by Richard Resch

In 2000, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri convicted Marcus DeAngelo Jones on two felon-in-possession counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and one false-statement count under § 922(a)(6). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 327-month sentence. Jones then filed a timely motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The motion resulted in vacatur of one concurrent § 922(g) sentence and no other relief. Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023) (“Hendrix”).

Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019), later held that the Government must prove a defendant knew he possessed a firearm and knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing one. The decision abrogated the Eighth Circuit rule applied at Jones’ trial and on direct appeal. Jones sought a new collateral claim based on that interpretation. Because Rehaif interpreted a statute, it provided neither newly discovered evidence under § 2255(h)(1) nor a new rule of constitutional law under § 2255(h)(2), the only grounds for a second or successive motion.

Jones instead filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in the Eastern District of Arkansas, where he was imprisoned. The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Hendrix. The Supreme Court held that § 2255(e), the statute’s saving clause, does not permit a prisoner to use § 2241 to present a successive statutory claim that § 2255(h) does not authorize. The Court did not decide the Rehaif claim’s merits.

The majority treated § 2255(h) as Congress’ choice of finality over further error correction after the initial motion. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan jointly dissented, and Justice Jackson dissented separately. Both opinions argued that the Court’s construction could deny a merits forum to a prisoner asserting that later statutory law established his conduct was not criminal. The Supreme Court did not decide whether Jones was factually innocent.

For a federal prisoner, the availability of a sentencing-court remedy is only the starting point. Section 2255 generally permits one ordinary motion. Whether that motion results in adjudication or relief depends on several independent requirements. A later legal development may not authorize another motion at all.

A prisoner who cannot obtain relief under § 2255 may look to other postjudgment procedures. Two Supreme Court decisions in 2026 illustrate the limits of one such procedure, viz., compassionate release. Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. 411 (2026), bars using compassionate release to challenge a conviction’s validity. Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. 454 (2026), bars using Congress’ nonretroactive § 924(c) sentencing change to establish eligibility for compassionate release, alone or with other factors. A different procedural label does not remove the statutory limits on the claim.

Federal postconviction review begins with selection of the correct procedural vehicle. For a claim properly brought under § 2255, a second threshold is whether subsection (a) recognizes the alleged error. Nine additional groups of rules can prevent adjudication or relief: (1) guilty pleas and waivers, (2) the one-year period, (3) procedural default, (4) pleading, recharacterization, amendment, and preliminary review, (5) evidence, hearings, and counsel, (6) prejudice and harmless error, (7) certificates of appealability, (8) second or successive motions, and (9) retroactivity. Satisfying one group does not satisfy another.

A single hypothetical can show how the nine barriers apply to different claims and how a claim that satisfies one can still fail under another. This Cover Story follows Josef K., a fictional federal prisoner named after the protagonist of Franz Kafka’s The Trial. K. struggles with byzantine proceedings he cannot comprehend or effectively challenge. A federal prisoner can face a comparable predicament when the law provides a remedy but the requirements for using it prevent consideration of his claim on the merits.

Readers may also recall the name from CLN’s October 2026 Cover Story on 28 U.S.C. § 2254 relief for state prisoners. The two articles use different hypothetical cases. All facts, dates, and dispositions attributed to the federal K. are invented.

In 2015, K. entered a guilty plea to a felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1). His agreement included two distinct waivers, one governing direct appeal and the other collateral review. A narrow exception preserved ineffective-assistance claims alleging that counsel’s representation rendered the plea or waiver invalid.

K. deposited his initial § 2255 motion for mailing on November 29, 2016. It raised two claims. Claim A concerned counsel’s advice about the collateral-review waiver. He alleged that his lawyer had failed to explain its effect and had wrongly assured him that the waiver would not restrict a later ineffective-assistance claim. In Claim B, he alleged that counsel had failed to object to an enhancement at sentencing.

The example follows those claims through the initial proceeding, then turns to a claim raised after that proceeding ended. Relying on Rehaif, K. alleges that, when he possessed the firearm, he did not know he had been convicted of an offense punishable by more than one year. He disputes knowledge of his status, rather than knowledge that possessing the firearm violated the law. His theory rests on a later statutory interpretation and the original proceeding’s failure to establish the required element. That theory does not itself establish factual innocence. Whether a federal court may consider this later claim turns on § 2255(h) and Hendrix.

A failure to prove prejudice would defeat Claim A on its merits. Enforcement of the waiver against Claim B would leave that claim’s merits undecided, as would exclusion of the later claim under § 2255(h). All three outcomes deny relief, but they do not resolve the same questions. Kafka’s protagonist is left without an explanation of the accusation against him. The federal K. may be left without a judicial decision on the merits of his later claim.

Where to Start

Use the accompanying Quick Reference Guide’s Section 1 to identify the proper procedure. For a § 2255 motion, begin with Sections 3A and 8 to calculate and record your filing deadline, then use Section 3B for filing instructions. Do not delay filing past the deadline while waiting for records or a form. Before another § 2255 motion, also check Section 2’s Barrier 8 entries and Section 6. For ineffective-assistance claims, use Sections 4 and 5 for evidence and prejudice. If relief has been denied or granted only in part, promptly consult Section 3B’s appeal and postjudgment instructions. Use Section 7 to track preparation and preservation tasks. Read the corresponding discussion in this Cover Story for explanations and fuller treatment of the limits.

Section 2255: A Substitute for Traditional Habeas Corpus

Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948 to place most federal collateral attacks in the sentencing court. Federal prisoners had previously sought habeas relief in districts that could be far from the trial record, counsel, witnesses, and sentencing judge. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), explained that Congress changed the forum while preserving the prisoner’s substantive rights. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), described § 2255 as “exactly commensurate” with prior habeas. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974), confirmed that the remedy can include a qualifying federal statutory claim.

The state-prisoner framework does not govern a federal prisoner’s § 2255 motion. There is no requirement to exhaust state remedies and no state-court merits decision to which § 2254(d) deference applies. Nor does § 2255 carry over the state-record restriction that Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), associated with § 2254(d)(1) review. Section 2254(e)(2)’s separate restrictions on federal evidentiary hearings likewise do not apply. Section 2255 motions are instead subject to their own limits on timing, procedure, factual development, appeals, and successive review.

Choosing the Correct Procedure and Court

The first threshold determination concerns the object of the claim and the relief requested. A federal prisoner ordinarily uses § 2255 in the sentencing court to challenge a federal conviction or sentence. A prisoner ordinarily uses § 2241 in the district of confinement to challenge execution of custody. Constitutionally deficient plea advice concerns the conviction’s validity. A Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) calculation of the date on which a lawful sentence expires concerns execution. The requested relief and allegations, rather than the label alone, determine whether the filing challenges validity or execution.

For a § 2255 motion, “controlling circuit law” means binding precedent from the U.S. Court of Appeals covering the sentencing district, even if the prisoner is confined in another circuit. For an ordinary § 2241 challenge to sentence execution filed in the confinement district, consult the circuit covering that district. Applicable Supreme Court precedent controls in either proceeding. Decisions from other circuits ordinarily provide persuasive authority, meaning the court may consider their rulings and reasoning but need not follow them.

Execution claims include disputes over sentence commencement, prior-custody credit, good-conduct time, First Step Act earned-time credits, and some release-related custody decisions. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585 and United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), the U.S. Attorney General, through the BOP, calculates sentence credit after sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 governs good-conduct time and specifies when First Step Act earned-time credits may be applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release. In Valladares v. Ray, 130 F.4th 74 (4th Cir. 2025), the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of a § 2241 petition because Valladares had not been convicted of the death-resulting enhancement that the BOP treated as disqualifying for First Step Act credits. That holding involves eligibility under the provision the Fourth Circuit construed, not a general entitlement to a particular placement.

A BOP rule effective September 30, 2026, permits otherwise eligible prisoners to begin earning First Step Act credits when their sentences commence under § 3585(a), without waiting to arrive at their designated facilities. Credits still depend on successful participation in qualifying assigned programs or productive activities. First Step Act Time Credits–Revisions, 91 Fed. Reg. 55740, 55741 (Aug. 31, 2026).

