by Douglas Ankney

The Supreme Court of Idaho unanimously held that competing affidavits concerning whether the defendant accepted a plea offer created a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary disposition of his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court also held that postconviction counsel’s statements while seeking to withdraw were her own legal assessment and could not be treated as Ennis’s concession. It vacated the judgment dismissing the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Background

After Steven Ronald Ennis, Jr.’s 2018 convictions, he pursued postconviction relief through a sworn pro se petition and amended affidavit. He alleged that he accepted the State’s offer of five fixed years and 10 indeterminate years and directed trial counsel to notify the prosecutor. According to Ennis, counsel did not do so, and the offer had been withdrawn by his trial’s second day.

Trial counsel swore that Ennis declined the offer and proposed different terms, which the State rejected. At the summary-disposition hearing, postconviction counsel cited her lack of supporting evidence and ethical obligations while acknowledging that Ennis disagreed. Ennis told the district court that counsel had declined to receive evidence he possessed.

The district court then summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing for lack of admissible factual support. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal on a different ground, treating postconviction counsel’s statements as a concession that mandated the ruling. The Idaho Supreme Court granted review of whether counsel made a binding concession and whether Ennis was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by addressing whether postconviction counsel’s statements bound Ennis. Counsel made them while explaining her motion to withdraw, identified them as her legal opinion, and expressly recognized Ennis’s disagreement. His later comments reflected disagreement with her assessment, the Court noted. Invited error bars relief when a party’s conduct induces the asserted error. See Doe I v. Doe (2024-23) (In re Doe II), 566 P.3d 409 (Idaho 2025). Because counsel spoke only for herself and Ennis contested her view, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ sua sponte rationale.

Admissibility of Ennis’s Affidavit

The Court next reviewed Idaho’s summary-disposition framework. Summary disposition is the postconviction equivalent of summary judgment. Creech v. State, 558 P.3d 723 (Idaho 2024). I.C. § 19-4906(c) permits it when “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” If such an issue exists, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Bell v. State, 572 P.3d 209 (Idaho 2025). Courts liberally construe facts and reasonable inferences for the petitioner but may disregard mere conclusions lacking admissible evidentiary support. Rodriquez v. State, 524 P.3d 913 (Idaho 2023).

I.C. § 19-4903 limits a petition to facts the applicant personally knows and requires affidavits or records supporting its allegations. The Court explained that Ennis could testify about the offer, his response, his direction to counsel, counsel’s failure to convey that response, and the offer’s withdrawal because those matters arose from his acts, discussions, and observations. I.R.E. 602, 701(a). However, he could not testify about why trial counsel reacted as she did, and his account of trial counsel’s explanation for not conveying the alleged acceptance was hearsay. I.R.E. 602, 701(a), 801(c)(2), 802. Those defects did not make the remaining allegations conclusory, the Court determined.

Material Factual Dispute

The Court then addressed the constitutional claim. The Sixth Amendment and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee effective assistance of counsel. Marsalis v. State, 458 P.3d 203 (Idaho 2020). A petitioner must prove deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Performance is deficient if objectively unreasonable, although strategic choices receive a strong presumption of acceptability. State v. Yakovac, 180 P.3d 476 (Idaho 2008); Marsalis. Plea acceptance belongs to the defendant. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). Effective assistance extends through plea bargaining, and counsel must communicate formal offers. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). The Court stated: “The duty runs in both directions. Once a client decides to accept an offer, counsel’s role is to carry that decision out, not to override it.”

The material dispute was whether Ennis accepted the offer or rejected it and proposed a counteroffer. Crediting Ennis would support likely deficient performance; crediting trial counsel would instead establish rejection and a counteroffer. Resolving that conflict requires a credibility determination unavailable on summary disposition, the Court explained. The State’s contention that Ennis would have objected vociferously had counsel ignored his acceptance likewise concerned credibility. Whether Ennis ultimately prevails remains for further proceedings. The Court declined to address Strickland’s prejudice prong because prejudice had not been identified as a dismissal ground in either the State’s motion or a notice from the district court. I.C. § 19-4906(b); see DeRushe v. State, 200 P.3d 1148 (Idaho 2009).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment, reversed the order summarily dismissing Ennis’s petition, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Ennis v. State, 2026 Ida. LEXIS 132 (2026).  

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