
email exchange included a description of a previous application of the technique, in which "we used the largest Ewal
[sicHub^e had." {See email from: [REDACTED]; to {{^^•^^^•||fcccJ^ED ACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject:
(048); date: February
2004, at 11:42:16 PM.) As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into alNashiri "in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." {See
(231709Z

MAY 04).) Majid KhanV^uncl^ray/^on^^ ofhummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was "pureed" and

rectally infused. {See ^^^••^•••3240

(231839Z SEP 04).) The CIA's June 2013 Response does

not address the use of rectal feeding with CIA detainees, but defends the use of rectal rehydration as a "well
acknowledged medical technique." CIA leadership, including General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt,
was also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two detainees at

DETENTION SITE COBALT. CIA attorney mmHHIH was asked to follow up, although CIA records do not
indicate any resolution of the inquiry. CIA records indicate that one of the detainees, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, was later
diagnosed with chronic hemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse. See email from:
[REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc:

[REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS

from the GC Updat^hi^^ornine^ateT^^^^^^^I, at 12:15 PM; email from:
to:
[REDACTED]; cc: BHHHjBjREDACTro], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the
GC Update this Momjng^ate^^Bmimi|, at 1:23:31 PM; email from:
[REDACTED]; cc: ^^^I^^HTfREDACTED]; subject: Re: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Mominj

REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: December |, 2003, at 10:47:32 AM; ••

3223

HEADQUARTERS
See, for example,

38130 (121722Z MAY 03);

38584

38127 (121714ZMAY 03);^||^^^^^^B 38161

(201133Z MAY 03);

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Cables revealing that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were used at CIA

that were not designated as CIA detention sites.^^^
In the first half of 2003, the CIA interrogated four detainees with
medical complications in their lower extremities: two detainees had a broken foot, one detainee

had a sprained ankle, and one detainee had a prosthetic leg.^*^^ CIA interrogators shackled each
of these detainees in the standing position for sleep deprivation for extended periods of time until
medical personnel assessed that they could not maintain the position. The two detainees that
each had a broken foot were also subjected to walling, stress positions, and cramped
confinement, despite the note in their interrogation plans that these specific enhanced

interrogation techniques were not requested because ofthe medical condition of the detainees.^^^
CIA Headquarters did not react to the site's use of these CIA enhanced interrogation techniques
despite the lack of approval.
Over the course of the CIA program, at least 39 detainees were

subjected to one or more of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records
indicate that there were at least 17 CIA detainees who were subjected to one or more CIA
enhanced interrogation techniques without CIA Headquarters approval. This count includes
detainees who were approved for the use of some techniques, but were subjected to unapproved

techniques, as well as detainees for whom interrogators had no approvals to use any of the
techniques. This count also takes into account distinctions between techniques categorized as
"enhanced" or "standard" by the CIA at the time they were appliedThe 17 detainees who
38595 (201216ZMAY 03); |

(131326Z MAY 03);
(121709Z MAY 03).
See, for example, \

38126

35341

[REDACTED]; subject: Memo; date:
MAY 03); •^••H||HH37708

139042(^^MMAY03)jemailfr^^

39098

to:

2005-8085-IGj^^^^^^^^H|| 39101
(051225Z MAY 03);
(271719Z

MAY 03);
39099 (281101Z MAY 03).
For more details, see detainee reviews for Muhammad Umar 'Abd al-Rahman aka Asadallah; Abu Hazim al-Libi;
Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim; and Khallad bin Attash.
The two detainees were Abu Hazim al-Libi and Al-Shara'iya aka Abd al-Karim.

This is a conservative estimate. CIA records suggest that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques may have
also been used against five additional detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT in 2002, which would bring the

number ofCIA detaineessubiecte^(Hh
detainees were

intenogation techniques to 44. Those additional
[DETAINEE R], who was approved for the CIA's enlianced

interrogation techniques, but whose records do not refer to the use oftlie tecliniques (ALEC jlHIii dHliHHH

I)); Ayub Murshid Ali Salih andHa41AzizAhmadA^

whose records refer t^^ac^^leep^unio^^

application ofsleep deprivation (||^|^^^H|^^^^Hf28132 (101143Z OCT 02);

27964 (071949Z OCT 02)); Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, who later told debriefers that, when he was first

captured, he "had to stand up for five day^traigh^nc^nswe^uestions'' and "was also forced to strip naked and
stand in front of a female interrogator"

14353 (231521Z APR 03)); and Sa'id Salili Sa'id,

who later told debriefe^that he was "mistreated and beaten by Americans while bUnd-folded and stripped down to
his underwear in HH "
13386 (090154Z JAN 03)). See also detainee reviews in
Volume III for more information.

The CIA's June 2013 Response objects to the Committee's count, arguing that "[n]o more than seven detainees
received enhanced techniques prior to written Headquarters approval." The CIA's June 2013 Response then asserts

diat "the Study miscounts because itconfusestheuseofstandar^echn^^
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Page 101 of 499
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were subjected to techniques without the approval of CIA Headquarters were: Rafiq Bashir al-

Hami,^^^ Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihandi,^^^ Hikmat Nafi Shaukat,^^^ Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi,
Muhammad Ahmad Ghulam Rabbani aka Abu Badr,^^^ Gul Rahman,Abd al-Rahim al-

tlme they were administered with enhanced techniques that did." This statement in the CIA's June 2013 Response is
inaccurate. First, prior to January 2003, theCIAhad not yet designated any technique as a "standard" technique.
Because sleep deprivation was included in the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum approving the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah, the Committee included, among the 17, CIA detainees
subjectedto sleep deprivation without CIA Headquarters authorization prior to January 2003. In January2003,
sleep deprivation under a specific time limit was categorized as a "standard" CIA interrogation technique. Second,
the January 2003 guidelines state thatadvance CIAHeadquarters approval was required for "standard" techniques
"whenever feasible." For this reason, tlie Committee did not include cases where CIA interrogators failed to obtain
authorization in advance, but did acquireapproval within several days of initiating the use of the "standard"

techniques. Finallywater dousing was not characterized as a "standard" technique until June 2003. {See

DIRECTOR||||||l£ll^

DIRECTOR

JAN 03);

(302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR••

(311702Z

39582 (041743ZJUN 03).) In numerous cases prior to June 2003, water

dousing was expli^ly described in CIA cables as an "enhanced" interrogation technique. {See, for example,

DIRECTOR lllllllipi (I01700Z FEB 03).) The Committee thus included, among the 17, CIA detainees subjected to
water dousing prior to June 2003 without CIA Headquarters authorization. The distinction between standard and

enhanced interrogation techniques, which began in January 2003, was eliminated by CIA leadership in 2005. See
Volume I and Volume III for additional details.

Rafiq Bashir al-Hami was subjected to 72 hours ofslee^epnvationbetweenh^^ arrival atDETENTION SITE

COBALT and his October

2002, interrogation. See ||||g||||^m|||^m|m^ 28297 HHHilHii-

Tawfiq Nasir Awad al-Bihani was subjected to 72 hours ofsleepdeprivationbetw^

SITE COBALT and his October

2002, interrogation. See

arrival at DETENTION

28462

CIA cablesfrom October2002noted thatShaukat was "tired from his regimen of limited sleepdeprivation." See
29381

Lufti al-Arabi al-Gharisi underwent at least two 48-hour sessions ofsleej^^givation in October 2002. See
29036

and

Abu Badr was subjectedtoforcedstandii^^
November 2002. See
596

29352

grasps, and cold temperatures without blankets in
29963

CIA interrogators used sleep deprivation, facial slap, use of cold (including cold cells and cold showers),

takedowns/^ietar^miliPulatioiLil^^iilj-SSiii^lii^EP"^^^'®

29520

29520J

29770^^^^^^H^H||^^^^Hint^iewof

'hard

Rahinan. See |

[CIA OFFICER December

2002; ^^m^^^^^^^Hntervie^o^iammond DUNBAR, January 9, 2003; Memorandum for Deputy Director

of Operati^nsr^oiti^^

January 28, 2003, Subiect^eatlUnvestigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA

InspectorGeneral, Report of Investigation, Deathof a Detainee
(2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005; and
CIA InspectorGeneral, SpecialReview, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001 October 2003), May 7, 2004.
IIIII 111 III

Page 102 of 499
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Nashiri,^^^ Ramzi bin al-Shibh,^^^ Asadallah,^^^ Mustafa al-Hawsawi,^*^^ Abu Khalid,^^^ Laid bin
Duhman aka Abu Hudhaifa,^^^ Abd al-Karim,^®^ Abu Hazim,^"'^ Sayyid Ibrahim,Abu Yasir
al-Jaza'iri,*^^^ and Suleiman Abdullah.^®^ In every case except al-Nashiri, the unauthorized
Abd al-Raliira al-Nasliiri was subjected to unapproved nudity and approximately two-and-a-half days of sleep
deprivation in December 2002, with his arms shackled over his head for as long as 16 hours. See email from:
[DETENTION SITE BLUE]

[^••1^1]

to;

subject; EYES ONLY -

ONLY ~ MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22, 2003.

The facial hold was used against Ramzi bin al-Shibh multipletimes without approval. See m|||^^U0415

10429 (101215Z FEB 03);

(242026Z FEB 03);

(252002Z FEB 03);

10573 (241143Z FEB 03)r^^H 10582
10602 (262020Z FEB 03);

1^633

(011537Z MAR 03)rand^|^| 10704 (071239Z MAR 03).
Interrogators used water dousing, nudity, and cramped confinement on Asadallah witliout having sought or
received authorization from CIA Headquarters. Bathing detainees did not require authorization by CIA

Headquarters; however, as describedin CIA cables, the application of "bathing" in the case of Asadallaliwas done
punitively and was used as an interrogation technique. Nudity was also used in conjunction widi water

dousing/bathing and laterasaninte^^
techmque^ithou^pp^^ fi^om CIA Headquarters. See
134241
and
34310
Mustafa al-Hawsawi was subjected to water dousing without approval from CIA Headquarters. See

•••••••
(081207Z APR 03).
Interrogators used sleep deprivation against AbiHChali^rio^^eekin^uthorizatioi^roiT^I^i^dquarters,

andthen^iledtoobta^^ authorizatioi^5e^^^PH|B|||imii 35193

and

mmilimilimil^l 35341 m^mnil^ljjlf Abu KhaUd had been in CIA custody for 17 days prior to
the use of the technique. Advance autiiorization from CIA Headquarters was therefore "feasible," and thus required
under the guidelines.

Hudhaifa was subjected to baths in which ice water was used, standing sleep deprivation for 66 hours that

was discontinued due to a swollen leg attribute^^rolongec^anding^mdity^n^ietar^nanipu^^

from:

to; [REDACTED],|^H|||||||||||^H,

(5e^mail

llHIHiiH'

1^1

ject: our telecom; date: March ^7^04; CIA Office of Inspector General Report; 2005-8085-IG;
39098

39042

MAY

and

39101 HI^ImAY 03).). No request or approval for the use ofstandard or
enhanced interrogation tecliniques could be located in CIA records.
Abd al-Karim, who suffered from a foot injury incurred during Ills capture, was subjected to cramped

confinement, stres^ositions, and walling despite CIA Headquarters having not approved their use. See
DIRECTOR
^^HImAY 03); and DIRECTOR
Abu Hazim, who also had afoot injury incun^^unn^u^apture^^subjecte^^walling^e^te CIA
Headquaiters having not approved its use. (See

36908

37410 (291828Z APR 03).) Nudity^ietar^riani^^
Abu Hazim at least 13 days prior to receiving approval.

WIO (291828Z APR 03);••••^^••3^3

and

facial grasp were used on
37411 (291829Z APR 03);

DIRECTOR
HiiHiMAY 03).
CIA cables indicate that Sayyid Ibraliim was subjected to sleep deprivation from January 27^004,toJanuary 30,

2004, whichexceeded the 48hoursapproved by CIAHeadqi^ters. See HEADQUARTER^^^^B (272155Z
JAN 04); ||^^^H1303]^P||WAN04XH
•^•jAN 04); ••••1303
[AN04)lMH^lliT|H|H|j^

During March 2003 intenogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, Abu Yasir al-Jaza'iri was "bathed," a term
used to describe water dousing, which was considered at the time to be an enhanced intenogation technique. (See

••{^^••••^l
35558 •••§
MAR 03).) Water dousing had not been approved, and the subsequent
request, by DETENTION SITE BLUE, to use theCWsenhan^ inteiTogation techniques on al-Jaza'iri, did not
include water dousing. See

10990

Intenrogators requested approvals to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Suleiman Abdullah,
including water dousing. CIA Headquarters tlien approved other techniques, but not water dousing. (See

•HlHilHHBi! 36559 •••••I;

Abdullah was nonetheless subjected to water dousing
lOI

DIRECTOR

i|l( III I

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interrogation techniques were detailed in CIA cables, but CIA Headquarters did not respond or
take action against the CIA personnel applying the unauthorized interrogation techniques.
This list does not include examples in which CIA inten-ogators
were authorized to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but then implemented the
techniques in a manner that diverged from the authorization. Examples include Abu Zubair^®^
and, as detailed, KSM, whose intenogators developed methods of applying the waterboard in a
manner that differed from how the technique had previously been used and how it had been
described to the Department of Justice. This count also excludes additional allegations of the
unauthorized use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^®
Over the course of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,
numerous detainees were subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques by untrained
interrogators. As noted, the CIA did not conduct its first training course until November 2002,
by which time at least nine detainees had already been subjected to the techniques.^The DCI's
January 28, 2003, guidelines, which stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA "conducted at least 29 investigationsof RDI-related conduct,
plus two wide-ranging reviews of the program... one involved the death of an Afghan national who was beatenby a
contractor. The individual involved was prosecuted by the Department of Justice and convicted of a felony charge.
Another case involved a contractor whoslapped, kicked, and struckdetainees while they werein military custody.
... [T]hecontractor was terminated from the CIA,had his securityclearances revoked, and was placedon a
contractor watch list." However, the two specific examples providedin the CIA's June 2013 Response refer to
detainees who were never part of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. On November 6, 2013, the CIA
provided a list of "IG Investigations Concerning Detention, Interrogations, and Renditions." The list of 29 included
14 investigations that were diiectly related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Four additional
investigations wererelatedto detainees who claimed theyhad been subjected to abuse in transit from CIA custody
to U.S. mihtary custody at Guantanamo Bay. The remaining 11 investigations were unrelated to tlie CIA's

Detention and Interrogation Prograi^5e^TS #2013-3250.
CIA chief of interrogations,

placed a broomstick behind the knees of Zubair when Zubair was in a

stress position on liis knees on the floor. Although stress positions had been approved for Zubair, the use of the
broomstick was not approved. See April 7, 2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel, CIA Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation Programs, at 22.

Majid KhmUm^laimecHhatJ^

2003, he was subjected to immersion in atub that was filled with ice and

water. {See
Briefing for the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, Implementation
of Central Intelligence Agency Secret Detentionand Interrogation Program,dated March 14, 2008.) While CIA
cables do not confirm bathingor waterdousing. Chiefof Interrogations
subjected Abu Hudhaifa to

m^una^orized) "icy water" bath at the same ^^^^^vhere^jid Khan was held. (See email from:
to: [REDACTE^^REDACTED],

telecon; date:

email from: [REDACTED]

subject:

to:

subject: Memo; dateTHjimm.) Ayub Murshid Ali Salih and Ha'il Aziz Ahmad al-Maythali were described
a^ioMiavin^lept^Ithoueh itis unclear from CIA records whethe^I^ntenjogatore kept them awake. {See
28132 (101143Z OCT 02) and

2^7^64 (071949Z OCT 02).)

Basliir Nasri Ali al-Marwalah told debriefers at Guantanamo Bay that he was "tortured" at DETENTION SITE

COBALT with five days of continual standing and nudity. (See

14353 (231521ZAPR

03).) Sa'id Salih Sa'id likewise informed debriefera at Guantanamo that he was "beaten" while blind-folded in CIA
custody. {See
13386 (090154Z JAN 03).) Sixteen other detainees were held at

DETENTION SITE COBALT between September and December 2002, a periodduring wliich exposure to the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques such as sleep deprivation and nudity cannot be determined based on the
lack of details in CIA cables and related documents.

December4, 2002, TrainingReport, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training
Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running).
1(11 'iM III I

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"may be employed only by approved interrogators for use with specific detainees," raised the
additional issue of approved techniques used by unapproved interrogatorsThe January 28,
2003, DCI guidelines did not explicitly require CIA Headquarters to approve who could use the
CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques, including techniques that were not previously
considered "standard" and that would later be reclassified as "enhanced" interrogation

techniques. Rather, the DCI guidelines required only that "all personnel directly engaged in the
interrogation" be "appropriately screened," that they review the guidelines, and that they receive

"appropriate training" in the implementation of the guidelines.^
4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department ofJustice Approval;
Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding
CIA Headquarters approved requests to use water dousing, nudity,
the abdominal slap, and dietary manipulation, despite the fact that the techniques had not been

reviewed by the Department of Justice.^^'^ Interrogators used the water dousing technique in
various ways. At DETENTION SITE COBALT, detainees were often held down, naked, on a
tarp on the floor, with the tarp pulled up around them to form a makeshift tub, while cold or

refrigerated water was poured on them.^^^ Others were hosed down repeatedly while they were
shackled naked, in the standing sleep deprivation position. These same detainees were

subsequently placed inrooms with temperatures ranging from 59 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit.^^^
^'2 DIRECTOR

director

(311702Z JAN 03). For example, on May |,

2003, CIA interrogatorjtllBiHH applied three facial attention grabs, fiv^aciaHnsul^l^s, and tliree

abdominalslapstoAbd^

underthesupemsioj^fCI/^nterrogator

(See

37821

) HII lia^

[CIA OFFICER 1].

^een approved by CIA Headquarters

to employ the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques on al-Karim; approval had only been provided for |
[CIA OFFICER I] to use the CIA's enhance^nterrogation techniques. (See DIRECTOR
III.) On
CIA interrogator BmHIH' under tlie supervision of
conducted an
intenogation ofAbd al-Karim in which intenogators used the facia^ttentioi^r^faciaHi^^
and abdominal
al-Karim. (See
38583
) ll^^^lhad
approved by CIA Headquarter^^mpl^ the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques against Abd al-Karim. In

another example, on^B||B^^HpETENTION SITE COBALT requested approval for certified intenogators

jjjjjlljj^l^^ and
[CIA OFFICER 1] to use the CIA'senhance^^iTogatiorUechn^^
Kliallad bin Attash, and for tliree other interrogators,
HIHHIil^^ndJ|i|H|HHIHHl to
also use the techniquesj|unde^^
supervision of senior certified intenogator[||§^(]7^5^

H|[||H 38325

)

CIA Headquarters approved the use ofCIA's enhanced

intenogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash, but the approval cable did not include approval for participation
by

n;ssupervision. (See DIRECTOR ••
Iunder^^^^^^

or

03).) On May 17 and 18, 2003,
Attash under the supervision of

(162224Z MAY

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on bin

I, including facial grabs, facial insult slaps^abdomina^^

water dousing. See

and

38557 (191641Z MAY 03); g||||||||^||^|^||^ 3339^

(201225Z MAY 03).

DIRECTOR n i l (302I26Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR••

(311702Z JAN 03). The DCI guidehnes provided

no further information, other than to note that the screening should be "from the medical, psychological, and
security standpoints."
See, for example, DIRECTOR
(10I700Z FEB 03).

In the case of Abu Hudhaifa, and allegedly Majid Khan, intenogators placed the detainee in an actual tub in a
CIA
when employing water dousing that included ice water.
CIA cable records often describe tlie detainees as naked after tlie water dousing, while other records omit such
detail. See Volume III for additional information.

III!

11 III I

iim imii

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Other accounts suggest detainees were water doused while placed on a waterboard.^'^ Although
CIA Headquarters approved the use of the "waterdousing" interrogation technique on several
detainees, interrogators used it extensively on a number of detainees without seeking or
obtaining prior authorization from CIA Headquarters.^^^

(TS/^H(^^^^U^^}F^runtenjoeation sessions on April 5, 2003, and April 6, 2003,
seniorCIA interrogator

another interrogator used the waterdousing

technique on detainee Mustafa al-Hawsawi at DETENTION SITE COBALT. Al-Hawsawi later

described the session to a different CIA interrogator,
who wrote that alHawsawi might have been waterboarded or subjected to treatment that "could be

indistinguishable from the waterboard."^^^ Anemail from the interrogator stated that:
"We did not prompt al-Hawsawi - he described the process and the table on
his own. As you know, I have serious reservations about watering them in a
prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the
effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on

the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the
effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.

I have real problems with putting one of them on the water board for 'dousing.'
Putting him in a head down attiaide and pouring water around his chest and
face is just too close to the water board, and if it is continued may lead to
problems for us."^-^
Several months later, the incident was referred to the CIA inspector
general for investigation. A December 6, 2006, inspector general report summarized the findings
of this investigation, indicating that waterwas poured on al-Hawsawi while he was lying on the
floor in a prone position, which, in the opinion of at least one CIA interrogatorquoted in the

report, "can easily approximate waterboarding."^-^ The OIG could not corroborate whether alHawsawi was strapped to the waterboard when he was interrogated at DETENTION SITE
COBALT. Bodi of the interrogators who subjected al-Hawsawi to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on April 6, 2003, said that al-Hawsawi cried out for God while the
J^ng
[REDACTED] account; to:
subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003.

Email from;

and

Foradditional details, see Volume III^
Email from:

using

Email from:

^^^^^^^u^ng

[REDACTED] account;

su^j^^^j^^^^^jjidMt; date: November 21, 2003.
[REDACTED] account; to:

and
subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident; date: November 21, 2003. Volume III of tlie
Committee Study includes a CIA photograph of a wooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE COBALT. As detailed

in thefull Committee Study, there are norecords of theCIAusing the waterboard interrogation technique at
COBALT. The waterboard device in thephotograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink
solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of waterboard. In

meetings between the Committee staffandtheCIA in the summer of 2013, the CL\ was unable to explain thedetails
of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at
DETENTION SITE COBALT.

CIA OIGDisposition Memorandum, "Alleged Useof Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case20047604-IG, December 6, 2006.
I(II

I (III I

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water was being poured on him and one of the interrogators asserted that this was because of the
cold temperature of the water. Both of the interrogators also stated that al-Hawsawi saw the
waterboard and that its purpose was made clear to hira. The inspector general report also
indicates that al-Hawsawi's experience reflected "the way water dousing was done at
[DETENTION SITE COBALT]," and that this method was developed with guidance from CIA

CTC attorneys and the CIA's Office of Medical Services.^^^
Inuring the same time that al-Hawsawi claimed he was placed on
the waterboard in April 2003, a CIA linguist claimed that CIA detainee Abu Hazim had also

been water doused in away that approximated wate^arding.^^^

Country^^HH from HIHI' ^003, until

2003, told the OIG that;

alinguist in

"when water dousing was used on Abu Hazim, a cloth covered Abu Hazim's
face, and
[CIA OFFICER 1]] poured cold water directly on Abu

Hazim's face to disrupt his breathing. [Th^ingui^said that when Abu

Hazim turned blue, Physician's Assistant [^H^^|] removed the cloth so
that Abu Hazim could breathe."^^'^

allegation was reported to the CIA inspector general on

August 18, 2004. The CIA reported this incident as a possible criminal violation on September

CIA OIG Disposition Memorandum, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques" OIG Case 20047604-lG, December 6, 2006.

An accusation related to an additional detainee was included in a September 6, 2012, Human Rights Watch report
entitled, "Delivered Into Enemy Hands." The report asserts that documents and interviews of former detainees
contradict CIA claims that "only three men in US custody had been waterboarded." Specifically, the report states
that Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, "provided detailed and credible testimony that he was waterboarded
on repeated occasions duringUS intenogations in Afghanistan." According to the report, Mohammed Shoroeiya
stated that a hood was placed over his head and he was strapped to a "wooden board." Tlie former CIA detainee
stated that after being strapped to the waterboard, "then they start with the water pouring... They start to pour water

to the point where you feel like you are suffocating." As detailed in the full Committe^h^, Mohammed
Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE

on April

2003.

Wliile there are no CIA records of Mohammed Shoroeiya, aka Abd al-Karim, being subjected to the waterboard at

DETENTION SITE ^||H, the full nature of the CIMn^ogations at DETENTION SITE

largely unknown. Detainees at DETENTION SITE |BI|Hi

remains

subjected to techniques that were not recorded

in cable traffic, including multiple periods of sleep deprivation, required standing, loud music, sensory deprivation,

extended isolation, reduced quantity and quality offood, nudity, and "rough treatment." As described^^ol^e III

oftlie Committee Study includes aCIA photograph ofawooden waterboard at DETENTION SITE |m[||||||. As
detailed in the full Committee Study, there are no records of the CIA using the waterboard intenogation technique at
DETENTION SITE
waterboard device in the photograph is surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of
unknown pink solution (filled two thirdsof tlie way to the top) and a watering can restingon the wooden beamsof
waterboard. In meetings between the Committee staff and tlie CIA in the summer of 2013, tlie CIA was unable to

explain the details ofthe photograpM^nclude the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's

presence at DETENTION SITEI^BB-

response to the allegations in the September 2012 Human Rights

Watch report, the CIA stated: "The agency has been on the record that there are three substantiated cases in which
detainees were subjectedto the waterboarding technique underthe program." See "Libyan Alleges Waterboarding
by CIA, Report Says," New York Times, September 6, 2012.

CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December6, 2006. 2004-7771716.

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10, 2004, to the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia.^^^ The inspector
general report concluded that there was no corroboration of the linguist's allegation, stating,
"[t]here is no evidence that a cloth was placed over Abu Hazim's face during water dousing or
that his breathing was impaired.

5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques
In the summer of 2003, the CIA captured three Southeast Asian

operatives: Zubair,^-^ Lillie,^^^ and Hambali. (These captures are discussed later in this

summary in the section entitled, "The Capture of Hambii.")^^^
August 2003, Hambali was captured and transferred to CIA
custodyDespite assessments that Hambali was cooperative in the interview process without
"the use of more intrusive standard interrogation procedures much less the enhanced measures,"

CIA interrogators requested and obtained approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques on Hambali approximately a month after his transfer to CIA custodyIn late 2003,
Hambali recanted most of the significant information he had provided to interrogators during the
use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, recantations CIA officers assessed to be

credible.^^^ According to a CIA cable:
CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of Unauthorized Techniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-7771716.
626

CIA IG Disposition Memo, "Alleged Use of UnauthorizedTechniques," dated December 6, 2006. 2004-77717-

84854^
87617

impilj^l 87426 (111223Z AUG 03). Lillie was subjected to die

CIA's enhanced inteiTOgation techniques almost immediately upon his anival at DETENTION SITE COBALT, on

August |, 2003. H^wa^|strippe^nii^lo^thing," and "placed in acell in the standing sleep deprivation position,

in darkness." {See

1242 (151914Z AUG 03).) A day later an interrogation plan for

Lillie, including the use oftheCIA^senhancedii^rrogation techniques, was submitted toCIA Headquarters on

August | , 2003. {See
ofthe CIA's enhancedinten-ogati^^

1243 (152049Z AUG 03).) CIA Headquarters approved the use
on Lillie on the following day, August | , 2003. {See

HEADQUARTERS |||m||| (llHHI AUG 03).) As described, the Committee's count of detainees subjected to

unauthorized techniques did not include detainees such as Lillie, who were subjected to the CIA's "standard"
techniques prior to authorization from CIA Headquarters, but for whom authorization from CIA Headquarters was
acquired shortly thereafter. As noted, tlieJanuary 2003 guidelines requiredadvance approval of such techniques

"whenever feasible."

629 ••^••19515

HHH B7414
'Hambali Capture." For additional details, see Volume II.

^^"^^^^•87617
631

1271

AUG 03);

1267

AUG 03).

The cable also noted that CIA contractor Hammond DUNBAR had arrived at the detention site and was

participating in Hambali's interrogations as an interrogator. The "psychological assessment"portion of the cable
was attributed to a CIA staff psychologist, however, and not to DUNBAR.

CIA officers interrogating Hambali in November 2003 wrote about Hambali's "accountof how, through
statements read to liim and constant repetition of questions, he was made aware of what type of answers his
questioners wanted. [Hambali] said he merely gave answers that were similar to what was being asked and what he
infened the interrogator or debriefer wanted, and when the pressure subsided or he was told that the information he
gave was okay, [Hambali] knew that he had provided the answer that was being sought." The cable states, "Base
assesses [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible. [Hambali]'s admission came after three
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"he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on
himself ... and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali]

assessed thequestioners wanted to hear."^^^
officers later suggested that the misleading answers and
resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA*s
enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, LilHe, may
not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and
their poor English language skills.

6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters
Questions Detention ofDetainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S.
Military Custody and Heldfor An Additional Four Years
In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan
national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape

through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001.^^^ After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation,
Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his
hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family." According to CIA
cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding

them to the dogs."^^^

Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep.^^^ Two days later,
however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to
21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced
weeks of daily debriefing sessions with [tlie case officer] carried out almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali]
has consistently waimed to [tlie case officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer]
additional information that he had avoided in tlie past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to
[the case officer] about his fears and motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali]

looks to [the case officer] ashis sole confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind^^J^5e^^

BIH

(301055Z NOV 03). Tliis cable appears to have been retransmitted the following day as

1144 (010823Z DEC 03).

®3H|||||11^(301055ZNOV03)

1072 (110606Z OCX 03)^^^^^Bl075(lJ^28Z OCX 03);
(08I459Z DEC 03);

1142 (301055Z NOV 03);

1604 (191232Z JAN 04). After an Indonesian

speaker was deployed to debrief Hambali, the debriefer "got the distinct impression [Hambali] was just responding
'yes' in the typical Indonesian cultural manner when they [sic] do not comprehend a question." Xhe CIA cable then
noted that, "lj]ust to clarify, [the Indonesian speaking debriefer] then posed the same question in Indonesian," and

"[w]itliout pause, [Hambah] rephe^witf^direct contradiction, claiming tliat on 20 September 2001, he was in
Karachi, not Qandahar." (See

1^75 (111828Z OCX 03).) A January 2004 cable stated that "Lillie is of

limited value," adding that "[h]is English is very poor, and we do not have a Malay linguist." See

j^miH 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). See also detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information.
<^3SWASHINGX0N|

^^^^Hm^^^^^Hl393^01006Z OCX 03). Xhe information was also released in

|48122mi^^mi|||. CIA records indicate that the CIA's interrogations ofArsala Khan resulted
in one disseniinated intelligencerepo^ derived from information Khat^roWde^h^a^Mi^j^rienced the
hallucinations.

via CIA WASHINGXON DC

<53^ ^^^^^^^^^Bi3^201006Z OCX 03)
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interrogation techniques "[d]ue to lack of information from [Arsala Klian] pinning him directly
to a recent activity.Three days after the reporting about Khan's hallucinations, and after the
interrogators had already subjected Khan to the additional 21 hours of standing sleep deprivation
(beyond the initial 56 hours), CIA Headquarters sent a cable stating that RDG and the Office of

Medical Services believed that Arsala Khan should not be subjected to additional standing sleep
deprivation beyond the 56 hours because of his hallucinations.^^'^
After approximately a month of detention and the extensive use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Arsala Khan, tlie CIA concluded that the
"detainee Arsala Khan docs not appear to be the subject involved in... current plans or activities

against U.S. personnel or facilities," and recommended that he be released to his village with a
cash payment.^® CIA interrogators at DETENTION SITE COBALT instead transferred him to
U.S. military custody, where he was held for an additional four years despite the development of
significant intelligence indicating that the source who reported that Arsala Khan had aided
Usama bin Laden had a vendetta against Arsala Khan's family.^^
7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBALT Opens, the CIA Reports "Unsettling Discovery
That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little"
In the fall of 2003, CIA officers began to take a closer look at the

CIA detainees being held in Country

raising concerns about both the number and types of

detainees being held by the CIA. CIA officers in Country | provided a list ofCIA detainees to
CIA Headquarters, resulting in the observation by CIA Headquarters that they had not previously
had the names of all 44 CIA detainees being held in that country. At the direction of CIA

Headquarters, the Station in Country | "completed an exhaustive search ofall available records
in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of the [CIA] detainees." A December 2003

cable from the Station in Country | to CIA Headquarters stated that;
"In the process of this research, we have made the unsettling discovery that we
are holding a number of detainees about whom we know very little. The

majority of [CIA] detainees in [Country | | have not been debriefed for months
and, in some cases, for over a year. Many of them appear to us to have no
further intelligence value for [the CIAl and should more properly be turned

over to the [U.S. military], to [Country |] authorities or to third countries for
further investigation and possibly prosecution. In a few cases, there does not
appear to be enough evidence to continue incarceration, and, if this is in fact
the case, the detainees should be released."^^
638

HEADQUARTERS

^0 HEADQUARTERS
' See, for example.
;HEADQUARTERS

,^^^^1375
1375

; HEADQUARTERS
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Records indicate that all of these CIA detainees had been kept in

solitary confinement. The vast majority of these detainees were later released, with some
receiving CIA payments for having been held in detention.

8. CIA Detention Sites in Country | Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support
the Interrogations of Detainees

Throughout 2003, the CIA lacked sufficient personnel and
adequate translators to conduct debriefings and interrogations in Counti7
Because of this
personnel shortage, a number of detainees who were transferred to CIA custody were not
inten-ogated or debriefed by anyone for days or weeks after their arrival at CIA detention

facilities in Country

As noted ina cable from the CIA Station in Country |, in April 2003:

"Station is supporting the debriefing and/or interrogation of a lai'ge number of
individuals... and is constrained by a lack of personnel which would allow us

to fully process them in a timely manner."^^
I.

Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues

1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care
While CIA Headquarters informed the Department of Justice in
July 2002 "that steps will be taken to ensure that [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way

exacerbated by the use of these [enhanced inteiTogation] methods,"^"^^ CIA Headquarters
informed CIA interrogators that the interrogation process would take "precedence" over Abu

Zubaydah's medical care.^"^^ Beginning on August 4, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was kept naked, fed a
"bare bones" liquid diet, and subjected to the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation

techniques.^'^® On August 15, 2002, medical personnel described how Abu Zubaydah's

interrogation resulted in the "steady deterioration" of his surgical wound from April 2002.^'^^ On

This included Sa^ Habib

Zarmein ("a nominal payment"), Modin Nik Mohammed ($H|), and Ali

Saeed Awadh ($|HH). See Volume III for additional details.
For detailed information, see Volume III.

36229 (060943Z APR 03). See also detainee reviews for Lillie, Hambali, Mustafa alHawsawi, and Suleiman Abdullah.

See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee,

Assistant Attorn^ General, Office ofLegal Counsel, August 1, 2002, InteiTogation ofal Qaeda Operative."

ALEC H|B|(18232.1Z JUL 02)

See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information, as well as email from:
[REDACTED], to:
[REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15, 2002, at 06:54
AM.

An email to OMS stated: "We are currently providing absolute minimum wound care (as evidenced by the steady
deterioration of the wound), [Abu Zubaydah] has no opportunity to practice any form of hygienic self cai*e (he's

filtliy), the physical nature of this phase dictates multiple physical stresses (liis reaction to today's activity is I

believe the culprit for the superioredgesepara^n), and nutrition is bare bones (six cans ofensure daily)." See
email from: [REDACTED], to: HHHUII and [REDACTED], subject: 15 Aug Clinical; date: August 15,
2002, at 06:54 AM.

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August 20, 2002, medical officers wrote that Abu Zubaydah's wound had undergone

"significant" deterioration.^^^ Later, after one of Abu Zubaydah's eyes began todeteriorate,^^'
CIA officers requested a test of Abu Zubaydah's other eye, stating that the request was "driven
by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ." The cable relayed, "[w]e have a
lot riding upon his abihty to see, read and write."^^^
In April 2003, CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each

broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placedin castsCIA cablesrequesting
the use of the CIA's enhanced inten*ogation techniques on the two detainees stated that the
interrogators would "foregocramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical

shackling (due to [the detainees'] injury)."^^"^ Notwithstanding medical concerns related to the
injuries, both of these detainees were subjected to one or more of these CIA enhanced

interrogation techniques prior to obtaining CIA Headquarters approval.^^^
I" the case of Abu Hazim, on May 4, 2003, the CIA regional

medical officer examined Abu Hazim and recommended that he avoid all weight bearing
activities for an additional five weeks due to his broken foot.^^^ In the case of Abd al-Karim, on
April 18, 2003, a CIA physician assistant recommended that al-Karim avoid extended standing

for "a couple of weeks."^^^ Six days later, on April 24, 2003, CIA Headquarters reviewed x-rays
of al-Karim's foot, diagnosing him with a brokenfoot, and reconmiending no weight bearing and

the use of crutches for a total of three months.^^^ Despite these recommendations, on May 10,
650

10647 (201331Z AUG 02);

10654 (211318Z AUG 02);

10679 (250932Z

AUG 02)

Records indicate that Abu Zubaydah ultimatelylost the eye. See
1^679 (250932Z AUG 02);

11026(070729Z OCT 02).

11026 (070729Z OCT 02)

44147 ^^••^H[^^H||^^^Hy6862(m352Z

APR 03)

36862

APR

To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled
standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent

disruptions ofnormal sleeping patterns." For water dousing^he detaineesM^
lastic." The requests were approved. See DIRECTOR

would be "wrapped in
DIRECTOR

With regard to Abu Hazim, on April 24, 2003,an additionalCIA Headquarters approval cable was sent to

DETENTION SITE COBALT authorizing interrogator IH||H|||||||^||||||i to use the attention grasp, facial insult
slap, abdominal slap, water dousing, and slee^eprivatwrui^^^io^; the cable did not approve the use of

walling or the facial hold. (See DIRECTOR B|||

Despite tlie lack of approval, walling was

used against Abu Hazim on April28-29, 2003, and the facial hold was used on April 27, 2003.
37411 (291829Z APR 03);

37410 (291828Z APR 03);

37509 (021309^MA^^3V^A May 10,2003, CIA Headquarters cable approved walling and the facial
grasp. (See DIRECTOR
03).) Abd al-Karimwas also subjected to unapprovedCIA
enhanced interrogation techniques that the detention site initially indicated would not be used due to the detainee's

injuries. Without approval from CIA Headquarters, CIA interrogators subjected Abd al-Karim to cramped

confinement^n^£r^^

2003; stress positions on Apri^^003^ndwalling on April 21, and 29, 2003. (See

37121 (221703Z APR 03);
37152 (231424Z APR 03);
37202 (250948Z APR 03);
37508 (021305Z MAY 03).) On
May 10, 2003, CIA Headquarters approved an expanded list of CIA enhanced interrogation techniques that could be

used against Abd al-KarimJncl^ing walling and stress positions. See DIRECTOR
DIRECTOR •••
MAY 03)
36862 (181352Z APR 03)
DIRECTOR I
KM

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2003, CIA interrogators believed that both Hazim and al-Karim were "strong mentally and

physically due to [their] ability to sleep in the sitting position."^^^ On May 12, 2003, a different
CIA physician assistant, who had not been involved in the previous examinations determining
the need for the detainees to avoid weight bearing, stated that it was his "opinion" that Abu
Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries were "sufficiently healed to allow being placed in the

standing sleep deprivation position."^^^ He further reported that he had "consulted with [CIA's
Office of Medical Services] via secure phone and OMS medical officer concurred in this

assessment."^^^ CIA Headquarters approved the use of standing sleep deprivation against both
detainees shortly thereafter.As a result, both detainees were placed in standing sleep
deprivation. Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation from June 3-5,
2003,^^^ and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation on

May 15, 2003.^^^
detainee Asadallah was left in the standing sleep deprivation

positiondespite a sprained ankle. Later, when Asadallah was placed in stress positions on his
knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. Asadallah was told he could not sit unless
he answered questions truthfully

2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues

Psychological and behavioral problems experienced by CIA
detainees, who were held in austere conditions and in solitary confinement, also posed
38161 (13I326Z MAY 03)

38262 (150541Z MAY 03);
38161 (131326ZMAY03)
38161 (131326ZMAY03)

MAY 03) for Abu Hazim; and DIRECTOR|

See DIRECTOR

MAY 03) for

Abd al-Karim.
663

|39656(060955Z JUN 03)

39582 (041743Z JUN 03);
38365 (170652Z MAY 03)

664

Asadallah was also placed in a"small isolation bo^^o^^riinutes^vi^ authorizatior^n^ithoiit discussion

of how the technique would affect hisankl^(5^^|H[^^^^^^^^^^^^4098
34294

34nO^|HB|iH.)

While CIA records contain information on other detainee medical complaints (see Volume III), those records also

suggest that detainee medicalcomplaints could be underreported in CIA medical records. For example, CIA
medical records consistently report that CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh had no medical complaints. However,
CIA interrogation records indicate that when bin al-Shibhhad previously complained of ailments to CIA personnel,

he was subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogationtechniques and told by CIA inte^ogators that liis medical

condition was not ofconcern to the CIA. (5ee |H|HH 10591 (252002Z FEB 03); m[||p|||10627 (281949Z
FEB 03).) In testimony on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden referenced medical care of detainees in
the context of the ICRC report on CIA detentions. Hayden testified to the Committee; "The medical section of the
ICRC report concludes that the association of CIA medical officers witlithe intenogation program is 'contrary to
international standaids of medical ethics.' That is just wrong. Tlie role of CIA medical officers in tlie detainee

program is and always has been and always will be to ensure thesafety and the well-being of the detainee. The
placement of medical officers during the interrogation techniques represents an extra measure of caution. Our
medical officers do not recommend the employment or continuation of any procedures or techniques. The allegation
in the report that a CIA medical officer threatened a detainee, stating that medical care was conditional on
cooperation is blatantly false. Healthcare has always been administered basedupon detainee needs. It's neither
policy nor practice to link medical care to any other aspect of the detainee program." This testimony was
incongruent with CIA records.
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management challenges for the
For example, later in his detention, Ramzi bin al-Shibh
exhibited behavioral and psychological problems, including visions, paranoia, insomnia, and

attempts at self-harm.^^^ CIA psychologists linked bin al-Shibh's deteriorating mental state to
his isolation and inability to cope with his long-term detention.^^^ Similarly, 'Abd al-Rahim alNashiri's unpredictable and disruptive behavior in detention made him one of the most difficult

detainees for the CIA to manage. Al-Nashiri engaged in repeated belligerent acts, including

throwing his food tray,^^^ attempting to assault detention site personnel,and trying to damage
items inhis cell.^^^ Over a period ofyears, al-Nashiri accused the CIA staff ofdrugging or
poisoning his food and complained of bodily painand insomnia.^^^ As noted, at one point, alNashiri launched a short-lived hunger strike, and the CIA responded by force feeding him

rectally.^^^ An October 2004 psychological assessment ofal-Nashiri was used by the CIA to
advance its discussions with National Security Council officials on establishing an "endgame"

for the program.^^'^ In July 2005, CIA Headquarters expressed concern regarding al-Nashiri's
"continued state of depression and uncooperative attitude."^"^^ Days later a CIA psychologist
assessed that al-Nashiri was on the "verge of a breakdown."^^^
Beginning in March 2004, and continuing until his rendition to

U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in September 2006, Majid Khan engaged in a series of
hunger strikes and attempts at self-mutilation that required significant attention from CIA
detention site personnel. In response to Majid Khan's hunger strikes, medical personnel
Foradditional details, see Volume III.

••••
1759 (0213I9ZQCT04);HEADQUARTERSl|^Hm40023ZNOV05);|
(171225Z NOV 04);
(140915Z NOV 04);
(06I620Z DEC 04);
2207(1113I9Z APR 05)I^^^Hl2210a^7Z APR05)~|^|H2535 (051805Z JUL05);

^^••^9 (120857ZJUL05)n^^^|2830 (29I304Z AUG 05);
1890 (171225Z NOV
040r^^B^^^^893^00831Z NOV 04); CIA document entitled, "Detainee Talking Points for ICRC Rebuttal, 12
April2007T||^BIB2210(141507Z APR 05); •^^••25^(051805Z JUL 05);
2210
(141507Z APR05)r^H|||[B225 (051805Z JUL05)I^B|| 2830 (291304Z AUG 05);
1930 (061620Z DEC

2210 (141507Z APR 05)

2210(141507Z APR 05);

2535 (051805ZJUL05);

2830 (29i304Z AUG

1691 (081609Z SEP04);
1_716(180742Z SEP 04);
1998 (020752Z JAN
2023 (151735Z JAN 05);
2515 (301946Z JUN 05);
1150
(282019Z NOV 03)
1029 (291750Z JUN 06);
1_142 (041358Z AUG 06);
1543 (111600Z AUG04);
17I6(180742Z SEP 04);
3051 (301235Z SEP 05);
1029 (291750Z JUN 06)
See, for example,
2474 (251622ZJUN 05);
2673 (021451Z AUG 05);
1716(180742Z SEP 04).
See, for example,
1356 (011644Z JUL 04);
(140917Z NOV 04);
1959(111700Z DEC 04);
I II II III I III I nil
1959 (111700Z DEC 04);

05);

2038 (211558ZJAN05)^^^BPHIHi 1091 (031835Z NOV 03);

1266 (052309Z JAN 04); ^••••|^HT63?(271^0Z

MAR 04).

1^11^^^11203 (231709ZMAY04)7^^H^U 1202 (231644Z MAY04). CIA records indicate that at

least five detainees were subjected to rectalrehydration or rectal feeding; Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,

Khalid Shaykh MohammadjMaiid^

Email from; ••••••;

to:

and Marwan al-Jabbur. See Volume III for additional details.

[DETENTION SITE BLACK|j|Hcc:

subject: InteiTogator Assessments/Request for Endgame Views; date: October 30, 2004.

HEADQUARTERS ^^1(282217Z JUL 05)

CIA Sametime exchange, dated 29/JUL/05 08:01:51 - 08:50:13; between
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implemented various techniques to provide fluids and nutrients, including the use of a
nasogastric tube and the provision of intravenous fluids. CIA records indicate that Majid Khan

cooperated with the feedings and was permitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.^^^
After approximately three weeks, the CIA developed a more aggressive treatment regimen

"without unnecessary conversation."^^^ Majid Khan was then subjected to involuntary rectal
feeding and rectal hydration, which included two bottles of Ensure. Later that same day, Majid
Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hunmius, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins, was "pureed"

and rectally infused.®^^ Additional sessions ofrectal feeding and hydration followed.^^^ In
addition to his hunger strikes, Majid Klian engaged in acts of self-harm that included attempting

to cuthis wrist on two occasions,^^^ an attempt tochew into his arm at the innerelbow,^^^ an
attempt to cut a vein in the top of his foot,^^^ and an attempt to cut intohis skin at theelbow joint
using a filed toothbrush.^^"^
J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at
the CIA About Possible Lack of Policy Supportfor CIA Interrogation Activities

On several occasions in early 2003, CIA General Counsel Scott
Muller expressed concern to the National Security Council principals, White House staff, and
Department of Justice personnel that the CIA's program might be inconsistent with public
statements from the Administration that the U.S. Government's treatment of detainees was

"humane."^^^ CIA General Counsel Muller therefore sought to verify with White House and
Department of Justice personnel that a February 7, 2002, Presidential Memorandum requiring the

U.S. military to treat detainees humanely did not apply to the CIA.^^^ Following those
3183(161626ZSEP 04);

3190(181558ZSEP 04); H
3197 (201731ZSEP04);
m35 (120625Z SEP04);

3184(161628ZSEP04);
3196 (201731ZSEP 04);
3206 (211819ZSEP 04);
3181 (161621ZSEP04)

n 3237 (230552Z SEP 04)
3240 (231839ZSEP04)

13259 (261734Z SEP 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "rectal
rehydration" is a "well acknowledged medical technique to address pressing health issues." A follow-up CIA
document provided on October 25,2013 (DTS #2013-3152), states that "[fjrom a health perspective, Majid Klian
became uncooperative on 31 August 2004, when he initiated a hunger strike and before he underwent rectal
rehydration... CIA assesses that the use of rectal rehydration is a medically sound hydration technique...." Tlie
assertion that Majid Khan was "uncooperative" prior to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding is inaccurate. As
described in CIA records, prior to being subjected to rectal rehydration and rectal feeding, Majid Khan cooperated
with the nasogastric feedings and was pennitted to infuse the fluids and nutrients himself.
3694 (301800Z NOV 04);

4242 (191550Z MAR 05);

[4250 (221213Z MAR 05)

n 3724 (031723Z DEC 04)
3835 (260659Z DEC 04)

14614 (071358Z JUN 05)
Febmary 12,2003, MFR from Scott Muller, Subject: "Humane" treatmentof CIA detainees; March 7, 2003,
Memorandum for DDCIA from Muller, Subject: Proposed Response to Human Rights Watch Letter.
January 9, 2003, Draft Memorandum for Scott Mueller [sic], General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency,

from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral^Offic^^^ga^o^^ re: Application ofthe President's
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discussions in early 2003, the White House press secretary was advised to avoid using the term
"humane treatment" when discussing the detention of al-Qa'ida and Taliban personnel.^^^
In mid-2003, CIA officials also engaged in discussions with the
Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and attorneys in the White House on whether
representations could be made that the U.S. Government complied with certain requirements
arising out of the Convention Against Torture, namely that the treatment of detainees was
consistent with constitutional standards in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.In
late June 2003, after numerous inter-agency discussions, William Haynes, the general counsel of
the Department of Defense, responded to a letter from Senator Patrick Leahy stating that it was

U^Sjolicy to compl^witl^hes^tantods.^^^ According to amemorandum from the CIA's
H^BcTC Legal,
August 1, 2002, OLC opinion provided alegal

"safe harbor" for the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation techniques.The August 1, 2002,
opinion did not, however, address the constitutional standards described in the letter from
William Haynes.
In July 2003, after the White House made a number of statements
again suggesting that U.S. treatment of detainees was "humane," the CIA asked the national

security advisor for policy reaffirmation of the CIA's use of its enhanced interrogation
techniques. During the time that request was being considered, CIA Headquarters stopped
approving requests from CIA officers to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^'
Because of this stand-down, CIA interrogators, with CIA Headquarters approval, instead used
repeated applications of the CIA's "standard" interrogation techniques. These "standard"
techniques were coercive, but not considered to be as coercive as the CIA's "enhanced"

interrogation techniques. At this time, sleep deprivation beyond 72 hours was considered an
February 7, 2002, Memorandum on the Geneva Convention (HI) of 1949 to the Release of an al Qaeda Detainee to

the Custody of the CIA. The memorandum statedthat neither al-Qa'ida nor Taliban detainees qualified as prisoners
of war under Geneva, and that Common Article 3 of Geneva, requiring humane treatment of individuals in a

conflict, did not apply to al-Qa'ida orTaliban detainees
March 18, 2003, Memorandum for the Recordfrom

Subject: meeting with DOJ and NSC

Legal Adviser.