One question about the reach of § 2241 is pending before the Supreme Court. Maxwell v. Dinis, No. 25-5930 (U.S. cert. granted June 1, 2026), is scheduled for argument on November 2, 2026. The question before the Court is whether a prisoner may use § 2241 for a First Step Act time-credit claim seeking accelerated transfer to a halfway house or home confinement. Until the Court rules, the question remains open, and prisoners should distinguish a claim of eligibility for credits from a claim to a specific transfer or placement.

A core § 2241 petition ordinarily names the immediate custodian and is filed in the district of confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Section 2241 contains no express exhaustion requirement. Courts of Appeals have developed exhaustion rules, and their consequences and exceptions differ. For example, the Eleventh Circuit treats exhaustion as judicially imposed and nonjurisdictional. Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir. 2015). A prisoner should identify the controlling circuit’s rule and preserve evidence of the BOP administrative process or any claimed exception. The confinement district, custodian, transfer history, and later release or placement can affect the proper respondent and the court’s ability to grant effective relief.

Other procedures have narrower functions. A defendant typically uses direct appeal to challenge trial or sentencing errors while the judgment is under direct review. After sentencing, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) permits a guilty plea to be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack. An ordinary plea-withdrawal motion is no longer available.

Generally, Rule 33 allows three years after the verdict or finding of guilt for a newly discovered evidence motion and 14 days for other new-trial grounds, subject to Rule 45 extensions. Rule 35(a) normally permits correction of arithmetic, technical, or other clear sentencing error within 14 days after oral sentencing. Rule 35(b) requires a substantial-assistance motion by the Government, generally within one year after sentencing, with specified later exceptions. Rule 62 permits limited Rule 35 extensions during a declared Criminal Rules emergency. These procedures do not create general authority to reconsider convictions.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) permits sentence modification only through enumerated exceptions. Under § 3582(c)(2), a prisoner may seek a reduction when a retroactive U.S. Sentencing Commission amendment lowers the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, subject to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. The proceeding permits a limited sentence adjustment, not a full resentencing, and does not authorize correction of unrelated sentencing errors. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010).

First Step Act § 404 separately permits reduced sentences for qualifying covered crack-cocaine offenses committed before August 3, 2010. A covered offense must have had its statutory penalties modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Prior application of those changes or a prior merits denial under § 404 can prohibit another § 404 motion. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. Motions properly brought under § 3582(c)(2) or § 404 seek a sentence reduction in the criminal case. They are not § 2255 motions and do not count as prior motions under § 2255(h). Eligibility under either provision does not require a reduction. Neither provision authorizes vacating the conviction. A filing which seeks that relief remains subject to the rules governing its substance.

Coram nobis is an extraordinary residual remedy that may become relevant when a person cannot satisfy § 2255’s custody requirement, but circuit law controls its availability and United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), requires circumstances justifying extraordinary relief. A prison-conditions claim ordinarily requires a civil action under an available cause of action against proper defendants. Federal custody does not itself create a damages remedy, and Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), sharply limits recognition of new claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), meaning implied constitutional damages claims against federal officers.

Filing a collateral motion while direct review remains pending presents a separate timing question. The Tenth Circuit normally defers collateral consideration during a direct appeal absent extraordinary circumstances but treats that practice as nonjurisdictional. United States v. Prows, 448 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006). A prisoner must check the controlling circuit’s rule rather than assume that both proceedings can advance together.

These procedures are not interchangeable. Under Hendrix, § 2241 remains available for genuine execution claims and unusual circumstances making sentencing-court relief impossible or impracticable but not merely because § 2255(h) excludes a later statutory claim.

Cognizability: Which Claim § 2255(a) Recognizes

The second threshold is cognizability, i.e., whether § 2255(a) recognizes the asserted ground for relief. Section 2255(a) permits a person in custody under a federal sentence to claim a right to release because the sentence violated the Constitution or federal law, the court lacked jurisdiction, the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. Calling an error “jurisdictional” does not control. The court applies governing jurisdictional law to the alleged defect.

The residual ground does not include every federal-rule violation or sentencing mistake. Hill held that failure, without aggravating circumstances, to provide the formal opportunity for allocution required by the then-operative Rule 32 was not a fundamental defect producing a complete miscarriage of justice. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979), held that a later U.S. Parole Commission policy did not invalidate a lawful sentence merely because it frustrated the sentencing judge’s expectation about release. In contrast, the 1974 Davis decision held that § 2255 could adjudicate a statutory claim which, if correct, meant the prisoner had been punished for conduct federal law did not criminalize. Cognizability identifies a claim category the statute can adjudicate. Waiver, timeliness, default, proof, and successive-motion restrictions remain separate questions.

Fourth Amendment exclusion claims require identification of controlling circuit law. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), restricted review of a state prisoner’s direct exclusionary-rule claim when the State provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation. Stone did not decide whether that restriction governs § 2255. The Sixth Circuit has extended Stone to federal prisoners. Ray v. United States, 721 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2013). The Eighth Circuit has declined to apply Stone as a categorical bar to the certified § 2255 issue before it. Baranski v. United States, 515 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2008). An ineffective-assistance claim regarding counsel’s handling of suppression remains distinct because it alleges a Sixth Amendment violation. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986).

Sentencing claims require classification by the source and effect of the error. Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. 256 (2017), held that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to a due process vagueness challenge because they guide discretion within the statutory range. The decision did not resolve vagueness challenges to the formerly mandatory Guidelines. The Third Circuit, joining several other Courts of Appeals, held that an incorrect advisory-Guidelines career-offender designation, standing alone, is not a fundamental defect cognizable under § 2255. United States v. Folk, 954 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2020). That holding does not resolve claims arising under the formerly mandatory Guidelines or independent constitutional challenges. A sentence above the statutory maximum fits § 2255(a)’s text, and ineffective assistance at sentencing alleges a constitutional violation.

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause. Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016), held that rule retroactive on collateral review. United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), invalidated § 924(c)(3)(B). Relief on a particular predicate claim still depends on the judgment, predicates, posture, and collateral-review rules.

Custody and requested relief impose additional limits. A person serving supervised release remains in custody under § 2255. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1999). When the challenged sentence expired before filing, collateral consequences alone typically do not satisfy the custody requirement. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) (per curiam). When custody ends after filing, jurisdiction and mootness remain separate, and continuing consequences can preserve a live controversy. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).

A challenge to a federal enhancement requires distinguishing whether a prior conviction legally qualifies as a predicate from whether that conviction is itself invalid. The qualification issue concerns the federal sentence and remains subject to § 2255(a)’s limits on statutory and Sentencing Guidelines claims and the other requirements for collateral relief. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001), addressed attacks on the constitutional validity of state convictions whose sentences had expired and that were used to enhance a federal sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Court generally barred those attacks under § 2255 when the prisoner had failed to pursue available review or had pursued it unsuccessfully. It recognized an exception for an unconstitutional failure to appoint counsel, subject to ordinary procedural-default rules. Deficient advice from a lawyer does not itself satisfy that exception.

Invalidating the prior judgment ordinarily requires use of any review procedures still available for that judgment. A successful vacatur can support an application to reopen the federal sentence, but it does not automatically change that sentence or establish the application’s procedural availability. The Second Barrier Section explains the timing rule for such an application under § 2255(f)(4).

A restitution-only claim normally cannot obtain § 2255 relief because it asserts no right to release. Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2003), applied that rule while reserving whether an unusually severe monetary restraint could constitute custody. Forfeiture and immigration consequences require the same attention to custody, the judgment component challenged, requested relief, and circuit law.

