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Fbi Schmidt Report on Guantanamo Military Interrogations 2005

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1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)

Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report
Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Detention and interrogation operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo
(JTF-GTMO) cover a three-year period and over 24,000 interrogations. This
AR 15-6 investigation found only three interrogation acts in violation of
interrogation techniques authorized by Army Field Manual 34-52 and DoD
guidance. The AR 15-6 also found that the Commander of JTF-GTMO failed
to monitor the interrogation of one high value detainee in late 2002. The
AR 15-6 found that the interrogation of this same high value detainee
resulted in degrading and abusive treatment but did not rise to the level of
being inhumane treatment. Finally, the AR 15-6 found that the
communication of a threat to another high value detainee was in violation
of SECDEF guidance and the UCMJ. The AR 15-6 found no evidence of
torture or inhumane treatment at JTF-GTMO.
INTRODUCTION
In June 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began an internal
investigation to determine if any of its personnel had observed mistreatment or
aggressive behavior towards detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). On
9 Jul 04, the FBI – Inspection Division (INSD), sent an e-mail message to all FBI
personnel who had served in any capacity at GTMO. The e-mail stated in
relevant part:
“You have been identified as having conducted an assignment at GTMO, Cuba
since 9/11/2001. The Inspection Division has been tasked with contacting those
employees who have served in any capacity at GTMO and obtain information
regarding the treatment of detainees. Employees should immediately respond to
the following:
1) Employees who observed aggressive treatment, which was not consistent
with Bureau interview policy guidelines, should respond via e-mail for
purposes of a follow-up interview.
2) Employees who worked at GTMO and observed no aggressive treatment
of detainees should respond via an EC documenting a negative
response…”
The above e-mail message was sent by INSD to 493 FBI personnel who had
served in GTMO between 9 Sep 01 and 9 Jul 04. INSD received 434 total
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responses, and 26 agents stated that they had observed aggressive treatment of
detainees at GTMO.
In response to FBI agent allegations of aggressive interrogation techniques at
Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) Cuba, that were disclosed in
Dec 04 as a result of FOIA releases, General (GEN) Bantz J. Craddock,
Commander United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), ordered an
AR 15-6 investigation and appointed Brigadier General (BG) John T. Furlow,
United States Army South Deputy Commander for Support, as the investigating
officer. BG Furlow was directed to address the following allegations:
a. That military interrogators improperly used military working dogs during
interrogation sessions to threaten detainees, or for some other purpose;
b. That military interrogators improperly used duct tape to cover a detainee’s
mouth and head;
c. That DoD interrogators improperly impersonated FBI agents and
Department of State officers during the interrogation of detainees;
d. That, on several occasions, DoD interrogators improperly played loud
music and yelled loudly at detainees;
e. That military personnel improperly interfered with FBI interrogators in the
performance of their FBI duties;
f. That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation against
detainees;
g. That military interrogators improperly chained detainees and placed them in
a fetal position on the floor, and denied them food and water for long
periods of time;
h. That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold
during their interrogation of detainees.
Subsequent to the initial appointment, GEN Craddock directed BG Furlow to
investigate two additional allegations concerning a female military interrogator
performing a “lap dance” on a detainee and the use of faux “menstrual blood”
during an interrogation. Finally, the appointment letter directed BG Furlow to not
limit himself to the listed allegations.
On 28 Feb 05, after two months of investigation, BG Furlow advised GEN
Craddock that he needed to interview officers senior in grade to himself. On 28
Feb 05 GEN Craddock appointed Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Randall M.
Schmidt, United States Southern Command Air Forces Commander, Davis-

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Monthan AFB, AZ, as the senior investigating officer. This report reflects the
combined findings and conclusions of the initial investigative efforts and the
combined investigative efforts of both BG Furlow and Lt Gen Schmidt.
After submission of the AR15-6 Report of Investigation on 1 Apr 05, CDR
USSOUTHCOM directed on 5 May 2005 that the investigation be reopened to
consider memos dated 11 Dec 04 and 24 Dec 04, that had recently been
discovered, regarding the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan. Prior
to completion of the follow-up, CDR USSOUTHCOM directed on 2 Jun 05 that
the investigation should also address new allegations made by the subject of the
first Special Interrogation Plan.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
This investigation was directed and accomplished under the “informal
procedures” provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for Investigating
Officers and Boards of Officers, dated 30 Sep 96, (AR 15-6). This AR 15-6
investigation centered on alleged abuses occurring during interrogation
operations. This AR 15-6 found incidents of abuse during detention operations;
all of which were appropriately addressed by the command. The investigation
team conducted a comprehensive review of thousands of documents and
statements pertaining to any allegations of abuse occurring at GTMO, to include
the complete medical records of the subjects of the first and second Special
Interrogation Plan. The team interviewed 30 FBI agents, conducted interviews of
over 100 personnel from 6 Jan 05 to 24 Mar 05 and had access to hundreds of
interviews conducted by several recent investigations. These interviews included
personnel assigned to GTMO, USSOUTHCOM, and OSD during the tenure of
JTFs 160, 170, and GTMO. It included nine DIA personnel, including every Joint
Intelligence Group Chief and every Intelligence Control Element Chief. It
included 76 DoD personnel, to include every General Officer who commanded
Joint Task Force 160, Joint Task Force 170 and Joint Task Force GTMO. DoD
personnel interviewed also included personnel who served as interrogators at
GTMO and instructors at the US Army Intelligence School and Center. During
the course of the investigation, the team visited Birmingham, AL; Chicago, IL; Ft
Bragg, NC; Ft Devens, MA; Ft Huachuca, AZ; GTMO (twice); Los Angeles, CA;
Miami, FL; and Washington D.C. (five times).
The investigation team attempted to determine if the allegations alleged by the
FBI, in fact, occurred. During the course of the follow up investigation the AR156 also considered allegations raised specifically by detainees the subject of the
first and second Special Interrogation Plans. The investigating team applied a
preponderance standard of proof consistent with the guidance contained in
AR15-6. The team also applied guidance contained in FM 34-52, CDR
USSOUTHCOM, and SECDEF memorandums authorizing special interrogation
techniques in deciding if a particular interrogation approach fell properly within an
authorized technique. In those cases in which the team concluded that the

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allegation had in fact occurred, the team then considered whether the incident
was in compliance with interrogation techniques that were approved either at the
time of the incident or subsequent to the incident. In those cases where it was
determined the allegation occurred and to have not been an authorized
technique, the team then reviewed whether disciplinary action had already been
taken and the propriety of that action. On 28 Mar 05, GEN Craddock, as the
investigation appointing authority, asked Lt Gen Schmidt to determine
accountability for those substantiated violations that had no command action
taken.
The team did not review the legal validity of the various interrogation techniques
outlined in Army Field Manual 34-52, or those approved by the Secretary of
Defense.
BACKGROUND
On 7 Mar 05 Vice Admiral A.T. Church, III submitted his final report of detention
operations and detainee interrogation techniques in the Global War on Terror to
the Secretary of Defense. (hereinafter “Church Report”) That report included a
thorough background discussion of detainee operations at GTMO. Our
investigation independently researched the genesis and adjustments to policy
and interrogation techniques from the origination of GTMO to the present. Our
independently derived findings regarding the development and adjustments to
policy and interrogation techniques are identical to the Church report. Therefore,
I have adopted relevant portions of the Church report to show the development of
permissible interrogation techniques.
Interrogation operations at GTMO began in January 2002. Initially interrogators
relied upon the interrogation techniques contained in FM 34-52. These
techniques were ineffective against detainees who had received interrogation
resistance training. On 11 Oct 2002, Major General Michael E. Dunlavey, the
Commander of Joint Task Force (JTF) 170, the intelligence task force at GTMO,
requested that the CDR USSOUTHCOM, GEN James T. Hill, approve 19 counter
resistance techniques that were not specifically listed in FM 34-52. The
techniques were broken down into Categories I, II, and III, with the third category
containing the most aggressive techniques. On 25 Oct 02 CDR USSOUTHCOM
forwarded the request to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Richard B. Myers. On 2 Dec 02, the Secretary of Defense approved the use of all
Category I and II techniques, but only one of the Category III techniques (which
authorized mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the
chest with a finger, and light pushing). In the approval memorandum, the
SECDEF approved the techniques for use by CDR USSOUTHCOM, who
subsequently verbally delegated the authority to approve and apply these
techniques to CDR JTF-GTMO.

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On 15 Jan 03, SECDEF rescinded his approval of all Category II techniques and
the one Category III technique leaving only Category I techniques in effect. The
SECDEF memo permitted use of Category II and III techniques only with
SECDEF approval. No approval was requested or granted.
On 16 Apr 03, the Secretary of Defense issued a new policy accepting 24
techniques, most of which were taken directly from or closely resembled those in
FM 34-52. The Secretary’s guidance remains in effect today. This policy
memorandum placed several requirements on CDR USSOUTHCOM. First, it
required all detainees to continue to be treated humanely. Second, it required
SECDEF notification prior to the implementation of any of the following
aggressive Interrogation techniques: Incentive/Removal of Incentive; Pride and
Ego Down; Mutt and Jeff; and Isolation. Third, it specifically limited the use of
these aggressive techniques to circumstances required by “military necessity.”
The memorandum did not attempt to define the parameters of “humane
treatment” or “military necessity.”
The CDR USSOUTHCOM issued a memorandum on 2 Jun 03 providing further
guidance on the implementation of the 16 Apr 03 SECDEF approved techniques.
This guidance provided that prior to the use of any of the specified aggressive
techniques, the JTF Commander would submit the request in writing to CDR
USSOUTHCOM for submission to SECDEF. The guidance also stated that
“specific implementation guidance with respect to techniques A-Q is provided in
Army Field Manual 34-52. Further implementation guidance with respect to
techniques R-X will need to be developed by the appropriate authority.” GTMO
standard operating procedure on interrogations provides guidance for
interrogations.
In addition, the CDR USSOUTHCOM guidance provided the following
clarification to the SECDEF’s 16 Apr 03 memorandum: (quoting)
(a) Reference Technique B, the Working Group was most concerned
about removal of the Koran from a detainee—something we no longer
do. Because providing incentives (e.g., McDonald’s Fish Sandwiches
or cigarettes) is an integral part of interrogations, you will notify me in
writing when the provided incentive would exceed that contemplated
by interrogation doctrine contained in Army FM 34-52, or when the
interrogators intend to remove an incentive from a detainee;
(b) Reference Techniques I and O, you will notify me in writing when use
of these standard interrogation techniques goes beyond the doctrinal
application described in Army FM 34-52. When use of the technique
is consistent with FM 34-52, you do not need to notify me;
(c) I define “sleep deprivation”, referenced in Technique V, as keeping a
detainee awake for more that 16 hrs, or allowing a detainee to rest

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briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in
succession;
(d) Reference Technique X, I do not consider the use of maximumsecurity units as isolation. A detainee placed in a maximum-security
unit is segregated, but not truly isolated;
(e) I define the “least intrusive method” as the technique that has the least
impact on a detainee’s standard of treatment, while evoking the
desired response from the detainee during interrogations;
(f) Except in the case of Techniques B, I, O, and X, I have determined
that the first 0-6/GG-15 in the chain of command or supervision, is the
“appropriate specified senior approval authority,” unless approval
authority is withheld from that individual by higher authority.
Lastly, I have told the Secretary of Defense his 16 April guidance applies
to all interagency elements assigned or attached to JTF GTMO. (end
quote)
There have been over 24,000 interrogation sessions at GTMO since the
beginning of interrogation operations.

FINDINGS
GENERAL DETAINEE POPULATION
Allegation: That DoD interrogators improperly impersonated FBI agents or
Department of State officers during the interrogation of detainees.
Finding #1: On several occasions in 2003 various DoD interrogators
impersonated agents of the FBI and the Department of State.
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 (p. 3-13); Category I technique approved by
SECDEF – Deceiving interrogator identity
Discussion: The Chief of the Special Interrogation Team directed two
interrogators to pose as US State Department representatives during an
interrogation. In addition another interrogator posed as an FBI agent on one
occasion. This impersonation came to the attention of the Senior Supervisory
Agent (SSA) of the FBI at Guantanamo Bay when several other agents advised
him that detainees were complaining d uring interviews that the FBI had already
asked them the same questions. The SSA approached the Joint Interrogation
Group (JIG) Chief, with his agents’ concerns. According to the SSA, the JIG
Chief did not contest the FBI agents’ accusations. In fact, the JIG Chief knew of
at least one military interrogator who had impersonated an FBI agent. After the

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meeting, the JIG Chief agreed to stop the practice of DoD interrogators
impersonating FBI agents without prior FBI approval. The SSA made it clear to
the investigation team that he did not believe the impersonation interfered with
FBI operations and was pleased with the JIG Chief’s rapid and thorough
response to the situation.
Organizational response: Immediately stopped the practice.
Recommendation #1: The allegation should be closed. The technique,
while authorized, was undermining the inter-agency working relationship.
No additional corrective action is necessary or appropriate.
Allegation: That a female military interrogator performed a “lap dance” on
a detainee during an interrogation. I have expanded this allegation to “That
female military interrogators performed acts designed to take advantage of
their gender in relation to Muslim males.”
Finding #2a: On one occasion between October 2002 and January 2003, a
female interrogator put perfume on a detainee by touching the detainee on his
arm with her hand;
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 (p. 3-11); Category III technique approved
by SECDEF – Mild, non-injurious physical touching
Discussion: a. On at least one occasion in late 2002, a female interrogator
rubbed perfume on a detainee. The Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief
stated that he specifically directed the interrogator to go to the PX and purchase
rose oil with the intent o f rubbing a portion of the perfume on the detainee’s arm
to distract the detainee. The interrogator admitted to using this approach with a
detainee. At the time of the event the detainee responded by attempting to bite
the interrogator and lost his balance, fell out of his chair, and chipped his tooth.
He received immediate and appropriate medical attention and did not suffer
permanent injury.
Organizational response: a. The interrogator was not disciplined for rubbing
perfume on a detainee since this was an authorized technique.
Finding #2b: During the month of March 2003, a female interrogator
approached a detainee from behind, rubbed against his back, leaned over the
detainee touching him on his knee and shoulder and whispered in his ear that his
situation was futile, and ran her fingers through his hair.
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – Act used to highlight
futility of the detainee’s situation.

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Discussion: b. On 17 Apr 03, An interrogation supervisor supervised a female
interrogator as she interrogated a detainee with her BDU top off 1, and
subsequently the interrogator ran her fingers through the detainee’s hair. The
interrogator also approached the detainee from behind, touched him on his knee
and shoulder, leaned o ver him, and placed her face near the side of his in an
effort to create stress and break his concentration during interrogation.
Organizational response: b. The interrogation supervisor was given a written
letter of admonishment for failure to document the techniques to be implemented
by the interrogator prior to the interrogation. There is no evidence that either
activity ever occurred again.
Recommendation #2: Command action was effective and sufficient with
respect to the individual interrogators. AR 15-6 recommends that the
approval authority for the use of gender coercion as futility technique be
withheld to the JTF GTMO-CG.
Allegation: That a female military interrogator wiped “menstrual blood” on
a detainee during an interrogation.
Finding #3: In March 2003, a female interrogator told a detainee that red ink on
her hand was menstrual blood and then wiped her hand on the detainee’s arm.
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – act used to highlight
futility of the detainee’s situation
Discussion: The female interrogator is no longer in military service and has
declined to be interviewed. According to a former ICE Deputy the incident
occurred when a detainee spat in the interrogator’s face. According to the former
ICE Deputy, the interrogator left the interrogation room and was crying outside
the booth. She developed a plan to psychologically get back at him. She
touched the detainee on his shoulder, showed him the red ink on her hand and
said; by the way, I am mens truating. The detainee threw himself on the floor and
started banging his head. This technique was not in an approved interrogation
plan.
Organizational response: The ICE Deputy verbally reprimanded the
interrogator for this incident. No formal disciplinary action was taken. There is
no evidence that this happened again.
Recommendation #3: Command action was inadequate with respect to the
individual interrogator. The interrogator should have been formally
admonished or reprimanded for using a technique that was not approved in
advance. Advance approval ensures that retaliatory techniques are not
1

It was common practice at GTMO to conduct interrogations in a t-shirt with the BDU top removed
because of the heat and humidity.

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employed on impulse. Considering the lapse in time, recommend this
allegation be closed.
Allegation: That DoD interrogators improperly played loud music and
yelled loudly at detainees.
Finding #4: On numerous occasions between July 2002 and October 2004,
detainees were yelled at or subjected to loud music during interrogation.
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Incentive and Futility – acts
used as reward for cooperating or to create futility if not cooperating.
Discussion: Almost every interviewee stated that yelling and the use of loud
music were used for interrogations at GTMO. On a few occasions, detainees
were left alone in the i nterrogation booth for an indefinite period of time while
loud music played and strobe lights flashed. The vast majority of yelling and
music was accomplished with interrogators in the room. The volume of the
music was never loud enough to cause any physical injury. Interrogators stated
that cultural music would be played as an incentive. Futility technique included
the playing of Metallica, Britney Spears, and Rap music.
Organizational response: None.
Recommendation #4: The allegation should be closed. Recommend JTFGTMO develop specific guidance on the length of time that a detainee may
be subjected to futility music. Placement of a detainee in the interrogation
booth and subjecting him to loud music and strobe lights should be limited
and conducted within clearly prescribed limits.
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat
and cold during their interrogation of detainees.
Finding #5: On several occasions during 2002 and 2003, interrogators would
adjust the air conditioner to make the detainee uncomfortable.
Technique: Unauthorized prior to 16 Apr 03: SECDEF did not approve
exposure to cold in his 2 Dec 02 list of approved techniques
Technique: Authorized after 16 Apr 03: SECDEF approved technique. This
technique was officially permitted under 16 Apr 03 SECDEF Memorandum –
Environmental Manipulation
Discussion: Two FBI agents indicated that they were aware of DoD
interrogators using temperature adjustment as an interrogation technique. Many
interviewees, FBI agents and military interrogators, believed the hot climate at
GTMO and the detainee’s comfort in a hot climate caused a differing in opinions

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regarding the use of the air conditioning units in the interrogation booths. There
were several individuals who were interviewed who acknowledged that certain
military interrogators would adjust the air conditioning down (cool) in an attempt
to make the detainee uncomfortable for the interrogation. Several witnesses
indicated that the practice of adjusting the temperature ceased when CDR JTFGTMO directed that the practice no longer be employed. The current GTMO
SOP still permits interrogators to adjust the temperature. In addition, one
interrogator supervisor stated that detainees were interrogated at Camp X-Ray,
where the “booths” were not air-conditioned, to make the detainees
uncomfortable.
Organizational response: No disciplinary action required.
Recommendation #5: The allegation should be closed.
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation
against detainees.
Finding #6: During 2003 and 2004 some detainees were subjected to cell
moves every few hours to disrupt sleep patterns and lower the ability to resist
interrogation. Each case differed as to length and freque ncy of the cell moves.
Technique: Unauthorized prior to 2 Dec 02 and between 15 Jan 03 and 16
Apr 03: Neither sleep disruption or deprivation is an authorized FM 34-52
technique
Technique: Authorized between 2 Dec 02 and 15 Jan 03 and after 16 Apr
03: The exact parameters of this technique remained undefined until 2 Jun 03
when CDR USSOUTHCOM established clear guidance on the use of sleep
adjustment. His guidance prohibited the practice of keeping a detainee awake
for “more than 16 hours or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly
awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession.”
Discussion: Only one FBI agent alleged sleep deprivation; his complaint was
that an individual was subjected to 16 hours of interrogation followed by four -hour
breaks. He says he was told about these sessions by DoD interrogators and
they implied that these 16 hour interrogations were repeated on a 20 hour cycle,
but he did not know for certain what in fact occurred. The FBI agent was at
GTMO from 2 Jun 03 to 17 Jul 03. Under CDR USSOUTHCOM’s 2 Jun 03
guidance, 16 hour interrogations were permitted and do not constitute sleep
deprivation if done on a 24 hour cycle. During the course of the investigation of
the FBI allegation, the AR 15-6 did conduct a review of the interrogation records
to see if there was any evidence that corroborated this allegation. While not
directly supporting the FBI’s allegation, records indicated that some interrogators
recommended detainees for the “frequent flyer program.” A current GTMO
interrogation analyst indicated that this was a program in effect throughout 2003

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and until March 2004 to move detainees every few hours from one cell to another
to disrupt their sleep. Documentation on one detainee indicated that he was
subjected to this practice as recently as March 2004.
Organizational response: None. Current JTF-GTMO Commander terminated
the frequent flyer cell movement program upon his arrival in March 04.
Recommendation #6: The allegation should be closed. Recommend
USSOUTHCOM clarify policy on sleep deprivation.
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used duct tape to cover a
detainee’s mouth and head.
Finding #7: Sometime in October 2002 duct tape was used to “quiet” a
detainee.
Technique: Unauthorized
Discussion: In his testimony, the ICE Chief testified that he had a situation in
which a detainee was screaming resistance messages and potentially provoking
a riot. At the time of the incident there were 10 detainees in the interrogation
section and the ICE Chief was concerned about losing control of the situation.
He directed the MPs to quiet the detainee down. The MP mentioned that he had
duct tape. The ICE Chief says he ultimately approved the use of duct tape to
quiet the detainee. The MP then placed a single strand of duct tape around the
detainee’s mouth. The single strand proved ineffective because the detainee
was soon yelling again. This time the MPs wrapped a single strand of duct tape
around the mouth and head of the detainee. The detainee removed the duct
tape again. Fed up and concerned that the detainee’s yelling might cause a riot
in the interrogation trailer, The ICE Chief ordered the MPs to wrap the duct tape
twice around the head and mouth and three times under the chin and around the
top of the detainee’s head. According to an FBI agent, he and another FBI agent
were approached by the ICE Chief who was laughing and told the agents that
they needed to see something. When the first agent went to the interrogation
room he saw that the detainee’s head had been wrapped in duct tape over his
beard and his hair. An interrogator testified that another interrogator admitted to
him that he had duct taped the head of a detainee. According to the first agent,
the ICE Chief said the interrogator wrapped the detainee’s head with duct tape
because the detainee refused to stop “chanting” passages from the Koran.
Organizational response: The JTF-170 JAG testified that she became aware
of the incident and personally counseled the ICE Chief. The counseling session
consisted of a verbal admonishment.2 The ICE Chief did not receive any formal
2

While the ICE Chief testified that he was counseled by the JTF-GTMO Commander this is not possible.
The Commander in question did not arrive until the month following the event. The previous Commander
has no recollection of the event.

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discipline action. We have no evidence that duct tape was ever used again on a
detainee.
Recommendation #7: Command action was inadequate with respect to the
ICE Chief. He should be formally admonished or reprimanded for directing
an inappropriate restraint to be used on a detainee.
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly chained detainees and
placed them in a fetal position on the floor
Finding #8: On at least two occasions between February 2002 and February
2003, two detainees were “short shackled” to the eye-bolt on the floor in the
interrogation room.
Technique: Unauthorized.
Discussion: Two FBI agents each stated that they witnessed a detainee in an
interrogation room that had been “short shackled” to the floor. Short shackling is
the process by which the detainee’s hand restraints are connected directly to an
eyebolt in the floor requiring the detainee to either crouch very low or lay in a
fetal position on the floor. The FBI agents indicated that each of the detainees
was clothed. Another FBI agent stated she witnessed a detainee short shackled
and lying in his own excrement. The AR 15-6 was unable to find any
documentation, testimony, or other evidence corroborating the third agent’s
recollection, to this allegation or her email allegation that one of the detainees
had pulled his hair out while short shackled. We also found that ‘short shackling’
was initially authorized as a force protection measure during the in processing of
detainees. 3
Organizational response: None. JTF -GTMO has implemented SOPs that
prohibit short shackling.
Recommendation #8: The allegation should be closed. The AR 15-6 was
not able to find any evidence to adequately assign responsibility for these
actions. This practice is now specifically prohibited by current GTMO
interrogation policy.
Allegation: That military personnel improperly interfered with FBI
interrogators in the performance of their FBI duties.
Finding #9: We discovered no evidence to support this allegation.

3

During the course of a site visit to GTMO several detention operations personnel indicated that they
understood that short shackling was permitted in the early days of GTMO as a force protection measure.
They all stated that it was no longer authorized as either a detention measure or during interrogations.

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Discussion: This allegation stems from an FBI agent objections to a proposed
Special Interrogation Plan. The dispute resulted in a DoD official being rude to
the FBI agent. The team did not find any evidence of “interference” with FBI
interrogations that extended beyond the dispute over which techniques worked
best in interrogation. During the infancy of interrogation operations at GTMO, it
was obvious that the different investigative agencies had different interrogation
objectives. Law enforcement agencies were primarily interested in interviews
that would produce voluntary confessions that would be admissible in U.S.
Federal District Courts. Conversely, DoD interrogators were interested in
actionable intelligence and thus had greater latitude on the techniques used
during the interrogations. These different goals created friction.
Recommendation #9: The allegation should be closed.
Allegation: That military interrogators denied detainees food and water for
long periods of time.
Finding #10: We discovered no evidence to support the allegation that the
detainees were denied food and water.
Discussion: This allegation stems from the statement of an FBI Agent. She
reports two incidents of observing two detainees in “the fetal position and lying on
the floor of interview rooms.” And that there were was no “evidence of any food
or water.” The Agent admits in her statement that she made an assumption that
the detainees were denied food and water based solely upon their appearance.
The Agent was unable to provide any specific information as to the day she
made these observations to permit additional proof or assignment of
responsibility.
Recommendation #10: The allegation should be closed.

SPECIAL INTERROGATION PLANS
During the course of interrogations certain detainees exhibited refined
resistance techniques to interrogations. These detainees were suspected
to possess significant current intelligence regarding planned future
terrorist attacks against the United States. For these reasons Special
Interrogation Plans were proposed and approved for the detainees. A total
of two Special Interrogation Plans were carried out. They are referred to
herein as the “First Special Interrogation Plan” and the “Second Special
Interrogation Plan”.

THE FIRST SPECIAL INTERROGATION PLAN
On 23 Nov 02 interrogators initiated the first Special Interrogation Plan. The
interrogation plan was designed to counter resistance techniques of the subject

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of the first Special Interrogation Plan. The memo authorizing the techniques for
this interrogation was signed by SECDEF on 2 Dec 02. These techniques
supplemented techniques already permitted under the provisions of FM 34-52.
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used military working
dogs (MWD) during interrogation sessions to threaten detainees, or for
some other purpose.
Finding #11a: On one occasion in October 2002 a military working dog was
brought into the interrogation room and directed to growl, bark, and show his
teeth at the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan.
Technique: Unauthorized prior to 12 Nov 02.
Discussion: a. October 2002 incident: GTMO records indicate that on 01 Oct
02, the Commander of JTF-170 requested Joint Detention Operations Group
(JDOG) support for interrogation operations to interrogate the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan. The dog was requested to assist in the movement of
the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan between Camp X-ray and the
GTMO Naval Brig to “discourage the detainee from attempting to escape.” The
interrogation plan (IP) indicates that the interrogation would begin on the 2 nd or
3rd of October 2002. One FBI agent in his statement recalls the MWD being
used on or about 05 Oct 02. He indicated that the events were notable for
several reasons. He had recently purchased a German Shepard and wanted to
get some “tips” from the dog handlers. The FBI agent noticed that there were
two working dog teams (one Navy and one Army) present for the interrogation of
the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. Finally, the FBI agent recalled
that he and his partner left the observation room when the MWD was introduced
into the interrogation room. The FBI agent’s partner corroborates this statement.
In addition an interrogator indicated that she recalled a MWD being brought into
the interrogation room during interrogation of the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan at Camp X-ray, between 02-10 Oct 02. She stated that the
dogs were used only “briefly.” She stated that the use of the dog was
documented on the IP and approved by the ICE Chief and CDR, JTF-GTMO
Finding #11b: In November 2002 a military working dog was brought into the
interrogation room and directed to growl, bark, and show his teeth at the subject
of the first Special Interrogation Plan.
Technique: Authorized: SECDEF approved the use of Category I and II
techniques for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. Category II
technique permits the use of dogs to exploit “individual phobias” during
interrogations.

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Discussion: b. An interrogator testified that the MWD was in the booth on one
occasion for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. He testified that
he was approached by another interrogator and discussed the use of a MWD in
an interrogation session. Specifically, the first interrogator stated that the second
interrogator told him that a MWD was brought into the doorway of the
interrogation room and ordered by the dog handler to growl, show teeth and bark
at the detainee. In addition a psychologist assigned to the Behavioral Science
Consultation Team (BSCT) for JTF-170/JTF-GTMO witnessed the use of a MWD
named “Zeus” during a military interrogation of the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan during the November 2002 time period. In his interview, the
ICE Chief acknowledged that an MWD had entered the interrogation room of the
subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan under the authority of a “special IP”
for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. The unsigned but approved
interrogation plan for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan is from 12
Nov 02. (Church p. 115) It indicates dogs will only be used in interrogation if
approved in writing, in advance. Both JTF-GTMO Commanders who were in
charge during the execution of the special interrogation plan deny that they
authorized the use of MWDs in the interrogation room.
Organizational response: a. and b. None. Current SOPs expressly prohibit
the use of MWDs in the interrogation room. There is no evidence that this has
ever happened again.
Recommendation #11: The allegation should be closed. While the ICE
Chief was aware of and condoned the first use of the MWD, additional
corrective action is not necessary. The event occurred on two occasions
and was expressly approved after the first occasion for this detainee. This
practice is now specifically prohibited by current GTMO interrogation
policy.
Allegation: That a female military interrogator performed a “lap dance” on
a detainee during an interrogation. I have expanded this allegation to “That
female military interrogators performed acts designed to take advantage of
their gender in relation to Muslim males.”
Finding #12a: On 21 and 23 Dec 02, MPs held down a detainee while a female
interrogator straddled the detainee without placing weight on the detainee;
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – Act used to highlight
futility of the detainee’s situation.
Finding #12b: On 04 Dec 02, a female interrogator massaged the detainee’s
back and neck over his clothing;
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – Act used to highlight
futility of the detainee’s situation.

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Finding #12c: On various occasions between October 2002 and January 2003,
a female interrogator invaded the private space of a detainee to disrupt his
concentration during interrogation;
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Futility – act used to highlight
futility of the detainee’s situation.
Discussion: Interrogation logs and MFRs for the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan document that on both 21 and 23 Dec 02, a female
interrogator straddled, without putting any weight on the detainee, the subject of
the first Special Interrogation Plan while he was being held down by MPs. During
these incidents a female interrogator would tell the detainee about the deaths of
fellow Al-Qaeda members. During the straddling, the detainee would attempt to
raise and bend his legs to prevent the interrogator from straddling him and
prayed loudly. Interrogation MFRs also indicate that on 04 Dec 02, a female
interrogator began to enter the personal space of the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan, touch him, and ultimately massage his back while whispering
or speaking near his ear. Throughout this event, the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan prayed, swore at the interrogator that she was going to Hell,
and attempted to get away from her. The female interrogator admitted in her
interview that she personally prepared portions of the MFRs of the the subject of
the first Special Interrogation Plan interrogations. She asserts that she had
permission to employ all these techniques. We have found no evidence of a lap
dance ever occurring.
Organizational response: No disciplinary action taken. The ICE Chief
approved these techniques at the time.
Recommendation #12: The allegation should be closed. No command
action is necessary with respect to the individual interrogators. Their
supervisor acknowledged that he approved the approaches at the time of
the interrogation. AR 15-6 recommends that the approval authority for the
use of gender coercion as futility technique be withheld to the JTF GTMOCG.
Allegation: That DoD interrogators improperly played loud music and
yelled loudly at detainees.
Finding #13: On numerous occasions between November 2002 and 15 Jan 03,
the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was yelled at or subjected to
loud music during interrogation.
Technique: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Incentive and Futility – acts
used as reward for cooperating or to create futility in not cooperating.