See, for example, March 18, 2003, email firom: HHIHHH; to: Scott Muller; subject: Memorandum for
the Record - Telcoi^itl^LC^^: March 13, 2003^mailft2mj^ott W. Muller; to: Stanley M. Moskowitz, John

H. Moseman; cc: HjH^H^^H^oht^. Rizzo,

subject: Interrogations; date: April 1,2003, at

1:18:35 PM; emailfromT^^^^^^H; to: Scott Muller; cc: John Rizzo, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED]; subject: Black letter law on Interrogations; Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and
Interrogation of Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel; date: April 17, 2003.
June 25, 2003, Letter from William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense to Patrick
Leahy, United States Senate.

June 30, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from

Subject: White House Meeting on

Enhanced Techniques (DTS #200^659)^^^^^
See, for example, email fi-om:
to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: FYI - Draft
Paragraphs for the DCI on the Legal Issues on Interrogation, as requested by the General Counsel; date: March 14,

2003; June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.htm; email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,

|; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on
Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003; July 3, 2003, Memorandum for National Security Advisor
fromDirectorof Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency's
Interrogation Program.

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"enhanced" interrogation technique, while sleep deprivation under 72 hours was defined as a
"standard" CIA interrogation technique. To avoid using an "enhanced" interrogation technique,
CIA officers subjected Khallad bin Attash to 70 hours of standing sleep deprivation, two hours
less than the maximum. After allowing him four hours of sleep, bin Attash was subjected to an
additional 23 hours of standing sleep deprivation, followed immediately by 20 hours of seated

sleep deprivation.^^^
Unlike during most of the CIA's interrogation program, during the
time that CIA Headquarters was seeking policy reaffirmation, the CIA responded to infractions
in the interrogation program as reported through CIA cables and other communications.

Although Hmm, the chief of the intenrogations program in RDG, does not appear to have
been investigated or reprimanded for training interrogators on the abdominal slap before its use
was approved,training significant numbers of new inten-ogators to conduct interrogations on
potentially compliant detainees,or conducting large numbers of water dousing on detainees
without requesting or obtaining authorizationthe CIA removed his certification to conduct
interrogations in late July 2003 for placing a broom handle behind the knees of a detainee while
that detainee was in a stress position.^^^ CIA Headquartersalsodecertified two other

interrogators,

[CIA OFFICER 1] and HIHHH'

period,

although there are no official records of why those decertifications occun*ed.^^^
2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security
Council, Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss ofLife,
Possibly Extensive Policymakers Reauthorize Program
^003, DCI Tenet and CIA General Counsel Muller

attended a meeting with Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Rice, Attorney
General Ashcroft, and White House Counsel Gonzales, among others, seeking policy
Bin Attash has one leg, which swelled during standing sleep deprivation, resulting in the transitionto seated sleep
deprivation. He was also subjected to nudity and dietary manipulationduring this period. See
12371
(212J21Z JUL 03);

693
694

12385 (222045Z JUL 03); and

12389 (232040Z JUL 03).

Training and Curriculum, November 2, 2002, at 17.
Training and Curriculum, November 2, 2002, at 17.

See, for example,

10168 (092130^A^^nterview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of

InteiTogations for Countertenorism Puq^oses,

2003; CIA Office of Inspector General,

Special Review: Countertenorism Detention and Inten'ogation Activities(Septei^^

-October 2003) (2003-

7123-IG), MayJ7^2004jHM| 10168 (092130Z JAN 03)J||||||||i|^^
340981
|M179£62200ZFEB 03)^^^^^^^^^^H34294|

34310
|^^^^^^^^H^757 (101742Z MAR 03);
135025 (16132IZ MAR 03).

April 7,2005, BriefingforBlueRibbonPai^^

Renditio^ Detention, and Interrogation Programs at22;

Memorandum for Chief,|||mm||||mi|||B|, via

CTC Legal from Cliief, CTC/RDG, July 28, 2003,

Subject: Decertification of former Interrogator. Document not signed by
available for signature."
See Memorandum for Chief,

via

28, 2003, Subject: Decertification of former Intenogator, signed by

because he was "not

ICTC Legal from Chief, CTC/RDG, July
[CIA OFFICER 1] on July

29, 2003; and April 7,2005, Briefing for Blue Ribbon Panel: CIA Rwjdition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs

at 22; Memorandum for Chief, HjjjHHUHiHH'

HH

Legal from Chief, CTC/RDG, July 28,

2003, Subject: Decertification of former Intenogator.
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reaffirmation of its coercive interrogation program. The presentation included a list of the CIA's
standard and enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA General Counsel Muller also provided a
description of the waterboard inten'ogation technique, including the inaccurate representation

that it had beenused against KSM 119 times and Abu Zubaydah 42 times.^^^ The presentation
warned National Security Councilprincipals in attendance that "termination of this program will
result in loss of life, possibly extensive." The CIA officers further noted that 50 percent of CIA
intelligence reports on al-Qaida were derived from detainee reporting, and that "major threats
were countered and attacks averted" because of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques. The CIA provided specific examples of "attacks averted" as a result of using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including references to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi,
the Heathrow Plot, the Second Wave Plot, and lyman Faris,^^^ As described later in this
summary, and in greater detail in Volume 11, these claims were inaccurate. After the CIA's

presentation, Vice President Cheney stated, and National Security Advisor Rice agreed, that the

CIA was executing Administration policy in carrying out its interrogation program.^®®
The National Security Council principals at the July 2003 briefing
initially concluded it was "not necessary or advisable to have a full Principals Committee

meeting to review and reaffirm the Program."''®^ A CIA email noted that the officialreason for
not having a full briefing was to avoid press disclosures, but added that:

"it is clear to us from some of the runup meetings we had with [White House]
Counsel that the [White House] is extremely concerned [Secretary of State]

CIA records indicate that KSM received at least 183 applications of the waterboard technique, and that Abu
Zubaydali received at least 83 applications of the waterboard technique. In April 2003,CIA InspectorGeneral John
Helgerson asked General Counsel Scott Muller aboutthe repetitious use of the waterboard. In early June 2003,
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and the Vice President's Counsel, David Addington, who were aware of the
inspectorgeneral's concerns,asked Mullerwhether the numberof waterboard repetitions had been too high in light
of tlie OLC guidance. This question prompted Muller to seek information on the use of the waterboard on Abu
Zubaydah and KSM. (See interview of Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003; and email from: Scott Muller; to: John Rizzo; cc:

[REDACTED], ••••1,
[REDACTED]; subject: "Report from
Gitmo trip (Not proofread, as usual)"; date: June |, 2003, 05:47 PM.) As Muller told the OIG, he could not keep up
with cable traffic from CIA detainee interrogations and instead received monthly briefings. According to OIG
records of the interview, Muller "saidhe does notknow specifically how [CIA guidelines on intenogations] changed
because he does not get that far down into the weeds," and "each detainee is different and those in the field have

somelatitude." (See interview of ScottMuller, Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.) Despitethis
record and others detailed in the full CommitteeStudy, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that the CIA's
"confinementconditions and treatment of high profiledetainees like Abu Zubaydah were closely scrutinizedat all
levels of management from the outset."

August5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29
July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003.

August 5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of the Interrogation Program
on 29 July 2003. A briefing slide describing the "Pros" and "Cons" associated with the program listed the following
under the heading "Con": (1) "Blowback due to public perception of 'humane treatment,'" (2) "ICRC continues to
attack USG policy on detainees," and (3) "Congressional inquiries continue." See Volume n for additional details.

August5, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from ScottMuller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program,July
29, 2003.

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Powell would blow his stack if he were to be briefed on what's been going
on.

"702

National Security Advisor Rice, however, subsequently decided
that Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should be

briefed on the CIA interrogation program prior to recertification of the covert action^^^ As
described, both were then formally briefed on the CIA program for the first time in a 25 minute
briefing on September 16, 2003

On September 4, 2003, CIA records indicate that CIA officials may
have provided Chairman Roberts, Vice Chairman Rockefeller, and their staff directors a briefing

regarding the Administration's reaffirmation of the program^®^ Neither the CIA nor the
Committee has a contemporaneous report on the content of the briefing or any confirmation that
the briefing occurred.

K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress,
and the U.S. Supreme Court

1. ICRC Pressure Leads to Detainee Transfers; Department ofDefense Official Informs the
CIA that the U.S. Government "Should Not Be in the Position of Causing People to
Disappear"; the CIA Provides Inaccurate Information on CIA Detainee to the
Department ofDefense

f^N¥) In January 2004, the ICRC sent a letter to |
indicating that it was aware that the United States Government was holding

unacknowledged detainees inseveral facilities in Country | "incommunicado for extensive
periods of time, subjected to unacceptable conditions of internment, to ill treatment and torture,

while deprived of any possible recourse."^''^ According to the CIA, the letter included a "fairly
complete list" of CIA detainees to whom the ICRC had not had access.^^^ This prompted CIA
Headquarters to conclude that it was necessary to reduce the number of detainees in CIA

custody

The CIA subsequently transferred at least 25 of its detainees in Country | to the

U.S. military and foreign governments. The CIA also released five detainees.^^^
Email from; John Rizzo; to:

subject: Rump PC on interrogations; date: July 3J, 2003.

August 5,2003, Memorandumfor the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program, July
29, 2003.

September 26,2003, CIA Memorandumfor the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Intenogation Program.
September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing
January 6, 2004, Letter from |

HEADQUARTERS |
HEADQUARTERS

1603

See, for exarnpl^DIRECTOR^
1696
DIRECTOR
I; headqijartersMB|^^^^^B|Kh^dquarters
1001

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(TS/^|||||||||[|||H||||||/^^) The CIA provided afactually incorrect description to the
Department of Defense concerning one of the 18 CIA detainees transferred to U.S. military
custody in March 2004. The transfer letter described CIA detainee Ali Jan as "the most tmsted

bodygua^f Jaluluddin Haqqani (a top AQ target of the USG)" who was capUired in the village

of

oi^un^H, 2002.^^^ Although there was an individual named Ali Jan captured in

the village of

on June

2002^^^CIArccords indicate that he was not the detainee

being held by the CIA in the Country
facility. The Ali Jan in CIA custody was
apprehended circa early August 2003, during the U.S. military operation
in
Zormat Valley, Paktia Province, Afghanistan.'^^^ CIA records indicate that Ali Jan was
transferred to CIA custody after his satellite phone rang while he was in military custody, and the

translator indicated thecaller was speaking in Arabic.^^^ After his transfer to U.S. military

custody, Ali Jan was eventually released on July I, 2004.^^4
In response to the ICRC's formal complaint about detainees being

kept in Country | without ICRC access. State Department officials met with senior ICRC

officials in Geneva, and indicated that it was U.S. policy to encourage all countries to provide
ICRC access to detainees, including Country
While the State Department made these
official representations to the ICRC, the CIA was repeatedly directing the same country to deny
the ICRC access to the CIA detainees. In June 2004, the secretary of state ordered the U.S.

ambassador in that countr^^eliverademarche, "in essence demanding [the country] provide
full access to all [country
detainees," which includeddetainees being held at
the CIA's behest.^These conflicting messages from the United States Government, as well as
increased ICRC pressure on the country for failing to provide access, created significant tension
between the United States and the country in question.^^^
that year, in advance of a National Security Council
Principals Committee meeting on September 14, 2004, officials from the Department of Defense
called the CIA to inform the CIA that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz would not
support the CIA's position that notifying the ICRC of all detainees in U.S. Government custody
would harm U.S. national security. According to an internal CIA email following the call, the
deputy secretary of defense had listened to the CIA's arguments for nondisclosure, but believed
that it was time for full notification. The email stated that the Department of Defense supported
the U.S. Government's position that there should be full disclosure to the ICRC, unless there
were compelling reasons of military necessity or national security. The email added that the
March 4, 2004, Letter from Jose Rodriguez, Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center to Thomas O'Connell,
Assistant Secretary of Defense. Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.

'

I II I i|

2296 (101709Z
2296 (101709Z

04)
04)

Details in June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.

^••^^•^^•1234^

HEADQUARTERS^^^^II^j^^^^^^^J. During this same period, countries whose nationals were in

CIA custody were issuing demarchesT^^^^^Bi issued ademarche to Country B in
issued a demarche to the U.S. in

2004, and |

2004^Sgg^^BB||^BmB|^M 2274

92037, and 93291
For more information, see Volume I.

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Department of Defense did not believe an adequate articulation of military necessity or national
security reasons warranting nondisclosure existed, that "DoD is tired of 'taking hits' for CIA
'ghost detainees,'" and that the U.S. government "should not be in the position of causing people
to 'disappear.

Despite numerous meetings and communications within the
executive branch throughout 2004, the United States did not formally respond to the January 6,
2004, ICRC letter until June 13, 2005.^^^
2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program
"Imbalanced and Inaccurate," Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to
Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector
General

The CIA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was first
informed of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in November 2002, nine months
after Abu Zubaydah became the CIA's first detainee. As described, the information was
conveyed by the DDO, who also informed the OIG of the death of Gul Rahman. In January
2003, the DDO further requested that the OIG investigate allegations of unauthorized
inten'ogation techniques against 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. Separately, the OIG "received
information that some employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an
overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of human rights," according to

the OIG's Special Review.^^®
During the course of the OIG's interviews, numerous CIA officers
expressed concerns about the CIA's lack of preparedness for the detention and interrogation of

Abu Zubaydah.^^^ Other CIA officers expressed concern about the analytical assumptions
driving interrogations,^^- as well as the lack of language andcultural background among
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John Rizzo, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
Jose Rodriguez, John P. Mudd, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD's position on ICRC notification; date: September 13, 2004.
June 13, 2005, Letter to ICRC, responding to 2004 ICRC note verbale.

Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September2001 - October 2003)
(2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, (DTS #2004-2710).
The chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site told the OIG that "[t]he Reports

Officers did not know what was required of them, analysts were not knowledgeable of the target, translators were

not native Arab speakers, and at least one ofthe [chiefs ofBase] had limited fielc^xperience/\^e Interview report
of [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 20, 2003. According to
of CTC Legal,
there was no screening procedure in place for officers assigned to DETENTION SITE GREEN. See interview of

b^REDACTED^md [REDACTED, Office ofthe Inspector General, February 14, 2003. See
also interview of||||HHHHIiH' Office ofthe Inspector General, March 24,2003.
In addition to the statements to the OIG describe^bove^eg^ing the interrogation ofAbu Zubaydah, CIA
officers expressed more general concerns. As

noted, the assumptions at CIA Headquarters that

Abu Zubaydah "knew everything about Al-Qa'ida, including details ofthe nex^ttack^Jjeflect^iow "the 'Analyst
vs. Interrogator' issue ha[d] been around from 'day one.'" {See interview of

Office of the

Inspector General, February 27, 2003.) According to Chief of InteiTogations^H^H^HTsu^ct matter experts
often provided interrogation requirements that were "not valid or well thought out," providing the example of

Mustafa al-Hawsawi. (See interview of j^^^^^^H^ffic^^h^iTspecto^eneral, April 7, 2003.) Senior CIA
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members of the interrogation teams7^^ Some CIA officers described pressure from CIA
Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, which they attributed to faulty
analytical assumptions about what detainees should know.^^"^ As the chief of RDG,

|, stated to the OIG in a February 2003 interview:
"CTC does not know a lot about al-Qa'ida and as a result, Headquarters

analyst^a^ constructed 'models' ofwhat al-Qa'ida represents to them.
noted that the Agency does not have the linguists or subject
matter experts it needs. The questions sent from CTC/Usama bin Laden

(UBL) to the interrogators are basedon SIGINT [signals intelligence] and
other intelligence that often times is incomplete or wrong. When the detainee
does not respond to the question, the assumption at Headquarters is that the
detainee is holding back and 'knows' more, and consequently. Headquarters
recommends resumption of EITs. This difference of opinion between the
interrogators and Headquarters as to whether the detainee is 'compliant' is the
type of ongoing pressure the interrogation team is exposed to.
believes the waterboard was used 'recklessly' - 'too many times' on Abu

Zubaydah at [DETENTION SITE GREEN], based in pai't on faulty
intelligence."^-^

interrogator

toldtheOIG thatinterrogators "suffered from a lackof substantive requirements from

CIA Headqu^te^" and that "in every case so far, Headquarters' model ofwhat the detainee should know is
flawed."

told the OIG that "I do notwant to beat a man up based on what Headquarters says he should

know," commenting that, "Iwant my best sho^i^ometfiing he (the detainee) knows, not afishing expedition on
things he should know." (See interview of

Office of the Inspector General, April 30, 2003.) Two

interviewees told the OIG tha^jequirem^ts were sometimes based on inaccurate orimproperly translated intercepts.
5e^ntervi^ ofinterrogator
Office ofthe Inspector General, March 24, 2003; Interview of|_
[former chief of Station in the country that hosted the CIA's first detention site]. Office of the
Inspector General, May 29, 2003.
One interviewee noted that several interrogators with whom he had worked insisted on conducting inteiTogations

in English to demonstrate theirdominance over the detainee. (See intei-view report of
Office of
the Inspector General, Maich 17, 2003.) TheCIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "[t]heprogram
continued to face challenges in identifying sufficient, qualified staff~ particularly language-quahfied personnel -- as

requirements impose^^Agen^ involvement in Iraq increased."

According to]|^|^H||^m| of CTC Legal, "[t]he seventh floor [CIA leadership] can complicate tlie process

because of the mindsetthatinterrogations are thesilverbullet [andCIA leadership is] expecting immediate results."

(Se^ntCTview of||^m||H|[|, Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003.) Senior Intenogator ijjH
provided the exampleof Khallad bin Attash, who,he told the OIG, was determined by the chief of Base at

DETENTIO>^IT^^UE not to "warrant" the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. According to ||^||^|,
debriefer

called ALEC Station andtoldthem to "go to the mat" in advocating for the use of theCIA's

enhanced interroption techniques, claiming that bin Attash was holdingbackinformation. (See interview of
I Office ofthe Inspector General, April 30, 2003.)
described the "inherent tension
that occasionally exists between officers at the interrogation facilities and those at Headquarters whoview the

detainee^r^ithholdinginformation."

provided the exampleof^u Yassir al-Jaza'iri. (See interview

of
Office of the Inspector General, May 8, 2003.)
alsodescribed disagreements on
whetherto subjectdetaineesto the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques as a "field versus Headquarters issue."
(See interview of

Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.) As described, interviewees also

described pressur^ron^I^Ieadquarters related tothe interrogations ofKSM and Abu Zubaydah.
Interview of

Office of the Inspector General, February 21, 2003.

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senior interrogator,
informed the OIG that
differences between CIA Headquarters and the interrogators at the CIA detention sites were not

part of the official record. According to

"all of the fighting and criticism is done over

the phone and is not put into cables," and that CIA "[cjables reflect things that are 'allrosy.'"^^^
As is described elsewhere, and reflected in the final OIG Special

Review, CIA officers discussed numerous other topics with the OIG, including conditions at
DETENTION SITE COBALT, specific inteiTogadons, the video taping of interrogations, the
administration of the program, and concerns about the lack of an "end game" for CIA detainees,
as well as the impact of possible public revelations concerning the existence and operadon of the

CIA's Detention and Interrogation Progi-amJ-^
In January 2004, the CIA inspector general circulated for comment
to various offices within the CIA a draft of the OIG Special Review of the CIA's Detention and

Interrogation Program. Among other matters, the OIG Special Review described divergences
between the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques as applied and as described to the
Department of Justice in 2002, the use of unauthorized techniques, and oversight problems
related to DETENTION SITE COBALT. The draft OIG Special Review elicited responses from

the CIA's deputy director for operations, the deputy director for science and technology, the
Office of General Counsel, and the Office of Medical Services. Several of the responses—

particularly those from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and CIA Deputy Director for
Operations James Pavitt—were highly critical of the inspector general's draft Special Review.
General Counsel Muller wrote that the OIG Special Review presented "an imbalanced and

inaccurate picture of the Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," and claimed
the OIG Special Review, "[o]n occasion," "quoted or summarized selectively and misleadingly"
from CIA documents.^^^ Deputy Directorfor Operations James Pavitt wrote that the OIG
Special Review should have come to the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and
saved lives," and that "EITs (including the water board) have been indispensable to our
successes." Pavitt attached to his response a document describing information the CIA obtained
"as a result of the lawful use of EITs" that stated, "[t]he evidence points clearly to the fact that

without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist

Interview of^^H^H||||||||||, Office ofthe Inspector General, April 30, 2003.
DDO Pavitt described possible public revelations related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program as
"the CIA's worst nightmare." Interviewof James Pavitt,Officeof the InspectorGeneral, September 21, 2003.
According to OIG recordsof an interview with DCI Tenet, "Tenet believesthat if the general public were to find out
about this program, many would believe we are torturers." Tenet added, however, that his "only potential moral
di lemma would be if more Americans die at the hands of teiTorists and we had someone in our custody who

possessed information that couldhaveprevented deaths, butwe had notobtained such information." See interview
of George Tenet, Officeof the InspectorGeneral, memorandum dated, September8, 2003.
See CIA Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program

Special Review, dated February 24, 2004 (200^12MG^^^^^^^^^^^
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attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casiialties."^-^ A review of CIA records found

that the representations in the Pavitt materials were almostentirely inaccurateJ^^
addition to conveying inaccurate information on the operation,

management, and effectiveness of the CIA program, CIA leadership continued to impede the
OIG in its efforts to oversee the program. In July 2005, Director Goss sent a memorandum to the
inspector general to "express several concerns regarding the in-depth, multi-faceted review" of
the CIA's CTC. The CIAdirector wrote that he was "increasingly concerned about the
cumulative impact of the OIG's work on CTC's performance," adding that "I believe it makes
sense to complete existingreviews... before opening new ones." DirectorGoss added, "[t]o my
knowledge, Congress is satisfied that you are meetingits requirements" with regard to the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program.^^^ At the time, however, the vice chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence was seeking a Committee investigation of the CIA program, in
part because of the aspects of the program that were not being investigated by the Office of

Inspector General.^^^ In April 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden had his "Senior
Councilor"—an individual within the CIA who was accountable only to the CIA director—
conduct a review of the inspector general's practices. Defending the decision to review the OIG,
the CIA told the Committee that there were "morale issues that the [CIA] director needs to be

mindful of," and that the review had uncovered instances of "bias" among OIG personnel against
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^^^ In 2008, the CIA director announced the
results of his review of the OIG to the CIA work force and stated that the inspector general had
"chosen to take a numberof steps to heighten the efficiency, assure the quality, and increase the
transparency of the investigative process."^^"^
3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess
the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
The final May 2004 OIG Special Review included a
recommendation that the CIA's DDO conduct a study of the effectiveness of the CIA's
interrogation techniques within 90 days. Prompted by the recommendation, the CIA tasked two

seniorCIA officers to lead "an informal operational assessment of the CIA detainee program."
The reviewers were tasked with responding to 12 specific terms of reference, including an
assessment of "the effectiveness of each interrogation technique and environmental deprivation"
™Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February
27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.
730 Pqj. additional information, see Volume II.

July 21, 2005, Memorandum for Inspector General from Porter J. Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency re:
New IG Work Impacting the CounterTerrorism Center.
Transcript of business meeting, April 14, 2005 (DTS #2005-2810).

Committee Memorandum for theRecord, "Staff Briefing with BobDeitz on his Inquiry into theInvestigative
Practices of the CIA Inspector General," October 17, 2007 (DTS #2007-4166); Committee Memorandum for the

Record, "Notes from Meetings with John Helgerson and Bob Deitz in late 2007 and early 2008" (DTS #2012-4203);

Committee Memorandum for theRecord, "StaffBriefing with CIA Inspector General John Helgerson" (DTS #20074165).

Letter from DCIA Michael Hayden to SenatorJohn D. RockefellerIV, January 29, 2008 (DTS #2008-0606).
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to determine if any techniques ordeprivation should be "added, modified, ordiscontinued."^^^
According to a CIA memorandum from the reviewers, their review was based on briefings by
CTC personnel, "a discussion with three senior CTC managers who played key roles in running
tlie CIA detainee program," and a review of nine documents, including the OIG Special Review
and an article by the CIA contractors who developed the CIA's enhanced interrogation

techniques, Hammond DUNBAR and Grayson SWIGERT^^^ As described in this summary,
and in more detail in Volume H, these documents contained numerous inaccurate representations

regarding the operation andeffectiveness of the CIA program. There are no records to indicate
the two senior CIA officers reviewed the underlying interrogation cables and intelligence records
related to the representations. Their resulting assessment repeated information found in the
documents provided to them and reported that the "CIA Detainee Program is a success,
providing unique and valuable intelligence at the tactical levelfor the benefit of policymakers,
war fighters, and the CIA's covert action operators." The assessment also reported that
regulations and procedures for handling detainees were "adequate and clear," and that the
program had responded swiftly, fairly, and completely to deviations from the structured
program.^^^ Nonetheless, the assessment came to the conclusion that detention and
interrogations activities should not be conducted by the CIA, but by "experienced U.S. law
enforcement officers," stating:

"The Directorate of Operations (DO) should not be in the business of nmning
prisons or 'temporary detention facilities,' The DO should focus on its core
mission: clandestine intelligence operations. Accordingly, the DO should
continue to hunt, capture, and render targets, and then exploit them for
intelligence and ops leads once in custody. The management of their
incarceration and interrogation should be conducted by appropriately
experienced U.S. law enforcement officers, because that is tlieir charter and
they have the training and experience.
assessment noted that the CIA program required significant
resources at a time when the CIA was already stretched thin. Finally, the authors wrote that they

"strongly believe" that the president and congressional oversight members should receive a

735
j2, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from
Chief, Information
Operations Center, and HenryCrumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor

Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review ofCIA Detainee Program/

736
12, 2004, Memorandum for DeputyDirector for Operations from
Chief, Information
Operations Center, and HenryCrumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor
Operations, withthe subject line,"Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program." The CIA's June 2013 Response
states, "[w]e acknowledge tliattlie Agencyened in permitting the contractors to assess tlie effectivenessof enhanced
techniques. They shouldnot have been considered for such a role given theirfinancial interestin continued
contracts from CIA."

May 12, 2004, Memorandum for DeputyDirector for Operations from
Chief, Information
Operations Center, and HenryCrumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor

Operations reOperational Review ofCIA Detainee Program. For additionalinfomiati^^ Volume II.
May 12, 2004, Memorandum for DeputyDirector for Operations from
Chief, Information
Operations Center,and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Directorfor

Operations reOperational Review ofCIA Detaine^rogran^^^^^^^^^^
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comprehensive update on the program, "[g]iven theintense interest andcontroversy surrounding
the detainee issue."^^^

On January 26, 2005, DCI Goss forwarded the senior officer

review to Inspector General John Helgerson/"^^ The DCI asked whether the review would satisfy
the inspector general recommendation for anindependent review of the programJ"^^ On January
28, 2005, the inspector general responded that the senior officer review would not satisfy the

recommendation fo^TMndepet^ent review.^"^^ The inspector general also responded to a

concern raised by H^|^^|OMS that studying the results of CIA interrogations would
amount to human experimentation, stating:

"I fear there was a misunderstanding. OIG did not have in mind doing
additional, guinea pig reseai'ch on human beings. What we are recommending
is that the Agency undertake a careful review of its experience to date in using
the various techniques and that it draw conclusions about their safety,
effectiveness, etc., that can guide CIA officers as we move ahead. We make
this recommendation because we have found that the Agency over the decades

has continued to get itself in messes related to interrogation programs for one
overriding reason: we do not document and learn from our experience - each
generation of officers is left to improvise anew, with problematic results for
our officers as individuals and for our Agency. We are not unaware that there
are subtleties to this matter, as the effectiveness of techniques varies among
individuals, over time, as administered, in combination with one another, and

so on. All the more reason to document these important findings."^"^^
I" November and December 2004, the CIA responded to National

Security Advisor Rice's questions about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques by asserting that an effectiveness review was not possible, while highlighting
examples of "[k]ey intelligence" the CIA represented was obtained after the use of the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques. The December 2004 memorandum prepared for the national
security advisor entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques,"
begins:

May 12, 2004 Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from

Chief, Information

Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division, via Associate Deputy Director for
Operationsre Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program.
See Volume I for additional information.

Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,
[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regardim

Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,]

|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED],
)rt; date: January 28, 2005.

|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED],

[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regardint OIG Report; January 28, 2005.

Email from: John Helgerson; to: Porter Goss,]

|; cc: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo, [REDACTED],

[REDACTED]; subject: DCI Question Regarding OIG Report; date: January 28, 2005. Tlie CIA's June 2013

Response maintains that"[a] systematic study over time of theeffectiveness of the techniques would have been
encumbered by a number of factors," including "Federal policy on the protection of human subjects andthe
impracticability of establishing an effective control group."
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"Action Requested: None, This memorandum responds to your request for an
independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced
interrogation techniques. There is no way to conduct such a study. What we
can do, however, if [sic] set forth below the intelligence the Agency obtained
from detainees who, before their interrogations, were not providing any
information of intelligence [value].

(T8/^BimHiH^^^) Under a section ofthe memorandum entitled, "Results," the CIA
memo asserts that the "CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced inten'ogation techniques, as part of
a comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots [and] capture
additional terrorists." The memorandum then lists examples of "[k]ey intelligence collected
from HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques," which led to "disrupte[ed]
terrorist plots" and the "capture [of] additional terrorists." The examples include: the "Karachi
Plot," the "Heathrow Plot," "the 'Second Wave'" plotting, the identification of the "the Guraba
Cell," the identification of "Issa al-Hindi," the airest of Abu Talha al-Pakistani, "Hambali's
Capture," information on Jaffar al-Tayyar, the "Dirty Bomb" plot, the arrest of Sajid Badat, and
information on Shkai, Pakistan. CIA records do not indicate when, or if, this memorandum was

provided to the national security advisor.^'^^
a subsequent CIA memorandum, dated March 5, 2005, concerning
an upcoming meeting between the CIA director and the national security advisor on the CIA's
progress in completing the OIG recommended review of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques states, "we [CIA] believe this study is much needed and should be
headed up by highly respected national-level poHtical figures with widely recognized reputations

for independence andfairness."^"^^
On March 21, 2005, the director of the CTC formally proposed the
"establishment of an independent 'blue ribbon' commission... with a charter to study our
Errs."^"^^ The CIA then began the process of establishing a panel that included
and

Both panelists received briefings and papers from CIA

personnel who participated in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. H||[m| [the
first panelist] wrote: "It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the
program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the
overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional
terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qa'ida (AQ).... There are
accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,'
Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Tecliniques."
December 2004 CIA Memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence,'
Subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." Italics in original.
March 5, 2005, Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with NationalSecurity Advisor re CIA Proposal for
Independent Studyof the Effectiveness of CTC Intenogation Program'sEnhanced Interrogation Techniques.
March 21, 2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI
CounterteiTorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation Programs.
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interrogations." He also observed, however, that "[n]either my background nor field of expertise

particularly lend themselves to judgin^h^fectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken
individually or collectively."^"^^
second panelist] concluded that "there is no
objective way to answer the question of efficacy," but stated it was possible to "make some
general observations" about the program based on CIA personnel assessments of "the quality of
the intelligence provided" by CIA detainees. Regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, he wrote: "here enters the epistemological problem. We can never
know whether or not this intelligence could have been extracted though alternative procedures.
Spokesmen from within the organization firmly believe it could not have been."^"^^

4. The CIA Wrongfully DetainsKhalidAl-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountabilityfor
Officer Involved

After the dissemination of the draft CIA Inspector General Special

Review in early 2004, approvals from CIA Headquarters to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques adhered more closely to the language of the DCI guidelines. Nonetheless, CIA
records indicate that officers at CIA Headquarters continued to fail to properly monitor
justifications for the capture and detention of detainees, as well as the justification for the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on particular detainees.^^®

Por example, on January H, 2004, the CIA rendered German
citizen Khalid al-Masri to a Country | facility used by the CIA for detention purposes. The
rendition was based on the determination by officers in the CIA's ALEC Station that "al-Masri

knows key information that could assist in the capture of otheral-Qa'ida operatives that pose a
serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests and who may be planning
terrorist activities.The cable did not state that Khalid al-Masri himself posed a serious threat
of violence or death, the standard required for detention under the September 17, 2001,
Memorandum of Notification (MON).

CIA debriefing cables from Country | on January 27, 2004, and
January 28, 2004, note that Khalid al-Masri "seemed bewildered on why he has been sent to this

particular prison,"^^^ and was "adamant that [CIA] has the wrong person."^^^ Despite doubts
from CIA officers in Country | about Khalid al-Masri's links to terrorists, and RDG's
concurrence with those doubts, differentcomponents within the CIA disagreed on the process for

his release.^^"^ As later described by the CIA inspector general, officers in ALEC Station
continued to think that releasing Khalid al-Masri would pose a threat to U.S. interests and that
748

September 2, 2005 Memorandum from I

Ito Director Porter Goss, CIA re Assessment of EITs

Effectiveness. For additional information, see Volume II.

September 23, 2005 Memorandum from |||||||||m|||||

Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence

Agency re Response to Request from Director for Assessment of EIT Effectiveness. For additional information, see
Volume II.

For additional information, see Volume III.
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monitoring should be required, while those in the CIA's

Division did not want to notify

the German government about the rendition of a German citizenJ^"' Because of the significance
of the dispute, the National Security Council settled the matter, concluding that al-Masri should

be repatriated and that the Germans should be told about al-Masri's renditionJ^^
Khalid al-Masri was transferred from Country |

to

After al-Masri arrived in^|BI>

officers released him and sent him toward

a fake border crossing, where the officers told him he would be sent back to Germany because he
had entered
illegally
At the time of his release, al-Masri was provided 14,500

Euros,^^^ as well as his belongingsJ^®
the CIA inspector general issued a Report of

Investigation on the rendition and detention of Khalid al-Masri, concluding that "[a]vailable
intelligence information did not provide a sufficient basis to render and detain Khalid al-Masri,"

and that the "Agency's prolonged detention of al-Masri was unjustified."^^^ OnOctober 9, 2007,
the CIA informed the Committee that it "lacked sufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri,"

and that the judgment by operations officers that al-Masri was associated with terrorists who

posed a threat to U.S. interests "was not supported by available intelligence/^^^eCIA director
nonetheless decided that no further action was warranted against

then the

deputy chief of ALEC Station, who advocated for al-Masri's rendition, because "[t]he Director
strongly believes that mistakes should be expected in a business filled with uncertainty and that,
when they result from performance that meets reasonable standards, CIA leadership must stand
behind tlie officers who make them." The notification also stated that "with regard to

counterterrorism operations in general and the al-Masri matter in particular, the Director believes
the scale tips decisively in favor of accepting mistakes that over connect the dots against those
that under connect them."^^^
CIA Officeof InspectorGeneral, Reportof Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Klialid
al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.

CIA Office of InspectorGeneral, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid
al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.

^^042655
Using May 2004 exchange rates, this amounted to approximately $17,000.
''''

42655

CIA Office of InspectorGeneral, Report of Investigation, The Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Klialid
al-Masri (2004-7601-IG), July 16, 2007.

Referring to
and a secondCTC officernamed in the OIG's Report of Investigation, the
notification to Congressstated that the director "does not believe that... the performance of the two named CTC
officers fall below a reasonable level of professionalism,skill, and diligence as defined in CIA's Standard for
Employee Accountability." The notification also stated thatthere was a "high tlireat environment" at the time of the
rendition, which "was essentially identical to the one in which CTC employees,including the two in question here,
previously had been sharply criticized for notconnecting the dots priorto 9/11." The notification acknowledged "an
insufficient legal justification, which failed to meet tlie standard prescribed in tlie [MON]," and refened to the acting
general counsel the task of assessing legal advice and personal accountability. Based on recommendations fiom the
inspectorgeneral,the CIA "developeda template for rendition proposals tliat makes clear what information is
required, including the intelligence basis for that information." (See Congressional notification, with the subject,
"CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri,"
dated October 9, 2007 (DTS #2007-4026).) The last CIA detainee, Muhammad Raliim, had already been rendered

to CIA custody by the time ofthis notification^Th^CIA^^un^Ol^Respon^points to areview ofanalytical
im

MUM

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5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL
Facilitator—Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

Ghul in the Iraqi Kurdistan I iiiiiii mi Iiiiii ii i B 'INM '

foreign authorities captured Hassan

lli i his identity was confirmed on

January
2004^^ Ghul was rendered from U.S. military custody to CIA custody at
DETENTION SITE COBALT on January H, 2004.^^^ The detention site interrogators, who,
according to CIA records, did not use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, sent
at least 21 intelligence reports to CIA Headquarters based on their debriefings of Hassan Ghul
from the two days he spent at the facility
As detailed in this summary, and in greater detail in Volume II,
CIA records indicate that the most accurate CIA detainee reporting on the facilitator who led to
Usama bin Laden (UBL) was acquired from Hassan Ghul—prior to the use of the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ Ghul speculated that "UBL was likely living in [the]
training arising out of the al-Masri rendition, but states that, "[n]onetheless, we concede that it is difficult in

hindsight to understand how the Agency could make such a mistake, take too long to correct it, determine that a
flawed legal interpretation contributed, and in the end only hold accountable three CTC attorneys, two of whom

receive^nl^i^m^dmonition."

21753j^^^H|^|; HEADQUARTERS ••

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CIA confirmed that the individual detained matched the

biographical data on Hassai^hul^Chalid ShtiykhM^ammad and Khallad bin Attash confirmed that a photo
provided was of Ghul. See

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As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was

cooperative prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA
Office of InspectorGeneral, a CIA officerfamiliar with Ghul's initial interrogations stated,"He sang like a tweetie
bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset." {See December 2, 2004, interview with
[REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department,
) CIA records reveal that Ghul's

information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti wasdisseminated while Ghul was at DETENTION SITECOBALT, prior to
the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On April 16, 2013, tlie Council on Foreign Relations
hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, "Manhunt." Tlie forum included former CIA officer Nada
Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided the critical information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to

Kurdish officialsprior to entering CIA custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds,
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Peshawar area," and that "it was well known that he was always with Abu Ahmed [al-

Kuwaiti]."^^^ Ghul described Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as UBL's "closest assistant,who
couriered messages to al-Qa'ida's chief of operations, and listed al-Kuwaiti as one of three
individuals likely with
Ghul further speculated that:
"UBL's security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely
lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.... Ghul speculated
that Abu Ahmed likely handled all of UBL's needs, including moving

messages out to Abu Faraj [al-Libi]...."^^^
During this same period, prior to the use of the CL\'s enhanced
interrogation techniques, Ghul provided information related to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu
Faraj al-Libi (including his role in delivering messages from UBL), Jaffar al-Tayyar, 'Abd alHadi al-Iraqi, Hamza Rabi'a, Shaik Sa'id al-Masri, Sharif al-Masri, Abu 'Abd al-Rahman alNajdi, Abu Talha al-Pakistani, and numerous other al-Qa'ida operatives. He also provided
information on the locations, movements, operational security, and training of al-Qa'ida leaders

living in Shkai, Pakistan, as well as on the visits of other leaders and operatives to Shkai.^^^
Ghul's reporting on Shkai, which was included in at least 16 of the 21 intelligence reports,
confirmed earlier reporting that the Shkai valley sei-ved as al-Qa'ida's command and control

center afterthe group's 2001 exodus from Afghanistan.^^"^ Notwithstanding these facts, in March

Bakos stated:
..honestly, Hassan Ghul.. .when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally
was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to
anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish
papers about sort of their interpretation of tlie story and how forthcoming he was." (See
www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.) Given the unusually high number of intelligence
reports disseminated in such a short time period, and the statements of former CIA officer Bakos, the Committee
requested additional information from the CIA on Ghul's interrogation prior to entering CIA custody. The CIA
wrote on October 25, 2013: "We have not identified any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul
first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in [foreign] custody." No information was provided on Hassan
Ghul's intelligence reporting while in U.S. military detention. See DTS #2013-3152.
AN 04)
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Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Detainee Profile on Hassan Ghul for coord; date;
December 30, 2005, at 8:14:04 AM.

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2005, the CIA represented to the Department of Justice that Hassan Ghul's reporting on Shkai
was acquired ''after''' the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniquesJ^^
After two days of questioning at DETENTION SITE COBALT
and the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports, Ghul was transferred to DETENTION SITE

BLACKJ^^ According to CIA records, upon arrival, Ghul was "shaved and barbered, stripped,
and placed in the standing position against the wall" with "his hands above his head" with plans

to lower his hands after two hours^^'' The CIA interrogators at the detention site then requested
to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Ghul, writing:
"[the] interrogation team believes, based on [Hassan Ghul's] reaction to the

initial contact, that his ai-Qa'ida briefings and his earlier experiences with U.S.
military interrogators have convinced him there are limits to the physical
contact interrogators can have with him. The interrogation team believes the
approval and employment of enhanced measures should sufficiently shift
[Hassan Ghul's] paradigm of what he expects to happen. The lack of these
increasd [sic] measures may limit the team's capability to collect critical and
reliable information in a timely manner."^^^

(^FS/4|^H|||||||^^H||//NE) CIA Headquarters approved the request the same day.^^^
Following 59 hours of sleep deprivation,^^*^ Hassan Ghulexperienced hallucinations, but was told
by a psychologist that his reactions were "consistent with what many others experience in his
condition," and that he should calm himself by telling himself his experiences are normal and

will subside when he decides to be truthfiil.^^^ The sleep deprivation, as well as otherenhanced

interrogations, continued,^^- as did Ghul's hallucinations.''^^ Ghul also complained of back pain
and asked to see a doctor,^^"^ but interrogators responded that the "pain was normal, and would
stop when [Ghul] was confirmed as telling the tnith." A cable states that "[i]nterrogators told
[Ghul] they did not care if he was in pain, but cared only if he provided complete and truthful
information.A CIA physician assistant later observed that Hassan Ghul was experiencing
"notable physiological fatigue," including "abdominal and back muscle pain/spasm, 'heaviness'
and mild paralysis of arms, legs and feet [that] are secondary to his hanging position and extreme
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from
Legal Group, DCI
Counterterrorist Center, re: Effectiveness of theCIA Counterterrorist Intenogation Techniques. Italics in original.
For additional representations, see Volume II.
AN 04)
AN 04)
04)
HEAD UARTERS
JAN 04)
780
JAN 04)
JAN 04)
JAN 04)

JAN 04);

1312IBI JAN 04). The CIA's June 2013 Response

states that when hallucinations occurredduring sleep deprivation, "medical personnel intervenedto ensure a

detainee would be allowed a period of sleep." Asdescribed in this summary, and more extensively in Volume III,
CIA records indicate that medical personnel did notalways intervene and allowdetainees to sleepafterexperiencing
hallucinations.
1299 •••
JAN 04)
785

1299

04). See Volume III for similar statements made to CIA detainees.

loi' 'iM III I

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degree of sleep deprivation," but that Ghul was clinically stable and had "essentially normal vital

signs," despite an "occasional premature heart beat" that the cable linked to Ghul's fatigueJ^®
Throughout this period, Ghul provided no actionable threat information, and as detailed later in
this summary, much of his reporting on the al-Qa'ida presence in Shkai was repetitive of his
reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Ghul also provided no
other information of substance on UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti7^^ Nonetheless, on
May 5, 2011, the CIA provided a document to the Committee entitled, "Detainee Reporting on
Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists Hassan Ghul as a CIA detainee who was subjected to the

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and whopmvided^TierOne|Mnfo
Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin."^^^ Hassan Ghul was
later released

6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held in 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques; CIA Ojficer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do
Anything Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs
In March 2004, the CIA took custody of an Afghan national who

had sought employment at a U.S. military base because he had the same name (Gul Rahman) as

an individual believed to be targeting U.S. military forces in Afghanistan.^^^ During the period
in which the Afghan was detained, the CIA obtained signals intelligence of their true target
communicating with his associates. DNA results later showed conclusively that the Afghan in
custody was not the target. Nonetheless, the CIA held the detainee in solitary confinement for

approximately a month before he was released with a nominal payment.^^^
In the spring of 2004, after two detainees were transferred to CIA
custody, CIA interrogators proposed, and CIA Headquarters approved, using the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on one of the two detainees because it might cause the detainee to
provide information that could identify inconsistencies in the other detainee's storyAfter
both detainees had spent approximately 24 hours shackled in the standing sleep deprivation

position, CIA Headquarters confirmed that the detainees were former CIA sources.^^"^ The two
detainees had tried to contact the CIA on multiple occasions prior to their detention to inform the
CIA of their activities and provide intelligence. The messages they had sent to the CIA

ISOSH^HJAN 04)
See Volume II for additional information.

See CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, dated May 5,2011, which includes a document
entitled, "Background Detainee Infomiation on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti," with an accompanying six-page chart

entitled, "Detainee ReportingonAbi^hmed al-Kuwaiti" (DTS #2011-2004).
2441HEADQUARTERS

''^^See\

EHsl

1635

1712••••••iHEADOUARrERSl

The individual detained and the individual believed to be targeting U.S. forces were different from the Gul
RtJiman who died at DETENTION SITE COBALT.
2Q33

([REDACTED])

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were not translated until after the detainees were subjected to the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques

During this same period in early 2004, CIA inten^ogators

interrogated Adnan al-Libi, a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. CIA Headquarters
did not approve the use of the CIA's enhanced techniques against al-Libi, but indicated that
interrogators could use "standard" interrogation techniques, which included up to 48 hours of

sleep deprivationJ^^ CIA interrogators subsequently reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep
deprivation sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a combined three hours of sleep
between sessions.^^^

Beginning in late April 2004, a number of media outlets published

photographs of detainee abuse at the Department of Defense-run Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The
media reports caused members of the Committee and individuals in the executive branch to focus

on detainee issues. On May 12, 2004, the Committee held a lengthy hearing on detainee issues
with Department of Defense and CIA witnesses. The CIA used the Abu Ghraib abuses as a

contrasting reference point for its detention and interrogation activities. In a response to a
question from a Committee member, CIA Deputy Director McLaughlin said, "we are not
authorized in [the CIA program] to do anything like what you have seen in those
photographs.In response, a member of the Committee said, "I understand," and expressed
the understanding, consistent with past CIA briefings to the Committee, that the "norm" of CIA's
interrogations was "transparent law enforcement procedures [that] had developed to such a high
level... that you could get pretty much what you wanted." The CIA did not correct the
Committee member's misunderstanding that CIA interrogation techniques were similar to
techniques used by U.S. law enforcement.^^^

7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the
Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single
Source Information

May 2004, the OLC, then led by Assistant Attorney General

Jack Goldsmith, informed the CIA's Office of General Counsel that it had never formally opined
on whether the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the CIA's program was

^''5 HEADQUARTERS •
Volume III.

I([REDACTED]). For more information on AL-TURKI and AL-MAGREBI, see

See Volume Iand II, including HEADQUARTER^^^HJ||H||^^B^H- I" November 2003, CIA

General Counsel Scott Muller sent an email to lll^^l^l^^uggesting "changing the sleep deprivation line
a^ic^etweer^nhanced and standard from 72 to 48 hours." (See November 23, 2003, email from Scott Muller to
John Rizzo, Subject: Al-Hawsawi Incident.) On January 10, 2004, CIA Headquarters

informed CIA detention sites ofthe change, stating that sleep depri^tion over 48 hours would now be considered an
enhanced" interrogation technique. See HEADQUARTERS
(101713Z JAN 04).
1S88 (091823Z MAR 04);
1889 (091836Z MAR 04).
Tliereis no indication in CIA records that CIA Headquailers addressed the repeateduse of "standard" sleep
797

deprivation againstAdnan al-Libi. For more information, see Volume in detainee report for Adnan al-Libi.
Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, May 12, 2004 (DTS #2004-2332).

Transcript ofSenate Select Committee oi^ntelligenc^iearir^
I(II

I (III I

(DTS #2004-2332).
I I'll (III11

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consistent with U.S. constitutional standards.Goldsmith also raised concerns about

divergences between the CIA's proposed enhanced interrogation techniques, as described in the
August 1, 2002, memorandum, and their actual application, as described in the CIA Inspector
General's Special Review.In late May 2004, DCI Tenet suspended the use of the CIA's
"enhanced" and "standard" interrogation techniques, pending updated approvals from the
OLC.^®^ On June 4, 2004, DCI Tenet issued a formal memorandum suspending the use of the

CIA's interrogation techniques, pending policy and legal review.^®^ The same day, the CIA
sought reaffirmation of the program from the National Security Council.^^ National Security
Advisor Rice responded, noting that the "next logical step is for the Attorney General to

complete the relevant legal analysis now in preparation."^^^

H' ^004, a foreign government captured Janat Gul, an
individual believed, based on reporting from a CIA source, to have information about al-Qa'ida

plans to attack the United States prior to the 2004 presidential election.^®^ In October 2004, the
CIA source who provided the information on the "pre-election" threat and implicated Gul and
others admitted to fabricating the information. However, as early as March 2004, CIA officials

internally expressed doubts about the validity ofthe CIA source's information.^®^
On July 2, 2004, the CIA met with National Security Advisor Rice,
other National Security Council officials, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, as well as the
attorney general and the deputy attorney general, to seek authorization to use the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, specifically onJanat Gul.^®^ The CIA represented that CIA
800
25^ 2004, Talking Points for DCI TelephoneConversation with Attorney General: DOJ's Legal Opinionre
CIA's Counterterrorist Program (CT) Interrogation. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith UI to
Director Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710).

May 27, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith to General Counsel Muller.
May 24, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from
subject: Memorandumof Meeting with the
DCI RegardingDOJ's Statementthat DOJ has RenderedNo Legal Opinion on Whether CIA's Use of Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques would meetConstitutional Standards. Memorandum for Deputy Directorfor Operations
from Director of Central Intelligence, June 4. 2004, re: Suspension of Use of InteiTOgation Techniques.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence, re:

Suspension of Use of Intenogation Techniques. On June 2, 2004, George Tenet informedtlie Presidentthat he
intendedto resign from liis position on July II, 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004.
June 4, 2004, Memorandum for the National Security Advisor from DCI George Tenet, re: Review of CIA
Interrogation Program.

June 2004, Memorandum for the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence from Condoleezza

Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, re: Review ofCIA'^nteiTOgation Program.

^"^••••|39^4

••

3121

The former chief of the CIA's Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March | , 2004, email that the reporting was "vague"
and "worthless in terms of actionable intelligence." He suggested that the reporting "would be an easy way [for alQa'ida] to test" the loydty of the source, given al-Qa'ida's knowledge that leaked threat reporting "causes panic in

Wasliington." (See

date: March

from:

to: ^^||||^HI||||Hi[>

[REDACTED],

|; subject: could AQ b^estin^^ASSE^Y] and [source name REDACTED]?;

2004, at 06:55 AM.) A^^tatior^ffi^^^BHjHHHBexpresse^imilaj^o^s ir^^

to the
See emailfrom^^^^HH^^^^|;tor||||||||^^|; cc:
[REDACTED], jMUJjU^Jsnhject: Re: could A^b^^ing [ASSE^f^n^source name

REDACTED]?; date: March •, 2004, at 07:52:32 AM). See also ••••

1411 (^•^^•04).