K.’s allegations illustrate both threshold determinations. Claims A and B challenge his federal conviction or sentence, so § 2255 is the standard vehicle. Both allege ineffective assistance, a constitutional claim type that § 2255 can adjudicate. His later Rehaif theory presents a statutory claim that could be cognizable in an initial motion under the 1974 Davis decision, subject to the requirements for collateral relief. For Claims A and B, the analysis begins with the precise terms of K.’s plea and separate waivers.

The First Barrier: Guilty Pleas, Direct-Appeal Waivers, and Collateral-Review Waivers

As a general rule, a guilty plea forecloses independent challenges to pre-plea defects. A valid direct-appeal waiver relinquishes specified claims on direct review. A valid collateral-review waiver relinquishes specified claims in a § 2255 proceeding. Courts must analyze the acts separately.

Guilty pleas are the usual basis for federal convictions, making their consequences a central concern in postconviction review. The U.S. Sentencing Commission recorded 65,099 guilty pleas among 66,662 cases in fiscal year 2025, or 97.7%. That prevalence makes it especially important to distinguish the claims foreclosed by a guilty plea itself from those relinquished through a separate waiver. The figures establish how frequently defendants pleaded guilty in the reported cases. They do not establish how often those pleas included an appeal or collateral-review waiver.

In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who entered a counseled guilty plea ordinarily could not present an antecedent constitutional defect as an independent habeas claim. Federal collateral review instead concerns the plea’s voluntary and intelligent character and the adequacy of counsel’s advice. The defect may bear on that advice, but it does not independently justify vacating a valid plea.

Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), held on direct appeal that a guilty plea alone did not bar a constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction when the agreement did not expressly waive that claim. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), requires real notice of the charge’s true nature for an intelligent plea. It also enforced procedural default because Bousley had not challenged his plea on direct review. The plea’s validity and the availability of collateral review are not the same inquiry.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 creates the record used to determine what the defendant relinquished. Before accepting a guilty plea, the District Court must advise the defendant about the charge and trial rights and determine understanding and voluntariness. Before entering judgment, it must find a factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(F)–(G), (b)(2)–(3). Rule 11(b)(1)(N) separately requires the court to inform the defendant of any plea-agreement provision waiving appeal or collateral attack on the sentence and determine that the defendant understands it. The agreement and colloquy bear on the waiver’s scope and validity.

A collateral-review waiver’s scope and enforceability depend on circuit law and the agreement. In United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of a § 2255 motion because White knowingly and voluntarily waived that remedy and his ineffective-assistance allegation involved sentencing rather than the plea or waiver’s validity. The relevant record includes the waiver language, express exceptions, counsel’s advice, the Government’s performance, and the claim’s relationship to the waiver. When a plea is based significantly on a prosecutor’s promise, the Government must fulfill it. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). A waiver exception limited to ineffective assistance affecting the plea or waiver may still exclude a complaint about counsel’s sentencing performance.

Circuit law can recognize exceptions beyond those written into the agreement. In United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001), the Tenth Circuit recognized that limits on appeal-waiver enforcement also apply to § 2255 waivers, including exceptions for sentences exceeding the statutory maximum or based on an impermissible factor such as race. Whether an exception applies depends on the controlling circuit’s rule and the alleged error.

U.S. Department of Justice policy directs federal prosecutors not to seek ineffective-assistance waivers. For plea agreements entered before October 14, 2014, it directs prosecutors to decline enforcement when counsel was prejudicially ineffective or the claim raises a serious debatable issue. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual § 9-16.330. The policy permits other lawful waivers, does not bind courts, and requires no reporting of compliance rate.

Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. 713 (2026), held that an agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when enforcement would produce a miscarriage of justice. The error must be obvious and egregious enough to bring the judicial system into disrepute. Ordinary sentencing-law errors do not satisfy that standard. The Court reasoned that a broader exception could reduce the waiver’s value to the Government and concessions to defendants. On remand, the Fifth Circuit found no miscarriage of justice, enforced Hunter’s waiver, and dismissed his appeal. United States v. Hunter, No. 24-20211, slip op. at 2, 14 (5th Cir. July 29, 2026).

Hunter addressed direct review of a sentence, not collateral-review waivers. In a June 30, 2026, statement, Justice Sotomayor encouraged lower courts to consider Hunter’s reasoning when deciding whether to enforce a collateral-review waiver against a challenge to the conviction’s validity. Her statement respecting denial of certiorari was not a holding. Jones v. United States, No. 25-524, slip op. at 1–3 (U.S. June 30, 2026) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).

An appeal waiver does not eliminate counsel’s separate obligations concerning an appeal. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), requires consultation when counsel has reason to think a rational defendant would want an appeal or the defendant reasonably demonstrated interest. Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019), presumes prejudice when counsel forfeits an appeal by disregarding an instruction to file despite a waiver. Proof of the instruction can support a claim that counsel improperly forfeited the appeal even when the agreement restricts the issues available on appeal. When counsel’s deficient performance costs the prisoner an appeal he otherwise would have taken, the remedy is a renewed opportunity to appeal without requiring proof that the appeal would have succeeded. Any enforceable waiver still limits the issues available on that appeal.

K.’s agreement produces claim-specific results. Its collateral-review waiver bars Claim B, which alleges counsel’s failure to object to a sentencing enhancement. The hypothetical assumes that the prosecutor sought and obtained this waiver of sentencing ineffective-assistance claims despite the Justice Department’s October 14, 2014, policy and that the Government later requested its enforcement. Claim A alleges that counsel misdescribed the waiver and is covered by the agreement’s express exception for ineffective assistance that rendered the plea or waiver invalid. The exception permits consideration of Claim A, whose performance and prejudice elements still require proof. The later Rehaif claim depends on the waiver’s text and the controlling circuit’s treatment of intervening statutory law. Any claim that remains reviewable must also satisfy § 2255(f)’s one-year filing period.

The Second Barrier: The One-Year Filing Period Under § 2255(f)

Under § 2255(f), a federal prisoner has one year to file a motion, measured from the latest applicable date among four statutory alternatives. The alternatives are (1) finality of the judgment, (2) removal of a governmental impediment created in violation of the Constitution or federal law that prevented the motion, (3) the Supreme Court’s initial recognition of the asserted right, if newly recognized and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, and (4) the date due diligence could have discovered the supporting facts. Because the impediment, right, or facts can differ among claims, timeliness can require a claim-specific calculation. The First Circuit applied that method in Capozzi v. United States, 768 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2014).

Ordinarily, subsection (f)(1) provides the starting date. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003), held that a conviction affirmed on direct appeal becomes final when the time to seek certiorari expires if the defendant files no petition. The appellate judgment enforcing K.’s appeal waiver was entered on September 1, 2015. He did not seek a rehearing or certiorari. Supreme Court Rule 13.1, as then in force, allowed 90 days from entry of the appellate judgment. His conviction became final on November 30, 2015. For a claim governed by subsection (f)(1), the standard one-year period ended on November 30, 2016.

Other direct-review paths require different calculations. A timely petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals moves the start of the standard 90-day certiorari period to denial of rehearing or, if rehearing is granted, entry of the subsequent appellate judgment. Sup. Ct. R. 13.3. When the prisoner timely seeks certiorari on direct review, finality under subsection (f)(1) typically occurs when the Supreme Court denies certiorari or affirms on the merits. Clay. The appellate mandate does not provide the starting date. A request for rehearing of a certiorari denial does not itself postpone finality. Robinson v. United States, 416 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2005); Sup. Ct. R. 16.3.

When no direct appeal is taken, the judgment normally becomes final when the time to appeal expires. Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Sanchez-Castellano v. United States, 358 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2004). Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), the appeal period generally ends 14 days after entry of the judgment on the criminal docket. Rule 26(a) counts intervening weekends and legal holidays but extends a period ending on one of those days to the next day that is neither. Note that all time periods expressed in days throughout this Cover Story are measured in “calendar” days, not “business” days. The additional 90-day period for seeking certiorari after appellate review does not apply to an unappealed judgment.