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Discussion: See above discussion for Finding #4.
Organizational response: No disciplinary action required; technique
authorized.
Recommendation #13: The allegation should be closed. Recommend JTFGTMO develop specific guidance on the length of time that a detainee may
be subjected to futility music. Placement of a detainee in the interrogation
booth and subjecting him to loud music and strobe lights should be limited
and conducted within clearly prescribed limits.
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat
and cold during their interrogation of detainees.
Finding #14: On several occasions between November 2002 and January 2003
interrogators would adjust the air conditioner to make the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan uncomfortable.
Technique: Unauthorized prior to 16 Apr 03: SECDEF did not approve
exposure to cold in his 2 Dec 02 list of approved techniques
Discussion. There are no medical entries indicating the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan ever experienced medical problems related to low
body temperature. The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan’s medical
records do indicate that he did have a body temperature between 95 and 97
degrees twice. The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan’s medical
records do indicate that from 7 -9 Dec 02 he was hospitalized for observation
after an episode of bradycardia. He was released within forty-eight hours, after
the bradycardia resolved without intervention and he maintained stable
hemodynamics. 4 He experienced a second episode of bradycardia in Feb 03.
Organizational response: None
Recommendation #14: The allegation should be closed.
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation
against detainees.
Finding #15: From 23 Nov 02 to 16 Jan 03, the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan was interrogated for 18-20 hours per day for 48 of the 54 days,
with the opportunity for a minimum of four hours rest per day.
Technique: Authorized: SECDEF approved technique. This technique was
officially permitted under 2 Dec 02 SECDEF Memorandum – The use of 20-hour
interrogations
4

Bradycardia is a relatively slow heart; hemo dynamics are mechanics of blood circulation.

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Discussion: SECDEF approved 20 hour interrogations for every 24-hour cycle
for the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan on 12 Nov 02. Later, CDR
USSOUTHCOM formalized the definition of sleep deprivation in his 02 Jun 03
memorandum “promulgating” SECDEF’s interrogation techniques of 16 Apr 03.
He defined sleep deprivation as keeping a detainee awake for more than 16
hours, or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him,
not to exceed four days in succession.
Organizational response: None. This was an authorized interrogation
technique approved by SECDEF.
Recommendation #15: The allegation should be closed. Recommend
USSOUTHCOM clarify policy on sleep deprivation.
Additional Allegations, Re: The subject of the first Special Interrogation
Plan: In addition to the FBI allegations addressed above, the following additional
interrogation techniques (not all inclusive) were used in the interrogation of the
subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan. Each act is documented in the
interrogation MFRs maintained on the subject of the first Special Interrogation
Plan.
Finding #16a: That the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was
separated from the general population from 8 Aug 02 to 15 Jan 03.
Technique: Unauthorized prior to 12 Nov 02: SECDEF did not approve
movement of detainee to an “isolation facility” for interrogation purposes prior to
approval of Category II techniques for the subject of the first Special Interrogation
Plan on 12 Nov 02.
Technique: Authorized after 12 Nov 02:
Discussion: The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was never
isolated from human contact. The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan
was however placed in an “isolation facility” where he was separated from the
general detainee population from 8 Aug 02 to 15 Jan 03. The subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan routinely had contact with interrogators and MPs while
in the “isolation facility.” The SECDEF did not define “isolation facility” when he
approved the use of an “isolation facility” for up to 30 days with additional
isolation beyond 30 days requiring CDR JTF-GTMO approval on 12 Nov 02.
Prior to the SECDEF’s approval, placement in an “isolation facility” was not an
authorized interrogation technique.
Organizational response to Additional Allegations, Re: The subject of the
first Special Interrogation Plan: None taken.

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Eight Techniques Below: Authorized: FM 34-52 technique – Ego down and
Futility.
Finding #16b: On 06 Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan
was forced to wear a woman’s bra and had a thong placed on his head during
the course of the interrogation.
Finding #16c: On 17 Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan
was told that his mother and sister were whores.
Finding #16d: On 17 Dec 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan
was told that he was a homosexual, had homosexual tendencies, and that other
detainees had found out about these tendencies
Finding #16e: On 20 Dec 02, an interrogator tied a leash to the subject of the
first Special Interrogation Plan’s chains, led him around the room, and forced him
to perform a series of dog tricks.
Finding #16f: On 20 Dec 02, an interrogator forced the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan to dance with a male interrogator.
Finding #16g: On several occasions in Dec 02, the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan was subject to strip searches.5 These searches, conducted by
the prison guards during interrogation, were done as a control measure on
direction of the interrogators.
Finding #16h: On one occasion in Dec 02, the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan was forced to stand naked for five minutes with females
present. This incident occurred during the course of a strip search.
Finding #16i: On three occasions in Nov 02 and Dec 02, the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan was prevented from praying during interrogation
Finding #16j: Once in Nov 02, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan
became upset when two Korans were put on a TV , as a control measure during
interrogation, and in Dec 02 when an interrogator got up on the desk in front of
the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and squatted down in front of
the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan in an aggressive manner and
unintentionally squatted over the detainee’s Koran.
Finding #16k: On seventeen occasions, between 13 Dec 02 and 14 Jan 03,
interrogators, during interrogations, poured water over the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan head.
5

The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan alleges that he was subject to “cavity searches.” During
the course of interrogation, the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was strip searched. The AR
15-6 was unable to determine the scope of these strip searches.

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1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)
Discussion: the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was a high value
detainee that ultimately provided extremely valuable intelligence. His ability to
resist months of standard interrogation in the summer of 2002 was the genesis
for the request to have authority to employ additional counter resistance
interrogation techniques. The techniques used against the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan were done in an effort to establish complete control
and create the perception of futility and reduce his resistance to interrogation.
For example, this included the use of strip searches, the control of prayer, the
forced wearing of a woman’s bra, and other techniques noted above. It is clear
based upon the completeness of the interrogation logs that the interrogation
team believed that they were acting within existing guidance. Despite the fact
that the AR 15-6 concluded that every technique employed against the subject of
the first Special Interrogation Plan was legally permissible under the existing
guidance, the AR 15-6 finds that the creative, aggressive, and persistent
interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan resulted in the
cumulative effect being degrading and abusive treatment. Particularly troubling
is the combined impact of the 160 days of segregation from other detainees, 48
of 54 consecutive days of 18 to 20-hour interrogations, and the creative
application of authorized interrogation techniques. Requiring the subject of the
first Special Interrogation Plan to be led around by a leash tied to his chains,
placing a thong on his head, wearing a bra, insulting his mother and sister, being
forced to stand naked in front of a female interrogator for five minutes, and using
strip searches as an interrogation technique the AR 15-6 found to be abusive and
degrading, particularly when done in the context of the 48 days of intense and
long interrogations. 6 While this treatment did not rise to the level of prohibited
inhumane treatment the JTF-GTMO CDR was responsible for the interrogation of
the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and had a responsibility to
provide strategic guidance to the interrogation team. He failed to monitor the
interrogation and exercise commander discretion by placing limits on the
application of otherwise authorized techniques and approaches used in that
interrogation. The Commander stated he was unaware of the specific details or
impacts of the techniques on the detainee for this important interrogation. His
failure to supervise the interrogation of the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan allowed subordinates to make creative decisions in an
environment requiring extremely tight controls 7.
Recommendation #16: The Commander JTF-GTMO should be held
accountable for failing to supervise the interrogation of the subject of the
first Special Interrogation Plan and should be admonished for that failure.
6

The AR 15-6 found no evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was ever
physically assaulted. His medical records show no evidence of any physical assaults. A medical
examination completed on the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan on 16 Jan 03 found no medical
conditions of note.
7
The JTF-GTMO Commander’s testimony that he was unaware of the creative approaches taken in the
interrogation is inconsistent with his 21 Jan 03 letter to CDR USSOUTHCOM in which he asserts that the
CJTF approved the interrogation plan in place and it was followed “relentlessly by the command.”

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1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)
Allegation: In addition to the allegations above, the AR 15-6 also considered
additional allegations raised specifically by the subject of the first Special
Interrogation Plan.
Finding #17: The AR 15-6 was unable to corroborate the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan’s allegations to the point of concluding that they had
occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. Specific findings include:
The AR 15-6 did find that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was
required to stand for periods of time which he may have interpreted as forced
positions.
There is evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan regularly
had water poured on his head. The interrogation logs indicate that this was done
as a control measure only.
There is no evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was
subjected to humiliation intentionally directed at his religion. It is however
possible that the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan interpreted many
of the interrogation techniques employed to be religious humiliation.
The AR 15-6 found no evidence that the subject of the first Special Interrogation
Plan was threatened with homosexual rape. He was told on 17 Dec 02 that he
was a homosexual but not threatened in any manner.
There is no evidence, to include entries in his medical records, that either
occurred regarding the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan or any other
detainee.
Discussion: In reaching conclusions on the treatment of the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan the AR 15-6 relied heavily on the interrogations logs.
The level of specificity of the logs strongly supports their credibility regarding the
interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan and thus they
carried considerable weight on the findings.
Recommendation #17: The allegation should be closed

THE SECOND SPECIAL INTERROGATION PLAN
In July 03 interrogators initiated a request for approval of a Special Interrogation
Plan for a detainee. This plan was approved by SECDEF on 13 Aug 03.
Interrogation logs indicate that the techniques were never implemented because
the subject of the second special interrogation plan began to cooperate prior to
the approval.

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1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)
In addition to the interrogation logs, the AR 15-6 also considered allegations of
abuse raised by the subject of the second special interrogation, himself.
Specifically, after months of cooperation with interrogators, on 11 Dec 04, the
subject of the second special interrogation notified his interrogator that he had
been “subject to torture” by past interrogators during the months of July to
October 2003.8
Allegation: That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat
and cold during their interrogation of detainees.
Finding #18: During the summer of 2003, interrogators would adjust the air
conditioner to make the subject of the second special interrogation
uncomfortable.
Technique: Authorized: SECDEF approved technique. This technique was
officially permitted under 16 Apr 03 SECDEF Memorandum – Environmental
Manipulation.
Discussion: The interrogation logs of the subject of the second Special
Interrogation Plan indicate that on at least two occasions on 10 and 11 Jul 03 the
air conditioner was turned off to heat up the room. In addition the subject of the
second special interrogation alleges that on repeated occasions from Jul 03 to
Oct 03, he was subjected to placement in a room referred to as the “freezer.”
Organizational response: No disciplinary action required. Environmental
manipulation was expressly permitted in the 16 Apr 03 SECDEF Memorandum.
There is no evidence in the medical records of the subject of the second special
interrogation being treated for hypothermia or any other condition related to
extreme exposure.
Recommendation #18: The allegation should be closed.
Allegation: The subject of the second special interrogation alleges that
female military interrogators removed their BDU tops and rubbed
themselves against the detainee, fondled his genitalia, and made lewd
sexual comments, noises, and gestures.

8

He reported these allegations to an interrogator. The interrogator was a member of the interrogation team
at the time of the report. The interrogator reported the allegations to her supervisor. Shortly after being
advised of the alleged abuse, the supervisor interviewed the subject of the second special interrogation,
with the interrogator present, regarding the allegations. Based upon this interview, and notes taken by the
interrogator, the supervisor prepared an 11 Dec 04 MFR addressed to JTF – GTMO JIG & ICE. The
supervisor forwarded his MFR to the JTF – GTMO JIG. The JIG then forwarded the complaint to the JAG
for processing IAW normal GTMO procedures for investigating allegations of abuse. The JAG by email
on 22 Dec 04 tasked the JDOG, the JIG, and the JMG with a review of the complaint summarized in the 11
Dec 04 M FR and directed them to provide any relevant information. The internal GTMO investigation was
never completed.

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Finding #19: The AR 15-6 was unable to corroborate the allegations to the point
of concluding that they had occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.
Discussion: The interrogation logs for the subject of the second special
interrogation indicate that on a number of occasions female interrogators used
their status as females to distract the subject of the second special interrogation
during the interrogation but there is nothing to corroborate the allegation of the
subject of the second special interrogation.
Organizational response: No disciplinary action taken.
Recommendation #19: The allegation should be closed.
Allegation: The subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan alleges
that in late summer of 2003 he was hit by guards and an interrogator “very
hard” and “with all their strength” he was hit “all over.”
Finding #20: The AR 15-6 was unable to corroborate the allegations to the point
of concluding that they had occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.
Discussion: The interrogation logs contain no reference to any physical
violence against the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan. His
medical records indicate that in August 2003 the subject of the second special
interrogation reported “rib contusions” from an altercation with MPs when moved
between camps. During this examination the physician also noted an “edema of
the lower lip” and a “small laceration” on his head. There are no other medical
entries of any other physical injuries. There are no indications of swelling or
contusions to support a conclusion that the subject of the second special
interrogation was hit “very hard all over.”
Organizational response: No disciplinary action taken. The allegation was not
substantiated.
Recommendation #20: The allegation should be closed. There is no
evidence to support the subject of the second special interrogation’s
allegation of physical abuse.
Allegation: A DoD interrogator improperly impersonated a Navy Captain
assigned to the White House.
Finding #21: The Special Team Chief impersonated a USN Captain assigned to
the White House during interrogation of the subject of the second special
interrogation.
Technique: Authorized: This technique is permitted under FM 34-52 –
Deception.

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1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)
Discussion: On 2 Aug 03 the Special Team Chief presented himself to the
subject of the second special interrogation dressed as a Captain in the USN and
indicated he was from the White House in an effort to convince the subject of the
second special interrogation that he needed to cooperate with his interrogators.
The Special Team Chief presented a letter to the subject of the second special
interrogation, which indicated that because of the subject of the second special
interrogation’s lack of cooperation, U.S. authorities in conjunction with authorities
from the country of origin of the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan
would interrogate the mother of the subject of the second Special Interrogation
Plan. The letter further indicated that if his mother was uncooperative she would
be detained and transferred to U.S. custody at GTMO for long term detention.
While the JTF-GTMO Commander acknowledges that he was aware of the intent
by the interrogator to wear Captain’s rank and purport to be from the White
House, he stated that he was not aware of the intention to convey a threat or the
plan to use a fictitious letter.
Organizational response: None taken.
Recommendation #21: The allegation should be closed. No further action
necessary.
Allegation: That Military interrogators threatened the subject of the second
special interrogation and his family.
Finding #22: The Special Team Chief threatened the subject of the second
special interrogation and his family in July, August and September 2003.
Technique: Unauthorized: This technique was rejected by SECDEF on
Dec 2002

2

Discussion: During the interrogation of the subject of the second special
interrogation, a masked interrogator was used to interrogate the subject of the
second special interrogation 9. On 17 Jul 03 the masked interrogator told that he
had a dream about the subject of the second special interrogation dying.
Specifically he told the subject of the second special interrogation that in the
dream he “saw four detainees that were chained together at the feet. They dug a
hole that was six-feet long, six-feet deep, and four -feet wide. Then he observed
the detainees throw a plain, pine casket with the detainee’s identification number
painted in orange lowered into the ground.” The masked interrogator told the
detainee that his dream meant that he was never going to leave GTMO unless
he started to talk, that he would indeed die here from old age and be buried on
“Christian… sovereign American soil.” On 20 Jul 03 the masked interrogator, “Mr.
9

The interrogator was a DoD interrogator who was masked so as to preserve the identity of the
interrogator. This was done in case the interrogation team wanted to use that interrogator later
in another role.

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X”, told the subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan that his family was
“incarcerated.” On 2 Aug 03, the Special Team Chief, while impersonating a USN
Captain from the White House, told the subject of the second special
interrogation that he had a letter indicating that the subject of the second special
interrogation’s family had been captured by the United States and that they were
in danger. 10 He went on to tell the subject of the second special interrogation
that if he wanted to help his family he should tell them everything they wanted to
know. The MFR dated 02 Aug 03 indicates that the subject of the second special
interrogation had a messenger that day there to “deliver a message to him”. The
MFR goes on to state:
“That message was simple: Interrogator’s colleagues are sick of hearing
the same lies over and over and are seriously considering washing their
hands of him. Once they do so, he will disappear and never be heard from
again. Interrogator assured detainee again to use his imagination to think of
the worst possible scenario he could end up in. He told Detainee that
beatings and physical pain are not the worst thing in the world. After all, after
being beaten for a while, humans tend to disconnect the mind from the body
and make it through. However, there are worse things than physical pain.
Interrogator assured Detainee that, eventually, he will talk, because everyone
does. But until then, he will very soon disappear down a very dark hole. His
very existence will become erased. His electronic files will be deleted from
the computer, his paper files will be packed up and filed away, and his
existence will be forgotten by all. No one will know what happened to him
and, eventually, no one will care.”
Finally, interrogator MFRs dated 08 Sep 03 indicate that the subject of the
second special interrogation wanted to see “Captain Collins” and that they
“understood that detainee had made an important decision and that the
interrogator was anxious to hear what Detainee had to say. Detainee stated he
understood and will wait for interrogator’s [Captain Collins] return and that the
subject of the second Special Interrogation Plan “…was not willing to continue to
protect others to the detriment of himself and his family.”
In investigating the actions above, the AR 15-6 focused on the threat made by
the Special Team Chief.11 When questioned about the threats to the subject of
the second special interrogation, the Special Team Chief indicated that prior to
the “threat” to detainee the subject of the second special interrogation he cleared
the proposal and the letter with the senior judge advocate who approved the
technique as a “deception.” As written the letter does contain a threat to detain
the subject of the second special interrogation’s mother but does not contain any
threat on her life or that of her family. The SJA indicated in his initial interview
10

The actual content of the letter simply indicates that his mother will be taken into custody and
questioned.
11
Mr. X’s dream story does not rise to the level of a threat. It appears to be a staged prelude to
the direct threat made by the Special Team Chief.

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that he did not recall the letter. He subsequently elected to exercise his Article
31 rights and declined to answer direct questions about the letter and the threats.
The Special Team Chief also indicated that both JIG Chiefs in charge during the
promulgation of the Special Interrogation Plan12 were also aware of the threat
letter. The first JIG Chief has retired and was unwilling to cooperate with this
investigation. The second JIG Chief indicated under oath that he was unaware
of the interrogation events discussed above. He recognizes, that read in
conjunction with each other, they indicate a threat. He believes that the
Commander of JTF-GTMO was not aware of the threat since the second JIG
Chief was not aware of the threat. The second JIG Chief stated that they had
weekly meetings with the Commander to discuss interrogations but they would
not have covered this level of detail in that meeting. Neither he nor the
Commander read interrogation MFRs on a regular basis. Finally, the
Commander denies any knowledge of the existence of the threat or the letter.
He does not recall ever discussing the issue of threats with the interrogators. He
is aware that this is a prohibited practice and would not have permitted it if he
had been aware of the plan.
Taken as a whole, it appears that the decision to threaten the subject of the
second Special Interrogation Plan was made by the Special Team Chief. He
claims that he cleared the plan with the senior judge advocate but not with his
supervisors. Considering the actual content of the letter, it is reasonable to
conclude that the JAG advised that the letter was a proper deception and
therefore additional approval was not required. The Special Team Chief knew
that under FM 34-52 deception did not require additional approval.
Despite the fact that the letter may be a proper deception technique under FM
34-52, the interrogation logs clearly indicate that the interrogation went well
beyond the “threat to detain” made in the letter, and in fact was a threat to the
subject of the second special interrogation and his family that violated the UCMJ,
Article 134 Communicating a threat.
Organizational Response: None taken.
Recommendation #22: While the threats do not rise to the level of torture
as defined under U.S. law, the facts support a conclusion that the Special
Team Chief violated the UCMJ, Article 134, by communicating a threat.
Recommend his current commander discipline the Special Team Chief.

12

The first JIG Chief was in charge during the approval process for the second Special Interrogation Plan
and then rotated out of JTF-GTMO. The second JIG Chief was in charge during the execution of the second
Special Interrogation Plan

UNCLASSIFIED
26

UNCLASS
1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The findings above fall into three categories: Techniques that were authorized
throughout the interrogation periods; techniques that were never authorized and
finally, techniques that were originally unauthorized, and then subsequently
authorized. The summary below only outlines the latter two categories of
techniques to address whether the findings violated the UCMJ, international law,
U.S. Law, regulations or directives.
Techniques that were never authorized: AR 15-6 determined the following
acts were NEVER authorized under any interrogation guidance:
a) On at least two occasions between February 2002 and February 2003,
two detainees were “short shackled” to the eye-bolt on the floor in the
interrogation room;
b) Sometime in October 2002 duct tape was used to “quiet” a detainee.
c) Military interrogators threatened the subject of the second special
interrogation and his family;
Techniques that became authorized after the fact: AR 15-6 determined the
following acts were initially not authorized under existing interrogation guidance
but later authorized as an approved technique.
a) On several occasions during 2002 and 2003, interrogators would adjust
the air conditioner to make the detainees, to include the subject of the first
Special Interrogation Plan, uncomfortable. This technique is now permitted
under the SECDEF 16 Apr 03 guidance.
b) On several occasions prior to 2 Dec 02 and between 15 Jan 03 and 16
Apr 03 interrogators had detainees moved from one cell to another every
few hours to disrupt sleep patterns and lower the ability to resist
interrogation. This technique is now permitted under the SECDEF 16 Apr
03 guidance.
c) In October 2002 a Military Working Dog was brought into the
interrogation room during the course of interrogation of the subject of the
first Special Interrogation Plan and directed to growl, bark, and show his
teeth at the detainee. This technique is subsequently approved for the
interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan by
SECDEF on 12 Nov 02.
d) The subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan was separated from
other detainees in an isolation facility away from the general population
from 8 Aug 02 to 12 Nov 02. This technique was subsequently approved

UNCLASSIFIED
27

UNCLASS
1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)
for the interrogation of the subject of the first Special Interrogation Plan by
SECDEF on 12 Nov 02.
In each of the incidents above the violations can best be characterized as
violations of policy. The SECDEF’s subsequent approval of each of the
techniques clearly establishes the ultimate legitimacy of that technique and thus
additional corrective action is not necessary.
Additional Matters: In addition to findings outlined above it is important to
document some additional findings:
a) The team found no evidence that any detainee at GTMO was improperly
documented or unaccounted for at any time. Every agency interviewee
clearly indicated that they never knew of any “ghost detainees” at GTMO;
b) Several past interrogators at GTMO declined to be interviewed. In the
case of personnel who are currently in a civilian status we had extremely
limited authority to compel the individuals to cooperate with this
investigation; of particular note was former SGT Erik Saar who has written
a book into “activities” at GTMO. Despite repeated requests he declined
to be interviewed;
c) During the course of this investigation, JTF-GTMO CG investigated and
took action for personal misconduct of senior DoD personnel on GTMO.
These allegations were reviewed and it was determined that they were not
relevant to this investigation, and did not rise to a level to suggest a
leadership environment with any impact on interrogation or detainee
operations.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
This AR15-6 recommends consideration of the following:
a) Recommendation #23 Recommend a policy-level review and
determination of the status and treatment of all detainees, when not
classified as EPWs. This review needs to particularly focus on the
definitions of humane treatment, military necessity, and proper
employment of interrogation techniques. (e.g. boundaries or extremes);
b) Recommendation #24 Recommend study of the DoD authorized
interrogation techniques to establish a framework for evaluating their
cumulative impact in relation to the obligation to treat detainees humanely;

UNCLASSIFIED
28

UNCLASS
1 Apr 05 (Amended 9 Jun 05)
c) Recommendation #25 Recommend a reevaluation of the DoD and Interagency interrogation training consistent with the new realities of the
requirements of the global war on terror;
d) Recommendation #26 Recommend a policy-level determination on role
of Military Police in “setting the conditions” for intelligence gathering and
interrogation of detainees at both the tactical level and strategic level
facilities;
e) Recommendation #27 Recommend an Inter-Agency policy review to
establish “standards” for interrogations when multiple agencies and
interrogation objectives are involved. Particular emphasis should be
placed on setting policy for who has priority as the lead agency, the
specific boundaries for the autho rized techniques in cases with multiple
agencies involved, a central “data-base” for all intelligence gathered at a
detention facility, and procedures for record keeping to include historical,
litigation support, lessons learned, and successful/unsuccessful
intelligence gathering techniques.

UNCLASSIFIED
29

AR 15-6 REPORT
GTMO Investigation' - FBI allegations of Abuse
1. (U) FBI e-mail dtd 9 Jul 04
2. (U) Appointment letter - BG Furlow dtd 29 Dec 04
3. (U) Appointment Letter - Lt Gen Schmidt dtd 28 Feb 05
4. (U) CDR SOUTHCOM Supplemental Instructions letter dtd 05 May 05
5. -tS'INP) Allegations of Torture Letter 11 Dec 04
6. (SIINP) Allegations of Torture Letter 24 Dec 04
7. fU SnNOD'S WJeA81tt) CDR SOUTHCOM Supplemental Instructions letter #2
dtd 02 Jun 05
8. fSHNODI9) Extract ICRC Report 11 May 05
.
9. (U) Cover of AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers
w/Table of Contents
10. (U) Definition - Preponderance of the Evidence for AR 1~
11. (U) FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, Cover and Table of Contents
12. (S11NF) MG Dunlavey Summarized Witness Statement
13. (U) MG Dunlavey Request dtd 11 October 2002
14. (U) GEN Hill Forward to CJCS dtd 25 October 2002
15. (U) SECDEF Approval Letter dtd 02 Dec 02
16. (U) SECDEF Rescission dtd 15 Jan 03
17. (U) SECDEF Memorandum dtd 16 Apr 03 New Policy
18. (SHNFJfX1) CDR USSOUTHCOM Memorandum dtd 2 Jun 03
dard Operating Procedure for GTMO
19. (~) Curr
20. (SIYNPr LCDR
Summarized Witness Statement
21. (5#NF) Mr.
ummarized Witness Statement
22. (FOUO) SA
Summarized Witness Statement
23. ts/tNF) Mr.
Summarized Witness Statements (x2)
24. (SHHF) SGT
ummarized Witness Statement
25. (SHNF) 2LT
Summarized Witness Statement
26. (FOUO) 2LT
Letter of Admonishment, 19 May 03
27. (FOUO) MAJ
Summarized Witness Statement
28. (.SHHF) LTC
ummarized Witness Statement
29. (S#NP) SGT
Summanzed Witness Statement
30. (SNNF) SS~ Summarized Witness Statement
31. (FOUO) SA _
Summarized Witness Statement
32. (.SHNF) SA _.Summarized Witness Statement
33. (SHNF) ENS _Summarized Witness Statemenl'
34. (S#NF) S A _ FD 302 from FBI dtd 14 July 04
35. (SHNF) MFR dtd 26 Mar 02 w/attached cell transfer schedulelfrequent flier program
36. (SLLNE) SSA _
Summanzed Witness Statement·
.
37. (SIINFr SGT
J Summarized Witness Statement
.
38. (FOUO) LTC~marized Witness Statement
39. (SBUIIFOUO) SA _
FD 302 from FBI dtd 9 Sep 04
40. (SHNP) Re~ Interrogation Plan for ISN 063
Summarized Witness Statement
41. (SHHfi) SA _
42. (&#NF) Inter~ Level Timeline
43. (StfHf9 MAJ _
Summarized Witness Statement

DOD JUNE

763

I

AR 15-6 REPORT
, GTMO Investigation - FBI allegations of Abuse

.

44. (&ffORCONtCIMBIS;Nfi) Unsigned Interrogation Plan for ISN.
45. (S#NF') MG Miller Summarized Witness Statement
46. (SIINP,ORCON) Shift Log-21 Dec 02
47. (51/NFfOftCON) MFR dtd 21 Dec 02
48. (St/NF10RCON) Shift Log-23 Dec 02
49. (.SIINFfO~GON) MFR dtd 23 Dec 02
50. (SHNPiORCON) Shift Log-4 Dec 02
51 . (SHNFiOReON) MFR dtd 4 Dec 02
52. (S}- Excerpts of Medical Records for ISN.
53. (SffNFI0RCO~ Shift Log-6 Dec 02
54. (SI,'NFIOFtCON) Shift Log-17 Dec 02
55. (SlJORCON) Interrogation Log-17 Dec 02
56. (Sf/OReON) Interrogation Log 27 Dec 02
57. (SHNP/ORCON) Shift Log-20 Dec 02
58. (SHe~CON' Interrogation Log- 20 Dec 02
59. (SIlNF!ORCON) Shift Log - 23 Nov 02
60. (SUNF/OFtCON) Shift Log - 01 Dec 02
61. (SHNFIORCON) Shift ~og - 14 Dec 02
62. (SIINFlORe~ift Log - 28 Nov 02
63. (SIINF) M a j _ Sworn Statement
64. (SHNF/ORCON) Extracts from Shift logs 13 Dec 02 - 14 Jan 03
65. (5) ISN. Medjcal
... Exam dtd 16 Jan 03
66. (Si/NF/ORCON}-.MG Miller letter dtd 21 Jan 03
67. (S) Special Interrogation Plan 13 Aug 03
68. fSt MFR dtd 10 Jul 03
69. (St MFR dtd 11 Jul 03
70. f&) LTC" email22Dec04containinglSN.Allegations
71. (&) ISN"-Medical Report 08 Sep 02
72. (SHNP') Apprehension of Mother Deception Memo
73. (S) MFR dtd 17 Jul 03
74. fS) MFR dtd 20 July 03
75. ~ MFR dtd 2 Aug 03
76. (81 MFR dtd 8 Sep '03

DOD JUNE

764

Enclosure 1
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

765

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

29 December 2004

SCCC

MEMORANDUM FOR BG John T. Furlow, US Army, USARSO, Fort Sam Houston, TX
f..."'

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

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1. You are hereby appointed· as an investigating officer to conduct an Army Regulation 15-6
(AR 15-6) investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of detainee
abuse at fIF-Guantanamo (J1F-G'IMO), Cuba. Specifically, your investigation is to concentrate
on, but is not limited to, allegations raised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in
e-maiIs and memoranda. You are not to investigate allegations that are the subject of ongoing
criminal investigations by the Army Criminal Investigative Division. Your investigation should
address itself to the following allegations:

~

,
~'

.

a. That military interrogators improperly used military working dogs during interrogation
sessions to threaten detainees, or for some other purpose.
b. That military interrogators improperly used duct tape to cover a detainee's mouth and
head.
c. That DoD interrogators improperly impersonated FBI agents and Department of State
officers during the interrogation of detainees.
d. That, on several occasions, DoD interrogators improperly played loud music and yelled
loudly at detainees.
e. That military personnel improperly interfered with FBI interrogators in the perfonnance of
their FBI duties.
f. That military interrogators improperly used sleep deprivation against detainees.

, ,

g. That military interrogators improperly chained detainees and placed them iR -a fetal
position on the floor, and denied them food and water for long periods of time. -h. That military interrogators improperly used extremes of heat and cold during their
interrogation of detainees.

,e

2. If you substantiate any allegation, you are to determine whether the facts and circumstances
of the substantiated allegation were in compliance with the interrogation techniques that were
approved and in place at the time of the incident being investigated. Where allegations have
previously been investigated by JTF-G'IMO or any of its subordinate units, you are to analyze
the investigation and subsequent corrective action, if any.
AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
2.
of 76 Exhibits
Exhibit

UNCLASSIFIED
DOD JUNE

766

•c

SCCG-·· "':"
SUBJECf: Appointment ofInvestigating Officer
3. Use the informal procedures under AR 15-6 in your inquiry. Include in your report specific
findings as well as any opinions and recommendations you consider appropriate. You are
authorized to administer oaths. During your investigation, if you suspect a member of the US
Armed Forces of committing an offense, you must inform that person of his or her rights under
Article 31, UCMJ, before taking a statement. If you suspect a civilian employee of the US
Government of committing an offense, that person must also be intonned of his or her rights as
established by Federal law. You must consult with the judge advocate identified below before
interviewing any civilian employees.

rL
[

4. Determine whether there has been a violation of any article of the UCMJ or a violation of
Intemationallaw, U.S. law, regulation or other directive. Also, determine whether established
policies and procedures provide the means for preventing such violations in the future and, if
appropriate, provide recommendations on preventive measures that shOuld be taken.

