by Doug Ankney

In a unanimous opinion, with a special concurrence by Chief Justice Neville, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that when a defendant seeks a self-defense jury instruction after using force against a police officer, the trial court must apply the established six-element test from People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. 1995), to determine whether the record contains some evidence of each element, including whether the officer’s use of force was unlawful.

The Court rejected the Fourth District’s newly created two-step inquiry in People v. Vesey, 243 N.E.3d 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024) (“Vesey 2024”), which required a threshold determination of excessive force before applying the Jeffries elements, as well as the Third District’s holding in People v. Amnions, 193 N.E.3d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021), that a self-defense instruction is automatically required whenever evidence exists that an arresting officer used excessive force. The Court reasoned that both approaches improperly allowed trial courts to make factual determinations about excessive force that belong to the jury. Applying these principles, the Court determined that the defendant presented some evidence of each Jeffries element, concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing the self-defense instruction, and ruled the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Background

On June 28, 2022, Judinetta Robinson received a text message from her daughter, A.V., stating “We’re going to heaven.” A.V. was visiting her father, defendant Courtney B. Vesey, pursuant to a custody arrangement following the couple’s divorce. Robinson called A.V. and overheard defendant say he was God and that his chariot was descending. Robinson contacted police and reported that defendant and A.V. were at Longview Park in Rock Island.

Officers Brett Taylor, Eugenio Barrera, and Sergeant Kristopher Kuhlman responded to the park, where they found Vesey sitting with his daughter. Taylor patted Vesey down, and he complied. During conversation with officers, Vesey made statements about reptiles and lizards coming through a closet, which concerned the officers. After Robinson arrived, the officers decided A.V. would leave with her mother and that the Department of Children and Family Services would be notified. The officers determined no one would be arrested.

When informed that his daughter would leave with Robinson, Vesey became agitated and raised his voice, a reaction Taylor acknowledged was understandable. Vesey tried to get past the officers, who stood between him and his daughter; he did not push through them and repeatedly said, “excuse me, excuse me,” while asserting he had a legal right to be with his daughter. As Vesey tried to pass, Kuhlman pushed him in the chest. Vesey swatted Kuhlman’s arm away and told him not to touch him. Kuhlman testified he was neither in pain nor injured by this contact. 

Taylor testified that due to Vesey’s demeanor and the fact that he had “already commit[ted] a felony to a police officer,” Taylor determined a “hands-on” approach was appropriate rather than his preferred method of informing a person he was under arrest. Without warning Vesey that he was being detained or arrested, Taylor tackled him backward toward a concrete-brick retaining wall. As Vesey fell, he wrapped his arms around Taylor’s neck, and both men fell over the wall onto grass. Vesey maintained his grip for approximately five seconds until other officers assisted Taylor. He acknowledged he did not attempt to arrest Vesey peacefully.

Vesey was charged with two counts of aggravated battery of a police officer. Before trial, he filed notice of his intent to raise self-defense under §§ 7-1 and 7-14 of the Criminal Code of 2012. At the jury instruction conference, he requested the pattern self-defense instruction. The trial court denied the request after analyzing the Jeffries elements, ruling Vesey was the aggressor, that the officers acted within the scope of their duties so their force was not unlawful, and that Vesey had not established evidence of each required element. The jury acquitted him of aggravated battery against Kuhlman but convicted him of aggravated battery against Taylor. He was sentenced to 24 months’ probation. 

The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed after creating a two-step inquiry for cases involving claims of self-defense against police officers. Under this approach, “the trial court must consider whether the trial record contains sufficient evidence of excessive force”; if insufficient, § 7-7 of the Criminal Code prohibits the defendant from raising self-defense. Vesey 2024. Only if sufficient evidence of excessive force exists would the court proceed to apply the Jeffries six-element test. The Fourth District expressly distanced itself from contrary Third District precedent in Amnions, which held that “a jury instruction on self-defense is required where there is evidence that the arresting officer used excessive force.”

Analysis

The Court began by reviewing its established framework for self-defense instructions. In Jeffries, the Supreme Court explained that after the State establishes the elements of the charged offense, the trier of fact may consider self-defense only if the defendant establishes some evidence of each of the following elements: “(1) force is threatened against a person; (2) the person threatened is not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm was imminent; (4) the threatened force was unlawful; (5) he actually and subjectively believed a danger existed which required the use of the force applied; and (6) his beliefs were objectively reasonable.”

The Court observed that this test aligns with §§ 7-1(a) and 7-4 of the Criminal Code. Section 7-1(a) provides that a person is justified in using force “when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” Section 7-4 limits this justification when the person claiming self-defense is the initial aggressor.

Rejection of Both Appellate Approaches

The Court rejected both the Fourth District’s two-step inquiry and the Third District’s Amnions holding. Regarding the Fourth District’s approach, the Court determined it “overlooks the evidentiary standard applicable when determining whether the defendant is entitled to receive a self-defense jury instruction.” Rather than asking whether there was “some evidence, however slight, of excessive force,” the Fourth District employed a higher standard to determine whether the officer used excessive force. The Court stated this approach “invades the province of the jury because it allows the trial court to weigh the evidence and make a final decision on whether there was excessive force.”