A court calculating an actual deadline must examine the judgment, appellate docket, rehearing and certiorari records, and any amended judgment or resentencing. The absence of an appeal, dismissal of an appeal, an amended judgment, or resentencing can change the finality analysis under controlling circuit law. However, a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) or Criminal Rule 35(b) does not restart the subsection (f)(1) period. The distinction between a sentence reduction and a new judgment is addressed in the Barrier 8A Section.

On November 29, 2016, K. deposited his initial motion in the institution’s designated legal-mail system with first-class postage prepaid and included a declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming the deposit date and prepayment. Rule 3(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (“§ 2255 Rules”) treats a prisoner’s paper as timely when deposited on or before the last filing day. Where the institution maintains a system designed for legal mail, Rule 3(d) requires the prisoner to use that system. The prisoner may establish the deposit date and prepaid first-class postage through a declaration under § 1746 or a notarized statement. Institutional mail records can provide additional proof.

A request for more time does not itself suspend the § 2255 deadline. Courts disagree about their authority to decide such a request before a substantive motion is filed. The Second Circuit held that jurisdiction was lacking in United States v. Leon, 203 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The Third Circuit permits consideration of a prefiling request but requires the showing necessary for equitable tolling. United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2013). It affirmed denial because Thomas had not shown diligent pursuit and an extraordinary circumstance preventing timely filing. A statement that claims will be provided later does not satisfy Rule 2’s pleading requirements or reserve the claims for later amendment.

Section 2255(f)(3) starts the year when the Supreme Court initially recognizes the asserted right. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005), applied that date even when the Court declares the right retroactive later. Accordingly, a movant may have less than one year after retroactivity is established. Rehaif’s decision date alone does not make K.’s new theory timely. He must satisfy every element of subsection (f)(3) or establish another starting date for that claim.

Subsection (f)(4) concerns facts discoverable through due diligence. Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005), treated an order vacating a predicate conviction as a fact and measured the year from notice, provided the prisoner diligently sought vacatur after the federal judgment. The en banc Fourth Circuit held that a later decision changing the legal significance of existing facts does not qualify under (f)(4). Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The prisoner must identify the new fact and explain why reasonable diligence could not have discovered it earlier. If the predicate conviction was vacated after an initial § 2255 proceeding ended, also examine whether the resulting motion is nonsuccessive and requires no appellate authorization. The Barrier 8A Section explains that separate classification question.

For a claim that counsel disregarded an instruction to appeal, subsection (f)(4) may provide a later starting date. The inquiry is when reasonable diligence would have disclosed that no notice of appeal had been filed. Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2000). A prisoner who learns of the omission late does not automatically receive a year from that discovery. The court may find that reasonable inquiries would have revealed it earlier. Diligence depends on the prisoner’s circumstances, including the conditions of confinement. Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2002). Explain when and how the omission was discovered, what earlier inquiries were made, and what prevented earlier discovery.

The state-prisoner tolling provision does not transfer. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) excludes time while a properly filed state collateral proceeding is pending. Section 2255 contains no corresponding exclusion. Another collateral proceeding therefore does not suspend a federal prisoner’s period merely because it remains pending.

Equitable tolling does not create a fifth statutory trigger. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), arose from a state-prisoner petition under § 2244(d) and requires the prisoner to pursue his rights diligently and show that an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. In United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit applied tolling because counsel deceived the prisoner about the deadline and filing status, failed to communicate, and retained necessary papers while the prisoner acted diligently. The Court reversed the untimeliness dismissal and remanded for merits consideration. Martin distinguished the misconduct in that record from attorney negligence and simple error. Other asserted impediments require the controlling circuit’s rule and evidence that the circumstance caused the delay.

Lack of legal training does not itself establish equitable tolling. United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2004). A prisoner seeking tolling because of a lockdown or restricted access to records or a law library must show that an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing despite reasonable diligence. Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 2000).

An innocence allegation must identify what the prisoner disputes. Factual innocence concerns whether the prisoner committed the offense, including its required mental state. Statutory noncoverage means the conduct is outside the statute. Failure of proof under a later interpretation implicates an element the original proceeding did not establish. Claimed innocence of a sentence or enhancement involves punishment eligibility. These descriptions are not interchangeable.

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), treated the innocence gateway as distinct from equitable tolling. It allowed a state prisoner to overcome an expired period by presenting new reliable evidence showing that, more likely than not, no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Delay bears on reliability, although McQuiggin did not make diligence a separate threshold element. Circuit law controls any application to a federal prisoner, especially for asserted innocence of a noncapital sentence. The Fourth Circuit declined to extend McQuiggin to that theory in United States v. Jones, 758 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 2014). K.’s Rehaif allegation does not itself constitute new reliable evidence of factual innocence.

Section 2255(f) and procedural default answer different questions. Filing within the applicable year does not excuse a failure to present a claim at trial or on direct review. When default applies, the prisoner must separately satisfy the rules governing that omission.

The Third Barrier: Procedural Default

A federal prisoner generally defaults a claim by failing to present it at trial or on direct review when those proceedings provided the required opportunity. In United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982), the Supreme Court rejected direct-appeal plain-error review for a defaulted jury-instruction claim raised under § 2255. The Court required both cause for the default and actual prejudice from the asserted error. Frady found no actual prejudice and thus did not decide cause.

Bousley applied procedural default after a guilty plea. Bousley did not challenge his plea on direct review. He later sought § 2255 relief based on the Supreme Court’s intervening interpretation of the offense statute. The Court held that he had defaulted the claim and could obtain merits review only by establishing cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence.

Cause typically requires an impediment external to the defense, such as official interference that prevented compliance or a factual basis that was not reasonably available. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), a § 2254 case, also recognizes constitutionally ineffective assistance as cause. United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2000), applies that principle under § 2255. A prisoner relying on trial or appellate counsel must establish a meritorious ineffective-assistance claim and explain how counsel’s failure caused the omission. Oversight or attorney error that falls short of a constitutional violation is insufficient. The underlying claim still requires the separate showing of actual prejudice.

An intervening decision does not automatically establish cause. Bousley rejected the argument that adverse circuit precedent had made the claim futile. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), a state-prisoner case under § 2254, likewise explained that perceived futility does not establish cause when the legal basis for an objection was available. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984), another § 2254 case, recognized a narrow novelty rule. Novelty can establish cause when the claim’s legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel. A court applying that rule examines the law when the default occurred. The later issuance of Rehaif and adverse precedent at the time of K.’s plea do not, by themselves, establish cause.

Cause and actual prejudice are separate requirements. Frady requires harm that substantially disadvantaged the prisoner and infected the trial with constitutional error. The prisoner must prove that harm independently of the reason offered to excuse the earlier omission. Frady’s description arose from a jury trial. Because K. pleaded guilty, the court must use the prejudice standard applicable to his claim and procedural posture.

A sufficient showing of actual innocence excuses the default without a showing of cause and actual prejudice. Bousley requires factual innocence. A demonstration that the conviction is legally deficient is insufficient. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), a state-prisoner case under § 2254, requires new reliable evidence and a showing that, considering the entire record, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted the prisoner. The omission of the knowledge-of-status element from K.’s plea proceeding establishes an error in that proceeding. It does not establish that K. lacked the required knowledge. The Government may present admissible evidence outside the plea record. If the Government did not pursue a more serious charge during plea bargaining, Bousley also requires actual innocence of that charge.

A freestanding innocence claim seeks relief because of innocence itself, independent of another constitutional violation. Fernandez confirmed that the Supreme Court has neither recognized nor ruled out that independent ground for federal collateral relief.

Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021), illustrates how a defendant’s prior felony record can bear on a Rehaif knowledge claim, but its procedural posture limits its use here. The Court decided two cases together under the plain-error standard of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Gregory Greer had been convicted by a jury. Michael Gary, like K., had pleaded guilty. The Fourth Circuit had vacated Gary’s plea and convictions after treating the omission of the knowledge-of-status element from his plea colloquy as structural error. United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court held that the Rehaif errors were not structural, affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment against Greer, and reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment in favor of Gary.