July 2, 2004, CIA Memorandum re Meeting witli National Adviser Rice in the White House Situation Room, re
Interrogations and Detainee Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.
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"interrogations have saved American lives," that more than half of the CIA detainees would not

cooperate until they were interrogated using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,and
that "unless CIA interrogators can use a full range of enhanced inteiTogation methods, it is
unlikely that CIA will be able to obtain current threat information from Gul in a timely

manner."^^^ Janat Gul was not yet in CIA custody.
On July 6, 2004, National Security Advisor Rice sent a

memorandum to DCI Tenet stating that the CIA was "permitted to use previously approved
enhanced interrogation methods for Janat Gul, with the exception of the waterboard." Rice
offered "to assist [the CIA] in obtaining additional guidance from the Attorney General and NSC
Principals on an expedited basis" and noted the CIA's agreement to provide additional
information about the waterboard technique in order for the Department of Justice to assess its
legality. Rice's memorandum further documented that the CIA had informed her that "Gul

likely has information about preelection terrorist attacks against the United States as a result of
Gul's close ties to individuals involved in these alleged plots.
In a meeting on July 20, 2004, National Security Council
principals, including the vice president, provided their authorization for the CIA to use its
enhanced interrogation techniques—again, with the exception of the waterboard—on Janat Gul.
They also directed the Departmentof Justice to prepare a legal opinion on whether the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques were consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution.On July 22, 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft sent a letter to

Acting DCI John McLaughlin stating that nine interrogation techniques (those addressed in the
August 1, 2002, memorandum, with the exception of the waterboard) did not violate the U.S.
Constitution or any statute or U.S. treaty obligations, in the context of the interrogation of Janat

Gul.^'"^ For the remainder of2004, the CIA used its enhanced interrogation techniques on three
detainees—Janat Gul, Sharif al-Masri, and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—with individualized

approval from the Department of Justice.^^^
being rendered to CIA custody on July

2004, Janat Gul

was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including continuous sleep
deprivation, facial holds, attention grasps, facial slaps, stress positions, and walling,until he
At the timeof this CIA representation, the CIA had held at least 109detainees and subjected at least33 of them
(30 percent) to tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to
the Honorable George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul. CIA Request for Guidance Regarding
Interrogation of Janat Gul, July 2, 2004.
For additional details, see Volume III.

July 6, 2004, Memorandum from Condoleezza Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to
the HonorableGeorge Tenet, Directorof Central Intelligence, re Janat Gul.

July 29,2004, Memorandum forthe Record from CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, "Principals Meeting
relating to Janat Gul on 20 July 2004."

Theone-paragraph letter didnot provide legal analysis or substantive discussion of theinterrogation techniques.
Letterfrom Attorney General Ashcroft to Acting DCI McLaughlin, July 22, 2004 (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 4).
See Volume III for additional details.

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experienced auditory and visual hallucinations.^'^ According to a cable, Janat Gul was "not
oriented to time or place" and told CIA officers that he saw "his wife and children in the mirror
and had heard their voices in the white noise."^^^ The questioning of Janat Gul continued,
although the CIA ceased using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques for several days.

According to a CIA cable, "[Gul] asked to die, or justbe killed."^^^ After continued
interrogation sessions with Gul, on August 19, 2004, CIA detention site personnel wrote that the
interrogation "team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information.On
August 21, 2004, a cable from CIA Headquarters stated that Janat Gul "is believed" to possess
threat information, and that the "use of enhanced techniques is appropriate in order to obtain that

information."^^^ On that day, August 21, 2004, CIA interrogators resumed using the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques against Gul.^^^ Gul continued not to provide any reporting on
the pre-election threat described by the CIA source.^^^ On August 25, 2004, CIA interrogators
sent a cable to CIA Headquarters stating that Janat Gul "may not possess all that [the CIA]
believes him to know."^^ The interrogators added that "many issues linking [Gul] to al-Qaida

are derived from single source reporting" (the CIA source).^^^ Nonetheless, CIA interrogators
continued to question Gul on the pre-election threat. According to an August 26, 2004, cable,
after a 47-hour session of standing sleep deprivation, Janat Gul was returned to his cell, allowed

to remove his diaper, given a towel and a meal, and permitted to sleep.^^^ In October 2004, the

CIA conducted a||B||B

source who had identified Gul as having knowledge of

attack planning for the pre-election threat. ||^mi|^^HI||||i> the CIA source admitted to

fabricating the information.^^^ Gul was subsequently ti^ansferred to a foreign government. On
(informed the CIA that Janat Gul had been released.^^^
Janat Gul never provided the threat information the CIA originally
told the National Security Council that Gul possessed. Nor did the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against Gul produce the "immediate thi-eat information that could save
American lives," which had been the basis for the CIA to seek authorization to use the

techniques. As described elsewhere in this summary, the CIA's justification for employing its
enhanced interrogation techniques on Janat Gul—the first detainee to be subjected to the
techniques following the May 2004 suspension—changed over time. After having initially cited
Gul's knowledge of the pre-election threat, as reported by the CIA's source, the CIA began
representing that its enhanced interrogation techniques were required for Gul to deny the

existence of the threat, thereby disproving the credibility of the CIA source.^^^
1541
1541

1567
1574

82' HEADQUARTERS
822

104)

[04)

^4)
104)
). See Volume III for additional information.

)492
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attome^General^ffic^^ega^ou^l, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of
111!

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August 11, 2004, in the midst of th^ntemjgation of Janat Gul
using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA attorney
wrote a letter
to Acting Assistant Attorney General Dan Levin with "brief biographies" of four individuals
whom the CIA hoped to detain. Given the requirement at the time that the CLA seek individual
approval from the Department of Justice before using the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques against a detainee, the CIA letter states, "[w]e are providing these preliminary
biographies in preparation for a future request for a legal opinion on their subsequent
interrogation in CIA control." Two of the individuals—Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabi'a—
had not yet been captured, and thus the "biographies" made no reference to their interrogations
or the need to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The third individual, Abu Talha

a^akistani^a^i^oreign government custody. His debriefings by aforeign government, |
described in the letter as "only moderately effective" because Abu
Talha was "distracting [those questioning him] with noncritical information that is truthful, but is
not related to operational planning." The fourth individual, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, was also

ir^or^n government custody and being debriefed by foreign government officials
According to the letter, Ghailani's foreign government debriefings were "ineffective"
because Ghailani had "denied knowledge of current threats." The letter described reporting on
the pre-election threat—much of which came from the CIA source—in the context of all four

individuals.^^*^ Ahmed Ghailani and Abu Faraj al-Libi were eventually rendered to CIA custody
and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
On September

2004, after the CIA had initiated a

counterintelligence review of the CIA source who had reported on the pre-election threat, but
prior to the CIA source's
the CIA took custody of Sharif al-Masri, whom the CIA
source had reported would also have information about the threat.Intelligence provided by
Sharif al-Masri while he was in foreign government custody resulted in the dissemination of

more than 30 CIA intelligence reports.^^^ After entering CIA custody, Sharifal-Masri expressed

his intent to cooperate with the CIA, indicating thathewasfng^

ofinterrogations because

he had been tortured while being interrogated in
The CIA nonetheless
sought approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against al-Masri because of

his failure to provide information on the pre-election threat.^^"^
After approximately a week of interrogating al-Masri using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation that coincided with
UnitedStates Obligations Under Article 16 of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniquesthat May Be
Usedin the Interrogationof High Valueal QaedaDetainees, at 11. See section of this summary and Volume II
entitled, "The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help ValidateCIA
Sources."
Letter from

•••,

I, Assistant General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

2004.

83' WASHINGTON

19045

|MAR 04). See HEADQUARTERS

See, for example,
3191
3194

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auditory hallucinations, CIA interrogators reported that al-Masri had been "motivated to

Spate" at the time ofhis arrival.^^^ Despite al-Masri's repeated descriptions oftorture in
the CIA transferred al-Masri to that government's custody after approximately thi*ee
months of CIA detention.

As in the case of Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, the CIA's requests

for OLC advice on the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ahmed
Khalfan Ghailani were based on the fabricated reporting on the pre-election threat from the same

CIA source.^^^ Like Janat Gul and Sharif al-Masri, Ghailani also experienced auditory

hallucinations following sleep deprivation.^^^ As described in this summary, after having opined
on the legality of using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on these three individual
detainees, the OLC did not opine again on the CIA's enhanced interrogation program until May
2005.

8. Country ^Detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf
Consideration ofadetention facility in Country | began in
2003, when the CIA sought to transfer Ramzi bin al-Shibh from the custody of a foreign

government to CIA custody.liiHHBHIHHHilimH!' which had not yet informed the
country'political leadership of the CIA's request to establish a clandestine detention facility in

Country [ surveyedpotential sites for the facility, while the CIA set aside $| million for its
construction.'^'^" In

2003, the CIA arrangedfor a "temporary patch" involving placing two

CIA detainees (Ramzi bin al-Shibh and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) within an already existing

Country | detention facility, until the CIA's own facility could be built.^"^^ That ^ring, as the
Iin Countries

CIA was offering millions of dollars in subsidies to
835

|, and |

842

For more information, see Volume III, detainee report for

3289

Sharif al-Masri.

836 HEADQUARTERS
See letter from

138021

Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Actin^Assi^nt Attorney

General, August 25, 2004 (DTS #2009-.1809WNote: At various times during this perio^jj^B^^s identified as
both CIA associate general counsel and |||H||||[|CTC Legal). See also aletter from

Assistant

General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, September 5, 2004 (DTS #2009-1809). A CIA
email sent prior to the CIA's request for advice from the OLC indicated that tlie judgment that Ghailani had
knowledge of tenorist plotting was speculative: "Although Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his
respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some

knowledge about ongoing attack planningagainsttheUm

email from: •••H,

States homelandjandtheoi^^

involved." (See

CTC/UBLd|||||H||^| (formerly ALEC^^HHIH; to: [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on TaIha, Ghailani, Hamza

RabT^n^AbuFaraud^ AugusnO^OO^^Gl^lani was rendered to CIA custody on September ^2004. (See
3072 lllHflHIi )

began using its enhanced interrogation techniques

on Ghailani on September 17,2004, as the CIA was iniUatin^t^ountmnteUi^^

provided the false repo£i^onthepre-e^ threat5e£j|H|H|H
HEADQUARTERS

ofthe source who

04); ^^^^^•4267^^^^^^4).

(181558Z SEP 04);

838 [REDACTED] 3221

839 [REDACTED] 2234^
8*'» HEADQUARTERS

8'" HEADQUARTERS

8''- While CIA Headquarters offered $| million to Country | for hosting aCIA detention facility, |

precluded the opening of the facility. Only$lmillionwa^m^^^^i^
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CIA Headquarters directed the CIA Station in Count

to

^think big" about how CIA

Headquarters could support Country |'s
After the Station initially
submitted relatively modest proposals, CIAI^dquarters reiterated the directive, adding that the

Station shoul^rovid^"wish list."^''^ Ii^^B|2003, the Station proposed amore expansive $|||

million in
subsidies.^"^^ jjH^ubsidy payments, intended in part as
compeimtion for support ofthe CIA detention program, rose as high as $| miUion.^"^^ By
IHBH 2003, after an extension of five months beyond the originally agreed upon timeframe
for concluding CIA detention activities in Country |, both bin al-Shibh and al-Nashiri had been

transferred out of Country | to the CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^"^^
9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case ofRasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA

Detaineesfrom Guantanamo Bay to Country^
Beginning in September 2003, the CIA held a number of detainees

at CIA facilities on the grounds of, but separate from, the U.S. military detention facilities at

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^'^'^ In early January 2004, the CIA and the Department of Justice began
discussing the possibility that a pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Rasul v. Bush, might grant
habeas corpus rights to the five CIA detainees then being held at a CIA detention facility at

although CIA Headquarters asked the CIA Station to "advise if additional funds may be needed to
keep [the facility] viable over the coming year and beyond." CIA Headquarters added, "we cannot have enough

blacksite hosts, and we are loathe to let one we have slip away."Countiylne^hoste CIA detainees. See
HEADOUAR
[REDACTBD] 5298 iHHHljH; HEADQUAR
ALEC

interview on the CIA program,

noted that the

program had "more money than we could possibl^pen^^hc^ht, and itturned out to be accurate." In the same
interview, he stated that "in one case, we gave
$|,000,0001
Myself and Jos6 [Rodriguez]
We never counted it. I'm not about to count

that kind ofmon^for a receipt." The boxes contained one hundred dollar bills.
recipient ofthe $| million. See transcript ofOral History Interview, Interviewee:

did not identify the
(RJ) - October

13, 2006, Interviewer: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

ALEC ••
ALEC

8^^ See DTS #2010-2448.
[REDACTED] 2498

April

2003, Memorandum for Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from |

I, Chief

Rendition and Detainee^roup^ia^H|^^^^^B|, Counterterrorist Center, Chief of Operations,

Chief, IIIIIIBIII^II^^HIHTSubjec^Reqi^s^^Relocat^iig^Value Detainees to an Interim

Detention Facility at Guantanamo. See also DIRECTOR
CIA detainees were held at
two facilities at Guantanamo Bay, DETENTION SITE MAROON and DETENTION SITE PsfDIGO. {See

Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, Coverage Period:

) A third

CIA detention facility, DETENTION SITE REI

13897

9754

3445

8405^m^^Hi^^H8'^081

and September 1, 2006, Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA)Concerning the Detention by DODof Certain Terrorists at a Facility at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Station.
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Guantanamo

Shortly after these discussions, CIA officers approached the

in Country | to determine if it would again be willing to host these CIA detainees, who would
remain in CIA custody within an already existing Country | facility.^'*® By January | , 2004, the
in Country | had agreed to this arrangement for a limited period oftime.^^^

(TS/^^BHUHI^^) Meanwhile, CIA General Counsel Scott Muller asked the

Department of Justice, the National Security Council, and the White House Counsel for advice
on whether the five CIA detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay should remain at Guantanamo

Bay or be moved pending the Supreme Court's decision.^^^ After consultation with the U.S.
solicitor general in February 2004, the Department of Justice recommended that the CIA move
four detainees out of a CIA detention facility at Guantanamo Bay pending the Supreme Court's
resolution of the case.^^^ The Department of Justice concluded that a fifth detainee, Ibn Shaykh
al-Libi, did not need to be transferred because he had originally been detained under military

authority and had been declared to the ICRC.^^"^ Nonetheless, by April

2004, all five CIA

detainees were transferred from Guantanamo Bay to other CIA detention facilities.

Shortly after placing CIA detainees within anal^dy existing
Country 1 facility fora second time, tensions arose between the CIA andCountry |
856

2004, CIA detainees in a Coun

facility claimed to hear cries of

pain from other detainees presumed to be in the

facility.^^^ When the CIA chief of Station approached the
[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in

Email fiom: Scott W. Muller; to:

Gitmo; date: January |, 2004.

S50 See HEADQUARTERS •••
[REDACTED] 1845
The CIA's longterm facility in Country which the CIA Station in Country | had warned was a drain on the Station's resources,
had not yet been completed. See [REDACTED] 1785

[REDACTED] 1679H||^|HHi
Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt,

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED],

I; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED],
|; subject: CIA Detainees atGITMO; date:

February |, 2004.
I; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED],

Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt,

[REDACTED],

|; subject: CIA Detainees atGITMO; date:

[REDACTED],

February |, 2004.
; cc: George Tenet, John McLaughlin, [REDACTED],

Email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt,

[REDACTED], •^^^^^•jREDACT^

\, subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date:

FebruaryI, 2004.
; ALEC

10255

13698

;ALEC

11672

[REDACTED] 1898^^
See, for example, [REDACTED] 16791

. For additional details of the CIA's interactions with

Country |, see Volume I.

Among tiiedetaineesm^ this claim was Ibn Shaykh al-Libi, who had previousl;^eei^ndered from CIA
custody to
ALibyan national, Ibn Shaykh al-Libi reported while in BB|custody tliat Iraq
was supporting al-Qa'ida and providing assistance with chemical and biological weapons. Some of this information
was cited by Secretary Powell in his speech to the United Nations, and was used as a justification for the 2003

invasion ofIraq. Ibn Shaykh al-Libi recanted the claim after he was rendered to CIA custody on February |, 2003,
claiming that he had been tortured by the IHHH, and only told tliem what he assessed they wanted tohear. For

more details, see Volume IIL While in CounfrJ^^ibHol^I^ebnefer^iat the "sobbing and yelling" he
11)1

MUM

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Iabout the accounts ofthe CIA detainees, the

stated with "bitter

dismay" that the bilateral relationship was being "tested."^^^ There were also counterintelligence
concerns relating to CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who had attempted to influence a Country

I officer.^^^ These concerns contributed to a request from

in

2004 for the CIA to remove all CIA detainees from Country

(^S/^^H^^^^^B^PMj^^^H|2004^heiUhe chief of Station in Country | again
appi*oacheTthe^^^|||||||||||||||HH^^^HH|H|^with allegations from CIA detainees

about the mistreatment of Country | detainees^^^^| in the facility, the chief of Station

received an angry response that, as he reported to CIA Headquarters, "starkly illustrated the
inherent challenges [of]

According to the chief of Station, Country | saw the CIA as
cooperation."^^' By the end of

"quemlous and unappreciative recipients of their I

2004, relations between the CIA and Country | deteriorated, particularly with regard to
intelligence cooperation.®^^" The CIA detainees were transferred out of Country |
2005.«63

Beginning in

(TS//

2005, the

in Country | insisted, over the CIA's opposition, to brief Country |'s

on

the effort to establish a more permanent and unilateral CIA detention facility, which was under
constmction. A proposed phone call to the
Vice President Cheney to

solidify support for CIA operations in Country | was complicated by the fact that Vice President
Cheney had not been told about the locations of the CIA detention facilities. The CIA wrote that

there was a "primary need" to "eliminate any possibility that
could
explicitly or implicitly refer to the existence of a black site in [the country]" during the call with

the vice president.^^"^ There are no indications that the call occurred. The

of

Country | nonetheless approved the unilateral CIA detention facility, which cost$| million, but

was never used by the CIA.^^^ By

2006, the CIA was working widi Country | to

decommission what was described as the "aborted" project. 866

heard reminded him of what he previously endured in

custody and it sounded to him like a prisoner had

been tied up and beaten. See [REDACTED] 1989

[REDACTED] 20101

[REDACTED] 2010
[REDACTED] 2317

The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i]t was only as leaks

detailing the program began to emerge that for^n partners felt compelled to alter the scope oftheir involvement.'
As described above, the tensions with Country Jwere unrelated topress leaks.
[REDACTED] 2602

5&&[REDAOEDn318^^HH^H; [REDACTED] 31281 ••••••;
and [REDACTED]
2783 BIBHUHI- Country | officials refuse^^rovid^h^IA with counterterrorism information,

including informationobtained through CIA-funded

See [REDACTED] 31281

8" HEADQUARTERS

8^-' HEADQUARTERS
8''-' [REDACTED] and CTCmmRDG, "Evolution of the Program.'
[REDACTED] 3706 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced,
Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of
Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem"

In the fall of 2004, CIA officers began considering "end games," or
the final disposition of detainees in CIA custody. A draft CIA presentation for National Security
Council principals dated August 19, 2004, identified the drawbacks of ongoing indefinite
detention by the CIA, including: the need for regular relocation of detainees, the "tiny pool of
potential host countries" available "due to high risks," the fact that "prolonged detention without
legal process increases likelihood of HVD health, psychological problems [and] curtails intel
flow," criticism of the U.S. government if legal process were delayed or denied, and the
likelihood that the delay would "complicate, and possibly reduce the prospects of successful
prosecutions of these detainees.CIA draft talking points produced a month later state that
transfer to Department of Defense or Department of Justice custody was the "preferred endgame
for 13 detainees currently in [CIA] control, none of whom we believe should ever leave USG

custody.""^^^
2004, the overwhelming majority of CIA
detainees—113 of the 119 identified in the Committee Study—had already entered CIA custody.
Most of the detainees remaining in custody were no longer undergoing active interrogations;

rather, they were infrequently questioned and awaiting a final disposition. The CIA took custody
of only six new detainees between 2005 and January 2009: four detainees in 2005, one in 2006,
and one—the CIA's final detainee, Muhammad Rahim—in 2007.^^^

I" 2004, CIA detainee^ere beingheldinUirc^oui^^ at
DETENTION SITE BLACK in Country |, at the^Ifacility
in
Country I, as well as atdetention facilities in Country DETENTION SITE VIOLET in
Country | opened inearly 2005.*^^^ On April 15, 2005, the chief ofBase at DETENTION SITE
BLACK in Country | sent the management ofRDG an email expressing his concerns about the
detention site and the program in general. He commented that "we have seen clear indications
that various Headquarters elements are experiencing mission fatigue vis-a-vis their interaction
with the program," resulting in a "decline in the overall quality and level of experience of
deployed personnel," and a decline in "level and quality of requirements." He wrote that
because of the length of time most of the CIA detainees had been in detention, "[the] detainees
have been all but drained of actionable intelligence," and their remaining value was in providing
"information that can be incorporated into strategic, analytical think pieces that deal with
motivation, structiu-e and goals." The chief of Base observed that, during the course of the year,
the detention site transitioned from an intelligence production facility to a long-term detention
facility, which raised "a host of new challenges." These challenges included the need to address
CIA PowerPoint Presentation, CIA Detainees: Endgame Options and Plans, dated August 19, 2004.
September 17, 2004, DRAFT Talking Points for tlie ADCI: EndgameOptions and Plans for CIA Detainees.
The CIA took custody of Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abu Munthir al-Magrebi, Ibrahim Jan, and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi in
2005, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in 2006.

Thefirst detainees aiTived in Country [ in

I facility in Country | from m to

2003. CIA detainees were heldwithin anexisting Country

2003, and then again beginning in m

2004. For additional

information, see Volume I.

I III

11 III I

IIIII (III11

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the "natural and progressive effects of long-tenn solitary confinement on detainees" and ongoing
behavioral probleras.^^^

(T8//H^^HH|//NF) With respect to the personnel at DETENTION SITE BLACK, the
chief of Base wrote:

"I am concerned at what appears to be a lack of resolve at Headquarters to
deploy to the field the brightest and most qualified officers for service at [the
detention site]. Over the course of the last year the quality of personnel
(debriefers and [security protective officers]) has declined significantly. With
regard to debriefers, most are mediocre, a handfull [sic] are exceptional and
more than a few are basically incompetent. From what we can determine there
is no established methodology as to the selection of debriefers. Rather than
look for their best, managers seem to be selecting either problem,
underperforming officers, new, totally inexperienced officers or whomever
seems to be willing and able to deploy at any given time. We see no evidence
that thought is being given to deploying an 'A-Team.' The result, quite

naturally, is the production of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelhgence....
We have seen a similar deterioration in die quality of the security personnel
deployed to the site.... If this program truly does represent one of the agency's
most secret activities then it defies logic why inexperienced, marginal,
underperforming and/or officers with potentially significant
[counterintelligence] problems are permitted to deploy to this site. It is also
important that we immediately inact [sic] some form of rigorous training
program.

"872

A CIA OIG audit completed in June 2006 "found that personnel
assigned to CIA-controlled detention facilities, for the most part, complied with the standards
and guidelines in carrying out their duties and responsibilities." The OIG also found that,
"except for the shortage of debriefers, the facilities were staffed with sufficient numbers and
types of personnel." The lack of debriefers, however, was described as "an ongoing problem"
for the program. According to the audit, there were extended periods in 2005 when the CIA's

DETENTION SITE ORANGE in Country | had either one or no debriefers. At least twice in
the summerof 2005, the chiefof Station in that country requested additional debriefers, warning
that intelligence collection could suffer. Months later, in January 2006, the chief of Base at the
detention site advised CIA Headquarters that "the facility still lacked debriefers to support
intelligence collection requirements, that critical requirements were 'stacking up,' and that gaps
in the debriefing of detainees were impacting the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting
and would make the work of future debriefers more difficult.
Email from: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to;
subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.

^^^maUfrom: [REDACTED] (COB DETENTION SITE BLACK); to:
HlfjUBHIHI' subject: General Comments; date: April 15, 2005.

Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of

Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. As further described in the
111! I I I III I
I

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M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005

1. Department ofJustice Renews Approvalfor the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques in May 2005
acting assistant attorney general for
OLC, Steven Bradbury, issued two legal memoranda. The first analyzed whether the individual
use of the CIA's 13 enhanced interrogation techniques—including waterboarding, as well as a
number of interrogation techniques that had been used in 2003 and 2004, but had not been

analyzed in the original August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum—were consistent with the criminal
prohibition on torture.^^'^ The second memorandum considered the combined use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.^^^ Both legal memoranda concluded that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques did not violate the torture statute.
^005, the CIA inspector general, who had been

provided with the two OLC memoranda, wrote a memo to the CIA director recommending that
the CIA seek additional legal guidance on whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
and conditions of confinement met the standard under Article 16 of the Convention Against

Torture.^^^ The inspectorgeneral noted that "a strong case can be made that the Agency's
authorized intenogation techniques are the kinds of actions that Article 16 undertakes to
prevent," adding that the use of the waterboard may be "cruel" and "extended detention with no
clothing would be considered 'degrading' in most cultures, particularly Muslim." The inspector
general further urged that the analysis of conditions was equally important, noting that the
inspector general's staff had "found a number of instances of detainee treatment which arguably

violate the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and/or degrading treatment."^^^

Committee Study, the Inspector General audit described how the CIA's detention facihties were not equipped to
provide detainees witli medical care. The audit describedunhygienic food preparation,including at a facility with a
"rodent infestation," and noted that a physician assistant attributed symptoms of acute gastrointestinal illness and
giardiasis experienced by six staff and a detainee to food and watercontamination. Tlie audit further identified
insufficient guidelines covering possible detainee escape or the death of a detainee.
See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven
G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al
Qaeda Detainee.

See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven

G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of
High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General,

re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of JusticeConcerning Legal Guidance on Intenogation
Techniques.

May 26, 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central LitelligenceAgency, from John Helgerson, Inspector General,
re: Recommendation for Additional Approach to Department of JusticeConcerning Legal Guidance on Interrogation
Techniques.
loi

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On May 30, 2005, a third OLC memorandumexamining U.S.
obligations under the Convention Against Torture was completed.^^^ The conclusions in this
opinion were based largely on the CIA's representations about the effectiveness of the CIA

interrogation program in obtaining unique and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence."
As described later in this summary, and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA's effectiveness
representations were almost entirely inaccurate.

2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA *s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to
Department of Justice Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against
Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques When He Complains of Hearing Problems
Ori May 2, 2005, when Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qa'ida's chief of

operations, was captured in Pakistan, the OLC had not yet issued the three aforementioned May

2005 legal memoranda.^^^ CIA officers described Abu Faraj al-Libi's capture as the "most
important al-Qa'ida capture since Khalid Shaykh Muhammad."^^^ Shortly after al-Libi's
capture, the CIA began discussing the possibility that Abu Faraj al-Libi might be rendered to
U.S. custody.^^'

On May | , 2005, four days before the rendition of Abu Faraj alLibi to CIA custody, Director of CTC Robert Grenier asked CIA Director Porter Goss to send a

memorandum to the national security advisor and the director of national intelligence "informing
them of the CIA's plans to takecustody of Abu Faraj al-Libi and to employ interrogation
techniques if warranted and medically safe."^^^ On May 24, 2005, the White House informed the
CIA that a National Security Council Principals Committee meeting would be necessary to
discuss the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, but the
travel schedule of one of the principals was delaying such a meeting.^^^ CIA Director Goss
instructed CIA officers to proceed as planned, indicating that he would call the principals
individually and inform them that, if Abu Faraj al-Libi was found not to be cooperating and there
were no contraindications to such an interrogation, he would approve the use of all of the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques other than the waterboard, without waiting for a meeting of

See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven

G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application
of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
For more infomiation on Abu Faraj al-Libi's detention and interrogation, see Volume III.

HEADQUARTERSHM (251840ZMAY05^^

See, for example,

1085

(describing meetings on May 6 and 7, 2005).

May | , 2005, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, via Acting Deputy Director, Central

Intelligence Agency, ExecutiveDirector, Deputy Directorfor Operationsfrom Robert Grenier, Director, DCI

Counterterrorist CenteTjrejlnterrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

Email froiir^m^^^p|; to; Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTEDl, [REDACTED1, |
I^^IHBTrEDACTED],
cc:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date: May 24,
2005.

mi 'ii( III

iiiiiiiiiii

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the principals.Abu Faraj al-Libi was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE

ORANGE on May

2005,^^^ and transferred to DETENTION SITE BLACK on May H,

2005.^^^

on May
2005, CIA Director Goss formally notified National
Security AdvisorStephen Hadley and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) John Negroponte

that Abu Faraj al-Libi would be rendered to the unilateral custody ofthe CIA.^^^ Director Goss's
memorandum stated:

"[sjhould Abu Faraj resist cooperating in CIA debriefings, and pending a
finding of no medical or psychological contraindictations [sic], to
interrogation, I will authorize CIA trained and certified interrogators to employ
one or more of the thirteen specific interrogation techniques for which CIA
recently received two signed legal opinions from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that these techniques, both individually

andused collectively, are lawful."^^^
The memorandum from Director Goss described Abu Faraj al-Libi

as holding the third most important positionin al-Qa'ida, and "play[ing] a leading role in
directing al-Qa'ida's global operations, including attack planning against the US homeland."
Abu Faraj al-Libi was also described as possibly overseeing al-Qa'ida's "highly compartmented
anthrax efforts."^^^

On May
2005, one day after al-Libi's arrival at DETENTION
SITE BLACK, CIA interrogators received CIA Headquarters approval for the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi.CIA interrogators began using the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi on May 28, 2005, two days before
the OLC issued its memorandum analyzing whether the techniques violated U.S. obligations

under the Convention Against Torture.^^'
The CIA intenogated Abu Faraj al-Libi for more than a month

using tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On a number of occasions, CIA
interrogators applied the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to Abu Faraj al-Libi when he
Email from:

to: Robert Grenier, John Mudd, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],!

IHiH' I^I^^Hj^DACTED], ••••,

cc:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Possible significant delay in EITs for AFAL; date; May 24,

2005^

88-'' ^

887 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from

PorterGoss, Director, CenUal Intelligence Agency, May

2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

888 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from

Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May

2005, re: Interrogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

889 Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of National Intelligence, from
Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, May
2005, re; Intenogation Plan for Abu Faraj al-Libi.

8^° HEADQUARTERS ••1
891

2336 (282003Z MAY 05)
111! il ( III I

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complained of a loss of hearing, repeatedly telling him to stop pretending he could not hear

well.^^^ Although the interrogators indicated that they believed al-Libi's complaint was an
interrogation resistance technique, Abu Faraj al-Libi was fitted for a hearing aid after his transfer
to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay in 2006.^^^ Despite the repeated and extensive use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Faraj al-Libi, CIA Headquarters
continued to insist throughout the summer and fall of 2005 that Abu Faraj al-Libi was
withholding information and pressed for the renewed use of the techniques. The use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Faraj al-Libi was eventually discontinued
because CIA officers stated that they had no intelligence to demonstrate that Abu Faraj al-Libi
continued to withhold information, and because CIA medical officers expressed concern that
additional use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "may come with unacceptable
medical or psychological risks."^^"^ After the discontinuation of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, the CIA asked Abu Faraj al-Libi about UBL facilitator Abu Ahmad al-

Kuwaiti for the first time.^^^ Abu Faraj al-Libi denied knowledge of al-Kuwaiti.^^^
3. CIA Acquires Two Detaineesfrom the U.S. Military

Another legal issue in late 2005 was related to the U.S. Department
of Defense's involvement in CIA detention activities. In September 2005, the CIA and the

Departmentof Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding on this subject,^^-^^ and the U.S.
military agreed to transfer two detainees, Ibrahim Jan and Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi, to CIA custody.
Both were held by the U.S. military without being registered with the ICRC for over 30 days,
pending their transfer to CIA custody.The transfer of Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi took place
notwithstanding Department of State concerns that the transfer would be inconsistent with
statements made by the secretary of state that U.S. forces in Iraq would remain committed to the

law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.^^^

2499 (262123Z JUN 05

Email from:

to:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]7HHHBii' [REDACTED],

subject:

IResponse to DDO Tasking of 7 July on Abu Faraj Interrogation; date: July 8, 2005, at 06:16 PM.

DIRECTOR••

(121847Z JUL 05); HEADQUARTERS

(291232Z JAN 04); DIRECTOR ••
••
29454 (131701Z JUL 05)

AN 04); illi 20361

(040522Z MAY 04)

Memorandum of Understanding ConcerningDOD Support to CIA with Sensitive Capture and Detention
Operations in the War on Terrorism.

^^^5^mail from: [REDACTED], •••;

••I,

to:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DoD Request for

a list of HVTs not to be issued ISN numbers. The email stated: "In conjunction with discussions between CIA and
DoD over the weelcend regarding our request to have the military render Ibraliim Jan to our custody and NOT
issuing him an ISN number, DoD has requested CIA provide a list of HVTs to whom, if captured, the military

should NOT issue ISN numbers" (emphasis in original)^ee ||H|^|l505jH|H||| OCT 05).

July
2005 Memorandum for Joint Staff (HmA
Regarding (^^^m
nil 'ill III I

Interim Guidance

^

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In late 2005, during the period the U.S. Senate was debating the
Detainee Treatment Act baning "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,the

CIA subjected Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi to its enhanced interrogation techniques.^®^ A draft
Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) stated that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information
that could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots"—the type of information
sought by the CIA, and the CIA's justification for the use of its enhanced interrogation

techniques.^^^ Later, the statement that Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi provided "almost no information that
could be used to locate former colleagues or disrupt attack plots" was deleted from the draft

PDB.^®^ Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi remained in CIA custody until early September2006, when he was
transferred to U.S. military custody in Iraq.^^
4. The CIA Seeks "End Game "for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From
Liaison Partners

Email from: [REDACTED]; to;

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:

II^Himill [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; Subject: McCain Amendment on Detainee Treatment; date: October
6, 2005, at 12:37 PM.

According to CIA records, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps,
abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree
Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation,

and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiriil ace bandages. He was moved to a
sitting position, and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided
with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102
hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation,
after which CIA Headquarters infomied interrogators that eight hours was the minimum rest period between sleep

deprivation sessions exceeding 48 hours. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also experienc^an edema

on his head due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles. SeeW^B^M 1810

IDEC 05);

IDEC 05); HHH

1813

DEC 05);•••

1819 ^^HpEC05)J|^^l 1847

05); HEADQUARTERS^^!••j^DEC^).

See

additional informationonAbuJ£faraWmqHi^olum^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
titled:

December

13, 2005, ALT ID#: -2132586. Director Goss notified the national security advisor that he had authorized the use of
die CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi because "CIA believes that Abu Ja'far possesses

considerable operational information about Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi." See December 1, 2005, Memorandum for the
National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, from Porter Goss, Central Intelligence Agency,

subject, "CounterteiTonstlnterrogationTechnique^^
PDB Draft titled:

December

2005, ALT

ID: 20051217 PDB on Abu Jafar al-Iraqi. Urging the change to the draft PDB, one of the interrogators involved in
Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi's interrogation wrote, "If we allow the Director to give tliis PDB, as it is written, to the President,
I would imagine the President would say, 'You asked me to risk my presidency on your intenogations, and now you
give me this that implies the intenogations are not working. Why do we bother?' We think the tone of the PDB
should be tweaked. Some of the conclusions, based on our experts' observations, should be amended. The glass is
half full, not half empty, and is getting more full every day." See email from: [REDACTED]

^••1;

to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED];

subiect^D^n [Abu Ja|fo^Mraqi]^te: December 15, 2005, at 12:25 AM.
2031

In June 2007, inaccurate information about the effectiveness of the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Ja'fai* al-Iiaqi was provided to the Committee. See CIA Response to
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questions for die Record, June 18,2007 (DTS #2007-2564); |

32732 •••

0cr05)^^l|||| 32707HpH OCr05)^HHH 32726•••
f^lO ^HHOCT^ ^•^•32944^HHB0^^^
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(TS/^^Hp||[^H|//NF) In early 2005, the CIA again sought an "endgame" policy for its
detainees, citing its unstable relations with host governments and its difficulty in identifying
additional countries to host CIA detention facilities.^®^ Talking points prepared for the CIA
director for a meeting with the national security advisor made the following appeal:
"CIA urgently needs [the Presidentof the United States] and Principals
Committee direction to establish a long-term disposition policy for the 12
High-Value detainees (HVD)s we hold in overseas detention sites. Our liaison

partners who host these sites are deeply concerned by [REDACTED]^®^ press
leaks, and they are increasingly skeptical of the [U.S. government's]
commitment to keep secret their cooperation.... A combination of press leaks,
international scrutiny of alleged [U.S. government] detainee abuse, and the
perception that [U.S. government] policy on detainees lacks direction is
eroding our partners' trust in U.S. resolve to protect their identities and
supporting roles. If a [U.S. government] plan for long-term [detainee]
disposition does not emerge soon, the handful of liaison partners who
cooperate may ask us to close down our facilities on their tenitory. Few

countries are willing to accept the huge risks associated with hosting a CIA
detention site, so shrinkage of the akeady small pool of willing candidates
could force us to curtail our highly successful interrogation and detention
program. Fear of public exposure may also prompt previously cooperative
liaison partners not to accept custody of detainees we have captured and
interrogated. Establishment of a clear, publicly announced [detainee]
'endgame' - one sanctioned by [the President of the United States] and
supported by Congress - will reduce our partners' concerns and rekindle their
enthusiasm for helping the US in the War on Terrorism."^^^
I" March 2005, talking points prepared for the CIA director for a
discussion with the National Security Council Principals Committee stated that it was:
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that an "important factor" contributing to the slowerpace of CIA detention
operations was al-Qa'ida's relocation to the FATA, which "made it significantly morechallenging [for the Pakistani
government] to mount capture operations resulting in renditionsand detentions by the RDI program." A review of
CIA records by the Committee found that legal, policy, and otheroperational concerns dominated internal

deliberations abou^e program. In 2005, CIA officers asked
one mifjfll and one HH.

officials to render two detainees to CIA
neither

detainee was transferred to CIA custody. CIA officers noted that obtaining custody of detainees held by a foreign

government during this period was becoming increasingly difficult, highlighting diat IHlHjHHliiHIHH
In March 2006, Director

Goss testified to the Committee thatlack(rfspacewas the limiting factor in taking custody of additional detainees.

See HEADQUAJRTERSHH^H|H||||HhEADQUARTERS HI^Hl^H^^ail from:
[REDACTED], l^^^Kto:

cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],!

[REDACTEDUREDACrED]^[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: for coord, pis: D/CIA

talkin^oint^ll^miPIII^Ire rendition ofj
6702|||||B|||fH|^^|ntIEADQUARTERS

transcript of Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

906 Text redacted by the CIA priorto provision to Committee members at the U.S. Senate.
See CIA document dated, January 12,2005, entitled, "DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National
Security Advisor."
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"only a matter of time before our remaining handful of current blacksite hosts
concludes that [U.S. government] policy on [detainees] lacks direction and...
[the blacksite hosts] ask us to depart from their soil.... Continuation of status
quo will exacerbate tensions in these very valuable relationships and cause
them to withdraw their critical support and cooperation with the [U.S.

government]."^®^
During this period, the U.S. solicitor general, however, expressed
concern that if CIA detainees were transferred back to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, they might be
entitled to file a habeas petition and have access to an attorneyMeanwhile, the National
Security Council continued to discuss a public roll-out, and as described later in this summaiy,

the CIA engaged the media directly in order todefend and promote the program.^^®
The question of what to do with the remaining detainees in CIA
custody remained unresolved throughout 2005, during which time the CIA pursued agreements
with additional countries to establish clandestine CIA detention facilities.^'^ The Detainee
Treatment Act was passed by Congress on December 23, 2005, as part of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Yeai* 2006. That day, the CIA suspended its interrogation program

again.^'^ As described later in this summary, in February 2006, the CIA informed the National
Security Council principals that the CIA would not seek continued use of all of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.^'^
5. Press Stones and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees

Result in the Closing ofCIA Detention Facilities in Countries | and |

In October 2005, the CIA learned that Washington Po^Hjeporter
Dana Priest had information about the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program,

negotiations with the Washington Post in which it sought to prevent the newspaper from

publishing information onthe CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^'"^ Fearful that
See CIA Talking Points for Principals Committee Meeting on Long-Term Disposition of High-Value Detainees,
8 March 2005.

See email from:
planning; date: January 14,2005.

to: John Rizzo; subject: Meeting this am with WH counsel on endgame

Email &omJHHH^p; to^H^^HHccOREDA^D],

A. Rizzo,

[REDACTED], John

subject: Re: Brokaw

Take

date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM. In 2006, Vice PresidentCheney expressed resei-vations about any public
release of information regarding the CIA program. See CIA Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED],

C/CTCjlHI' subject, "9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting on Detainees."
Negotiations with Countries | and | tohost CIA detention facilities are described in this summary, and in
greater detail in Volume I.
HEADQUARTERS

(232040Z DEC 05)

9'^ DDCIA Talking Points for 10 February 2006 Un-DC re Futureof the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention,

andIntenogation Program - Interrogation Techniques.
HEADQUAR

HEADQUAR

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the CIA recommended the

immediate transfer of CIA detainees to Department of Defense custody
When the
Department of Defenserejected the proposal, the National Security Council directed the CIA to

prepar^ther options.^^^ Meanwhile, two U.S. ambassadors, one in

and another in

inquired whether Secretary of State Rice had been briefed on the impending
Washington Post article and sought to speak to the secretary herself to ensure that the CIA
program was authorized. According to CIA documents, Secretary Rice was not aware of the

specific countries where the CIA detention facilities were located.^^^ In lieu of a phone call from
Secretary Rice, the CIA recommended that the State Department's CounterteiTorism Coordinator

and former CTC DDO, Henry Crumpton, call the ambassadors.^^^ The Washington Post
published an article about CIA detention sites on November 2, 2005.^^^
The publicationofthe Washington Post article resulted in a

demarche to th^Unite^StatesfromJ^^BHH^^

which also suggested that

contribution jjj^^^H^^^H^^^^^^ould be in jeopardyThe United States also

received ademarch^^m^^^^H^^||.^-^ According to aCIA cable, U.S.
representatives to

"if another shoe were to drop," there would be

considerable ramifications for U.S. relations with

on a number of issues that

depended on U.S. credibility in the area of human rights. The representatives also "questioned
whether the gravity of this potential problem is fully appreciated in Washington."^--

The other options put forward by the CIA were transfer of CIA detainees

which the CIA

anticipated would release thedetainees after a short period. The CIA also proposed its own outright release of the
detainees. See CIA document entitled D/CIA Talking Points for use at

Principals Meeting (2005).

HEADQUARTERS

Talking Points for Dr. J.D. Crouch fortelephone calls to Ambassadors in [REDACTED] regarding possibility of
forthcoming Dana Priest press article; email from:

I; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTE^^REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want to

speak to the SecState^datej^^PHmi, at06:45 PM.

Email fiom: ^^HHRtoTiREDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],

[REDACTED]; subject: Phone Call with State/L re Ambassadors who want tospeaktotheSec^ate; date: October
24, 2005, at 06:45 PM; email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: •••••I,
[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTCDUREDACTEDU^DACTED]; subject: Phone caU from S/CT

Amb. Hank Crumpton to Ambassador in

^^te: November 1, 2005, at 6:13:21 PM.

After the subsequent press revelations, the U.S. ambassador in Country | asked again about whether the secretary of
state had been briefed, prompting the CIA Station in Countiy | tonote in a cable that briefing U.S. officials outside
of the CIA "would bea significant departure from current policy." See [REDACTED] HI [REDACTED].

See "CIA
Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons," the Wasliin

Post, November 2, 2005.

|. See cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUAR |
cables to [REDACTED] at HEADQUAR

cable to [REDACTED] at HEADQUA^

and HEADQUAR

|; Memorandum from D/CIA Goss to Hadley, Townsend and Negroponte,

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catalogued how the Washington Post story created
tensions in its bilateral counterterrorism relations with

allies and determined that:

"[t]he article is prompting our partners to reassess the benefits and costs of
cooperating with the [U.S. government] and CIA. These services have
conducted aggressive, high-impact operations with CIA against... targets,

including
aggressive or cooperative. »923

We no longer expect the services to be as

In April 2006,

informed CIA officers that press stories on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program led
the
government to prohibit
from providing "information that could lead to the
rendition or detention of al-Qa'ida or other terrorists to U.S. Government custody for

interrogation, including CIA and the Department ofDefense."^^"^
M^dia leaks also created tensions with countries that had hosted or

continued to host CIA detention facilities. For example, leaks prompted Country | officials to
convey their intent to communicate directly with the Departments ofJustice andState^^iey

then formally demarched the U.S. government.^"^ As late as H 2009, the

Country | raised with CIA Dii'ector Panetta the "problemoftheseojet detention facility" that
had "tested and strained" the bilateral partnership. The

ofCountry | also stated

that assurances were needed that future cooperation with the CIA would be safeguarded.^^^
After publication of the Washington Post article,

Countt^^demanded^e closure of DETENTION SITE BLACK within | hours.^^^ The CIA
transferred the H|| remaining CIA detainees out ofthe facility shortly thereafter.^^^
[REDACTED]

See email from: HHHH^^MjtoOREDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTEdT^^^H^H, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject:

sensitive do not forward - draft intel; date: April 7, 2006, at 04:12:59 AM. See also September 2, 2006, Fax from
DD/CTC, to Steve Bradbury, John Bellinger III, Steve Cambone, foi-warding September 1, 2006
Memorandum, "Anticipated Foreign Reactions to the Public Announcement of die US Secret Terrorist Detention

Center." |||||||B

begun raising legal and policy concerns related to [an^otential] support and assistance to the

CIA in rendition, detention, and interrogation operations in Marcl^005j|||fcfficer^ndicate^haUl^ believed
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
prohibited
H from aiding or assisting in these CIA operations. For iilililiinnNM^^iiimil iinHjh i' il (iiiii imi ilmiil
Renditions and Detention, see email from: [REDACTED]^OS

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: more from

ReTHlH

John A. Rizzo^c^REDACTED],

11:09 AM.

"[REDACTED] article fallout." According to CIA records, the
ofCountry | was "very angry"
about press reports, which, he believed, would be "exploited by radical elements" to "foment increa^hostility

toward [Country J] government." [REDACTED] DIRR|||||||||||| [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] |||H||

[REDACTED]. CIA records further state that the press reporting would"put considerablestrain on the
relationship." (See "[REDACTED] article fallout.") Despite this record, and other records in the full Committee

Study, theCIA'sJune 2013 Response state£"[w]efound noevidence that the RDI program in any way negatively
affected US relations overall with Countr

[REDACTED] 23281
927 [REDACTED] 7885 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
528 [REDACTED] 4895 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
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Country |

officers refused to admit CIA detainee Mustafa

Ahmad al-Hawsawi to a local hospital despite earlierdiscussions with country representatives

abou^ow adetainee's medical emergency would be handled.^^^ While the CIA understood the
officers' reluctance to place a CIA detaineein^ocal hospital given media reports, CIA
Headquarters also questioned the "willingness of
to participate as originally
agreed/planned with regard to provision of emergency medical care."^^^ After failing to gain
assistance from the Department of Defense,the CIA was forced to seek assistance from three
third-party countries in providing medical care to al-Hawsawi and four other CIA detainees widi

acute ailments. Ultimat^, th^CI^pai^heB|||H^^^^^^H|^Bmorcthan$^| million for
the treatment of

fo^h^reatmen^f

and

and made arrangements for

to be treatedin^HBj^^^The medical issues resulted in the closing

of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Countryjfin|B|| 2006.^^^ The CIA then transferred its
remaining detainees to DETENTION SITE BROWN. At diat point, all CIA detainees were
located in Country

Meanwhile, the pressures on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation

Program brought about by the Washington Pos^t^ prompted die CIA to consider new options
among what it called the "[d]windling pool
partners willing to host CIA Blacksites."^^^
The CIA thus renewed earlier efforts to establish a detention facility in Country
The CIA had

earlier provided $| million to Country |'s

in preparation for apotendal CIA

^tention site, prompting the chief of Station to comment, "Do you realize you can buy [Country

^7"939

December | , 2005, the chief of Station in Country | met with the

who was not concerned about the CIA's detention of terrorists in his

country, but wanted assurances that the CIA interrogation program did not include the use of

^29 HEADQUARTERS

I([REDACTED] [REDACTED]). See also HEADQUARTERS

([REDACTED] [REDACTED]).
[REDACTED] 5014
HEADQUARTERS

See CIA Request Letter to DOD for Medical Assistance, dated __MM •' 2006, from DCIA Porter Goss. This

letter was written four days after theCIA Headquarters cable noting theemerging difficulties in relying on host-

country medical care. See also CIA document entitled. Summary and Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on

OMS Participation in the RDI Program. While the document is undated, it includes infomiation updated through
2007.

5eeCI^(^umententitled/|C0^
TO
FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed.
•^^•7719
See also CIA document entitled, "COMPENSATION TO LIAISON FOR
MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed, which indicates that the total compensation provided was $Bm.
Summary and Reflections of Chiefof Medical Services on OMS Participation in ttieRDI Program.
SeeVolume I for additional details.
4118

HEADQUARTERS

See CIA Counterterrorlst Rendition, Detainee, andInteiTogation ProgramTdatedlBFebrucu-y 2006, "Un-DC"
Meeting slides.

Transcript ofOral History Interview, Interviewee: |B||^H|||||||| (RJ) - October 13, 2006, Interviewer:
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

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torture.^"^® In providing his approval, the

agreed to a request from the chief

of Station not to inform the U.S. ambassador in Country
The CIA also reached an
agreement with another country, Country
to establish a CIA detention facility in that country

and arranged with the leadership ofCountry | not to inform tlie U.S. ambassador there.^"^^ The
CIA ultimately did not detain individuals in either counti7.
In late October 2005, days before the publication of the

Washington Post article, the CIA asked a separate country. Country |, to temporarily house B
CIA detainees.The chief of Station briefed the U.S. ambassador in Country

who requested

that the National Security Council and the White House be bnefe^rnh^lan.^"^ There are no

CIA records to indicate the briefing occurred. Country |'s |||^m||||||||m
provided
approval, while seeking assurances that the CIA would develop a contingenc^lai^i^as^ie
detention site was exposedinthem^^
the CIA Station and the
considered

in Countiy

CIA Headquarters directed that a

long-term CIA detention facility be established in the country. Counti7 ['s
approved a plan to build a CIA detention facility

^ut

noted his ongoing concerns about the lack of a CIA "exit strategy.
The lack of emergency medical care for detainees, the issue that

had forced the closing of DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country

was raised repeatedly in

the context ofthe construction ofthe CIA detention facility in Country |. On March
2006,
CIA Headquarters requested that the CIA Station in Country | ask Counti'y | to arrange discreet
access to the nearest hospital and medical staff. The cable stated that the CIA "look[s] forward
to a favorable response, prior to commencing with the construction of our detention facility.
Construction nonetheless began on the facility without the issue of emergency medical care

having been resolved. In ^Hj 2006, after the deputy chief of the CIA Station in Counti'y |, the
deputy chief of RDG, and an OMS officer met with

officers, the Station reported

that the establishment of emergency medical care proximaHothesitewas^^i^^

In

July 2006, an OMS representative informed the chief of

CIA Headquarters that the facility in Country | "should not be activated without a clear,
committed plan for medical provider coverage.
^"0 [REDACTED] 1938
[REDACTED] 1938

^"2 [REDACTED] 3145
HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 6481

^''5 [REDACTED] 6481
REDACTED] 6903

[REDACTED] 6877

947 HEADQUARTERS
[REDACTED] 7670

9495e^nail from: [REDACTED]^:

subject: ||H|||| CTC^^I leetin re.

discussion is also referenced in

C/CTC^^B/RDG; subject: Site Visit to

UREDACTED]; cc: Hi

date;
'^•57:2^M. The June
I; Memorandum for the Record; to: C/CTCj^H;from:
^and Recommendations. As described, in June 2006, the CIA

inspector general issued an audit tliatconcluded that while CIA detention facilities lacked sufficient debriefers, they
"were constructed, equipped, and staffed to securely and safely contain detainees and prompt intelligence
exploitation of detainees." The audit furtlier determined thatthe facilities "are not equippedto provide medical

treatment to detainees who have ordevelopseriousphysica^^iei^^
III!

