by Sagi Schwartzberg

In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the state’s self-defense statute justifies the use of force necessary for self-protection, even if the necessity only becomes apparent after the incident. Therefore, the self-defense statute does not require that an individual was reasonable in their belief, if the belief turns out to be correct.

Background

Antonio Turner, an “upstanding citizen” with no prior criminal history, was pursuing a double major in biology and medical humanities at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. He had graduated from Warren Central High School, where he participated in band and earned a reputation among bandmates and their parents as honest and peaceful. In addition to his studies, Turner worked for Kroger processing e-commerce orders and for a dog training business. He lived with his mother in a “very dangerous” part of eastside Indianapolis, where he had witnessed many shootings, prompting her to give him a handgun for protection.

Turner was enrolled in the difficult Organic Chemistry course during his senior year, so he often studied with a classmate, Nyah Grice. Their last study session, in preparation for an upcoming Monday exam, took place around 5:00 p.m. on a Saturday at Grice’s home in a quiet Lawrence, Indiana, neighborhood just outside Indianapolis. Another student, Maray Bell, joined them a short time later.

Grice had been in a relationship with Dequan Briscoe, though it was unclear if they were still dating at the time. Over the course of the evening, Briscoe called and texted Grice repeatedly, and Turner overheard several of those conversations on Grice’s speakerphone. Grice told Briscoe not to come over because they were studying, which angered Briscoe, leading him to question why Turner was at her house. Briscoe eventually stated repeatedly that he was going to “pull up” on Turner – a phrase Turner, familiar with eastside Indianapolis lingo, understood to mean Briscoe was coming to harm him in some way.

Concerned for his safety, Turner went outside around 8:30 p.m. to retrieve his legally owned and licensed handgun from the passenger side of his car. As he walked to his car, he noticed headlights from another car about five houses down. Since it was stationary, he ignored it. After retrieving the firearm, Turner began walking back up Grice’s driveway when the other car’s engine suddenly revved, and it – a Volkswagen Jetta – sped down the street toward him with tires squealing. Turner had never met Briscoe, did not know what he looked like, and was unaware of the type of car he drove, but Grice had previously informed Turner that Briscoe regularly carried a gun. As the car barreled toward him, Turner “just knew” it was Briscoe.

Turner attempted to run into Grice’s house but could not reach it before the Jetta abruptly stopped in the middle of the street in front of the driveway. The car had dark, illegally tinted windows, preventing Turner from seeing inside. Sensing an imminent attack, Turner turned and fired four shots at the vehicle, ceasing fire once it drove away. Two of the shots struck Briscoe, one in each arm. Turner’s intuition proved correct: Briscoe was driving the Jetta, armed with a handgun, and had drawn his gun inside the car with the probable intent to shoot Turner.

After being shot, Briscoe fled and pulled into a nearby open garage, where authorities soon arrived to treat his wounds. They also discovered Briscoe’s blood-stained, unholstered handgun resting in the passenger seat of the Jetta, pointed toward the passenger window. Meanwhile, Turner gathered his belongings from Grice’s house and returned home. Upon learning from Grice that his shots had wounded Briscoe, Turner promptly called the police and reported the incident.

Procedural History

The State charged Turner with Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon. Turner waived his right to a jury trial, and a magistrate judge conducted a bench trial in which Turner claimed the shooting was justified self-defense.

Both Briscoe and Turner testified, providing conflicting accounts. Turner’s testimony aligned with the factual background described above. Briscoe, however, claimed he was only “a little upset” that Grice had told him not to come over, denied speeding (attributing any perception of speed to his car’s modified loud exhaust), and insisted he did not draw his handgun inside the car. He said the gun found by police had simply fallen from its holster in the console or that he unholstered it only after being shot while driving away. He also testified that upon stopping, he saw someone in the driveway – whom he assumed was Turner – who “just turned around and started shooting.”

After hearing all the evidence, the judge explicitly agreed with Turner’s account of “what the facts are,” including that Briscoe was upset about Turner being at Grice’s home with his girlfriend or ex-girlfriend, that Briscoe’s phone statements constituted “threats” to Turner, and that Briscoe “did likely draw his gun inside the car and probably had [the] intent” to shoot Turner. The judge credited Turner’s testimony as truthful, both to police and in court, and relied on witnesses attesting to Turner’s reputation for truthfulness. Conversely, the judge found Briscoe had lied about the gun “fall[ing] out of the holster,” noting that holsters are designed to prevent such occurrences, and concluded Briscoe had unholstered it with “bad intent.”

Despite this, the judge rejected Turner’s self-defense claim and convicted him, describing the case as involving “a good guy in a bad guy situation” and empathizing that he “might [have] done the same thing” himself, given that “what the heck else [was Turner] supposed to do?” The judge, however, believed Indiana self-defense law required conviction because Turner “couldn’t see inside this car” and “couldn’t see a gun,” rendering his fear – though accurate in hindsight – unreasonable under the circumstances known to him at the time. As the judge interpreted the law, justification for the shooting would have required Turner to either see the gun being raised toward him, definitively know Briscoe was the driver, or face the car about to run him over, in combination with the phone threats and observed circumstances. The judge lamented the consequences of Turner’s new felon status but assured him: “honestly, if your choice was between being a convicted felon and being harmed, you probably made the right choice.”

Turner timely appealed, arguing solely that the trial court had misinterpreted and misapplied Indiana’s self-defense statute – not seeking to reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility – and that the court had acknowledged Turner’s life would have been in real jeopardy absent his actions. The State countered that the analysis must focus on the reasonableness of Turner’s actions based on contemporaneous circumstances, not hindsight. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed in a nonprecedential memorandum decision, citing Turner’s testimony that he had never met Briscoe or seen his car, did not know who was driving, did not see a gun pointed at him, and that Briscoe never fired at him.

