by David Kim

Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court of Washington unanimously held that courts are not precluded from considering race and ethnicity when determining whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court reasoned that such factors constitute relevant and objective evidence that may be weighed under the totality of the circumstances test, provided the evidence presented is both relevant and objective. Although the Court announced this rule, it determined that the defendant in this case was not in custody when deputies questioned him during a community caretaking encounter that evolved into a DUI investigation and further determined that the defendant had not presented relevant and objective evidence of race and ethnicity at his suppression hearing.

Background

On October 12, 2022, Ahmed Mohamud Wasuge, a Black man, was driving home after spending time with a friend the previous night when his car broke down on a residential road. Unable to afford towing services, Wasuge attempted to push the vehicle to the roadside and then made calls seeking assistance from family and friends. While waiting for someone to return his calls, he reclined in the driver’s seat and fell asleep.

At 6:31 a.m., a 911 caller reported a car blocking the roadway. King County Sheriff’s Deputies Andrew Robinson and Andrew Farley responded, arriving at 6:41 a.m. and 6:43 a.m., respectively. The deputies found Wasuge’s vehicle obstructing the southbound lane with its headlights and taillights illuminated, the engine idling, and the transmission in drive. Wasuge was asleep in the front seat with his mouth open and feet positioned near the pedals.

Concerned that Wasuge might awaken startled and inadvertently accelerate into them, the deputies positioned their patrol vehicles to box in Wasuge’s car before making contact. Robinson activated his overhead lights. Farley then knocked on the driver’s window, announcing himself as law enforcement. When Wasuge awoke, Farley observed that he appeared dazed and confused, with glassy, watery, and bloodshot eyes. Upon Wasuge rolling down his window, Farley detected an odor of alcohol from within the vehicle.

Farley asked Wasuge to exit the car. After Wasuge complied, the deputy noticed him stumbling and detected the smell of alcohol on him. Farley then advised Wasuge that he was being detained for a DUI investigation and proceeded to ask why Wasuge had been sleeping in the roadway and whether he had been drinking. Wasuge denied consuming alcohol even after Farley commented that he could smell alcohol.

Wasuge agreed to perform field sobriety tests on the public sidewalk, which he performed poorly. The entire encounter lasted approximately 20 minutes in a public setting on a residential road where cars passed by. The record reflected no evidence of coercion. Farley did not raise his voice or make threats, Wasuge never asked to leave, and he was neither handcuffed nor placed in a patrol vehicle. Although additional officers arrived at the scene, they were present solely to redirect traffic and had no interaction with Wasuge.

At trial, Wasuge unsuccessfully moved to suppress the statements he made before receiving Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished portion of its decision, concluding that a reasonable person in Wasuge’s position would not have believed he was in police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest. The Washington Supreme Court granted review.

Analysis

The Berkemer Framework
and Community Caretaking

The Court reviewed de novo whether Wasuge was in custody for Miranda purposes. It observed that law enforcement officers frequently engage in community caretaking functions unrelated to criminal investigation, such as assisting stranded motorists and rendering first aid. See State v. Boisselle, 448 P.3d 19 (Wash. 2019). Under this doctrine, officers may make contact with individuals, but the inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); see also State v. Acrey, 64 P.3d 594 (Wash. 2003). Once the reasons for initiating the encounter are fully dispelled, the noncriminal investigation must end. State v. Kinzy, 5 P.3d 668 (Wash. 2000).

The Court observed that Washington has adopted the Berkemer test for determining custody under Miranda. State v. Heritage, 95 P.3d 345 (Wash. 2004). Under this framework, a person detained during a traffic stop is not in custody for Miranda purposes because such stops are ordinarily temporary and brief, the atmosphere is less police-dominated given that a driver usually encounters only one or a few officers, and the setting is typically public with other pedestrians or motorists in view, the Court explained. McCarty.

The Court determined that the deputies’ initial contact with Wasuge fell within the community caretaking function. They had responded to a 911 call reporting a vehicle blocking traffic. Farley observed circumstances suggesting a safety risk, i.e., Wasuge was asleep behind the wheel of a running vehicle with the transmission in drive on a residential road. It was during this community caretaking encounter that Farley began questioning Wasuge about alcohol consumption after observing indicators of impairment.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that Wasuge was not in custody when he answered questions about whether he had been drinking and why he was asleep in his car. The encounter lasted approximately 20 minutes and occurred in a public setting on a residential street. The deputies did not engage in coercive conduct, Wasuge was not restrained, and other officers present were merely directing traffic rather than interacting with him.

Race and Ethnicity Under the Totality of the Circumstances Test

The Court then addressed the broader legal question of whether race and ethnicity may be considered in the Miranda custody analysis. It explained that determining whether a defendant is in custody depends on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the circumstances, an objective inquiry that considers numerous factors under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Escalante, 461 P.3d 1183 (Wash. 2020); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). These factors include the length of interrogation, the nature and public visibility of the location, whether the defendant was separated from belongings, whether the defendant could freely leave and terminate the encounter, and the coercive nature of the interaction. See Escalante; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012).

The Court stated that this analysis “has never excluded relevant and objective factors in the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.” It quoted the United States Supreme Court’s observation in J.D.B.: “Not once have we excluded from the custody analysis a circumstance that we determined was relevant and objective, simply to make the fault line between custodial and noncustodial ‘brighter.’” The Court observed that the custody test is by design holistic, considering numerous factors and contexts. It noted that the inquiry “remains a holistic one in which the nature and context of the questions asked, together with the nature and degree of restraints placed on the person questioned, are relevant.” Escalante.

Given this holistic framework, the Court concluded that race and ethnicity constitute relevant factors that may be objectively considered when appropriate. “A holistic inquiry includes race and ethnicity as relevant factors that may be objectively considered when relevant,” the Court instructed. It clarified that “Washington law recognizes race and ethnicity as any other relevant and objective evidence that can be considered under the totality of the circumstances test when analyzing custody for Miranda purposes.”

The Court announced the governing standard: “Washington law does not preclude courts from considering race and ethnicity in the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test. We require only that such evidence be relevant and objective.”

Applying this principle to the case before it, the Court observed that while race and ethnicity are permissible considerations, they were not dispositive here because Wasuge was not in custody regardless. Additionally, Wasuge had not presented relevant and objective evidence regarding race and ethnicity at his suppression hearing for the trial court to consider, according to the Court.

Conclusion

The Court held that courts may consider relevant and objective evidence related to race and ethnicity when analyzing whether a defendant is in custody under the totality of the circumstances test for Miranda purposes. Because Wasuge was not in custody when he made statements to Farley during a community caretaking encounter that developed into a DUI investigation, and because he had not presented relevant and objective evidence of race and ethnicity at his suppression hearing, his statements were not subject to suppression, the Court held.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. See: State v. Wasuge, 2026 Wash. LEXIS 57 (2026) (en banc).  

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