Neither defendant represented on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not know his prohibited status. The Court also explained that convicted felons ordinarily know that status. Accordingly, K.’s prior-conviction record may bear on what he knew. These cases nevertheless involved direct appeals rather than § 2255 motions. Greer does not replace Frady’s cause-and-prejudice rule or Bousley’s factual-innocence standard.

Ineffective-assistance claims receive different procedural treatment. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), held that a federal prisoner may raise an ineffective assistance claim for the first time under § 2255 even if he omitted it from his direct appeal. The trial record often cannot show counsel’s reasons or the evidence needed to assess performance. As a result, that omission does not procedurally default the ineffective-assistance claim. That rule addresses when the claim may be raised. The prisoner must still prove deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

An issue already decided on direct appeal typically cannot be litigated again under § 2255. In Nyhuis, the Court applied that restriction even though the prisoner characterized the same alleged error under a different, previously available legal theory. Reconsideration requires a recognized basis under controlling law. The 1974 Davis decision recognizes an exception for an intervening change in law. Any such claim remains subject to the applicable timing, retroactivity, and successive-motion requirements. A distinct ineffective-assistance claim requires proof of counsel’s constitutional failure. Calling the rejected claim ineffective assistance does not establish deficient performance or prejudice.

K. did not present his knowledge-of-status theory on direct review. Even apart from the successive-motion restriction, his later Rehaif claim requires cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence to overcome that default. Timely filing and the later issuance of the decision are insufficient by themselves. Claims A and B receive Massaro’s different treatment of ineffective assistance, but neither a default exception nor an available claim substitutes for adequate factual pleading.

The Fourth Barrier: Pleading, Recharacterization, Amendment, and Preliminary Review

A court can dismiss a claim at preliminary review even if waiver and default do not apply, because the motion provides no facts that would warrant relief. Rule 2 of the § 2255 Rules requires factual pleading. Rule 4 directs dismissal when the motion, exhibits, and prior record plainly show no entitlement to relief.

Rule 2 requires the inclusion of every ground, its supporting facts, the requested relief, as well as legible writing, substantial compliance with the national or local form, and a penalty-of-perjury signature. A movant challenging more than one judgment must file a separate motion for each. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (“AO”) Form 243 asks about the judgment, prior proceedings, timeliness, and factual support. It says legal citations are unnecessary and warns that omitted grounds may become unavailable. Claim A should state counsel’s waiver advice, when counsel gave it, any supporting witness or record, and its effect on K.’s plea decision. An allegation that counsel was ineffective does not provide those facts.

Other ineffective-assistance theories require comparable factual detail. For an omitted witness or investigation, the motion must identify the witness or investigative lead, the expected evidence, and how that evidence could have changed the relevant decision or result.

Rule 3 requires the movant to file an original and two copies, and Rule 3(d) applies the prison-mailbox rule. The clerk must enter the motion on the criminal docket. Rule 3’s committee note states that no fee is required. The clerk may not reject a motion solely for failure to use the standard form, although the court may require correction. A movant should check the sentencing court’s current form, standing orders, local rules, and electronic-filing instructions.

Rule 4 requires prompt examination. If the motion, exhibits, and prior record plainly show no entitlement, the judge must dismiss the motion and notify the movant. Otherwise, the judge must order a response or specified action from the U.S. Attorney. Rule 5 requires the answer to address the allegations and prior federal remedies and permits a reply. If the answer refers to a brief or transcript absent from the record, the judge must order the Government to furnish it.

In the analogous § 2254 context, Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006), requires notice and an opportunity to respond before a court, on its own initiative, considers a limitations defense the Government failed to raise. Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012), prohibits a court from overriding the Government’s deliberate waiver. Controlling circuit law determines whether these rules apply under § 2255.

Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), requires notice, a warning about later second-or-successive restrictions, and an opportunity to withdraw or amend before a court recharacterizes a differently labeled pro se filing as the litigant’s first § 2255 motion. Without those steps, the recharacterized filing does not count as the first motion when those restrictions are later applied. The warning gives the litigant an opportunity to consider the consequences of a first motion and to furnish any omitted claims and facts.

Rule 12 permits use of the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure only when consistent with federal statutes and the § 2255 Rules. Civil Rule 15 permits amendment within specified periods or later with written consent or court leave. An otherwise untimely added claim relates back only when it shares a common core of operative facts with a timely claim. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005), rejected relation back merely because both claims attacked the same conviction. Because Mayle arose under § 2254, controlling circuit law governs its application to § 2255.

Amendment before judgment must be distinguished from a new filing after denial or dismissal of the initial motion. Some procedural dispositions count for successive-motion purposes even without a decision on the underlying claim. A pending collateral appeal does not itself preserve an unrestricted opportunity to add claims. Successive-motion restrictions and the rules governing proper postjudgment motions impose separate limits.

For Claim A, an order requiring the Government’s response leaves the factual dispute about counsel’s advice unresolved. Section 2255(b) and the evidence-development rules determine whether the court needs documents, discovery, or testimony to decide it.

The Fifth Barrier: Obtaining Evidence, a Hearing, and Counsel

Factual development under § 2255 depends on the material dispute and the procedure requested. The statute contains no counterpart to § 2254(e)(2), but discovery, record expansion, services, counsel, and a hearing have separate statutory or rules-based conditions.

Section 2255(b) requires a prompt hearing unless the motion and the case files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. In Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962), detailed allegations of off-record promises and threats presented disputed facts that the record and the sentencing judge’s recollection did not resolve. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973) (per curiam), vacated a summary denial because detailed allegations of coercion and illness, supported by records, were not conclusively answered by the plea hearing.

In Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), a state-prisoner case under § 2254, the Court explained that solemn plea declarations carry a strong presumption of verity while affirming further factual development of a specific off-record promise allegation. A court may reject allegations that are vague, conclusory, palpably incredible, or conclusively refuted by the record.

Rule 6 permits discovery for good cause. The request must state reasons, include proposed interrogatories or requests for admission, and identify requested documents. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997), interpreted the materially parallel § 2254 rule and found good cause where specific allegations gave reason to believe that developed facts could establish entitlement to relief. A request may identify plea communications, specified portions of former counsel’s file, investigative records, or documents and testimony from identified witnesses tied to a pleaded claim. The movant must explain what the requested material is expected to prove.

Rule 7 permits the court to expand the record with letters, documents, exhibits, sworn interrogatory answers, and affidavits. The opposing party must be provided with an opportunity to admit or deny the correctness of the added material. The court can use the expanded record to decide whether the claim is conclusively resolved or testimony is required. Contested submissions remain subject to evaluation.

The Government may submit an affidavit from former counsel addressing an ineffective-assistance allegation. Counsel’s affidavit does not automatically resolve a factual dispute, and disagreement alone does not establish the need for a hearing. The question remains whether the motion, files, and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. United States v. Witherspoon, 231 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Flood, 188 F.4th 250 (4th Cir. 2026), clarified how the Fourth Circuit reviews denials without an evidentiary hearing. At preliminary review under Rule 4, the Court accepts well-pleaded allegations as true and asks whether the record conclusively forecloses relief. After briefing and record development, review resembles summary judgment, i.e., the court cannot weigh evidence or resolve credibility disputes. Reasonable inferences favor the movant at both stages, and § 2255(b) creates no presumption against a hearing.

Rule 8 requires the judge to review the answer, prior transcripts and records, and any Rule 7 materials before deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted. A District Court may refer the motion to a magistrate judge for a hearing and recommended disposition. A party has 14 days after service of the recommended disposition to object. The District Court must determine de novo each properly objected-to portion.

Timely objections must identify each disputed finding or legal conclusion and explain the claimed error. Failure to make timely, sufficiently specific objections can forfeit appellate review under controlling circuit law. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 2007).

The Constitution generally does not require counsel for collateral review. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). Without a constitutional right to counsel in that proceeding, deficient performance by § 2255 counsel does not itself establish a constitutional ineffective-assistance claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), applies that principle in state postconviction review. An ordinary omission by § 2255 counsel does not create an authorization ground under § 2255(h) for a new claim in a later motion.