5. I have directed that a field grade officer be appointed to assist you in this investigation. This
officer will take his direction and guidance from you and is available to assist you for the entire
duration of this investigation.

t.

....,

.

6. l(b)(S)
USN, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, uSSOumCOM. is available to
assist you as your le~al advisor. You may contact !(b)(S)
Ifor a procedural brief at (305)
437-1304. Submit your fmdings and recommendations in written form oD.DA FORM 1547 by
1 February 2005. Any request for extension to complete this investigation must be submitted in
writing to the USSOUTIICOM Chief of Staff.

B

~"-L
DOCK

General, US Army
Commander

'.

1
<.

DOD JUNE

.... _.. -------

767

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOU'1'HEM COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE·COMIWfDfll
3511'Wt1ST AVENUE

IIAIII, FL mn-1217

sccc

28 FebNary 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Lt Ocn Randall M. Schmidt. USAF, Commander, US Southern
Command Air Forces, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 85707-4100
{.

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SUBJEL'T: Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer
1. You are hereby appointed as the senior investigating officer for tho Army Regulation 15-6
(AR 15-6) investigation currently being conducted by BG John T. Furlow into the facts and
circumstances surroundiog the FBrs allegations of detainee abuse at JOint Task ForteGuantanamo, Cuba •

2. 1take this action because BG Furlow reported to me on 28 Febroary 2005 that be IlOW has
information that indicarcs the scope of the investigadon wID" teqUUc that III olfa=' senior ill rank
to him be interviewed. Accordingly, you are In assume authority aDd CODItOI over SO Furlow's
investigation and continue it until irs conclusion. DO Furlow and his investiptive team arc to
wort directly for you for the duration. and will fold their eJtistiDg wort product into )WI"
invcstigatioo. The scope of the investigation, and JUles UDder which it is tabe CODducted. tcmain .
the same as my original appoinlment memorandum for BO Furlow (EncJOS1D"C).
3. I(b)( 5)
IUSAF. Assislant StaffJudge Advocate, USSOumCOM. is
available to assist you as your 'ega! advisor. You may contaet~bH5)
Ifor a procedural
brief ar !(b){S)
I Submit your findings and recornmeDdaUons in written form on DA .
FORM 1574 by 31 March 2005. Any request for e.xteDSion to compJete this investigation
be submitted in writing to me.

must

End
as

1~~ndCommander

,.

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
F=vhihit

DOD JUNE

768

a

nf

71:. &:vhlhlt""

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

•

UNITED STATES SouTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
UIAIoU, Fl 33172-1217

5 May 2005

SCCC

MEMORANDUM FOR Lt Oen Randall M. Schmidt, USAF, Commander, US Southern
Command Air Forces, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 85707-4100
SUBJECf: Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer - Supplemental Instructions

1. References:
a Memorandum, USSOUTIICOM, SCCC, 29 Dec 04, Appointment of Investigating Officer
b. Memorandum, USSOUIHCOM, SCCC, 28 Feb OS, Appointment of Senior Investigating
Officer
2. In addition to those ma~ in the referenced memos, you are directed to further investigate
the facts and circumstances concerning allegations of detainee abuse contained in two memos
dated 11 Dec 04 and 24 Dec 04 and provided to BG Furlow. You are directed to make additional
[mdings and recoII1D1Cndations as necessary in your report and submit your report to me as soon
as possible.

~

General, US Army
Commander

-.
UNCLASSIFIED
DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit
'.f
of 76 Exhibits

769

SEcnETHNOFORN

.<'

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.s. NAVAL BASE, GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA

APO A.E 09360

JTF-GTMd b )(2)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Allegations of Torture regardina(b)(6)

------

1. b)(6)
has been one ofthe most ifnot the mo
at JTF-GTMO. b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
mse 10 0 e auntanJan au onties 10
November 2001·~b)(1) Sec 1 4lc)
I In July 2002, he was
turned over to the US in Bagr~ AF and arrived in GTMO fb)(1) Sec 1.4(a) I
2.tb)(6)
Ireported to~1) Sec Jon Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a) ~e following story of torture that
occured here at GTMO unng the months of August through October of2003. According to the
detainee, approximately a year after his arrival here he was subjected to torture by personnel at
Guantanamo. He has named some of the personnel involved.
"
personnel who were present .
S
"ticall he mentioned b)(6)
fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

'"

. b

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

:(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
i

!

SEC REI 17

DOD JUNE

l~

0 fOR N"

AA 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit
'5
of 76 Exhibits

770

SECRETNNOFORN
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I
7. Kb)(6)
Istates that as a result of this torture he was coerced into signing a statement that
implicated bimKb)( 1) Sec 1.4(c)
iThe detainee has since recanted
that statement. Within the time that he has been
compliant, he has denied ever being
involved in or knowing aboutb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~

CO=lY

8. Recommendation. Pass this infonnation up the chain ofcommand to facilitate an
investigation into the detainee's allegation of torture.

I

b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

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:..-_------_--.!

Received by Kb)(6),b)(3) 10
'I ICC C'of')OO

Signature:

Date:
Time:

5E€RETIINOFORN
DOD JUNE

771

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Joint Task Force GTMO
APOAE 09360

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Possible Torture AllegationJb)(2),(b)(6)

'----------

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the testimony and allegation of abuse
from(b)(2),(b)(6)
l The following is the detainee's statement and other
background infonnation regarding his allegations.
2. On 23 May 2003, b)(6),(b)(3) 50 USC tumed over hold status of the detainee to
DODVb)( 1) Sec 1 4(c)
Kb)(2),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
,Three days later, three personnel
appeared atKb)(1) Sec
with the detainee. kb){ 1) Sec 1 4(c)
t
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

--

ese ree personnel stated that they had been working on his case for a
~
long time behind the sceneS1hlLtLSek1-4icL-.
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

Kb)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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,

4. On 17 June 2003, two guards appe~t the detainee's cell and infortlled him that
he was moving. One of the guards ha4:b)(~),written plai~ his gloves, so the
detainee informed his block-mates that he wa~ mo.v.J·n.0. .td b )(2, lhe detainee was taken

,,
,1 was kept. later,
to an isolation block where one other detainee \~)(6)
ig?t~?,(b)(6):wasmoved to the block and all three tonptbAr WAcO I;uinn nnc:-:11p-:-)(=2:-)!

-5 E eRE 'fIlNOJl'OItN-

DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
b
of 76 Exhibits
Exhibit

'.
772

SEC R E TIINOFORN
Ilb)(2) lb)(S iwas left alone. At this point, all the detainee's personal items with the
exception of his clothes were confiscated, The detainee describes the room he was in
as built of steel from floor to ceiling with a very cold temperature setting on the air
conditioner. Other detainee described this room as the "freezer'. Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
Kb)(1') Sec'1.4(c)
i
,
I

i
i

1

_

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

'.

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

SEC R E T//NorOftN

DOD JUNE

-.
773

'S-E C oR

~

T//NOFOR.'J.

.

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

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I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

--

ib)( 1) Sec 1.4(c), (b)(6)

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,

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

'S Ii: eRE THNOFORN

DOD JUNE

-.
774

SEC R E TltNOFORN

(b)(1) See 1.4(e)
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,

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defalneeaiWayshacrabreakatOOonfor lunch. Every morning the detainee was scared

l~b)(1) See 1.4(e)

I
I

fb)(6),(b)(1) See 1.4(e)

l(b)(1) See 1.4(e),(b)(6)
I

were p ae a around. The room had normal lighting and b 6 gave the detainee food
but he refused to eat it. The detainee stated that he refused to eat food when he was
humiliated.
Kb)(1) See 1.4(a),(b)(6)
i

--s--E-t R E THNO...· ORN

DOD JUNE

775

..s E CitE TttNO('ORN
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

------"

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c);(b)(6)

-----~--------------

l(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I

i

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

H~_
Khere was three days
16. ith\X1) Sec 1 4(c). ~~
without b)(1) Sec
bOnducted bWb)(2) (b)(S)
Ithe detainee)yas
transferred to(b)(2) Iblock in the general populace for one night and he told his brothers
there what had happened to him. On Sunday they returned the detainee back to his
previous cell. ~b\(2)
. ...
ithe guards took the detainee tq(b)(2) IBlock,
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
. The detainee stayed Friday through Mond~y. which was
hiS weekend of rest mentioned earlier.
_

•

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

s ~ (. R .E THNOFORNDOD JUNE

776

· SEC R E Tl+NOFORN

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)
,,

I
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I

I

18.
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

SEC R E TNNOFORN

DOD JUNE

777

SEC R E Th'NOFORN-

.

The detainee claims that he went without food sometimes for 24 hours and when he
was fed the portions were very little and always served cold. The detainee was awaken
every hour or two and only and forced to drink one liter of water. The detainee was
either drinking water or on the toilet all night. b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
!(OJ( I) ;sec I A(C)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)
i

...
21. The detainee stated that Evidence to support his allegations corroborated by

IOOki~kJW1)t~:J~I~~)a thlncs
i

• Medical reports from the incident could be found showing that he received
medical care, but he was never taken to the hospital
.KblLttSec 1 4(c) (bUS)
.1~~~ Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)
.
~
• The Intemational Community of the Red Cross had no contact with the detainee
'.
for more than a year
• b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC
§130B

-8 E eRE THNOFOKN- ...

DOD JUNE

778

.s E C It £ TIINOFORN
Kb)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

'.

s-E C

DOD JUNE

l~

E THNOFORN-

779

UNCLASSIFIED
(SE.CRET NODIS WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY ENCLOSURE)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
3511 NW JiST AVENUE
MIAMI, A. ~172-1217

2 June 2005

SCCC

MEMORANDUM FOR Lt Gen Randall M. Schmidt. USAF. Commander. U.S. Southern
Command Air Forces, Davis-MOnthan AFB r AZ. 85707-4100
SUBJECT: Appointment of Senior Investigating Officer - Supplemental Instruction #2

1. (U) References:
a. Memorandum. USSOUTHCOM. SCCC, 29 Dec 04. Appoinbnent of Investigating
,
b. Memorandum, USSOUTHCOM, SeCC r 28 Feb OS. Appoinbnent of Senior
Investigating Officer
c. Memorandum. USSOUTHCOM, secc. 5 May OS. Appoi~t of Senior
Investigating Officer- Supplernentallnstructions
Offi~

•

2. (U) In addition td those matters in the referenced memoranda, you are hereby
direct69 to make specific findings and recommendations with respect to the allegations
of ill treatment made by a particular detainee that are new to me and not addressed in
your draft Report of Investigation. The specific allegations as contained in the
Enclosure. Submit your report to me as soon as possible.

Enel
as

-e
AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
UNCLASSIFIED
Exhibit'
of 76 Exhibits
. (SECRET NODIS WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY ~CLOSURE)

.. .>

DOD JUNE

780

Enclosure 8
Denied in full
Exemption 3
JOUSC130c

DOD JUNE

781

Enclosure 9

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

782

Enclosure 10

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

783

Enclosure 11

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

784

Enclosure 12
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

785

Enclosure 13

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

786

Enclosure 14

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

787

Enclosure 15

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

788

Enclosure 16

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

789

Enclosure 17

Is a public document

DOD JUNE

790

Enclosure 18

Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

791

~CRETlfNOFORNI/

Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP)
for the

.~

~b)(2)

I~-

JTFGTMO
Joint Intelli~nce GraDD

lJIG)~

I(U)

._-----------~

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 January 2003
REVISED
12 JUNE 2003
REVISED
26 JULY 2004

DERIVED FROM: DIA DO HUMTNT SCG, March 2002
DECLASSIFY ON: X-I
AA 15-6 GTMO Investigation
. of 76 Exhibits

Exhibit'"
• ~ECRETttNOFOR1"

DOD JUNE

792

~SECRETf/X"·l

l'"

.

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

4

Preface

5

1. Purpose

6

2. Scope

6

3. References

6

4. ~ersonnel.
5. ~b)(2)

,

,

6

,

7

1

6. ~b)(2)

.............................................................................7

7. ~b)(2)

:

7

fb--~

8. [>)(2)

:Schedules

9. (b)(2)

Priorities

7

,

L-.--:---~_._--'

f·· ..·.. ······....·.. ·.. ·.. ·..·····........··..........···..·· .... 9

10. (b)(2)

------'

I

11. ~b)(2)

;

Initial~b)(2)

12.

8

'----~

9
1O

iProducts

13. (b)(2)
I

14. Report Writing

~

:

----'I

15. Detainee Requests forf_)_(2)_ _
16.Kb)(2)

16

,

19

...................................................................................19

17. ~b)(2)

IBrier<b)(2)

I,• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • _ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

19

18. Chain of Command

19

19. Usc of Military Police (MP)

20
Pftg~2 of

SECRETI(X-J

DOD JUNE

793

SECftET/f)[w1 .

APPENDIX
A. (b)(2)
I

B. (b)(2)

'cheduling Request

,

,

21

IS~reening Categories by Priority

22

D. Analyst Support Package (ASP)

23

IGuide

E!b)(2)

.24

F. Summary(~b)~(2)L-_ _~~~---.-JIGuide

29

G. Intelligence Infonnation Report (UR) Guide

32

H. ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I. MSU Transfer Request Forni

1· .. · .. ··· .. · .. ··· .... ·· .. ·· .. · .. ·· .. ··· .. ··· .. ·.·... 35

,

J~b)(2)

K.~_)

,

"

"

l

-~_B~fE

37

Guide

:

LKb)(2)
I

'.

Psgt!t2 of

SI';CRETllX I
'.

DOD JUNE

36

794

38

SECRETlIX~

INTRODUCTION
(0) History is being made with the Interrogations Operations takioe place at
(b)(2)

GlIa nt ::ma mo Q.,,,

!
_ f_ _

.

~.~_.~_

..

~

.~r--. ---'"---_._~--"';---- ••_.· _ ...... va'L..,--vn-~UA"-Vlll(
....U

-vL4u...~·urr-

l--~ _ _---\~_b)_(2_)_ -. - Operationally, it breaks new ground. The Comman<L (~l~ __~---J Analysts,
Service and Support elements, and Military Police are daily being asked not just to do the jobs they
were trained for, but to radically ~reate new methods and methodologies that are needed to complete
this mission in defense of our nation. Reserve and Active components of all service branches are
working this mission. along with numerous civilian and federal law enforcement a encies. This is a
and most
unique opportunity to work with other agencies, to enhance your b)(2)
importantly, to serve in defense of your -country. There is much you WI - as
to 0 which is not
in any of your prior training. There are legal. political. strategic and moral issues that influence and
affect how operations are conducted in this vital part of Operation Enduring Freedom. You must be
aware that your activities and actions are often directed by or reported to the highest levels of
government. Also, agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), foreign
delegations, and the world media keenly watch how this operation is conducted and how (b)(2)
i
are handled. It is vital to JTF-GTMO that all Soldiers, Sailors, Ainnen, Marines and Civilians
conduct themselves in a manner that reflects well on the legal principles America is founded upon.

--

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SIi;;CRKTl/x I-

DOD JUNE

-.
795

~CRE'fIIX-l

Preface

~eb-)_(2_)

----e'CODE (W CONDUCT

I. Treat detainees humanely.
a. President Bush dctennined that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to members of al Qaida or
the Taliban and that they are not prisoners of war but are unlawful combatants.
b. President Bush does requireilie Department ofDefense to treat detainees humanely, and, to the
extent appropriate- and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the Geneva
Conventions (pOTUS memorandum (C), 7 February 2002, Subj: Humane Treatment of a1 Qaeda and
Taliban detainees).
c. Humane treatment consists of providing detainees adequate food, drinking water, clothing,
shelter, medical treatment, and the free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of
detention. President's Military Order (0), 13 November 2001.
d. Humane treatment during~,-b_)(2_)
suffering.

,
L

~b)(1)

,operations means no severe physical or mental pain or

Sec 1.4(c)

,
!

!

~

c. TORTURE is not authorized under any circumstances.
I

(b)(1) Sec 14(e)

l~_

~.

--_..

J

~--~-,_._-------~-----

4. Ensure that competent authority has approved your interrogation plan. Any interrogation technique
not approved in this SOP or contained in the SECDEF guidance must be forwarded through the chain of
command for appropriate command approval for usc with any specific detainee.
~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

6. Contact the Staff Judge Advocate for further information concerning the legal basis of detention or
(b)(2),operations.

SECREl'HX-1

DOD JUNE

796

-sECItE·lnx-r·

JOINT TASK
. FORCE-GTMO
.

r:.

.'

~b)(2) JO~INTERROG~ONGRmIP
SOP

(b)(2)

1.

ffi]

purooSj To provide the unique information needed to succeed in the challenging and vital
I(b 2)~
Operations taking place at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in support of the International War
on Terrorism.

~===-~ly to

2. (U) Scope. These procedmes
l(b)(2)

LO--'--''--'--_-----'

l(b)(2)
I serving within the
Group (nO) of Joint Task Force (JTF)

GTMO.
3. (U) References.
A. (U) DIAM 58-11, The DoD HUMINT Policies (U) SECRETINOFORN, 3 AUO 1998

B. (U) DIAM 58-12, DoD HUMINT Management System, 30 June 1997

C. (U) FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, 8 March 1994

I

D. (U) FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis, 15 March 1990
E. (U) FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 8 May 1987
~

F. (U) Understanding. Islam, Yahiya Emerick; 2002
4. (U) lliTIJPersoDDel.

~~f:!!~§§~;nhi~'e~f. Responsible for success of ~ mission, provides overall
lement.
B.

.

L

(U) no Operations Officer. Deals with all issues within the detainee caJ!!.I?J(b)(2)
=o=J
and
Also coordinates interrogator contact with the Field Hospital Qocated next toM
~-,--)(-,-2~)_ -,land
Brig, as necessary. Provides liaison with l(b)(3):S(1)
I

--J}.

L ----E. (U) Reports Officer. Reviews and transmits IIRs, KEs, disseminates 3025, updates
collection binders, and archives all docwnents mentioned to the J2\(b)(2) \Drive.

Pag,\lef
DOD JUNE

797

I

·

~.,

Q'f'{'IUi'TIi i

Kb)(2) "
G·I

I
I

I

!:L---G.

I

I. ,~~L.J~---l..:o.LLeCl~L!lli!~~~l.L~£!Y!lli@.~d'tJll:
Works within the Renjo"?!
-(b)(2)
develop and process intelligence requirements (b)(1) Sec
.,l~J?b~\I-!1..J.\~S"""tJ:c;....1L.S4J..i(a::J.J)llHelps maintain the (b)(1) Sec 1,4(a)
n~~l Sec Idatabase.
LI---------.I-----~

I

(U) Regional Team Chief. Provides leadership and manages (b)(2)
;pl~
execution oOb)(2)
and report writing. Responsible for developing and reporting (b)(2)
(b)(2~_.paily Highlights to l e a d e r s h i p . - - - '

(U). Analyst.

Works within a ~:. . .:b).:. . (2):. . ._

!_:_---~

b)(2)
L.

~

I

(b)(2)
I Works within a ~b)(2)
I Conducts (~b)(1:ol2)
intelligence collected. Helps determine the proper order offiillil
personal relationship with detainee and writes the ~b)(2)

K. (U)

.-J

particular~b)(2)

and ensure qual ity in

reports on
'Develops a
I detailing how a
an........,."d

""_'1

F

I

L. (U) Linguist.- Works within a ~b)(~
answers in an accurate and timely manner.

5. (U) ~b)(2)

I

Translates~_b)_(2_)_ _~Iquestions and detainees

!

<

~b)(2r~----------------------lj

--------------==-==========-

6. 1!ll.~(b)::(2):.._

___J~

~

II

i

7. (U) Kb)(~)

-- --- - e----__ J

A. (C)(b)(1) Sec 14 C

(b)(1) Sec 14 C

I

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DOD JUNE

798

·

,;;.

.
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

B.

.

(C)~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1} Sec lAIC)
I

L

~~

~

_

------~

-------- -

- -- - ---

8. (U~bi(i)------ i Schedules.
A. (U) Once a b)(2)

Ihas selected specific detaineesKb)(2)
1 a tentative schedule of
developed for the next week.~b)(2)
_ Jschedules identify ~b)(2)
detainee ISNs, requested date and time, estimated nmnber oIhours required for an,(:-b"""')(2:-:-)- - booth and-linguist, and specific language needed.
~

lis

b)(2)

;

:

l-I

B. (5) (b)(2)

schedule

----.J

_ _

~b)(2)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

C. (8) Regardless of a shift,(b1l21

lean be scheduled at any time of the day if necessarY

l(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

9. (e)
(b)(1)
i

-~---,------,----=------------------

~b)(1)Sec1.4C

sL

I

i

v

b)(2)
L-

-1

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f·'

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SECIttTt/X"-1
DOD JUNE

-799

schedules is necessary

-

-8ECRE'fflX-1
B. (U)~t~H~L
Js for a definite time period not to exceed
120 days. It identifies new short- to intermediate-term information needs in response to
unforeseen situations, emerging crises or contingencies. It can be used to register additional or
refined requirements in cormection with a unique collection opportunity. (Or it may be used to
raise the priority of an existing requirement.) fb)(2) : will not be used as a substitute for
submitting standing~b)(2LJnominations or revisions to current ~b)(2) : ThJb)(2) Imust include a
justification explaining the time urgency, the priority of information needeCra:na7or criticality to
the consumers' mission/task accomplishment.
u

C. (ujb)(2)
.is an expansion on one or more of the
broad reqUIrements contaIned In National HUMINT Collection Directives (NHCDs). An Kb)(2)
may support one or more NHCDs. Within DoD, Commands, Services, and production elemenr.s
assigned primary production resoonsibility under the 000 Intelligence Production Program
support DoD operational planning, policy and decision(DoDJPP) generate ~b)(2)
making, intelligence production, and intelligence databases. Them=:Jprovides the collector
sufficient detail to focus and target collection efforts against the stated infonnation needs.

D. (C) b)(2)
is a docwnent that provides tailored
nonnall based on a KB. While standing
requirements to levy on a specific source )(2)
~b )(2)
!generally contain sufficient coIl ectt~lo~n~.Y.ul~~~!Ml!.....J...a.uJ!lllt.en.LtItleID-tIill:2L-l..IunJllid~
additional details tailored to the specific b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
L,,--..------....-----;....-:--;---,....---._=_:_~
(b)(1) Sec
They refine a collector's focus an Improve e capa ility to fully exploit the
opportunity. The (b)(2) I is not a means to submit new requirements, or levy additional
requirements unrelated to the collection element's stated target or opportunitY,Kb)(1) Sec
I
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c) ~~
I
10. (U) Kb)(2)
~b)(2)
.-

!

'.

Il.JJlL(b)_(2_)
(b)(2) _

1

.

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DOD JUNE

800

SECllET/tX J-

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}

:(b)(2)

L

12. (U) InitiaUb)(2)

_

! Products.

A. (U) Analyst Support Package (ASP).

(1) (U) The analyst's goal as a member of the(b)(2)
is to provide timely, thorough and
useful intelligence to help guide the ~b~2:L;=:::so:::=:::=£;r~ocess. In order to reach this goal. the '.
Analyst works hand-in-hand \\-ith other i b)(2)
imembers to ensure research is done
exactly-as needed.
(2) (U) The first step in the process that requires analyst involvement is the selection of the

r~)~ to belbH21

::.'

II

IbId;

(3) (U) There are also Ad Hoc requirem~nts that are addressed by th~b)(2)
I. These are
handled as received and as time allows.
Names of detainees developed through
investigations are discussed by members of the ~b)(2)
! and
introduced to the
(b)(2)
llist in an order agreed upon by the team.
(4) (U) Next in tht!~b)(2)
preparation process that the analyst creates the Analyst Support
Package (ASP) (Appendix D). This is the most critical contribution the analyst will make
and will require the largest amount of the analyst's time. The time involved in preparing this
package varies greatly depending on the amount of information available on the detainee.

(a) (C) The analyst begins with the ASP temnlate and aleans as much infoTnllltion as possible
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
Then using
lall of the research tools aVaIlable, the analyst creates the ASP, which enables the
(b)(2)
Ito create a solid ~b)(2)
1- critical for 'the success of any
(b)(2)
I
(b)~(b)(1)

Sec 14 C

(b)( 1)

(c) (S)(b)(1)Sec14C
(b·)(1)'1,.IS..ec, , - , 1 " . 4 " ' C . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - ' 1
,

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of

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DOD JUNE

801

SECRE'l'llX I
(d)' (U) ASP Format:
(U) ~b)(2)

1

fb)(2)

!

II
I

2.

(U)

I

Photo. The most current photo of the detainee.

E(U)b)(2)
b)(2)

-----------------------'
1M~

~

EL-·--------------------1

1

Q

~X1) Sec 1.4 C
ec1
.4C

t::.

r

S) bX1j Sec 1.4 C

b)(1) ec 14 C
-:.

Z

(SfNF)]b)(1) Sec 14 C
(b)(1) Sec 1:-. v
i
I

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~)(2)
i

b)(2)

\

-=--_-_-_-_-_-.-._-_-_.-..-_.-.-_.--..-_.-. ._-__-_.-_-_.=---__-.-_-._-._--.-_..-_-_-_-_-_=--_-=--_

2. (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

~

t9\C1\ Sec 11 C

I

10 (C) Collection Requirements. Identifies collectio~)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~b).(~1_~ec__.: Will help the~b)(2)

I

develop the (b)(: based on these requirements.

especially (b)(2)

-----------~-------------I

llM~

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SlU'RETIIX." .
(U)~b)(2)

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b)(1)

ec 1.4 C

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(5) (U) (b)(2)

L- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

i

I
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B. illll-E.b)~(2!_)

---J

(l)lillj;(,b ,)~{2)~

___{

(b)(2) '-

(2) (U) Review pertinent sources of information let include when nndatina
hard copy detainee file as well as the soft cop}'i\b)(2)

I'

I

,

vonrW I T"e ~th the
!

(a) (U) Detainee Files.fb)(2).
. ..
.
. ] Detainee folders are filed numerically
by Internee Serial ~6er-(ISN).-Whena-detalneefolder is removed~b)(2)
Iit must
be signed out first using the sign-out sheet found in every hanging flle folder.
(b) (U)(b)(2)

I

_____ 1

(b)(2)

(c) (C) ~b)(l) Sec 1.4 C

(b)Ti)sec 14 C
!
!

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DOD JUNE

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(d) '(C}b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

(b)(1Y :sec

1.4 G

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(e)

r

---------

~--

---- - - - -

(U).(b)_(2)

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l

(2) -

!

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I
(f) ~b)(2)

~
II

rbl~I----------------------1

i

Information

Reports.

Extracted

from

previously

answered

(k) (C) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 14 G

-----.--..- l

(1) ~(1) Sec 1.4 C
~b)(1)

I

v-r."V

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(m) (U)(b)(2)

JCommunicationILeadership Matrix.

(3) (U)~)(2)
(b)(2)

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.-SECRET/IX +

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1

(5) (U) ~b)(2)
/Linguist Meeting. This meeting must take place at least fifteen rnin1Jles
prior to the1bl(21
~b )(2)
.
(b)(2)
__
_
__
~
I
~b)(2)
! No later
than the day prior to the (b)(2)
Ishould confinn with the linguist
scheduled time and language of the linguist supporting the 0.: .(1))=(2:1-)_ _--'
(6)~ __
b)(_2)

_

~b)(2)

j
1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

~b)(2)
(a) (C) b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

".,.

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~b)(1)

(b~)(U)lb)-(2)---------------------1
(b)(2) -

,

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(c) (C)ib)(1)SeC1.4C
(b)(1):.....-

---'

(d) Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

1 JID.Jb)(2)

-

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2

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(cjb)(1) Sec 14 C

I,

cu1b)(2)

~b)(2)

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(C)~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

ro~,""

-13. (U)(b)(2l
• ,I The objective of any b)(2)
is to obtain the maximum amOlmt of
L
usable information in the timeliest manner. A succ-es,...,.s...-::T1r.=::--'-----,produces needed infonnation
that is timely, complete. clear, and accurate.~b)(2)
~b)(2)
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b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

...

C~b)(2)
~b)(2)

---------------------------.:

(l) (U)~b)(2)
rb)(2)1~----------------------------!

I

(2um}b)(2)

-er

(b)(2)

I

(3) iCJb)(l) Sec 1.4 C
. (b)(l)L.1--~-------------------------i,

(4t(!ll~b)(2)
(b)(2)

~,-

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I
I

------------------------!

,

(5) (C) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

[,

(b)(l) Sec 1.4 C

1-

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D. JQ,(b)(l) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(l)

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SE(~RET!IX

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E. (C)Kb)(1) Sec 1.4C
(W..... o
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F. ~b)(1)Sec1.4C
(b)(1 )

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(b)(1):""",,~,.-------------------------------4

I

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1. (S) fb)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 G

..
(l) (S) fb)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b){1) Sec 14 C

(2) ($) (b)(1) Sec 14 C
(b)(1) Sec 14 C

(3) (S)~b)(1) Sec 14 C

(4) (SHb)(1) Sec 14 C
(b)(1) Sec t .. G

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808

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(6) (S) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec1.~I
.. . , . . . . v - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I
I

1

'--------------------------,

14. (U) REPORT WRITING.
A. (S) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1)'"tIV I." IOi
I

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(1) (U)~b )(2)

~'-.._-_-.-.-.~---_.-.-_~~-_-.-. -__-.-._-.._-.-_-._-.-_-_-.-._-_-----;:..- -.._-.-.-._-._-._-.-.-_.-._-.-_-._.-.-.-_._-_--1]
(2) (1) ~b)(2)
(b)(2)

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(3)F)(2!

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b)(2)

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B. (U) PostKb)(2)
a post~b)(2)
b
)(2)

Meeting. Following every (b)(2)
Imeeting. (b)(2)

t

have
I

I During this meeting the
determme which {b\m'"
have been
answered. At that point the determination is made concerning the need for another w(blli
\12u-\~~_
to answer the(b)(2)
I If the detennination is made for another
(b)(2)
101 tills detamee the whole process should go back to the ASP preparation step and
proceed from there.
If (b)(2)
! infonnation is obtained, the Cb)(2l
i writes an
Intelligence Information Report (IIR) Annex K). ~)(2)
:
~b)(2)
If the analyst was presenJb)(2)
Ithen
s e S ou asSist ill drafting the I~b)(2)
(b1l2\

C. fT n ~b)(2)
~L.

_

15. (U) Detainee Requests~(b_)(2_)

_'

A. (C~ Periodically detainees make requests through the MPs to see an fb)(2)
~b)(2)."
Inonnally work him into th~Lb);..:..(2_)- ;:==~
sc eduIe. A "visit" is conducted with_ the detainee in the booth to see what he wantfb)(2) !
Kb)(2)
Usual detainee requests involve questions concerning
status of their "case," cell transfers, or guard or medical-related issues.
!

B. (Cjb)(1) Sec 14 C
(b)(1) Sec 14 C
i

C. (U) The 13 Operations Officer posts detainee requests on thdb)(2) betainee Request Board each
day. Once a team has taken care of the request, the detainee's ISN is highlighted in yellow to
indicate the request has been filled. Team Chiefs ensure that ~b)(2)
manner to detainee requests.
'

~

----_._--;r.'.'

r:==, ,-r-,....-.

r==='I"'

---------

Irespond in an efficient
---

r=rJ.l"""- 'I.Je ...."

------1
£

~b)(2)

--J

=

I
I

i

I

I

PQg~2 ef

1i;F.,CRETt'f*: 1-

DOD JUNE

810

1
ii

... SECREl'f,X- r

.

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

17. (cJb)(1)Sec1.4C
fb)(1) Sec 1.4 C

I
18. ® Chain of-eommand. The Chain of Command for all personnel, civilian and military assigned
to th~(2)
Iis as follows: the immediate supervisor (the Section Chief),
followed by the Officer in Charge ofthe llil@, followed by the Joi
errogation Group Director,
followed by the JTF Commanding General. In the ~ce of the b)(2) OIC, the Operations Officer will
have command authority. In the absence of both th~ ole and th b)(2) Operations Officer, the
senior Section Chief will exercise command authority within the orgamzauon. All personnel are
Ioversight and properly reporting incidents through the proper Chain of
responsible [0*)(2)
Command.
, The Military Police (MP) may not participate in
19. (q Use Military Police DulinJb)(2)
~b)(2)
Iprocess. "Their role is strictly for security and safety of all individuals associated with
the (b)(2)
process.