11 III I

and operable plans are not in place
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By the time a CIA team visited the Country | detention site inlate
2006, the CIA had akeady invested $B million in the new facility. Describing the absence of
adequate emergency medical care options as "unacceptable," the chief of RDG recommended in

a draft memo thatconstruction efforts beabandoned for this reason.^^® The following day, an
edited version of the same memo described the issue as a "challenge," but did not recommend

that the CIA cease constm^ion of the facility.^^^ The resulting CIA detention facility, which

would eventually cost $|H million, was never used b^he CIA. Press reports about the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program that appeared in ||^| and m eventually forced the CIA
to pass possession of theunused facility to the Countryy|g(
| government. 952
In early January 2006, officials at the Department of Defense
informed CIA officers that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had made a formal decision not to

accept any CIA detainees at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.^^^ At the time, the
CIA was holding 28 detainees in its two remaining facilities, DETENTION SITE VIOLET, in

Country |, and DETENTION SITE ORANGE, in Country

In preparation for a meeting

with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on January 6, 2006, CIA Director Goss was provided a
document indicating that the Department of Defense's position not to allow the transfer of CIA

detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay "would cripple legitimate end game

planning" for the CIA.^^^ The talking points for that meeting suggested that Director Goss tell
Secretary Rumsfeld that the:

"only viable 'endgame' for continued US Government custody of these most
dangerous terrorists is a transfer to GTMO... [a]bsent the availability of
GTMO and eventual DoD custody, CIA will necessarily have to begin
transferring those detainees no longer producing intelligence to third countries,

to provide inpatient care for detainees," and concluded that CIA detention facilities were not equipped to provide
emergency medical care to detainees. The audit team did not visit the facility in Country but stated, with regard

to another country, Country |, that "CIA funds have been wasted in constructing and equipping a medical facility
that was later determined not to be a viable option for providing inpatient care for detainees." See Reportof Audit,
CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report
No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14, 2006, at DTS # 2006-2793. The CIA's
supervised the

CIA's Renditions and Detention Group.

^^J|||H||Hp|2006, Memorandum for the Record, to: C/CTCHjl, from: C/CTCm^RDG, re: Site Visit to

^^^^^^^HpH2006, Memorandum for the Record, to: C/CTC|^^|, from: C/CTC||^H/RDG, re: Site Visit

to IIIII^HIII^Vand Recommendations (2).
Congressional Notification: Central Intelligenc^gen^Response to Host Country Government Order to Vacate
an Inactiv^lacksit^et^tion Facility,
#2009-3711); SSCI Memorandum for the

Record,
CIA Document, RDI Program Background Brief for Leon Panetta, 2009.
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA
Detainees on GTMO.

See CIA Memo, "As of 01 January 2006, therew^ 28 HVDs inCIA custody." As noted above, DETENTION
SITE VIOLET inCountry | would beclosed in
2006.
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretary of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA
Detainees on GTMO.

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which may release them, or [the CIA itself may need to] outright release
them."^^^

After Secretary Rumsfeld declined to reconsider his decision not to
allow the transfer of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, CIA officers
proposed elevating the issue to the president. CIA officers prepared talking points for Director

Goss to meet with the president onthe "Way Forward" onthe program on January 12, 2006.^^^
The talking points recommended that the CIA director "stress that absent a decision on the longterm issue (so called 'endgame') we are stymied and the program could collapse of its own

weight."^''^ There are no records to indicate whether Director Goss made this presentation to the
president.
2005 and 2006, the CIA transferred detainees from its custody to

at least nine countries, includinji
as well as to the U.S. military in Iraq. Many of these

detainees were subsequently released.^^^ By May 2006, the CIA had 11 detainees whom it had
identified as candidates for prosecution by a U.S. military commission. The remaining detainees

were described as having "repatriation options open."^^°
6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following
the Detainee Treatment Act, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

Following the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act in December
2005, the CIA conducted numerous discussions with the National Security Council principals
about modifications to the program that would be acceptable from a policy and legal standpoint.

In February 2006, talking points prepared for CIA Director Goss noted that National Security
Advisor Stephen Hadley:
"asked to be informed of the criteria CIA will use before accepting a detainee
into its CIA Counterten-orist Rendition, Detention, and InteiTOgation Program,

stating that he believed CIA had in the past accepted detainees it should not
have."^^^

The CIA director proposed future criteria that would require not

only that CIA detainees meet the standard in the MON, but that they possess information about
threats to the citizens of the United States or otiier nations, and that detention in a CIA facility
DCIA Talking Points for 6 January 2006 Breakfast with Secretaiy of Defense, re: SecDef Refusal to Take CIA
Detainees on GTMO.

DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with tlie President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist
Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program.

DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on CounterteiTorist
Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Program.
See Volume I for additional details.

960 jyjgy |g^ 2006, Deputies Committee (Un-DC) Meeting, Preliminary Detainee End Game Options. For additional
information, see Volume I.

DCIA Talking Points for 9 February2006 Un-DC,re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention,
and Interrogation Program - Detainees.

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wa^pprapriate for intelligence exploitation.^^^ Afew months later,

Legal,

wrote to Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury suggesting a
modified standard for applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The suggested new

standard was that "the specific detainee is believed to possess critical intelligence of high value
to the United States." While the proposed modification included the requirement that a detainee
have "critical intelligence of high value," it represented an expansion of CIA authorities, insofar
as it covered the detention and interrogation of an individual with information that "would assist

in locating the most senior leadership of al-Qa'ida of [sic] an associated terrorist organization,"
even if that detainee was not assessed to have knowledge of, or be directly involved in, imminent
terrorist threats.^^^

Discussions with the National Security Council principals also
resulted in a March 2006 CIA proposal for an interrogation program involving only seven of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial

grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab.^^"^ This proposal was not acted upon at
the time. The proposal for sleep deprivation of up to 180 hours, however, raised concerns among
the National Security Council principals.^^^
In April 2006, the CIA briefed the president on the "current status"
of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. According to an internal CIA review, this
was the first time the CIA had briefed the president on the CIA's enhanced interrogation

techniques.^^^ As previously noted, the president expressed concern at the April 2006 briefing
about the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the
bathroom on himself."^*^^

On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the

case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, concluding that the military commission convened to try Salim
DCIA Talking Points for 9 February 2006 Un-DC, re: Future of the CIA Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention,
and Intenogation Program - Detainees.

Letter from
Legal
Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury, May 23, 2006.
(DTS#2009-1809); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from StevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re;
Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A toCertain Techniques That May be Used in the InteiTogation of a

High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #200^^l0^a^), citing Fax for Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney

Genera^ffice of Legal Counsel, fromBH^^^H> Assistant General Counsel, CIA (Jan. 4, 2005) ('January 4
Fax'); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior DeputyGeneralCounsel, Central Intelligence Agency,
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10,2005, Re:
Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to the Combined Useof Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of
High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 10); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of
the Convention AgainstTortureto Certain Techniques tliat May be Used in the Interrogation of High ValueAl
Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11).

DCIA Talking Points for 9 March 2006 PrincipalsCommittee Meeting.

Memorandum for the Record from [REDACTED], C/CTCH, re: 9 March 2006 Principals Committee
Meeting on Detainees.

See CIA document entitled, "DCIA Meeting with the President/^atedApril 8, 2006.
Email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED]; cc:
meeting with DCI; date: June 7, 2006.
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I III! mil I

Hamdan, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, was inconsistent with statutory requirements and
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The implication of the decision was that treating
a detainee in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 would constitute
a violation of federal criminal law. CIA attorneys analyzed the Hamdan decision, noting that it
could have a significant impact on "current CIA interrogation practices.Their memorandum
also referenced that Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury had the "preliminary
view ... that the opinion 'calls into real question' whether CIA could continue its CT
interrogation program involving enhanced interrogation techniques," as the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques "could be construed as inconsistent with the provisions of Common

Article 3 prohibiting 'outrages upon personal dignity' and violence to life and person."^^^
The case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a
draft memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques.^^® The CIA did not use its enhanced inten-ogation techniques again
until July 2007, by which time the OLC had interpreted the Military Commissions Act, signed by
the president on October 17, 2006, in such a way as to allow the CIA to resume the use of the
techniques.^^^
N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program

L President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program

After significant discussions throughout 2006 among the National
Security Council principals, the Department of Defense ultimately agreed to accept the transfer
of a number of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody

(U) On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush delivered a public speech acknowledging
that the United States had held al-Qaida operatives in secret detention, stating that the CIA had
employed an "alternative set of procedures" in interrogating these detainees, and describing
information obtained from those detainees while in CIA custodyAs described later in this
summary, the speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, contained
CIA memorandum from tlie CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld."
CIA memorandum from the CIA's Office of General Counsel, circa June 2006, entitled, "Hamdan v. Rumsfeld."

Email from:

[REDACTED]; cc:

Rizzo; subject; FW: Summary

of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility;

Report, Investigation into the Office of LegalCounsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central
Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected TeiTorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS
#2010-1058).

Memorandum for Jolin A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the
War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain

Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See Volume I for details on these discussions.

September6, 2006, The White House, PresidentDiscusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected
Terrorists.

nil

II nil

I nil Mill I

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significant inaccurate statements, especially regarding the significance of information acquired
from CIA detainees and the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques.
(U) In the speech, the president announced the transfer of 14detainees to Department of
Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay and the submission to Congress of proposed legislation on

military commissions.^^^ As all other detainees in the CIA's custody had been transferred to
other nations, the CIA had no detainees in its custody at the time of the speech.^^^
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees
After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006
After the 14 CIA detainees arrived at the U.S. military base at

Guantanamo Bay, they were housed in a separate building from other U.S. military detainees and
remained under the operational control of the CIA.^^^ In October 2006, the 14 detainees were
allowed meetings with the ICRC and described in detail similar stories regarding their detention,
treatment, and interrogation while in CIA custody. The ICRC provided information on these

claims to the CIA.^^^ Acting CIA General CounselJohn Rizzo emailed tiie CIA director and
other CIA senior leaders, following a November 8, 2006, meeting with the ICRC, stating:
"[a]s described to us, albeit in summary form, what the detainees allege
actually does not sound that far removed from the reality... the ICRC, for its
part, seems to find their stories largely credible, having put much stock in the
fact that the story each detainee has told about his transfer, treatment and

conditions of confinement was basically consistent, even though they had been
incommunicado with each otherthroughout their detention by us."^^^
In February 2007 the ICRC transmitted to the CIA its final report
on the "Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." The ICRC report
concluded that "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include
descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques - singly or in combination - that amounted

to torture and/orcruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."^^® Notwithstanding Rizzo's comments,
the CIA disagreed with a number of the ICRC's findings, provided rebuttals to the ICRC in
See Volume I and Volume II for additional infomiation.

September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Militiury Commissions to Try Suspected
Terrorists.

See Volume III for additional information.

CIA Background Memo for CIA Director visit to Guantanamo, December |, 2006, entitled Guantanamo Bay
High-Value Detainee Detention Facility.

^^^mai^roi^|^^^^^^H|CTC/LGL; to; John Rizzo,[REDACTEDl,

•^•^•,^^^^^Br[REDACrEDUREDACTED],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:

[REDACTED],

subject: 8 November 2006 Meeting v^'ith ICRC reps; date:

November 9, 2006, at 12:25 PM.

Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, Michael J. Morell; cc:
[REDACTED]; subject: Fw: 8 November 2006 Meeting with ICRC Reps; date: November 9,
2006, at 12:25 PM.

February 14, 2007, Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel,

International Committee of theRed Cross, |

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writing, and informed the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical or threatened
abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall
credibility.The ICRC report was acquired by The New York Review of Books and posted on

the Review'?, website in April 2009.^*^^ The Committee found theICRC report to be largely
consistent with information contained in CIA interrogation records.^^^
3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act

noted, in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft legal memorandum on the impact of the

Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^^"^ The administration
determined that the CIA would need new legislation to continue to use the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.The Military Commissions Act addressed the issues raised by the
Hamdan decision and provided the president the authority to issue an Executive Order detailing
permissible conduct under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The bill passed the

Senate on September 28, 2006, and the House ofRepresentatives the following day.^^^

On November |, 2006, when Abd Kadi al-Iraqi was rendered to
CIA custody, the draft Executive Order and an updated OLC memorandum had not yet been

prepared.^^^ Although Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was consistently assessed as being cooperative,
CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatmentof Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in
CIA Custody. At a Committee Hearing on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden emphasized die close relationship

tlie CIA had with thelCR^^I^eliev^ur contacts with the ICRC have been very useful. I have met wit^

I, tlie
for the Red Cross, on several occasions atCIA. It appears that ~
]is arunner and he's promised to bring his gear with him next time he comes to Langley so that we can

jog on the compound."), but emphasized the errors in the ICRCreport, stating: "While CIA appreciates the time,
effort, and good intentions of the ICRC in forming its report, numerous false allegations of physical or threatened
abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the reportundermine its overall credibility." (See SSCI Hearing
Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS# 2007-3158).) As is described in more detail in Volume II, Director
Hayden's statements to the Committee regarding the ICRC report included significant inaccurate infomiation.
See Assets/nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/022/icrc—report.pdf and detainee reviews and reports in Volume
III.

CIA officers in RDG and OMS prepared a number of documents disputing tlie ICRC allegations. See document
entitled, "CIA Comments on the Febmary 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees'
in CIA Custody." See Volumes I and III for additional infonmtion.
Email from:
^o: [REDACTED]; cc:
of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM.

John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary

Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury told tlie Department of Justice's Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) that officialsfrom the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice met with the president and
officials from the CIA and the NSC to consider the impact of the Hamdan decision, and that it was clear from tlie
outset that legislation would have to be enacted to address the application of Common Article 3 and the War Crimes
Act to the CIA interrogation program. As the OPR report noted, ''Hamdan directly contradicted OLC's January 22,

2002 opinion to the White House and the Department ofDefense, which had concluded that Common Article 3did
not apply to captured members of al Qaeda." See Department of Justice Officeof Professional Responsibility;
Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central
Intelligence Agency's Use of EnhancedInterrogation Techniques on Suspected Tenorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS
#2010-1058).

S. 3930 passed the Senate by a vote of 65-34 (RecordVote Number: 259) and the House by a vote of 250-170
(Roll no. 508). It was signed into law on October 17, 2006.
6361

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interrogators also believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations

ofhigh-value targets.^^^ The CIA believed his

February 2007 supported this

conclusion,prompting discussions at CIA Headquarters about the possible use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques against him. By the end of the month, however, the CIA had
determined there was "insufficient intelligence...that [Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi] possesses actionable

information... to justify the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

(TS//^|||||||||||||||||||||||/^^) In October 2006, a panel of CIA interrogators recommended that
four CIA enhanced interrogation techniques—the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, nudity,
and the waterboard—^be eliminated, but that the remainder of the interrogation techniques be

retained.^^^ Under this proposal, the CIA would have been authorized to subject detainees to
dietary manipulation, sleep deprivation, the facial slap, the facial grasp, the attention grab,
walling, stress positions, and water dousing. There are few CIA records describing the panel's
deliberations, or the CIA's response to its recommendations. The panel proposed dropping two
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—nudity and the abdominal slap—that the CIA
director had proposed retaining in March 2006, while recommending that the CIA retain three
other techniques— walling, stress positions, and water dousing—that had not otherwise been
requested for retention.^^^

4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the
Military Commissions Act

Iri the spring of 2007, the OLC completed a draft of a legal opinion
concluding that the use of the CIA's seven proposed enhanced interrogation techniques—sleep
deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the
attention grab—would be consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva

Conventions and the Military Commissions Act. This draft generated significant disagreement
between the State Department's legal advisor, John Bellinger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney
General Steven Bradbury, resulting in Secretary of State Rice refusing to concur with the
proposed Executive Order.
See, for example,
(041805Z NOV 06);

1335 (021946ZNOV 06);

1370 (071318Z NOV 06);

(271250Z NOV 06);^^^! 1703 (040918Z DEC 06)
(Q81606ZJAN 07); ^^1^1956 (15121IZ JAN 07);

1340 (041114ZNOV 06);
1574 (230910Z NOV 06);
1860(181622Z DEC 06);
2007 (251057Z JAN 07).

2065 (081633Z FEB 07)

^^"Ei^lTom:

ICTC/LGL; to;

HHII; subject: What needs to occur before we ask for EITs on

REDACTED],

; HEADQUARTERS

(272015Z FEB

07); date: February 9, 2007.
See October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from

Chief,

^^^Se^^ber23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from
Chief, [
m m and DCIA Talking Points for 9March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting.
February 9, 2007, letterfrom John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Steven G. Bradbury,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. At the time, there were internal

disagreements within the CIA about whether the CIAshouldhave a detention and interrogation program. An April
2007 Sametime communication between the chief of CTC and another senior CIA leader described these

disagreements and how CIA leadership responded to them. According to

"[REDACTED]

was carping to [REDACTED] and Jose [Ro^iguez^as^rid^^^haUi^nd^ichael] Sulick (!) had a long talk
KU' 'iM III

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2007, in an effort to gain Secretary Rice's support, the CIA
asked CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR to brief Secretary Rice on the CIA's

inten'ogation program. During that briefing, Secretary Rice expressed her concern about the use
of nudity and a detainee being shackled in the standing position for the purpose of sleep
deprivation. According to CIA records, in early July 2007, after the capture of Muhammad
Rahim, Secretary Rice indicated that she would not concur with an interrogation program that
included nudity, but that she would not continue to object to the CIA's proposed interrogation
program if it was reduced to six of the enhanced inteiTogation techniques listed in the draft OLC
memorandum: (1) sleep deprivation, (2) dietary manipulation, (3) facial grasp, (4) facial slap,

(5) abdominal slap, and (6) the attention grab.^^'^
5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence
On June 25, 2007, al-Qa'ida facilitator Muhammad Rahim was

captured in Pakistan.^^^ Based on reports of debriefings of Rahim in foreign government custody
and other intelligence, CIA personnel assessed that Rahim likely possessed information related

to the location of Usama bin Laden and other al-Qa'ida leaders.^^^ On July 3, 2007, Acting CIA
General Counsel John Rizzo informed Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury that
the CIA was anticipating a "new guest," and that the CIA "would need the signed DOJ opinion

'in a matterof days.'"^^^
Muhammad Rahim was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION

SITE BROWN in Country | on

B 2007."® Upon his arrival, CIA

interrogators had a single discussion with Rahim during which he declined to provide answers to
questions about threats to the United States and the locations of top al-Qa'ida leaders.Based
on this interaction, CIA interrogators reported that Rahim was unlikely to be cooperative. As a
and agree tlieCIA is off the track and rails... that we shouldnot be doingdetention, rendition, interrogation."
Referringto a CIA leadershipmeeting that day in which the Committee's April 12, 2007, hearing would be

discussed, BHHH stated that: "Iwant to take that [criticism] on by letting all know how importan [sic] this
[hearing] is... and what the leaderships [sic] position is from hayden, kappes and jose... in case there is some

corrosive, bullsliit mumbling and rumblings amongcon^^

- "componenT^^

seeing." Sametimecommunication between

ofwhich i am
12/Apr/07, 09:50:54

to 09:56:57.

Email from:
Rodriguez, John Rizzo etc.; subject: EIT briefing for SecState on
June 22, 2007; date: June 22, 2007; July 3, 2007, Steven Bradbury, Handwritten Notes, "John Rizzo"; email from:
John A. Rizzo; to:
cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date:
July 3,2007.
995 1

1199 (251634ZJUN 07);

7516

6439

CIA memorandum titled, CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007. The
document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled CTC/RDG
Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Raliim - 25 June 2007. See also
2463 (201956ZJUL 07).
Email from: John A. Rizzo; to:

cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with

Bradbury; date: July 3,2007.
75161

999 ^^^2^ II^^HrULOT)^
im

n

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result, CIA DirectorMichael Hayden senta letter to the president formally requesting that the
president issue the Executive Order interpreting the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow

the CIA to interrogateRahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A classified
legal opinion from OLC concluding that the use of the CIA's six enhanced interrogation
techniques proposed for use on Rahim (sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp,
facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab) did not violate applicable laws was issued on
July 20, 2007. The accompanying unclassified Executive Orderwas issued the same day.^®^®
Although Rahim had been described by the CIA as "one of a handful of al-Qa'ida facilitators

working directly for Bin Ladin and Zawahiri,"^®®^ Rahim remained in a CIA cell without being
questioned for a week, while CIA intenrogators waited for approval to use the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against him.^'^^^
CIA interrogators initially expressed optimism about their ability to
acquire information from Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A cable
sent from the CIA detention site stated:

"Senior interrogators on site, with experience in almost every HVD [highvalue detainee] interrogationconducted by [CIA], believe the employment of
interrogation with measures would likely provide the impetus to shock
[Rahim] from his current resistance posture and provide an opportunity to
influence his behavior to begin truthful participation."'^®^
Pour CIA interrogators present at the CIA detention site began

applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on July 21, 2007.^®"'^ According to CIA
records, the interrogators "employedinterrogation measures of facial slap, abdominal slap, and
facial hold, and explained to [Rahim] that his assumptions of how he would be treated were

wrong."'®®^ The inteiTogators emphasized to Rahim that"his situation was the result of his
deception, he would stay in this position until interrogators chose to remove him from it, and he

could always correct a previous misstatement."^®®^ According to the cable describing the
interrogation, Rahim then threatened to fabricate information:

"[Rahim] reiterated several times during the session that he would make up
information if interrogators pressured him, and that he was at the complete
1000 j^jiy

2007, letter from Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to President George W.

Bush; Executive Order 13440, July 20, 2007; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, ActingGeneral Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the

Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques thatMay Be Used by theCIA in the Intenogation of High Value al
Qaeda Detainees.

CIA memorandum titled, "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007."
The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled
"CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007."
2445 (181104Z JUL 07);
2463
2467
2467
2467

2463 (201956Z JUL 07);

12467 (211341ZJUL07)

(201956Z JUL 07)
(211341Z JUL 07)
(211341Z JUL 07)
(211341Z JUL 07)

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mercy of the interrogators and they could even kill him if they wanted.
InteiTogators emphasized to [Rahim] that they would not allow him to die
because then he could not give them information, but that he would,
eventually, tell interrogators the truth.

During the interrogation of Rahim using the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, Rahim was subjected to eight extensive sleep deprivation sessions,

as well as to the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial slap.^®^^ During
sleep deprivation sessions, Rahim was usually shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper
and a pair of shorts.Rahim's diet was almost entirely limited to water and liquid Ensure
meals.CIA interrogators would provide Rahim with a cloth to further cover himself as an
incentive to cooperate. For example, a July 27, 2007, cable from the CIA detention site states
that when Rahim showed a willingness to engage in questioning about "historical information,"

he was "provided a large towel tocover his torso" as a "subtle reward."^®'^ CIA interrogators
asked Rahim a variety of questions during these interrogations, seeking information about the
current location of senior al-Qa'ida leaders, which he did not provide.

1007

2467(211341ZJUL07)

Rahimwas subjected to 104.5hours of sleep deprivation from July 21, 2007, to July 25, 2007. Sleep
deprivation was stopped when Rahim "describedvisual and auditory hallucinations." After Raliim was allowed to
sleepfor eight hours and the psychologist concluded that Rahim had beenfaking his symptoms, Raliim was

subjected toanother 62 hours of sleep deprivation. Athird, 13 hour session, was haltedduet^ limit of 180 hours

of sleep deprivation during a30 day period^SeeJP^^^I 2486 (251450Z JUL07)J^^BH 2491 (261237Z JUL

07)j||||| 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); |H|Bin501 (271624Z JUL 07);

JUL 07); and

H^H2^8 (291820Z JUL 07).) On August 20, 2007, Rahim was subjected to afourth sleep deprivation

session. After a session that lasted 104 hours, CIA Headquarters consulted with tlie Department of Justice and
determined that "[tjermination at this point is required to be consistent witli theDCIA Guidelines, whichlimt sleep

deprivation to an aggregate of180 hours in any repeat any 30 day period." {See HEADQUARTERS ^H|[|
(240022Z AUG 07).) Between August 28, 2007, and September 2,2007^ahim was subjected to three additional

sleep deprivation sessions of 32.5 hours, 12 hours, and 12 hours. {See |^U^^64^291552Z AUG 07);
•liil 2661 (311810Z AUG 07);
2662 (010738Z SEP OT^TandjBHIi 2666 (020722Z SEP 07).)
As described, CIA interrogators conducted an eighth sleep deprivation session, lasting 138.5 hours, in November
2007.

12467 (211341Z JUL 07^
12558 (08151IZ AUG 07);

^2496 (261834ZJUL 07
12558 (08151IZ AUG 07);
2645 (291552Z AUG 07);

2502 (281557Z JUL 07);

^54 (301659Z AUG 07); f
2508 (291820ZJUL07);

2626 (241I58Z AUG 07); [
2661 (31181OZ AUG 07);

2554 (071453Z AUG 07)
2671 (061450Z SEP 07)
2554 (071453Z AUG 07)
2644 (281606Z AUG 07);
2662 (020738Z SEP 07);

12666 (030722Z SEP 07)

12467 (211341Z JUL 07);

2570 (101155Z AUG 07);

2615 (201528Z AUG 07)

2501 (271624ZJUL 07)

12467 (211341ZJUL07)
12502 (281557ZJUL 07);
2558 (08151 IZ AUG 07)
2644 (281606Z AUG 07);
2661 (311810Z AUG 07);

12476 (231419Z JULOJ^
[2508 (291820Z JUL07);
12570 (101155Z AUG 07);
2645(291552Z AUG 07);

12662 (020738Z SEP 07); [

2496 (261834ZJUL 07);
2554 (071453Z AUG 07);
2626 (241158Z AUG 07);
2654 (301659Z AUG 07);
2666 (030722Z SEP 07);

12671 (061450Z SEP 07). CIA contractor DUNBAR participated inMuhammad Rahim's interrogation
sessions from August 9, 2007, to August 29, 2007. See Volume III for additional details.
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11 III I I I i i i i i i i

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On September 8, 2007, CIA Director Hayden approved an
extension of MuJiammad Rahim's CIA detention

The Director of the National Clandestine

Service Jose Rodriguez disagreed with the approved extension, writing:
"I did not sign because I do not concur with extending Rahim's detention for
another 60 days. I do not believe the tools in our tool box will allow us to

overcome Rahim's resistance techniques. J.A.R."^^^^
Shortly after the September 2007 extension, CIA personnel were
directed to stop the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim. Rahim was

then left in his cell with minimal contact with CIA personnel for approximately six weeks.
On September 10, 2007, Rahim's interrogators reported to CIA Headquarters that Rahim had
"demonstrated that the physical coiTective measures available to HVDIs^'^'^ have become

predictable and beaiable."^^^^ The use ofthe CIA's enlianced interrogation techniques on Rahim
resumed on November 2, 2007, with a sleep deprivation session that lasted until November 8,

2007, for a total of 138.5 hours. This sleep deprivation session, the longest to which Rahimhad
been subjected, was his eighth and final session. Rahim was also subjected to dietary
manipulation during this period.

According to CIA records, intermittent questioning of Rahim

continued until December 9, 2007, when all questioning of Rahim ceased for nearly three weeks.
During this time, CIA detention site personnel discussed and proposed new ways to encourage
Rahim's cooperation. These new proposals included suggestions that Rahim could be told that
audiotapes of his interrogations might be passed to his family, or that
CIA memorandum from
Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central
Intelligence Agency, September 7, 2007, Subject: Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim.

CIA Routing and Record Sheet with Signatures for approval of the Memorandum, "Request to Extend Detention
of Muharrnm^ Rahim," September 5, 2007. J.A.R. are theinitials of the Director of the NCS, Jose A. Rodriguez.
1016
2697 (121226Z SEP 07); CIA memorandum from
Director, Counterterrorism
Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 31, 2007, Subject: Request Approval for the use of

Enhanced InteiTOgation Techniques; HEADQUARTERS IHI (101710 SEP 07). During this period, contractor
Grayson SWIGERT recommended two approaches. The first was increasing Raliim's amenities over 8-14 days
"before returning to the useof EITs." The second was"switching from an interrogation approach thatin effect
amounts to a 'battle of wills,' to a 'recruiting' approach that sidesteps theadversarial contest inherent inframing the
session as an interrogation." SWIGERT noted, however, that thelatter approach "is apt to be slow in producing
information" since intelligence requirements would not be immediately serviced, and "it would work best if [Rahim]

believe^i^ill be hUCIA^usto^indefinitely." (See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED] and

IHIIII^HIi;cc: HUBHiH

Hammond DUNBAR; subject: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation

next steps;date: September 17, 2007, at 4:05 PM.) The CTC's deputy chiefof operations replied that,"It's clear
that the 'harsh' approach isn't going to workand the more we try variants on it, the more it allows [Rahim] to

believe he has won^Th^uestion iswhether tliat perception will be conveyed in Scenario 2." See email from

[REDACTED] to: |H|^^Hccj[REDACrcD],

DUNBAR, [REDACTED]7||||||[|^^

Grayson SWIGERT, Hammond

[REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Some thoughts on [Rahim]

interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:28 PM.
HighValue Detainee Interrogators (HVDI)

'"'^•[^•2691

(101306ZSEP07)

1019
2888 (022355Z NOV 07);
2915 (081755Z NOV 07). Due to the time zone difference,
when this sleepdeprivation session began it was November 2, 2007,at CIAHeadquarters, but November 3, 2007,at
the detention site.
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Rahim was cooperating with U.S. forces. On December

18, 2007, CIA Headquarters directed the detention site to stand down on the proposals.
The CIA's detention and interrogation of Mohammad Rahim

resulted in no disseminated intelhgence reports.On March B, 2008, Muhammad Rahim was

to

where

took custod^^^im.

The|BHgovernment immediately transferred Rahim to the custody of

which point Rahimwas transferred back to CIA custody and rendered by the CIA to U.S.

military custody at Guantanamo Bay.'^^^
6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Callsfor StudyofEffectiveness of
Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use ofRapport-Building Techniques
in Future CIA Interrogations

On April 21, 2008, and April 22, 2008, the CIA's RDG convened
an after-action review of the CIA's interrogation of Muhammad Rahim. According to summary

documents, the CIA review panel attempted to determine why the CIA had been unsuccessful in
acquiring useful information from Rahim. The summary documents emphasized that the
primary factors thatcontributed to Rahim's unresponsiveness were the interrogation team's lack
of knowledge of Rahim, the decision to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
immediately after the short "neutral probe" and subsequent isolation period, the lack of clarity
about whether the non-coercive techniques described in the Army Field Manual were permitted,
the team's inability to confront Rahim with incriminating evidence, and the use of multiple
improvised interrogation approaches despite the lack of any indication that these approaches
might be effective.The summary documents recommended that future CIA interrogations
should incorporate rapport-building techniques, social interaction, loss of predictability, and
deception to a greater extent.The documents also recommended that the CIA conduct a

13097 (141321Z DEC 07)^^HH 3098

3144 (270440ZDEC 07);
3165 (311016Z DEC 07);
(180120ZDEC 07)

151203Z DEC 07

3151 (291607Z DEC 07);
3166 (011404Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS
See Volume II and Volume III for additional information.

m;f|||^|8408 jjj^^^^^^^^^BRecords indicate that Rahim did not depart

uring

his time in nominal^^^Bcustody. See Volume IIIfor additional details on ttiis transfer.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled

After-Action Review, author (REDACTED); Undated CIA

Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Raliim] Lessons

Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerningth^Modificatioi^^lee^Deprivatioi^n^Re^^
Walling as an

and Memorandum from

to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008,Subject: Results of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Intenogation. A
document drafted by one of tlie participants prior to the review suggested that"intenselegal/policy scrutiny" was
also a negative factor; however, this point was not mentioned in anyof the post-review summaries, except in the
context of discussing confusion over whether particular interrogation methods were legal. The summary documents
state that CIA officers devised and implemented severaldifferent strategies, one after another. According to one of
the documents, "[t]hese varied strategies were implemented due to frustration and concern regarding the lack of
intelligence production."
"^24 Undated CIA Memorandum, titled

After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA
Memorandum, titled [Raliim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons
Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concemingth
Deprivation and Reinstatement of
i( )|| iiii( II ii I
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survey of interrogation tccliniques used by other U.S. government ageneies and other countries
in an effort to develop effective interrogation methods.'"--^
Muhammad Rahim was the last CIA detainee in the CIA's

Detention and Interrogation Program.

7. CIA Contracting ExpensesRelated to Company Formed by SWIGERTand DUNBAR
CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central
role in the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002,
and then used the techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005
["Company
In addition to providing interrogators for the CIA's interrogation program,
Company Y was granted a sole source contract to provide operational psychologists, debriefers,
and security personnel at CIA detention sites.Under the contract. Company Y was tasked
with conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees to learn about the terrorist mind set

(this project was named the "Terrorist Think Tank" or "T-^"), developing
strategies, and writing the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.Later

descriptions of their services note that—on behalf of the CIA—Company Y officers participated
in the interrogations of detainees held in foreign government custody and served as
intermediaries between entities of those governments and the CIA.'^^^^"
By 2OO6, the value of the base contract for their company, with all

options exercised, was in excess of$180 million.As ofMay 2007, Company Y had hired |
former CIA staff officers, many of whom had previously been involved with the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. Company Y's chief operating officer was the former
Walling

and Memoranduni from

IIIH to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subiect^esults of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation.
Undated CIA Memorandum, titled

After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA

Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons
Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of
Walling as an EIT.
See Volume III for additional information.

1027 Pqj. more infomiation on CIA contracting with [Company Y], seeVolume I.
Letter
Y|, attn: Hammond DUNBAR from [REDACTED],
Contracting Officer, re Confirmation of Verbal Authorization to Proceed Not to Exceed (ATP/NTE); email from:

[REDACTED]; to: ••••;
cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED];
subject: Next Contractual Stepswitl^WIGERT&D^
date: March 2, 2005; March 18, 2005, Letter from

[REDACTED], Chief^^H|ta|p|^^^^^^^^^^^Company Y], re Letter Contract
Email from:

AM^emai^rom:^

subject:

date: June 17, 2005, at 11:08:22

to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: PCS CTC officer to [Company Y

location] ("One ofthe primary functions isto develop and set-up what we call the 'Terrorist Think Tank'
(previously briefed to the DDO and ADDO) which will be critical as we develop our
date: July 12, 2005, at 10:25:48 AM; Justification Date: 28 February 2006, Justification For Other Than Full And
Open Competition, Contractor: [Company Y].
for example, [Company Y] Monthly report, Febioiary 2006; [Company Y] Monthly Report, March 2006;
[Company Y] Quarterly, 01 Jan - 31 March 2007.

Justification Date: 25 July 2006, Justification For Other Than Full and Open Competition, Contractor:
[Company Y].
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chief of

division of the CIA supervising the Renditions and

Detention Group. In addition, Company Yhired atleast | CIA security protective officers to
work on Company Y's CIA contracts. In March 2006, a list of projected staff and contractors

within CIA's Renditions and Detention Group included
separate positions.Of those |
positions, H [73%] were for contractors, the majority ofwhom were contractors from
Company
gy
2007, RDG reported having | staff officers and

contractors.

By 2008, RDG had atotal of

positions, with | staff officeiTandJI [85%]

contractors, according to the CIA. 1035

The CIA's contract with Company Y was terminated in mid-2009.
From the time of the company's creation in 2005 thi'ough the close-out of its contract in 2010,

the CIA paid Company Y more than $75 million for services in conjunction with the CIA's
Detention and Inten'ogation Program.The CIA also certified Company Y's office in

[, as a Secure Compartmented Infomiation Facility (SCIF), which required
a CIA officer to be detailed to
and provided Company Y access to CIA internal
computer networks at its facility. In 2008, the CIA authorized an additional payment to
Company Y of approximately $570,000, after CompanyYindicatedthaUUm
conducting countersurveillance of its officers when

for

appeared in the press in conjunction with the program. The CIA agreed to a $5 million
indemnification contract for the company that covered, among other expenses, criminal
law firm for representation in
prosecution.^"^' Company Y hired a prominent
2007,'®^^ and billed the CIA $1.1 million for legal expenses from 2007 through 2012 per its

indemnification agreement.
Part of these expenses included legal presentation at a
Committee staff briefing by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November >, 2008.^^^° Under the
CIA's indemnification contract, the CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses

through 2021.'041

1032 dO/CTC^^^RDG Projected Staff &Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006.
1033 dO/CTcHH/RDG Projected Staff &Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006.
1035
1036

June 4, 2007, RDG, Mission Summary.

confirmation, received by telephone on November 16, 2012.
#2009-1258; DTS #2012-4008. CFA paid Company Y $612,000 in 2010 for contract close-out costs. In a

Mai-ch 2009 notification, the CIA also infonned the Committee that, in addition to payments to Company Y,

Grayson SWIGERTand Hammond DUNBARhad received $1.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively, as
individuals. As noted elsewhere, the notification includes inaccurate representations about the effectiveness of the
CIA program. See Congressional Notification, March 18, 2009 (DTS #2009-1258).

Email from: [REDACTED], CTC^M; to: Hammond DUNBAR, Grayson SWIGERT; cc:
[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Copy of

Signed IndemnificationAgreemen^ date: July 13, 2007, at 02:22 PM; email from: [REDACTED], Chief, Contract
Law Division; to:

cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Modified Indemnification Agmt... New AR 7-17 Waiver Memo,
Too?; date: November 13, 2007, at 10:32 AM.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
August 12, 2008, at 06:42 PM.

subject:

Billing, May-December 2007; date:

1039 Response from the CIA regardingContract Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008).
See DTS #2009-0572.

'0'^' Response from the CIA regarding ContractCost^o^^Compan^G^cto^^ 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008).
nil

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Mill

8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends

(U) On December 5, 2007, fewer than nine months after Director Hayden told the European
Union that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was not a CIA program, but
"America's program," the House-Senate conference for the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence
Authorization Act voted to include an amendment that banned coercive interrogation techniques
and established the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations as the
interrogation standard for all U.S. government interrogations.The conference report passed
both the House and the Senate with bipartisan majorities.
(U) On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 that banned coercive interrogations. In a radio address explaining the decision, the
president stated "[t]he bill Congress sent me would take away one of the most valuable tools in
the war on terror—the CIA program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives."
Addressing the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, President Bush stated that
the "main reason" the CIA program "has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use
specialized interrogation procedures to question a small number of the most dangerous terrorists
under careful supervision." The president stated that the CIA program had a "proven track
record," and that the CIA obtained "critical intelligence" as a result of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques related to the Camp Lemonier plotting, the Karachi plotting, the Second
Wave plotting, and the Heathrow Airport plotting. The president then repeated a warning the
CIA had previously provided to the White House, that to "restrict the CIA to [interrogation]
methods in the [Army] Field Manual," "could cost American lives."^^"^ As is described in this
summary, and detailed more extensively in the full Conmiittee Study, the CIA's representations
to the White House regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the
thwarting of the referenced plots were inaccurate.

(U) On March 11, 2008, by a vote of 225-188, the House of Representatives failed to override
the presidential veto.^^"^^

(TS//^||||||||||||||H[//NF) In December 2008 and January 2009, CIA officers briefed the
transition team for President-elect Barack Obama on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program. CIA Director Hayden prepared a statement that relayed, "despite what you have heard
or read in a variety of public fora, these [enhancedinterrogation] techniques and this program did

1042 director 1111111 (152227Z MAR 07); House Report 110-478 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, 110"^ Congress (2007-2008), Section 327.
H.R. 2082 passed the House of Representatives on December 13, 2007, by a vote of 222-197 (Roll No: 1160)
and passed the Senate on February 13,2008, by a vote of 51-45 (Record Vote Number: 22).

See "Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," The New York Times, dated March 8, 2008. Located, among
other places, at www.nytiiTies.eom/2008/03/08/washington/08cnd-ptext.html. For an exampleof a previous CIA
briefing to the White House with similar assertions, see CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation
Programon 29 July 2003," preparedby CIA General Counsel Scott Muller,dated August 5, 2003; with briefing
slidesentitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003. The CIAdocument provided to the participants
states, "Termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." For additional commentary, see
"Veto of Bill on CIA Tactics Affirms Bush's Legacy," The New York Times, dated March 9, 2008.

U.S. House of RepresentativesRoll Call Vote 117 of the 110^ Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01
PM.

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work."^^^ The prepared materials included inaccurate information on the operation and
management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as the same set of
examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIA had
provided to policymakers over several years.The examples provided were nearly entirely
inaccurate.

On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order
13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that
it currently operates and... not operate any such detention facility in the future." The Executive
Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using inten'ogation techniques other than
those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations.

1046
Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including
"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover
memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama

National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." Tlie briefing book includes the previously
mentioned, "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same
intelligence claims found in the document of tlie same name, but dated April 15, 2005.
1047
detailed information, see Volume II.
The Executive Order also stated that the FBI and "other Federal law enforcement agencies" could "continufe] to
use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation tliat are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not
involve the use of force, threats, or promises." (See Executive Order 13491, "Ensuring Lawful Interrogation,'
January 22, 2009.)

(DTS #2013-1723)
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IKIII III 11

III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of
the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple
Constituencies

A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations
From 2002 through 2009, in order to obtain policy authorizations
and legal approvals, the CIA made a series of representations to officials at the White House,

the Department of Justice, and the Congress, asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques were uniquely effective and necessary to produce otherwise unavailable intelligence
that the U.S. government could not obtain from other sources.The CIA further represented
1049 These representations were also made by the CIA to other elements of the executive branch, to include the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. As described in this Study, the Department of Justice first approved
the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on August 1, 2002.

1050

2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding theeffectiveness of the CIA'senhanced

interrogation techniques provided a specificset of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terroristscaptured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(I) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Officeof Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
tlieCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the

OLC include that the use ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critic^,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential"for the U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United
States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of UnitedStates Obligations UnderArticle 16 of the Convention Against Tortureto CertainTechniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques.
CitingCIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing die CIA's interrogation program
(which was basedon CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable inteUigence. ...As the President
explained [on September6, 2006], 'by givingus information about ten-orist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the program has saved innocentlives.'" {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that MayBe Used by theCIAin the Interrogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIAbriefings for members of the National Security Council in July andSeptember 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one Icind or anotherhad produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the view of CIAprofessionals, saved hves," and which warned policymakers that
"[t]ermination of this program will result in lossof life, possiblyextensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for
the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA
Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member
Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.)
(4) The CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [the CIA] received... as a resultof the lawful use of enhancedinterrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly savedcountless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to

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that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "saved lives" and "enabled the CIA to disrupt
teiTorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of critical intelligence on

al-Qa'ida."^^^' The Departmentof Justice used these representations of effectiveness to assess
the fact tliat without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks

involvinghundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (SeeMemorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Directorfor Operations; subject: re (S) Commentsto Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-lG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for
CIA Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and
the [enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all,
of the timely intelligence acquiredfrom detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by
other means." {See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence andReporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid
Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including"DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the SenateSelect Committee on Intelligenceon
March 18,2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), which provides a list of "some of the
key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributedto the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques, and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timelyintelligence acquired from detainees in this
program wouldnot have been discovered or reportedby any other means." See VolumeII for additional CIA
representations assertingthat tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled die CIA to obtain unique,
otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."

1051 Aniongother documents that contain the exact, or similarCIA representations, see\ (1) CIA memorandum for
the Record, "Review of InteiTogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller,
dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29,2003, presented to
senior White House officials widi additional briefings using tlie slides as documented in September 4, 2003, CIA
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record
from Scott Muller,Subject: CIA Interrogation Program. (2) CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector Generzil from
James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated Febiiiary 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to
Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment,
"Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004. (3) CIA

Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13^004;

fax to tlie Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, "HI, Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. |i|." This
report was widely disseminated in the IntelligenceCommunity and a copy of this report was provided to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 31,2009, former Vice President Cheney requested
die declassification of tliis Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24,

2009. (4) CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence/^ubie^

"Effectiveness of the ClACountertei^ Inte^gatior^fechi^ues,'' included in email from:]HHIHiH' to:
^"^t^ibject:

on

tecliniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr.

Rice explaining the value ofthe interrogation techniques." (5) CIA Memorandum for^ve Bradbury at Office of

Legal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2,2005, from

1^1 Legal Group, DCI

Countertenorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," (6) CIA
briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA
Detention and Intenogation Program." (7) CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI
Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Inten'ogation (HVDI)Techniques." (8) CIA "Briefing
Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" faxed from the CIA to the DepartmentofJustice on April 15, 2005, at

10:47AM. (9) CIA fax to DOJ Command Center^ate^^ril 22, 2005, for
Counsel, U.S. Depai tment of Justice, from

Office ofLegal

Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, re:

H, Materials ofKSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykli Muhammad:
Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah.; (10) CIA

Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee ReportingPivota^o^i^^a^gains^^a'ida," June 2005, which CIA
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whether the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were legal;^^^" policymakers at the White
House used these representations—and the legal analysis by the Department of Justice—to
records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. TheIntelligence Assessment at the
SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June3, 2005. On March 31, 2009,

former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly
released with redactions on August 24, 2009. (11) CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Countertenorist

Detention and Interrogation Program," dated December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J.
Hadley, Assistantto the President/National Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the

President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence,
Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis." (12) CIA briefing
document dated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006
Briefing forChief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Programs."
(13) CIA briefing document entitled, "Detainee Intelligence Value Update," dated 11 July 2006, internal document
saved witliin CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING."

(14) CIA document dated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist
InteiTogations Program," and"CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6,
2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing die CIA's Detention and InteiTogation
Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the
High Value Tenorist Detainee Program." (15) CIA classified statement for the record. Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007, and
accompanying Senate Select Committee onIntelligence hearing transcript, entitled, "Hearing on Central Intelligence
Agency Detention and Interrogation Program." (16) CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on

October 26, 2007, at5:39:48PM,entitled, "Talking Points Appeal ofdie $|H Million reduction in CIA/CTC's
Rendition and Detention Program." (17) "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboai'd 06 November 2007," dated November

6, 2007, with thenotation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." (18) CIA
Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and InteiTOgations (RDI)" including "Tab 7,"
named "RDG Copy- Briefing onRDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13January 2009." (19) CIA briefing
documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic
attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)."
Tlie documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with

associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key
Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and
Plots Disrupted." (20) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18,2009, at
3:46PM, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258). See also CIA representations detailed in
OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven
G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application
of United States Obligations Under Article 16 ofthe Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees; and OLC memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbuiy, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel,July 20, 2007,Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the DetaineeTreatment

Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May BeUsed by the CIA in the
Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

See section of this summary addressingrepresentations to the Department of Justice, as well as Memorandum

for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative; Memorandum for John A. Rizzo,
Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under
Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture toCertain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation ofHigh
Value Al Qaeda Detainees; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Centi-al Intelligence
Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,
2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva

Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by dieCIA in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda
Detainees.
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assess whether the CIA interrogation program should be approved as a matter ofpolicy;^®^^ and
members of Congi-ess relied on the CIA representations in overseeing and assessing the program,
providing funding, and crafting related legislation.
Among otherdocuments, see the August 5, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record from Scott Muller from a
July 29,2003, National Security Council Principals Meeting with the subject, "Review of Inteaogation Program on

29July 2003," as well as theaccompanying briefing slides, "CIA Interrogation Program, July 29,2003"; March 4,
2005, Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document, dated March
4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice PresidentCheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program"; CIA document,

dated May 2, 2006, entitled, BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OFSTAFF TOTHE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006Briefing for
Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and InteiTogation Programs; CIA document

entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, withthe notation die
document was"sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting"; andCIA Briefing for Obama National
Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing
on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," prepared "13 Januaiy 2009."

'^'^''Among otherdocuments, see\ (1)CIAtestimony to theSenate Select Conunittee on Intelligence (SSCI) on April
24, 2002, regarding Abu Zubaydali's initial intenogation; (2)CIA written answers to Committee Questions for the
Record, dated August 15,2002, regarding results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogations; (3) CIA testimony to SSCIon
September 5, 2002, regarding covert detention facilities and results of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation; (4) CIA cable
documenting September 27, 2002, briefing to Chairman Bob Graham and Vice Chainnan Richard Shelby and their
staff directors regarding the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the intenogations of Abu Zubaydah; (5)
CIA Memorandum for the Record documenting February 4, 2003, briefing to SSCI Chairman Pat Roberts and

Committee staffdirectors regarding the CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program; (6) CIA testimony to SSCIon
March5, 2003, regarding the capture and initial interrogation of KSM; (7) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on
March 19,2003, regarding KSM's inten:ogation; (8) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on April 1, 2003, regarding
KSM's capture; (9) April 3, 2003, Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment regarding KSM threat
reporting, entitled "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Tmths, Sunounded by a Bodyguard
of Lies," provided to the SSCI on April 7, 2003; (10) CIA testimony to SSCI on April 30, 2003, regarding detainee
reporting; (11) CIA testimony to SSCI on June25, 2003, regarding KSM intenogation; (12)CIA testimony to

SSCI on July 30j2003^reear^g CIA detainee threat reporting; (13) CIA testimony to SSCI on September 3,
2003, regarding

^'^^^'^orities, including CIA detention authorities; (14) CIA prepared briefing for

Chairman Pat Roberts and Vice Chainnan John D. Rockefeller IV entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program: DDO

Talking Points, 04 September 2003"; (15) CIA witness testimony to SSCI on May 12,2004, regarding CIA rolein
abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; (16) SSCI staff notes for July 15, 2004,CIA briefing to Chairman Pat Roberts and
Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV regarding the status of the CIA intenogation prograjii; (17) CIA testimony

to SSCIon September 13,2004, regarding CIA and the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; (18) Hand-written notes of
Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV recording a briefing by Jose Rodriguez on March 7, 2005; (19) CIA
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Sensitive Issue -Counterterrorism, October 31, 2005, regarding briefing for
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist regarding the Detainee Treatment Act, and email exchanges between John Rizzo,

lll^^llllllll^,

subject: "Re: Immediate Re; Sen. Frist required for briefing on impact of

McCain Amendment"; date: October 31, 2005, and associated records concerning CIA briefings for Senators John

McCain, Tliad Cocluan, Ted Stevens, and John Cornyn; (20) SSCI Memorandum for die Record, March 8, 2006,
documenting CIA briefing of March 7, 2006, to staff on status of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program;
(21) CIA Director Porter Goss testimony to the SSCI on March 15, 2006,regarding the status of the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program; (22) CIA DirectorMichael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on September 6,
2006, regarding the CIA's Detention and Intenogation Program, priorto Senateconsideration of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006; (23) CIA Director Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on November 16, 2006,
regarding the CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program, following passage of the Military Commissions Actof
2006; (24) CIA DirectorMichael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on April 12,2007,regarding the CIA's Detention
and Intenogation Program and a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross; (25) CIA fax from CIA
employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover
sheetentitled, "Talking points," senton October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points

Appeal ofthe $Hi Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program"; (26) CIA Director

Michael Hayden testimony to the SSCI on Decembe^^^OOT^egardin^h^ublic revelation of the CIA's
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CIA presentations to the executive and legislative branches, the

CIA represented that other parties had consented to, or endorsed, the CIA's interrogation
program. As an example, during a policy review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques
in July 2003, the CIA informed a subset of the National Security Council principals that theuse
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "approved by the attorney general," and was
"fully disclosed to the SSCI and HPSCI leadership." In the same presentation, the CIA
represented that the CIA interrogation program "had produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives." The CIA then provided
examples of "attacks averted" as a direct result of the CIA interrogation program, and warned
policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will resultin loss of life, possibly
extensive."'^^^

When the CIA was asked by White House officials to review and

provide further evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in
2004, the CIA responded that it was "difficult, if not impossible" to conduct such a review, but
assured White House officials that "this program works," "the techniques are effective," and the

program produces "results."^®^^ The "results" provided by the CIA consisted ofthe "disruption"
of specific terrorist plots and the capture of specific terrorists. The CIA further represented that
the information acquired as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique
and "otherwise unavailable.These specific CIA claims played an especially important role
destiiiction of videotapes of the interrogations of AbuZubaydah and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri; (27) CIA Director

Michael Hayden public testimony to theSSCI on February 5, 2008, regarding waterboarding andCIA
interrogations, priorto Senate vote on February 13, 2008, on the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act
that would have prohibited any member of the U.S. Intelligence Community from using interrogation techniques not
authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual.

Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003." Memorandum prepared by
CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation
Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending the meeting included
thedirector of the CIA, George Tenet; theCIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice; White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General John Ashcroft;
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security
Council, John Bellinger.

1056

talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting

PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Inten-ogation (HVDI) Techniques," datedMarch4, 2005, for a March
8, 2005, meeting. See also CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor Rice entitled, "Effectiveness of the
CIA CounterteiToristInterrogation Techniques," dated December 2004.

1057 pjQiyj 2003 through 2009, the CIA'srepresentations regarding tlie effectiveness of theCIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific setofexamples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted that theintelligence obtained from the useof theCIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(1) CIArepresentations in theDepartment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30,2005,
which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from theuse of
theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include thatthe useof the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical,"
"vital,"and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt" terrorist tlireats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [theOLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United

States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo^enio^Deput^enera^oun^ Central Intelligence Agency, from
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in the Department of Justice's legal review of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Department of Justice documents stated that an analysis of the legality of the CIA's enhanced
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16of theConvention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Intenogation of High Valueal QaedaDetainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, wliich alsorelied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the useof theCIA'senhanced interrogation techniques.
CitingCIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's intenogation program
(which was based on CIA-provided infonnation), tlie OLC memorandum states: 'The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to servetliispaiamount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantitiesof otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6, 2006], *by giving us information about terrorist plans wecouldnot get anywhere else,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" {See Memorandum forJohn A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, fromSteven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the WarCrimes Act, tlie Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3
of tlie Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in tlie Intenogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September2003,

which represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kindor another had produced significant
intelligence information that had, in the view of CIAprofessionals, saved lives," and which warned policymakers
that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum
for the Record from Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA

Interrogation Program, July29,2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member
Briefing; and September 26,2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.)
(4) Tlie CIA's response to the Office of InspectorGeneral draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Infomiation [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has

almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidencepoints clearly to
the fact tliat without tlie use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks

involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date; Febinary 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI progiam worked and tlie

[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Piogram18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khaiid
Shaykli Muhaimnad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document"EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key IntelligenceImpacts Chart: Attaclmient(AZ and KSM),"
"Backgroundon Key IntelligenceImpacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on KeyCaptures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]" (DTS #2009-1258), wliich provides a list of "some of the
key captures and disrupted plots" tliat the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhancedintenogation
techniques, and states: "CIA assesses that most, if not all,of the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this

program would not have been discovered or reported by any othermeans." See Volume II for additional CIA
representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtainunique,
otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
See Volume II for detailed infomiation. The OLC's May 30, 2005, memorandum relied on the CIA's

representations in determining that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques did not violate the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on executive conduct that "shocks the conscience," indicating that this analysis was a
"highly context-specific and fact-dependent question." Tlie OLC also linked its analysis of whetherthe use of tlie
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques was "constitutionally arbitrary" to the representation by the CIA that the
program produced "substantial quantities of otlierwise unavailable actionable intelligence." (See Memorandum for
John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central IntelligenceAgency,from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office o^ega^ounsel^^a^0^005^e: Application ofUnited States
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interrogation techniques was a "highly context-specific, fact-dependent question" and
highlighted the importance of the CIA representation that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques produced "substantialquantities of otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence,"
and were "largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United States.
B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques

During the period in which the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program was operational, from 2002 to 2009, there were three reviews that addressed the

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques: (1) the CIA Office of Inspector
General Special Review, released in May 2004; (2) an internal review conducted by two senior
CIA officers in 2004; and (3) a 2005 "Blue Ribbon" panel consisting of two individuals not
employed by the CIA. According to CIA records, as of the spring of 2007, the CIA had not
"conducted any other studies on the effectiveness of interrogation techniques."^®^^
Each of the previous reviews relied on interviews with CIA

personnel involved in the program, as well as documents prepared by CIA personnel, which
represented that the CIA interrogation program was effective, and that the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques had "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture

Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention AgainstTorture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the
Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees.) The CIA provided examples of the purported effectiveness of the

CIA^^nhanced interroeatioiHech^ues in response to arequest from the OLC. According to an email ftom H
mCTC Legal
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury explained that
"because the standards under Article 16 [of the Convention Against Torture] require a balancing of the
government's need for the information, it would be quite helpful if we had any case studies or examples to

demonstrate the value ofinformation produced by the program." 5eeemail^romj^^B|J|||(; to:

illljll^H; cc: ^^•^BjREDA^D],
[REDACTED], [REDACTED]; date: March 2, 2005, 2:32 PM.

1059 y^jyiong other documents, seeDepartment ofJustice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda dated May 30,2005,

and July 20, 2007. The May 30, 2005, OLC memorandum repeats additional CIA representations, including that
"enhanced interrogation techniques remain essential to obtaining vital intelligence necessary to detect and disrupt
such emerging threats" and that the use of the techniques "led to specific, actionableintelligence." The July 20,
2007, OLC memorandum states that the "...use of enhanced interrogation techniques is intended to service this
paramount interest [security of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable
intelligence," citing CIA representations to the President that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced
information "we could not get anywhere else," andthat "the use of suchtechniques saved American lives by
revealing information about planned terrorist plots."

See CIA draft response to Questions for the Record submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
after an April 12, 2007,hearing on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA draft response states
the CIA Blue Ribbon Panel, consistingof two outside reviewers, was the only independent review of the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques, and that "CIA had not conducted any other studies on
the effectiveness of [the] interrogation techniques." The final CIA response to tlie Committee states: "The 2004

CIA Officeof the InspectorGeneral reportthat reviewed CIA's counterterrorism detention and interrogation
activities recommended a non-CIA independent experts' review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EFT

and a determination regarding thenecessiw for the continue^iseofeach technique. As a result, CIA sought and

obtained the agreement ofMr. |||||||||||||||||||||||| and Mr.

to conduct an independent review, which is

also known as the Blue-Ribbon Panel report. Their individual reports are provided at Tabs A and B."
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additional terrorists, and collect a high-volume ofcritical intelligence on al-Qa'ida."^®^' CIA
personnel represented: "[t]his is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."^°^^
There ai e no indications in CIA records that any of the past

reviews attempted to independently validate the intelligence claims related to the CIA's use of its
enhanced interrogation techniques that were presented by CIA personnel in interviews and in
documents. As such, no previous review confirmed whether the specific intelligence cited by the
CIA was acquired from a CIA detainee during or after being subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, or if the intelligence acquired was otherwise unknown to the United
States government ("otherwise unavailable"), and therefore uniquely valuable.
C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured
Terrorists"

Before the CIA took custody of its first detainee, CIA attorneys
researched the limits of coercive interrogations and the legal definitions of torture. On
November 26, 2001, CIA Office of General Counsel (OGC) attorneys circulated a draft legal

memorandum entitled "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for CIA Officers."^®^^ The
memorandum listed interrogation techniques considered to be torture by a foreign government
and a specific nongovernmental organization, including "cold torture," "forced positions,"
"enforced physical exhaustion," "sensory deprivation," "perceptual deprivation," "social
deprivation," "threats and humiliation," "conditioning techniques," and "deprivation of
sleep."
The draft memorandum described various prohibitions on torture and the potential
use of "necessity" as a legal defense against charges of torture, stating:
"[i]t would, therefore, be a novel application of the necessity defense to avoid
prosecution of U.S. officials who tortured to obtain information that saved
many lives... A policy decision must be made with regard to U.S. use of
torture in light of our obligations under international law, with consideration
given to the circumstances and to intemational opinion on our current
See: (1) CIA Office of Inspector General, Special Review - Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation
Program, (2003-7123-IG), May 2004; (2) May 12, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from
Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Divisions
via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, witii the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee
Program"; and (3) Blue Ribbon Panel Review, including a September 2, 2005, Memorandum from

mllllljl to Director Porter Goss, CIA, entitled "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness," and aSeptember 23, 2005,
Memorandum from
to the Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, entitled,
"Response to request from Director for Assessment of BIT effectiveness."
See, among other examples, a June 27,2003, Inspector General interview with CTC's Chief of Operations,

The record ofthat interview (2003-^2MG^t^s:

stated that the

Agency's Al-Qa'ida program has been very effective. •
views the intelligence as the main criteria
for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other tenorists off the
street and to prevent terrorist attacks. Tliis is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."
1063 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for
CIA Officers." This document includes information regarding Paragraph 4.

1064 November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations for

CIA Officers." See Volume I for additional information.

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campaign against terrorism—states may be very unwilling to call the U.S. to
task for torture when it resulted in saving thousands of lives
On February 1, 2002, a CTC attorney researched the impact of the

application of the Geneva Conventions (GC) on future CIA interrogation activities.The
attorney wrote:

"If the detainee is a POW and enjoys GC coverage, then the optic becomes
how legally defensible is a particular act that probably violates the convention,
but ultimately saves lives. I believe that [a named CIA attorney!'s papers
reflecting on necessity and anticipatory selfdefense are the two most obvious
defenses available."^^^^

(U) The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) included the "necessity defense"
in its August 1, 2002, memorandum to the White House Counsel, determining, among other
things, that "under the current circumstances, necessity or self-defense mayjustify interrogation
methods that might violate" the criminal prohibition against torture.The OLC memorandum
states:

"It appears to us that under the cun-ent circumstances the necessity defense
could be successfully maintained in response to an allegation of a Section
2340A violation. .. .Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess
Italics added. November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Intenogations: Legal
Considerations for CIA Officers," at L The CIAwould later repeat bothclaims, representing to seniorofficials and
the Department of Justice that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques produced intelligence that
"saved lives," and that this intelligence was otherwise unavailable. Further, on August 1, 2002, OLC issued an
unclassified, but non-public opinion, in the form of a memorandum to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales,
analyzing whether certain interrogation methods would violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. The memorandum

provides a similar rationalefor the necessity defense, stating, "certainjustification defenses might be available that
would potentially eliminate criminalliability. Standard criminal law defensesof necessity and self-defense could
justify intenogation methods needed to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat to the United
States and its citizens." The memorandum laterconcludes: "even if an interrogation method might violate Section

2340A, necessity orself-defense coul^rovid^ustifi^ions that would eliminate any criminal liability."
'0^ Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
and [REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and Questioning";
date: February I, 2002.

Italics added. Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
[REDACTED]; subject: "POW's and
Questioning"; date: February 1, 2002. In response to a requestfrom the Department of Justice's Officeof
Professional Responsibility (OPR), the CIA provided two memoranda- one dated November 7, 2001, the other
undated - neither of which discussed the necessity defense. The OPR report states: "Although the CIA Office of

General Counsel (OGC) told us that these were the only CIA memoranda in itspossession on interrogation policy,
some of the infonnation weobtained from theCIA suggested otherwise. In an internal email message dated
February 1, 2002, from CTC attorney [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] refened to '[CIA Attorney
[REDACTED]] papers reflecting on necessity and anticipatory selfdefense.'" See Department of Justice, Office of
Professional Responsibility, Report. Investigation intothe Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues
Relating to theCentral Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists,
July 29, 2009, pp. 31-32.

1068 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay C. Bybee, Assistant Attorney

General, Officeof Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, "Re Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C
2340-2340A," the U.S. Federal Torture Statute.

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information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that

potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude.
Clearly, any harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to
insignificance compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack,
which could take hundreds or thousands of lives."^^^^

According to a report by the Department of Justice Office of
ProfessionalResponsibility (OPR), released in July 2009, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John Yoo "acknowledged that the CIA may have indirecdy suggested the new sections [related
to Commander-in-Chief authority and possible defenses, including the necessity defense] by
asking him what would happen in a case where an interrogator went 'over the line' and
inadvertently violated the statute." Yoo also told the OPR that he drafted those relevant sections.
Another senior Department of Justice lawyer at the time, Patrick Philbin, informed the OPR that
when he told Yoo that the sections were superfluous and should be removed, Yoo responded,
"They want it in there." The CIA's former Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo told the OPR
that the CIA did not request the addition of the sections.In his response to the OPR report,
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee stated that the "ticking time bomb" that could justify the
necessity defense was, in fact, a "real world" scenario. According to Bybee, "the OLC attorneys
working on the [August 1, 2002] Memo had been briefed on the apprehension of Jose Padilla on

May 8, 2002. Padilla was believed to have built and planted a dirty bomb."^^^^ The August 1,
2002, memorandum states that the "[i]nterrogation of captured al Qaida operatives allegedly
allowed U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies to track Padilla and to detain him upon

his entry into the United States."^®^^ This information was inaccurate.

Italics added. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for

Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, pp. 39-41. On December 30, 2004, the OLC issued a new
memorandum superseding tlie August 1, 2002, memorandum in its entirety. The OLC wrote that "[b]ecause the
discussion in [the August 1, 2002] memorandumconcerning the President's Commander-in-Chief power and the
potential defenses to liability was - and remains—unnecessary, it has beeneliminated from the analysis that follows.
Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive
that United States personnel not engage in torture." (See Memorandumfor James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney
General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A). No CIA detainees were subjected to
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques between the issuance of the December 2004 memorandum and May
2005, when the OLC opined on the application of the federal proliibition on torture to the techniques.
Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal
Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to tlie Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009, p. 51.
Bybee response, at 74, n. 6, cited in the OPR Report at fn. 171. Department of Justice, Office of Professional
Responsibility, Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to
the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' on Suspected TeiTorists, July 29,
2009.

1072 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.

See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the
Capture of Jose Padilla.

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With the issuance on August 1, 2002, of a second OLC

memorandum specific to Abu Zubaydah,^^'''^ the CIA initiated the use of its enhanced
inten*ogation techniques. After the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah and other CIA detainees to the
techniques, the CIA made increasingly stronger assertions about the effectiveness of the CIA's
interrogation program, eventually asserting that the CIA interrogation program "saved lives,"^^^^
and that the use of the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques was necessary, as the
intelligence obtained could not have been acquired in any other way.
Many of the representations made by the CIA about the

effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were first made in the spring of
2003 and evolved over the course of the year and into early 2004. In April 2003, CIA officers
told the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) that KSM, who had been subjected to the

techniques between March [j, 2003, and March 25, 2003, was still not fully cooperative. For

example, on April 3, 2003, more than a week after the CIA had discontinued the use of its

enhanced interrogation techniques on KSM, the deputy chief of ALEC Station,

informe^h^O^ that KSM had made "remarkable progress," but there was "alot
more to be done."
context.

did not cite any specific intelligence obtained from KSM in this

1077

27, 2003, more than three months after the CIA had

ceased using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM, CTC Chief of Operations
told the OIG that he was convinced that KSM "knows more and is just

Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810,
Tab 1).

Among other documents,see CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Programon 29 July
2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller,dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CIA
Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Memorandum to the

Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated February 27, 2004, with the
subjectline, "Commentsto DraftIG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program'
(2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated
February 24, 2004; and the September 6, 2006, CIA-vetted speech by the President on the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program.
See, among other examples, interview of James Pavitt, by

and [REDACTED], Office of the

Inspector General, August 21, 2003; Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Directorfor
Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27,2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of

CIA's Counterterrorism Detentioi^n^nte^ogation Activities; and a June 27, 2003, Inspector General interview of
the Chief of Operations CTC,

record of that interview states:

that the Agency's Al-Qa'ida program has beenvery effective.

stated

views the intelligence as the main

criteria for judging the success of the program; specifically, intelligence that has allowed CTC to take other terrorists

offthe street and tomjeventtenorist attacks. This is information that CTC could not have gotten any other way."
Interview of

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3,

2003. On Apri^^2003^^TCanalyst told the IG that KSM "has not provided anything significant to date." {^See

interview of^Hm|^|, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 21,

2003.) On April 30, 2003, one of KSM's interrogators pointedto "information on hijackings, bridges in New York,
and nuclear plants," andinfonnation on hidden uranium, which was never found. Seeinterview of |

|,by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]^ffic^^h^nspecto^en^l, April 30, 2003.
I (II

M

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waiting for us to ask the right q u e s t i o n s , " t h e n provided two examples of
information that KSM had not provided until he was asked specifically about the matters by CIA
interrogators: information on the "tallest building in California" plot (also known as the "Second
Wave" plot), and the inclusion of a building in Canary Wharf as a target in the plotting against
Heathrow Airport.Asked if he could think of any instances in which information from CIA

detainees had led to the arrest ofa tenwist, HIHH stated only that Majid Khan provided
information that led to the arrest of lyman Paris by the
This information was inaccurate,
as Majid Khan was not in CIA custody when he provided information on lyman Paris.
represented to the OIG that the CIA's inteiTogation
program was "very effective," and that the intelligence obtained from CIA detainees was "the

main criteria for judging the success ofthe program; specifically, inteUigencethayjasaUowed
CTC to take other terrorists off the street and to prevent tenwist attacks."
also
told the OIG that the information obtained from CIA interrogations was "information that CTC

could not have gotten any otherway."^°^^
(U) On June 26, 2003, President Bush issued a statement for the United Nations International
Day in Support of Victims of Torture. That statement—referencedin multiple news articles—
relayed that the:
"United States is committed to the world-wide elimination of torture and we

are leading this fight by example. I call on all governments to join with the
United States and the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting,
investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent

othercruel and unusual punishment."^®^^
The following day, after the Washington Post published an article
on the Administration's detainee policy, CIA Deputy General Counsel John Rizzo called John
Bellinger, the legal advisor to the National Security Council. According to an email from Rizzo
to other senior CIA officers, Rizzo called Bellinger to:

1078

told the OIG that KSM was asked about the plan to hijack an airplane in Malaysia and fly it into

the Library Tower in Los Angeles, which tlie CIA had learnedfrom another detainee. That detainee was Masran bin
Arshad, who was in foreign government custody,
told tlie OIG that KSM "provided information on

the Heathrow/Canary Whaif option, buUioUinti^ersonnel at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] asked him about a
picture he drew of an I-beam." See

Memorandum for tlie Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of

Operations^_|^|j|||||||||||[||||^ Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.
Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief ofOperations, |

CounterteiTorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003. See sections of this summaiy and Volume II on tlie

Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group, and the Thwarting of the
HeathrowAirportand Canary Whaif Plotting.

1080

Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief of Operations, Counterterrorist

Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.

See section of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris.

1082 Umill, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Chief ofOperations, |
Counterterrorist Center (2003-7123-IG); date: 27 June 2003.

June 26, 2003, Statement by the President, United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture,
http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html.

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"express our surprise and concern at some of the statements attributed to the
Administration in the piece, particularly the Presidential statement on the UN

International Day in Support of Victims of Torture as well as a quote from the
Deputy White House Press Secretary ScottMcClellan that all prisoners being
held by the USG are being treated 'humanely.
While Rizzo expressed the view that the presidential statement did
not appear to contain anything "we can't live with," Rizzo conveyed to senior CIA leaders that it
"might well be appropriate for us to seekwritten reaffirmation by some seniorWhite House
official that the Agency's ongoing practices... are to continue."^^^^
Ori July 3, 2003, DCI George Tenet sent a memorandum to

National Security Advisor CondoleezzaRice seeking reaffirmation of the Administration's
support for the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. The memorandum
stated that the reaffirmation was sought because:
"recent Administration responses to inquiries and resulting media reporting
about the Administration's position have created the impression that these

[interrogation] techniques are not used by U.S. personnel and are no longer
approved as a policy matter."^"^^
While the CIA was preparing to meet with the White House on the

reaffirmation of the CIA interrogation program, CIA personnel provided additional inaccurate

information about the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the
OIG, as well as to senior CIA leadership. These inaccurate representations described the

"thwarting" of specific plots and the capture of specific terrorists attributed to the interrogation
of CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

f/N¥) On July 16, 2003, Deputy Chief o^ALE^tation ||||^^|
was interviewed again by the OIG. In this interview

asserted that KSM

"provided information that helped lead to the arrest of lyman Paris, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-

Marri, Majid Khan, and Ammar al-Baluchi.'°^^ These representations were almost entirely
maccurate.

1088

Email from; John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,^^^^}}!^^}' cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William
Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee PoUcy; date: June 27, 2003.

Email from: John Rizzo; to: John Moseman,H^^^^B; cc: Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William
Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003.

1086 j^iy 3^ 2003, CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Director ofCentral Intelligence George J.
Tenet with the Subject: Reaffimiation of the Central Intelligence Agency'sInterrogation Program. Seealso Scott

Muller, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29July 2003; date: 5 August

2003(OG^^003-50078).
1087

Memorandum for the Record; subject; Meeting with Deputy Chief,

Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.

See sections of this summary andVolume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris; the
Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha; the Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri; tlie
Capture of Majid Khan; and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Ammaral-Baluchi).
liii 'iM III'

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also informed the OIG that information from CIA

detainees "provided a wealth of information about Al-Qa'ida plots," including: a terrorist plot in
Saudi Arabia against Israel; a plot against the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; a plot against
Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf; a plot to derail trains; a plot against subways; a gas station
plot; a plot against the "tallestbuilding" in California; a plot against suspension bridges; and a

plot to poison water supplies.Much of this information was inaccurate.^^^^Ac^ding to
OIG records, "[o]n the question of whether actual plots had been thwarted,

opined

that since the operatives involved ii^ian^f the above plots had been arrested, [CTC had], in

effect, thwarted the operation[s]." ||||H|||| pi'ovided alist to the OIG of teirorist^aptured and
tlie plots with which they were associated. None of the individuals listed by
captured as a result of reporting from CIA detainees.

were

//NF) During this same period in 2003, CIA officers were compiling

(TS/^

similar information for CIA leadership. On July 18, 2003, tlie chief of ALEC Station, HBl
wrote an email to ALEC Station officers requesting information on the "value and

impact" of CIA detainee information on behalf of the CIA Rendition^roup (RDG),^®^^ which
he stated was being compiled for senior CIA leadership.wrote that "[o]ne way to
assist now is to provide input to RDG on highlights of intel and ops reporting from the
detainees," in particular "reporting that helped reveal or stop plots, reporting that clinched the

identity of terrorist suspects, etc."'®^"^ The first portion o^h^sponse^ompiled by ALEC
Station, was drafted by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station

who wrote that CIA

detainee reporting "plays a key role in our ability to identify and capture al-Qa'ida ten^ns^

including those who were planning to attack inside the United States." In an email, |||^||H
wrote that "[t]he ability of the detainees to identify many operatives previously unknown to us or
to the FBI resulted in the successful capture/detention of several terrorists," and that the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "key" to acquiring this information on these
operatives. As examples of operatives "previously unknown" to the CIA and the FBI and
identified by CIA detainees,
PadiUa, BinyamMohammed, Majid Khan,

I, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, CounterteiTorist Center

1089

ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.

See sections of this summary and Volume 11 on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots; the Thwarting of the

Heathrow Airport andCanary WharfPlotting; the Identification, Capture, and AiTest of lyman Paris; the Capture of
Majid Khan; the Thwarting of the SecondWave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group; and the KSM
detainee review in Volume El.

'05" imHI listed Majid Klian (gas station and poison plotting), lyman Paris (the suspension bridge plot, as well as
a possible shopping mall plot), Kliallad bin Attash (theHeathrow plot), Masran bin Arshad (the"tallest building"
plot), and Ammai- al-Baluchi (theplot against theU.S. consulate in Karachi). See relevant sections of tliis summary
and Volume 11 for additional information.

As noted, the "Renditions and Interrogations Group," is also refened to as the "Renditions Group," the

"Rendition, Detention^andlntenogation Group," "RDI," and "RDG" in CIA records.
Email from:

to: DQ_CTC_ALEC Group Cliiefs; cc:

|; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM.
Email fiom:

to: DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs; cc:

; subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 01:09 PM.

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I^mai^aris, and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.^®^^ These representations were inaccurate.
Iemail concluded:
"Simply put, detainee information has saved countless American lives inside

the US and abroad. We believe there is no doubt al-Qa'ida would have
succeeded in launching additional attacks in the US and that the information

obtained from these detainees through the use of enhanced measures was key
to unlocking this information. It is our assessment that if CIA loses the ability
to interrogate and use enhanced measures in a responsible way, we will not be
able to effectively prosecute this war."^^^^
The information relayed from ALEC Station to RDG in July 2003
for CIA leadership also included information from a CIA assessmententitled "Significant
Detainee Reporting.That document included information that was largely congruent with
CIA records. It stated that KSM provided details on the Heathrow Airport Plot and the Karachi
Plots only after being confronted with the capture of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-

Baluchi;^®^^ diat with regard to plots inside the United States, KSM had only admitted to plots
that had been abandoned or already disrupted; that KSM fabricated information in order to tell

CIA interrogators "whathe thought they wanted to hear"; and that KSM generally only provided
information when "boxed in" by information already known to CIA debriefers.^'^^ This
information was not included in CIA representations to policymakers later that month.

(TS/y|||^|p|^H[|//NF) On July 29, 2003, as aresult of DCI Tenet's July 3, 2003, request
seeking reaffirmation of the CIA's detention and interrogation policies and practices. Tenet and
CIA General Counsel ScottMuller conducted a briefing for a subset of the National Security

I, [REDACTED],

Email from:

[REDACTED],

[REDACTED],
t: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM; email from:
DO_CTC_ALEC Chiefs Groups,

[REDACTED],

I;subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,2003, at 3:57:45 PM.
See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the
Capture of Jose Padilla; theCapture of Majid Khan; the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris; and the
Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha.
Italics added. Email from:

to:

I, [REDACTED],

DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs ,

I; subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,

2003, at 3:57:45 PM.

I, DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs,I

Email from:

[REDACTED],

cc:

subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,2003, at 3:57:45

PM. See CIA document "Significant Detainee Reporting."
See section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots, and the KSM detainee review

in Volume III.
Email from:

[REDACTED],

to:

cc:

DO_CTC_ALEC Group Chiefs,|

subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18,2003, at 3:57:45

PM. See also "Significant Detainee Reporting" and KSM detainee review in Volume III.

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Council principals.•
According to a CIA memorandum, Muller represented that CIA
"detainees subject to the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced

significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA professionals, saved lives."'
briefing provided the "results" of using the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques in briefing slides with the heading: "RESULTS: MAJOR
THREAT INFO." The slides represented that KSM provided information on "[a]ttack plans

against US Capitol, otherUS landmarks"; "[a]ttacks against Chicago, New York, Los Angeles;
against towers, subways, trains, reservoirs, Hebrew centers, Nuclear power plants"; and the
"Heathrow and Canary Wharf Plot." The slides also represented that KSM identified lyman

Paris, the "Majid Khan family," and Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.^^^^ These representations were
largely inaccurate.

The CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was
obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee 'Abd al-

Rahim al-Nashiri regarding "US Navy Ships in the Straits of Hormuz." This representation was
inaccurate and omitted material facts.The CIA slides further indicated that "major threat"
information was obtained from the use of tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against
CIA detainee Ramzi bin al-Shibh—specifically that bin al-Shibh "[i]dentified Hawsawi" and

CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated

July 29, 2003, presented to seniorWhite House officials. Those attending the meeting included the directorof the
CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, ScottMuller; Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Rice;
Wliite House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.
CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated
July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
' CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Intenogation Progi:am on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated
July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials.
CIA records indicate diat the "attacks," "attack plans," and "targets" discussed by KSM were well known to the
Intelligence Community prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, or were merely ideas for attacks that were

proposed, but never operationalized. TheCIAbriefing slides made no mention of KSM withholding or fabricating
information during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See relevant sections of this
summaiy and Volume 11, as well as the KSM detainee review in Volume HI.
CIA records indicate that al-Nashiri provided details on multiple terrorist plots—including plans to target ships
in the Strait of Hormuz—prior to his CIA detention and theuse of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

With regard to the targeting of ships in the Straitof Hormuz, tliis information was provided by al-Nashiri while he
was still in foreign government custody and was disseminatedin CIA intelligencereports prior to liis CIA detention.

{See MM 36595 M B ;

36726 ^

disseminated intelligence,

|.) For other reporting from al-Nashiri while in foreign government custody

see

pTOSTO^^^^H^mfF^ disseminated intelligence,
See also detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nasliiri in Volume III.

KM

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provided "major threat" information on "[a]ttacks against Nuclear Power Plants, Hebrew
Centers," This representation was inaccurate and omitted material facts.

I" ^he context of "[mjajor threats [that] were countered and attacks

averted," the CIA slides represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Khallad bin Attash on an "[ajttack
against U.S. Consulate in Karachi." This representation was inaccurate.The CIA slides
further represented that "major threat" information was obtained from the use of the CIA's

enhanced interrogation techniques on CIA detainee Abu Zubaydah, resulting in the
"[ijdentification of [Jose] Padilla, Richard Reid," as well as information on "[a]ttacks on banks,
subways, petroleum and aircraft industries." These representations were inaccurate.
The briefing slides, which contained additional inaccuracies

detailed in Volume II of the Committee Study, were used, at least in part, for CIA briefings for

Al-Hawsawi was linkedto the September 11,2001, attacks and targeted by the CIA and otherintelligence

agencies prior to bin al-Shibh's capture. (See WASHINGTON ^Bf(232012Z MAY 02), CIA
APR 02);

17743 (051408Z MAR 02); DIRECTOR

(032022Z

|(231756Z APR 02); ALEC

(161821Z JUL 03X^A1-Hawsawi's arrest on March 1, 2003, was unrelated to any reporting from CIA

detainees. (See ALEC |i|H (16182IZ JUL 03).) With regard to the referenced "attacks," no operational plots
targeting the sites referenced were everidentified by theCIA. Personnel at CIA Headquarters concluded in 2005
that the "mostsignificant" intelligence derived from Ramzi bin al-Shibh was obtained prior to liis rendition to CIA
custodyand the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to a 2005 CIA assessment, the

"most significant" reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh onfuti^ attacks was background information related to alQa'ida'splans to attack Heathrow Airport. (See ALEC

(302240Z JUN 05).) Ramzi bin al-Shibh provided

the majority ofthis information in mid-0ctobe^002^vhil^ruh^|u^dy ofaforeign government and prior to
being transferred toCIA custody. (See CIA | | ^ |

) See also detainee review ofRamzi bin al-

Shibh in Volume III

See tlie section of this summary and Volume II on the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots. CIA officers in BHI
wroteof the referenced reporting from bin Attash: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was

chilling-[CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either tlirough previous information or through

interviews ofal-Baluchi and Ba Attash priorto£ieir transfer out ofKarachi." This cable also stated, "[a]s noted in
severalprevious cables, in December 2002

§•••

became aware of die threat to Consulate officials." See

14510

For information on the "[ijdentification of [Jose] Padilla," see the section of this summary andVolume II on the
Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla. Richard Reid was arrested in

December 2001, priorto Abu Zubaydah's capture. See multiple open source reporting and Department of Justice
materials, including, UnitedStates v. RichardReidIndictment, U.S. DistrictCourt, District of Massachusetts,

January 16, 2002. Abu Zubaydah provided information on potential places al-Qa'ida might target, including banks
and subways, shortly after his capture to FBI interrogators, months prior to the use of the CIA's "enhanced

interrogation techniques" in August 2002. See Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the
interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu Zabaidah" and provided to die Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence by cover letterdated July 20, 2010(DTS #2010-2939). Seealso Abu Zubaydah detainee review in
Volume UI.
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Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,as well as for Assistant
Attorney General Jack Goldsmith.

In subsequent interviews of CIA personnel, the OIG received
information that contradicted other CIA representations about the CIA's Detention and

Interrogation Program. The chief of the |||| Branch of the UBL Group at CTC described at
length how the arrests of Majid Khan and lyman Paris were um-elated to reporting from CIA
detainees.^
The deputy director for law enforcement for the FBI's Counterterrorism Division
told the OIG how Uzhair Paracha and FBI operational activities were ultimately responsible for

the capture of Sayf al-Rahman Paracha.The chief of targeting and special requirem^Jts for
CTC's al-Qa'ida Department and former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force,fHIH
I, told the OIG that "the often-cited example ofZubaydah identifying Padilla is not
'[n]ot only did [Abu Zubaydah] not tell us who
quite accurate."
According to
Padilla was, his information alone would never have led us to Padilla."
stated that the
Pakistanis had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and his partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing

any information on the pair, relaying, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky.
At the same time, however, CIA personnel provided inaccurate

examples of the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to the OIG. The
deputy chief of the Al-Qa'ida Department of CTC told the OIG that "KSM gave us Majid Khan
and Uzair Paracha."'
Deputy DCI John McLaughlin told the OIG that information from KSM
"led to the capture" of Majid Khan, which in turn led to the capture of Hambali. McLaughlin
also represented that "the capture of Richard Reid was a result of modus operandi information
obtained from [Abu] Zubaydah."^These representations were inaccurate.
I" addition to these specific inaccurate examples, CIA leadership
made additional general claims to the OIG about the effectiveness of the CIA intenogation
Memorandum for the Record; subject: CIA Interrogation Program; September27, 2003 (OGC-FO-2003-50088).
Slides,CIA Intenogation Program, 16September 2003. The Memorandum for the Recorddrafted by John Bellinger
refers to a "detailedhandout" provided by tlie CIA. See John B. Bellinger, in, Senior Associate Counsel to the
President and Legal Advisor, National Security Council; Memorandum for the Record; subject: Briefing of
SecretariesPowell and Rumsfeld regardingIntenogation of High-Value Detainees; date: September 30, 2003.
Scott W. Muller; Memorandum for the Record; Interrogation briefing for Jack Goldsmitli; date: 16 October 2003
(OGC-FO-2003-50097).

" Interview ofchief of the IIIH Branch ofthe UBL Group,
Inspector General^ul^0^003.

Interview of|B|||||BHIi'

hy

Office ofthe

Office of the Inspecto^eneml^ugust 5, 2003.

August 19,2003,Memorandum for the Record, meeting with

Officeof the Inspector

General.

August 19, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting witli

Office of the Inspector

General. This infomiation was not included in the IG Special Review.

'•'5 HIHHH' Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center AlQa'ida Department; date: 28 July 2003.

Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
September 5, 2003. This information was included in theCIA's July 2003 briefing slides. Richard Reid was
anested in December 2001, prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah.

See tlie section in this summary and in Volume II on the Captureof Majid Khan; the Capture of Hambali; and
the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullali Paracha. See also the KSM detainee review in Volume in.

Richard Reid was arrested prior tothe captureofAbuZubaydal^^^^^^^^
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program that highlighted the "critical threat information" that could only be acquired by using
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Jose Rodriguez, then CTC
director, told the CIA OIG that "the use of EITs has saved lives and prevented terrorist
operations from occurring."Deputy DCI McLaughlin told the OIG that he "believes the use
of EITs has proven critical to CIA's efforts in the war on terrorism."^DDO Pavitt stated that
the program was "invaluable to U.S. national security," that "American lives have been saved as
a result of information received from detainees," and that the CIA "has been able to obtain

information that would not have been obtained without the use of EITs."*^^° According to OIG
records, DCI Tenet stated he "firmly believes that the interrogation program, and specifically the
use of EITs, has saved many lives." Tenet added that the use of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques was "extremely valuable" in obtaining "enormous amounts of critical
threat information," and that he did not believe that the information could have been gained any
other way.^^^^
January 2, 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson
provided a draft of the OIG Special Review, entitled "Counterterrorism Detention and

Interrogation Program," to senior CIA officials for comment. The draft Special Review, which
was based on numerous interviews of CIA personnel, as well as additional research by the OIG,
described the origins of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, the detention sites that
were operational at the time of the review, and the guidance that had been provided on both

interrogation and detention. The draft also identified a number of unauthorized interrogation

techniques that had been used,^^"^ and conckided that, in a number ofcases, CIA interrogations
went "well beyond what was articulated in the written DOJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002."^^-^
Interview of Jose E. Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August
12, 2003.

"'9 Interview of John E. McLaughlin, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General,
September 5, 2003.

H20 Pavitt also stated that by "September, October and November" of 2002, "they saw a clear benefit" to the use of

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah (Interview of James Pavitt,by
[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 21, 2003).
Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September,
2003.

1122 Pqj. example, the draft described interrogators placing pressure on a detainee's artery, conducting mock

executions, blowingcigaretteor cigar smoke intoa detainee's face, usingcold water to interrogate detainees, and
subjecting a detainee to a "hard takedown." In an interview conducted after Gul Rahman's death at DETENTION

SITE COBALT, Dr. DUNBAR described a "rough takedown." The interview report stated: "According to
[DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each one had a roleduring the
takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened tlie door of [a detainee] cell and rushed in
screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with

Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ranhimup anddown a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They
slapped himandpunched himseveral times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to
hit him as hard as theycould, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along thecorridor, a
couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). [The detainee]
did acquire a numberof abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention."
DUNBAR stated that after "something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to 'give diem
something to think about.'" See Memorandum for Deputy Directorof Operations, from |
January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman, pp. 21-22, paragraph 34.
CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG),
January 2004.

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The draft report repeated the inaccurate examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques that had been conveyed by CIA officers to OIG personnel,but
nonetheless concluded:

"[w]ith the capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots,
it is not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain viable
or even if they were fabricated in the first place. This Review did not
uncover any evidence that these plots were imminent."

After reviewing the draft Special Review, including the OIG's

qualified conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques^he
CIA's CTC began preparing a highly critical response. In preparation for that response,

|CTC Legal,

requested additional information that could be used as

evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from CTC

personnel.
sent an email seeking "a list of specific plots that have been thwarted by
the use of detainee reporting that we acquired following the use of enhanced techniques."
noted that he would compile the information, "emphasizing that hundreds or
thousands of innocent lives have been saved as a result of our use of those techniques...

In

a separate email,
emphasized that it was "critical" that the information"establish
direct links between the application of the enhanced interrogation techniques and the production
of intelligence that directly enabled the saving of innocentlives," that the intelligence obtained
after the use of die CIA's enlianced inten'ogation techniques be "significantly different in nature
from the intelligence acquired before the use of the enhanced techniques," and that the
information be "absolutely ironclad" and "demonstrably supported by cable citations, analytical

pieces, or what have you."^^^^

further noted that "[w]e can expect to need to

present these data to appropriately cleared personnel at the IG and on the Hill, to the Attorney
General, and quite possibly to the President at some point, and they must be absolutely
verifiable." He concluded, "[i]t is not an exaggeration to say that the future of the program, and

the consequent saving of innocent lives, may depend substantially upon the input you
provide.""^^

The SpecialReview draft stated that KSM"providedinformation that helped lead to the arrests" of Sayf alRahman Paracha, Uzhair Paracha, Saleh al-Marri, and Majid Khan, and that KSM's information "led to the

investigation and prosecution" of lyman Paris. The draft Special Review also stated that information from Abu

Zubaydah "helped lead to the identification" ofJose PadillaandBii^^ Muhammad. Finally, the draft included the
"plots" described by Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
during her July 16, 2003, interview. Most
of the inaccurate representations wouldremain in the final version of the Special Review completedin May 2004.
See CIA InspectorGeneral, Special Review,Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123IG), January 2004.

CIA Inspector General, Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program(2003-7123-IG),
January 2004.
Email from:

to: Scott Muller, John Rizzo,

and^^^^^H^fsubject: "For the response to the IG report"; date: February 4, 2004, at 1:04:03

PM.

'^2'' Email from:
Februai-y 10,

[REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date:

Email from: m|||||m|||||^||||.

[red/i^cTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date:

Februaiy 10, 2004. As described in this summaryan^n^^
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Responding to the request for information, Deputy Chief of ALEC
sent an email describing intelligence from KSM in which she wrote,

Station

"let's be foward [sic] leaning."The content of |^H||^'s email would serve as atemplate
on which future justification^o^he CIA program and the CIA's enhanced interrogation

techniques were b a s e d . e m a i l stated that "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's
information alone has saved at least several hundred, possibly thousands, of lives." She then
wrote that KSM "identified" lyman Paris, "who is now serving time in the US for his support to
al-Qa'ida," and "identified a photograph" of Saleh al-Marri, "whom the FBI suspected of some
involvement with al-Qa'ida, but against whom we had no concrete information," adding that al-

Marri "is now being held on a material witness warrant." IH^H's email stated that KSM
"provided information" on Majid Khan, who "is now in custody," "identified a mechanism for
al-Qa'ida to smuggle explosives into the US," and "identified" Jaffar al-Tayyar.^'^^
email also represented that "[a]fter the use of enhanced [interrogation techniques], [Abu
Zubaydah] grew into what is now our most cooperative detainee," and that Abu Zubaydah's
information "produced concrete results that helped saved lives."These representations were
almost entirely inaccurate.As she had in an interview with the OIG,

former chief of the Abu Zubaydah Task Force, refuted this view, writing in an email that Abu
Zubaydah "never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information," that Abu Zubaydah discussed
Jose Padilla prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and that "he never

really gave us actionable intel to get them.""^"^ Separately, Deputy Chiefof ALEC Station
compiled were provided over the following years to the President, the Congress,die Department of Justice, and the
American public.

Email from:

to:
cc:
[REDACTEDUR^ACTED],
|; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. ^^|H's email

began: "here is my draft contribution... it's late,I'm tired, so it's not especially elegant... welcome any fact
correcting I got wrong, but let's be foward [sic] leaning." The inaccurate information included in the email was
used in the CIA's formal response to the OIG.

'

email and the subsequent DD^espons^^he OIG wereusedastte template for talking points on

the program. See, for example,
from:
to:
subject:
re EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwardingcomments for response to draft Inspector

Genera^evie^o^ape^o^ondoleezz^ic^n December 2004); date: December 6, 2004; email from:

to: HHHHi,

HUHHIi'

HHHUH'

subject:

re EDITED Final - RE: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures (forwarding comments for response to draft Inspector

General review foMalkin^oints in November 2005); date: November 4, 2005.
In response to

email, one CIA officer asked whether "re the jaffar al-tayyar stuff, didnt [sic] we

alread^ave
HIHI'
KSM/AZ and measures^ate^Fe^ary 10,2004, at 09:38 AM.
Email from:

to:

cc:

email from: [REDACTED]; to:
subject:

on

[REDACTED], [REDACTED],

|; subject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004.
See relevant sections of tliis summary and Volume II on the eight primary CIA effectiveness representations and

12 other prominen^I^epresenta^ns ofeffectiveness^^
Email from:

to:

cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez,

[REDACTED], [REDACTEDlTll^H^^^l. subject: Re: Please Read ~ Re CTC Response to the Draft IG

Report^ate: February 10, 2004. As noted, in an August 19, 2003^Memor^dum for tlie Record detailing BIH
IBlHi's interview with the Office ofthe Inspector General, IHHI told the OIG that "the often-cited
exampleof Zubaydahidentifying Padillais not quite accurate,"and that "[n]ot only did [AbuZubaydah] not tell us
who Padilla was,his infonnation alone would never have led us to Padilla." Noting thatthe Pakistani government
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forwarded additional inaccurate information from CIA personnel in ALEC

Station to CTC Legal related to

al-Nashiri,'^^^ and Hambali.^^^^

On February 27, 2004, DDO Pavitt submitted his formal response
to the OIG draft Special Review in the form of a memorandum to the inspector general. Pavitt

urged the CIA OIG not to "shy away from the conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks
and saved lives," and to "make it clear as well that the EITs (including the waterboard) have

been indispensable to our successes."^Pavitt's memorandum included an attachment
describing the "Successes of CIA's CounterteirorismDetention and Interrogation Activities,"
and why the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary. The attachment stated:
"Information we received from detained terrorists as a result of the lawful use

of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved
countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence

points clearly to the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our

had told the CIA about Jose Padilla and liis partner prior to Abu Zubaydah providing any information on the pair,

jfHHmillstated, "[i]n essence, CTC got lucky." Tliis infonnation was not included intlie draft orfinal OIG
Special Review.

The information forwarded by

was related to tlie Heathrow Aiqiort plotting and stated that "[o]nly

after enhanced measures" did KSM "admit that the sketch of a beam labeled Canary Wharf in his notebook was in

fact an illustration that KSM the engineer drew himself to show another AQ operative tliat tlie beams in the Wharflike tliose in the World Trade Center - would likely melt and collapse the building, killing all inside." The email
also stated that KSM "identified the leading operatives involved in both the UK and Saudi cells that would support
the operation." These representations were inaccurate. See the section of this summary and Volume 11 on the
Thwarting of the Heatlirow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting, and the KSM detainee review in Volume III.
'•36 Tlie information forwarded by
stated that, "subsequent to the application of enhanced measures," the
CIA "learned more in-depthdetails" about operational planning, "to includeongoingoperations against botli the US
and Saudi interests in Saudi Arabia." This representation omitted key informationprovided by al-Nashiri in foreign
government custody and prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. See the 'Abd al-Rahimal-

Nashiri detainee review in Volume lU^^^
The information forwarded by
stated that, "after tlie use of enhanced measures [Hambali] provided
information that led to the wrap-up of an al-Qa'ida cell in Kar achi, some of whose members were destined to be the
second wave attack pilots inside the US after 911.... [TJheu- identification and subsequentdetention saved hundreds

of lives." This representation was inaccurate. See the section oftliis summary and Volumellonth^

the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of theAl-Ghun^

of

{See email from: H^IHUlii'

multiple cc's; subject; EDITED—Re: Heathrow plot

insight from KSM; date: February 10, 2004, at 2:38:36 PM^^h^mainnclu^ th^oHowin^ext: "Here is
Heathrow." Below this text were forwarded emails from

and |||||||||||||||||||||||||||. See email from:

to:
^^^^BB^B[^^B[^^^^^^B||subiect: Heatlirow plot insight
from KSM;date: February 10, 2004, at(H^MPMTemailft^nTlBjj^^^^BBB to:
BHU' subject: OGO^butta^^t 5andfind-Rejal^shiri; date: February 12, 2004, at 02:59 PM;
forwarding email from:

to:

I; subject: Re: al-Nashiri; date: February 10, 2004, at 06:11 PM; email from:

to:

|; subject: **immediate—Hambali Reporting; date: February 10, 2004, at
11:43 AM.

Memorandum for: Inspector General; fiom: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Countertenorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities.
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allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not
thousands, of casualties."'
T^he attachment to Pavitt's memorandum repeated much of the

inaccurate information contained in Deputy Chief of ALEC Station
about KSM and Abu Zubaydah, as well as the additional information ALEC Station personnel
provided on KSM, al-Nashiri, and Hambali. In Pavitt's memorandum, every intelligence success
claim was preceded with some version of the phrase, "as a result of the lawful use of EITs."'''^^
Inaccurate information provided to the OIG during interviews and in the Pavitt memorandum

was included in the final version of the OIG's Special Review.^The relevant portion of the
Special Review, including much of the inaccurate information, has been declassified.'''^^

As ^^^HUcTC Legal

anticipated

February 10, 2004, email, much of the information provided to the inspector general on the
"effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was later provided to
policymakers and the Department of Justice as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.

In late 2004, as the National Security Council was considering
"endgame" options for CIA detainees, the CIA proposed a public relations campaign that would
include disclosures about the "effectiveness" of the CIA program. CIA talking points prepared
in December 2004 for the DCI to use with National Security Council principals stated that "[ijf
done cleverly, selected disclosure of intelligence results could heighten the anxiety of terrorists at
large about the sophistication of USG methods and underscore the seriousness of American

commitment to prosecute aggressively the War on Terrorism.""'^ The following month, the
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and InteiTogation Activities.
Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention iind Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities.
A review of CIA records found that almost all of the information in the Pavitt memorandum was inaccurate and

unsupported by CIA inten:ogation and intelligence records. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that CIA officers
"generally provided accurate information [to the Inspector General] on the operation and effectiveness of the
program," and that "with rare exceptions, [CIA officers] provided accurate assessments to the OIG."
The CIA Inspector General Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," was
declassified with redactions in May 2008. On August 24, 2009, some portions of the Review that were redacted in

May2008^were unredacted and declassified.
wrote in an email: "We can expect to need to present these data to appropriately cleared personnel

at the IGand on the Hill, tothe Attorney General^andqi^^

to the President at some point, and they must

be absolutely verifiable." (See email from: |||||||||||||[||||I|B to: [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ
and measures; date: February 10,2004.) As detailed in this Study, the CIA consistently used the same
"effectiveness" case studies. The eight most frequently cited "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists are examined
in this summary, and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, as are 12 other prominent examples tliat the CIA
has cited in the context of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Talking Points for the DCI: DOD Proposals to Move Forward on Transfer of HVDs to Guantanamo, 16
December 2004.

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CIA proposed that the public information campaign include details on the "intelligence gained

and lives saved in HVD inten-ogations."^''^^ There was no immediate decision by the National
Security Council about an "endgame" for CIA detainees or the proposed public information
campaign.

In early April 2005,
chief of ALEC Station,
asked that information on the success of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program be
compiled in anticipation of interviews of CIA personnel by Tom Brokaw of NBC News. The
first draft included effectiveness claims relating to the "Second Wave" plotting, the Heathrow

Airport plotting, the Karachi plotting, and the identification of a second shoebomber.^A
subsequent draft sought to limit the information provided to what was already in the public

record and included assertions about Issa al-Hindi, lyman Paris, and Sajid Badat.^^"^^ That day.
Deputy Director of CTC Philip Mudd told
that "we either get out and sell, or we get
hammered, which has implications beyond the media. [CJongress reads it, cuts our authorities,
messes up our budget."The following day, the draft was cleared for release to the media.