Counsel and publicly funded services have separate conditions. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), the court may appoint counsel for a financially eligible § 2255 movant when the interests of justice require. Rule 6(a) requires appointment when a qualifying movant needs counsel for effective discovery, and Rule 8(c) requires appointment when an evidentiary hearing is warranted. Appointed counsel may request necessary investigative, expert, or other services under § 3006A(e), subject to the statutory procedure. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 separately entitles a financially unable capital movant challenging a death sentence under § 2255 to counsel and reasonably necessary services.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), a government-paid transcript requires in forma pauperis status (permission to proceed without prepaying costs) and judicial certification that the proceeding is not frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976), reversed an order requiring a transcript without that certification. The plurality rejected an automatic constitutional entitlement before the prisoner had presented a nonfrivolous claim requiring the transcript.

An ineffective-assistance claim can place attorney-client communications at issue. In Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), a state-prisoner case, the Ninth Circuit limited the implied privilege waiver to material necessary to litigate the claim and approved a protective order restricting use outside the habeas proceeding. In a federal § 2255 case, the Tenth Circuit likewise limited implied waiver to communications necessary to prove or disprove the ineffective-assistance claim. United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972 (10th Cir. 2009). The scope of production and any protective order depend on the claim and controlling circuit law.

Rule 4(a) generally assigns the motion to the judge who conducted the challenged proceeding. The assignment uses the judge’s familiarity with the record and can also require the judge to assess alleged failures in a proceeding the judge conducted. That circumstance alone is not grounds for recusal. Judicial disqualification is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), explains that prior rulings and opinions formed during judicial proceedings ordinarily do not require recusal unless they demonstrate bias so severe that the judge cannot adjudicate fairly. Familiarity with the case cannot substitute for evidence when material off-record facts remain disputed.

The motion, files, and records do not conclusively resolve Claim A, so the court orders a limited evidentiary hearing on counsel’s advice. The resulting findings, considered together with the existing record, provide the facts needed to decide that claim’s separate prejudice element.

The Sixth Barrier: Prejudice and Harmless Error

An evidentiary hearing can establish counsel’s conduct without establishing ineffective assistance. Under Strickland, the prisoner typically must prove deficient performance, meaning objectively unreasonable representation, and prejudice. Prejudice requires a reasonable probability of a different result absent counsel’s error, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. A different result need not be more likely than not.

Courts evaluate counsel’s conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time and apply a strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable. An unsuccessful strategy does not itself establish deficient performance. But describing an omission as strategic does not end the inquiry. Counsel must reasonably investigate or reasonably decide that further investigation is unnecessary. Strickland. For a failure-to-investigate claim, identify the information or leads available to counsel, what counsel knew or was told, what inquiry counsel made, and why the decision to stop or omit investigation was unreasonable. The missing evidence’s effect remains a separate prejudice question.

When deficient advice induced a guilty plea, the relevant decision is whether to plead. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), requires a reasonable probability that the prisoner would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial. Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017), requires attention to whether that choice would have been rational and to contemporaneous evidence supporting it. A later assertion alone is insufficient. On Lee’s particular record, the Court found prejudice despite a weak trial defense because his plea decision depended on avoiding deportation. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded.

The loss of a favorable plea offer requires a different showing. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), recognizes counsel’s general duty to communicate formal favorable offers. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), addresses deficient advice that causes rejection of an offer. The prisoner must establish a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the offer, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, the court would have accepted its terms, and the resulting conviction or sentence would have been less severe. The offer’s terms, any expiration date, and communications showing what counsel conveyed and how the prisoner responded can support those showings. A successful claim does not automatically entitle the prisoner to the offered sentence; the remedy depends on the circumstances. Lafler.

At sentencing, prejudice can be based on a reasonable probability of a shorter prison term absent counsel’s deficient performance. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001), rejects a minimum amount of additional imprisonment as a condition of prejudice. The prisoner must still connect counsel’s failure to the longer sentence. When appellate counsel omitted an issue, the prisoner must show an unreasonable omission and a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal. Appellate counsel need not present every nonfrivolous issue. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).

A preserved structural error, such as denial of a public trial, ordinarily receives no harmless-error review. Section 2255(f)’s deadline and § 2255(h)’s successive-motion requirements still apply. The structural classification does not necessarily excuse proof of prejudice when counsel’s failure to object supplies the claim. In Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017), an unpreserved public-trial violation during jury selection did not establish ineffective-assistance prejudice automatically. The Court considered a reasonable probability of a different outcome and assumed, without deciding, that demonstrated fundamental unfairness could also suffice. It affirmed the judgment denying relief and reserved how other structural errors affect ineffective-assistance claims.

For a trial-based claim of suppressed favorable evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the prisoner must establish materiality as part of the constitutional violation. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), requires a reasonable probability that disclosure of favorable evidence would have produced a different result. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), requires collective assessment of the suppressed evidence. Once a Brady/Bagley violation is established, the court conducts no additional harmless-error inquiry under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

Ordinary constitutional trial error requires a different analysis. For preserved error on direct review, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), places the burden on the prosecution to establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Brecht instead requires a prisoner challenging trial error under § 2254 to establish actual prejudice, meaning a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict. Finality and the costs of retrial help explain the stricter collateral standard.

Applying harmless-error review under § 2255 requires identifying controlling circuit law. The Third Circuit adopted Brecht in United States v. Bentley, 49 F.4th 275 (3d Cir. 2022). In Stinn v. United States, 188 F.4th 109 (2d Cir. 2026), a coram nobis decision, the Second Circuit acknowledged that it had not formally selected the § 2255 standard, although its decisions had repeatedly applied the standard from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), that Brecht adopted. These decisions reflect broad circuit agreement on Brecht, but they do not establish a uniform national rule.

Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118 (2022), requires a state prisoner challenging ordinary trial error adjudicated on the merits in state court to satisfy § 2254(d) as well as Brecht. Even a federal court’s grave doubt about whether the error substantially affected the verdict, which satisfies Brecht, does not eliminate that statutory requirement. Section 2255 has no corresponding state-court-deference requirement.

After the hearing, the court denies K.’s Claim A because he has not established a reasonable probability that correct waiver advice would have caused him to reject the agreement and insist on trial or that doing so would have been rational. The court enforces the collateral-review waiver against Claim B.

What Happens When Relief Is Granted

For a prisoner who establishes an error warranting relief, the court must determine the appropriate remedy. Section 2255(b) directs the court to vacate and set aside the judgment, then discharge the prisoner, resentence him, grant a new trial, or correct the sentence. The remedy depends on the defect. Thus, a grant need not require immediate release.

In United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652 (4th Cir. 2007), the District Court vacated a firearm conviction and removed its 60-month consecutive sentence, leaving 168 months on the drug convictions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the corrected judgment without requiring a resentencing hearing. It recognized that a court may reconstruct interdependent sentences after vacating one component but held that § 2255 did not invariably require that procedure. The prisoner must distinguish a full resentencing from correction of a particular sentence. The Barrier 8A Section explains how a judgment entered after sentence correction can affect the need for appellate authorization to file a later § 2255 motion.

Full resentencing can increase a sentence on a remaining count within lawful limits and leave total imprisonment unchanged. In United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2017), vacatur of a consecutive firearm conviction on direct appeal led to resentencing on the remaining counts. The District Court increased another count’s sentence and again imposed a total of 420 months, which the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Due process prohibits a resentencing court from retaliating against a defendant for successfully challenging the judgment. A higher sentence creates a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness only when the circumstances present a reasonable likelihood of retaliation; otherwise, the defendant must prove actual vindictiveness. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). In Ventura, the Fourth Circuit compared the total sentences and found no presumption because total imprisonment had not increased.

At a full resentencing, the court may consider postsentencing rehabilitation and, in appropriate cases, impose a lower sentence on that basis. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011). Rehabilitation does not require a reduction, and a limited remand can make that evidence irrelevant to the authorized resentencing.