".

(. ;

PRg~2

af

SF-CItE IJ/X-t

DOD JUNE

'.

811

·SECR:ElYIX-i- .
20. Appendix A

Battle Rhythm
(b)(2)

«'.

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

{

,

.

•
'

(b)(2)
(b)(2)

r'-----b_)(2_)

\

1

.

(b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

Paee.2 ef
DOD JUNE

812

Friday. 17 JANUARY 2003
Team

~':

Start Time Duration

fSN

Language Linguist 1st Linguist 2nd

POC

fSN

Language linguist 1st Linguist 2nd

poe

Saturday. 18 JANUARY 2003

;

Team

Start Time Duration

DOD JUNE

81.3

SEeRErtnM

.

Appendix C

-

(b)(1) Sec 14(c)
__

~

I

.~_

.•

._._,

"

.

., _ _..1I

.

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I
~)(1) Sec 14(c)

I

I
~b)(1) Sec 14(c)
I

[(1) Sec 14(e)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

.,.

'.

-.
I

I
I

P-8g~2

9f

'SECltET/tX·t-

DOD JUNE

-.
814

~F;CRJ!:'f'it.X-t

AppendixD

ANALYST SUPPORT SUMMARY
JTF-GTMO JIG

I'

(Sf/NF)
(SfINF)
(S//NF)
(Sf/NF)

,

;

(Sf/NF)

l
~

(SIINF)
(SIINF)
(SIINF)
(SIINF)
;-.

(Sf/NF)
(S/lNF)
(SIINF)

REFERENCE INFORMATION
CURRENT AS OF DATE
ISN#
NAM&GTMO#
MP#
SOURCE#
LANGUAGE
CITIZENSHIP
ETHNICITV
CURRENT CELL
ANALYST
INTERROGATOR
SUMMARY OF

(SI/NF)

PREVIOU~_b)(_2)

DETAINEE

PHOTO

~1 AND REPORTING

(b)(1) Sec 1 4(e)

,
,

(b)(1) See 1.4(e)

~rbJ=(1=)s=ec=1='4(=e)================================================~I
~lbJ(1J Seo '<(oj
(b)(1) See H(e)

~

l

(b)(1) See H(e)

I
'SECRETIIX 1

DOD JUNE

815

__

I

I

:

't.'

SECREIJlX-T

...•..

--~-----

~ _

--

c

_

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(SIINF)

I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(SIINF)

I

SOURCES

"
-'.'

':i..

--

'.

Pag~2

af

SECItET11JM.
'.

DOD JUNE

816

SE€R£TflX-1 .

.,

Appendix E

ISN:
Source Name:
Languages Spoken:
Team:
DoD Team Chief:
DoD.Team ChielPhone #:
~b)(2)

Analyst:

CMT:
Language Requested:
Linguist Requested:

i'

Datelfime o~_b)_(2-:-)

L

~:~;no~t~~,rr2toD ~

I
I

Previous Reports:
Report Number

Subject

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
t_

_

:(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

!

.sECRETJ~

DOD JUNE

l-

81.7

SECMTlIX-I·
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Purpose of (b)(2)

...
(Requirements:

----

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

Translation Meth'od:
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
'.

Seqoential Questioning Plan:
Controllable Material

Questioner

PllgE'j2 ef
~l/;CRKT;lfX 1

DOD J1JNE

818

~.

Control Questions:

'.

PQge;2 ef
SECIQ;TJlX 1

DOD JUNE

819

· SECRET/IX I

(b)(1) See 1.4{e)

~b){l)

Sec lA{e)

I

P8g~18f

SECRETIRW
DOD JUNE

820

... ~_., _

'.' .1.&-'"

.

.' Appendix F
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
i

----.JI(U)

r_)(2_)
~b)(2)

1. (S) b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
b)(1) vue> i'

V

S I ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1L--

2.

~

3. (S) b)(1)Sec1.4C
~b)(1

<.

4. (S)~b)(1) Sec 14 C
~b)(1)""". . . - - r : - r c r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - l

I
!

I
I

5. ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
~b)(1)I<>oo ,.• v
I

P-.. g~2 ef

..'

~E(.RErllX-l-

DOD JUNE

821

'-SECREl1tX-l
6. (S)~b)(1) Sec HC
(bi(Tj'sec 1.4 C

7. JIDjb)(1)Sec1.4C
~b)(1)1

A. (S1b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

B. (S)

8.

~liL:"b";)(1;)S~ec;1=;:4;:C===================================---ib)(1) ~ec .... 0

I

9. ~!b)(1)Sec1.4C
I
r.~b)~(1~):::=:::=========:==:=r------------------

rb)(1)SeC14C

I

..,

i
' - - - - - - - - -

I

lO.1S)fb)(1) Sec 1.4 C

~b)(1}vl::CT:'f,,,o,----------------r-----"--------d
.....

rb)(1) Sec 14 C

,-

I

] 1. (5) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

.-.--------j

~bj(ij

Kb)(1fsec 14 C-

~.

-

'·-1

---_. -----.-

12. (S)~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
,

PIl~~2 6f
~ECRF,'fH*-i

DOD JUNE

822

-SECRETHX=I .

A.

(S)~b)(1) Sec 1.4C
(b)(1)L'~~-----------'----:--------------

,

B. (8) (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C

C. (S)(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
ib)(1) Sec 1.4 C

.~

II
13. (S) OTHER REPORTS TO BE GENERATED:

A.~S b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
b)(1

l

B. (S) fb){1) Sec 1.4{c)
(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130b

15. (U)!
Kb)(2),(b)(3):10

usc §130b

I

P8g~2

of

-SECRK=fUX-J

DOD JUNE

823

I

SECR~T/tx ·1

Appendix G

....

Intelligence Information Report (JIlt) Guide (U)
(V) QU~STIONS REGARDING IIR WRITING REFER TO THE ClAM 58-12 SECTION 6 OF 7HE REGIONAL
COLLECTION BINDER OR ASK AN RO FOR ASSISTANCE.
(UJ

EVERYTHING BELOW IN BLUE IS FOR REFERENCE AND SHOULD 3E DELETED BEFORE SEND!NG THE

flN1'.L IIR '1'0 THE REPORTS OFFICER.
(UJ In the text REMOVE I, $, ", :, AND .~NY OTHER SYMBOLS. CCLm:S (:) AND QUOTES ("J
SHOULD BE CHANGED TO DOUBLE DASHES (--), DOLLAR SIGNS :$) TO USD AND NUMBER SIGNS
(II) TO NO. (SHORT FOR NUMBER) OR JUST COMPLETELY REMOVE.
THERE CAN BE NO "TABS" IN
THE REPORT. THE FIRST TIME A PERSON'S LAST NAME IS INTRODUCED, IT IS IN «
) ). Do
not remove colons (:) after pro-words.

SEC RET
SERIAL:
Wi (b)(2)
COUNTRY:

(U) COUNTRY (IES)

(COUNTRY CODES).

SEPARATE BY SEMI-COLONS (i).

SUBJ: ~b)(2)
TITLE (MENTION COUNTRY INHERE)
AT END) ; CLASSIFY TITLE IF APPROPRIATE (U)

1-

J~:

(NO PERIOD

WARNING:
(U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASSIFIED SEC RET.

--------- --

DOl :

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
------~---

(U»)~Kb~)~(2=:l:)-__:__::_;__;_-----------------------'-,

~VENT(S) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
REQS:
DHCDs,

(U) HCRs; SDRs(PARTIAL-COMPLETE) REQUIREMENTS IN THIS ORDER; D-4J2-2410-002-02;

l

SOURCE:
(S) ~b)(2)
FULL MIDDLE NAME «LAST NAME) J SOURCE
NAME AS IT APPEARS UN tHE KB. THIS PART OUTLINES THE BACKGROUND, ACCESS, AND
RELIABILITY. LIST CITIZENSHIP/ NATIONALITY, OCCUPATION/EMPLOYMENT, AND ALIASES.
LIMIT TO 5 LINES.
SUMMARY:
(S) CAPTURE KEY HIGHLIGHTS. SUCCINCTLY DESCRIBE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
INFORMATION IN THE IIR. LIMIT TO 5 LINES. IF ENCLOSURE, --ADD THE WORD --ENCLOSURE- AT THE END OF PARAGRAPH.
TEXT:

(S)

1. (5) USE ACTIVE VOICE. STATE WHAT THE SOURCE SAID, NOT YOUR QUESTI~S, OR
'SOURCE SAID
' WHAT YOU ARE WRITING IS WHAT THE SOURCE SAID .. ' USE 'FIELD
COMMENTS' -- DO NOT USE COLONS(:)
WHEN THERE IS INFORMATION YOU NEED TO ADD THAT
WILL AMPLIFY WHAT THE SOURCE STATED E.G.,
'AT THIS TIME SOURCE BEGAN FIDGETING AND
ACTING EVASIVE' OR 'THE ZSU-23/4 HAS NOT BE~N REPORTED PREVIOUSLY IN AFGHANISTAN.'
USE 'SOURCE COMMENT'-- WH~N THE SOURCE PARENTHETICALLY ADDS INE?::~!Tn: ~ ~
THE WAY. THE HonSE I STAYED IN DID )JOT Y,AVE ANY RUNNING WATER.lb~t~a",--o.,." .... " w a u I
(b)(2)
IFOR CITY AND FEATURE LOCATIONS _
2
(b)(2)

':v

S~CJQ;TIIX::.J

DOD JUNE

824

SEC~ETIIX
2.

CLASSIFY INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS.
APPROPRIATELY, DO NOT INDENT.

($)

1

USE A, B, C,

E'I'C.

FOR SUB-PARAGRAPHS MEl

CI~,SSIFY

'.

3. (S)
IN MULTIPLE SOURCE IIRS, USE AN EXPRESSION SUCH AS "SOURCE (NUMBER)
STATED" PRECEDING THE PORTION OF THE TEXT AT'I'RIBUTABLE TO THAT SOURCE. LIS1' THE:
ADDITTONAL SOURCES IN TliE SOURCE PARP.GRAPH, NO ~mRE THAN FIVE LINES A PIEC£.
COMMENTS,:,.:~(~S~).....,--;-=1.
(5) jb)(1)Sec1.4C

_

~b)(1) Sec 1.4 dL
: -----------------------------1
----_._---------

.__ ._ ..

._--.J

2.
(e) (b)(1)Sec1.4C
(b)(1) Sec 1.41
1

i

CUI Lrb.:. :.)(2..:. .)

fb)(2)

_

~b)(2)

I

I
I
5.
(b)(2)

tv) (b)(2)
I

II
6

([j

1 (b)(2)

--

'-----------,----------------------

(b)(2)

7
(S\ (b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 fL

INSTR:
(b)(2)

Wi

_

'.

{hll2\

i
PRE P :

(U;

~b)(2)

l

(b)(2)

ENCL:

(b)(2)

(U ) (b)(2)

'-----------------------------

--sECRE I'7IX-T
'.

DOD JUNE

825

-----_._-----

(b)(2)

SECRlT1JX-1 _
",-

,-

ENCL: (U) ~b)(2)
TITLE (oj,
Li

ACQ:

(0)

_

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

DISSEM:

(U) (b)(2)

ENCLOSURES.

WARNING:

1-----------------------------

(0)

REPORT CLASSIfIED SEC RET.

Kb)(2)
DECL: Xl

~
0-

Pftgl\2 of
cSECIttT71X-1

DOD JUNE

826

SEC:RETI~- J

.

AppendixH
~b)(2)

i

(b)(2)

(b)(2)
I

(b)(2)
I

(U){b)(2)
(U)(b)(2)
I
(S) fb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

(S)~b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(0)

I
fb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

OR
fb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

(U~b)(2)

(b)(2)

OR

(b)(2)
(S) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

D(b)(1ySec1.4(0,------- -,

-

Ob)(1)

-~--

.-

----- ---

secT4[c)-

O~b)(1) Sec 14(c)
Ub)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

Pftg~2

of

~F-CRETllX-J

DOD JUNE

827

-SECRE1YIX- J

Appendix I

.-

(b)(2)

Kb)(2)
;

~(b)(2)
Mb)(2)
(sfb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I
EX:
fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I
I
(U)~b)(2)

(U~)
(b)(2)
,

==========:=-====

(S)(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

D

~b)(1)

o

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

D

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Sec 14(c)

o
(S~J~l~~ 14(c)

D

(b1(1l Sec 14(c11

D

(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

....

DOD JUNE

828

-

,
-

SECRt:T1JX-l
Append.ix J

'.

(b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)
I

(b)(2)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

'----------------------(U)(bj[ij- -

_~_u_u_

- - --

(S)

1

(S)~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(Ujb)(2)
.~

i

(U) ~b)(2)

-------------'

(stb)(1) Sec 14(c)
(S)~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

rb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(8) ~b)(1) Sec 14(c)

o ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
o ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
o

~b)(1) Sec 14(c)

(S)ib\(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

I

-.--- . ---- -----------l

~b)(1) Sec f4(c)

i

I

I

Pagt)lof
SECItE~l

DOD JUNE

829

SF.:CRElflX-l·
Appendix K
!.=.(b)u=:(2L)

--..-'1 Brie~b)(2)

__

Writing Guide

l__ - - - '

DATE:

ISN:
NAME: (AS GIVEN FROM BAGRAM IN SOURCE FILE)
DOD LEAD(b)(2)

. LINGUIST:
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

fuIT2LSTART TIME:

...

~b)(2) ~ND TIME:

>

L
~b)(1) Sec 14(0)

~~

I

I
!

~b)(1) Sec 14(0)

ib)(1) See 14(e)

i
II
I

~b)(1) Sec 14(0)

'.

I

-~.

JA.(b)(1) Sec 14(e)
2 (b)(1) See 14(e)
1

PQ~~J at

'SECftRTh£Xcl

-DOD JUNE

830

---

_._~----

SECItETltx-l
3. BlRTCITY-- XXx. (IF BORN IN DIFFERENT COUNTRY WllENlWllY DID HE MOVE
THERE?)

.-

....

4. BIRTCTRY-- XX. (COUNTRY WHERE HE WAS BORN.)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

-------------- - - - - - - - -

I

I

i

.!

'I

HIJREE (ISLAMIC CALENDAR): MONTH, DAY, YEAR
GREGORIAN (CHRISTIAt'lIWESTERN CALENDAR): MONTH, DAY, YEAR

6. LANGUAGES SPOKEN- XXX; XXX; XXX. (LIST LANGUAGES SOURCE KNOWS TO
INCLUDE VARIOUS DIALECTS OF ARABIC)

~.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

,(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
i
I

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

• • C>a·

P-agt>t2 af
SECnET/1X-J

DOD JUNE

831

••

4 ....... &&:&>

..... , .

~ECJU;;'fIIX-l·
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c) :

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I

I

I
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

i,

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

'.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

'.

DOD JUNE

832

SECU:E't'IIX-t .
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I
I

I

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

Pllg~19r

.sI:CRE'f/,c)( 1
:

DOD JUNE

833

-SEl:UKrNX 1,

··r..

Appendix L

SECRET/INOFORN
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WAS\:tINGTON, DC 20301·1000

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

. ~b)(2)
L'

_

MEMORANDUM FOR mE COMMANDER. US SOurHERN COMMAND

~S)

~b)(2)

Il - -

--'

(S/NF) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 14 C

(S/NF) ib)(1) Sec 1.4 C
P,)(1) Sec 1.4 C
'-.'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

,

a. ~~b)~(2):,::===================::;__

fU)

J

~_-'-'IU~) b. ~b)(2) ,
I

ib){2)

--------------------

_.,--~I,_,__S.,_)_c_.~b)(1) Sec 14(c)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4{c)

~

(S) d." ~b)(1)Sec1.4C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
IS/NFl ~b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
(b)(1) Sec 1.4 C
L..i

,

.

IS/NFl ~sec 1.4 C

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4 C

j

--------------.------------'

I
~~(S!oU)'__;\Kb)(1) Sec 1.4 C

~b)(1)

i.

Sec 1L.--

.,.-.-

il

I

--.,-.

'---1

----'

~b){6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

Attachments:
As stated

I

I

I

I
I
I-J

..
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FORElGN NAnONAl.5

Classified By: Secretary of
Defense
Reason:
1.5(a}
Declassify On: 2 April 2Q13

#At..
'-'

SECRETIINOFORN

2)
(b)(c--~i

(b)(2)

~EcnET/~

DOD JUNE

I

834

_
_

SEC~Th,*=l

:-

TIllS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK

'

.:

.

.

:

P-agt>t2 Af

SECRET/IX J

DOD JUNE

..
835

Enclosure 20
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

836

Enclosure 21
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

837

Enclosure 22
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

838

..
SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OFI(b)(6)
~ho was interviewed on 10 January
2005 at a Conference room in the Commissions Building, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). His
statement was substantially as follows:
I am the current Joint Interrogation Group (nG) Chief. I work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. 1
was deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) for a two year assignment. I took over the nG in late
summer 2003.
During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I
was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs,
inappropriate use-of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of
loud music andlor yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures
during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to inchide use
of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

-.. ..
~.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

li:,.•

I am not aware of any military working dogs being used in an interrontion l(b)(1)
l(b)(6)
I

I

J

(b)(6)
(b)(6)
When the FBI
comp ame a ut ml Italy mterrogators impersonating FBI, we discussed the issue and the practice was
stopped. J do not believe it violates any laws but the practice was stopped.
b)(6)

I am aware thatl(b)(6)
Iwas given a Letter of Reprimand by LTd(b)(6)
Ifor her involvement,
as the NeOIC, of the "lap dance" incident. She was one of the best interrogators. In fact, I believe that
Major General Miller sponsored her so she could obtain a commission.
The interrogation teams and the individual interrogators draft the interrogation plans and the approaches
to be used for the interrogation. If the plan doesn't involve techniques requiring additional approval, as
detailed in the 16 April 2003 S,ECDEF Memo, it is approved by the I(.:E Chief. If the approaches require
additional approval, the interrogation plan is forwarded to me for review and if necessary, notification is
sent to SECDEF. If a response not received within 7 days, I instruct the interrogation team to proceed
with the implementation of the approach.

is

The abnosphere at JTF-GTMO has gradually improved during my tenure. The pressure in the beginning
was tremendous because of the need to get information. The atmosphere was tense and the agencies
didn't always get along. That is not the case now.
.
I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the
witness~(b)(5)
I Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

~-~

DOD JUNE

... --

~~....:-

~

JOHN FURLOW
vesti2atins;. Officer

839

AQ 1

,,_~ ~TMn Investioation

c

Chief, JIG, GTMO, was interviewed and made the following
statement on or about 1600 hoW'S, PST, 15 April 2005, via telephone from GTMO to
Davis-Monthan AFB. nus statement is a summary of that interview only:

Kb)(6)

This interview was conducted for thi s)le Furpose of clarifying facts and circumstances
surrounding the interrogation ofISN (b (
Iwas sworn in as a witness and advised of his rights under the 5th
Amendment. He was told that he was ~ted of being a co-conspirator in
communicating a threat to detainee ISN ~ He said he understood his rights, did not
want a lawyer, and was prepared to answer questions.
Mrj(b)(6)

He stated that he arrived and began work at GTMO on 14 JuI o3.I(b)(6)

rb)(6)

....,

i_~

_

He commented that FM 34-52 pennits fear up during the course ofinterrogation and that
it is a proper and authorized interrogation technique. He stated that under the SECDEF
16 Apr 03 guidance that fear up can be approved by the interrogator and that it would not
have required higher-level approval.
(b)( 1)

He stated that MG Miller would have weekly staff meetings in which they would
specifically discuss interrogations but he would not have briefed or discussed this level of
detail with MG Miller. He cannot recall any specific guidance that MG Miller had in
place that had to do with threats to detainees in interrogation.

~)(~lb:"~ ~3 .

..

~~~r!'"
DOD JUNE

840

ran

He cannot be certain if LCDRI(b)(6)
this by the JAG prior to acting or in what level
of detail he would have briefed the JAG. He does not doubt LcnRJ(b)(6) Itestimony, he
just cannot confinn it.
l(b)(1 )
1(>-bL..»(--.l1) c--

------.JI He was not aware that it occmred and did not approve this

approach.

I swear that the above statement is a fair and accurate summary ofthe testimony ofMr.
l(b)(6)

I

(b)(6)

DOD JUNE

84J.

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF SGT~b)(6)
~ .interviewed on 8 February 2005
at a conference room at the 2SOth Ml Battalion Headquarters, Long Beach, California. The Alpha
Company Commander for the 250th Military Intelligence Battalion was also present for the interview.
Her statement was substantially as follows:
I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 07 August 2002 to 15 February 2003. At the
time I was stationed at GTMO I was assigned as an interrogator on the Saudi Arabian Team and Special
Projects Team.

....,.

During the course ofthe interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I
was specifically_asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs,
inappropriate"1JSe of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of
loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures
during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use
of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.
I have personal knowledge ofthe following:
I graduated from Fort Huachuca Interrogator Course, 97E, seven months prior to my deployment.

)?

It wr
)urderstanding..that detainee's were to be allowed four hours ofuninterrupted sleep and that
Mr. b 6 had to approve the use ofthe extended interrogations. Based on that criteria I never
witnessed sleep deprivation being used in interrogations.
I heard that the manipulation of the air conditioners to make the detainees uncomfortable was a
permissible technique during the OctoberlNovember 2002 timeframe, but I never saw it used.

ll..JoL~~---=---=---=--:-:-~---=--:r:========;--=---=---~--=:-

Both times the
Ithe Interrogation Control (ICE) Chief. The
technique was authorized and/or suggested b~(b)(6)
frrst incident occurred when my partner and I were interrogating a detainee who refused to stop praying.
The translator mentioned that he couldn't pray ifhc were "unclean." Mr-Vb)(6) linstructed me to
purchase some perfumed lotion and rub it
.
.
. ,
l(b)(6) Iverball a roved the techni ue. I(b)(6)

I declare under ~nalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary ofthe statement given by the
witness, SGT t(~(6)
I Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

rb)(S)

-

I

Investigating Officer
.
AR 1!5-6 GTMO Tnvestigation
1::'_1.-:1...: . . . . . .

DOD JUNE

842

_, ..,~ I::'_....:.... i.....

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF 2LT (b)(6)
who wasinterviewed on 23
March 2005 at Moon Hall, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. MAJ(b)(6)
2LTI(b)(E?)
counsel, was also present for this interview. Her statement was substantially as follows:
I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 14 February 2003 to 22 November
2003. At the time I was assigned to/working for the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) as the .
NCOIC of the Gulf States Team and later an interrogator for the Special Projects Team.
During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at
Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military
working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents,
inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an
interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

l
.--4.

I have personal knowledge of the following:
I graduated from the 97E course at Fort Huachuca in 1992. Prior to deploying to ITF-GlMO, I
completed a three-week "refresher course" at Fort Huachuca called "Tiger Team University."
Tiger Team UniverSity was split into two phases. The first phase, which was one week long,
provided an overview of the Arabic culture and the Islamic terrorist network. The second phase,
which lasted two weeks, was intended to provided the interrogators with specific scenarios and
reinforce the approaches that were both approved and successful JTF-GTMO. Several ofthe
instructors at Tiger Team University had personal experience interrogating detainees at JTFGTMO.
I heard about the use of female interrogators encroaching on a detainee's personal space while
attending Tiger Team University. A fonner JTF-GlMO instructor described bow a "SGT
l(b)(6} I used her gender, being a female, as an asset during interrogation sessions with a high
value detainee. The instructor described howKb)(6)
Itouched a detainee on the shoulder
and knee, leaned in close to the detainee's face, and whispere~ comments or questions in his ear.

I am aware of an interrogato~ impersonating an FBI agent.l(b)(6)

~b)(6)
!

~and loud music were both utilized in interrogations.

I(b)(1 ) ·

I

~ I wouldn't characterize the music as "loud." There was a policy that music used in
interrogations couldn't hurt the detainee's ears. Yelling was a technique used in implementing
the "Fear Up Harsh" approach. The use of yelling was taught during the basic 97E course at Fort

Huachuca.
I did not observe sleep deprivation used by interrogators..When I first arrived in GTMO, the
standing rule was a detainee couldn't be interrolZated for ·'more than 20 hours in a row." MG
DOD JUNE

843

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360

Kb)(1) Sec

JTF GTMq:b)(2)

11 4(a)

I

~M~E~M~O~RAQ.!:N~D~~~b~6'4b)(3)10 USC §130B
b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

~_---::----=-~_..-r

arno, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, APOAE 09360

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Admonishment

I. b 1 Sec 1.4 a
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
Techniques were used in the interro~~!.j.,;,~;,.:.,;;a~anni'iiVOrnif;;;a-;oriV""<ap;;V;pro~v:;:cd~on;-tbth,;;c-_--r
Interrogation PlAn (JP) As tbdlb¥fiLion duty that evening it was your responsibility to ensure
that aU ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a).
lWere completed as to the approved IP's.

2. You are hereby admonished for your failure to acoomplish supervisory duties. As an~b)(6) I
I have to be able to reJyon you to ensure that the mission is accomplished correctly. If I lose that
faith in your abilities, you lose any value to the mission. I sincerely hope that you use this
incident as a learniIlg tool and that this is a small blip in an otherwise iane career. While I remain
confident in your abifity. rest assured, any repeated failures will be dealt with severely.
3. This admonishment is imposed as an administrative measure and not punishment under
Article 15. UeMJ. This memorandum is referred to you for acknowledgment and rebuttal. if
any, to be provided within 72 hours of your receipt to myself. It is my intention to file this
admonislunent in your local file where it will remain for six months from the date oflhis
notification or until you depart, whichever is sooner.

Kb)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit
aUG. Exhibits

a"

'.

DOD JUNE

844

JTF GTMo(b)(2)I
~
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Admonishment

J. I hereby acknowledge receipt of this admonishment on~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

,

2. I have read and understood the unfavorable infonnation contained therein and:
a.

-P-

b. _

Elect to submit a response.
Electnot to submit a response.

3. I understand that if] wish to submit a response. I have 72 hours from the date of receipt in
which to do so.

b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC
130B

'.

-_.-.-...:.

2
'.

DOD JUNE

845

sUMMARIZED WIlNESS STATEMENT OF MAJI(b)(6) 0 •• , Fonner Operations Officer, who
interviewed on 7 March 2005 at the US Anny South LNO Office. USSOUTIiCOM Headquaners,
Miami, Florida. His statement was substantially as follows:

Was

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from Febnwy 2003 to January 2004.
During the caine of the interview 1was asked about what Jmew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I
. was specificaJlyasked about the foUowing acts: Inappropriate use ofmilitary wOlting dogs,
inappropriate use of duct tape. impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of
loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation. short-sbackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures
during interrogation, and inappropriate use ~f sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use
of lap dances and simulated m~qstnJal fluids.
I have persooal knowledge ofthe following:
I am not aware of any militaJy worldng dogs that were used in an iotenogation. We had a dog outside
the pumpkin patch, 1he area where new detainees are held. It was outside the reception area.
I was aware of SFCI(b)(6). limpersonating a Department ofState ropresc:atative. He was part ofthc
special projects team and would have been approved at the no level, that would have to be approved.
I did wimcss the use of music and strobe lights in interrogatiODS. The civilian contraetor interrogators
would use this teclm!que as part of a "Fear Up" approach in April or May 2003. We tol~ them to stop it
after Abu Ghraib came oul
.
. ~
.
I am not aware of short shackling being used in an interrogation. The detainee might be left in the booth
for an extended period of time after interrogations awaiting MPs. lbe short chain was done as a control
measure. The chain was close to the floor. The detainee was chained with his wrist close to the floor.
The interrogator would ask the MPs to put the detaiDec in that position. Where I saw that. I can't
remember if a chair was in the room. As far as I Jcnow, everything was in the boundaries.

J am familiar with an incident when SSG I(b) (6) Iand SOT IilillID1 used sexual contact to distract a
detainee. Both were told not to use the technique again and I believe SSGKb )(6) ~ived a written
letter of admonishment. Additionally J am familiar with the "magic market" incident The d_ee spat
in SGTl{l:»(6) ~ face. She was crying outside the booth and she developed a plan to psycholo8ically get
back at him. This tcchniquewas not in an approved interrogation plan. She touched the detainee on bis
shoulder, showed him the red ink on her hand and said by the way, I ~ ~ting. The guy threw
himself on the floor and started to bang his head because he was so freaked out by the ink.

.

I am not aware of sleep deprivation being used against detainees. IntClTogators had to get approval for up
to 15 boursa,day. TberuJesGeneral Miller set were 14 hours with five bours ofUnintenupteds)eep.
Sleep interruption was done by the interrogators at night. was quite labor-intensive, and was not
practical. It was something in the toolbox.
.-.-..:-

~-

1declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct swumary ofthe statement given by the
witness. MAl Kb)(6)
I Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. on 29 March 2005.

1I1lri A~~ll:ltn
DOD JUNE

~1~-AG
JOHN FURLOW
846

SUMMARIZED 'WITNESS STATEMENT OF Lt
~b)(6) ] former Interrogation
Control Element (ICE) Chief, who was interviewed on 22 March 2005 at his home in
Alabama.

eoi

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GlMO) on or about the first week of
December 2002 and re-deployed at the end ofJune 2003. I was the Interrogation Control
Element (ICE) Chief.
During the course ofthe interview I was aslced about what I knew about detainee ~use at
Guan~. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate uSe of
military worldng dogs, inappropriate use ofduct ta~ impersonation ofor intetference
with FBI agents, inappropriate use ofloud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, shortshackling, inappropriate use of extreme technique, to include the use oflap dances and
simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge ofthe following:
1t was i?illdC1Standing that prior to SECDEF approval of the Special InteImgation Plan
for ISN b ("m early December 2002), the guidance for interrogation procedures was
Field Manual 34-52. .
\(b)(6)

\

When 1 arrived at GlMO, I(b )(6)
] my predecessor, arranged for. SERE instructors
to teach their techniques to the interrogators at GTMO. 1he instructors did give some
briefings to the Joint Interrogation Group (nO) interrogators. MGMiller and I didn't
believe the techniques were appropriate for the IIF-GlMO mission.

I never heard ofany interrogators on my watch impersonating FBI agents. I do mow that
an intenogator, "LT\(b)(6)
Ion the Middle Eastern Team, impersonated a Depar1plent
of State agent prior to my arrival at GTMO. I would not ~ve had a problem with an
interrogator impersoriating any federal agency.
'".

"

Loud lllusic was used during selected interrogations. The rule on volume was that it
sbould..Dot be so loud that it would blow the detainee's ears out.

Yelling was also used on occasion during interrogations. Like music, the volwne was
never too loud, just a raised voice.
.
There were times that interrogators adjusted the air conditioner in an attempt to make the
interrogation booth cold. It wasn't like the booth was a "snow stonn" but it was cool.
The temperature depended on the cooperation of the detainee. It was a technique used to
make the detainee uncomfortable. I don't believe this would be in an interro~ation plan.

847
DOD JUNE

l

It is my understanding that a "la d
.. or something close occurred during my tenure
at JTF-GTMO. I be 'eve SG b 6
cd the "lap dance" and her supervisor was
l' ~b)(6)~
Iss
d
b)(6) ottogctherpriOIIO~~gationllDd'
decid to use Sexual tcosioo in an attempt to break a detainee. SG'll-){6:=Jubbed up
against the detainee and was
not to
teehn.ique again. SSG ScaIpato received
a written admonishment from \b)(6)
_ or this event Job
'."'":)

WId

~,

use,

.

In my op~on.ISN~ never physically abused duriDg the execution ofthc s
interrogation plan. ~~yhave been subjected to some menta1an . (b)(6)
.(b)(6)

f.;.

I declare under peuaby that ~fi::-::-o~0:.;;o;:,P1g in a 1rue aDd conect Slunmary of the statement
given by the wi~ Lt CoI(b)(6)
Executed at Davis-MontbanAir Force Base,
Arizona. on 29 March 2005.
(b)(6)

Investigating Officer .

·Ii

DOD JUNE

848

rt<

I

~...) 1=

vJb

1

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF SGT\(b)(6)
Iwho was interviewed on
09 February 2005 at a Conference room at the 2SOth Military Intelligence Battalion
Headquarters, Long Beach, California Her statement was substantially as follows:
~.

~: :
~ ...
ai,

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (OlMO) from 7 August 2002 to IS February 2003.
While I was stationed at GTMO, I was assigned as an interrogator to the Gulf States Team. I was
on loan during late November or early 2002 to the Special Projects Team.
During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at
Guantanamo.. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military
working dogs, inappropriate use ofduct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents,
inappropriate use ofloud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an
interrogation technique, to include use oflap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.
I have personal knowledge ofthe following:
I am not aware ofany interrogators being suspended or disciplined for interrogation misconduct.

I was never asked to use sexual tension in my interrogations. I never touched a detainee in a
sexual manner. I may have touched a detainee or put my hand close to a detainee's face so the
detainee had to acknowledge my existence, but never in a forceful or sexual manner. I would get
close to a detainee to erlsure he was paying attention to me and make sure that he was focUsed on
the interrogation
I would yell at detainee's occasionally to emphasis a point.

Music was used in interrogations. SGTj(b)(6) ~Iand I would use music to soothe the detainee's.
The music was Arabic, not heavy metal, rap or anything like that.
I am not aware of sleep deprivation beinp

IIsed

3Dgind gn" dAt.. i ... oo "

~b\{6\

!(b)(6)
1 declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by
the witness, SGTI(b)(6)
I Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base,-Arizona, on 29
March 2005.
'

~~-

JOHN FURLOW

estigating Officer
AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Cvh:&..... i.~.

DOD JUNE

849

_6 ...,...~_.L..:L.:A._

..

~

r·o
SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF SSGI(b)(6)
jwho was
interviewed on 09 February 2005 at a Conference room at the 250th MI Battalion Headquarters,
Long Beach, California. His statement was substantially as follows:
I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GlMO) from August 2002 to February 2003. At the
time I was stationed at GTMO I was assigned as an interrogator for the Special Projects Team
from October 2002 to November 2002 and the rest of the time I Was assigned to the Central Asia

....

~

Team.

~.

L

at

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse
Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military
working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents,
inappropriate use ofloud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an
interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.
I have personal knowledge of the following:
(b)(6)

I never impersonated an FBI agent or heard of any other interrogators impersonating FBI agents.
However, I would try anything except impersonating clergy, medical or Red Cross. !fyou can
use it and sell it to the detainee I say try it. A lot of interrogators used different ~'ro)es."
I am aware of yelling and loud music hein use . .
during interrogations. b 6
b
I don't recall music being used outside of Camp X-RaYiU.~~e~w-:::::o=,-r:use=",zemaI==-=:Ie=-=arti::::;:::·stI~m=:us::i-:;c,it,-.J
like Brittney Spears or Christina Aguilera. Yelling was part of Fear Up Harsh.
We never denied a detainee food or water. ISNllliillrefused food and water all the time. He was
fasting.

f,'

I never wi
(b)(6)

, .. I.

II

r,
L

DOD JUNE

eard of an interrogator

Enclosure 31
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

851

Enclosure 32
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

852

ENsk

b)(6)
sUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF
llnterrogator, who was interviewed on
23 February 2005 at a conference room at the RFTA, Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Her statement was
substantiaJJy as foJIows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from July 2002 to October 2002. I was a Team
leader for Interrogator.;.
During the course of the interview Jwas asked about what I knew about detainee ab~ at Guantanamo. I
was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of milital)' working dogs,
inappropriat~_use ofduct tape, impersonation ofor interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of
loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling. inappropriate usc of extreme temperatures
during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use
of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.
I have personal knowledge of the following:

e mg. screaming. or talking directly in the detaincc's ear were techniques used in
implementing the Fear'Up Approach.
Sleep Deprivation - No. Most oftbe interrogations I conducted while at GTMO didn't last longer than 2
or 3 hours. We would alter the times we interrogated dctainccs. For example, wakin the de •
galioo; rather than cooductin
(b)(6)
3 a.m. to conduct the· t
(b)(6)
(b)(6)

..
I heard that some interrogators mani uIated the air conditioner.; to make the detainees uncomfo.:t.able but
were told to sto . (b)(6)
,b )(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)

We were uqder a 101 ofpressure to obtain information from the detainees (especially ISN~
I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct stlIIUIWy ofthe statement given by the
witness, ENSkb)(6)
Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. o~ 29 March 2005.

I

.~-~...:-

~

~v±~~
..s-

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
P"""._L!L....

DOD JUNE

853

-

-

-

.. _ _ -

•••

a.

Enclosure 34
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

854

..f" .

(b)(1) Sec
:1 4(a)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECf: (b)( 1) Sec 1.4(c)
1. Request DctaineeKb)(2),(b)(6)
~ b)(6)
be mo::v~ea~acco~:;'ra';Jn~g"t"'oTlth"'e:-TC"-::;;e;rrll-OYI":::'rans::=;;fr:::er:'-;Sl:":c::t:h:;;:ea;r.Ul~e;-:W1::::ii·thic·;:jn(:;;b'V)("'2\) - Kb)(2)
: Attached is a proposed schedule ofmovementlinterrogafion
n:tneS(bH 1) Sec 1 4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

2. All comfort and nonessential items must be removed from the Detainee's
possession, except those required by official policy.

..

3.I(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. (b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

I.

L

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
'-

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
of 76 Exhibits
Exhibit &s.

~
~",

DOD JUNE

.~
855

Enclosure 35
Attachment Denied in
Full
Exemption 1

DOD J1JNE

856

Enclosure 36
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

857

SUMMARIZED WllNESS STATEMENT OF SGT I(b )(6)
lwho was interviewed on 09
February 2005 at a conference room at the 250th MI Battalion Headquarters, Long Beach,
California. Those present besides the witness was the Alpha Company Commander, 250th
Military Intelligence Battalion. His statement was substantially as follows:
I was stationed at Ouantanamo Bay, Cuba (OTMO) from August 2002 to February 2003. At the
time I was stationed at GTMO, I was assigned as an interrogator. However, m.ost of my time was
spent reviewing Memorandums for Record and draft interrogation plans with the military
analysts.

"<

During the course ofthe interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at
Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military
working dogs, inappropriate use ofduct tape, impersonation ofor interference with FBI agents,
inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an
interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.
I have personal knowledge of the following:
'.

l(b)(6)