DCI Talking Points for Weekly Meeting with National Security Advisor, 12 January 2005; included in email

from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED],

cc: BMBBj^Bp^BjohnA^J^zzo,

subject:
Coord on NSC Talkings for 1/14; date: January 11, 2005, at 03:33 PM.
The draft stated tliat the "Second Wave" plotting "was uncovered during the initial debriefings of a senior alQa'ida detainee," that the Heathrow plotting "was also discovered as a result of detainee debriefings," tliat the
Karachi plotting "was revealed during the initial debriefings of two senior al-Qa'ida detainees," and tliat the CIA
"learned form [sic] detainee debriefings of the second shoe bomber. {See email from:

to:

[REDACTED],[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],j

,[REDACTEpTBi^^^Bj^DACTED], ••••.

[REDACTED], [REDACTED; cc;

; subject: FOR IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: summary of impact of detainee
program; date: April 13,2005, at 5:21:37 PM.) These claims were inaccurate. See relevant sections of this
summary and Volume 11.
The draft discussed Issa al-Hindi, who had been referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report, stating that "[p]rior
to KSM's reporting, the U.S. Government was not aware of Issa's casing activity, nor did we know his true
identity." It added tliat "KSM's reporting was the impetus for an intense investigation, culminating in Issa's
identification and arrest." The draft also included two examples that had not been in official public documents, but
had been described in press stories. The first was that "KSM led U.S. investigators to an Ohio tnick driver named

lyman Paris." Tlie second was that "KSM's confessionswereals^nstrumental in determining the identity ofSaajid

Badat," the second shoe bomber. {See email from:
••••,

ChiefofOperatio^, ALEC Station; to: m

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[REDACTED],

subject: Brokaw interview: Take one; date: April 13, 2005, at 6:46:59 PM.) As described elsewhere, tliese claims
were incongruent with CIA records. At least one earlier media account of KSM's purported role in tlie aiTest of
lyman Paris was provided in a book by an author who had extensive access to CIA officials. {See Ronald Kessler,
The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003.). The CIA's cooperation with the author is described
elsewhere in this summary, as well as in more detail in the full Committee Study.

Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and |^^^|BHHi< April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to
19:56:05.

; cc: [REDACTED], BBHI^H' [REDACTED], John

Email fi-om:

subject: Re: Brokaw interview: Take one;

A. Rizzo,

date: April 14, 2005, at 9:22:32 AM.
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On April 20, 2005, the same examples were circulated as part of an
anticipated official public campaign to promote the "effectiveness" of the still-classified CIA

program.^In response.
|CTC Legal,
|, expressed concern that
"the examples cited, while true, and perhaps as far as we can go, are not nearly the most striking
examples of lives saved." Referencing KSM's reporting on lyman Paris,
noted that
"we risk making ourselves look silly if the best we can do is the Brooklyn Bridge - perhaps we
should omit specific examples rather than 'danm ourselves with faint praise.'"
who offered the Heathrow Airport plot as an example, made the following suggestion: "Can
[Office of Public Affairs] be more strongly declarative - 'while we can't provide details' (or

maybe we can) 'the program has produce^nteUigence that has directly saved lOO's/lOOO's of

American and other innocent lives'?"
then attached claims originally compiled in
February 2004 for the purpose of responding to the draft OIG Special Review which, he wrote,
described "some of the actionable intelligence acquired as a result of the Program and the lawful
use of such techniques."^*''' The examples were inaccurate.*
On June 24, 2005, Dateline NBC aired a program, accompanied by
several online articles, which quoted CIA Director Goss and Deputy Director of CTC Mudd, as
well as anonymous "top American intelligence officials." Among other claims, NBC reported
that the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh "le[d] ultimately" to the captures of KSM and Khallad bin
Attash.^*^^ This information was inaccurate.

At the end of 2005, congressional concerns about the treatment of
detainees again spurred interest at the CIA for public disclosures on the "effectiveness" of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Specifically, congressional action on the Detainee
Treatment Act (the "McCain amendment") prompted a CIA attorney working at the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence to express concern that legislative support was needed for the
CIA to continue to use its enhanced interrogation techniques, and that a public information
campaign would be required to garner that support. The CIA attorney described the "striking"
similarities between the public debate surrounding the McCain amendment and the situation in
Israel in 1999, in which the Israeli Supreme Court had "ruled that several... techniques were
possibly permissible, but require some form of legislative sanction," and that the Israeli

""^0 See CIA document entitled, "INTERROGATION PROGRAM DRAFT PRESS BRIEFING," from April 2005.
from:

to

Rizzo;

Re:

Interrogation Program-Going Public Draft Talking Points—CommentsDueto^B||iTie by COB TODAY Thanks;
date: April 20, 2005, at 5:10:10 PM.

See the sections of this summary and Volume El on the Capture of Khalid Shaykli Mohammad (KSM) and the
Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash).
"The frightening evolution of al-Qaida; Decentralization has led to deadly staying power," Dateline NBC, June

24, 2005. In 2003, Ronald Kessler published a book with which theCIAcooperated that stated "intercepts and
information developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh... allowed the CIA to trace [KSM]." The
Kessler book also stated that the bin Attash capture was the "result" of interrogations of KSM. This information is
incongruent with CIA records. See Ronald Kessler, The CIA at War, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2003. See also
John A. Rizzo; to
cc:
Scott W. Muller,
[REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22, 2004, at 09:28 AM).

See the sections of this summary and Volume n on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the

Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding thecaptureofKhal^
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government "ultimately got limited legislative authority for a few specific techniques."^

The

CIA attorney then wrote:

"Once this became a political reality here, it became incumbent on the
Administration to publicly put forth some facts, if it wanted to preserve these
powers. Yet, to date, the Administration has refused to put forth any specific
examples of significant intelligence it adduced as a result of using any
technique that could not reasonably be construed as cruel, inhuman or
degrading. Not even any historical stuff from three or four years ago. What
conclusions are to be drawn from the utter failure to offer a specific

justification: That no such proof exists? That the Administration does not
recognize the legitimacy of the political process on this issue? Or, that need to
reserve the right to use these techniques really is not important enough to

justify the compromise of even historical intelligence?"^
described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the

Administration sought legislative support to continue the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, and chose to do so by publicly disclosing the program in a 2006 speech by President
Bush. The speech, which was based on CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA,
included numerous inaccurate representations about the CIA program and the effectiveness of
the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques. The CIA's vetting of the speech is detailed in CIA
"validation" documents, which include CIA concurrence and citations to records to support

specific passages of the speech. For example, the CIA "Validation of Remarks" document
includes the following:

'''...questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that
has saved innocent lives by helping us to stop new attacks - here in the United
States and across the world.'

CIA concurs with this assessment. Information from detainees prevented -

among others - the West Coast airliner plot, a plot to blow up an apartment
The CIA attorney also described the Israeli precedent with regard to the "necessity defense" that had been
invoked by CIA attorneys and the Department of Justice in 2001 and 2002. Tlie CIA attorney wrote that the Israeli
Supreme Court "also specifically considered the 'ticking time bomb' scenario and said tiiat enhanced techniques
could not be pre-approved for such situations, but that if worse came to worse, an officer who engaged in such
activities could assert a common-law necessity defense, if he were ever prosecuted." {See email from:
[REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo, \

[REDACTEDl^ubject: Re: IVlcCain^ate^Decei^er 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AlVI.) At the time, the CIA attorney and
the former |H^|CTC Legal,
working in the Office of tlie Director of National
Intelligence. The OLC, in its July 20,2007, memorandum, included an analysis of the Israeli court case in the
context of concluding that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were "clearly authorized and justified by
legislative authority" as a result of the Military Commissions Act. See memorandum for Jolin A. Rizzo, Acting
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment
Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by tlie CIA in the
Intenogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.

Email from: [REDACTED]; to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], John A. Rizzo,|

|, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: McCain; date: December 19,2005, at 10:18:58 AM.
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building in the United States, a plot to attack various targets in the United
Kingdom, and plots against targets in Karachi and the Arabian Gulf. These
attacks would undoubtedly have killed thousands."

(T8/^|||||||||||||||||^||B^^^

Multiple iterations ofthe CIA "validation" documents reflect

changes to the speech as it was being prepared. One week before the scheduled speech, a
passage in the draft speech made inaccurateclaims about the role played by Abu Zubaydah in the
capaire of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the role of Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh in the
capture of KSM, but did not explicitly connect these claims to the use of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques. In an August 31, 2006, email exchange, CIA officers proposed the
following language for the speech:

"That same year, information from Zubaydah led the CIA to the trail of one of
KSM's accomplices, Ramzi bin al Shibh. Information from Zubaydah together
with information from Shibh gave the CIA insight into al-Qa'ida's 9/11 attack

planning and th^mportanc^fKSM With the knowledge that KSM was the
'mastermind,' |||||||m|H||||||| Pakistani partners planned and mounted an
operation that resulted in his eventual capture and detention."

The August 31, 2006, email exchange included citations to CIA

cables to support the proposed passage; however, neither the cables, nor any other CIA records,
support the assertions.^
Emphasis in original. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy,Wednesday, 6 September2006, Draft
#15. As described in the relevant sections of this summary, and more extensively in Volume II, these claims were
inaccurate.
Email from:

; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc:

; subject: Source list for our AZ paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.
The cited cables describe Abu Zubaydah's June 2002 description of a meeting with Ramzi bin al-Shibh

(acquired prior to the use ofthe CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah), and Abu

Zubaydah's August 200^eportin^i^ussing the same meeting (after the use ofthe techniques). (See CIA
(I01514Z JUN 02);
August 2002).) Neither cable—or any other CIA record—indicates a
connection between Abu Zubaydah's reporting on his meeting with bin al-Shibh and bin al-Shibh's capture. The
cited cables also do not include information, which was available to the CIA prior to the captureof Abu Zubaydali,
highlighting KSM's "importance." The citedcabledescribes Abu Zubaydah's April 2002 reporting, prior to the use

ofthe CIA's enhance^nteiToe^ techniques, identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and the "mastermind" ofthe 9/11
attacks. (See H||||^^^H|^|(13 April 2002).) The citations did not include cables referencing infonnation
available to the CIA about KSM that was obtained prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah, including information on
KSM's alias "Mukhtai'" and KSM's role in tlie September 11, 2001, attacks, as is detailed elsewhere in this

summary. The cables also did not supportthe claim that information provided by Abu Zubaydahor Ramzi bin alShibh led to the capture of KSM. One cited cable related to the identification by Ramzi bin al-Shibh, while bin al-

Shibh waMi^oreigr^ov^ment custody, ofAli Abdul Aziz Ali as "Ammar^[The cable was cited as
20700

As determined later, the actual cable was

20790.] As described elsewhere in

this summary, KSMwas notcaptured as a result of information related to Ammar al-Baluchi. The email exchange
listed two cablesdirectly related to the capture of KSM. The first cable,from approximately a week before KSM's
capture, described the CIA's operational use and value of the asset who led the CIA to KSM. The cable stated that

the relationshk^jetweeiUh^sse^n^CSM^s^^^B^^

the asset gained access to KSM, was "based

on
The cabl^tate^hat Cl^Iea^u^irters
'continues to be impressed with the evidence of[the asset's] access to IHI^HiKSM HHlii associates, I
." (5ee DIRECTOR

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Within a few days, the passage in the draft speech relating to the
captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM was modified to connect the use of the CIA's enhanced
inteiTogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. The
updated draft now credited information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh with
"help[ing] in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed." The updated draft speech stated:

"Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] was questioned using these [interrogation]
procedures, and he soon began to provide information on key al-Qaida
operatives - including information that helped us find and capture more of
those responsible for the attacks of Nine-Eleven. For example, Zubaydah
[zoo-BAY-da] identified one of KSM's accomplices in the Nine-Eleven
attacks - a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh [SHEEB]. The information

Zubaydah [zoo-BAY-da] provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh.
And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the
planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed."^

An updated CIA "validation" document concurring with the
proposed passage provided a modified list of CIA cables as "sources" to support the passage.
Cable citations to Abu Zubaydah's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques were removed.Like the previous version, the CIA's updated "validation"
document did not cite to any cables demonstrating that information from Abu Zubaydah "helped

lead to the capture of [Ramzi] bin al-Shibh."^

Similarly, none of the cables cited to support

the passage indicated that information from Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was in
foreign government custody when he provided the information cited by the CIA) "helped in the

described KSM's capture, stating that it was "based on locational information" provided by the asset. {See
41351
) Neither of the two cables cited to support the claim made any
reference to Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, or any other detainee in CIA or foreign government custody. The

capture of KSM, including the role of tlie asset (referred to herein as "ASSET X") is detailed elsewhere in this

summaiy and in greater detail in the full ComniitteeStudy^^eeeinailfr

[REDACTED]; cc: HUHHHIII' HHHHHii'

to: [REDACTED],

Source

our AZ

paragraphs; date: August 31, 2006, at 08:56 AM.
Pronunciation brackets in original draft. CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6
September 2006, Draft #15.
Tlie document cited a cable on Abu Zubaydali's August 2002 description of his meeting witli Ramzi bin al-

Shibh, but not the previously cited June 2002 cable related toAbu Zubaydah's description of the same meeting^^
Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See

The information included in tlie cable describing Abu Zubaydah's August 200^^portin^rHii^2®®^|"
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was unrelated to tlie capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh. {See

)

The CIA document also citedasa^|sourc£^^^
the capture ofbin al-Shibh with no mention ofAbu
Zubaydah's reporting. {See HHHUHHHH-) Ihe details ofRamzi bin al-Shibh's capture are
described elsewhere in this summaiy and ingreaterdetaiUrHh^ul^om^
1(11

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planning and execution of the operation thatcaptured [KSM]."^'^^ As described elsewhere in
this summary, there are no CIA records to support these claims.
The CIA documents validating the president's speech addressed
other passages that were Hkewise unsupported by the CIA's cited cables. For example, the
speech included an inaccurate claim regarding KSM that had been part of the CIA's
representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques since 2003.
The speech stated:

"Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these
procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another
planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about
another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody - a terrorist named
Majid Khan. KSM revealed that [Majid] Khan had been told to deliver
$50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambah,
the leader of al Qaeda's Southeast Asian affiliate known as 'J-I.' CIA officers

confronted Khan with this information. Khan confirmed that the money had
been delivered to an operative named Zubair, and provided both a physical
description and contact number for this operative. Based on that information,
Zubair was captured in June of 2003, and he soon provided information that

helped lead to the capture of Hambali."' ^^^
support for this passage, the CIA cited a June 2003 cable

describing a CIA interrogation of Majid Khan in which Majid Khan discussed Zubair.^The
CIA "validation" document did not include cable citations from March 2003 that would have

revealed that Majid Khan provided this inforaiation while in foreign government custody, prior

to the reporting from KSM.^'^"^

The CIA document included a previousl^itec^^le relatin^^hecapture^ KSM that made no mention of

reporting from CIA detainees. (^See

41351 ri^HIH|||||Hi ) '^he CIA document also

included the previously cited cable describing bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar." As described in the section
of this summary, as well as in Volume II, on the Capture of KSM, KSM was not captured as a result of information

relate^o Ammar al-Baluchi. (The document cited the cable as

20700, as noted, the actual cite was

20790.) The CIA cable also cited an analytical product whose relevance was limited to the connection

between KSM and al-Aziz (Ammar al-Baluchi). (See DI SerialFlierCTC 2002-30086CH: CIA analytic report,
"Threat Threads: Recent Advances in Understanding 11 September.") Finally, the document included a cable that
was unrelated to the content of the speech.

See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid
Shaykh Mohammad (KSM).

1165 Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based onCIA information and vetted by CIA personnel.
CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, Wednesday, 6 September 2006, Draft #15; |

^^^^8 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as
Further, the June 2003 cable,
DIRECTOR idBI (122120Z JUN 03), cited by the CIA as validation, makes no reference to reporting from KSM.
Khan was captured on March 5, 2003 and was in foreign government detention until being transferred to CIA
custody on May

2003. See details on the detention and interrogation of Majid Khan in Volume III.
1(11 'iM III

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On September 6, 2006, President Bush delivered the speech based
on the CIA-vetted information.On September 8, 2006, the chief of the

Department in CTC,
participated in the CIA's validation of the
speech, distributed the "final validation document" for possible updates or changes. In an email,

m m urged the recipients to "[pjlease look very carefully, as this is going to be a very
important document."

On September 11, 2006, a CIA officer responded, questioning the

passage in the speech related to the capture of KSM, as well as the relevance of the CIA cables
cited in the validation document to support the passage. The CIA officer questioned whether a
CIA cable describing Ramzi bin al-Shibh's identification of "Ammar" supported the claim that
bin al-Shibh's reporting helped lead to the capture of KSM. The officer wrote:

"I presume the information in this cable that supports the statement is Ramzi's
admission regarding Ammar?? Did that actually help lead us to KSM?? not
sure who did this section, but we may want to double-check this and provide
additional cables on how this actually 'assisted us'. This also seems to be a
point critics in the press seem to be picking on, I will do some digging on my
own as well."^'^^
There are no CIA records to indicate that the CIA officer's

comments about the inadequate sourcing were further addressed. As described in this summary,
and in more detail in Volume H, there are no CIA records to support the passage in the speech
related to the capture of KSM.
After the speech, press accounts challenging aspects of the speech

became the subject ofinternal discussion amon^om^I^officers. On September 7, 2006, the

chief of the KIIHH Department in CTC,

email stating: 'The

NY Times has posted a story predictably poking holes in the President's speech." Defending the
passage in the specch asserting that, after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

On April 29, 2009, Marc Thiessen, the speechwriter responsible for President Bush's September 6, 2006,
speech, wrote: "This was the most carefully vetted speech in presidential history - reviewed by all the key players
from the individuals who ran the program all the way up to the director of national intelligence, who personally
attested to the accuracy of the speech in a memo to tlie president. And just last week on Fox News, former CIA
Director Michael Hayden said he went back and checked with the agency as to the accuracy of that speech and
reported: *We stand by our story.'" See Maic Thiessen, "The West Coast Plot: An 'Inconvenient Truth,"' The

/?ev/evv^pri^5^009.
from:

to:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^|H|n^HHl^H> [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
subject: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!! Please verify the
attached; date: September 8, 2006, at 06:28 PM.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to:
cc:
[REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]7^^Hli^^^^H

H

I; subject: Re: THE MOMENT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR!!!
Please verify the Attached; date: September 11, 2006, at 9:16:15 AM; attachment Nl: CIA Validation of Remarks
on Detainee Policy Final (Draft #15). The email also identified as unrelated one cable that had been cited as a

source and conected a transposed number ofthecabledescribin^aii^
I III

11 III I

identification of"Ammar."
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Abu Zubaydah providedinformation "tJiat helped lead to the capture of bin al-Shibh,'
explained:

"...we knew Ramzi bin al-Shibh was involved in 9/11 before AZ was captured;
however, AZ gave us information on his recent activities that—when added

into other information—helped us track him. Again, on this point, we were
very careful and the speech is accurate in what it says about bin al-Shibh."^
statement, that Abu Zubaydah provided "information

on [bin al-Shibh's] recent activities" that "helped [CIA] track him," was no^uppor^ by the

cables cited in the CIA's "validation" document, orany other CIA record. |||||||B||||||||'s email
did not address the other representation in the president's speech—that Abu Zubaydah
"identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh.^

The New York Times article also challenged the representation in
the speech that Abu Zubaydah "disclosed" that KSM was the "mastermind behind the 9/11

attacks and used the alias 'Mukhtar,'" and that "[t]his was a vital picce of the puzzle that helped
our intelligence community pursue KSM." As the New York Times article noted, the 9/11

Commissior^iad pointed to acable from August 2001 that identified KSM as "Mukhtar." In her
email,
acknowledged the August 2001 report identifying KSM as "Mukhtar" and
provided additional information on the drafting of the speech:

"[0]n 28 August, 2001, in fact, [CIA's] HHHI [database] does show a report
from [a source] stating that Mohammad Rahim's brother Zadran told him that

KSM was now being called 'Mukhtar.' Moreover, we were suspicious that
KSM might have been behind 9/11 as early as 12 Sept 2001, and we had some
reporting indicating he was the mastermind. We explained this latter fact to
the White House, although the 28 August report escaped our notice."

Email from; HHHHI'
Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED],

[REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydali's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7,
2006. A September 7, 2006, article (published September 8, 2006) in theNew York Times, by Mark Mazzetti,
entitled, "Questions Raised About Bush's Primary Claims of Secret Detention System" included comments by CTA
officials defending the assertions in the President's speech. The article stated: "Mr. Bush described the
interrogation techniques used on the C.I.A. prisoners as having been 'safe, lawful and effective,' and he asserted that
torture had not been used. .. .Mr. Bushalso said it was the interrogation of Mr. Zubaydah that identified Mr. bin alShibh as an accomplice in the Sept. 11 attacks. American officials had identified Mr. bin al-Shibh's role in the
attacks months before Mr. Zubaydah's capture."

Thereare no CIArecords to support these claims. See thesection of this summary on thecapture of Ramzi bin
al-Shibh, as well as a more detailed account in Volume II.

from: jjjjBHUHH' to

Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDL^^BBf^BHHinREDACT^,
[REDACTED]; subject: Questions about Abu Zubaydah's identification of KSM as "Mukhtar"; date: September 7,
2006. There are no CIA records indicating what was "explained" to the White House. The CIA validation
document provided officially concurred with the passage in the speech. See CIA Vahdation of Remarks on Detainee

Policy, Wednesday, 6September2006, Draft#^
KM' 'iii( III I I I I ! >^'111

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In her email, HIHii stated that "[t]he fact that the 9/11
commission, with 20-20 hindsight, thinks we should have known this in August 2001 does not
alter the fact that we didn't."'

(TS/4l||H^HIIi^B'/NF) In addition to the New York Times article, the CIA was concerned
about an article by Ron Suskind in Time Magazine that also challenged the assertions in the

speech about thecapturc^f Ramzi bin al-Shibh an^^CSNl^^^^r^September 11, 2006, email,

the chief ofdie |||||HIHili Department in CTC,

wrote; *'[w]e are not

claiming [Abu Zubaydah] provided exact locational information, merely that he provided us with

information that helped in our targeting efforts." |HH|'s email did not address the
representations in the president's speech that Abu Zubaydah "identified" Ramzi bin al-Shibh and
that the information from Abu Zubaydah "helped lead to the capture" of bin al-Shibh. With

regard to the capture of KSM,
email acknowledged that Suskind's assertion that
"the key was a cooperative source" was "correct as far as it goes, but the priority with which we

pursued KSM changed once AZ conclusively identified him as the mastermind of 9/11."^^^^

j^^HH's email did not address the representation in the president's speech that Abu
Zubaydah, along witii Ramzi bin al-Shibh, "helped in tii^lanning and execution of the
operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed."

statements about the captures

of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and KSM are not supported by CIA records.

The president's September 6, 2006, speech, which was based on
CIA-provided information and vetted by the CIA, was the first detailed, formal public

representation about tiie effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.The

Email from:

to |

Mark Mansfield, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTEDLl^^|||^^^^^H[i, [REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: Questions aboutAbu Zubaydali's identification of KSM as "Muklitar"; date: September 7,
2006.

The Unofficial Story of the al-Qaeda 14; Tlieir torture by the CIA was wrong - in more ways than you might
think, Ron Suskind, Time, 18 September 2006.

Email from:

to: [REDACTED], ^•••1,

[REDACTED], [REDACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: URGENT: FOR YOUR COMMENT: DCIA Questions on
the Suskind Article; date: September 11, 2006, at 08:23 PM.
See the section of this summary and Volume II on the Captiue of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and the Capture of Khalid

Shaykh Mohammad (KSM). In 2007, CIAofficers also questioned the passage in the President's September 6,
2006, speech concerning tliedisruption of plotting against Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. See the section of this
summary and VolumeII on the Thwarting of tlie Camp Lemonier Plotting for additional infomiation.

1178 President Bush made other public statements that relied on inaccurateinformation provided by the CIA. For
example, as described elsewhere in this summary, on March 8, 2008,President Bush vetoed legislation that would
have limited intenogations to techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. The President's veto message to
the Houseof Representatives stated that "[t]he CIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized inteirogation
program for terrorists whopossess the most critical information in the waron terrorhas helped the United States
prevent a number of attacks, including plotsto fly passenger airplanes intothe Library Tower in Los Angeles and
into Heatlirow Airport or buildings in downtown London." {See message to the Houseof Representatives, President
George W. Bush,March 8, 2008). Tlie President also explained his veto in his weekly radio address, in whichhe
referenced tlie "Library Tower," also known as the "SecondWave"plot, and the Heathrow plot, while representing
that the CIA program "helpedus stop a plot to strikea U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attackon the U.S.
consulate in Karachi..." {SeePresident's Radio Address, President George W. Bush, March 8, 2008). As detailed

in this summary, and described more fully ir^olum^I^I^representation^j^
im

IM III I

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I (III I

inaccurate representations in the speech have been repeated in numerous articles, books, and
broadcasts. The speech was also relied upon by the OLC in its July 20, 2007, memorandum on

the legality of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, specifically to support the premise
that the use of the techniques was effective in "producing substantialquantities of otherwise
unavailable intelligence."'

D. CIA Representations About theEffectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
Against Specific CIA Detainees

While the CIA made numerous general representations about the

effectiveness of its enhanced interrogation techniques, CIA representations on specific detainees
focused almost exclusively on two CIA detainees, Abu Zubaydah, detained on March 28, 2002,
and KSM, detained on March 1, 2003.''^®
I. Abu Zubaydah

As described in greater detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA
provided significant information to policymakers and the Department of Justice on the CIA's
decision to use the newly developed CIA^'enhanced interrogation techniques" on Abu Zubaydcih
and the effects of doing so. These representations were provided by the CIA to the CIA OIG,''^'

enhancedintenogation techniques with regard to the SecondWave, Heathrow, Djibouti and Karachi plots were
inaccurate.

The OLC memorandum, along withother OLC memoranda relying on inaccurate CIA representations, has been
declassified, as has the May 2004OIGSpecial Review containing inaccurate information provided by CIA officers.
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy AssistantAttorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War
Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, andCommon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS#2009-1810, Tab 14).
See Volume II for additional information on CIA representations.

Among other documents,see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Directorfor
Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to DraftIG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and InteiTogation
Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of

CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenjogadoi^ctivitie^^^^^^^^^

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the White House,the Department of Justice,Congress,and the American public.

The representations include that: (1) Abu Zubaydah told the CIA he believed "the general US

population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary";^
(2) Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating with U.S. government personnel using traditional
interrogation techniques;(3) Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in critical information on teiTorist

operatives and plotting;^^^^ and (4) the use of CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu
Zubaydali was effective in eliciting critical intelligence from Abu Zubaydah.
representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

These

The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah "expressed [his] belief
that the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to 'do what
was necessary' to prevent the terrorists from succeeding in their goals" is not supported by CIA

Amongotlier documents, see Memorandum for the Record: "Reviewof Intenogation Programon 29 July
2003." Memorandum preparedby CIA General Counsel ScottMuiler,dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides
entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003,presented to seniorWhite House officials; and Briefing
for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and InteiTogation Program,CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled,
"Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.'
Among otlierdocuments, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for SteveBradbury from|
Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Centerre: Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Techniques.
Amongother documents, see CIA classified statement for the record. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing tianscript for April 12, 2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central
Intelligence AgencyDetention and Interrogation Program." DirectorHayden stated: "Now in June [2002], after
about four mondis of intenogation, Abu Zubaydah reached a point where he refused to cooperate and he shut down.
He would not talk at all to the FBI intenogators and although he was still talking to CIA interrogators no significant
progress was being made in learning anything of intelligence value."

1185 pqj. example,see CIA "Questions and ProposedAnswers" 9/2/2006, Tab 2 of CIA Validation of Remarks on

Detainee Policy, September 6, 2006.

See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from

HH Legal

Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of theCIA Countertenorist Intenogation Techniques."
See, for example,ODNI September2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial inteiTOgation, Abu
Zubaydahgave some information tliathe probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including
that Klialid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This
identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to tliis
teiTorist plotter—leads that eventuallyresulted in his capture. It was clear to his inteiTogators that Abu Zubaydah
possessed a great deal of infonnation about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stoppedall cooperation. Over the ensuing
months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program tliat would be safe, effective, and legal." See also
Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel.

As detailed in DIRECTOR llli (031357Z AUG 02). See also Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for

John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, dated August 1, 2002, and entitled
"Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative," which states: "TlieinteiTogation team is certain [Abu Zubaydah] has
additional information that he refuses to divulge. Specifically, he is witWiolding information regaiding tenorist
networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and information regarding plans to conduct attacks within the
United States or against our interests overseas."

Amongother documents, see Officeof the Directorof National Intelligence, "Summary of the High Value
Terrorist Detainee Progiam," September 6, 2006; and CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at the Department of

Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from HIHiiHH' H Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject
"Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist Intenocatior^echnique^^^^^^
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records.'^^^ On August 30, 2006, a CIA officer from the CIA's al-Qa'ida Plans and Organization
Group wrote: "we have no records that 'he declared that America was weak, and lacking in
resilience and that our society did not have the will to 'do what was necessary' to prevent the

terrorists from succeeding in theirgoals.In a CIA Sametime communication that same day,
a CIA ALEC Station officer wrote, "I can find no reference to AZ being deifant [sic] and
declaring America weak... in fact everything I have read indicated he used a non deifiant [sic]

resistan^strategy." In response, the chief of the

Department in CTC,

wrote: "I've certainly heard that said of AZ for years, but don't know why...." The

CI^ALE^Station officeo^plied^robably a combo of[deputy chief ofALEC Station,
^nd

••• I'll

at that." The chief of the

Department completed the exchange, writing "yes, beheve so... and agree, we shall pass over in
silence."^^^2

(^^S/^|||^|||||H||||||||[|//NF) The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped cooperating
with debriefers using traditional interrogation techniques is also not supported by CIA
records.In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators recommended that Abu Zubaydah

spend several weeks in isolation while the interrogation team members traveled |m|| "as a
means ofkeeping [Abu Zubaydal^off-balance and to allow the team needed time offfor a break
and to atten^^^onal matters
as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu

Zubaydah jjjjjjjjjjj^^ with officers from CIA Headquarters.As aresult, Abu Zubaydah spent
much of June 2002, and all of July 2002,47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA officers next

interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques,

including the waterboard.^^^^ Prior to this isolation period, Abu Zubaydah provided information
on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its

leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics.
Abu Zubaydah provided the same type of information prior to, during, and after the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information
See, for example, March 2, 2005, CIA memorandum for Steve Bradbury from

mH Legal

Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
from:
to:
and
I; subject:

"Suggested language change forAZ^^jdatejAugust30, 2006, at06:32 PM.

Sametime communication,

HHHlHH' 30/Aug/06 13:15:23 to 19:31:47.

See ODNI September2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial interrogation, AbuZubaydah gave some
information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh
Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to

comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that
eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of
information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Overthe ensuing montlis, the CIA designed
a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." Seealso Presidential Speechon September 6,
2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel, that states: "We knew that Zubaydah had more
information that could save innocent lives. But he stopped talking... And so, the CIA used an alternative set of
procedures."

10424 (070814Z JUN 02)

See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume IE, to include CIA email [REDACTED] dated March 28, 2007,

04:42 PM, with the subjectline, "Subjectdetainee allegation - per our telcon of today."
See reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review, as well as CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated
March 2005. The sameinformation was included in an "Abu Zubaydah Bio"document "Prepared on 9 August
2006."

See reporting charts in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

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on the next attack in the United States—and operatives in the United States—provided the basis

for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," as well as for the CIA's
determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information that CIA Headquarters believed he
was withholding. The CIA further stated that Abu Zubaydah could stop the application of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, like the waterboard, by providing the names of

operatives in the United States or information to stop the next attack.^At no point during or
after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type
of information.

representation that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team
believed the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques would result in new information
on operatives in the United States and teiTorist plotting is also incongruent with CIA records.
While Abu Zubaydah was in isolation in July 2002, CIA Headquarters informed the Department
of Justice and White House officials that Abu Zubaydah's interrogation team believed Abu

Zubaydah possessed information on terrorist threats to, and al-Qa'ida operatives in, the United
States.The CIA officials further represented that the interrogation team had concluded that
the use of more aggressive methods "is required to persuade Abu Zubaydah to provide the
critical information needed to safeguard the lives of innumerable innocent men, women, and
children within the United States and abroad," and warned "countless more Americans may die

unless wecan persuade AZ to tell us what he knows."^-®^ However, according to CIA cables, the
interrogation team at the detention site had not determined that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques were required for Abu Zubaydah to provide such threat information. Rather, the
interrogation team wrote "[o]ur assumption is the objective of this operation is to achieve a high
degree of confidence that [Abu Zubaydah] is not holding back actionable information concerning

threats to the United States beyond that which [Abu Zubaydah] has already provided."^^^^
The CIA representation that the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah was effective in producing critical threat information
See

10586 (041559Z AUG 02), which states: "In trutli, [Zubaydah] can halt the proceedings at any

time by providing truthful revelations on the threat which may save countless lives."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.
'200 As detailed in DIRECTOR
(031357Z AUG 02). The CIA further represented: (1) that the enhanced

interrogation phase of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation would likely last "no more than several days but could last up
to thirty days," (2) "that tlie use of the [enhanced interrogation techniques] would be on an as-needed basis and that
not all of these techniques will necessaiily be used," (3) tliat the CIA expected "these techniques to be used in some
sort of escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard, though not necessarilyending with this technique," (4)
"that although some of these techniques may be used more tiian once, that repetition will not be substantial because
the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions," and (5) "that steps will be taken to ensure
tliat [Abu Zubaydah's] injury is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these methods." See the Abu Zubaydah
detainee review for detailed information for how these statements proved almost entirely inaccurate. See also
Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant

Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Inten ogation of al Qaeda Operative.

'20' DIRECTOR ••

(031357Z AUG 02)

'202 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02); email from:

and •^••1;

to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED],

subject: Addendum from [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: July 23, 2002, at07:56:49 PM;

[REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02). Additional assessments by the interrogation team that Abu Zubaydah was

not witliholding information aie described inth^bi^ubaydal^e^^
11)1

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on terrorists and terrorist plotting against the United States is also not supported by CIA records.
Abu Zubaydah did not provide the information for which the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques werejustified and approved—information on the next attack and operatives in the
United States.According to CIA records, Abu Zubaydah provided information on "al-Qa'ida
activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships," in addition to information on "its leadership
structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics."'^®"^ This type
of information was provided by Abu Zubaydah prior to, during, and after the use of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques.At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide information on al-Qa'ida cells in the United
States or operational plans for terrorist attacks against the United States.Further, a
quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence
reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation, before the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and when FBI special agents were directly
participating, than were derived during the next two-month phase of interrogations, which
included the non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques 24 hours a day for 17

days.'^^^ Nonetheless, on August 30, 2002, the CIA informed the National Security Council that
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Vohniie III. Participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydali alsowrote
that Abu Zubaydah"probably reached the pointof cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced'
measures -a development missed because of the narrowfocus of die questioning. In any event there was no
evidence that the waterboard produced time-perishable information which otherwise would have been

unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections ofm^^|Medical Services on OMS participation in the RDI
program.

CIA paper entitled "Abu Zubaydah" and dated March 2005. See also "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared
on 9 August 2006."

See Abu Zubaydahdetainee review in Volume III, and CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March2005;
as well as "Abu Zubaydah Bio" document "Prepared on 9 August 2006."
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

Abu Zubaydah was taken intoCIAcustody on March
2002, and was shortly thereafter hospitalized until
April 15, 2002. Abu Zubaydah returned to DETENTION SITEGREEN on April 15,2002. During the months of
April and May 2002, which included a period during which Abu Zubaydah was on lifesupport andunable to speak
(Abu Zubaydah communicated primarily withFBI special agents in writing), Abu Zubaydah's interrogations
resulted in 95 intelligence reports. In February 2008, the CIAidentified the "key intelligence andreporting derived"
from Abu Zubaydah. The three items identified bytheCIA were all acquired in April andMay of 2002 by FBI

interrogators. Abu Zubaydah was placed in isolation from June 18, 2002, to August 4, 2002, without being asked
any questions. After 47 days in isolation, the CIA reinstituted contact widi Abu Zubaydah at approximately 11:50
AMon August 4,2002, when CIApersonnel entered the cell, shackled and hooded Abu Zubaydah, and removed his
towel, leaving Abu Zubaydali naked. Without asking any questions, CIA personnel made a collar around his neck

with a towel and used thecollar "toslam him against a concrete wall." Multiple enhanced inteiTogation techniques
were used non-stop until 6:30PM, when Abu Zubaydah was strapped to the waterboard and subjected to the
waterboard technique "numerous times" between 6:45 PM and 8:52 PM. The"aggressive phase of interrogation"

using theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques continued for20days. {See Abu Zubaydah treatment cluonology
in Volume III.) During the months of August and September 2002, Abu Zubaydah's reporting resulted in 91
intelligence reports, fourfewer than thefirst twomonths of his CIAdetention. {See Abu Zubaydah detainee review
in VolumeIII.) Specifically, for infonnation on AbuZubaydah's initial walling, see CIA email dated March28,
2007, at 04:42 PM, withthe subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today," which states that
Abu Zubaydah claims "a collar was used to slam him against a concrete wall." The CIA officer wrote, "While we

do not have a record that this occurred, one interrogator at thesite at thetime confinned that this did indeed happen.
For the record, a plywood 'wall' was immediately constructed at tlie site after the walling on the concretewall."
Regarding theCIA's assessment of the "key intelligence" from Abu Zubaydah, seeCIA briefing documents for
Leon Panetta entitled, "Tab9: DCIA Briefing on RDI ftogram- I8FEB.2009" andgraphic attachment, "Key

Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abj^ubaydaj^n^aiali^hay^
Kii' 'iM III' I

(KSM)" (includes "DCIA
I kII mil I

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the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and "producing meaningful
results."'^^^ Shortly thereafter, however, in October 2002, CIArecords indicate that President
Bush was informed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) that "Abu Zubaydah resisted providing
useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of

improving his living conditions." The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.Subsequently, the CIA represented to other senior policymakers
and the Department of Justice that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were
successfully used to elicit critical information from Abu Zubaydah.For example, in a March
2, 2005, CIA memorandum to the Department of Justice, the CIA represented that information
obtained from Abu Zubaydah on the "Dirty Bomb Plot" and Jose Padilla was acquired only
''after applying [enhanced] inteiTogation techniques."This CIA representation was repeated
in numerous CIA communications with policymakers and the Department of Justice.The

information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. On the evening of April 20, 2002, prior to the
Briefing on RDIProgram" agenda, CIAdocument "ElTs andEffectiveness," withassociated documents, "Key
Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart:

Attachment," and "supporting references," to includeJ|Backgroun
Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")On August 30, 2002,
Legal, IHIHHiHl'
Legal Adviser John Bellinger
to discuss Abu Zubaydali's interrogation. {See email from; John Rizzo^o^ohn Moseman; subject: Meeting with
NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September 3, 2002; ALEC |m^|, 052227Z SEP 02.) According to
I's email documenting themeeting, he "noted that we had employed thewalling techniques,
confinement box, waterboard, along with some of the other methods which also had been approved by the Attorney
General,"and "reportedthat while the experts at the site and at Headquarters were still assessing the product of the
recent sessions, it did appeal" that the current phase was producing meaningful results." {See email from: John
Rizzo; to: John Moseman; subject: Meeting with NSC Legal Adviser, 30 August 2002; date: September3, 2002.)

The email did not provide any additional detail on what was described to Bellinger with respect to either the use of
the techniques or the "results" of the interrogation. It is unclear from CIArecords whether the CIA ever informed
the NSC legal adviseror anyoneelse at the NSC or the Department of Justice that Abu Zubaydah failed to provide
information about future attacks against the UnitedStates or operatives taskedto commit attacks in the U.S., during
or after tlie use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

ALEC ilil (181439Z OCT 02)

These representations were eventually included in the President's September 6, 2006, speech, in which the
President stated: "We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped
talking... so tlie CIA used an alternative set of procedures... Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and
soon he began to provideinformation on key al Qaedaoperatives, including information that helped us find and

capture more of those responsible fortlie attacks onSeptember the 11"'." Tliese representations were also made to
the Committee. On September6, 2006, DirectorHaydentestified that, "faced with the techniques and with the
prospects of whathe did notknow was coming, Abu Zubaydah decided thathe had earned tlie burden as far as
Allali had requiredhim to cairy it and that he could put the burden down and cooperate with his interrogators." {See
transcript of briefing, September 6, 2006 (DTS#2007-1336).) Director Hayden's Statementfor the Recordfor an
April 12, 2007, hearingstated that: "[ajfter the use of these techniques, Abu Zubaydah becameone of our most
important sources of intelligence on al-Qa'ida." Seestatement for the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence from
CIA Director Hayden, for April 12, 2007, hearing (DTS #2007-1563).
Italics in original document. CIAMemorandim
Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel,Dep<u-tment of

Justice, dated March 2,2005, fi-om

HI Legal Group, DCI Counterteriorist Center, subject

"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Inten-ogation Techniques."

Among other documents, see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memoranda dated May 30, 2005,
and July 20,2007. The July 20, 2007, memorandum - now declassified - states (inaccurately) that: "InteiTogations
of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al Qaeda operatives already in the
United States and planningto destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in
Washington, D.C." See VolumeII, specifically the sectionon the "Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings
Plot" and tlie capture of Jose Padilla, for additional details concerning the inaccuracies of this statement.
nil

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use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided this information to
FBI officers who were using rapport building interrogation techniques.
2. Khalicl Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)

As described in more detail in the full Committee Study, the CIA
provided significant inaccurate information to policymakers on the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques in the interrogation of KSM. These representations were

10091 (210959Z APR 02). Despite requests by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the
CIA has never conected the record on this assertion. On September8, 2008, the Committee submitted Questions for
the Record(QFRs) to the CIA from a hearing on the legalopinions issuedby the Department of Justice's Officeof

Legal Counsel on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. Because of time constraints, theCIA agreed "to
take backseveral questions from Members that [the CIA was] unable to answer at thehearing." On the topic of the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the Committee asked"Why was this information
[related to Padilla], which was not obtained through the use of EITs, included in the 'Effectiveness Memo?"' CIA

records provided for thi^jevi^ contain coinplete^respoi^s to tliese Questions for the Record. Tlie CIA's answer

to this question was:

Legal

simply inadvertently reporte^iis wrong. Abu

Zubaydah provided information on Jose Padilla while being interrogated by the FBI (HIHl 10091)." The
Committee never received this response, despite numerous requests. Instead, the CIA responded with a letter dated
October 17, 2008, stating that the "CIAhas responded to numerous written requests for information from SSCI on
this topic [the CIA's Detention andInterrogation Program]," and that"[w]e are available to provide additional
briefings on this issue to Members as necessary." In a letterto CIA Director Michael Hayden, Chairman
Rockefeller wrote, "[tjhe CIA's refusal to respond to hearing Questions for the Record is unprecedented and is
simply unacceptable." Senator Feinstein wrote a separate letterto CIA Director Michael Hayden stating, "I want
you to know that I found the October 17, 2008 reply...appalling." The CIA did not respond. (See: (1) Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Questions for theRecord submitted to CIA Director Michael Hayden on September 8,
2008, with a request for a response by October 10,2008 (DTS #2008-3522); (2) CIA document prepared in
response to "Questions for theRecord" submitted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on September 8,
2008; (3) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ChairmanJohn D. RockefellerIV, dated October 29,
2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217); (4)letter from Senate Select Committee onIntelligence
ChainnanJohn D. Rockefeller IV,dated October 29,2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS #2008-4217);
and (5) letter from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee member, Dianne Feinstein, dated October
30, 2008, to CIA Director Michael Hayden (DTS#2008-4235).) In February 2004, a senior CIA officer wrote: "AZ
never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every plot/operation he hadknowledge of and/or
wasworking on wasonly preliminary. (Padilla and thedirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he never really

gave actionable

to get them)." See email from: llli^^H|^^H||||htoJH|||^^H^m, cc:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTEDL^^BHIilHjohn^Mu^^

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTEDlHIHBIH; subject: Please
Read - Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004)
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provided by the CIA to the

the White House/^^^ the Department of Justice,the

Congress,and the American public.The representations include that: (1) KSM provided
little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques(2) the CIA overcame KSM's resistance through the use of the

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques;^-^® (3) the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique
was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSM;'^'^ (4) KSM "recanted little of the
information" he had provided, and KSM's information was "generally accurate" and
"consistent";'-^^ (5) KSM made a statement to CIA personnel—"soon, you will know"—
indicating an attack was imminent upon his aiTest; and (6) KSM believed "the general US
'2''' Among otlierdocuments, see Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Directorfor
Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation
Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of
CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Inten'ogation Activities.

'2'-'' Among otlierdocuments, see Memorandum for the Record: "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July
2003," Memorandum prepaied by CIAGeneral Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003, and briefing slides
entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to seniorWhite House officials; Briefing for
Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled,
"Briefingfor Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," and "DCIA Talking Points:
Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov.
6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."

Among otlier documents, see March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from

||^|

Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIACounterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
Among other documents, see CIA classifiedStatement for the Record, SenateSelect Committeeon Intelligence,
provided by General Michael V. Hayden, Director, Cential Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying
Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12,2007, entitled, "Hearing on Central
Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program."
See, for example, CIA "Questions and Proposed Answers" (related to the President's speech) 9/2/2006; Tab 2 of
CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy, September 6, 2006; and speech by President Bush on September 6,
2006.

CIA memorandum to"National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence,'^ubje^
"Effectiveness oftlie CIA Counterterrorist Inte^ogatioirrechni^
included in email from:
and

subject:

to:

on value

techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document datedMarch 4, 2005, entitled,"Briefing for
Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA TalkingPointsentitled, "Talking Points
for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Intenogation (HVDI) Techniques."
CIA briefingdocumentdated May 2,2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FORCHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT2
May 2006 Briefingfor Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Intenogation
Legal Group, DCI
Programs." March 2, 2005,Memorandum for Steve Bradbuiy from
CounterteiTorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation Techniques.

CIA memorandum to"National Security Advisor," from "Director ofCentral Intelligence,''Subie^
"Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterrorist InterrogatiornTechi^
included in email from:
subject:

to:

on value

techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM; CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for
Vice PresidentCheney: CIA Detention and Intenogation Program." CIA briefingdocument dated May 2, 2006,
entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the
President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention and Intenogation Programs."

See, for example, transcript. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
"Klialid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," authored by [REDACTED],
CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB; CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and
Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009," referenced
materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect

Banack [sic] Obama National Security Teanrruesday^^anuar^009^3^- 11:30 a.m."

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population was 'weak,' lackedresilience, and would be unable to 'do what was necessary."'"'^
These representations are not supported by internal CIA records.

While the CIA represented to multiple parties that KSM provided
little threat information or actionable intelligence prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques, CIA records indicate that KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques within "a few minutes" of first being questioned by CIA
interrogators.This material fact was omitted from CIA representations.
The CIA represented that the CIA overcame KSM's resistance to

interrogation by using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.CIA records do not
support this statement. To the contrary, there are multiple CIA records describing the
ineffectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in gaining KSM's cooperation.
On March 26, 2003, the day after the CIA last used its enhanced interrogation techniques on
KSM, KSM was described as likely lying and engaged in an effort "to renew a possible
resistance stance.On April 2, 2003, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism
(IICT) produced an assessment of KSM's intelligence entitled, "Precious Truths, Surrounded by
a Bodyguard of Lies." The assessment concluded that KSM was withholding information or
lying about terrorist plots and operatives targeting the United States.'--^ During and after the use
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA repeatedly expressed concern that KSM
was lying and withholding informationin the context of CBRN (Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear) programs,plotting against U.S. interests in Karachi, Pakistan,
plotting against Heathrow Airport,^^^^ Abu Issa al-Britani,^^^' as well as the "Second Wave"
plotting against the "tallest building in California," which prompted the CIA's ALEC Station to
note in a cable dated April 22, 2003, that it "remain[e]d concerned that KSM's progression
towards full debriefing status is not yet apparent where it counts most, in relation to threats to US
interests, especially inside CONUS."^^^^

1223

2,2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from

jj^H Legal Group, DCI

Counterterrorist Center re: Effectiveness of the CIACounterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
34491 (051400Z MAR 03)

CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject:

'|Effectivenes^ni^CI/^Coun^^

Interrogation Techniques," included in email from;
subject;

on value

techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. CIA document dated March 4, 2005,entitled, "Briefing for
Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program." CIA briefingdocument dated May 2, 2006,
entitled, "BRIEFING FOR CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefing for Chief of Staff to the
President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition,Detention and Interrogation Programs."

^••11026

(271034Z MAR 03)

1227 "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting - Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,"
Interagency IntelligentCommittee on Terrorism (IICT), April 3, 2003.

'228 DIRECTOrJ^H (121550Z JUN 03)
'229 alec ^^B(022012Z MAY 03)
1230 Memorandum for:

; from:

Action detainee branch; date: 12 June 2003.

'23' ALEC

(210159Z OCT 03); email from:
[REDACTED]; cc:

subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16,2003, at 5:25:13 PM.

'232 alec

(222153Z APR 03)
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repeatedly represented that the CIA's waterboard

interrogation technique was particularly effective in eliciting information from KSMJ~^^ This
representation is not supported by CIA records. Numerous CIA personnel, including members
of KSM's interrogation team, expressed their belief that the waterboard interrogation technique
was ineffective on KSM. The on-site medical officer told the inspector general that after three or

four days it became apparent that the waterboard was ineffective and that KSM "hatedi^ut
knew he could manage."^-^"^ KSM debriefer and Deputy Chiefof ALEC Station

BHH

inspector general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the

waterboard],and she relayed in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM...

using the Majid Khan stuff... and theemails^|Mri other words b^onfi^JJJjjJ^^SM with
information from other sources. ^B^^^|CTC Legal, iHHBHIIH, told the
inspector general that the waterboard "was of limited use on KSM."^^^^ A KSM interrogator told
the inspector general that KSM had "beat the system,and assessed that KSM responded to
"creature comforts and sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" approaches.The
interrogator later wrote in a Sametime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back"
despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, adding "I'm ostracized whenever

I suggest those two did not tell us everything. How dare I think KSM was holding back."'-'^® In
April 2003, ^^^^^|OMS told the inspector general that the waterboard had "not been very
effective on KSM." He also "questioned how the repeated use of the waterboard was

categorically different from 'beating the bottom of my feet,' orfrom torture in general."^^'^^
The CIA repeatedly represented that KSM had "recanted little of
the information" he had provided, and that KSM's information was "generally accurate" and

"consistent."^^'^^ This assertion is not supported by CIA records. Thi*oughout the period during
See, for example, SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency

Detention and Intenogatioi^rogri^^
'23'' Interview of

12, 2007 (SSCI #2007-3158).
by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May

15,2003.

'-3-'' Interview of

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3,

2003.

Sametime Communication,

and [REDACTED], 02/May/05, 14:51:48 to 15:17:39. The

"Majid Klian stuff refers to confronting KSM with the reporting of Majid Klian, then in foreign government
custody.

'237 Interview of

by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector

General, August 20^2003^^^^
'238 Interview of
22, 2003.
'239

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October

11715 (201047Z MAY 03)

^2'*') Sametime Communication,

and^H^^^H^5/Aug/06, 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. The

Sametime also includes die following statement from
"I thinlc it's a dangerous message to say we
could do almost the same without measures. Begs the question- then why did you use them before?"