The Court similarly rejected Amnions, which held that a self-defense instruction is required whenever there is evidence that an arresting officer used excessive force. This approach “fails to follow Jeffries because it does not require some evidence of all the elements of self-defense before a self-defense instruction can be given,” the Court explained. Additionally, like the Fourth District’s framework, Amnions improperly “allows the trial court to decide whether a police officer used excessive force, instead of leaving that determination to the jury,” the Court stated.

Proper Analysis When Force
Is Used Against Police

The Court clarified how the Jeffries test applies when a defendant’s use of force is directed at a police officer. Under § 7-5, an officer may use force he reasonably believes necessary to effect an arrest or protect himself or others. An officer’s force becomes unlawful when it exceeds what is necessary under the circumstances or when it violates § 7-5.5’s prohibitions. Section 7-7 limits a person’s right to respond to an officer’s force, providing that a person may not use force to resist an arrest he knows is being made by a peace officer, even if the arrest is unlawful. However, a person cannot knowingly resist an arrest he does not know is occurring, the Court explained.

Reading these provisions together, the Court held that “a person who uses force against a police officer is not entitled to a self-defense instruction unless he can show some evidence of the elements of self-defense, which includes a showing of some evidence that the officer threatened unlawful force.” For the fourth element – whether the threatened force was unlawful –”if there is some evidence from which a jury could conclude the police officer used excessive – and therefore unlawful – force, the self-defense instruction should be given if there is some evidence of the other elements.” Whether an officer used more force than necessary is “a question of fact that should ultimately be determined by the jury,” the Court stated. Because the “unlawful force” question in this setting turns on whether the officer used more force than necessary, the Court stated that juries should be instructed both on the force a peace officer is authorized to use and on the general rule that a person may not ordinarily resist arrest.

Standard of Review

The Court reaffirmed that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review when a trial court refuses a jury instruction based on insufficient evidence, adhering to People v. McDonald, 43 N.E.3d 476 (Ill. 2016). An abuse of discretion occurs “only where the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.” People v. Rivera, 986 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 2013). The Court rejected arguments that McDonald should be overruled, finding “no special justification to depart from our established standard of review” under stare decisis principles.

The Court stated that while the circuit court must determine whether “some evidence” of an affirmative defense exists, “the circuit court does not weigh the evidence.” The determination that such evidence exists in the record “is a discretionary act,” but the “court’s discretion is not in determining whether to give the instruction if the record contains that evidence,” the Court explained.

Application to Present Case

Applying the Jeffries elements, the Court found some evidence supporting each requirement. Regarding the first and fourth elements, the Court agreed there was evidence that force was threatened against Vesey. The body camera footage further “provided some evidence that the force Taylor threatened was unlawful as he, without warning, tackled defendant into the concrete-brick retaining wall.” Taylor testified he chose not to use his preferred, less hands-on methods despite Vesey’s earlier compliance with the pat-down search and merely verbal objections to the officers’ instructions. “Taylor made no attempt to make a peaceful arrest, despite the fact that defendant had not shown such an arrest was unlikely,” according to the Court.

For the second element, the Court found some evidence Vesey was not the aggressor. Until approaching the officers as they separated him from his daughter, Vesey had obeyed their directions. When he approached, “defendant did not push through them; he kept repeating ‘excuse me, excuse me’ and informing the officers that he had a legal right to be with his daughter.” Taylor testified Vesey’s reaction was understandable.

Regarding the third element, some evidence demonstrated the danger of harm was imminent because Vesey “did not wrap his arms around Taylor’s neck until after Taylor unexpectedly tackled him and pushed him backward toward a concrete wall.”

As to the fifth and sixth elements, although Vesey did not testify, the body camera footage “provide[d] some evidence” because “it showed defendant’s reaction to Taylor’s use of force and the concrete wall behind defendant as he fell.” The Court agreed with the appellate dissent that “a juror could infer defendant acted instinctively out of fear for his safety and actually and subjectively believed a danger existed requiring the use of the force he applied.”

Harmless Error

The Court determined the State failed to prove the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the failure to instruct on self-defense “affects the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial,” the State bore the burden of demonstrating harmlessness under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Court noted the jury was not asked to consider Vesey’s initial contact with Taylor separately from his continued contact after the fall. Additionally, the jury’s acquittal on the Kuhlman charge “suggests the jury may have found Taylor’s reaction to defendant’s contact with Kuhlman was unwarranted and his use of force excessive.” Thus, the Court reversed the judgments of the appellate court and the trial court, holding that Vesey was entitled to a new trial with proper self-defense instructions.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: People v. Vesey, 2026 Ill. LEXIS 6 (2026).  

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