~~~~~~~~=~~~'\L(b)_(6_)

_

SGT~described how she used either perfume or Vaseline during interrogations. According
to SGT M@] she it~d TI ut the lotion/perfume in her hand ~d then rub the detainee's hand and
anns. (In fact, SOT b 6 stated that she used Victoria Secret perfume so the detainee's would
smell like a woman).

I declare under penal@ that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by
the witness, SGTI(b) 6)
I Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29
March 2005.

,,~-­

"' s--

JOHN FURLOW

estigating Officer

~--DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Inv~c::tin-:::Itinn

858

Enclosure 38

Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

859

Enclosure 39
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

860

S-E eRE :r tNOFORN.
OEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORce 170
GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA
APOAE09360

JTF-17oKb)( i

Kb)(1) Sec

~

14

•

I

\

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Joint Task Force 160
SUBJEcr: Interrogation PJad...l.lb'-l.l)(.JI.,2.L)_ - - - l

1. (SINF) This memorandum requests Joint Detention Operations Grouo SUDOOr1 for an
W1 \ Sec-ppera!ionVb)(S\ (b\(1 \ Sec

I Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

l(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
i

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
'.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

t"

DERIVED FROM: OHS SCG MAR 02
DECLASSIFY ON: Xl

1
~b)(1)

AR 15·6 GTMO Investigation
of 76 Exhibits
Exhibit 40

.eIE=F-

Sec 1.4(c)

I

DOD JUNE

-.
861

S E .C ft

e T INOFORN

JTF-170.,(b)( i
SUBJECT: Interrogation Plan fo~b)(6)
6. (U) This request has been reviewed by my Staff Judge Advocate and determined to be legally

suffIcient.
Kb)(6) b)(3) 10 USC
7. (0) Commander. JDOG maYJt~l...MY-auestionsabout this matter to § 1308

~~----

I

Kb)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),b)(3) I

'110 usc

II

§130B

.~

\

DERIVED FROM: DHS SCQ MAR 02
DEClASSIFY ON: Xl

SEC A E T JNOFORN .

DOD JUNE

862

Enclosure 41
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

863

Enclosure 42
Denied in full
Exemption 1

DOD JUNE

864

Enclosure 43
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

865

Enclosure 44
Denied in full
Exemption 1

DOD JUNE

866

Enclosure 45
Deferred pending
completion of review

DOD JUNE

867

"SECRE I IINOFOItNIIORCON
~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(0)

!

I
J

(bl(1) Sec 1.4{l&
b)(1) Sec 1.4(0),(b)(6)

~~

~b)(1)

Seo 1.4(0)

!

i
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I
I
'1

'.

Kb)(1) Seo 1.4(0)

~~~

:

I

i L l

SECRETfINOFe -

'.
DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMQ Investigation
Exhibit &of Ie of 76 Exhibits

868

SECRETlfNOFORNIfORCON'
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

I

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

.""

r

J(1 JSoc 1.4(0)

TIlE DET~ATE " 'COMPLETE MEj AND DRANK. AN ENTIRE BOTTLE OF WATER AT
TIffi ORDER O~ b)(6)
,

("

THE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN to THE LATRINE AND EXERCISED~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)(1) Sec I

'~~

b)(1) Sec 1,4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)
'.

i,

I

I

rb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1,4(c),(b)(6)
I

'SECftETm~OJl'ORNHORCQN
DOD JUNE

869

•gEC1tEl'1NOFORttb'ORCO~~

(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

mE MEDIC TOOK THE VITAL SIGNS OF nm DETAINBE WHILE HE
WAS STANDING AND LATER SITTING. nm VITALS WERE AU.
NORMAL ALTHOUOH 1lfE MEDIC STATED lliAT THE DETAINEE'S

vrrALS WERE NORMAL HE STll.L NEBOED TO DRINK. WATER.
=~~.:iiK~ffgrPIJtrF:

war AND DR UW

01 m

J

11iE DETA1NF.E WAS TAKEN TO lliE LATRINE AND EXERCISED

Kb)(1)Sec 1.4(c)

g~eRElfNOFORt

;~'~~-l,jMO
, I

DOD JUNE

870

Investigation
ot76 Exhibits

SE€RETlmOPOR~,~RCON
~b)(1)

Sec 14(e)

,

i

I
rb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

i
,

I

~b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

I

THE DETAINEE WAS SEEN BY 11IE MEDIC AT 2130 HOURS. SHE STATED THAT IDS VITALS WERE
NORMAL. DETAINEE WAS Also TAKEN TO mE LATRJNB AND EXERCISED A COUPLE OF TIMBS
DUlliNG THE NIGHT.
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 14(c),(b)(2).(b)(6)

b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(e),(b)(6)

-BECftE'fY/NOFOR:-

DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO·lnvestigatfon
Exhibit
of 76 Exhibits

&of,

871

SF-eRE I MOfORNt'ORCON

<b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I
I

........_-.

I

I

.. '

nmmAINP.EWASSEENBYTImMEDleJbK1) Sec
ISHESTATED·'
mAT HIS VITALS WERE NORMAL. D£TA ~ WAs ALSO TAKEN TO THE
LATRlNBANDEXERClSEOKb)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I
I
I
I
I

I

i

S~CItETMOFOR

-

AA 15-6 GTMO Investigation
of
Exhibit !i..
- 76 Exhibits

.....

.~

:.

DOD JUNE

872

BECRETHNOFORNHORCON
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

L

_. _a.o ......... }.

SOURCE WAS GIVEN A HE.A1> BREAK AND TAKEN FOR A 10 MINUTE WAU.. SOURCE WAS SEEN
BY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND GIVEN THE "ALL-eLEAR."

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE WAS GIVEN A H.EA.Ii ,BREAK AND TAKEN FOR A JO MINUTE WALK.. SOURCE WAS SEEN
BY A DOCTOR AND GIVEN TitE "ALL-CLEAR."
WATER Bur REFUSED.

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
,I

Kb)
~1 ) !
!

!sej

~ I
!1.4
I(C) :
L~J
i

. __

_

__

_--

~~~ __ ._~

__ ~--____4_---

_

Ttfh lJOCTOR .AGA.l'N'SAW'SOURCE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HE NEEDED TO BE HYDRATED
AND WAS GIVEN AN IV. THE DOCTOR DREW BLOOD TO CHECK KIDNEY FUNCTION. TEST

RESULTS SHOWED THAT THE DETAmEE'S KIDNEY FUNCTION WAS NORMAL.

!(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

-8ECRET77N01~On'.

DOD JUNE

AH 15-6 GTMO lavestig;tion
Exhibit -50
of 76 EXhibits

873

SECR~TI;NOFORNHORCO~
~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

~b)(1)

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(c),(b)(6)

(b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

.
>

~ECRET1fNOFORNOORCON!

DOD JUNE

874

. ./

StCRLTh~OFOItN/ORCON

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

I

.

I

I

_

MEDlCAL REPRESENTATIVE FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GIVE mE
SOURCE AN IV BECAUSE THE LAST MEDI{OAL CHEC~Suo,F THR
SOURCE 'WAS BECOMlNGJlEHYllllATIIDL1.~n.u.t.l1ILB.:sJ~~el('::-:L1 ..QLul('.:.1
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

--'---

I

nJ£ SOURCE WAS OfFERED FOOD AND WATER BUT HE REfUSED. AFTER
ABOUT nnRlY MrNlJTF.S 1li6 MEDICAL REPRESENTAnV£ REMOVED ntE
FIRST IV AND REPLACED IT WITH A SECOND. mE SECOND IV WAS
REMOVt;O A:r APPROXIMATElY 1920 }fOURS.
~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

I
I

(b)(1) Sac 1.4(c),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

i

SECRETINOFOR

.

.).

DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 51 _qJ 79 Exhibits

875

Enclosure 52
Denied in full
Exemption 1

DOD JUNE

876

SECRE1YfflOFO~/ORCON
~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(0)

!

I
I
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I

ibl(1 I Sec 1.4(0)

I
...

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0),(b)(6)

mE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE COURSE OF THE
(b)(2)
I HE WAS ALSO OFFERED WATER AND FOOD BUT EVERY TIME HE WOULD
REFUSE TO EAT OR DRINK WATER

Kb)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

TIlE DETAINEE HAD BEEN ~EEN BY THE MEDICAL REPRBSENTATNE ON TWO OCCASIONS. THE
REASON FOR THE FlRST WAS TO CHECK THE DETAINEE'S BLOOD PRESSURE AND HIS WEIGHT.
SECOND WAS TO CHECK TIlE DETAINEE'S OVERALL WEU,NESSKb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I
i(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
:

!!JE

SECUt:;T//NOFOR .
DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit S! " of76' Exhibits

877

.

.'

SE€RETffflOFORNh~RCON
TI~E DETAINEE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SPEAK BECAUSE EVER YTHlNG HE STATED WAS WHAT
WAS STATED IN THE PAST.

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4{c),(b){6)

I

I
I

rl('l

Sec 1.4(01

I
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

b)(1) Seo 1.4(0)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I

.1-

1

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I
~b)(1)

_

a _ a ..... &it i DLia:c:zL)'.

Seo 1.4(0)

I
1
: . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~~ ~OURCE SENT ON BATIlROOM BREAK.. HE RECEIVED 30 MlNUTES OF EXERCISE

I
1

K G).lIb\{1 \ CORPSMAN CHECKED SOURCE'S VITAL SIGNS. SOURCE COMPLAINED TO
CORPSMAN OF DIZZINESS AND HEADACHES. CORPSMAN TOLD SOURCE l1lAT nlOSE SYMPTOMS
WERE A RESULT OF DEHY.oUTION. AFTER CONFERRING WITH THE DOCTOR ON DUTY,
CORPSMAN GAVE .SOURCE THREE BAGS
OF TV SOLlITION.
.
.

;(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

.~.

--SEeM I flNOF'ORNIIORCON
DOD JUNE

878

SECR:ETtINO}1'OI~//onCON
CONDOLENCE TO THE FAMiLIES. nus HE AGREED TO DO. THE SOURCE WROTE LETTERS TO
TWO FAMILIES WISHING THEM HIS BEST.
THE SOURCE WAS TAKEN TO TIlE HEAD AND EXERCISED 1-"OR 10 MINUTES. HE WAS CHECKED BY
MEDICAL AND WAS FOUND TO BE DEHYDRATED. THE SOURCE WAS OFFERED AND ATE ONE MRE
AND DRANK ONE BOTnE OF WATER. THE IV WAS DELAYED BY MEDICAL SINCE HE-.llB.AWK. THE
WATER.
~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(0)

I
I

I

~b)(1) See 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

THE DETAINEE WAS CONSISTENTLY OFFERED WATER THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. HE DRANK
CO" 1 AI ... \
I jWASEXERCISEDAFTER
.EACH VISIT TO TIlE LA
. b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

APPROXlMATELYSIX~.·OFWATERI(b\l1\

b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

'.

(b)(1) Sec l.4(e)

.~

£ECRETIINOI?OR
DOD JUNE

AR .1 ~-6 GTMQ "ivestjgatio~
J'f
of 76 8etlibits

EXhIbIt

-.

879

SECRETlmOFO~~UORCON
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4{c)

'"

I.,

I

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4{a)

..I. ..

rb1111Soc1.4{CI

I
Kb)( 1) IDE!AJNEE wAs EXERCISED TAKEN TO BATHROOM. HE REFUSED WATER.
rb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)( 1)

FOOD.

bETAIl!lEE wAs EXERCISED. TAICEN TO BATHROOM. HE REFUSED WATER AND.

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
j

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

(b)(1) Sec 14(c),(b)(6)

II
I

(b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(6)

-sECRF"l/INOFORN/lORCQN..
DOD JUNE

880

.-sECR:I:;;T O~CObl
~ Detainee offered food and water refused. Comsman chanped ank I.. h:lO,dages.
~b)(1) Sec 14(c)
(b)(1) !. DetaInee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~ f )(1)Sec1.4(C)
L~___
b

lb)(1)

.

__

~
II

;.:

•

D..etainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes.~:......:b)-=--(2.:-)
restated the facts presented throughout the day.
Detainee offered water - refused.

.lliillJ

-J~gan to

~ ;D~e,;;taJ.;:·n~ee7it;;ak~e:.:n:....:to:.:::...::ba:=::.thr=-o::..:o::.::m.::....=an::.:.d::......:.:w:..::a=lk=-=e=d-=l...=.O--",m=i=n~~Lb:..:.)(1..:,) _Sec_1._4(:...-0)

-r--

b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

~ Detainee was sent to the latrine and exercised for approximately

r:,
I

•

1"..]

10 minutes. He
was offered water but he refused to drink it. His vitals were nonnaJ.
~ Detainee was sent to the latrine. He was offered water but he refused it.
~ Detainee was ~nt to latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He was
offered food and water. He ate aJI of his meal except the applesauce and drank
water mixed with tea powder. The medic weighed the detainee. He weighed 116
poLUlds.
(b)(1) Detainee offered water. He refused the water. He was taken to the latrine and
exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He would discuss the Koran but nothing
.,----,-,-,..,-----, of value. He denies being involved with Al Qaeda.
(b)(1) ! Detainee w a s '
.
.d.cinkjb)(1) Sec 14(0)
!

~b)(1)

S.

I

~~1)

,

I~

etaInee was exercIse. sent to the latrine and offered water which he has been
refusing to drink all night.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(8)
(b)(1) --1 Corpsman checks vitals - O.K. (b)(1) Sec 14(0)
~b)(1)

~~1)

Sec 1.4(0)

: Detainee offered food and water. Ate one MRE and took two sips of water.
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

1..4la.L...J

AA 15-6 GTMO I"
Exhibit ~
nvestrgation. _
~- of 76 Exnibits

DOD JUNE

881

oSECRE I VRCJJN
Kb)(1) Sec
lb}(1) I Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Refusl:d water. ~A19J
_
_ ~ Wb\111 Sec 1 4/c\

~~~1) " D~tainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Refused water. Detainee
drank % cup of coffee.
~b.lllLJ (QlL1LSec.~.7L4(ol. . '
I
~ Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Refused water.
~ ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

:

..

"

j ."

ut to bed.
etamee c ec e
Sec 1.4(0}

~b}(1)

y corpsman -

I
I
[

[j

~: Detai~ee ~aken to bathroom and walked
(bl(1i
~b)(1)

II

b}(1)
... .;

] 0 minutes.

I Corpsman checked vitals - detainee beginning to get dehydrated.

Detainee offered food and water - ate one MRE and drank two bottles of water.
Detainee taken to bathroom and walked] 0 minutes. b}(1} Sec 1.4(0)
b}(1) Sec 1.4(0)

"
~

Detainee taken t9 bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Detainee sat and listened to
music for remainder of session.
(b)(1) [(bH1) Sec 1.4(0)
~ Detaine; refused water and food. He was sent;o the latrine and exercised for
approximately 10 minutes,(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)
I
~ Detainee was taken to the latrine and exer~ised for approximat I 0 nutes. He
refused food but he drank approximately six ounces of water. ~b)(1) Sec
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

.,

r

(b)(1) : (b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I

:£

,

I

.,

..

- - - exercised for approximately 10 minutes. He refuses to drink water again,
(b}(1) : Detainee was take to the latrine and exercised. He did not desire water. He
(b}(1) Sec 14(0)
~ D"e-:t-al~n-e-e-'d;-o-es-n-o"""t:-\\-'-an-:t"""w-a-t:-e-r.--Y;H'-e-w-a-s-tak:-r-en--,--to--:Tth-e-;l-atn.,.---;-'n-e-a-n-;d:-e-x-e-rc
..i-se-d;-,-----L.,,'

(b)(1)

I(b)(1)
Sec 14(c)
,
I

>i FCIUiT ORCON

DOD JUNE

882

!,LCRLr ORCOiq
~b)(1) Sec Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I

r·o.

Detamee-was taken to the Iatnne and exercised. He was given a meal ready to eat
and a bottle of water. He ate all of the meal and drank aU of the water.
Detainee was given a latrine break and exercised for approximately 10 minutes.
He does not desire water.
Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised.

-::-(b:-:-)(1:7"")7"Sec-!

~b)(1)

I

~b~~1)\ Secj

~b)(1) Sec 14(a)

~ ~entered the booth and offered water to detainee _ refused. b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)
b)(1) Sec 14(c)

~1~1)

I

Detainee was
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)
--

I

~b~~~\ sec:· Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes.

The detainee was told that

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

following information:
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)
I
~b)(1)

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c).{b)(6)

Sec 1.4(c)

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

-gf::Cr<::E: I OR«)1\

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit SA,
of 76 E~h1bits
'.

DOD JUNE

883

-5ECRF.:T ORCON(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~)(1)

I Detainee taken to bathroom and walked] 0 minutes. Detainee was offered water

- refused. Detainee was told to go to sleep.

~~b-)(--'-1)~! Detainee awakened, taken to bathroom, and walked 10 minutes. Corpsman
checked vitals - O.K. Detainee offered food and water - ate one MRE and drank
tWO bottles of water.

~ Detainee taken to sleep cell for sleep period.

~ec)(1) I Detainee awakened, taken to bat~oom'landexercised ]0 minutes.

Detainee offered water - refused. b)(6 began by asking the detainee why he
wanted to write a will. Detainee was evasive and finally stated that he didn't want
to answer that question. When asked ifhe was going to try to commit suicide, the
detainee stated "no", but death had been entering his mind lately. The detainee
was allowed to rewrite his will (it was essentially the same as that written the
previous day).~b)(6) began discussing the condemnation ofUBL by Islamic
lead~rs...
.
(
lliillIJ Detainee taken to bathroom and walked 10 mmutes.
iliTII[] Detainee offered food and water - refused. "'~b-;-;)(""'1)""""S'---ec--:1:-:.4:7(c7) - - - - - - - (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1)

: .

Detainee ljlken to bathroom and walked] 0 minutes. b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

F)(1) Sec l.4(c)

Detainee taken to bathroom and walked] 0 minutes. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
began talking about detainee's youth.
---------~
~b)(1) I Detainee taken to bathroom and walked ]0 mi
refused. b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) :

~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1)] 'Detamee taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes.

~.~a)

Corpsman took vitals - O.K.

'I'

_ _ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6).

'.

!

I

~ (ti)(1)S~1.4(~),(b)·(';;;6)'-=--='------'-------'-----'-----'----'-----'-----'------"-'---'-----"-=--'------I

i
!

-flECttPr OReOl'\!

DOD JUNE

884

~:C:Rl:. I

ORCON

(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

I

I
,

:

I

lliillIJ

Detainee offered water - took one sip.
Detainee taken to bathroom and \\talked 10 minutes.
biT1f : Detainee ate an MRE and drank a bottle of water.

Wll
b)(1)

b){1) Sec 1.4(c),(b){6)

I

~b)(1) I Detainee exercised and given a latrine break. Detainee tripped stepping out of
latrine.
looked
detainee.
over and everything was O.K. (b)(6)
.. Corpsman
.
.
.
~

,

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

..,

I

~ Detainee offered water - took one sip.

~ Detainee taken ~o bathroom and walked 15 minutes.
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
~

-,-"---...,......"...-:--::-:-:.,,..,----------------------:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

"

-~

~b)(1)

! Detamee taken to bathroom and exercised 10 minutes. Detainee offered water _
refused.

lliillD

(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

---:...~
Detainee was instructed to go to sleep.
Detainee was woken up. taken to bathroom and exercised

i
(b)(1) :
(b1l1l
(b)(1)
isec

i

~b)(1)

_

Sec 1.4(c)

Ii

(ii)fffl ~I=::;:==;=.::========================~
(b)(1) Sec 14(0)

'------'

II

~j

i

I
·SITRI:T OReON
:

DOD JUNE

885

SECRET/~eFORNHORCON
-------

----

~b)(f) Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)(1IDETAlNEE VITAlS WERE TAKEN, AND WERE wmUN NORMAL RANGE. DETAINEE WALKED

;

:

TO CELL AND TOLD TO GO to SLEEP.

.....

i(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

.,.

.... 0'

0=.0'

CJ.

1:&1L OJ",

1.

i lLC

SOORCE WAS OFFERED WATER BUT REFUSED INDICATING WITH THE WAVB OF A HAND.
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I
I
I

I

I
I

~-1

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I
. _ - - -

·...,sECRETffNOIi'Or
DOD JUNE

1

AR 15-6 GTMO Irwestigation
Exhibit -Sl_ of 76 Exhibits

886

SECRE1WNOFORNUORCON
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I/b\l1 \

UPON

.Inm

hUTAr:E WAS EXERCISED. TAKEN TO THE BATHROOM. SEARCHED

b)(1)

HE REFUSED WATER. OR FOOD.

.

Vb)';j \ SAC ....u THE bETAINEE REFUSED WATER AND STATED THAT HE WAS ON STRIKE
FROM FOOD AND wATER. HE MADE IDS STRlKE STATEMENT IN ENGLISH. HE WAS
EXERCISED AND TAKEN TO BATHROOM.
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~b}(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

I
~b)(1)

Sec 14(c)

I

i

t

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

l(b)(1)

DETAINEE WAS EXERCISED AND TAKEN TO BATHROOM. HE REFUSED WATER.

-sECRE1'1INOFORNIIORCON
DOD JUNE

-.
887

.-8ECH:ET/fNOFORN IIORCON
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

AFTER
A HEAD BREAK. THE SOURCE WAS
OFFERED FOOD AND WATER WHICH
HE REJECIED
----------.--.----..
..- - - _.
.

r:;-

~--------._----.-~-.---~----.------.---------

-

_•

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I

I
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(0)

I

SECRF.T//NOFORN/IORCON
DOD JUNE

888

8ECftETHNOFORNUORCON
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

iI
i

I
I
I

I
I

I

'.

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(8)

..

DETAINEE WAS AWAKEN FROM HIS NAP. H1S VITAL SIGNS WERE CHECKED BY THE
MEDICAL REPRESENTATIVE. HIS BLOOD PRESSURE (I 00158) AND PULSE RATE (62) WERE
NORMAL. HE WAS GIVEN A MEAL WITH AN EXTRA MAIN MEAL INSIDE. DETAINEE WAS
ALSO GIVEN A BOrn..E OF WATER. HE COMPLETED IllS ENTIRE MEAL AND THE BOTTLE
WATER.
THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE NIGHT TilE DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO THE LATRINE
AND EXERCISED FOR IMPROVED CIRCULAnON AND OVER ALL GOOD HEALTH. HE WAS

..........
~CftETnNOFOftNHORCO~
'.

DOD JUNE

889

SECRETi/NOF6RNJ/ORCON
ALSO GIVEN WATER A COUPLE OF TIMES THROUGHOlTT T~ NIGHT. HE REFUSED TO
DRINK WATER AT EVERY REQUES1~b)(6)
I
THE DOCTOR SPOIC£ WITH THE DETAINEE. HE WAS GIVEN AN 800MG MOTRIN FOR CHEST
PAINS. TIlE DETAmEE WAS ATTEMPTlNG TO GAIN THE SYMPATHY OF THE DOCTOR.. THE
DETAINEE COMPLAINED OF HAVING A HARD TIME BREATHING BUT AFrER 'J'.IiH -POC'TOR
EXAMfNEDTHE DETAINEE HE DETERMlNEDTHATTIfE DETAINEE COUlD AND WAS
BREATIIING JUST FINE. THE DETAINEE ALSO TOLD THE DOCTOR THAT HE WAS TIRED
AND NEEDED TO GEt SOME SLEEP. THE DOCTOR INFORMED THE DETAINEE mAT HE
WAS GETTING AMPLE SLEEP.

llillJ'ENTERED mE Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
DEI A1NEE DID NOT RESIST.

I AND GAVE DEJ:AJ}JEF. AN EVPN SMA YE. THE

r)ll) Sec 1.41')
I
I
I

I

TIlROUGHOVT THE NfGIfT THE DETAINEE'S VITAL SIGNS FLUCTUATED. Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
!
!lIS VITAL SIGNS WEit£ NORMAL. BY THE MIDDLE OF TIlE NIGHT THE DETAINEE'S PULSE
RAIE WAS SLIGHTLY HIGH AT 93. AT TIlE CLOSE OF THE NIOJIT THE DETAINEE'S PULSE RATE
WAS NORMAL AT 61 AND sO WAS HIS BLOOD PRESSURE AT 96/43.

fb\f1 \

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

-...

-

----

_

.... , .

_ .. -

.. _ - , . . . LoL#"

.I

au a II ....... I l n u J V LJ"'\.VI J'CI\.i,) 1"lJ.'lLJ

SEeREl'NNOFOR~UORGON
DOD JUNE

890

SF:CKET ORCO~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
Detainee was exercised kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) i
~

~b)(1)

Sec

I

:.:......:....:-...:..._-----~---~----'

~!1) I Medical representative observed the detainee's vital signs.
The detainee was sent to the latrine and exercised.
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

~b)(1)

They were nQrmal
Sec 1.4(c)

~ Detainee stated that the Saudi government could prove that his passport was
obtained legally. The detainee was sent to the latrine and exercised.

(b)(1fl Detainee's vital signs were checked by the medical representative. His vital signs
'"'-----' were normal. The detainee was given a complete meal and bottled water to
consume. He finished all of his meal and t
.
(b)(1)

i

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I
i

L,~b.:.:.)(1:-)~Sec_1_.4(......0)_-.,.----..--

--,1 Detainee was taken to the

latrme and exercised.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0),(b)(6)
I

!

~~1) !

I

Detainee was taken to the latrine and exercised. (b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

vki;~ t:;;;i
b
.., n
lhe was taken
outside for some fresh air and exercise. He was offered water but he refused.
M

•

,b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
(b) (1)

0

I.

•

•

i

II{b)(1 ),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SECKEl

DOD JUNE

()J{

1

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit S 1-&1 76 "Exhibits

891

MJCRET ORCO,'~
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

I
I

~

Detainee taken to bathroom and walked. ,b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
Offered food and water - refused.l...-------------"'""~b.,..,.)(1.,.,..)-: Detainee offered water - refused. Detainee states in English he is on strike from
food and water. Detainee taken to bathroom and walked. Detainee was
fb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)
(blm Sec!

..
I

['1
!

I

i Detainee taken to bathroom and walked.

(b)(1)

Wlu:::

,

)

~b)(1)

. j

t _

Offered water - refused.

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~

bathroom and walked 10 minutes.
fuillD Corpsman checked detainee's vitals - O.K. Detainee was taken to~
: Detainee taken to

1and
put to bed.
~ Detainee awakened , taken to bathroom and walked [(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~
~ (b)(1) Sec I Corpsman checked vitals _ O.K.
L - _ .- - - - - - - - - - - '
t~)!11~_ Detainee offered water - refused. Corpsman changed ankle bandages to prevent
I
chafing. tb)11) Sec 1 41c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I;':

!

~:. DetalOee taken to bathioom and walked 30 ~m':',Jjn!f!u"±te~s~:;_;_------­

~ Detainee offered food and water - refu'\ed. [b!(1~ Sec ~.4(C)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

.

-

£~CRET GRCQ1)l.eo

DOD JUNE

892

SEGRI:T QRCON
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I,

~ ~D=-.e=-;-faii~ne~e~o:-=f:ife_relid::;w\a_t_er_- __re_fu_s_ed_·Lb~).:-(1~)_S_e_c_1_._4..:..(c..:. ,)

r

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

etamee t en to a oom. Corpsman checked vitals - O.K. Conversation
Continued abOut topics such as music, dancing, history ofthe Koran, history of the
Bible, and Arabian histolj·. Detainee was ignorant of historical events oUtside of
the geographic region of the Arabian Peninsula. Detainee ave names ofIslamic
b )(6)
scholars that said 'mUsic was
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

t-,

I

,

,!
'..

!
,

;

I

: J

(b)(1) l Detainee taken to bathroom.
~ Detainee allowed to take a nap for one hour.
(b)(1) Sac I Detainee was awaken from his nap. His vital signs were checked by the medical
representative. His blood pressure (100/58) and pulse rate (62) were normal.

~b)(1)

I Detainee was taken to the latrine.

He was aHowed to exercise. He was given a
meal with an extra main meal inside. Detainee was also given a bottle of water.
He completed his entire meal and the bottle of water.
~ ~e doctor spoke with the detainee. He was given an 800mgmotrjn for chest
pams.
(b)(11 Sec I ffi)fenrered the(b)(1) Sec 1.4(8) and gave detainee an even shave. The
M-amee did not resist.
,

I

Kb).(1~ Sec I Detamee Was taKen to the latrine and exercIsed. His vitals were taken again. His
blood pressure was nonnal but his pulse rate was high at 93. The medical
representative will be monitoring the detainee's vitals closely until his=pulse rate
is lower.
. ,

~b~~~) Sec I (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

!

•

.>

SECI{E1' OReON

DOD JUNE

893

~ECRETlfflOFORNf/OR€ON

~b)(1) Sec 1A(a),(b)(1) Sec 1A(c)
i

fb)(1) Sec 1A(a),(b)(1) Sec 1A(c)
I

i
L=Kb--:-)(:-:-17""")=Se-c-1:-.4--:-(:-a:-),(:-:-b7-:)(-:-1)=-:S=--e-c----:1:-"A7"7(--:c)----------------~

I

I

I

Js

~'

"

--.J

'Kb)(1) Sec 1A(a),(b)(1) Sec 1A(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I
I

'.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

"

BE€RE:.F t
I
AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
~
n'NOFORNriORCON Exhibit 5'\ - of 76 Exhibits
'.

DOD JUNE

894

.sECRE177NOFORNllORCON
F)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

I
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

--

ibll1 JSec 1.~cJ
I
I

I
I

~b)(1) See 1.4(e)

I

,-----_._--~--------------~-----

._-- ..

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

SECREft~O~ORNHORCON
'.

DOD JUNE

895

SECRETlfNOFORNNORCON
DURING A LULL IN THE CONVERSATION HE WAS ASKED IF HE NEEDED TO USE THE RESTROOM.
AT FIRST HE SAID "NO" BUt AfTER ABOUT 30 SECONDS HE RECONSIDERED AND ASKED TO USE
IT. HE SAID THAT IT M1GHT TAKE HIM A LDTLE EXTRA T~~ AS HE_WAS H~YmG S.IOMACl:f
pRORl EMS

HE WAS

AI

I o\llpn

TO GO TO TUt;' PJ:CTDOOH

r

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~b)(1) Sec: 1.4(0)

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

I
!

rb)(') Sec 1.'lel
b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

-:.

I
I
(b)(1) Seo 1.4(0)
!

;

I
---

-

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

!"'-'"_.. _-----

-- --

-~----------

-

----

----- - - -

- . - - - - - - - - - - -.,..------

-

~~J

--------

._------_.~---

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

SECREVINOFORNHORCON
DOD JUNE

896

SECRET/~OFORNVORCON
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
,

~

i
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

i

..

_

ii'

THE CORPSMAN CHECKED

AROUND FOR IOMJNUTES DOING AN OCCASIONAL
KNEE BEND. UPON SOURCE'S RETURN TO THE BOOTH THE CORPSM AN UlP A PDPii' SOURCE'S

!"vuJ(cr;.., SWOLLeN rBel. SOORCE WALKED

FEET TO AVOID IRRITATION FROMTHECUFFS.Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
i CORPSMAN
TOLDKb)(6)
trHAT SO~CE NEEDED TO DRlNK WATER.. OR ELSE HE WOULD NEED AN I.V.
WHENKb)(6)
ISAT DOwN TO BEGIN Kb)(1 ) Sec 1.4(ay ]SOURCE STATED THAT HE WAS NO
LONGER ON STRlKE, AND THAT HE WANTED TO EAT AND DRINK. WHEN ~b)(6)
IASKED
SOURCE TO CLARIFY WHAT HE SAID, SOURCE SAID IN ENGLISH, "PLEASE, PLEASE, I WANT TO
EAT."tb)(6)
~AID, "SINCE IT IS MY BIRTHDAY, WE WILL HAVE A BIRTHDAY BREAKFAST."
BOTJ{b)(S)
lAND SOURCE ATE AN MRE.
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

I
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

-,

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

A1K.Q1L CORPSMAN TOLD SOURCE TO DRINK WATER, OR HE WOULD GET AN tv. SOUR
STATED THAT HE WASN'T ON STRIKE. BUT WOULD DRINK MIEN
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

"¥JLJOCJPCIVi"",

GAVE SOURCE A CHECK-UP. EVERYTHING WAS OK.
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

.........."......
AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
of 76
Exhibit "0
....... Exhibits

-

SECRETIINOIt'OR:NNOJ~CON

-.

DOD JUNE

897

8ECRETlINOFORNIIORCON
~b)(1) Sec

1.4(0)

,-------------------

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(8)

,SOURCE WAS TAKEN TO TIlE HEAD THEN WALKED FOR 10 MINUI'ES

TO MAINTAIN CIRCULATION IN HIS LEGS. (b)(1 ) Sec 1.4(c)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

·1

i

I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

.~

SOURCE WAS GWEN .-\NOTHER HEAD BREAK. AND EXERCISED FOR 10 MINUTES. HE WAS THEN
OFFERED WATER. HE fMMEDIATEL Y TOOK THE BOTTLE OF WATER 'r.!AND'77:~D~~,-","",.L..Uo","---u-,
OUNCES. HE THEN PUT THE BOTnE DOWN AND ASKED FOR SALAT b)(6)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~~~~s~;;:-;;~_:_=_------- THE SOURCE DRANK THE WHOLE BOTTLE

.SOURCE WAS TOLD TO EAT AND WAS OFFERED] MRE. HE ATE THE MRE AND DRANK AN
ADDITIONAL Yz BOTTLE OF WATER ON COMPLETION OF THE MR.E HE SAID THAT HE WAS GOING