'2^" Interview of•••••,

by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office ofthe Inspector General, April 11

and 13,2003.

'2''2 "Klialid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source On Al-Qa'ida," was authored by [REDACTED],
CTC/UBLD/AQPO/AQLB. CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and
InteiTogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDGCopy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009,"referenced
materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect

Barrack [sic] Obama National Security TeaiT^uesday^^anuar^009^^3^- 11:30 a.m."
TOP

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which KSM was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM provided
inaccurate information, much of which he would later acknowledge was fabricated and recant.
Specifically, KSM's fabrications andrecantations covered his activities immediately before his
capture,the identity of an individual whom he described as the protector of his children,^-"^
plotting against a U.S. aircraft carrier, a meeting with Abu Faraj al-Libi, and the location of

Hassan Ghul.^^"^^ KSM fabricated significant information, which he would later recant, related to
Jaffar al-Tayyar, stating that al-Tayyar and Jose Padilla were plotting together,linking al-

Tayyar to Heathrow Airport plotting'^"^^ and to Majid Khan's plotting,and producing what
CIA officials described as an "elaborate tale" linking al-Tayyar to an assassination plot against
former President Jimmy Carter.KSM later explained that "he had been forced to lie" about
al-Tayyar due to the pressure from CIA interrogators.KSM recanted other information about
the Heathrow Airport plotting, including information regarding the targeting,additional
operatives, and the tasking of prospective pilots to study at flight schools.KSM provided
significant information on Abu Issa al-Britani (Dhiren Barot) that he would later recant,

including linking Abu Issa al-Britani to Jaffaral-Tayyar and to the Heathrow Airport plot.'^''^
Under direct threat of additional waterboarding,'^^"^ KSM told CIA interrogators that he had sent
Abu Issa al-Britani to Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.In June 2003,
KSM stated he fabricated the story because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made

these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear."^-^^ KSM
also stated that he tasked Majid Khan with recruiting Muslims in the United States,which he

34513 (052246Z MAR 03);

[34569 (061722Z MAR 03);

139 (051956Z APR 03)

1281 (130801Z JUN 04); |

15712
[REDACTED],
[REDACTED]; subject: plannedrelease of [DETENTION SITE ORANGE] detainee Syed Habib; date:

10751 (102258Z MAR 03)JHH| 10762 (112020Z MAR 03), disseminated iis 1
23796 (121932Z AUG 04); §^>20873 (08163IZ MAR 04); B|||20873 (081631Z MAR 04);

DIRECTOR•• (101847Z MAY 04); DIRECTOR jjj^HaOlS^^M^04)
10740 (092308Z MAR03), disseminatedasBBHH^I;i^HH 10741 (100917Z MAR

03);j\LECMBi (120134Z MAR 03)

10883 (182127^1A^3), disseminated as
03), disseminated as

11717 (201722Z MAY

10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as

10894 (19I513Z MAR 03);^^^B 10902 (201037Z MAR 03)

10959 (231205Z MAR 03);

10950 (222127Z MAR 03)

10902 (201037Z MAR 03); HIH 10959 (231205Z MAR 03);

10950 (222127Z MAR

11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as P
10798 (131816Z MAR 03), disseminated as
; ALEC

I(192314Z MAY 03); •••

144201

11717 (201222Z MAY

12141 (27223IZ JUN

10778 (121549Z MAR 03), disseminated as

122939 (031541Z JUL 04);
describin

12141

JUN 03);

10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as

10828 (151310Z MAR 03), include^s part ofdisseminated intelligence
^arch 17, 2003, interrogation; HIIH! 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as
11717 (201722Z MAY 03), disseminated as
10941 (221506Z MAR 03);
10950 (222127Z MAR 03)

10942 (2216I0Z MAR 03), disseminated as

HHH 10948 (222101Z MAR

03), disseminated as
12095 (222049Z JUN 03)
10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as

nil 'ii ( III I

iii|i|

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would later recant.^-^^ On May 3, 2003, CIA officers recommended revisiting the information
KSM had provided "during earlier stages of his interrogation process," noting that "he has told us
that he said some things during this phase to get the enhanced measures to stop, therefore some
of this information may be suspect."

The CIA also repeatedly referred to a comment made by KSM
while he was still in Pakistani custody as indicating that KSM had information on an imminent

attack. In reports to the inspector general,the national security advisor,^and the
Department of Justice,^^^^ among others, the CIA represented that:
"When asked about future attacks planned against the United States, he coldly
replied 'Soon, you will know.' In fact, soon we did know - after we initiated
enhanced measures."^-^^

Contrary to CIA representations, CIA records indicate that KSM's comment was interpreted by
CIA officers with KSM at the time as meaning that KSM was seeking to use his future
cooperation as a "bargaining chip" with more senior CIA officers.
Finally, the CIA attributed to KSM, along with Abu Zubaydah, the
statement that "the general US population was 'weak,' lacked resilience, and would be unable to

'do what was necessary' to prevent the teiTorists from succeeding in their goals."^-^-^ There are
no CIA operational or interrogation records to support the representation that KSM or Abu
Zubaydah made these statements.

12558 (041938Z AUG 03); |

1258

|31148(171919Z DEC 05); I

31147 (171919Z DEC 05),

disseminated as|
1259

11437 (031551Z MAY 03). As detailed in Volumes II and III, KSM's claims tliat he fabricated

information appeared credible to CIA officers. Other intelligence collection supported these claims.
Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program"(2003-7123-IG);
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism
Detention and Intenogation Activities.

'2'"' CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject:

"Effectiveness ofthe CIA Countertenorist Intermgatioi^ech^
included in email from:
and iiiiigliiiiiiiiiiiggiii^ subject;
on value
techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM.
March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from

Legal Group, DCI

Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness of tlie CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.

Email from:

to:

cc: ••••,

[REDACTED], [REDACTED],

BHI^^Hi^H^ubject: re Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 9, 2004. Memorandum for:

Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Duectorfor Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG
Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: Febmary 27, 2004;
attachment: February24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and Intenogation
Activities.

41592 (051050ZMAR03);(^••^•41627(0^29Z^R03)

1265 March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradburyft^mJJ(HBBBi» iiH Legal Group, DCI
Countertenorist Center re: Effectiveness onh^CI^Countertenjorisnntm
111!

I (III I

Techniques.
I III! I III 11

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E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"
The CIA represented that the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques resulted in the collection of "a high volume of critical intelligence'-^^ on al-

Qa'ida."'^^^ The Committee evaluated the "high volume" ofintelligence collected by compiling
the total number of sole source and multi-source disseminated intelligence reports from the 119
known CIA detainees.

The CIA informed the Committee that its interrogation program
was successful in developing intelligence and suggested that all CIA detainees produced
disseminated intelligence reporting. For example, in September 2006, CIA Director Michael
Hayden provided the following testimony to the Committee:
Senator Bayh: "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the
[CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important
information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information
about al-Qa'ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence reports?"
Director Hayden: "Over 8000, sir."

Senator Bayh: "And yet this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals."

The "critical" description in thisCIA representation is addressed in the section of this summary concerning the
reported acquisition of actionable intelligence afterthe use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the
CIA represented as enabling the CIA to thwartterrorist plots and capture specific terrorists. See Volume II for
additional information.

Among other documents, see CIA Memorandum for the National Security Advisor (Rice) entitled,
"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," December 2004; CIA Memorandum to the

Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of theCIACountertenorist Interrogation Techniques," March 2,
2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention andInterrogation Program,"
March 4, 2005; CIA talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005
DCI MeetingPC: Effectiveness of the High-Value DetaineeInterrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March4,
2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Chief of Staff to the PresidentJosh Bolten: CIA Rendition,
Detention, and Interrogation Programs," dated May 2, 2006; CIA briefing document, entitled, "DCIA Talking
Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, witli the notation the document was "sent to

DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." Also included in additional briefingdocuments referencedand
described in this summary.

1268 \Yi^i|e

multi-source intelligence reports are included in the Committee Study, the quantitative analysis in

this summary is basedon sole-source intelligence reporting, as thesereports best reflectreporting from CIA
detainees. Multi-source intelligence reports are reports that contain data from multiple detainees. As described
above, a common multi-source report would result from the CIA showing a picture of an individual to all CIA
detainees at a specific CIA detention site. A report would be produced regardless if detainees were or were not able
to identify or provide information on the individual. As a specific example, see HEADQUARTERS
(202255Z JUN 06), which states that from January 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006, information from Hambali was "used

in thedissemination of three intelligence reports, two of which were non-recognitions of Guantanamo Bay
detainees," wliile the third "detailed [Hambali's] statement thathe knew of no threats or plots to attack any world
sporting events." Sole-source reports, by contrast, are based on specific information provided by oneCIAdetainee.
Page 216 of 499
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Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, all 96."''^^

(^F8yvm^m^H^NF) In April 2007, CIA Director Hayden testified that the CIA's
interrogation program existed "for one purpose - intelligence," and that it is "the most successful
program being conducted by American intelligence today" for "preventing attacks, disabling al-

Qa'ida."^^^*^ At this hearing DirectorHayden again suggested that the CIA interrogation program
was successful in obtaining intelligence from all CIA detainees.^^^^ A transcript of thatheaiing
included the following exchange:

Senator Snowe; "General Hayden. Of the 8000 intelligence reports that were
provided, as you said, by 30 of the detainees."

Director Hayden: "By all 97, ma'am."'^^^
suggestion that all CIA detainees provided information that
resulted in intelligence reporting is not supported by CIA records. CIA records reveal that 34
percent of the 119 known CIA detainees produced no intelligencereports, and nearly 70 percent
produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA
records, subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, nearly 20 percent produced
no intelligence reports, while 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. While the
CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program did produce significant amounts of disseminated
intelligence reporting (5,874 sole-source intelligence reports), this reporting was overwhelmingly
derived from a small subset of CIA detainees. For example, of the 119 CIA detainees identified
in the Study, 89 percent of all disseminated intelligence reporting was derived from 25 CIA
detainees. Five CIA detainees produced more than 40 percent of all intelligence reporting from
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA records indicate that two of the five
detainees were not subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.
F. The Eight Primaiy CIA Effectiveness Representations—the Use of the CIA's Enhanced
InteiTOgation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture
Additional Terrorists"

From 2003 through 2009,'^^"^ the CIA consistently and repeatedly
represented that its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective and necessary to produce

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central
Intelligence Agency Detention, Intenogation and Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (SSCl #2007-1336). At
the time this statement was made tliere had been at least 118 CIA detainees.

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Intenogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-3158).
See detainee intelligence reporting data in Volume 11.
'2^'' The CIA represented in 2002 that the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques were necessary and effective.

The Committee analysis focuses on CIA representation^etweei^OO^n^O^, during which time the CIA
loi' ||M iiii I

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critical intelligence that "enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists,
and collect a high-volume of critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida." The CIA further stated that the

information acquired as a result of the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques could
not have been acquired by the U.S. government in any other way ("otherwise unavailable").
provided specific examples of counterterrorism "successes" tlie CIA attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.

See list of 20 CIA representations included in this summary. From2003 through 2009, the CIA's
representations regarding theeffectiveness of theCIA's enhanced interrogation techniques included a specific setof
examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terroristscaptured that the CIA attributed to information obtained from

the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA representations further asserted thatthe intelligence obtained
from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, andresulted in
"savedlives." Among otherCIA representations, sec. (1) CIA representations in theDepartment of Justice Office

of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005, which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations
on the typeof intelligence acquired from theuseof the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques to assess their
legality. TheCIA representations referenced by the OLC include that the use of theCIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical," "vital," and"otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" thatwas
"essential" for the U.S. government to "detect and dismpt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states
that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for
preventing a subsequent attack within the United States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy

General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United StatesObligations Under Article 16of
the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al
Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum
dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the useof
theCIA's enhanced interrogation tecliniques. Citing CIA documents andthe President's September 6, 2006, speech
describing the CIA's interrogation program (which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC
memorandum states: "The CIA intenogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation
techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security of the Nation] byproducing substantial quantities
of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us
information about terroristplans we could not get anywhere else, the program has saved innocent lives.'" {See
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War

Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used by the CIA in theInterrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for
membersof the National Security Council in July and September 2003 representedthat "the use of Enhanced
Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence information that had, in the view of CIA

professionals, saved lives,"and warned policymakers that "[t]ermination of this program will result in loss of life,
possibly extensive." {See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record fromScott Muller, Subject: Review of
Interrogation Program on 29July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003; September 4,
2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the
Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) TheCIA's response to the Office of Inspector
General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts: "Information [the CIA] received... as a result of
the lawful use of enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has almost certainly saved countless American lives

inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to thefact that without theuseof such techniques,
we and our allies would [have] sufferedmajorterrorist attacks involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties."
{See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S)
Comments to Draft IG SpecialReview, "Counterterrorism Dietention and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG;
date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism

Detention andInteiTogation Activities.) (5)CIA briefing documents for CIA Director Leon Panetta in February
2009, which statethat the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked andthe [enhanced interrogation] techniques
were effective in producing foreign intelligence," andthat"[m]ost, if notall, of the timely intelligence acquired
from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other means." {See CIA briefing

documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tal^^CI^Briefin^nRDIProOTan^ 18FEB.2009" and graphic
Kii

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The CIA also represented tliat the best measure of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques was examples of specific terrorist plots "thwarted" and specific
terrorists captured as a result of the use of the CIA's techniques.
For example, in a December 2004 CIA memorandum prepared for
the national security advisor, the CIA wrote that there was "no way to conduct" an

"independent study of the foreign intelligence efficacy of using enhanced interrogation
techniques," but stated, "[t]he CentralIntelligence Agency can advise you that this program
works and the techniques are effective in producing foreign intelligence." To illustrate the
effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques, the CIA provided 11 examples of "[k]ey
intelligence collected from HVD interrogations after applying inten'ogation techniques," nine of
which referenced specific ten'orist plots or the capture of specific terrorists.Similarly, under
the heading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," a CIA briefing prepared for President Bush
in November 2007 states, "reporting statistics alone will not provide a fair and accurate measure
of the effectiveness of EITs." Instead, the CIA provided eight "examples of key intelligence
collected from CIA detainee inteiTogations after applying the waterboard along with other

interrogation techniques," seven of which referenced specific terrorist plots or the capture of
specific ten-orists.^^^^
The Committee selected 20 CIA documents that include CIA

representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques from
2003 through 2009. The 20 CIA documents, which were consistent with a broader set of CIA
representations made during this period, include materials the CIA prepared for the White
attaclunent, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid Shaykli Muhaminad (KSM),"
including "DCIA Briefing on RDIProgiam" agenda, CIA document "EITs andEffectiveness," with associated
documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence
Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots
Disrupted.") (6) CIAdocument faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 18, 2009, entitled,
"[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committeedatabases at DTS#2009-1258, which provides a list of
"some of the key capturesand dismptedplots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of tlie timely intelligence acquired from
detainees in this program would not have beendiscovered or reported by any otiier means." See Volume II for
additional CIA representations asserting that tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the CIA to obtain
unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."

Italics in original document. SeeCIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Directorof Central

Intelligence," Subject: "Effectiveness ofthe CIA Counterterron^nterro^^

from: iHUHIi'

||||||||||||^gm||||||m^

included in email

|||||||||m||||||||||||m_ subject:

on

value of interrogation techniques"; date: December 6,2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The emailreferences the attached
"information paperto Dr. Rice explaining the value of tiie interrogation techniques." The document includes the
following: Tlie "Karachi Plot," "TheHeatlirow Plot," Tlie "Second Wave," "TheGuraba Cell," "Issa al-Hindi,"
"Abu Talha al-Pakistani," "Hambali's Capture,""Jafaar al-Tayyar," "Dirty BombPlot," "Shoe Bomber," and
"Shkai, Pakistan."

See CIA documententitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboaid 06 November 2007," dated November6, 2007,
with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." The document

states, under theheading, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," that "reporting statistics alone will not provide a
fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs," and then provides a list of "examples of key intelligence
collected from CIA detainee inteiTOgations after applying the waterboard along with other intenogation

techniques...The 'Second Wave'...Hambali's Capture...The Guraba Cell...Shoe Bomber...Issa al-Hindi...Jafaar

al-Tayyar... The Karachi Plot...The H e a t h r o ^
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House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, the CIA Office of Inspector General, as well as
incoming members of President Obama's national security team, and the public. The Committee
selected the following 20 CIA documents:

1. July and September 2003: CIA Briefing Documents Seeking Policy Reaffirmation of the
CIA InteiTogation Program from White House Officials, "Review of Interrogation
Program."i278
2. Febmary 2004: The CIA's Response to the Draft Inspector General Special Review, CIA
"Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation
Program,'" and attachment, "Successes of CIA's CounterteiTorism Detention and

Interrogation Activities."^^^^
3. July 2004: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent
Source on Al-Qa'ida."'-^"

4. December 2004: CIA Memorandum for the President's National Security Advisor,
"Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques.
5. March 2005: CIA Memorandum for the Office of Legal Counsel, "Effectiveness of the
CIA CounterteiTorist Interrogation Techniques."

6. March 2005: CIA "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation
Program.
CIA memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003,"prepared by CIA
General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program,'''' dated
July 29, 2003, presented to seniorWhite Houseofficials. Additional briefings are detailed in September 4, 2003,
CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the
Record from Scott Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.

CIA memorandum to the CIAInspector General from JamesPavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations,
dated February 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and
Interrogation Activities," dated February 24,2004.

CIA Directorate ofIntelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad^reeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13,

2004; fax to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled,

Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah.|H "

This report was widely disseminated in theIntelligence Community, and a copy of this report was provided to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence onJuly 15,2004. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney
requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released witli redactions on
August 24,2009.

CIA memorandum to "National Security Advisor," from "Director of Central Intelligence," Subject:

"Effectivenes^^l^CI^Coun^
Inte^ogationTech^
included in email from:
HmHI'
subject:
on value

to:

techniques"; date: December 6, 2004, at 5:06:38 PM. The email references the attached "information paper to Dr.

Rice explaining the value of the interrogation techniques."

CI^Memorandi^ fo^teve Bradbury at Office ofLegal Counsel, Department ofJustice, dated March 2, 2005,
from
HI Lcgtil Group, DCI Countertenorist Center, subject: "Effectiveness ofthe CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."

CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney:
CIA Detention and Interrogation Program."

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7. March 2005: CIA Talking Points for the National Security Council, "Effectiveness of the

High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques."'^^"^
8. April 2005: CIA "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" provided to the
Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques.

9. April 2005: CIA "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah" and additional CIA documents
provided to the Department of Justice for the OLC's assessment of the legality of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.

10. June 2005: CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War

Against Al-Qa'ida."''^"^
11. December 2005: CIA Document entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterten'orist Detention

and Interrogation Program," with the attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee
Program to CT Operations and Analysis," from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen
Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances Townsend,
Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John
Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence.

12. May 2006: CIA Briefing for the President's Chief of Staff, "CIA Rendition, Detention
and Interrogation Programs," on the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.

'284 CIA Talking Points entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the HighValue Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques."

CIA "Briefing Notes on tlieValue of DetaineeReporting" faxed from the CIA to the Departmentof Justice on
April 15, 2005, at 10:47AM.

CIA fax to DOJ Command Center, dated Apri^2,2005, for
Office of Legal Coui^l, U.S.
Depaitment ofJustice, from HHHHI'
Legal Group, DCI Counteilerrorist Center, re: H|, Materials
of KSM and Abu Zubaydah, included CIA Intelligence Assessment "Khalid Shaykli Muhammad: Preeminent
Source on Al-Qa'ida," and CIA document, "Materials of KSM and Abu Zubaydah."

CIA Intelligence Assessment, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War Against Al-Qa'ida," June 2005, which
CIA records indicate was provided to White House officials on June 1, 2005. The Intelligence Assessment at the
SECRET//NOFORN classification level was more broadly disseminated on June 3, 2005. On Maich 31, 2009,
former Vice PresidentCheney requestedthe declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly
released with redactions on August 24, 2009.
CIA memorandum entitled, "Future of CIA's Counterterrorist Detention and Intenogation Program," dated
December 23, 2005, from CIA Director Porter Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National

Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, Ambassador John
D. Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, Attachment, "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to
CT Operations and Analysis."

CIA briefing documentdated May 2, 2006, entitled, "BRIEFING FORCHIEF OF STAFF TO THE
PRESIDENT 2 May 2006 Briefingfor Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detentionand
Interrogation Programs."
Mil

MUM

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13. July 2006: CIA Memorandum for the Director of National Intelligence, "Detainee
Intelligence Value Update."

14. September 2006: CIA documents supporting the President's September 6, 2006, speech,
including representations on the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program,
including: "DRAFT Potential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist
Interrogations Program," "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," and
"Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program." ^^^^
15. April 2007: CIA Director Michael Hayden's Testimony to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence describing the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation program.

16. October 2007: CIA Talking Points for the Senate Appropriations Committee, addressing
the effectiveness of theCIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, entitled, "Talking

Points Appeal ofthe SHI Million Reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention
Program.'"-^^
17. November 2007: CIA Director Talking Points for the President, entitled, "Waterboard 06
November 2007," on the effectiveness of the CIA's waterboard interrogation
technique.

18. January 2009: CIA Briefing for President-elect Obama's National Security Transition
Team on the value of the CIA's "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)."^"^^
19. February 2009: CIA Briefing for CIA Director Leon Panetta on the effectiveness of the

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009," "Key Intelhgence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," "EITs and Effectiveness," "Key Intelligence Impacts
Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart:

CIA briefing document entitled, "DetaineeIntelligence Value Update,"dated 11 July 2006, internal document
saved within CIA records as, "DNI Memo Intel Value July 11 2006...TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING."
CIA documentdated July 16, 2006, entitled, "DRAFTPotential Public Briefing of CIA's High-Value Terrorist

Interrogations Program," and "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6,
2006,speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation
Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the
High Value Terrorist Detainee Program."

CIA classified Statementfor the Record, Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, provided by General Michael
V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 12 April 2007; and accompanying Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence heating transcript for April 12,2007, entitled,"Hearingon Central Intelligence Agency Detention and
Interrogation Program."

CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committeeon Appropriations, Subcommittee on

Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "T^ng points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM. Document faxed
entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of tlie

Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and Detention Program."

1294 "dcia Talking Points: Waterboard06 November2007," dated November 6, 2007 with tlie notation the
document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."

CIA Briefing for Obama National Security Team- "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including

"Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RD^rogran^^an^OOQ/^repared "13 January 2009."

mi ii ( III IiiBg[([m[[||^Bi(i|iinii()ii|i|
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Attachment," and "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted," among other CIA
documents.

20. March 2009: CIA Memorandum for the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, including representations on the "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained

from HVDs in the RDI Program."^^^^
From the 20 CIA documents, the Conmiittee identified the CIA's

eight most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists that the CIA
attributed to information acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques:

Eight Most Frequently CitedExamples ofPlots*'Thwarted*^
and Terrorists Captured Providedby the CIA as Evidencefor
the Effectiveness ofthe CWs Enhanced Interrogation
Techniques
1
2

3
4

5

6
7

8

The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and
the Capture of Jose Padilla
The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots

The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery
of the al-Ghuraba Group

The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot
and die Capture of Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi
The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of lyman Paris
The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat

The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf
Plotting
The Capture of Hambali

Referenced X Nutnber

ofTimes in the 20 CIA
Documents
17/20
17/20
18/20

17/20
7/20
17/20
20/20

18/20

The Confmiittee sought to confirm that the CIA's representations
about the most frequently cited examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists were
consistent with the more than six million pages of CIA detention and inteiTogation records
provided to the Committee. Specifically, the Committee assessed whether the CIA's
representations that its enhanced interrogation techniques produced unique, otherwise

unavailable intelligence^

that led to the capture of specific ten'orists and the "thwarting" of

CIA briefingdocuments for Leon Panetta,entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDl Program- 18FEB.2009" and
graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
(KSM)," Includes "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "ElTs and Effectiveness," with
associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key
Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references,"to include "Background on Key Captures and
Plots Disrupted."
CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Mai'ch 18, 2009, at 3:46 PM, entitled,

"[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," which includes "Key Captures and Disrupted Plots Gained From HVDs in the RDI
Program" (DTS #2009-1258).

1298 piom 2003 tlirough 2009, the CIA's representations regarding tlie effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of teiTorist plots "disrupted" and tenorists captured that

the CIA attributed to information obtained fronUh^is^nt^nhance^nte^og^ation techniques. CIA
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representations further asserted that the intelhgence obtainedfrom the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations,see:
(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of highly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess their legality. Tlie CIA representations referenced by the

OLC include tliat the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critic^,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionableintelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
and disnipt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum further states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within the United
States." (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA

representations on the type of intelligence acquiredfrom the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program
(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As tlie President

explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3

of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by tlie CIA in the Intenogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the viewof CIA professionals, saved lives," and warnedpolicymakers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Inteirogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) Tlie
CIA's response to the Office of Inspector General draft Special Review of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [the CIA] received... as a result of the lawful use of enhanced inteirogation techniques ('ElTs') has
almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to
the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in February 2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and tliat "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by other
means." (See CIA briefing documentsfor Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258,
which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence

acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."

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specific plots were accurate.The Committee found the CIA's representations to be
inaccurate and unsupported by CIA records.
Below are the summaries of the CIA's eight most frequendy cited
examples of "thwarted" plots and captured terrorists, as well as a description of the CIA's claims
and an explanation for why the CIA representations were inaccurate and unsupported by CIA
records.

1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture ofJose Padilla
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced inten'ogation
techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disaipt terrorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period
of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated with, and the capture of,
Jose Padilla, as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
These CIA representations were inaccurate. The CIA first received reporting on the terrorist
threat posed by Jose Padilla from a foreign government. Eight days later, Abu Zubaydah
provided information on the terrorist plotting of two individuals, whom he did not identify by
ti-ue name, to FBI special agents. Abu Zubaydah provided this information in April 2002, prior
to the commencement of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002. The plots
associated with Jose Padilla were assessed by the Intelligence Community to be infeasible.

'299 xlye dy\ has representedthat it has provided the SenateSelectCommittee on Intelligence with all CIA records

related to tlie CIA'sDetention and Intenogalion Program. This document production phase lasted more than three
years and was completed in July 2012. The records produced include more than six million pages of material,
including records detailing the interrogation of detainees, as well as the disseminated intelligence derived from the
interrogation of CIA detainees. The CIA did not provide—nor was it requested to provide—intelligence records that
were unrelated to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. In other words, this Study was completed without
direct access to reporting from CIA HUMINT assets, foreign liaison assets, electronic intercepts, military detainee
debriefings, law enforcement deri ved information, and otlier methods of intelligence collection. Insomuch as this
material is included in the analysis herein, it was provided by the CIA witliin the context of documents directly
related to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. For example, a requirements cable from CIA Headquarters
to CIA interrogators at a CIA detention site could cite SIGNALS intelligence collected by NSA, or include a CIA
HUMINT source report on a particulai- subject, with a request to question tlie CIA detainee about the reporting.
While direct access to the NSA report, or the CIA HUMINT report, may not have been provided, it may still be
included in this Study because it appeared in the CIA Headquarters requirements cable relating to the questioning of
a CIA detainee. As such, there is likely significant intelligence related to die terrorist plots, terrorists captured, and
other intelligence matters examined in diis report, that is unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
and within the databases of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but which has not been identified or reviewed by the
Select Committee on Intelligence for this Study. As is detailed in the near 6800-page Committee Study, the
Committee found that there was significant intelligence in CIA databases to enable the capture of the terrorists cited,
and "disrupt" the terrorist plots represented as "tliwarted," without intelligence from the CIA intenogation program.
Had tlie Committee been provided with access to all intelligence available in CIA and Intelligence Community
databases, it is likely this finding would be strengthened further. Finally, as of March 2014, the White House had
not yet provided approximately 9,400 documents related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program—
equivalent to less than .2 percent of CIA detention and interrogation records—pending an Executive Privilege
determination. Tlie Committee requested access to tliese documents in tluee letters dated January 3, 2013, May 22,
2013, and December 19, 2013. The White House did not respond to tlie requests.

See Volume II for additional informationandanalysi^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Further Details: The Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings plotting refers to
terrorist plotting involving U.S. citizen Jose Padilla. Padilla and his associate, Binyam
Mohammed, conceived the "Dirty Bomb Plot" after locating information, derived from what the
CIA described as "a satirical internet article" entitled "How to Make an H-bomb," on a computer
at a Pakistani safe house in early 2002.^^®^ The article instructed would-be bomb makers to
enrich uranium by placing it "in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and swinging it around
your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes.Padilla and Mohammed approached Abu
Zubaydah in early 2002, and later KSM, with their idea to build and use this device in the United

States.Neither Abu Zubaydah nor KSM believed the plan was viable,'^^'^ but KSM provided
funding for, and tasked Padilla to conduct, an operation using natural gas to create explosions in

tall buildings in the United States,^^^^ later known as the "Tall Buildings Plot."'^®^
1301

10090 (210703Z APR 02) and CIA Document, Subject: "CIA Statement Summarizing Significant

Infonnation About Jose Padilla (21:10 hrs.- 8 June 02}." For more information on the Internet article that
recommended enriching uranium by "putting it into a bucket and twisting it around one's head to enrich it," see

2Jow to Make an H-Bomb" and [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04). See also email from: [REDACTED],
I^^BoTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including
subject: "Re:
[REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's
CBRN group's position on Padilla and Mohammed's plotting. According to the email: "Padilla and
Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a
1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results article. The article was intended to be humorous and included instructions

such as enriching uranium by placing liquid uranium hexaflouride in a bucket, attaching it to a six foot rope, and
swinging it around your head as fast as possible for 45 minutes. While it appears that Padilla and Zouaoui took the
article seriously, Zubaydah recommended that they take their (cockamamie) ideas to (I believe) KSM in Karachi. It
was at that point that KSM told them to focus on bringing down apartment buildings with explosives, (in other
words: keep your day iobs)." U.K. courts noted "that

Email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject: "Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium
Device' Information"; date: April 23,2002, at 08:25:40 PM. The email states, "CIA and Lawrence Livermore

National Lab have assessed that the article is filled with countless technical inaccuracies which would likely result in
the deatli of anyone attempting to follow the instructions, and would definitely not result in a nuclear explosive
device." See also [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04).

'303

10090 (210703Z APR 02)

'30^ CIA^^^B (290925Z APR 02);

11086 (261140Z APR 02). See also Padilla statement noting Abu

Zubaydah "chuckled at the idea," but sent Padilla and Muhammad to Karachi to present the idea to KSM. See fax
from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice NationalSecurity Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15,
2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla."

DIRECTOR ••

(041637Z). See also CIA ••

(290925Z APR 02); |||^Bi| 10091 (210959Z APR

02); [REDACTED] 2281 (071658Z MAY 04); and DIRECTOR

(J 01725Z MAR 04).

For additional background on the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plotting, see fax from Pat Rowan, Department of
Justice National Security Division, to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose
Padilla." The document states: "Jose Padilla is a United States citizen who has been designatedas an enemy
combatant by the President and has been detainedby the military since June 9, 2002. Padilla is commonly known as
\e 'dirty bomber' because early intelligence from a senior al Qaeda detainee [Abu Zubaydah] and Padilla's

intended accomplice [Binyam Muhammad] indicated that he had proposed to senior al Qaeda leaders the use of a
radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb,' against United States targets, or interests, and he was detained by the
military partly on that basis. Based on later and more complete intelligence, including Padilla's own statements
/ during military detention, it now appears that Padilla re-entered the United States after he accepted a mission from al
Qaeda leaders, specifically from Klialid SheikhMohammad ('KSM'), the emir of the attacks of September11, to
destroy one or more high-rise apartment buildings in the United States tlirough the use of natural gas explosions
triggered by timing devices, and had received training, equipment and money for that mission." See also other
records that describe the plotting as targeting tall apartment buildings, without reference to a radiological or "dirty"

bomb. For example, aJuly 15, 2004, CIA intelligenc^eporUitle^
liiv si'(

Muhammad: Preeminent
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The capture of, and the thwarting of terrorist plotting associated
with Jose Padilla, is one of the eight most frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as
evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Over a period of

years, CIA documents prepared for and provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials,
and the Department of Justice represent the identification and/or the capture of Jose Padilla,
and/or the disruption of the "Dirty Bomb," and/or the "Tall Buildings" plotting, as examples of
how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD inteiTogations after applying interrogation
techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and "capaire additional terrorists."
The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives,
Source on Al-Qa'ida," noted: "From late 2001 until early 2003, KSM also conceived several low-level plots,

including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qa'ida operative and US citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise
apartment buildings in an unspecified majorUS city." Similarly, an Intelligence Community report titled, "Klialid
Shaykli Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, SuiTounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," noted: "Binyam
Muhammad stated during his debriefmgs that his and Padilla's objective was to topple a high-rise building with a
gas explosion in Chicago." (See Community CounterteiTorism Board, IntelligenceCommunity Terrorist Tlireat
Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's Threat Reporting—Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of
Lies," Report Number IICT-2003-14, April 3, 2003.) The unclassified ODNI "Summary of the High Value
TeiTorist Detainee Program," released September 6, 2006, states that, "[wjorking with information from detainees,
the US dismpted a plot to blow up tall buildings in the United States. KSM later described how he had directed
operatives to ensure the buildings were high enough to prevent the people trapped above from escaping out of the
windows, thus ensuring their deaths from smoke inhalation."
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA
Counterterrorist Interrogation Tecliniques," from March 2, 2005. See also CIA talking points for National Security
Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of tlie High-Value Detainee
Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005, as well as multiple otlier CIA briefing records and
memoranda described in Volume II.

1308 Prom 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
intenogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA

representations further asserted that the intelligence obtained from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among other CIA representations, see:
(1) CIA representations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which relied on a series of liighly specific CIA representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of
the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques to assess their legality. The CIA representations referenced by tlie
OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary" to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "othei*wiseunavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential" for the U.S. government to "detect
and disrupt" tenorist threats. The OLC memorandum furtlier states that "[the CIA] ha[s] informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventing a subsequent attack within tlie United
States." {See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelhgence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing the CIA's interrogation program
(which was based on CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in particular, its use of enhanced intenogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. ...As the President
explained [on September 6, 2006], 'by giving us information about tenorist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the program has saved innocent lives.'" (See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
loi

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Por example, a document prepared for Vice President Cheney in
advance of a March 8, 2005, National Security Council principals meeting states, under a section
entitled "INTERROGATION RESULTS," that:

"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist
plots...

.. .Dirty Bomb Plot: Operatives Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammed planned
to build and detonate a 'dirty bomb' in the Washington DC area. Plot

disrupted. Source: Abu Zubaydah."^^^^
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3

of the GenevaConventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al Qaeda Detainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or another had produced significant intelligence
information that had, in the viewof CIA professionals, saved lives," and warnedpolicymakers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." {SeeAugust 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from
Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation
Program,July 29, 2003; September4, 2003, CIA Memorandum for the Record, Subject: MemberBriefing; and
September26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Office of InspectorGeneral draft Special Reviewof the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [tlieCIA] received... as a resultof the lawful use of enhancedinterrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidencepoints cleariy to
the fact that without the use of such techniques, we and our allies would [have] suffered major terroristattacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." {See Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Countertenorism Detention
and Intenogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefingdocuments for CIA
Director Leon Panetta in Febmary2009, which state that the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced intenogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program would not have beendiscovered or reported by other
means." {See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)," including"DCIA Briefingon RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on KeyIntelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIAdocument faxed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258,
which provides a list of "some of the key captures and disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the

CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquired from detainees in this program would not have been discovered or reported by any other means." See
VolumeII for additional CIA representations asserting that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
CIA document dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and
Interrogation Program." Tlie briefing document further represented that: (1) "Prior to the use of enhanced measures
against skilled resistors [sic] like KSM and Abu Zubaydah- the two most prolific intelligence producers in our
control- we acquired little threat information or significant actionable intelligence"; and (2) "[CIA] would not have
succeeded in overcoming the resistance of KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and other equally resistant HVDs without the

application of EITs."

\
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Likewise, the July 20, 2007, Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) memorandum on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques used CIAprovided information on Jose Padilla to describe the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and the success of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to date. The July 20, 2007, OLC memorandum
states:

"The CIA interrogation program—and, in particular, its use of enhanced
interrogation techniques—is intended to serve this paramount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable
intelligence. The CIA believes that this program 'has been a key reason why
al-Qa'ida has failed to launch a spectacular attack in the West since 11
September 2001'... We understand that use of enhanced techniques has
produced significant intelligence that the Government has used to keep the
Nation safe. As the President explained [in his September 6, 2006 speech], 'by
giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, the
program has saved innocent lives'.. .For example, we understand that enhanced
interrogation techniques proved particularly crucial in the interrogations of
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Zubaydah... Interrogations of
Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two

al-Qaeda operatives already in the United States^^^'^ andplanning to destroy a
high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological bomb in
Washington,

On April 21, 2009, a CIA spokesperson confirmed the accuracy of the information in the OLC
memorandum in response to the partial declassification of this and other memoranda.
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
thwarting of the Dirty Bomb plotting, the thwarting of the Tall Buildings plotting, and/or the
capture of Jose Padilla in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the Department

of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^^^

Italics added. CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided information on "two operatives already
in the United States." While neither Binyam Muhammad nor Jose Padilla was "already in the United States," the
OLC description appears to be a reference to Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, as the OLC then makes
reference to the "Dirty Bomb" and "Tall Buildings" plotting.
Italics added. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from

Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re:
Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the InteiTogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
See "Waterboarding Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response asserts
that it "took [the CIA] until 2007 to consistently stop referring to [Padilla's] 'Dirty Bomb' plot—a plan [the CIA]
concluded early on was never operationally viable." As noted, the CIA continued to refer to the "Dirty Bomb"
plotting through 2007 and confimied tlie information publicly in 2009.
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 tlirough 2009 with representations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in
Volume II.

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^ review of CIA operational cables and other CIA records found

that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques played no role in the identification of
"Jose Padilla" or the thwarting of the Dirty Bomb or Tall Buildings plotting. CIA records
indicate that: (1) there was significant intelligence in CIA databases acquired prior to—and
independently of—the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to fully identify Jose Padilla
as a terrorist threat and to disrupt any terrorist plotting associated with him;^^^"^ (2) Abu
Zubaydah provided information on the terroristplotting of two individuals who proposed an idea
to conduct a "Dirty Bomb" attack, but did not identify their true names; (3) Abu Zubaydah
provided this information to FBI specialagents who were using rapport-building techniques,
in April 2002, more than three months prior to the CIA's "use of DOJ-approved enhanced

See. for example,

CIA documententitled, "CIA Statement Summarizing

Sign^ant Information About Jose Padilla {21:10 hrs.- 8June 02}";

•IH (231837Z APR 02); and

10972 (12031Z APR 02); ALEC

10976 (120948Z APR 02); among other records.

Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn A1 Abideen Abu

Zabaidah" and provide^^h^en^e Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS#
2010-2939). See also
10092 (211031Z APR02). WhileAbuZubaydah was subjected to sleep
deprivation and nudity prior to this date by the CIA, he had been allowedto sleep shortly prior to being questioned
on this matter by the FBI special agents, who were exclusively usingrapport-building interrogation techniques when
the information was acquired from Abu Zubaydah (who was covered with a towel). The sleep deprivation and
nudity as implementedduring this period differedfrom how sleep deprivation and nudity were implemented after
the CIA developed, and the Department of Justiceapproved, the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques"in
August2002. Rather than being placedin a stress position during sleepdeprivation, Abu Zubaydahwas kept awake
by being questioned nearly non-stop by CIA and FBI interrogators. Records further indicate that during breaks in

the interrogations, Abu Zubaydah was allowed to briefly sleep. See also I^HHI 10116 (25073IZ APR 02),
which describes this sleep deprivation as a period of "no sustainedsleep" with "cat naps between interrogators."
The cable further states: "Like many medical students, the subject appears to handle 76 plus hours of limitedsleep
with few problems" (italicsadded). The use of nudity during this period also differedfrom future uses of nudity, as
Abu Zubaydahwas covered when interrogated by tlie FBI. See also SSCI Staff interview of FBI Special Agent Ali
Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (transcript at DTS #2008-2411). Ali Soufan
described events prior to Abu Zubaydah's provision of information related to the "Dirty Bomb," stating: "He was
injured, badly injured. He was dehydrated. I remember we were puttingice on his lips. And he didn't have any
bowel control, so we were cleaninghim. And the reason I'm telling you some of these disgusting things is because
it helped build rapport with the guy in this short period of time." Later, Ali Soufan described the provision of

information related tothe Dirty Bomb plotting, statingjJ'When I was going in, he was totally naked. I refused to go

and interview him naked. So I took atowel. And H

I and [REDACTED], every time we went in he had to

be covered or I [wouldn't] go. It's as simple as that." See also section of transcript stating, "So we went back. And
we start talking to him. We took someCoke, tea, and we start talking about different things. We flipped him about
differentthings,
and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came back to his senses and he started cooperating
again. And this is when he gave us Padilla." (Abu Zubaydah provided information concerningthe Dirty Bomb
plotting and Jose Padilla's kimya, but did not provide the name "Jose Padilla." As described in this summary, Jose
Padilla's name had already been provided to the CIA by a foreign government that identified Padilla as a U.S.
citizen suspected of being engaged in possible terrorist activity.) See also Abu Zubaydah detainee review in
Volume III.

III!

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interrogation techniques";^and (4) the Intelligence Community internally assessed that the
"Dirty Bomb"^^^^ and "TallBuildings"'^^^ plots were infeasible as envisioned.
Ti;ie Department of Justice finalized its approval of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, including
walling, facial slaps, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the waterboard, as well as other
techniques, on August 1, 2002. See VolumeI and Volume HI for additional details. Beginning on August 4, 2002,
and extending through August 20, 2002, Abu Zubaydah was subjectedto the non-stop concurrent use of the CIA's
enhanced intenogation techniques, including at least 83 applications of the waterboard. CIA records indicate that
tlie use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques ceased on August 30, 2002, when Abu Zubaydah received
clothing.

See intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include: (1) email from: [REDACTED]^^^^
^BBOTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including
subject: "Re:
[REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's
CBRN group's positionon Padillaand Mohammed'splotting; "Padillaand Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article
off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results
article. Tlie article was intended to be humorous..."; (2) email from: [REDACTED], CTC/OTA/CBRNB; subject:

"Note to Briefers Updating Zubaydah 'Uranium Device' Information"; date: April 23, 2003, at 08:25:40 PM; and
(3) U.K. court records relaying that "[Binyam Mohammed] at the outset said tliere was no Dirty Bomb plot (a
position he has consistently maintained to his defense lawyers)" (UKJudgment, at 39). According to U.K. legal
records, "[Binyam Mohammed] said ... that he had seen a file on a computer in Lahore and decided it was a joke part of the instruction included adding bleach to uranium 238 in a bucket and rotating it around one's head for 45
minutes." (UK Judgment, at 11). On June 10, 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced, "We have
captured a known terrorist who was exploring a plan to build and explode a radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty
bomb,' in the United States." The statement continued: "In apprehending A1 Muhajii* as he sought entry into the
United States, we have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive
'dirty bomb.' Now, a radioactive 'dirty bomb' involves exploding a conventional bomb that not only kills victims in
tlie immediate vicinity, but also spreads radioactive material that is highly toxic to humans and can cause mass death
and injury. From information available to the United States government, we know tliat Abdullah A1 Muhajir is an
A1 Qaeda operative and was exploring a plan to build and explode a radioactive dirty bomb. Let me be clear: We
know from multiple independent and coiToborating sources that Abdullah A1 Muhajir was closely associated with A1
Qaeda and that as an A1 Qaeda operative he was involved in planning future terrorist attacks on innocent American
civilians in the United States. .. .1 commend the FBI, the CIA and other agencies involved in capturing Abdullah A1
Muhajir before he could act on his deadly plan." See Transcript of the Attomey General John Ashcroft Regarding
the Transfer of Abdullah A1 Muhajir (Bom Jose Padilla) to the Department of Defense as an Enemy Combatant, on
June 10, 2002.

See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to
terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditionsd explosives and VBIEDs.
See also U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of
Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4, 2008.
The CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that the CIA "concluded early on" that the "dirty bomb" plot was
"never operationally viable." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "it took [the CIA] until 2007" to stop citing
the "dirty bomb" plot in its representations about the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
Tliis is incoirect. The CIA refened to tlie disruption of this plotting in a representation to die Department of Justice
in July 2007, in representations to Congress in late October 2007, and confirmed this information to tlie press in
April 2009. See CIA fax from CIA employee [REDACTED] to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Defense, with fax cover sheet entitled, "Talking points," sent on October 26, 2007, at 5:39:48 PM.
Document faxed entitled, "Talking Points Appeal of the
Million reduction in CIA/CTC's Rendition and
Detention Program." See also the July 20, 2007, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum, which states that
"interrogations of Zubaydah—again, once enhanced techniques were employed—revealed two al-Qaeda operatives
already in the United States and planning to destroy a high rise apartment building and to detonate a radiological
bomb in Washington, D.C." (italics added). As described elsewhere in this summary and in the full Committee
Study, on April 21, 2009, in response to the partial declassification of OLC memoranda that month, a CIA

spokesperson confirmed the CIA stood by the "factual assertions" in die OLC memoranda. See "Waterboaiding
Saved L.A.," Washington Times, April 25, 2009. The CIA's June 2013 Response further states "[d]espite the

imprecision of our language, we continue toasses^^va^^oo^xampl^^he importance of intelligence derived
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Prior to the capture of Abu Zubaydah on March 28, 2002, the CIA
was alerted to the threat posed by Jose Padilla. In early 2001, U.S. government records indicated
that a Jose Padilla came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. These records
indicated that Jose Padilla provided a "sketchy" story about overstaying his Pakistani visa and
that he was "allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A search of the State Department's
Consular Lookout and Support System was conducted at the time, which resulted in "multiple"

hits for "Jose Padilla."^^^® State Department records confirmed that Jose Padilla had sought a
new passport at the U.S. Consulate in Karachi in February 2001, and was subsequently provided
with a replacement on March 21, 2001.^-^^^
On December 15, 2001, the CIA provided the FBI with documents
obtained in Afghanistan from a purported al-Qa'ida-related safe house. Included in the binder
were 180 terrorist training camp application forms entitled, "Mujahideen Identification Form /
New Applicant Form." An application form for a then 33-year-old individual with the alias
"Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir" from "America" was among the forms. "Al-Muhajir's" form—dated
July 24, 2000—listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth;
language skills to include English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Yemen; and the individual's marital status.

from the detainee program." As described in this summary and throughout the full Committee Study, in its efforts to
obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, the CIA represented
that the intelligence referenced was obtained "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques (not the
"detainee program"), and that the information obtained was unique and otherwise unavailable.
The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) is used by State Department passport agencies, post, and
border inspection agencies to perfonn name checks on visa and passport applicants to identify individuals who are,
ineligible for issuance or require other special action. Source: www.state.gov
A February 16, 2001, email entitled, "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla," states that a "Jose Padilla," with a date
of birth of October 18, 1970, came to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi to report a lost passport. The email notes that

"his story is really-sketchy-been traveling here long enough to overstay his Pakistani visa, but speaks no Urdu, and
is allegedly studying Islamic law in Egypt." A March 5, 2001, email in CIA records, entitled, "The continuing Jose
Padilla saga!" states tliat there are "multiple CLASS hits" (Consular Lookout and Support System) for a Jose
Padilla. The author writes "[REDACTED] and 1both agree there is something sketchy about the guy." On March
21, 2001, State Department records indicate that Jose Padilla was provided with a replacement passport. See
documents included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, including
email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]: cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "Lost passport case- Jose Padilla"; date:
February 16, 2001, at 4:46 AM, included in materials provided by the CIA to the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence; second email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: "The continuing
Jose Padilla saga!"; date: March 5, 2001, at 10:09 AM; U.S. State Department travel records identified by the
Departmentof Justice; letter from Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Departmentof Defense, to James Comey, U.S. Department
of Justice, dated May 28, 2004.
Italics added. Jose Padilla's fingerprints would later be found on tlie forms. See Jose Padilla U.S. court

documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See also FBI Washington 101514Z

10AP^07V|Summar^hronolog^f Intelligence on Jose Padilla," and email from: [REDACTED]; to:
subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with FBI SA in Pakistan at the

time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of "Padilla's Muj pledge form." See
also numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to
be Padilla's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007; "Key Padilla evidence got to CIA in Afghan pickup,"
Associated Press, March 28, 2007; and "Terror Suspect's Path from Streets to Brig," New York Times, dated April
24, 2004. The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA could not locate information on this forni in CIA
databases. According to testimony of a CIA officer at Jose Padilla's federal trial, the binder and other material were

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On April 10, 2002, the CIA disseminated a cable with intelligence
derived from the exploitation of documents obtained during the raids in which Abu Zubaydah
was captured. Included in the CIA cable is a translation of a letter from mid-March 2002 that
references a 33-yeai'-old English-speaking individual. The cable states that the CIA believed this
individual might be involved in "a martyrdom operation." The translation disseminated states:
"There is a brother from Argentina, he speaks Spanish, English and Arabic, he is 33 years old, he
is maiTied and has two little children. He is a great brother. He knows business and studies

English language. He trains [in] selfdefense, he is a good looking man."^^^-^
April 11, 2002, the CIA was provided with
information from Pakistani officials on a 33-year-old U.S. citizen named "Jose Padilla," with a
date of birth of October 18, 1970, who was briefly detained by Pakistani officials on April 4,
2002. The Pakistani government provided a copy of Jose PadiUa's U.S. passport and relayed that
Jose Padilla had overstayed his travel visa, and that there were inconsistencies with Jose
wrote that they would provide the
Padilla's appearance and accent. The CIA's
information on "Jose Padilla" to the State Department's Regional Security Officer, and "would
follow-up with [Pakistani officials] on this matter."
The date of birth and travel information
included with Jose PadiUa's passport matched information on the "Mujahideen Identification
Form" (33-year-old "American" referenced as "Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir") the CIA had

provided to the FBI on December 15, 2001.^^^^
^002, Pakistani officials provided additional

information to the CIA's
specifically that they had detained a U.S. passport holder
named Jose Padilla and a British passport holder named "Fouad Zouaoui" (later identified as
Binyam Muhammad), who had suspiciously attempted to depart Pakistan. According to the CIA
cable, Pakistani authorities provided the information on the pair "due to concerns about possible

terrorist activity."^The cable noted that Pakistani authorities had to release Padilla, but tliat
PadiUa's associate remained in detention.(When questioned further, the Pakistani authorities

provided by a CIA source to CIA officers in Kandaliar, Afghanistan. The CIA officer testified at Jose PadiUa's trial
that, after he sorted tluough the material, the blue binder was placed in a sealed box and provided to tlie FBI in
Islamabad, Pakistan. See referenced open source reporting.

'32' ALECJHM (102327Z APR 02)

'32'* m^|^972 (12031Z APR 02). As noted, the State Department already possessed information of concern

related to Jose Padilla.