Resentencing can also change which statutory penalties apply. Hewitt v. United States, 606 U.S. 419 (2025), held that the First Step Act’s revised § 924(c) penalties govern when a pre-Act sentence has been vacated and the defendant is resentenced after enactment. That rule determines the penalties at resentencing. It does not independently authorize reopening a final sentence.

Vacating a guilty plea can also permit renewed prosecution. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3296, the court must reinstate timely filed counts dismissed under a court-approved plea agreement when the court vacates the guilty plea on the defendant’s motion and the Government moves to reinstate within 60 days after the vacatur order becomes final. The statute preserves defenses and objections other than limitations.

Sentence correction does not transfer the BOP’s initial responsibility for prior-custody-credit calculations to the sentencing judge. That distinction between the sentence and its execution follows Wilson.

K.’s appeal from the rulings on his claims requires a certificate of appealability as well as a timely notice.

The Seventh Barrier: The Certificate of Appealability Requirement

A prisoner appealing denial of § 2255 relief ordinarily needs a certificate of appealability (“COA”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The same certificate framework governs state-prisoner habeas appeals. Section 2253(c)(2) requires a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied, and subsection (c)(3) requires identification of the specific qualifying issues. Rule 11(a) of the § 2255 Rules requires the District Court to issue or deny a COA when entering its final adverse order. A prisoner whose request is denied may seek a certificate from a circuit judge.

The certificate requirement is narrower than § 2255(a)’s recognition of some nonconstitutional grounds. Cognizability in the District Court does not by itself provide a basis for a COA. In Hadden, the Fourth Circuit explained that nonconstitutional arguments could not warrant a certificate. A related constitutional claim, such as Bousley’s challenge to whether a plea was knowing and intelligent, requires its own supporting facts and procedural analysis. A prisoner must identify the constitutional right actually implicated, not simply attach a constitutional label to a statutory objection.

The District Court’s reason for denying relief determines the required showing. Under Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), a merits denial requires a showing that reasonable jurists could debate the court’s assessment of the constitutional claim or regard it as wrong. For a procedural denial, reasonable jurists must be able to debate the constitutional claim’s validity as well as the procedural ground for dismissal. A debatable filing-deadline ruling alone therefore does not establish entitlement to a certificate. The prisoner need not prove that the appeal will succeed.

A COA application should address every independently sufficient ground for denying the claim being appealed. If the certificate excludes an issue necessary to obtain relief, request expansion under the circuit’s procedures. A favorable ruling on one ground cannot produce relief if another independently sufficient ground remains beyond the permitted appeal.

In United States v. Robinson, 159 F.4th 277 (4th Cir. 2025), the District Court dismissed the motion as successive and, alternatively, untimely. The Fourth Circuit granted a COA only on whether a First Step Act sentence reduction created a new judgment. Robinson sought expansion on whether separate predicate offenses supported his § 924(c) convictions. The District Court’s rejection of equitable tolling had relied on its adverse view of that merits question. After denying expansion, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot because even a favorable ruling on the new-judgment issue would leave the independent timeliness holding intact.

The certificate inquiry limits which appeals receive merits adjudication without permitting the court to decide those merits prematurely. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), requires more than a nonfrivolous claim but confines the inquiry to whether the claim warrants further consideration. Without a certificate, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the merits. In Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017), the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate after deciding whether Buck had established extraordinary circumstances to reopen his habeas judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit had improperly resolved the reopening motion’s merits at the certificate stage. It reversed the judgment and remanded.

The prisoner must file a timely notice of appeal even while seeking a COA. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) typically allows 60 days after entry of the appealable judgment or order because the U.S. is a party. A COA request does not suspend that period. Rule 11 expressly provides that reconsideration of a certificate denial does not extend it. Qualifying postjudgment motions can change the calculation under Rule 4(a)(4), and Rules 4(a)(5) and (6) separately govern extensions and reopening. Under Rule 22(b)(2), a notice of appeal also constitutes a COA request when no express request is filed.

Partial relief requires identifying exactly what the prisoner challenges. A new criminal judgment can coexist with denial of other § 2255 claims. An appeal from those denials requires a COA. A challenge to the lawfulness of the new sentence proceeds as a direct criminal appeal. The defendant’s standard notice deadline for that appeal is 14 days under Rule 4(b)(1)(A). A challenge to the choice between correction and resentencing presents a circuit split. Hadden treated that challenge as a criminal appeal requiring no COA. The Third Circuit required a certificate in Clark v. United States, 76 F.4th 206 (3d Cir. 2023), and dismissed Kent Clark’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction after denying one. The Sixth Circuit permits a remedy-choice appeal without a COA. Ajan v. United States, 731 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2013). The Eleventh Circuit requires a certificate. United States v. Cody, 998 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2021). The object of the challenge and controlling circuit law determine the procedure.

That split remains unresolved nationally. In McDonald v. United States, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 26428 (1st Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), the First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that a COA was required to challenge the remedy. It denied the request because McDonald had not established the required constitutional showing. The decision did not adopt either side of the circuit split.

Under Clark, a prisoner appealing only the choice between correction and resentencing must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether that choice violated a constitutional right. The constitutional violation already remedied does not itself provide a basis for a COA. Clark. McDonald likewise rejected the argument that the prisoner need only show that the remedy addressed a constitutional violation. McDonald. Explain why the remedial decision itself arguably denied a constitutional right. Merely alleging that the court misunderstood its discretion under § 2255(b) does not make that showing.

A Court of Appeals’ denial of a COA does not foreclose a request for Supreme Court review. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998), held that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) to review a circuit judge’s or panel’s certificate denial. Certiorari remains discretionary. Sup. Ct. R. 10. Generally, the petition is due within 90 days after entry of the denial order. A timely appellate rehearing petition moves the starting date to denial of rehearing or, if rehearing is granted, entry of the subsequent judgment. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3. The mandate date does not control. Circuit rules determine what reconsideration or rehearing is available. Consequently, do not assume that every request for further consideration changes the certiorari deadline.

The District Court denied K.’s initial motion and denied a COA in its final adverse order. K. filed his notice of appeal within the 60-day period that Appellate Rule 4(a)(1)(B) allowed after entry of judgment. The Court of Appeals also denied a COA, so the appeal did not reach the merits. K. sought neither rehearing nor certiorari following the appellate denial, and his time to seek certiorari expired before the Supreme Court decided Rehaif on June 21, 2019. Because the court granted no relief, it entered no new criminal judgment from which he could take a direct appeal. His later Rehaif filing raises a different question, viz., whether he may present another merits claim under § 2255 at all.

The Eighth Barrier: Second or Successive Motions Under § 2255(h)

Barrier 8A: Determining Whether a Filing Is Second or Successive

Whether a later filing requires appellate authorization depends on its substance and the judgment challenged. “Second or successive” is a legal classification, not a count of documents. A pro se filing recharacterized without the Castro safeguards explained in the Fourth Barrier Section does not count as the first motion when those restrictions are later applied.

A first motion can count even when the court never decides the underlying constitutional claim. A proper dismissal for untimeliness constitutes an adjudication on the merits for successive-motion purposes, and a denial enforcing procedural default can likewise count. Villanueva v. United States, 346 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2003). Voluntary withdrawal requires attention to its reasons and circumstances. Thai v. United States, 391 F.3d 491 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam), distinguished withdrawal to correct a curable procedural defect from withdrawal under circumstances clearly showing that the prisoner recognized the motion lacked merit. The words “without prejudice” do not alone establish that another motion is exempt from § 2255(h).

Entry of a merits judgment on the initial collateral application generally makes a later filing asserting new claims against the same criminal judgment successive, even while an appeal remains pending. Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443 (2025), applied that rule under § 2254. United States v. Taylor, 152 F.4th 1297 (11th Cir. 2025), applied it to § 2255 and affirmed dismissals of unauthorized successive motions.