~~~~~HA~i:s~g~~s~~i11~~~V1J·~<;1ul~ KUCKJ\bD IV THE SI KlJCE AS Fl~gULD
SOURCE WAS OFFERED A TOOTH BRUSH BUT DECLINED TO USE ITJb)(6)

Kb)(1) -Sec 1.4(c)

L,

I

!

THE DOCWR VISITED THE SOURCE. THE CHECK WAS OK. SOURCE BEGAN COMPLAINING ABOUT
illS EMonONS AND THE DOCTOR LEFT. HE HAD NO MEDICAL COMPLAINTS.

£ECRE1~OFO~/ORCON
DOD JUNE

898

SECRf'r ORCON -

Kb-i(1)Sec 1.4(c)

-----------_.----------------_._-.-._-----

I
I

II
1

~)(1)

.,.,..--,-.,-:-:-, L
I

ec

~~-..,....---:--:-..,..---------=----;--:;---;---::--:--------::--~::-::-:--

Detainee's vital signs were taken again by the medical representative. All of his
vital signs were nonnal. His blood pressure was 96/43 and his pulse rate was 61,
He was taken to the latrine and exercised for approximately 10 minutes.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~)(1)

1'1
I

~
~~1)

Detainee taken to 'bathroom and \valked 10 minutes. Detainee is offered waterrefused.
I Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(bl(11 sed

wr.:b ,"""/1~'

Detainee was taken to bathroom and walked 10 minutes. Detainee was offered
food and water - refused b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

-'11

~I

-

,

{!ill.!Lj Defamee taken to 6atfuoom, walked 10 minutes, and corpsman checked vitals

a·K.vQi; \ Sec 1 4£cl.

o'

.!->-.L'

-'-~-------'-._L--~.~~:J

I

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

I

SECR:fS"1' ORCON

DOD JUNE

-.
899

SECRE I nNOFORN1tORCOflrr
NOTED THAT HISTORlCALLY THE DETAJNEE'S PULSE RATE IS LOW, ESPECIALLY IN THE
EVENINGS.
DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO Hill LATRINE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. HE
WAS ALSO OFFERED FOOD AND WATER BUT HE CONTINUOUSLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEM. HE
WAS EXERCISED SEVERAL TIMES FOR CIRCULATION AND TO HELP IMPROVE OVERALL HEALTH.
~~)(1) Sec14(a)
~b)(1)

ec 14()
. c
Sec 1.4(a)(b)(1)S
,

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b){1) Sec 1.4(c)

'.

II
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b){1) Sec 14(c)
I
I

,
':>

(b){1)
Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
,
'I

i

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

(b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SECRET,ltNOFORNtlORCON
DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Jnvestigation
Exhibit .. ,
of 76 Exhibits

900

SECRETJ/NOFORNIIORCON
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

I
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

I
I

I.

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

"'-

I
[b)(1) Soo 14101

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

'.

I

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

I!

I
!

"1.

AR 15-6 GTMe Investigation
of 76 Exhibits

8:ECRETHNOIfQRNI/ORCON Exhibit
DOD JUNE

901

:SECRETIINOFORNifORCON(b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)
!

(b)(1)-Sec1A(i))--- ---- - - - - - - I
I

. fb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

I
b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)
b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)
I

ti.•

~

I

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec H(e)
!

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

i

lliillIJ TAKEN TO RESTROOM AND EXERCISED OUTDOORS.

'.

~--""--'-;-~~""""'-------------------I

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

I

.

. __. _._

iDocrOR CHECKS SOUllCE; SAID THAT IF HE IS UNABLE TO DEFECATE, SOU~E Wll..L
REQUIRE AN ENEMA. DOC'I'OR STAlED THAT SOURCE'SFEETLOOKBETTBR.
.

Kb)(

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

:>

--

. S£CItE I fiNOFORIWOftCQN
DOD JUNE

902

I

3.ECRE1/~FORNHOR€ON

!(b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

kb)(6), (b)( 1) Sec

ISOURCE TO GO TO BAlHROOM AND WALK FOR TWENTY MINUTES.

CORPSMAN CHECKEp HIS

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

vrr AL SIGNS AND STATED HE WAS FINE. fti)ffi)

~

P)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

II

!

~

rb)I') Sec '«'I,lb)I') Sec' «o)

r---============~I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)
I

(b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(e)

(bH1) See 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

I
SECRET7'/NOFOftti/lORCPN
DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit "..
of 76 Exhibits

903

SECREV!NO~RNHORCO~

NOTED THAT HISTORlCALLY TIlE DETAINEE'S PULSE RATE IS LOW, ESPECIALLY IN THE
EVENINGS.
DETAINEE WAS TAK.EN TO THE LATRINE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THROUGHour THE NIGHT. HE
WAS ALSO OFFERED FOOD AND WATER BUT HE CONTINUOUSLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEM. HE
WAS EXERCISED SEVERAL tIMES FOR CIRCULAnON AND TO HELP IMPROVE OVERALL HEALTH.
~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(;;)(1) See 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec lA(e)
I

b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

(b)(1) See 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

SECRETHNOFORNHORCON

DOD JUNE

904

SECRE 177NOF'ORI~IIORCON(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

.l=-

r

l(1 1Sao 1.4(el

b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

....

,

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

~b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1,4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(c)
,

DOD JUNE

905

SECRE'ffINOFORNIIORCON
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
!

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

. 'I

I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

q;»~~CJE1!alo

CONSUMED TWO 2402 B01TLES OF WATER.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

c.

~

-I

)

: . .>
,.>

SECRETffNOFORN,l/OR CON
e.
DOD JUNE

906

lATE

,SECRETIINOFORNJlORCON
Kb)(1

fSec 1.4(c)-------

- - - - - - -_._-----

I

THE DOCTOR SPOK! WITH THE DETAINEE. HE WAS GIVEN AN 8OOMO MOTRIN FOR CHEST
PAINS. THE DETAINEE WAS AITEMPTINO TO GAIN THE SYMPATHY OF THE DOCTOR. THE
DETAINEE COMPLAlNED OF HA VINO A HARD TIME BREAnnNO BUT AFTER THE DOCTOR
EXAMINED TIm DETAINEE HE DETERMINED THAT THE DETAINEE CQill.D AND WA S
BREATHING JUST F'tNE,Vb\l1 \ Sec 1 4lc\

{b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
Vb)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

kND GAVEDEfAlNEE AN EVEN SHAVE. nm

~~-D~ET~AINE~~E~D~ID~N~O"';T~RES~Iri;;ST:r.--------:.,.,---;:::~
=:...::::.:.:..::==_....-""'""=;..:..:.~..=.:..:::::~
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(0)
!

I

I
,

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

_ •• COlO'

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

~b)(1)

" .,

{
\

Sec 1.4(a).(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

~b\l 1 \ I SOURCE wb;rr TO THE BATHROOM AND EXERCISED.
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SOURCE REFUSED WATER

I

;'
/

-.{

SECRETfINOFORNIIORCONeo

DOD JUNE

907

~ECREriiNOFORNHORC6N-

b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC
~130B
~b)( 1) ~ec

1 4(a)
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

~b)(6),(b)(1) ~ENt SouRCE TO BATHROOM.

SOURCE EXERCISED FOR IS MlNUTES.

l,b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~b)(1 )
/Sec
1.4(c)

~~

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

~b){ 1 )

:THE CORPSMAN ClffiC.KED SOURCE"S VITAL SIGNS. THEY WERE WITHIN
NORMAL RANGE. ~ORDERED SOURCE TO GO TO TIlE BATHROOM. HE ALSO
EXERCISED FOR 15 MINtITES.

! b)(1)

Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SECftET71NOFORN/fORCQN
'.

DOD JUNE

908

SECltETtJNOFORNlIORCON(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)
I

I. ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I

2. t'l 1'lel
Sec

3.

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)
I

I
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

II

-(b)(1) Sec 1.4(0)

I

b)(1) Sec
.4(0)

'.

(b)(1) Sec 14{c)

>

.,>

SECU:ET/tNOFOR NI/ORCON

..
DOD JUNE

909

SECRETlfNOFOltNlIOftCON
l(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I
I

I
I

~b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC

~130B

r)(')

Soc 1.<{a),lb)(') Soc 1.<{o)

b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

'.

(b~)(1~)S~ec~1=:i4(~C)===========----=============:::;1I~~f)SeC--I

r4(C)

I

I
I
SECR R'f'1INOFOftNI/On CON-

..

DOD JUNE

910

I

rSECRET/fNOFORNllonCON _
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
(b)( 1) ~ SOURCE EXERCISED FOR THIRTY MJNlJfES, AND USED THE BATHROOM.

Kb)(1)
Sec

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

11 41c)

,

i

L - I_

-

:

-

:

-

-

-_

_

-==========-,

~rbl=(1)=sec=1=.4(=C) ::::::;::;:;:::~:;::;:::;=================================-I

fb)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec l.4(c)
I

b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

'

.

.~

..

. SECRET/fNOIj"OR~//OR.CON

..

DOD JUNE

911

SECRETIfflO~RNNORCO~

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(6)

fb)(1) Sec 14(c)

I
I

THE DETAINEE WASTAKEN.·TO THE LATRINE AND EXF..RCISED SEVERAL TIMES THROUGHOur
TIlE NIGHT. HIS VITAkSJGNS WERE CHECKED TWICE AND THEY WERE NORMAL. HE WEIGHED
IN AT 141 POUND*b)(1) Sec
i

(b)(1)

Sec 1.4(a)
b)(1 )

(b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

ec
1.4.(a)

(b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

'.

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~~ClffilWNOEOR~aORCON
'.

DOD JUNE

912

S£CftE17JNOJiOItNIlORCONTHE DETAINEE WAS CHECKED BY THE DOCTOR AND THE DOCTOR EXPLAINED THAT HE NEEDED
TO DRJNK WATER SO THAT IVS WOULD NOT HA VE TO BE GIVEN TO HIM. TIlE ObiAINEE THEN
TOLD THE DOCTOR THAT HE WAS ON HUNGER STRIKE AND ON DRINKlNG STRIKE. THE DETAINEE
ATE AN MRE AND DRANK A BOTI1..E OF WATER AT 2100.

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
i
I

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

~

I
I
I

I
!

DETAINEE WAS TAKEN TO TliE LATRINE AND EXERCISED EVERY ONE HOUR AND FIfTEEN
MINUTES.
~b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

'.

(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

SECRE~/~OFQRNHORCQN

-.
DOD JUNE

913

SECRETIJNOFORNI/ORCON
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

~I===~~=;=;:;:;=======================~

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

I

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

rb)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I

~!-----========-I
K I\.ND GO TO lHE BATIIROOM. SOURCE ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
JWAS GIVEN AMRE PACKET. SOURCE Al'E THE MRE AND A
SECOND ONE AS WELL, SOUltCE WAS ALSO GIVEN A BANANA, 1WO PEARS, FOUR COOKlES, AND
TWO BOITLES OF WATER. SOURCE WAS VERY RESPONSIVE TODAY. SOURCE WAS CHECKED
OVER BY THE MEDIC ON SCENE, AND ALL WRAPPINGS WERE CHANGED.
SOURCE WAS AU.DWED m

Kb)(1) Sec 1.419

WAT

.

~b)(6),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

i;

..

\

. SECRETIINOBOIlNIIQH CON

DOD JUNE

914

SECfttlIlNOF'OI<NfiORCON
fb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
IQ

----

---------~-

a;

... _<0. 'XIUi".

-------------------

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I
I,

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

--

'.

SECRET//NOFORNIIORCON

..

DOD JUNE

915

SECRETffNOFOftNlIORCON
b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

L...---_~_~-_ _I
rJl1J Sec 1.4(01

I

I

'.

(b)(1) Sec 14(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

SECRRlymOFORNMQRCON
-.

DOD JUNE

916

AU1liONZ£D FOR lOCAl REPROOucl1oH

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MEDICAL CARE
SYMPTOMS DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT TREATING OR

.....
~-~-------

fb)(6)

I

I

i
I,

\

!

'.

I
1

-

HOSPITAL OR MeDICAL FAq
SPONSOR'S NAME

SSNIIO NO.

----------~

RElATIONS... TO SPONSOR

WAAONO.

Kb)(2),(b)(6)

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MeOICAL CARE

Medica' Record
SfANDARO FORM 600 (RE\'. 6-97)

~ ~~...

~

Pr.-iled
FIAMf\

bl GSMCMR

Exhibit

9~7

DOD JUNE

-

IA~ ~?€\~mQ. In.vestigation

r.s

of 76 Exhibits

-----+-I-~~-!..~~~-=~~~~~F_J~~' b)(6),(b)(3) 10 USC §130b - - -

'

.

.~

DOD JUNE

918

..sECkE IlmOfOItNJJORCON1tX-1
DEPARTMENT OF DeFEMSI:

JOINT TASK FORCE arM<>

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APOAB 09360
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(a)

rb)(6),(b)(3) 18 USC §798(a)
SUBJECT: Etrediveness ofltle U~ofCenain CIt.c8«Y II COQiter-ResistInce Stnaegies (U,
1. (U, Thit ~ tespOn(k 10 !he DirectOl'. (DIS) reQUe8I fbr iRfonNtion CDIIIetmilql
tile t&di....... o f ~tocbDiqne. pmiouslyllpJll:1mldbydlc ~
loehJdod widlltis ~ iJ a timeliDc ofd»jDl«rOplioa~ aapIoyod, 1he
iltfilnDlliiott oIJtai.m u a -.It of asiIIJ theM ~ .. -n .1bIjaltific:bJaa Cor

oeom-..

~ CiIIlftIln

~b)(1)

reohaiqMeS.

Sec 1.4(c)

I
I

rb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Dt:rJ'tU> NoN< ~ 00 IK.totM SUi. _
M1..usm ON ll-l
..

*2
'.

SECREI JlNOFOkNfiORCONlIX-1

;..

.7

-.
DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit c,c, - of76·Exhibits

919

.SKCREfflNOFUkNIIORCONf!X-!

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
i
I

i

I

~b)(1)

Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

2

DOD JUNE

920

.SECR£THNOPOkNIIORCONlIX-J
Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
I

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

9. (5) "I'bctc ~1Qf ~ huaaMo, whecb« ~..., or ill c:ocnIIioItiaa owr. period
u-1I'Id _ withia tile Ipirit and iatmt or~ d
.... A f I a ~wUb!he SIaft"
Judp ~ I bc1im: ChIIlbcy 81'0 DOC ill viGt.ItiGa oflbo8lh Amondatcac of the UnIred
sea. OoGttilUlicM proWbitins c:nd IIId 1IdIIIlIIJ ~ or.11tIe J8 oflbo llalIaI Staas
Code. SeGtiaan40...... ~ FOIknI TOIUCs.a&e}. T1If:Ic~ 1I'e.ct i~ ..
C8IlIC ~ set'ae. pk)'llial pain or suIferin& or pnHoaced.-.J hma, but_ iatad
inl..ted 10 ~ cuapcuooo lMlr • paiocI of time by WCIIlcaill& !he detainee's mcnlllllIId
plrySCIIllbility 10 l'IlISdt. . . l'residcm'a t.filiIary Onb d.alId 1 NOVClIIlbcr 2QOJ .... tbat the
decamcellIlUIC be IreaIed humanely MOl this IlumMa
incIudcII ~. iJod, medical
)

SOCUTJ~aFOmJlfORCON!JX

DOD JUNE

1

921

,SE€ltE j nNOFURNliuRCONilX-l

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
'Il

lOfJWauc
I

~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

I
rb)(S),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

I

-I

--

4

-BEeRE IIINOFORNI/6RCONUX-l

-.

DOD JUNE

922

~.-

Enclosure 67
Denied in full
Exemption 1

DOD JUNE

923

'~ECRET

Kb)(1) Sec
i4

A

l

,

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: (S) 1/ b)(2),(b)(6)

r;

~b)(6)
1. (S) SUMMARY:

a.

i

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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b. b)(1) Sec 1.4{c)

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'~

AR 15-6 GTMO uwestigation
Exhibit
of 76 Exhibits

c..

DOD JUNE

924

"ponrrr

:(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

21:00 hours detairiee was ~b)(6)
0
tifhe was hungry. He said yes.
Ihad detainee's cuffs taken offand was handed
Detainee was told to sit down~b)(6)
an MRE and a cup of water. Detainee ate only a few bites ofthe MRE, and drank water.

At

d.

InterrOQator sat aero.,., &om data: .., . •
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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3.

(S~r)(1)

Sec 1.4(0)

4. (8) (b)(1) Seo 14(0)
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i

I

i

5. (8) SUMMARYKb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

-

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":.:.-..:.._----------~

a. (8) None.

'.

DOD JUNE

925

SECRET
Kb)(1 )

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: (Sl!Lkfu(~(b)(6)

~~62~2:
eventually

~b)(6)

.

S:"'(i;';.4~(:rCfSlV"""!'ane",,",",:SI:!1':(eal"i"f"lan-LnfilSfflimiVO'iflthn.oe;r'r'''sn:bornw~se;--r.;jn;lNiJ,""~IJ;-;;aJcj;,c:J;h~ntt;:;:::J~l"AA::QI::'_~'
f.=·~=~th=-e

b)(1 ) Sec

~ over ,;,.;; ~encans anil SODllD Ba2t3m

A

"',banis
• tan. •

J

Detainee is the

1. (S) SUMMARY;
.. ib)(1) SEc 14(el

b.

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

'.

3. (5) Kb)(1) Sec 14(c)
~--C~T~~b"""')(1"CC")-=-Sec--:-1.-:-:-4(C--;-)

I
---,-

---1

:

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

4. (S) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
a. (5) (b)(1) Sec 14(c)
~b)(1)

...........

J.A;i'....t' II"

I

Sec 1.4(c)

SECltET .

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit
of76 'Exhibits

&1

DOD JUNE

926

(b)(6),b)(3) 10 USC §130B

•

Subject:

FW: DEtAINEE AllEGAllONS INQUIRY REPORT

lib"?' {I

urntnalY.doc (24 KB

Classification: SEC RET
Caveats: NONE
Sirs,
Another allegation to look at.

b)(6),b)(3) 10
~SC §130B

Attention: This electronic transmission may contain attorney work-product or information
protected from disclosure under FOIA, 5 USC 552. Do not release outside of DoD channels
without proper authorization from the sender.

-,
<~lb\l?\ lb I Sunmary. doc»
Classification: S B C R B T
> Caveats: NO PORN

>
>

>

Classification: SEC RET
Caveats: NONE

'.

AR 15-6 -GTMO Investigation
10 _ o~ 76 Exhibits

~Xhibit

DOD JUNE

927

SBCfU!'f
DETAINEE ALLEGATIONS INQUIRY REPORT
r:-:-~b....,....,)(~1):-::S==-e-c--:-1~.4-:-(a-:-)- - Kb)(2), (b)(6)
I

SJA - Summary of Allegation: Duringl(~b[!.:)(~2~),~(b:.!.:)(S6~)~;:::::=:=::=:=:======:==:=:==:=======I~aJ~le::oed~
that during the months of August throu October 2003:
(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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I

I
I
r

&

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c) lhathewascoercedinsi .
Millennium Bomb Plot at LAX
rt. b 2
b)(6)

r

_pa ••• 5.OX.. I

a false statement implicating himselfin the
s '1i
•

, b)(6)

JDoo Findings:
1.

DIMS Records

2.

SIRIIR Records

3.

FCE/IRF Records

4. _

Other (Specify)

Swnmary and Analysis:

JIG Findings:
'.

1. _ _ Documents (Specify)
2.

SIR/IR. Records

3.

lDIMS Records

4. _

Other (Specify)

Summary and Analysis:

JMG Findings:
.~

.,
'.

DOD JUNE

SJA AITORNEY WORK PRODUcr

928

"SI!CR:l!'fDETAINEE ALLEGATIONS INQUIRY REPORT
~b)(2),(b)(6)

2. _

~)secf.4(a) - .

I

~~'---cl:-'-.-----::M:-=-edicaJ

Records

Other (Specify)

Summarized Medical History (If Applicable)
Swnmary and Analysis:

..

...

..

.

SJA AlTORNEY WORK PRODUcr

DOD JUNE

929

Enclosure 71
Denied in full
Exemption 1

DOD JUNE

930

Enclosure 72
Denied in full
Exemption 1

DOD JUNE

931

I

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Kb)(1) Sec

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
$1 JR IFCysr-t!ilb)(2),(b)(S)

I

is a

Kb)(S)
3tteSte<l at hIS mother's: h01J"A in),1 ".J.eL
'n the
'fall of 200 J. DetaineeK b)( 1) Sec 1 .4( c)
_....... w Uk bltCII vgauollS anu
eventually handed over to the Americans and sent to Bagram AfgJ~anistan. Detainee is the
(b)(S)
++

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~"'-~b""-)(1"'--:)S;:-ec--::1-:.4~(c)--_:""-'-_------------

3.

L

rst) (b)(1) Sec~1[]4[{Q(c~)=;=~==----------_.l.--------l
.r~.
,SSffb)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

5.

96 f

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(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

b)(1) Sec 1.4(e)

a.
6.

j5)

~ ADDITIONAL COLLECTO~~~~~~~~~

Kb)(1)

I
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I
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None.
..__

SeC1A(c),(b)(Sr--- --- --

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(SJNf') ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

a.

'L

~4(C)

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b.

)S7NF) (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1 4(c)
(b)(1) Sec 14{c)

~

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~

I·

'.

DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMQ Investigation
Exhibit ,~
of 76 EXhibits

932

[

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(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
c.~ (b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

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i(S7$F) ~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

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(.S,lNF)~b)(1) S~ 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

b 1 Sec 1.4 c

g. (

m

b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 14(c)

Kb)(1) Sec 1.4(c)
~b)(1) Sec 1.4(a),(b)(1) Sec 1.4(c)

h. -fSfMFJ

b)(1) Sec 1.4(c),(b)(6)

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DOD JUNE

933

.

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JUN. 27. 2006J

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4:33PM

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1/111D1.1h.lnlJ..... DIwiIkIft hal Heft ..... will aontldnO «hue _"".layell
.'1i8ve s8rved in MY ~ lIt'QTNO Incllblliri in,.",.liIn reGarding the
Ira\mln, Df i_inl... Imp_... ~hDUtd ~ ~ liD th. fDUowlnS =

1) Emplo~11 wht observed laren1Ye ttulm-nt. Inwrroplianl or inlaNtlW
.lIcnnl~uu on GTMO da• • • which ~ nat ......"t With lurllu Intervltw

polil::yl&UidlllM1, IhouId ,.pend ViI emil far the pUlpIt. Gf. foUaw-up tntaMIW•
POI.' ll"fIaD rupDnIU shoUld be dlrlctacl fa:
.
InIpIction DMsIDft

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2) Irnp'~eH who .'Ntel III CITMO .nd Db••,.,1d no IGSIreulW trlatrnlnt or
dltlJneea. should respond via an EC' doaum,ndn; a n."lttvo rupanae. The Be
.ltmlld inc:fude the empIO)'I.'I.afftcll' BUl'Iau "lme, t1t11. and tanu,. of aulgnmant It
Gn'MO..
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'The Ie Mould be Wed ·Countarterrarilrn DM.". Q'TMQ. IMp.etten IploIll
InQUirY-,
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file t ZI'1·HQ-A' 3Z7111-A. The Be Ihould not be uploaded, bUt onty ••riallZ8cl. with II
hlrd oapy IOlWal"l2!d ~a:

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., FBI E-MaJl- !mployou Idard!.d ., Having."

As.ignmem 10 GTMO - &I Jul 04
,~

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IENSlTIVUMI'mCYISIE'iQ

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•

DOD JUNE

I

UNCLASSIF,IED ..
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Ixhlblt • J..
of 7. Exhlblta

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3734

NO. 704

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5U~RE: GTMO

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DOD JUNE

.