'325 See Jose Padilla U.S. court documents, which include the pledge form and a translation of the pledge form. See

also FBI Washington 101514ZQ0AP^^7V|SumiTiM^hr^^ ofIntelligence on Jose Padilla," and email
from: [REDACTED]; to:
subject: "Pakistan Raid Evidence- Meeting with
FBI SA in Pakistan at the time"; date: July 17, 2007, at 01:07 PM, which notes the raids recovered a copy of
"PadiUa's Muj pledge form"; and numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given
Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to be PadiUa's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007.

10976 (120948Z APR 02). The official cable st^s that the Pakistani official and his office "has not
received the full details, and he is passing this onto [the CIA] HII due to concerns about possible terrorist activity."
The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the reporting from the Pakistani government that a Pakistan-based U.S.
citizen named Jose Padilla was engaged in possiMe terrorist activity was "unremarkable at the time," and that the
CIA viewed the report as a "routine 'illegal traveler'" report.
1327

10972 (12031Z APR 02); I — 10976 ( 120948Z APR 02)
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stated that they suspected Jose Padilla of being "an al-Qa'ida member.")The information

identifyin^os^Milla and "Fouad Zouaoui" as potential terrorists had been provided by the
CIA's

to CIA Headquarters, several CIA Stations, and the State Department's

Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Karachi by April 12, 2002.'^^^ Using the identifyini

in^mationin Jose Padilla's passport, provided by the Pakistani government, the CIA'
requested that CIA Headquarters and the CIA's

database search) using

Station conduct "

^^e other identifying information

provided.The CIA's

that CIAHeadquarters and the CIA's

Station do the same for Padilla's associate, Fouad Zouaoui.
As a result, by April 12, 2002,
the CIA was already alerted that a named U.S. citizen, "Jose Padilla," had spent significant time
in Pakistan and was engaged in "possible terrorist activity."^^^^
Eight days after the CIA was informed that U.S. citizen Jose

Padilla was engaged in "possible terrorist activity," on the evening of April 20, 2002, Abu
Zubaydah told FBI special agents about two men who approached him with a plan to detonate a
uranium-based explosive device in the United States (the "dirty bomb"). Abu Zubaydah stated
he did not believe the plan was viable and did not know the true names of the two individuals,

but did provide physical descripdons of the pair.^^^^ This information was acquired after Abu
Zubaydah was confronted with emails that indicated Abu Zubaydah had sent two individuals to
KSM.
The FBI special agents who acquired this information from Abu Zubaydah believed it
was provided as a result of rapport-building interrogation techniques.Abu Zubaydah would
See DIRECTOR

(162003Z FEB 03), which details a follow-up exchange between

personnel andPakistani officials.

10972 (12031Z APR 02); BHI10976 (120948Z APR 02)
There were no records identified to indicate that the CIA informed tlie FBI at this time that U.S. citizen "Jose

Padilla" was engaged in "possible terrorist activity." As described in Volume 11, once alerted, the FBI identified

links between Jose Padilla and FBI counterterrorism subjects, including an individual who reportedly paid for Jose
Padilla's travel to Pakistan to attend a terrorist training camp.

10972 (12031Z APR 02); •••

10976 (120948Z APR 02)

10976 (120948Z APR 02). See additional reporting in the Volume II intelligence chronolo^

Abu Zubaydah provided the names of the individuals asTaiha al-Kini and Abdallah al-Muhajir (|
10090 (210703Z APR 02^^
1334

10063 (180515Z APR 02);

10096 (221545Z

APR 02)

See FBI communications to FBI Headquarters in April 2002, as well as May 13,2009, SenateJudiciary
Committee testimony of FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan on the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. In the CIA's June
2013 Response, die CIA states the CIA's representation that Abu Zubaydah provided the information after the "use
of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques"was accurate because, "Abu Zubaydah revealed this
information after having been subjected to sleep deprivation, which would be categorized as an enhanced

interrogation technique once the program wasofficially underway." As described in detail in the Abu Zubaydah

detainee review inVolume III, when Abu Zubaydah was discharged from a hospital in Country |, the CIA sought to
deprive Abu Zubaydah of sleep and to cease Abu Zubaydah's interaction with the FBI special agents who had been
interviewing Abu Zubaydah and acquiring information from him at the hospital. Days later, after this new CIA
approach was implemented, the CIA reversed this decision and the FBI was allowed to question Abu Zubaydah
again. Further, the use of sleep deprivation during this period differed from future uses of sleep deprivation and had
ceased by the time of the referenced FBI interview,as the CIA had determined diat Abu Zubaydah's ability to focus
on questions and provide coherent answers appeared compromised. (See

10071 (190827Z APR 02) and

10116 (250731Z APR 02).) Ali Soufan testified that Abu Zubaydali provided information about the
"Dirty Bomb" plot only after he (Soufan) re-initiated a more traditionalinterrogation approach with Abu Zubaydah,
stating, "We then returned to using the InformedInterrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydahagain
ini' 'iM II ii I

^

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not be subjected to the "use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques" until August
2002, more than three months later.^'^^^
two hours of the dissemination of this information, CIA

officei^^llllj^^^BHIIII^I

cables to CIA Headquarters and select CIA Stations

calling attention to the similarities between Abu Zubaydah's reporting and their request from
April 12, 2002, for information on Jose Padilla and Fouad Zouaoui, which had not yet been acted
upon by the receiving offices.A travel alert was then initiated for Jose Padilla based on the
previous information provided by the Pakistani government. Padilla was located and

unknowingly escorted back to the United States by an FBI special agent on May 8, 2002.^^^^
Upon his arrival in the United States Padilla was found to be carrying $10,526 in U.S. currency,
an amount he failed to report.^^^^ Padilla was interviewed and takeninto FBI custody on a

started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence. This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called
'dirty bomber.'" {SeeSenate Judiciary Testimony, transcript at;
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=38428wit_id=7906.) Tlie assertion in the CIA's June 2013
Response is incongruent with additional CIA records. See senior CIA analyst comments on the draft CIA Inspector
General Special Review from February 10, 2004, stating: "Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and
he never really gave us actionable intel to get them"; CIA draft response to Committee Questions for the Record

concerning an OLC memorandum suggesting that information on Jose Padilla was acquire^rom Abu Zubaydali

after enhanced interrogation techniques, with the CIA response stating that the CIA's BBIICTC Legal
simply inadvertently reported tliis wrong. Abu Zubaydahprovided infonnation on Jose Padilla while

being intenogated by the FBI (|||B|BI 10091)"; CIA testimony from CIA Director Hayden on April 12,2007,
stating, "In August 2002, CIA began using these few and lawful interrogation techniques in the interrogation of Abu
Zubaydah"; and tlie CIA-vetted speech by President Bush on September6, 2006. See also SSCI Staff interview of
FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, April 28, 2008, at 1:20 PM, Hart Senate Office Building (Ah Soufan: "So we went
back. And we start talking to him. We took some Coke, tea, and we start talking about different tilings. We flipped

him about different things, |B| and I and [REDACTED]. And then he came back tohis senses and hestarted
cooperating again. And this is when he gave us Padilla.") (DTS #2008-2411).
See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III that details how, after Department of Justice approval in
August 2002, tlie CIA began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah on August 4,

2002^ncludin^i^vaterboard. See also^^j/Zf/h 10644 (201235Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED];
to:
APR 02); and

and [REDACTED]; subject: "Re: So i^egins"; date; August 4, 2002, at09:45 AM.
11036 (220348Z APR 02). See also ALEC ••
(220238Z APR 02);
11041 (220802Z
U042 (220921Z APR 02).

1338 A^i^iong other documents, see letter from the CIA addressed to SSCI Staff Duector A1 Cumming, dated June 24,
2002, and entitled, "Anest of Jose Padilla." After being detained in Pakistan, Binyam Mohammad was rendered by

the CIA

July |, 2002, where he was hel^^^^^HHIII government^n Januat

2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to CIA custody |^^^|^^^|30586
••••l
630

1339 pjjjj
Rowan, Department of Justice National Security Division to [REDACTED], at CTC Legal, on
August 15, 2007 with subject line; "Jose Padilla," includes a Departmentof Justice memorandum that is based
primarilyon 29 URsof the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilladisseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9,
2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and

Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); aCIA Statement Summanzin^igmficant

Information about Jose Padilla of 8 June 02 ['CIA Summary']; a DIA Info Memo from
1/13/03); and
an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03). See also SSCI Transcript "Detention of Jose Padilla," dated
June 12, 2002 (DTS #2002-2603).

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material witness warrant.The exploitation of Jose Padilla's pocket litter^^"^^ and phone
revealed significant connections to known terrorists, including subjects of FBI terrorism
investigations in the United States.

In separate debriefings, PadiUa and his associate, Binyam
Mohammed, maintained they had no intention of engaging in terrorist plotting, but proposed the
"Dirty Bomb" plot in order to depart Pakistan, avoid combat in Afghanistan, and return
home.

Over several years CIA officers identified errors in the CIA's

representations concerning the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in
relation to the Abu Zubaydah reporting pertaining to Jose Padilla and Padilla's alleged plotting.

Inrcsponse to one such representation, the chief ofthe Abu Zubaydah Task Force wrote to |
IIIIIIIICTC Legal in 2002 that "AZ's info alone would never have allowed us to find [Jose
Padilla and Binyam Mohammed]."In 2004, she sought to correct inaccurate CIA
representations again, telling colleagues:

'3' ® CIA Notification, "Arrest ofJose Padilla," dated June 24, 2002 (DTS #2002-2866); WHDC ••

(242226Z

MAR 03). Discusses information obtained by FBI officials on March 20, 2003, and SSCI Transcript "Staff Briefing
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the Detention of Jose Padilla," dated June 11, 2002 (DTS #2002-2598).
Pocket litter refers to material acquired on a person upon a search and may include notes, identification cards,
tickets, phone numbers, computer files, photographs, or any other material in the person's possession.
See CIA Document, Subject "CIA StatementSummarizingSm
Information About Jose Padilla {21:10
hrs.- 8 June 02}," email from [REDACTED] to
on August 2, 2002, at 3:54:17 PM, with the
subject line; "Re: Padilla's travel history," and fax from Pat Rowan, Department of Justice National Security
Division to [REDACTED], at CIA CTC Legal, on August 15, 2007, with subject line: "Jose Padilla." The fax

includes a Department of Justice memorandum that is based primarily on 29 IIRs of the joint FBI-military
intenogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5,2003, to July 9, 2003, a FBI document "Jose Padilla Debrief
Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on

Padilla (5/14/02); aCIA Statement Summarizi^ Significant Information about Jose Padilla of8 June 02 ['CIA

Summary']; aDIA Info Memo from |||||||||||m|[ (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose Padilla Debrief Status"

(11/11/03). See also SSCI transcript "Detention ofJose Padilla," dated Jun^2^002 (DTS #2002-2603), in which
the CIA informs the SSCI that, based on his address book confiscated in
to Islamic extremists, both within the United States and outside the U.S."

Padilla "did have connections

See Department of Justice memorandum referenced in chronology in Volume II that is based primarily on 29
IIRs of the joint FBI-military interrogations of Padilla disseminated from May 5, 2003, to July 9, 2003; a FBI
document "Jose Padilla Debrief Summary, August 29, 2003," the FBI's 302s on Padilla (5/8/02) and Binyam
Muhammad (6/4/02), an FBI EC on Padilla (5/14/02); a CIA Statement Summarizing Significant Information about

Jose Padilla of8 June 02 ['CIA Summary']; a DIA Info Memo from m m (11/13/03); and an FBI LHM "Jose

Padilla Debrief Status" (11/11/03)^^^^^^^
See CIA memorandum from:

—
to:

Jul^0^002, at 01:18:50 PM. See also February 10, 2004,
HHllll'

[redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted],

subject: "AZ information"; date:

iH

ACTED],

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
subject: Please
Read ~ Re CTC Response to the Draft IG Report; date: February 10, 2004. In a SSCI transcript dated June 12,
2002, entitled, "Detention of Jose Padilla" (DTS #2002-2603), the CIA acknowledged it had information on Jose
Padilla prior to reporting from Abu Zubaydah. A CIA officer stated: "the Pakistaniliaison felt it was important to
bring [Padilla] to our attention, given the recent raids...there was enough information indicating that his travel was
suspicious, to put us on alert. This suspicion was enhanced during the debriefings of Abu Zubaydah, which

occurred on 21 April." This is the only known CIA representation that did not fully attribute information on Jose
Padilla to CIA interrogations.

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"AZ never really gave 'this is the plot' type of information. He claimed every
plot/operation he had knowledge of and/or was working on was only
preliminary. (Padilla and the dirty bomb plot was prior to enhanced and he

never really gave us actionable intel to get them)."^^'^^
In October 2005, the chief of CTC's CBRN (Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) Group wrote, under the heading, "Don't Put All Your
Uranium in One Bucket":

"Jose Padilla: we'll never be able to successfully expunge Padilla and the
'dirty bomb' plot from the lore of disruption, but once again I'd like to go on
the record that Padilla admitted that the only reason he came up with so-called
'dirty bomb' was that he wanted to get out of Afghanistan and figured that if
he came up with something spectacular, they'd finance him. Even KSM says
Padilla had a screw loose. He's a petty criminal who is well-versed in US
criminal justice (he's got a rap sheet as long as my arm). Anyone who believes
you can build an IND or RDD by 'putting uranium in buckets and spinning
them clockwise over your head to separate the uranium' is not going to

advance al-Qa'ida's nuclear capabilities."'^"^^
other U.S. government assessments also called into
question the "Tall Buildings" plotting, which was loosely based on attacks that were conducted
in Moscow in September 1999 using conventional explosives. The "Tall Buildings" plotting did

not envision the use of conventional explosives.^^"^^ Instead, the plotting envisioned using
natural gas to destroy high-rise residential buildings. As planned, the Intelligence Community

assessed the plotting was not viable.^^"^^ An August 4, 2008, U.S. government assessment stated:
"On the surface, the idea is simplistic, if not amateurish... the probability of an efficient fuel air

explosion is low."^^'^^
Jose Padilla was detained on a material witness warrant from May
8, 2002, to June 9, 2002, when he was tiansferred to U.S. military custody and designated an

"enemy combatant." On January 3, 2006, Jose Padilla was transferred to U.S. law enforcement
Email f r o m : t o ;
[REDACTED],

cc; [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED],
[RED ACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Jose Rodriguez,

[REDACTED], [REDACTED]7BHHHB^Bi' subject: Please Read --Re CTC Response to the Draft IG
Report; date: February 10, 2004.
See email from: [REDACTED] C/CTC/OTA/CBRNG/RNTB; to: multiple recipients; subject: "Re: Urgent:
Unclassified Fact Sheet for David Shedd"; date: October 6,2005, at 04:35 PM.
See additional details in Volume 11.

See Intelligence Community review of the Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to
terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using traditional explosives and VBIEDs.
See Intelligence Community review of tlie Tall Buildings plotting included in CIA records with references to
terrorist attacks in Russia in September 1999 against apartment buildings using tiaditional explosives and VBIEDs.
See also U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report entitled, "Use of
Natural Gas as a Terrorist Weapon in Apartment Buildings," dated August 4,2008. The latter document states that:
"If the idea of the plot is to cause death and destiuction on the same scale as had occurred in Russia, then Padilla's
methodology comes into question. The probability of causing this magnitude of death and destruction using natural

gas [versus conventional explosives] would be considerably lower."
III!

I I III I

I IIIIIIIII I

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custody and tried in federal court. On August 16, 2007, Jose Padilla and two co-defendants,
Adham Hassoun and Kifah Jayyousi, were found guilty of three criminal offenses relating to

terrorist support activities from October 1993 to November 1, 2001.^^^° The case against Jose
Padilla centered on his attendance at a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan in the fall of
2000—specifically, the terrorist training camp application form acquired by the CIA and
provided to the FBI in December2001. The form was found to have Jose Padilla's fingerprints,
as well as identifying data to include his date of birth, languages spoken, and travels.On
January 22, 2008, Jose Padilla was sentenced to 17 years in prison. On September 19, 2011, the

U.S. 11'^ Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the sentence was too lenient in partbecause it did not
take in account Jose Padilla's prior criminal offenses.

After beingdetained in Pakistan, Jose Padilla's associate Binyam

Mohammad was rendered by the CIaMB^^IJuly B 2002, where he was held by the
government. On January

2004, Binyam Mohammad was rendered to CIA

custody.On May | , 2004, Binyam Mohammad was transferred to the custody ofthe U.S.
military in Bagram, Afghanistan.On September 21, 2004, he was transferred to Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba.^^^^ Binyam Mohammad was then transferred from U.S. military custody to the
United Kingdom on February 23, 2009.

Lawyers representing Binyam Mohammad sued the government
of the United Kingdom to compel the release of documents relating to his whereabouts and

treatment after his initial detention in April 2002.'-^^^ In Februaiy 2010, a British court
compelled the release "of a summary of the torture" to which Binyam Mohammed was subjected

'350 ALEC ^^•(Mayl7^02), with references to FBI WASH 150315Z,
from

and CIA reporting

Upon Jose Padilla's arrest, Padilla was found to be in possession of the phone

number of Adham Hassoun,

|; and providing material support to terrorists. U.S. prosecutors focused on more
than 70 intercepted phone calls between the defendants during the 1990s, but provided no information at the trial
related to plotting in the United States. See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for defendants,

including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including "Without a plot, is Padilla guilty?," Christian
Science Monitor, dated July 19, 2007; and "The others on trial in Padilla case," Christian Science Monitor, dated
May 29, 2007.

An Assistant U.S. Attorney involved in the prosecution stated, "The narrative is fairly clem* that Padilla was
recruited to go overseas to participate in jihad." See U.S. District Criminal Court Docket, Florida Southern, for

defendants, including Jose Padilla, as well as open source news reports, including "Without a plot, is Padilla
guilty?," Christian Science Monitor, dated July 19, 2007; and "The others on trial in Padilla case," Christian Science
Monitor, dated May 29, 2007.
See open sources, to include press articles such as, "Court Says Padilla Prison Sentence Too Lenient," Reuters,

dated September 19, 2011.

^^^^^^^^•12520 (281655Z SEP 04)

1356 Terrorism Watch, March 10,2009, Guantanamo Detainee's Torture Claims Could Impact Bilateral Relationship
with UK.

'3-^7 [REDACTED] 3174 (311725Z JUL 08)
I III

II III I

I I'll "III I

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during his detention. In the fall of 2010, the British government awarded Binyam Mohammed a

reported £1 million in compensation.^^^^
2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots
Summary: The CIA represented tliat its enhanced interrogation
techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disrupt terrorist plots, capture teiTorists, and save lives. Over a period
of years, the CIA provided the thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) as evidence for the effectiveness
of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. These CIA representations were inaccurate.
The Karachi Plot(s) was dismpted with the confiscation of explosives and the airests of Ammar
al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in April 2003. The operation and arrests were conducted
unilaterally by Pakistani authorities and were unrelated to any reporting from the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program.
Fi^rther Details: The Karachi Plot(s) refers to terrorist plotting that
targeted a variety of U.S. and Western interests in the Karachi area, to include the U.S.
Consulate, named hotels near the airport and beach, U.S. vehicles traveling between the
Consulate and the airport, U.S. diplomatic housing, U.S. personnel subject to potential sniper

attacks, as well as Pakistan's Faisal Army Base.'^^^ CIA records indicate the CIA became aware
of the initial plotting as eaily as September 2002, and that it was disrupted in April 2003, when
the remaining plot leaders were arrested in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities.
While the plot leaders were captured in the process of procuring explosives, they maintained that
they were stiU in the process of locating vehicles, a safe house, and suicide operatives at the time
of their an-est.^^^^

The thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) is one of the eight most
frequently cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's
enhanced interrogation techniques,Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and
provided to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent
the Karachi Plot(s) as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from HVD interrogations
after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist plots" and capture

Among other open sources, see "Compensation to Guantanamo detainees 'was necessary,'" BBC News UK,
November 16, 2010.

See intelligence chronology in Volume IIand HHHI11454 (3017102Z APR 03).
33804 (190956Z SEP 02); [REDACTED] 34513 (052246Z MAR 03);

•••••;

45028

DIRECTOR

intellige^ chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR
••I
MAY

MAY 03) and DIRECTOR

Tlie Karachi terrorist plots encompassed a variety of potential targets in the Karachi area associated with U.S.
and Western interests. Although the plotting involved multiple targets, the plotting is most often referred to as the
"Karachi Plot."

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additional terrorists.The CIA further represented that the intelligence acquired from the
CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques was "otherwise unavailable" and "saved lives.
Italics included in CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA

CounterteiTorist Interrogation Techniques," from March 2, 2005. Seealso CIA talking points for National Security
Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCIMeeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee
InteiTogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005.

1364 Prom 2003 through 2009, the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques provided a specific setofexamples of terrorist plots "disrupted" andterrorists captured that
the CIA attributed to information obtained from theuse of itsenhanced interrogation techniques. CIA
representations further asserted thatthe intelligence obtained fromthe useof the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, and resulted in "saved lives." Among otherCIArepresentations, see:
(1) CIA representations in tlie Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30, 2005,
which reliedon a seriesof highly specific CIArepresentations on the typeof intelligence acquired from theuse of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to assess theirlegality. TTie CIArepresentations referenced by the
OLC include that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "necessary"to obtain "critical,"
"vital," and "otherwise unavailable actionable intelligence" that was "essential"for the U.S. government to "detect
and dismpt" terrorist threats. The OLC memorandum furdier states that "[the CIA] ha[sj informed [the OLC] that
the CIA believes that this program is largely responsible for preventinga subsequent attack within the United
States." {See Memorandumfor John A. Rizzo, Senior DeputyGeneral Counsel, Central IntelligenceAgency, from
StevenG. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Officeof Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re:
Application of United StatesObligations Under Article 16of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques
that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Valueal Qaeda Detainees.) (2) CIA representations in the
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum dated July 20, 2007, which also relied on CIA
representations on the type of intelligence acquired from the use of the CIA's enhancedinterrogation techniques.

Citing CIA documents and the President's September 6, 2006, speech describing theCIA's interrogation progiam
(which was basedon CIA-provided information), the OLC memorandum states: "The CIA interrogation program—
and, in pai'ticular, its use of enhanced interrogation techniques—is intended to serve thisparamount interest [security
of the Nation] by producing substantial quantities of otherwise unavailable intelligence. .. .As the President
explained [on September6, 2006], 'by giving us information about terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else,
the progiam has saved innocentlives.'" (SeeMemorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3

of the GenevaConventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value
al QaedaDetainees.) (3) CIA briefings for members of the National Security Council in July and September 2003
represented that "the use of Enhanced Techniques of one kind or anotherhad producedsignificant intelligence
information tliathad, in the viewof CIA professionals, saved hves," and warned policymjikers that "[t]ermination of
this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." (See August 5, 2003 Memorandum for the Record from

Scott Muller, Subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; Briefing slides,CIA Interrogation
Program, July 29, 2003; September 4, 2003, CIAMemorandum for the Record, Subject: Member Briefing; and
September 26, 2003, Memorandum for the Record from Muller, Subject: CIA Interrogation Program.) (4) The
CIA's response to the Officeof Inspector General draft SpecialReview of the CIA program, which asserts:
"Information [theCIA] received... as a result of the lawful useof enhanced interrogation techniques ('EITs') has
almost certainly saved countless American lives inside the United States and abroad. The evidence points clearly to
the fact that without tlie use of such techniques, weand our allies would [have] suffered major terrorist attacks
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties." (See Memorandum for: InspectorGeneral; from: James Pavitt,
Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Program" 2003-7123-IG; date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum
re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.) (5) CIA briefing documents for CIA
DirectorLeon Panettain February 2009,whichstatethat the "CIA assesses that the RDI program worked and the
[enhanced interrogation] techniques were effective in producing foreign intelligence," and that "[m]ost, if not all, of
the timely intelligence acquired from detainees in this program wouldnot have been discovered or reportedby other
means." (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta,entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derivedfrom Abu Zubaydah and Khalid

Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including "E)CI^Briefin^r^DJ^rogram|^g^
nil

'iM III I

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example, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a
set of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding

the Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique."^^^^ The document includes a section
entitled, "Plots Discovered as a Result of EITs," which states "reporting statistics alone will not

provide a fair and accurate measure of the effectiveness of EITs." The document then provides a
list of "Key Intelligence Derived through use of EITs," stating:

"CIA's use of DOJ-approved enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive interrogation approach, has enabled CIA to disrupt terrorist
plots... The following are examples of key intelligence collected from CIA
detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along with other
interrogation techniques: ...The Karachi Plot: This plan to conduct attacks
against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan was uncovered
during the initial interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi
and later confirmed by

Likewise, a CIA-prepared briefing for Vice President Cheney on
tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in March 2005, under a section of the briefing
called, "INTERROGATION RESULTS," asserts:

"Use of DOJ-authorized enhanced interrogation techniques, as part of a
comprehensive inteiTogation approach, has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plots,
capture additional terrorists.. .The Karachi Plot: Plan to conduct attacks
against the US Consulate and other US interests in Pakistan. Plot disrupted.
Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chait: Attachment (AZ and KSM),"
"Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background
on Key Capturesand Plots Disrupted.") (6) CIA document faxed to tlie SenateSelect Committee on Intelligenceon
March 18, 2009, entitled, "[SWIGERTJ and [DUNBAR]," located in Committee databases at DTS #2009-1258,

which providesa list of "some of tlie key capturesand disrupted plots" that the CIA had attributed to the use of the
CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, and stating: "CIA assesses that most, if not all, of the timely intelligence
acquiredfrom detainees in this program would not have beendiscovered or reported by any other means." See
Volume II for additional CIA representations asserting that tlie CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques enabled the
CIA to obtain unique, otherwise unavailable intelligence that "saved lives."
On September 17, 2007, President Bush nominated Judge Michael Mukasey to be Attorney General of the
United States. In October 2007, at his confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Mukasey

declined to say whether he believed waterboardingas an interrogation technique was unlawful. On October 30,
2007, Mukaseyresponded to written questions from tlie Senate Judiciary Committee on the issue of waterboarding,
stating: "As described in your letter, these techniques seem over the line or, on a personal basis, repugnant to me,
and would probably seem the same to many Americans. But hypotheticals are different from real life, and in any
legal opinion the actual facts and circumstances are critical." {See October30, 2007, Letter from Michael B.
Mukasey, to Senators Patrick J. Leahy, Edwaid M. Kennedy, Joseph R. Biden,Jr., Herb Kohl, Dianne Feinstein,
Russell D. Feingold, Charles E. Schumer, Richard J. Durbin, Benjamin L. Cardin, and Sheldon Whitehouse.) On
November6, 2007, days prior to a Senate vote to confirmMukasey, the CIA provided a set of talking points to the
CIA director for use with the President in a meeting about the CIA's use of the waterboard intenogation technique.
See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the
notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
Italics added. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November

6, 2007, with the notation the document wasJ^senU^DCI^Nov^i^repar^n for POTUS meeting."
mi

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Sources: Khallad Bin Attash, Ammar al-Baluchi. KSM also provided info on
the plot after we showed him capture photos of Ammar and Khallad.
The CIA provided similar inaccurate representations regarding the
thwarting of the Karachi Plot(s) in 17 of the 20 documents provided to policymakers and the
Department of Justice between July 2003 and March 2009.^^^^
A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found

that the CIA*s enhanced interrogation techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in
the disruption of the Karachi Plot(s). CIA records indicate that the Karachi Plot(s) was thwarted
by the arrest of operatives and the interdiction of explosives by Pakistani authorities, specifically

The CIA had information regarding the Karachi terrorist plotting as

early as September 11, 2002.^^^" On thatday, a

raid conducted b]

Pakistani authonties^^^^^^^^|^^m^^^^^^^^^|^^|, of an al-Qaida safe house
in Karachi, Pakistan, uncovered the "perfume letter," named as such because the term
"perfumes" is used as a code word. The letter, written in May 2002, was from KSM to Hamza

al-Zubayr, a known al-Qa'ida member who was killed in the raids.KSM's letter to al-Zubayr
states, "Dear Brother, we have the green light for the hotels," and suggests "making it three

instead of one."^^^^ By early October 2002, the CIA had completed a search of the names
identified in the "perfume letter" in its databases and found many of the individuals who "had
assigned roles in support of the operation" were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the

Italics added. CIA briefing for Vice President Cheney, dated March 4, 2005, entitled, "Briefing for Vice
President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program."
See list of CIA prepared briefings and memoranda from 2003 through 2009 with representations on the
effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques referenced in this summary and described in detail in
Volume II.

1369

45028

and DIRECTOR

2013

Response concedes that the CIA "mischaracterized the impact of tlie reporting [the CIA] acquired from detainees on
the Karachi plots," and acknowledges that the Karachi plotting was "thwarted by the arrest of the operatives and the
interdiction of explosives by [Pakistani authorities]." TTie CIA does not dispute that Pakistani authorities arrested
Ammar al-Baluchi and Kliallad bin Attash independently, and that information from the CIA's Detention and
Interrogation Program played no role in tlie arrests. The CIA's June 2013 Response states, however, that CIA

detainee reporting "revealed ongoing attack plotting against the US official presence in Karachi that prompted the
Consulate to take further steps to protect its officers." This statement is incongruent with CIA records. In response
to the reporting cited by the CIA, CIA personnel in Karachi wrote: "[w]hile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin
Attash] was chilling- [CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous infonnation
or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." The CIA
personnel in Karachi further reassured addressees that, in December 2002, the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took
increased steps to protect U.S. Consulate personnel. See Volume II for additional information.
1370 pqj. detailed information, see Volume II.

ALEC ••
1372

(032142Z OCT 02)
12535 (050557Z OCT 02);

11050 (101207Z OCT 02)J
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At least one person in the letter, Khallad bin Attash, a known al-Qa'ida operative,

remained at large.^^^"^
What remained of the Karachi plotting was disrupted unilaterally

by Pakistani authorities as a result ofa criminal lead. On April H, 2003, Pakistani authorities,
speciflcally
received a repoit that explosives and weapons were to
be transported in a pickup truck to a specific location in Karachi
Pakistani authorities made
arrangements to intercede, and, on April 29, 2003, they intercepted the vehicle and confiscated
explosives, detonators, and ammunition. The driver of the vehicle provided the location where
the explosives were being delivered, leading to the capture of several operatives, including
Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash, as well as to the discovery of another explosives
cache. A third captured individual stated that the explosives had belonged to Hamza al-Zubayr,
the known and now deceased al-Qa'ida operative, as well as others residing in the home raided
on September 11, 2002, where the "perfume letter" was discovered.

While being arrested, Ammar al-6aluchi was asked by a Pakistani
officer about his intentions regarding the seized explosives. Al-Baluchi responded that he was
planning to attack the U.S. Consulate in Karachi.In foreign government custody—and prior
to being rendered to CIA custody and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques—Ammai* al-Baluchi continued to provide information about the Karachi plotting to a
foreign government officer who was using rapport-building interrogation techniques.The
information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting included the surveillance conducted,
the envisioned targets, and the exact method of attack that was considered for the U.S. Consulate
in Karachi and other hard targets. Ammar al-Baluchi discussed the use of a motorcycle with a
bomb to breach the perimeter wall of the consulate and then how the operatives would seek to
exploit that breach with a vehicle filled with explosives.Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin

'373 alec ••
(0302054Z OCT 02). See also CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, "Threat Tlireads:
Most 11 Septem^r Plotters Still Under the Radar."
'37"^ ALEC

(0302054Z OCT 02). See also CIA paper dated January 11, 2002, entitled, "Threat Threads:

Mos^^Septeml^- Plotter^til^nder the Radar."
'37-'< ||||||||||m||45028
^I^ records indicate the interdiction was the result ofcriminal leads and was
unrelated to any reporting from CIA detainees.

I

DIRECTOR

^lA's June 2013

Response maintains that KSM's reporting on die thwarted "perfume letter" plotting was separate from the "plots
disrupted with the anest and interrogation of Ammar and Khallad." Because CIA records did not make this
distinction, and the fact that the operations, to at least some extent, shared targets, operatives, and the same set of
explosives, the operations are linked in diis Study.
1377

1378

^5028

; DIRECTOR

the threat to U.S. interests,CIA officers sought to participate in the intenogations. A May 2, 2003, CIA

cable (See
states that, because of Ammar al-Baluclii's "strong reticence towards the U.S.," CIA
officers were observing the foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The cable notes
that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammai* al-Baluchi was conducting all the
questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi on the plotting against U.S. interests in Pakistan, as
well as other matters.

'37^ Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response claims that "Ammar and Kliallad provided new information on odier attack
plans in Kaiachi after entering CIA custody and undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques," and that "[djuring
his fust inteiTogation in CIA custody and after enhanced techniques commenced, [Ammar] revealed tliat the plan

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Attash remained in foreign government custody for approximately H weeks, with Ammar alBaluchi—and to a lesser extent bin Attash—responding to questions on a variety of matters,
including the Karachi plotting.
On May

2003, Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were

rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation
techniques.
The next day, the CIA disseminated two intelligence reports on the Karachi
Plot(s) from the interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash.
The reporting
relayed that: (1) al-Qa'ida was targeting Western interests in Karachi, including the U.S.
Consulate and Western housing in a specific neighborhood of Karachi; and (2) the attack could
have occurred as early as "late May/early June 2003," but the plotters were still in the process of
finding vehicles, a safe house, and the suicide operatives at the time of their arrest.^^^ These
disseminated intelligence reports were used to support CIA representations in finished
intelligence products,talking points, briefing documents, and President Bush's September 6,
was to use a motorcycle bomb and a car bomb in a single, coordinatedattack at the end of May or early June, and he
pointed to the location on the Consulate's perimeter wall where the attack would occur." The information in the

CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. Ammar al-Baluchi provided the referenced information while in foreign
government custody, prior to entering CIA custody and being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation

techniques. Give^h^hre^to U.S. interests, CIA officers sought to participate in the interrogations. AMay 2,
2003, CIA cable (||||||||||H 14291) states that, because ofAmmar al-Baluchi's "strong reticence towards the
U.S.," CIA officers were observing the foreign government interrogations of Ammar al-Baluchi via video feed. The

cable notes that a foreign government officer who had developed rapport with Ammar al-Baluchi was conducting all
the questioning and obtaining intelligence from Ammar al-Baluchi. This included information about the

motorcycle-car bomb plottingagainst the U.S. Consulate, as well as information on plans to potentially target
Westerners in a specific housing area in Karachi. According to the information obtained, surveillance by the plotters
"had confirmed a U.S. presence significant enough to warrant such an attack." Ammar al-Baluchi further stated that

he had considered caijacking a U.S. Consulate vehicleand loadingit widi explosives to target the Consulate, and
elaborated on tlie initial idea to attack the U.S. Consulate with a helicopter, stating that he did not follow through

witli this idea because he believed it would take too long to train an operative for that type of attack {see |[||^^^|
14291, May 2, 2003). Later, theforeign govemment officerdescribed Ammar al-Baluchi as "morechatty" than
Khallad bin Attash, and detailed how,while in foreign government custody Ammar al-Baluchi "acknowledged plans

to attack U.S. Consulate officials at the airport, the Consul General's Residence and the Consulate itself" The

foreign government officer explained tliat "both the Consulate and the CG's residence" required a "tiered attackof
successive car bombs which would breach the perimeter" of the targets. The foreign government officer also stated
that, based on Ammar al-Baluchi's comments on his casing efforts, it was inferred that Ammar al-Baluchi had

sought totarget Americans attheir residences in specific areas of Karachi. See

19647 ^^^^|APR

04).

Records indicate that Khallad bin Attash was less cooperative (Ammar

al-Baluchi wasdescribed as "more chatty"), but nonetheless provided information in foreign government custody on

the surveillance heconducte^caimt United States government vehicles in Karachi, among other information.

45028 (JHHaPR 03); DIRECTOR ^^•••IaPR 03); BIHI14291 (May 2,
2003)7^^^^^! 19647 (|^^^|aPR04). CIA records indicate that Ammar al-Baluchi was providing
significant information to theforeign government officer conducting thequestioning who had developed rapport
with Ammar al-Baluchi.
[REDACTED] 38325

'^83 director

'3'' DIRECTOR

; [REDACTED] 38389

(^^•mAY^; DIRECTOR ••

(^^1 MAY 03); DIRECTOR i^|

(^^•mAY^

MAY 03). DIRECTOR••

noted

that Khallad bin Attash indicated that they had identified one suicide operative so far.

See CIA speech validation effortsfor the President'sSeptember 6,2006, speech acknowledging the CIA's
Detention and Interrogation Program. In thespeech. President Bushstated that"Terrorists held in CIAcustody...

helped stop aplanned attack on the U.S. consulat^r^arachMisin^a^oi^^ motorcycle bombs." See also,
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2006, speech that the Karachi Plot(s) was "thwarted," "disrupted," or "uncovered" as a result of
the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. However, within 24 hours of the dissemination of
these intelligence reports, CIA personnel in Karachi responded in an official cable that the
information acquired from the CIA detainees and disseminated was already known to the CIA
and U.S. Consulate officials. The cable stated:

"[w]hlle reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling- [CIA
officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous
information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior
to their transfer out of Karachi.

(T8/^^^|^^^^H^^TheCIApersonnel in Karachi reassured addressees that, in
December20027^^lmil^^^AH the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took increased steps to
protect U.S. Consulate personnel based on similar terrorist threat reporting. According to the
cable, Americans in the referenced housing area had akeady been vacated from die "area for
several months," the potential for "attacks targeting Americans at the airport" had been
"recognized several months ago," and new procedures and security measures had been put in
place to minimize the risks associated with the potential terrorist attacks.
As noted, in November 2007, the CIA prepared and provided a set

of talking points to the CIA director for an "upcoming meeting with the President regarding the
Waterboard Enhanced Interrogation Technique." Under a secdon endtled, "Plots Discovered as
a Result of EITs," the document lists the "Karachi Plot," stating the disruption was the result of

"key intelligence collected from CIA detainee interrogations after applying the waterboard along
with other interrogation techniques," and that the plotting was ''uncovered during the initial

interrogations of Khallad Bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi and later confirmed by KSM."^^^^
While Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were subjected to the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, there are no CIA records to indicate that either was ever subjected to
the CIA's waterboard interrogation technique. KSM did provide information on the plotting, but
was assessed by CIA personnel to be withholding information on the plotting, more than a month
after the CIA stopped using its enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM. In late April
2003, CIA inten-ogators confronted KSM with photographs demonstrating tiiat Ammar alamong other documents, the June 2005 CIA Intelhgence Assessment entitled, "Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the
War Against Al-QaMda." CIA records indicate this document was provided to Wliite House officials on June 1,
2005. A slightly modified version of this Intelligence Assessment was broadly disseminated witliin the Intelligence
Community on June 3, 2005. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of
this Intelligence Assessment, wliich was publicly released with redactions on August 24, 2009. The assessment
represents that "detainee reporting"resultedin the "[rjevealing of the Karachi Plots," stating: "When confronted
with information provided by Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad admittedduring debriefings that al-Qa'ida was planning
to attack the US Consulate in Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas." The footnote

for this claim cites the May

2003, disseminated intelligence report detailin^h^dmissioiMnade by Khallad bin

Attash while being subjectedtotheCIA/^nhanced inteirogation techniques
1386

14510

source.

This cable also stated, "As noted in several previous cables, in

December 2002 j^BConsulate became aware of the thieat to Consulate officials."

14510•••••

Italics added. See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points; Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November

6, 2007, with the notation the document wa^|senn^DCI^Nov^Mi^repara^n for POTUS meeting."
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Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash had been captured. When the CIA interrogators asked what
Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash were "up to" in Karachi, KSM provided information
regarding potential targets in Karachi.KSM's belated reporting prompted the CIA's ALEC
Station to write a cable stating:

"We were disappointed to see that KSM only made these new admissions of
planned attacks in Pakistan after seeing the capture photographs of Ammar alBaluchi and Khallad. We consider KSM's long-standing omission of [this]
information to be a serious concern, especially as this omission may well have
cost American lives had Pakistani authorities not been diligent in following up
on unrelated criminal leads that led to the capture of Ammar, bin Attash, and
other probable operatives involved in the attack plans... Simply put, KSM has
had every opportunity to come clean on this threat and, from our optic, he
deliberately withheld the information until he was confronted with evidence
that we already knew about it, or soon would know about it from Ammar and

Khallad... KSM's provision of the Pakistan threat reporting - only after he
was made aware of the capture of the attack planners - is viewed as a clear

illustration of continued and deliberate withholding of threat information
which he believed had not yet been compromised."
Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, and KSM remained in CIA

custody until their transfer to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in September

2006.'^^^ All three remain in U.S. military custody.
3. The Thwarting of theSecond Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group
Summary: The CIA represented that its enhanced interrogation

techniques were effective and necessary to produce critical, otherwise unavailable intelligence,
which enabled the CIA to disrupt tenorist plots, capture terrorists, and save lives. Over a period
of years, the CIA provided the "discovery" and/or "thwarting" of the Second Wave plotting and
the "discovery" of the al-Ghuraba group as evidence for the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced

inten-ogation techniques. These representations were inaccurate. The Second Wave plotting was
disrupted with the arrest and identification of key individuals. The arrests and identifications
1389

11448 (301141Z APR 03);

11454 (301710Z APR 03). As described in detail in the

intelligence chronology in Volume II, KSM was rendered to CIA custody onMarch

2003, and was immediately

subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. On March 5, 2003, he was "confronted" with the

"perfume letter," at which point hediscussed theletter and its recipient, Hamza al-Zubayr. KSM hadnotyet been
subjected to the waterboard. As described, Hamza al-Zubayr was killed in a September 2002 raid against al-Qa'idarelated safehouses. KSM stated that Khallad bin Attash hadbeen responsible forobtaining operatives for the
Hamza al-Zubayr operation. At the time KSM provided this information, a separate cable statedthat KSM

"continued to denyUi^e has any [knowledge ofj ongoing operations." See [REDACTED] 34513 (052246Z MAR
03); DIRECTOR W^M (062312Z MAR 02); [REDACTED] 34575 (061929Z MAR 03)
34566 (061646Z MAR 03);|

134575

34513 (052246Z MAR03).
(022012Z MAY 03)

3425 (050726Z SEP 06);|

1242 (050748Z SEP 06);

2214(050539Z

SEP 06).
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were unrelated to any reporting acquired during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques against CIA detainees. Likewise, the al-Ghuraba group was identified
by a detainee who was not in CIA custody. CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided significant fabricated information on both the Second Wave
plotting and the al-Ghuraba group.
Further Details: Al-Qa'ida's "Second Wave" plotting refers to

two efforts by KSM to strike the West Coast of the United States with airplanes using non-Arab
passport holders. While intelligence reporting often conflated the "Second Wave" plotting, KSM
viewed the plotting as two separate efforts.
Neither of the two efforts was assessed to be
imminent, as KSM was still engaged in the process of identifying suicide operatives and
obtaining pilot training for potential participants when each effort was disrupted through the
arrest or identification of the suspected operatives and operational planners.
The al-Ghuraba student group was established in late 1999 by

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leaders primarily to educate the sons of jailed JI leaders and to groom the
students for potential leadership and operational roles in JI. Some members of tJie al-Ghuraba
group reportedly completed militanttraining in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at
Islamic universities in Karachi.
Despite CIA representations to the contrary, intelligence and
See Second Wave / Al-Ghuraba Group intelligence chronology in Volume 11, including, among other

documents, DIRECTOR |||||i (2021IZ JUN 03) and cable note on "Draft Intel^CSN^^ails his Thinking on

and Efforts to Taiget California," included as an attachment to an email from |||[^^^B|||| to adistribution list

for CIA OTA in the Directorate of Intelligence, dated June 30, 2003, at 06:25 PM.

Seeintelligence chronology in Volume II for detailed information. See also statements by UnitedStates
government officials, such as a February 9, 2006, White House briefing on "the WestCoastTerrorist Plotby
Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to tlie President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism." At this briefing
the White Houseemphasized hov^' "collaboration withour international partners" had "disrupted teiTorist networks
around the worid and serious al-Qaeda plots." Using the "West Coast" plot as an example, Townsend stated that:
"KlialidShaykhMohammed was the individual who led thiseffort. .. .The cell leader was arrested in Febmary of
2002, and as we begin—at that point, the other members of the cell believed that the West Coast plot had been
cancelled [and] was not going forward... the lead guy is anested, which disrupts it in February of '02." When asked
about whether this plotting could be accurately described as a disruption giventhe belief by some that "it never got
far enough to be disrupted," Townsend stated, "there is no question in my mind that this is a dismption." Seealso
May 23, 2007, Wliite House Press Release, entitled, "Fact Sheet: Keeping America Safe From Attack," wliich states,
"We Also Broke Up Other Post-9/11 Aviation Plots. In 2002, we broke up a plot by KSM to hijack an airplane and
fly it intothe tallest building on the West Coast." As described in theStudy, KSM was not detained until March 1,
2003. Tlie CIA's June 2013 Response acknowledges that "[t]he Studyconectly points out that we erred when we
represented that we 'learned' of the Second Wave plotting from KSM and 'learned' of tlie operational cell
comprised of students from Hambali." The CIA's June 2013 Response describes the inaccurate representation as
"imprecision" by the CIA, but nonetheless states that the CIA "continue(s) to assess this was a good example of tlie
importance of intelligence derived from the detainee program"; and contends—for the first time—that Hambali's
capture "was a critical factor in thedisruption of al-Qa'ida's plan to conduct a 'Second Wave' attack." As described
throughout the Committee Study, in its effortsto obtain legal authorization and policy approval for the CIA's
enhancedinterrogation techniques, the CIA represented thatthe intelligence referenced was obtained "as a result" of
the CIA's enhanced inten'ogation techniques (not the "detainee program"), and that the information obtained was
unique andotherwise unavailable. Asdetailed in this summary andin Volume II, the capture of Hambali was
unrelated to the use of the CIA's enhanced inteiTogation techniques.

Reporting indicates tliat the al-Ghuraba group was similar to tliePan Islamic Party of Malaysia(PAS)'s
Masapakindo, aka Pakindo, organization. Masran bin Arshad wasconnected to Pakindo, and wliile in foreign

government custody, explained that "in 1991JPA^PaiUslami^art^
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open source reporting indicate the group was not "tasked with," witting, or involved in any
aspect of KSM's Second Wave plotting.
The "discovery" and disruption of the "Second Wave Plot" (also

known as the "West Coast Plot" and the"TallestBuilding Plot"),^^^^ along with the associated
identification, discovery, and capture ofthe al-Ghuraba "cell," is one of the eight most frequently
cited examples provided by the CIA as evidence for the effectiveness of CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques.Over a period of years, CIA documents prepared for and provided
to senior policymakers, intelligence officials, and the Department of Justice represent the
thwarting anddiscovery of the "Second Wave" plotting and the identification, discovery, or
arrest of the al-Ghuraba group members as an example of how "[k]ey intelligence collected from
HVD interrogations after applying interrogation techniques" had "enabled CIA to disrupt
Student Association known as 'Masapakindo' tohelp facilitate a steady pipeline of PAS religious and military
trainees traveling from Malaysia to Pakistan, sometimes continuing on to Afghanistan, but ultimately returning to
Malaysia. This student association forchildren ofPAS members also was intended to serve as a general support
structure for PAS students who were undergoing Islamic religious training in Pakistan and India. Masapakindo's
headquarters was based in Karachi, Pakistan." See also February 27,2004, Memorandum forCIA Inspector
General from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled "Comments to Draft IG Special Review,
Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled,
"Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Intenogation Activities." See alsoCIA Intelligence Product
entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scmtiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18,
2008. Although this report makes numerous references to the al-Ghuraba group, itdoes not reference the group's
potential engagement in KSM's Second Wave attack. As described in thissummary, andin greater detail in
Volume II, contrary to CIA representations, a wide bodyof intelligence reporting indicates that the al-Ghuraba
group was not"discovered" as a result of KSM's reporting, norwas the al-Ghuraba group "tasked" with, or witting
of, any aspect of KSM's "Second Wave" plotting. Seealso KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003, and
the intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03).
Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Generiil Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G.

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re; Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be
Used in the Interrogation of High Value A1 Qaeda Detainees. The memorandum states: "Use of enhanced

techniques, however, led to critical, actionable intelligence such as the discovery of the GurabaCell, which was
tasked with executing KSM's planned Second Waveattacks against Los Angeles."

'396 References to the "Second Wave" attacks appeared in public news reports shortly after September 11, 2001,

sometimes in reference to Zacarias Moussaoui. See, for example. The Washington Post, "Suspected Planner of 9/11
Attacks Captured in Pakistan after Gunfight" (09/14/2002) ("Some investigators have theorized that Moussaoui,
whose laptopcomputer contained information about crop dusting, may have been part of a second wave of terror
attacks or a back-up plan instead."); The New York Post, "2"^ Plot Tied to Moussaoui" (09/06/2002) ("French

officials reportedly are claiming that Zacarias Moussaoui was never meant tobethe '20'^ hijacker' but was tobepart
of a 'second wave' of terror."); The Los Angeles Times, "Officials Skeptical as Detainees Say Sept. 11 was First in a
Trio" (10/01/2002) ("Tlie Sept. 11 attacks may have been planned as the first of three terrorist strikes in the United

States, eachprogressively bigger and more devastating than thelast, U.S. officials saidMonday, citing recent
interviews with captured A1 Qaeda operatives.... Since days after Sept. 11, authorities have said tliey were
concerned about a possible 'second wave' of attacks."). Similarly, on May 6, 2006, an affidavit filed by Moussaoui
stated, "I was part of another al-Qaeda plot which was to occur after September 11, 2001."
A November 21, 2005, Newsweek article entitled, "The Debate Over Torture," referenced a member of the

Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence stating that "enhanced interrogation techniques" worked with KSM to
thwart an al-Qa'idaterrorist plot, which the magazine indicated was the "Second Wave" plot. The article included
thefollowing: "A career CIA official involved with interrogation policy cautioned Newsweek not to put too much
credence in such claims. 'Whatever briefing they got was probably not truthful,' said the official, who did not wish

to beidentified discussing sensitive matters/]
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terrorist plots" and "capture additional terrorists."The CIA further represented that the
intelligence acquired from the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was "otherwise
unavailable" and "saved lives."'

Italics in original. March 2, 2005, Memorandum for Steve Bradbury from |||||mi|^^H' IHII Legal Group,
DCI CounterteiTorist Center, document entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Countertenorist Interrogation
Techniques."

1399 Prom2003 tlirough 2009,the CIA's representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced
interrogation techniques provided a specific set of examples of terrorist plots "disrupted" and terrorists captured tliat
the CIA attributed to information obtained from the use of its enhanced interrogation techniques. CIA

representations furtlier asserted thatthe intelligence obtained from the use of theCIA's enhanced inteiTogation
techniques was unique, otherwise unavailable, andresulted in "saved lives." Among otherCIA representations, see\
(1) CIArepresentations in the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, dated May 30,2005,
which relied on a seriesof highly specific CIA representations on the typeof intelligence acquired from the use of
the CIA's enhancedintenogation techniques to assess theirlegality. Hie CIA representations referenced by the
OLC include that the use of tlie CIA's