Turner petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court for transfer, which it granted, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals decision.

Analysis

The Court addressed whether Indiana’s self-defense law deprives defendants of the benefit of hindsight when it reveals their conduct was necessary for self-defense, even if the necessity was not fully apparent at the moment of action. This novel issue arose in the context of Turner’s conviction for battery by means of a deadly weapon, where he shot Briscoe to prevent being shot himself, despite not seeing Briscoe or his gun due to the car’s illegally tinted windows.

The Court observed that self-defense serves as a legal justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662 (Ind. 2021), providing a complete bar to conviction, Hill v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. 1986). Indiana’s Constitution explicitly protects the “right to bear arms for defense of [self] or the State,” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 32, reinforcing the state’s long-standing recognition of robust self-defense rights, Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., 211 N.E.3d 957 (Ind. 2023). However, these rights are subject to regulation, and Indiana’s legislature governs self-defense through Indiana Code § 35-41-3-2, which balances the right to protect oneself with limits to prevent abuse, the Court stated.

The relevant portion of Indiana’s self-defense statute provides: “A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person: (1) is justified in using deadly force; and (2) does not have a duty to retreat, if the force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony.” § 35-41-3-2(c).

The statute’s final sentence further states: “No person, employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary” § 35-41-3-2(c). The Court stated that this provision codifies the core self-defense justification rooted in common law, extending protection to individuals and those facing derivative liability, such as employers or estates. Page v. State, 141 Ind. 236, 40 N.E. 745 (1895).

The Court noted that Indiana’s self-defense statute aligns with common features across jurisdictions, which typically recognize defenses for reasonable mistakes by including the term “believes” in their definitions. 2 Paul H. Robinson, Crim. L. Def. § 184 (2024). The statute establishes both subjective and objective standards for evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that force was necessary. Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 2007). Subjectively, the defendant must genuinely believe force is necessary to protect against imminent unlawful force. Objectively, that belief must be one a reasonable person would form under the same circumstances. This reasonableness is assessed prospectively, based on the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time, not in hindsight. French v. State, 403 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1980); Heglin v. State, 140 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1957). The law protects individuals who act under such circumstances, even if hindsight reveals their belief was mistaken, provided the mistake was reasonable. Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 2013).

The Court emphasized that hindsight plays a dual role in self-defense cases. When hindsight reveals a defendant’s belief was mistaken, the belief must have been reasonable to justify the force used. However, when hindsight confirms the necessity of the defendant’s actions, the justification may not depend solely on reasonableness. In Turner’s case, the trial court concluded that Turner’s fear was unreasonable because he could not see inside Briscoe’s car or confirm the presence of a gun, focusing solely on the prospective reasonableness of his belief. The Court disagreed, determining that the trial court overlooked the role of hindsight in confirming the necessity of Turner’s actions.

Applying canons of statutory interpretation, the Court analyzed the self-defense statute, particularly the final sentence, which it interpreted as codifying a core self-defense justification: a defendant is justified in using force when it is actually necessary to protect against an imminent threat, provided the force is proportional and the defendant acts without fault in a place they have a right to be. Spinks v. State, 437 N.E.2d 963 (Ind. 1982). This justification does not require the defendant’s belief to be reasonable if the belief is accurate. Thus, using force based on an unreasonable but correct belief is justified, whereas force based on an unreasonable and incorrect belief is not. 2 Paul H. Robinson, Crim. L. Def. § 122 (2024). The Court clarified that this interpretation aligns with Trogdon v. State, 32 N.E. 725 (Ind. 1892), which requires that a defendant’s use of force be motivated by a genuine intent to protect, not malice, ensuring that self-defense cannot be invoked for premeditated or malicious acts.

The Court also addressed limits on self-defense to clarify its scope. First, the defendant must act without fault and in a place they have a right to be. Larkin. Second, the threat must be imminent, not merely a verbal threat. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 2003). Third, the force must not be premeditated retaliation for past violence. Id. Fourth, the force must be proportional, ceasing when the threat ends. Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The Court concluded that Turner met these criteria: he was at Grice’s house lawfully, acted without fault, faced an imminent threat from Briscoe’s drawn gun, and used proportional force, stopping when Briscoe fled.

In the present case, the trial court found that Turner’s actions were necessary to avoid being shot by Briscoe, who had drawn his gun with intent to shoot, as confirmed by hindsight. However, the Court explained that the trial court erred by convicting Turner based solely on the unreasonableness of his belief – due to his inability to see inside the car or confirm Briscoe’s identity – ignoring the statute’s protection for accurate beliefs. Thus, the Court held that because Turner’s belief was correct and his use of force was necessary, proportional, and motivated by self-protection, his actions were justified under the statute, regardless of the belief’s reasonableness.

The Court rejected the State’s concern that this interpretation would encourage a “Wild West” mentality, noting that the legislature’s intent was to uphold robust self-defense rights. § 35-41-3-2(a). The ruling does not incentivize reckless behavior, as justification applies only when the defendant’s belief is accurate and meets statutory criteria, according to the Court. For example, if Turner had shot an innocent driver, the self-defense claim would fail due to the lack of actual necessity and the trial court’s finding of unreasonableness. Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated Turner’s conviction and sentence, emphasizing that Indiana’s self-defense law protects individuals who use necessary force to protect themselves, even if their belief in the threat’s imminence is deemed unreasonable, provided hindsight confirms the necessity of their actions. See: Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526 (Ind. 2025).

Writer’s note: Anyone interested in the topic of self-defense is strongly encouraged to read the Court’s full opinion.  

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