..
3735

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DEPARTMEftT' OF DEFENSE

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MWl,F\. 13172·1217

sccc

2 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR Major Genera.! Geo1fcry Miller, CammaDder, JoiDt Task Force Gulntmlmo,
GuantlIDaIDO Bay, Cuba
SUBJECT: (Sllf'ffTLetter ofPromulptiOIl Repnting Secretary oCDefaule GuidIIDcc: CD lDtcuoption
Techniques
1. 'tSh'NP}-:rhis memonmdam providcl amplification on !be 16 April 2003 pidlDcc from the Secrewy
ofDefcnse (SECDEF) RpJ'diug Joint Tuic Force Oa:mlmlamo's imp1emc:nbtiOll of interroption
techniques.
2. (S11NF) The SECDEF'. DlCIDOI'UIdum directs that Tcchniquca B, 1, 0, ad X be used oaIy when
. ~ by rmlitazy DCCleSSity, lIIld that tbc SECDEF be notifiocl iD adftDce. Prior to IIpplyiDJ thole
teclmiques against a specific deta:iDce, I direct you to submit •
for IppI'Oft1 pursumt to the
dctaiRcc'. initial iDtcnopDan stIaII:g)' (or wbm that

3. (S/!NF}To clarify otbcrmaUl:n niJed by the SECDEFI mcDIIOImdum:

(a) Reference TecbniqueB. the Werling Group 9o'U IJJOSt CClDCCrDCd aboatftmOW oCtile Kana &om I
dctaince-somc:thing we DO looga do. Bcc:ause pro-ridiDg iDoc:utites (c.c.. McDoaaId'. Fish Sandwiches or
cigan:ttcs) is an integral p8rt of iDtaTOptiaas. you wiD notify me ill wri1iq wbc:a the provided iDccmive
would c:x.cccd that contcmpla2r:d by 1ntln'OpbaD doctnDe caotained in Army FM 34-52, or whea the
iDtcrToptars iDtz:nd to n:::move aD inCClltnoe from. d$inee.
(b) Refcrcnc:e Techniques I and 0, you wm ootify me m writing wbc:D use of Ihcse standard
mtclrop1:ioo tcctmiquc:s goes beyond the doctriual app1ic:atioo deacribcd in AmJy PM 34-S2. When use of
the technique is consistcDt with PM 34-S2, YOIl do DOt need 11) DOtify me.

(c) I derme "sleep dcprivation," referenced in Technique V, as keeping. detainee awake for more
than 16 hrs or allowing a detainee to rest bne1ly lind then repeatedly lwUaring him, not to exceed four
days in succession.
(d) Rderc::nce Tcclmique X. I do DOt eoasidc:r the usc ofmuimum scc:urity DDits u isolatian. A
dctamce pl8ccd in a maximum aa:mity IllJit is qraptcd, but not truly ilOlaled.

(c) I define the "Ic:aet imnsivo metboer' .. the _bruque that baa the Ic:ut impact on. detaiDee',
staDdard of trea!mcDt, while C\'Okiac the ~ response from the detmJce during iDtcnogationa.

•

"

Memo to CDR JTF-GTMO Ref Letter of
Promulgation
Re SECDEF Guidance on InterroqallOn
T
__ I

DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit
of 76 Exhibits

...lI.-

3736

.-1
..
'

(f) Except in die case m'Tectmiques B, J. O.IDCI X, I bII\I'e lIelo !!jined tbIt!be first ().6JGG- t 5 in the
chain ofconunlDd or superviIiaa, is the "IppropID specified lCllior apProval n1hoiity." UDless appoval
authaity is withheld fiom dill individual by hiP- UIbority.
4.' ~/t4p) Lastly. I bave told the ScucDiy or Defense bis 16 April pidmc:e Ipplics to aD JDtcnpocy
elements assigned or abchod to JTP GTMO.
'-

Deriwd From: Muhiple Sources
R8uoft: 1.5(c)

Declon: Xl

• !

2

I'"
DOD JUNE

3737

...
SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATE.MENT OF MG (RETIRED) MIKE
DUNLAVEY
MG Mike Dunlavey, FORMER COMMANDER, JTF-170, was interviewed and made
the following statement on or about 1007 hours, 17 March 2005, at WFO, Arlington, VA:
Appointment memos were shown to this witness. The witness went over the allegations.
Witness sworn 'by LtGen Schmidt. The witness provided the following testimony:

BACKGROUND:
How I became the JTF-170 Commander? I was working at the National Security
Agency. On 14 February 2002, I was contacted to meet with the SECDEF. I received a
joint service billet description. I met with the SECDEF on the 20th or 21st of February
2002, along with the Deputy SECDEF, Wolferwitz and a number of other personnel.
The SECDEF told me that DoD had accumulated a number of bad guys. He wanted to
set up interrogation operations and to identify the senior Taliban and senior operatives
and to obtain information on what they were going to do regarding their operations and
structure.
The SECDEF said he wanted a product and he wanted intelligence now. He told me
what he wanted; not how to do it.
Initially, I was told that I would answer to the SECDEF and uSSOurnCOM. I did not
have to deal with USCENTCOM. Their mission had nothing to do with my mission.
Everything had to go up to USSOU11iCOM then to JCS. The directions changed and I
got my marching orders from the President of the United States. I was told by the
SECDEF that he wanted me back in Washington DC every week to brief him.
I have 35 years of Intelligence experience. I am a trial lawyer and between interrogations
in Vietnam, being a CI Commander, and as a trial lawyer. I have done over 3,000
interrogations. The SECDEF needed a common sense way on bow to do business.
The mission was to get intelligence to prevent another 9/11.

GTMO Situation:
Mike Lehnert did a miraculous job of getting Camp X-ray set up.
When I got to GTMO the facility consisted of literally a dangling fence. Detainees were
right next to one another. In the Seabee hut for example, everyone saw who was being
interrogated.

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
of 76 Exhibits
Exhibit ,2.

DOD JUNE

3738

DoD photographers'were taking pictures for historical purposes. They published them
with no regard for security. My job was to establish it.

~ b ~as the Assistant 12.

He worked up the IMD and tried to fill it with

~~lish the interrogation mission.

We have not fought a real war since Vietnam. Except for DHS, our interrogators were
. virtually inexperienced. It was an OIT situation on the ground at GTMO.
When I arrived, I met the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) for the FBi He was a SAC out
of Miami. Interrogations had started but there was no system. For example, the
interrogators though_as the big dog. He made a lot of noise in the prison grounds .
but he was not the big guy. There simply was no process in place to assess who the real
leaders were.

.~

V) (;

JTF-I60 was losing control of detainees. There was a major riot with the detainees.
They were shaking out their blankets and throwing food.

~orked

I tried to set up a process that would work for the FBI.
the
U.S.S. Cole incident He was the best interrogator. H~r and was
very, very good.

·e

fS"

The military linguists were worthless. They came out of school and coUld order coffee,
but they were getting smoked by the detainees.
The guards were living no better than the detainees.

,

The standard was to treat them humanely.

..

~.

,
t -.

Frankly, the 1992 version ofFM 34-52 had a problem with it. It was 18 years old and it
ations were. done for POWs.
was how'

is(

My people, the interrogators, got briefed on what my task force rules were.

.

~,

The detainees do not control the environment.

2

DOD JUNE

3739

-

Everyday we had undercover FBI agents o . t e r r o g a t i ng . We did want to
most continuously on the island.
protect the identity of the people. We had n

We eventually got good information on who the leaders were and then we sUIJ>rised them
with a response team. We grabbed them and took them out to the Brig where the JCRC
could see them, but they could not talk to them.

~,

.:

We had detainees that jumped the guards. There was a guy that took the MRE spoon,
shaved it down and mad~a scalpel. We changed their sheets to the sheets in the federal
prison system so they can't be tom or tied. They took magnets, welding rods, and
fashion them into weapons. We collected a footlocker full of weapons.

INTERROGATIONS:

The Combined Investigative Task Force (ClTF) brought to the staff and the Joint
Commander, a capability to collect evidence to criminally prosecute cases.
ed. We were trying to work through
moved out smartly and met with

C
good investigative skills and had experience dealing WI
murderers.
The FBI SAC came every two weeks. They could not decide what to do. Ther-never
built up any type of rapport. We had problems from the get go with the FBI. They had
the best interrogators. Interrogations were done in my facilities. Any intelligence they
got they would share with us.
'
We had an SOP on how we did business. We knew fro
the would accuse us of torture and inhumane treatmen

3

DOD JUNE

3740

~

I

£J(~~ b;} 12.'P"4L-- t1

~~V\\k\ ~ ~ II

t: {.Q UAttD

DOD JUNE

I!---

1-

3741

1

roO,
:.:..

·e

ABUSE ALLEGATIONS:
I would show up unannounced to see what was going on in the interrogations. Someone
being out of line is very possible. I won't equate it to NYPD Blue. There were situations
where a guy would urinate or jack off on a female interrogator. He did it to offend her. I
would not allow them to use religion as a shield. The detainees threw feces at the guards.
. ""
'

'

5

DOD JUNE

,...,

.

3742

An Article 15 was given to a guard for hosing down a detainee. The detainee threw a
bucket of urine on him.
If something was going wrong, the climate in the command was comfortable for self reporting.
We all knew the rules; and we followed them period.

.,

I fell on my sword for the guy that was 100 years old. He was 90 to 105 years old and in
his 4th lifetime. He had no real good information. If he died we could not do a forensic
study. I would violate Sharia. He was not an American soldier that would not come out.
in one piece. There were two other guys in their 70s to 80s. One was a cab driver that
took Al Qaeda to the border. We got him out of there in October. We released 211
detainees. Only AI Qaeda reponed abuses. None were abused. If a: guy had information,
we would focus on him.
The duct tape incident, I remember that. It was in June or July 2002. I did an internal
investigation. They sat and screamed at us. I think the MPs helped the interrogators. I
don't know if the guard was directed to restrain the detainee from doing something
As a judge if they screamed in court. I would tape them to a chair and tape their mouths.
In a legitimate detainee facility, you would do it. If we did not, they would do it.
The detainees were ~ated humanely. They had a high status of care. they were not
EPWs. They refused to identify themselves. On the postcards they gave us the wrong
name.
Humane is who we are as the American military.
My fIrst lesson was in Vietnam. I went out in the fIeld and the South Vietnamese had
two POWs. They got screamed at and kicked around. I watched what was going on. I
was a graduate of DLA. There was a big plate of boiled rice with flies on it. I asked one
ofPOWs when he had last eaten. He said, "four days ago and water two days ago".
They chained him to a .50 cal and said he would kill him if he ran away. I had a canteen.
I drank and gave him a drink. It worked. I got his name.
I employed what worked and did not work.

6
DOD JUNE

3743

egar
t e use of dogs. The dogs would be used to escort movement of personnel
from detention to interrogation facilities. Dogs were there to intimidate. There were only
four dogs in the whole facility. They were there to prevent riots and for security

e

The dogs were under control of the MP handler. They would have the dogs look at the
detainees. On the other side of the coin, we do use the dogs as PiII'S
n
ontrol in the
federal system. We did not let the dogs bark or bite detainees.
ought dogs to
my attention, I probably would have approved it. We did not use e ogs on the
pnsoners.
Keep in mind, they don't like dogs. Unless the dogs are on patrol, they would be in an
interrogation room. Using dogs is equal to the Fear Up technique. It breaks their
concentration in their response to the interrogation techniques. They would be thinking
about that dog. Is the dog a real threat? Absolutely not.

We physically removed an FBI agent when he went across the desk at a detainee. It
happened in my fIrst three months. He was a big kind of guy. The detainee said
something like he knows his family and that he was going to kill them. I think it
happened during my tenure.
FBI impersonation? No, not on a normal course of business. We did not identify who
people where. The names and rank were covered. The FBI wore polo shirts and their
badge. The CITF did the same thing. It was part of the deception technique. Maybe
there was a complaint. I never knew or heard about it. Would CITF and FBI act as
DoD? It could have been a technique.
Interfering with FBI; Wellignificant difference of opinion. There was a
management issue wher
uld corne in and did not coordinate for a detainee
because they wanted to ta
e detainee right away. FBI had interrogation plans.

7

DOD JUNE

3744

They did not brief 000. eITF was going in without telling us. Every IP had to
coordinated for facilities and linguists.
Loud music and yelling was part of a sequence of events to disrupt the detainees thought
process.
Chaining the detainee in a fetal position is not a normal procedure to be used in
interrogation. If the detainee leaped at an interrogator, it might have been used for
security. It is not a normal procedure. The interrogators were instructed not to touch the
detainees. They were to leave it to the guards.
If short shackled, the detainee had done an offensive action.

Food and water deprivation I find incredibly hard to believe. BG Baccus would not have
tolerated that. Short rations were a disciplinary process. ICRC was there everyday. The
Chaplain was there everyday. The average detainee gained 16 pounds. They got medical
attention everyday.
The detainees went on a hunger strike. When weight metabolism decreased they went
down to the medical facility. They bad to give the detainees forcible IVs. They wanted
Ensure. We made ajoke about it.
There was no lap dan~e or rubbing up on detainees. There is no doubt the interrogators
took off their BDU tops. They wanted to be comfortable. The hardcore detainees did not
respond to women. They would not look at women. I did not approve it under any
circumstances. It was stupid and offensive under the Geneva Conventions. It does not
serve any useful purpose. If that occurred, I want to see the FBI report.
Red ink used as menstrual fluid? I've never beard of that technique. It would disrupt the
intelligence and prosecution gathering operations.
Ghost detainees ...every person that landed on the island was processed through the MP
cycle.
11F-I60 was in disarray when I took over. They had 60 outstanding Inspector General
complaints. We tried to clean up as much as we could before MG Miller came.
11F-170 served two Article 15s to two individuals for personal misconduct. It was not
detainee related.

~--------

8

DOD JUNE

3745

Other than the incident with FBI contractor that physically w e _ t a i n e _ '
recall any other problems with FBI agents and detainees. LT
d LT
might have counseled someone for wrong or .inappropriate ben
..
.
I counseled people on the lack of preparation. I did it as a group. I counseled FBI. I
never had information from the IG or JAG that we had a problem. It would stick out.
_

FBI did separate· interviews. I have faith that thA,as not abusing
s. I had a high degree of faith. I had access to a n - , i wanted.

I also had high faith that the FBI was conducting proper interviews. Physical abuse just
does not work. Successful prosecution was their goal. They did not want to jeopardize
that
We had four to six guys in Camp X-Ray. To put a detainee in X-Ray required that we
notify USSOUTIICOM and JCS and we would have done a report in writing.
I was interviewed for the Church report.
Virtually no one had a degree of expertise to deal with these people. They do not
subscribe to our values legally and morally. We did benefit from some great young
people. We had a native Pakistani that was fluent in Arabic.

FBI's approach was that you would stay in jail if you did not talk to us.

bi

Was.Ortured? No.
I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement
given by the witness, MG (ret) Mike Dunlavey. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force
Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

-----

~tii~
DALL M. SCHMIDT
.

Lieutenant General, USAF
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

DOD JUNE

3746

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT LT CDR
who was interviewed on 24 March 2005 at a conference room in
LCDR
the Hilton Hotel located at the O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Winois. Also present was
legal representative (Navy Lieutenant). The follow-on interview took
place telephonically on 14 April 16, 2005 at 1254 hours. His combined statement was
substantially as follows:
I arrived at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) on or about 13 December 2002. I was
deployed !tOm European Command (EUCOM) on temporary duty status to act as the
Liaison Officer for EUCOM. While acting as the LNO for EUCOM I observed some
interrogations and even reviewed documents conceming_ however I did not
actively participate in interrogations or conversations concerning interrogation
procedures. On or about 28 June 2003, I was released from my obligations to EUCOM
and placed in the capacity of Special Projects Team Chief for Joint Task Force GlMO
(J1F-GTMO). I held that position until I re-deployed on 24 September 2003.
During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at
Guantanamo. 1 was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of
military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference
with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, shortshackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and
inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation teChnique, to inc:lude use of lap
dances and simulatea menstrual fluids.
I have personal knowledge of the following:

The only time I recall a miliwv working dog (MWD) near a detainee was in the
At no time was a MWD used during any
movement operations for _
interrogations o f "

I can say with cenainty that none of my interrogators impersonated FBI agents during
their interrogations because to do so would have been counterproductive. The mission
. for the J1F-GTMO interrogators was obtaining actionable intelligence from the detainee.
Most of the detainees assigned to the Special Project Team were very intelligent, EnglisbspeakIng men who were educated (at least partially) in the Urnted States of America and
understood our criminal justice operation. The detainees knew the FBI repres~!1ted the
law enforcement community. M a branch oflaw enforccmcnt, the dctaince's knew tbat
the FBI had the power to incarcerate them for years. With the above being said, it wasn't
shockmg to learn that the detainees did not like opening up to the FBI. Therefore, it
would have been stupid for me to encourage my interrogators to impersonate FBI agents.
I did authorize a couple of my interrogators

_

to impersonate Department of State agents during a few interrogations of ISN

760. The impersonation approach implemented by the interrogators was approved.

AR 15-&GTMO lnvestigation
Exhibit '1p = of. 7~ Exhibits

DOD JUNE

3747

My team never used "music" as an interrogation technique. However I know that musIc
was used as a technique by some of the other teams (however even the other teams
started to use the technique less and less over time).
Yelling was a common tool used during interrogations. Why not! My interrogators (on
the Special Projects Team) didn't yell to the point oflosing their cool, but they would
raise their voice if the detainee was being an obstinate ass. Yelling was never used to
obtain information - it was a means to make a point.
One of ~ ~ey components of the new parameters was the restriction of interrogation
sessions to 15 hours. The detainee was allowed 5 hours of uninteaupted sleep.
Therefore, interrogations o f . were limited to no more than 15 hours. I can't
remember any interrogator setting up a IS-hour interrogation.
I never witnessed a detainee being "short shackled." However I do recall reading MFRs
that described the practice (I can't recall the detainee, but it was sometime in December
2(02). I made a mental note of the practice for two reasons: FU'Sl, the use of stress
positions. in an interrogation, isn't an effective approach for obtaining reliable
information. Second, the MFRs were blunt and I feared that if "folks" not OD the "team"
read the reports that the contents could either be misconstnJed or make the interrogators
look bad (if taken in context). In fact, I even asked the interrogators about the practice
and counseled him about stress positions and drafting MFRs.
As head of the Special Projects Team I was the supervisor for the implementation of the
Special Interrogation Plan for
(the plan was submitted sometime in May 2003
and approved in late August 2003). The lead interrogator on the IP w a s _

-

~PIJ.",·
DOD JUNE

3748

hooded during the movement) have conversations in Arabic to funher confuse the
detainee.
I also posed as a White House representative (counsel to the President). I was a "Navy

Captain Collins." I presented 760 with an "officiaJ" letter (a five paragraph document)
deulinl how his family had been captured by the Coalition Forces and was in danger if
he
didn't coo
e. I vetted the Ie through the JTF-GTMO SJA

en e 0
s guard "he wanted to speak to ~because he was
unwilling to protect others at the detriment of himself and his family").
I don't know anything about someone describing a dream to a detainee about seeing a
coffin with the detainee's ISN on it. or the description of the detainee being buried in

Christian soil.
The approval process for a SpeciaJ IP: Team produces the product, team chief presents to
ICE Chief, who forwards to the nG Chief, who forwards it to CDR JlF-GTMO. The
CDR then submitted it to SOumCOM and SECDEF for approval. The chain of
command w
ey exCCtlted the second Special IP was ICE Chief_JIG Chief
and nF-GTMO CDR MG Miller

DOD JUNE

3749

I did not approve~all of the MFRs.
had approval
authority,.as did _
Both had approved MFRs. most especially when I- was OD
leave.
I declare under penalty that the ~ correct summary of the
statements given by the w i t n e s s . _ Executed at Miami, Florida OD

16 April 2005

---%Uoo
LTC GLENN CROWTHER
Investigating Officer

DOD JUNE

3750

"f'

B.7

,J

~

o~ 6

.

•

fo'

iO_i~ on 03 March

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT
!'-WhO was
2005 at a conference room in the National War College B~!, Fort McNal~

/. t,
:/

.j
.
of
National
Security
Strategy,
accompame
iiJlaiunng
the
lDtervlew.
artment
was interviewed a second time on or about 17 M h 2005 at the Washington Field
.Office for S Southern Command in Arlington, Virginia. His statement was substantially as
follows:
. .=-- - - '

j

ei

"p/

oj,

b

b1>

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (G'IMO) from the end of July 2002 to December
th
2002, At the time I was the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief for Joint Task Force 170
(nF-170th)/nF-GlMO. I was working fo
en I was
deployed to GlMO.

".-.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at
Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military
working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or inteiferencc with FBI agents,
inappropriate use of loud music andlor yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an
interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstl11a1 fluids.

r.

!;:

I have personal knowledge of the following:
J'~ m i l l _ o 'dog (MWD) was brought into the interrogation booth of a high value
.
detainee
n or about October 2002. The MWD was brought to the entrance of the
interrogatIon·
by the dog's handler and directed to bark and growl at the detainee. The use
,.of a MWD in an interrogation was unusual; and therefore, was mentioned in the interro~.
plan submitted to the J1F-170th Commander. Once approved, the interrogation plan fo~
was implemented. The use of a MWD was one of many techniques approved and executed
( during the interrogation cycle. It is important to note that theMWD was not ordered to attack or
harm the detainee. The MWD was only used as a means to intimidate the detainee..

Xl .

Wl....u.l read the redacted Federal Bureau of Investigation documents on the ACLU website (the
documents provided to the ACLU as part of a Freedom of Information Act request), I remember
coming across the statements regarding "duct tape" and thinking the statements ,,!~re.about me. I
recall, very vividly an incident involving duct tape that occurred during November 2002 and I am
glad I have the opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the incident.

'.'"

There was one time when I directed a couple of MPs to keep a detainee quite in the interrogation
booth. I did not direct the MPs to use duct tape as an interrogation technique nor would I ever
direct a guard or an interrogator to use duct tape as part of a formal interrogation. I authorized
the use of duct tape as a control measure - to prevent a detainee from inciting a riot. After an
interrogation session was complete (I was not involved in the session), the detainee began to yell
(in Arabic): "Resist, Resist with all your might..." I stepped out of my office when I heard the
commotion and walked to the interrogation booth where the yelling was coming from. When I
arrived at the booth, I saw a detainee screaming and an interrogator, translator and a COUDle of
.
~
AR 15-6 GTM01nveSligation
<: '-J ~ "
I;
1
Exhibit a.,
of 76 Exhibits

DOD JUNE

n

r

3751

1,1

"f
'J

".;.

.

guards standing there frozen. The soldiers didn't know what to do so I directed the MPs to keep
the detainee quite. One of the MPs mentioned he had duct tape. After a consultation with the
Joint Interrogation Group (nG) Chief, I approved the MP's use of duct as a means to keep the
detainee quite. The MPs placed a single strand of duct tape across the detainee's mouth. The
single strand proved ineffective because the detainee was soon yelling the same resistance slogan
again. 'Ibis time the MPs wrapped a single strand of duct tape around the mouth a&9ef18 'of the
detainee. The detainee removed the duct tape again. Feed up and concerned that the detainee's
yelling might cause a riot in the interrogation trailer (there were at least eight other interrogations
occurring at this time), I ordered the MPs to wrap the duet tap twice around the bead and mouth
and three tina under the chin and around the top of the detainee's bead. Just as the ~s were
finished wrapping the duct tape around the detainee's head. an FBI special agent appeared in'the
hallway. Without inquiring why the detainee's bead was wrapped in duct tape. the special agent
exclaimed that be wasn't going to stand by and witness this type of abuse and stormed out of the
trailer. Later that day I received a call from Major General (MG) Miller asking for my presence
in his office. When I arrived, MG Miller "chewed me out." I never received a formal reprimand
or any other type of punishment, but it wasn't necessary. MG Miller's conversation with me was
sufficient to get the point across: even if the reason for using the duct tape was valid, it was not
the interrogation section's jurisdiction to direct the guards to act. The guards were not under my
control and I was not to order them to act again.
A formal investigation was never conducted regarding the "duct tape" incident and an
investigation wasn't necessary. I admitted that I directed the use of duct tape and MG Miller told
me not to do it again.
I never instructed or authorized the impersonation of FBI agents as part of an approved
.
.
However I do remember when an interrogator (I believe the interrogator was
me he impersonated an FBI agent during an interrogation. I immediately
t the impersonation of any government agent was authorized and that be
was to
in
approach. In fact, I even held a "town hall" meeting and told the
interrogators that impersonation of non military US governmental officials was prohibited (this
"town hall" meeting occurred before MG Miller took over command of rIF·GlMO). For the
record, I do~'t believe the impersonation of FBI agents is against the law or violates any other
standing interrogation policy.
The use of loud music and yelling was used during the intenogation of certain high value
detainees. However the techniques were not "stand alone" techniques. The techniques were
always wrapped up in other approaches (i.e. Fear Up Harsh) and would be enumerated in the
interrogation plans sent to MG Dunlavey or Miller for approval.
I define "sleep deprivation" as keeping a detainee awake continuously for five or six day's
straight. Based on my definition of sleep deprivation, I never authorized or witnessed the use of
·'sleep deprivation" in an interroga ion session or approved interro ation
. I recalJ having a ,
meeting with the JIG Chief
be J1F-170dl 5JA
d myself regarding ~
the maximum length an interrogat on eSSlon could last. After some
ussion and research, we
determined that it was acceptable to interrogate detainees for a maximum of twenty hours in a
twenty-four hour period. However the detainee was required to have four hours of uninterrupted
sleep betwee~ interrogation sessions. We came to that Dumber after reading about the United

I

VJ (()

..

2

DOD JUNE

3752

---

.

.

'

States Army Ranger Course. During the Ranger Course, our soldiers are subjected to rwentyhour days and are apparently only required to have four hours of sleep. If it was okay to subject
our soldiers to twenty-hour days, then in our mind's it was okay to subject the terrorist to twentyhour interrogations. If a detainee were kept awake for 5 days straight - that would be sleep
deprivation.
-::--~-

As the ICE Chief I was never part of any interrogations. However it was my responsibility to
monitor the interrogators and interrogation sessions. I would periodically monitor interrogations
to watch my interrogators in action. During one of my monitoring sessions, I noticed that an
interrogator bad left the air conditioner "cranked down" to 60 degrees and left the det~ee alone
in the interrogation booth.

r:t'

...

""."
i::

.:

.:..

I can only remember directing a femaliiflintor to touch a detainee one time. The
I
interrogator, I believe her name was
was having difficulty inteIrogating a detainee. !A
Specifically, the detainee refused to s op praying during the interrogation session (i.e. the
detainee would stare at the flooriliEd
s ft) bant passages from the Koran). After an especially
frusttating
session,
d a native translator approached me with a. .".i
difficult and
suggestion to break the detainee'
·on. 1be plan was simple. According to the native
translator, devote Muslims cannot continue to pray if they are "unclean." Therefore, if the
detainee were made "unclean" he would have to stop praying. One w i i l t o
a Muslim male
unclean is to be touched by a female. B a s e d
.s_lan,
n I instnlcted
0 purchase ~
cheap perfume at the PX (rose oil). When
turned with
0 , instIUcted ber
to put the perfume on her hands and rub her
0 r the detainee's arms. The plan worked just
as anticipated. T h e . e e
t pped praying. However the detainee became violent and
attempted to attack
In the process, the detainee hit bis mouth on the chair and
chipped his tooth. .
ee was immediately taken to the hospital for treatment.

~/
I....)b

t!f.

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Many of the "aggressive" interrogation techniques we
requested during October 2002 was a direct result of the pressure we t om
obtain intelligence and the lack of policy guidance being issued by Washington.
d . . , . the foregoing in a UUe and COlleCt summary of the statement given by
I decl~e u
the wIlne
Executed at Davis-Montban Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March
2(x)5.
.

3

DOD JUNE

3753

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In-ctw:~ g

SUMMARIZED

Mr..-

I was originally assigned to GTMO from 25 June 2002 to August 2002. I was then re-deployed
to GTMO for a two-year tour from August 2003 to May 2005. During my first deployment I was
working as a Special Agent for the FBI and I am currently the Supervisory Special Agent in
Charge for FBI operations at OlMO.
During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at
Guantanarno. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military
working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation ofor interference with FBI agents,
inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an
interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

if'.·;,

I have personal knowledge of the following:
The FBI conducts separate interviews from the Joint Interrogation Element (nO) interrogators at
GTMO. There are times when we will conduct interviews with the Criminal Investigation Task
Force since we have similar law enforcement missions.

....'

~ know ~<

a memt>c:r of the S~cial Projects Team, posed as an FBI agent during an
mterrogatlon. Other agents mennoned that mterr~llators from other agencies also posed as FBI
and he said it wouldn't J 6
agents. I discussed the "impersonation issue" wi~
happen again without FBI approval. It was not an aggravated event and it was handled on the
ground level. You could ask 500 agents and 400 would tell you that they posed as other people
during interviews. It just requires prior coordination. The handling of this situation was an
example of proper inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

!

L

It is my understanding that short shackling was authorized. I have never personally seen it done.

i.

~{

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4,

t:

lNESS STATEMENT OF Supervisory Special Agent
ho was interviewed on 11 January 2005 at ~ room 111 the
,
ommisslOns Bui ding, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GlMO).
an attorney for the ~ /"
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), was also present for the interview. His statement was I wJ \.0
substantially as follows:

(~Old me that he witnessed this.

I decl~e under p e ~ atrue and correct summary ofthe statement given by
the Witness, Agen~ Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base
Arizona, on 29 Marcli 2005.
'

~

\:\\:-

JOHN FURLOW

estigating Officer

1

DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO In\lestigation
Exhibit 1.1. 76 Exhibits

of

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3757

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not =nsiItent with

BMtroy! lUI UNCI "SlFIEe

NgN-VeOBR

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Iwas TDY to ~O fi'am

July r . .
1
Iggrellive "atment. in'~ ~~
Wli
I",••u int.rvlllW pDliotl;aide&t by a~ PI, plllaftMlII' 11I1 iIUIrnPt&VI from FT.8I1VOir CGnIlaUn; of AIr
Fcne OSI. Navallnveatilltivl SI!Nic:e Ind possibl)' I IN...,...... 1fIhou;h I Cln' raQlI Wt\1Gh
.
aft.l. HDwIVlr. I da I"IGBIf .eelng nm. lechn,-ul. uUI'IZId by dw inlamplDlS not I ..adated •
the Fli Dr
the Ft. B.lvalr lnlemlllltarl. I. . .10n111111W IIlIIP depllVllUDn 1nIerve- • 1Iratt. lights Ind two dirfarent
kindl of lOud music. IUkell the'on. of the Inleno;a•• whit Ittey Wft doing 1\., II1d tMt It would lake
.p~",Xim.tlllY four days to ~ sameane doln.1ft InteIrDgIIictn 'Ii houri an wilft In, fights anet mUlic snd four
"ours, off. The sleep cternvatlon and "'. ftta and aItaIn*,. belli of the m&IIi= would we.r th. detainee down
ihlrl WIS Jliml plltDd whlrl'ltIl interTDgations.wer. ~wtiVe lnDugh th8t fl. InteIYIlw roaml for In enUre
fllDer were not l'ili/able I' ane of the.e teehnlquu ware beina utlIIDd.
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1heard mlny NmOf. about thine that I l1id "ot otlselYe. , apoka with on. InterTD;1ltcr (nlll lure If rnDltary Dr
conlfIClClr Dr oll1.r) U'lil Drag;.a IDOUl actng I tap a.,,=e on ana Dllaln" (pDlliblr ., 14). MothII' .,llm:taator
("01 lure 11 mUitlry Dr =o"tractDr or ott'l,r) brag;ed .b~ut making CII.lnee .,,~ listen t= ....nic b'-C:k mellt
millie for hour and r\C~url. Then the illlerrcgltDr c:Irtaera IS • Calholic Priest and blJ:ltiZed the dl.l. in order t
sal/e him.
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AA , H GTMO Inwltigltion
ExhIbit ...."
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CraI), Specili ~gen~ (SA)
Clayeland DiYiaion, £CD 12/D&/19,8, was advised of
C Io~-' 'the dent1~e 1nterv1ev:ln, Agen~ and the Datu:'. ef- 'the
E ~~_\ . 1nterview .......... prDY1de~ the fellow!n; info:mat1on 1~ regard to

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.l-~urllu·of IrivI.ti9aticD

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of • '''Spec111 Proj.c:~.b ca. vhich c:ons1.1ted of rS% SA _ .

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(Charlotte Division' and I t.lk forci. ott1c:.~ Who•• n.~e he
.~.
i5~m coa cs net recall.
.
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cUd net witn••• 0:' 'observe .;;,r••• 1vl treatment,
.~
~u~ in~erro;.t1on. 0% 1ntarv1aw technique. utilizad on Ci1HO detaine••
:i!e> condu~ted ~y FlI 0; other la~ enforcement personnel which were not
~~~ consistent with FlI or COJ po11=Y/9U1de11n•• , bu~ did abser71 .uc:~
E2
behavior by non-law enfor=emen~ Department ot De~.n'l [COOl
. (a1 wfS l'u"sClnnel on l't .la•• t two CI:c&siona. On the•• cpcc•• 1eft. t.he 000
LL.'~~S; personnel utilized .leep depr,vl:i~n by play1n; lcad·muI1c.fo: 1.
'... c_.-, rtCll,u'1 I t I tiN with lour hour. between sesa1ons, ~n:l
l~1t.1
others ~:C~9ht·the•• 1nstan=es to .t~~nt1on of alA
who
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Will his AC:'C1ng Supervisor (Atlantl DiY1.10~) at. GTH •
,

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~nterview te=hn~

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contact with OOD personnel
or detainee's c~her than
regularly held ~zief1n;s b~ the COC Commlnd Which prov1de~
updates of a~tivity and the r.um=e: af detainees It G~MO~ IIIIIIIIIt

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f'telephonically)
D"c ~1C1l1 •

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........ had no substantive
re;ard~n; ~dit1on or.treatment

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w1'th unidentified COD employee.

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~anv.rslt1ons

intervJ.ew technique" _
recalled ~ii!P.in
Isked if he used "felr
up" ex "family cQmplls~chniquel.
did not know th'.
1den~1t1es of the DOD~nt.rviewerl or d.~. n.l. 1nvolved in the
activity. The 1991'sslive intlrv1ewl _
w1tne3•• d occu.:red It
Camp Celta in either the ~ellcw, Brown or Gold are.;. Ho.t .
inter~iews condu~ted by law enforc:em~nt Ind DOD personnel occurred
1n 1nterview roams located in ~rlilerl in ;hes. areas. Often DOD
~ersonnll would.rl~.r • an e~:irt traile: When em lcrin; ,;;:els~~.

IV'I'

·

was nco: famil.iar with ~OD policy/;uidlnce
;.,nte:rg.;,a:ion t.lchn1qu•• were ..Ju:h=r1zed,

J.i",'Lill ".i'..;·

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DOD JUNE

3759

.09/1 i 12004,

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and cther,vI:e,pro91ded I ~cur of the call .~.a at GtHO a~d be '
cha%acter1aed the cells as .mall but acceptable. He recalled thit
the d.ta~ne•• we~e .w1tched fram Meal. Je.d~ to Eat fHRr.) to
%'e;~l.r food becau.e the d.et&!n•• ~'"• .~!.t.e_ ,"=om1ng. ~".~.t.;ht. d\1e to '. '~'.
~~ •. =alerJ.e. ccnto&~fted -in -t'ne- 'HRE..
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coul~ nc~ .recall any alle;lt1oft of m.t::eatIll8nt'

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deta1n••• , oth.~ than the detain.e.~.
tefe:r1lL9 to techniques emplcyed by, DOD, pe~.cmn.l •• UgUlel."
.
. . . - ~~1c.t..d ma8t 'of the 1nterv1e"s coraducted ~y the h!.
'.j
~,P:eject. team were ne~.• ~~~!. .Special, P:O~'8Ct.. wa. ~·••'k.CI "'~I:',
w1th interv.1ev1ng t~ 'mo'st ·h• .rtl.n.~ ,Qata,1n....
.
.,
...
,
_ ' w a l not in pos.e._lon of picture., Yidee, a,ulic,
·l
netes ~r ether doc~.n~at1on whic~ depicted 0: d••cr1Ded 1;;=e••L9•
_

~rouiht t~tenticn ~y

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He ind1clted tne 1nt.r"1a~.r. we~e,.ea~Ch.a fo~
{
each time they entered c% exited.the compound.
.
. ... . . . ..•......
.
hea:d man, rumQrs&bout .;;r•••1ve er
1nep~ropriat. lnterrDiat.on ta:hnique. by DOD which- ware
uns~b!tant1ated.
Amon; the :~ora ha halza w.~. ~h.t • female DOC
interrogater did a lip dance -on • detlin••, 'that .• DaD 1nte::zooVl.to%
torcBd a detainee to 111tan te Istan1c ~l.ck ••tal .ua1c for ho~=.,
and that a COD inter:ogitor dras5ed as • CAtholic p::i•• t and
,
Dap:ized a detain.t in or~er to sage him. ........ had no f1r.t
'
hand knowledge of thl.e events and wa. un,u~e
tc 1f they
Il:tually occurred.
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~reatment.
cQntra~.nd

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DOD JUNE

3760

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He was interviewed on or
SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Agent
was also
about 1030 hours, 20 ~?05, a~ Conference Room, NACAVC.
present during Agent-" mtervJew.
His statement was substantially as follow:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from mid September 2002 until the end of
October 2002.. I was ~epl.oyed to ?TMO ~ part ofthe Federal Bureau of~vestigatio_n

-

Behavioral SCIence DiVlsJon. During my tune at GTMO I was partnered With Agent

,.

...,

L
!

L

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I mew about detainee abuse at
Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military
working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents,
inappropriate use ofloud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-sbackling. inappropriate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an
interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

;annin

g ~d implementation of
When I fIrst ~ved at G~o.. I was ask~ to participate in the
an interrogauon plan for a high value detainee -ISNaSN
was bemg housed at the
Navy Brig and interrogated at Camp X-Ray. Agent
and I were asked to observe
interrogations oflSN_and offer guidance to the military interrogators, based on I S N _
behavior, on the best approaches to use in obtain reliable information. After observing a few
interrogation sessions, it became clear to me that the military interrogators were using more
aggressive interrogation approaches than the FBI. In fact, durin~e interrogation session,
Agent_ and I witnessed a dog inside the room where ISN. was being interrogated.
Once inside the room, the dog was ordered to growl and show teeth at the detainee.

d I were watching an FBI interrogation in one of the interrogation trailers when
came into the observation booth. He was excited and stated that he had something
to s ow us. was curious, so I followed~own the hallway to an interrogation room.
When I arrived at the interrogation room, I observed six or seven soldiers (or persons I believed
were soldiers) laughing and pointing at something inside the room. When I looked inside the
room I noticed a detain~s entire head covered in duct tape (except for his eyes and
maybe mouth). I asked_why the detainee's head was covered with duct tape?_
stated because he (the d . ') refused to stop "chanting the Koran" during an int..e_rrogation
session. When I asked
how he planned to take the tape off without hurting the detainee
~tainee had a beard and longer hair),_just laughed. I immediately infonn~nt
_
and raceeded to notify the Crimin~stigation task Force attorney (either_
I don't think_personally put the duct tape on the detainee's
head, but I believe from his actions he directed the soldiers to do it.
I recall observing two interrogations when the detainee appeared to be short shackled. The first
incident caught my attention because I heard loud yelling emanating from an interrogation room.
The voice I heard was speaking English and was yelling in an abusive manner. As I approached
the interrogation room, I heard a thump. I observed a detainee short shackled (hands shackled to
AR 15-6 GTM9 InvBstigation
~yhikit

r
DOD JUNE

3761

a.,_

",f "7&: C ....ikite

the eyebolt) to the floor when I looked inside the room. I do not remember the interrogators
name or the exact date of the interrogation.
I declare under penal

J:I

by the witness, Agen

ing in a true and correct summary ofthe statement given
f(.< /
Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on IJ./ p

29 March 2005.

)

\~-

JOHN FURLOW
estigating Officer

r.-

DOD JUNE

3762

SUMMARJZEDWIINESSSTATEMENTO~formcrStaffJudge
B
b
w~~n

Advocate, 170TH J'IF and rrF-GTMO. She
two separate occasions:
the first interview occurred on or about 1350 hours, 21 January 2005, a~~,
the second intef'!iew occ~ut 15.00 hours, ~ 7 M~h 2~5.~ D
b G was also present during_lOtervJeW, at the mtervJewee s request.

'G

I was stationed at GTMO from June 2002 to June 2003.
During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at
Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of
militaJjworking dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference
with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, shortshackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and
inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap
dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I would like to say at the outset of this interview that I am proud of the soldiers of Joint
Task Force GTMO (JTF-GTMO) and the job we did under the most trying of
circumstances.
I never reviewed a plan authorizing the use of military working dogs (MwD) dwing
interrogations. I personally observed between three and four hundred interrogations and I
never witnessed the use of a MWD. The MWDs are controlled and used by the Joint .
Detention Operations Group (1Doo). Therefore, authorization for the use ofMWDs
during an interrogation session would need the J'IF-GTMO Commander's approval (or
Major General Dunlavey's approval during the brief time period in October 2002 when
he was in command of both JTF-170lh and JTF-l60lb

I am aware of one incident when duct tape was used during an interrogation. However
the duct tape was not used as an interro~; instead the tape was used as a
force protection measure. According t ~ directed the guards present at
one of the interrogation rooms to duciiiiEta
a detainee s mouth shut when the detainee
started yelling resistance messages.
afraid that if the detainee weren't
10 rrogation trailer. I fIrst heard about the
shut 1.9' his actions would incite a riot 10
. incid~nt f r o m ' - t h e Crimin loves' ation Task Force (CITF) attorney.
Shortly after ~n wi
was or ere<! b MG Miller to look
into the incident and take care off it. I'
ate y calle
n I spoke with
e admitted to duct taping of the detainee's mouth or ordering the guards
• III ....:.·
_
detainee's mouth shut). 1 never got into the details of the incident (i.e.
whether the detainee suffered any pain when the ta~removed or exactly how mue
duct tape was used). After our conversation, I told~t the use of duct tape was n
an approved teclmique and never do it (duct tape a detainee's mouth) again. That was
extent of the "investigation" and the command response ~on't do that again."

UNCLASSIFIED

DOD JUNE

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 31
Qf ?6.Exhibits

3763

~IY

~b

I understand that an alleged "lap dance" occurred during the
months of 2003.
. . . the Joint
an
into the i s ' O r
~llinedthat something mappropnate occurred. I don t recall1f the report was
commined to writing, but if it was, a copy should be retained at the office of the Staff
Judge Advocate at GTMO: After the investigation, I believe the female interrogator
involved was removed from conducting interrogations for thirty days, re-train~ 4!!1~returned to the fight (purely an administrative action and punishment). It is important to
note: the female interrogator's actions/technique was not approved prior to

InteITog~tio~(JIG)'C~ef,conduct~ i~vestiga~on

imple~entation.

I am unllW8I'C of any instances of "short shackling." When we first spoke I stated J was
unaware of the practice being used in interrogatioD and I am still unaware that the
practice was used (other than hearing about the practice in this investigation and the

....

Church investigation).
The SECDEF approved twenty-hour interrogations with four hours of sleep for certain
high value detainees. I was involved in submittin the
est for additional techniques
uest:
in October 2002. Within that

Yelling was a v~d interrogation technique that was used by our interrogators to obtain
information.
Initially I believe interrogators would adjust the air conditioner in the interrogation
.
rooms. MG Miller found out about this practice and directed the interrogators to stop the
practice. I am not sure when this was exactly.

I ~eclare under. pen~o~g in a true and correct summary of the statement
glVen by the w1tness~xecutedat Davis-Monthan Air Force Base,
Arizona., on 29 March 2005.

\

UNCLASSIFIED

DOD JUNE

LTC GLENN A. CROWIlIER...Investigating Officer

2

3764

JUN. 27. 2006

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DOD JUNE

,.

3765

DOD JUNE

3766

NO. 704

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contact with H11itary Police
at GTHO rlvarQing de~ain••
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alle;ationl of mi.concuct at mistreatment by U.S. par.annel LL I
alleged by· interviewees or otne:, .......... tat.d .he had ftC~ ~~­
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.dep1ctec or d••cribed ig;=easivi treatment, interrogation. or
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.•~ wmGSS STA.TEMENT OF _ _ HI WIS interviewed on or
'about 093D boun~ 20 JIDUU)' 2005, It Ccmfar=ce be=. NACAVc.
was also
pramt durinS
iDterYiew. His ltatarJCAt wu mUImlaDy .. follow:

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I was JtlticmI4. 0uaDtaaIm0 Bay, Cuba (Gl'MO) tam II Sept 02 ta 29 Oe:t 02. r was
dq1oy~ to GNO II lilt oftb= Pedal I=- o!1D.YeIdptian 1e1aavi&dl Idenee nivisi=.
tJ"uriD1 my 1tIDe'at'GTMC) I wu p~ wfth'ApIlt

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Qumtanamo ·!WII·lI*i5caUyabdGOUltU~1dI: ~_o{militlt)'
iaappmpziate use ofcluet tape, impmautlcm. of CI' ~ 'Iftth B1 apms.

DudDI the courte oldie •
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~_.a£1Da4Jm&Iie.&DdIar~"~'~iq..~opnilte
\111 otextrlZDe tlaSjAI'IlUnl c1Ur1D, m.mptiallt Del iDIppl'DpnIIa" of- - tlDSioD II U
iDtan'Olatian tae1mlquc. to iDc1w1. use of Ill' dau::lllDd simuJltId JDCSIIINIl fhdds. '

1haY'personal bowlcclp oftbl faDawins:
Qn or ab9.~OS .Oct, 02.. AI=,"aacl I wimllJl!d a mW1.a1 warkin, dol beiDa used cluriD&
ThI dol 'flU brDu imo the iDtcoptlon mom.
~r wimlssiq this unanhqclax Wcropticm ,~
Wcth.
e~-"'1. oblll'V&1ion f'I:Mml. Whc ... dis=~the event with
, !Ie just lt111:C11be tedmique ftS
apptOyet! BIlrS he didn't see anything iDapFOPriall1bcnft UII of a dOl ill In iatenoptiOI'l.

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l,~~b.r. ~ ~lIn'QPu= vividly for two nllOZIL "l1li,1 bad II8YIl'sea I dOl usee! ba III
iDtmoptioa.and J believed it was mapprgprlate. SIClDDc!. _ _ ill the ...... I ba&l a
colvmaUon wilts two saUltii)' =1 bandied lone alta AadIm 'WIIID Azm11101die: mel the
omar was a NaY)' lI1lar) about the best meuJods for tniAiDa • GeauD Shepd. I wu mae:ruted
-1. because I bad just recmt1y acquired I German Shepard. .J!PJ!l- tlmup the baDeltlll cauld
lo'"\(!-, .., provide valuable iAfonutlcm. We talked \0 him
JCYerIl cWfermt times \C let him
know that we objected to the UK ar clOSI and thai WI die! DO' baliDeu that way. It was all
lot, - r ., mappropriate meuute. He told us that we ~d J) were JUIitl lad we JhauIcllCt

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appraa=bed
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WIS
laUI~nlli1d liked 1m ~ foIJow him 10 another inlenropdOA booth to &I. . lamethiq 'ftmn)'. i
dldn t 10, b u t _ dId. _
rcrumcd and laId me rhat he-bad obs.~ed a deuinec'. bad
lUll! facl complel.ly wrapped in duct lIpe.
Of

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by the witnuJ. Alent
becut~ It DavJs.M~Air Farce Buc. Adzana.
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29 Ma.r;h 2005. .

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ALL FBI tNFORMAT10N CONTAiNeD

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DOD JtJNE

3770

~onnerpsychiatrist with the ~ ~

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MA
Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCn,

sen~~ponseon 28 February 2005.

His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from July to December 2002.
During the course of the interview I was asked about ~t I knew about de~ee abuse ~~
Guantanamo. Iwas specifically asked about the followmg acts: Inappropnate ~ of IWlltary
working dogs, inappropriate use of duct ta~, impersonati~n~f or interfercnce.W1~FBI age~ts.
inappropriate-itSe of loud music and/or yellmg, sleep depnvauon, short-shacklmg, ma~propnate
use of extreme temperatures during interrogation., and inappropriate usc of sexual tensIon as an
interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

-

I have personal knowledge of the following:

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NovemberlDecember timeframe of 2002. We were told the usc of dogs was an approved part 0
the interrogation plan. Dogs were used to intimidate the detainee by getting the dogs close to
him and then having the dogs bark or act aggressively on command. I never saw a dog allowed
to bite or otherwise injure a detainee. I never saw dogs used except in the interrogation of this
sole detainee. One dog that was used regularly for this was a dog named, "Zcus". I do not recall
the name of the handler.

It was common to observe and hear about military interrogators "yelling" at detainee's d .

-

interrogations. ~wever I only saw loud music used in the inteII'ogation sessions 0
t e
uring those interrogations, loud music was commonly employed and was used wi
framework of the interrogation plan designed to confuse, disorient, and overwhelm the defenses
of this detainee.

5

---

exuil tension was one of many interrogation procedures approved for use in interrogations of
detainees (if approved in the interrogation plan). One example of sexual tension: an interrogator
rubbing against a detainee. It was felt that this sort of shocking behavior and might "rattle" the
detainee. It would be culturally taboo, disrespectful, humiliating, and potentially unexpected. I
did see female interrogators use scented perfumes or oils on their fmgertips so that when the
interrogator touc~ed a ~etainee ~at the oil or scent would be hard to wash off. It was hoped,
would be frustratmg, disconcertmg, embarrassmg to the detainee. It was done again to enforce a
commonly used "futility approach".
.
AR 15·6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit

DOD JUNE

3771

'13

of ~ Exhibits

5

All things considered. 1am proud as hell at the restraint demonstrated by the interrogators I
worked with.:-1 declare under ~oregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by

the witness, ~ Executed at Davis-Montban Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29
March 2005.

"t

JOHN FURLOW
vestigating Officer

2

DOD JUNE

3772

(R

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SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY D.
MILLER
MG Miller was interviewed on 18 March 2005 at WFO, Arlington, Virginia. The witness
was swom by LtGen Sclunidt His statement was substantially as follows:
I was the Commanding General for the Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 4
November 2002 to 26 March 2004.
My overall responsibility was interrogation and detention at Guatanamo Bay. Cuba. JTF160 was sct"up for detention and JTF-170 was set up for interrogation. My task was to
integrate them so that they. were in synchronization. USSOUTHCOM wanted to improve
intelligence and detention. I was told to fix it It was broken. I did not perceive that I
worked for the SECDEF. General Dunlavey and I had four days ofoverlap. We had a
change ov« from 4-9 November 2002. We did not have a conversation about whether he
had authority beyond GTMO. JTF-180 in Afghanistan was not in my command
relationship. It was a coordination and information relationship. The dctainccs did come
from JTF-180. Detainees and interrogators all came through ITF-180. There were no
detainees that came from IRAQ or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when I was there.
The command climate at GTMO was dysfunctional when I arrived. There were two
separate organizations with semor leadership that was at odds with each oth« regarding
bow they would integrate their missions. My first job was putting that together. The
leadership had a single mission focus that was separate. Single unit disparity did not
allow the units to ~ successful. There was no abuse or torture going on. The
organization was not worlcing together efficiently. It did not affect the detainees. SOPs
needed to be updated. The basic standard was going on. The detainees were treated in a
hmnane mann«.
I did receive FM 34-52. The additional techniques that werercquested went up to
GEN Hill. I was uncomfortable with Category Ill. I was not comfortable using Category
ill techniques in interrogations. We w«e going towards incentives. Category.m would
not help devdop intelligence rapidly and effectively from the dctainecs there. I did not
intend to.usc them. They were approved, but not directed. I had the latitude to use them.
It was an order that came down through the SECDEF. I did not question them about not
using the teclmiques in interrogation. They wanted to do aggressive teclmiques. Special
IntetTOgQ.tion Plans (IPs) had to be done in detail and sent to a higher authority. The
purpose-ofthe techniques was to support the nation's effort. There were two Special IPs;
they were enormous documents. The IPs were the way to set standards. Everyone
understood where the limits were.
Hovnontrolling was I? I'll be frank with you, when you put an organiZation together
you say here are the new standards. Some thought they were more aggressive. I would
state how to do and what to do. It is part of team building for success. You win the
battle one day at a time. Senior leadership got on board right away. That is why GEN
Hill asked me to come down to GTMO.

.>
,.

DOD JUNE

AR ~ ~-6 GTMO Inv~stigation
ExhIbIt "'5 -'ot7gExhibits

3773

.1

We had incidences of good faith mistakes. We stopped them. I would do a
Commander's Inquiry and corrective action was done on an interrogator. Retraining was
done. The interrogator would go back under the supervisor and then interrogate again. A
junior interrogator needed oversight It was a handful of occurrences. The occurrences
did not rise to torture, maltreatment, or inhumane treatment I bad an interrogator that
exceeded the bounds. It was a female interrogator who took offher BDU shirt and
inappropriately rubbed on the detainee. The female robbing was brought to my attention
by a contract interrogator. We pulled her out We found she did aoss boundaries. She
was given an administrative Letter ofReprimand and retained her. One incident, the
interrogatorasked the MP to help in an interrogation and the MP was actively involved. I
got it fixed. We continued to refine the policy. We built the SOPs. It was a continuously
evolving operation. We bad a weekly meeting that had enonnous leadership involvement
about staying within standards. Whoever violated the standards received appropriate
action. In another incident an MP could not control his temper. He struck a detainee. He
was a pretty good soldier..It occurred in the cell bloclc. The standards were well known.
If any standards were violated, appropriate action would be taken.· When a mistake was
made we took appropriate action.
The detainees are ruthless, murderous people. We had to teach interrogators and MPs not
to hate. I spent a lot oftime with the chain of command and how to control them
professionally. We had to talk about this to all interrogatolS.
There was a high leader touch. We had to lead the led. I was down there engaged at the
Camp. I spent enormous amount of time going through the cell block. It was difficult
.keeping that balance. We had weekly meetings. The lawyer went over the standards.
The lawyer would tell the in , _..... .,:: at ifyou cross the line call me. It got to be a
Do not cross those standards.
joke sometimes. I said call

... ...

.

General Hill told me that you are the Commander. Here are the basic guidelines, go
ahead, and go forward.

.

We had nmnerous actions routed through the 12
I worlced for General Hill.
A direct line to him would intenupt his comman • I, ty was very clear ofmy chain
of command. I talked to OSD almost every day. There was lots of talk. I understood for
whom I worked for. I had informal conversations with OSD. I sent a report to
DEPSECDEF through uSSOurnCOM.
I have known General Hill for 20 years. If I had a problem, I would call him. We talked
once or twice a week. I got guidance and all the support I needed.
Theoontiici:olS probably made up roughly 50% of the personnel. There were a higher
number of contract analysts that supported the' interrogation mission. 1 gave the same
talk to the contract analyst, their supervisor, and contract inteaogatolS. I told them they
were soldiers without the uniform.

2

DOD JUNE

~.

3774

'

..
The FBI was at the established weekly meeting. I had an FBI agent come down. They
had opportunity to come to the meeting every week. We had a meeting and I gave the
FBI Special Agent (SA) an hour. I told him it was anything he wanted to talk about
They had a different perspective. They had a law enforcement perspective. There was
significant friction between th1!!!EITF on how interrogations were done. It
was the first one and then SS
e later. I said here are the standaIds. No
FBI SA questioned interrogation metb
ogy. For segregation, we had to go to Gcocnl
HiIl for 30 days. No one from the FBI came to talk to me about that One ofthe
Doctor's ofCITF came to talk to me about interrogations.
I am not ali-bxpert on detention or interrogation. I spent an enormous amount oftime to
help me Wlderstand how I.can do this business better. I had a talk with every leader, ..
CITF, FBI and the JTF and told them that they would follow the standards. We would
come in on occasion and look at iDterrogations.

Nothing placed me in a compromising situation.
There was an interrogation SOP in place when I got there. I split the flO, ICE, and J2.
They were coWlterprociuctive. h was the most dysfunctional I've ever seen. I could not
believe it. It was senior leader's squabbling on personal matters. It was debilitating to
the organization. The JIO did normal 2 stuff
.\. ,~

~ working dogs- No, not in interrogations. They wee
~ They were used for detention, not interrogation.

'AIet tape - Not that I knew of. Aft1i!illeft
Iw
ld that a senior interrogator duet taped
:omeone's mouth. I was told it w
ut that is only speculation. I was
;urprised. I don't bow when it happen or e es.
I knew about the false flag. I don't know any instance. It was an authorized technique in
theIP.

Impersonating FBI· No.

~

Yelling:at detainee and loud music
It was an approved
technique. The intenogator was au~
Interference with FBI - There was an FBI and CITF focus on law enforcement on DoD

guiaancetb "develop inteIJigcnce. Their focus was on evidence. We were developing
intelligence. They had a different focus. We followed DoD. FBI followed public law.
,,-Sleep deprivation
~

3

DOD JUNE

3775

Short shackling. While I was there the detainees were chained to the eye-bolt for
secw'ity. Every interrogator saw the detainee's legs and feet. I saw hundreds of
interrogations. There were no stress positions. I gave guidance.
Food and water we do not use as a weapon.

_ained

30 pounds.

~

Hot and cold temperature - Not to my knowledge.

• I

Inappropriate touching is not au~ught to my attention and we took care
of it Thetouchingwasdoneby~ ~

S G . c a m o "'my attention
Ink and meostrual fluid - No.

There were no ghost detainees that were under the control of JTF-GTMO.
What humane treatment means to me are adequate food, sheher, medical care, and an
environment that would not cause physical or mmtal abuse.
.:tome interrogation techniques that SECDEF granted authority for was beyond what I
was comfortable with.
I never saw a memo or received a memo from the FBI that commented on SIPs.
It was clear to all the standards. The boundaries were for all. FBI and CITF bad the
same bo\D1daries for all DoD included. In our discussions,.evc:rybody understood the
standards. We have the same guidance. Everybody was formally notified that the
superior commander made the guidance for interrogations.
I recognize the CITF memo objecting to the Special IP. I scot the interim plan up and it
was approved by higher headquarters.

My focus was on the relationship between the eITF and the JTF. My focus was to
improve it. They were at odds professionally and personally to the detriment ofthe
mission. I called the CITF commander pctSODally. We discussed that they were trying to
develoJ1.cvidence and the JTF position is not to develop evidence, but intelligence. The
meeting was attended by General Ryder (the em Commander), the CITF commander,
and myself. We talked about an effective relationship about doing the mission.
Subordinates are to work together effectively. An interrogation plan .was approved and
we followed the plan.
.-..,.,-~

-

I directed the Director of the JIG to conduct an investigation into the lap dance~tion.

no

~~mmendations and findings. The Director of the
w~
~as an effective leader and did a good over watch. He was a senior

leader down there that would execute the mission.

4

DOD JUNE

3776

..
..
.

The standards were known across the mission. I foun
later. It never came to my level. I believe it came t
took appropriate action.

. duet tal
.ttention

I had several counseling sessions with~He is very fine man. He did 0

manner that demonstrated what the ~are.

-

I am a standards guy_ If you don't follow the standards, I'll take the appropriate action.
When hooest mistakes are made, you counsel, coach, and mentor.
I came to a dysftmctiooal organizatioo not with mission success. I spent a large amount
oftime fixing it

J am aware ofthe 2 May 2003 memo I signed. It was in response to the up and down
incident The letter was signed in response to an AR 15-6. It was a Fear up. The MPs
were told not to do it anymore. This particular incident was a single incident There
were some cases ofthe MPs being actively involved in inte:aogation; that was not my
guidance.

The ICRC brought several general statements for revi
i

\
The guidance every week revalidated the guidance. It was very important.
The FBi and CIA representative came every 30 days.
Interrogations require that we would restate the standards every time. I knew the contract
interrogators. I gave them the same speech for standards.
Therew8'i fairly large friction between JTF and JCRC. One of my focuses was to make it

effective. It was producing unnecessary friction.

---

.~

,

~

5

DOD JUNE

.
~
. ".-

-c~l;"nl;;. I -'-'

3777

(8 b/

t.31

I have not been through SERE. I don't believe to my knowledge that the interrogators
went through SERE. The Psychologist, Forensic Psychologist, and Clinical Psychologist
were trained through SERE.
Most intemrgators were school trained on tactical intClTOgation. Tactital debriefing in
strategic interrogation, some were trained. It was a small number. Some picked up
training while there at GTMO.

I have seen several hundred interrogations now. When I showed up at GTMO I had
never before witnessed one.
I believe one ofthe things we found out holistically. Unity of command for success and
standards demonstrated success on a regular basis.
JTF-160 and ITF-170 was an ad hoc organization that started from a cold start that we
normally would have in our institution. There were a lot ofdevelopmental operations
and procedures for strategic interrogation on how things should be done.
Abuse problems are simply about discipline setting, standards and developing these
standards. You need leadership involvement that clarifies and focuses OD the importance
of the mission.

GTMO and Iraq are different I have had a year and a balfto look at GTMO. GTMD
used standards, how to treat detainee that are not combatants, how to interrogate, and
incentive based interrogations. GTMO was successful.

Th6sei.n~ogations

did not involve torture.

GTMDize inappropriately reads bad infonnation. I have heard of it If you apply a
leader and standard there is adherence to the standards. In another context, it brings
discredit to all the leaders.

6

DOD JUNE

3778

On 26 March 2004, I departed the island and went to Iraq three days later.
I I I I I I I f I I I I I I II , I I I , , I I I I I I I I t III II , I I I I I I I I I t I I I ' , ! I II II I

j

I

MG Geoffrey Miller was interviewed, via secure telephone, a second time on 31 March
2005 at 1843 EST. At that time Lieutenant General Schmidt advised MG Miller ofhis
rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

U Oen Scbinidt asked MG Miller several questions regarding events that have been
documentec1 in the intem>gation logs obtained &om GTMO. Lt Gen Schmidt asked MG
Miller ifhe had evcrrcad.the interrogation logs and MG Miller responded that he had
not MG Miller responded that he was unaware ofthe following events:
- - on 21 and 23 Dec 02, MPs held down a detainee while ~dlc:d the
detainee without placing weight on the detainee
- on 4 Dec 02, SGT~assagc:d the detainee's back and neck over his
clothin~
~..
_--,_

7

DOD JUNE

3779

, .' , 1~7

o,bj.'a ~:L
\t(

ake letter from the White House that spelled

w

lut his au 0

f

on

-

0

MG Miller stated that had he known of the threats
....... have allowed il

t~ family. he would ~

'?J.
°1~7(3 b

.p~ ~

MG Miller stated that he was aware of the following:
- that detaiiiecs were yelled at and that music was ~ in interrogations

,;:tiiililiLas iDteao~ed for 20 hours a day with 4 hours ofsleep from 23
.j'~i UDtillS January 2003

- tha.-..a..as separated from the detainee population from 8 August 2002 until 15
]8D~'
-

u~

2

~personated a Navy Captain from the White Ho~

1 aeclare under pc:oalty that the

foregoing in a true and correct summary ofthe st8temc
given by the witness, MG Geoffrey Miller. Executed at Davis-Montban Air Force BISI..,
Arizona, on 31 March 2005.

f!3?:'Fh2'JJe
SCHMID~
RANDALL M.
ueuteoaD.t General. USAF
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

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DOD JUNE

3780

f

 

 

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