Rivers did not resolve every question concerning a postjudgment Rule 15 amendment and expressly reserved whether a later filing may be held in abeyance until the initial appeal ends. Taylor treated that course as discretionary rather than a prisoner’s entitlement.

A later motion can also be nonsuccessive because the claim arose only after the initial § 2255 proceeding ended. Several circuits have applied that rule when a state court subsequently vacated a conviction used to enhance the federal sentence. See Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Jones, 54 F.4th 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (collecting decisions from the Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits applying the later-arising-claim rule). The later vacatur creates the basis for the federal claim even though the federal judgment has not changed.

This exception concerns a claim based on a later event. Simply discovering new evidence about earlier events does not itself make a motion nonsuccessive. Stewart. Similarly, a favorable change in statutory interpretation does not itself make a motion nonsuccessive. Hendrix. K.’s Rehaif claim is based on a later interpretation of the statute and thus does not fall within this exception. A nonsuccessive motion requires no authorization under § 2255(h), but the prisoner must still establish timeliness and satisfy the other requirements for relief. The Second Barrier Section explains the diligence required for a vacatur-based claim under § 2255(f)(4).

A filing’s title does not control its classification. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), distinguished a Rule 60(b) challenge to a procedural defect in the federal collateral proceeding from a motion adding a claim or challenging a merits determination. The latter is successive; a genuine procedural challenge remains subject to Rule 60’s separate requirements. Gonzalez involved § 2254. United States v. Arrington, 763 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2014), applied that distinction under § 2255.

A proper, timely Rule 59(e) motion remains part of the initial proceeding. Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504 (2020), established that rule under § 2254. Rule 59(e) customarily requires filing within 28 days after entry of the judgment in the § 2255 proceeding, and Rule 6(b)(2) prohibits ordinary extensions. The Practical Guide Section’s “Notices of Appeal and Postjudgment Deadlines” Subsection addresses Rule 60(b)’s separate requirements and explains when emergency extensions or qualifying motions affect filing and appeal deadlines.

A new judgment in the criminal case can change the successive-motion analysis. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), held that a first § 2254 challenge to a new sentence following resentencing was not successive. It did not decide whether the prisoner could also challenge an undisturbed conviction. Applying Magwood under § 2255 requires circuit-specific analysis. In In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth Circuit held that vacating one conviction and its concurrent life sentence did not create a new judgment with respect to the remaining conviction and life sentence. The Court explained that the original criminal judgment continued to govern that sentence and alone satisfied Criminal Rule 32(k)(1). The later judgment concluded the civil § 2255 proceeding. It classified the later motion as successive and denied authorization.

In re Augustin, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 28195 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 2026), illustrates how a third § 2255 motion can avoid successive-motion restrictions. After denial of his first motion, Augustin obtained appellate authorization to file a second motion citing Davis. The District Court granted relief by vacating his § 924(c) conviction and removing its consecutive 120-month sentence. It left the other five convictions and their 380-month prison term unaltered and entered an amended criminal judgment without conducting a full resentencing.

When Augustin filed his third motion to challenge the surviving convictions, the Sixth Circuit held that § 2255(h) authorization was unnecessary because this was his first § 2255 challenge to the new judgment. The Court explained that § 2255(b) requires the prior judgment to be vacated before either sentence correction or resentencing. Selecting correction did not prevent the resulting judgment from being new. The Court remanded without deciding timeliness or the claims’ merits.

A later reduction in the prison term does not necessarily create a new judgment. In White v. United States, 745 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2014), the Seventh Circuit held that a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) implementing a retroactive Guidelines amendment did not restart the subsection (f)(1) year or remove successive-motion restrictions on a later challenge to that judgment. Relying on § 3582(b), Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2011), held that a reduction for substantial assistance under Criminal Rule 35(b) did not restart the subsection (f)(1) period. Examine the authority for the reduction and controlling circuit law. Importantly, the words “amended judgment” do not by themselves establish a new filing period or permission to bring another motion without authorization.

Barrier 8B: Obtaining Court of Appeals Authorization

Rule 9 requires a prisoner to obtain authorization from the appropriate Court of Appeals before presenting a successive motion. The Tenth Circuit treats authorization as a jurisdictional requirement the Government cannot waive. United States v. Wetzel-Sanders, 805 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2015). In United States v. Robinson, 159 F.4th 277 (4th Cir. 2025), a Fourth Circuit panel concluded that §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) impose claim-processing requirements rather than jurisdictional limits. The panel acknowledged earlier circuit decisions using jurisdictional language and explained that its disposition would remain unchanged under either classification. Robinson’s petition asking the Supreme Court to resolve the jurisdictional question remains pending. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Robinson v. United States, No. 25-7623 (U.S. filed June 9, 2026).

A three-judge panel determines whether the application makes a prima facie showing under § 2255(h), meaning a preliminary showing sufficient to permit filing. Subsection (h)(1) requires newly discovered evidence that, if proven and considered with the evidence as a whole, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the prisoner guilty of the offense. Subsection (h)(2) requires a previously unavailable new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to collateral cases by the Supreme Court. §§ 2255(h)(1)–(2), 2244(b)(3)(A)–(C).

The federal evidence provision differs from the state-prisoner provision. Section 2244(b)(2)(B) expressly requires a factual basis not previously discoverable through due diligence and a showing that, absent constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found guilt. Section 2255(h)(1) does not contain those clauses. Courts must apply the federal text rather than import the state requirements.

Bowe v. United States, 607 U.S. 13 (2026), held that § 2244(b)(1)’s prohibition on previously presented claims does not govern federal § 2255 motions. It also held that § 2244(b)(3)(E) does not prohibit Supreme Court certiorari review of a federal authorization denial. The Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded. Neither holding added a third ground for authorization.

Bowe reserved whether § 2244(b)(3)(E) prohibits panel or en banc rehearing. In Upchurch v. United States, 184 F.4th 933 (7th Cir. 2026) (Brennan, C.J., in chambers), a single judge applied the rehearing prohibition and directed that the rehearing petition be filed without further Court action. That limited ruling does not establish nationwide rehearing practice.

Authorization does not establish actual eligibility, timeliness, or entitlement to relief. Bowe explained that § 2255(h) does not incorporate § 2244(b)(4)’s District-Court reexamination command. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit’s corrected February 6, 2026, order authorized Michael Bowe’s challenge to his firearm conviction based on Davis only upon a prima facie showing and required District-Court determination of actual statutory eligibility under circuit precedent. It expressly declined to decide timeliness. In re Bowe, 166 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2026). The order granted permission to file, without deciding the claim’s merits.

Adding claims after authorization also requires circuit-specific analysis. United States v. MacDonald, 641 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 2011), recognized that a movant may add claims through a proper, timely Rule 15 amendment. Each claim must still satisfy § 2255(h). The Eleventh Circuit takes a narrower approach. In United States v. Ragland, No. 23-12278 (11th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026), it held that Rule 15 cannot bring claims beyond the appellate authorization within the District Court’s jurisdiction. A prisoner seeking to add those claims must obtain further authorization from the Court of Appeals. Bowe did not eliminate § 2255(f) or resolve the scope of potential common-law restrictions on repetitive claims.

The Supreme Court has scheduled Guerrero v. Johnson, No. 25-1003, for argument on November 4, 2026. The state-prisoner case concerns “previously unavailable” in § 2244(b)(2)(A), language also used in § 2255(h)(2). It asks whether a claim relies on a previously unavailable new rule when the prisoner could have asserted a claim based on that rule in an earlier petition. That pending question is distinct from the postjudgment-classification issue decided in Rivers v. Guerrero, 605 U.S. 443 (2025).

K.’s later Rehaif filing challenges the same criminal judgment after his initial proceeding ended. It provided neither newly discovered evidence under § 2255(h)(1) nor a new constitutional rule under § 2255(h)(2). The Supreme Court’s decision in Bowe provided no third authorization ground for that statutory claim. Whether a later rule applies retroactively is a further, distinct question.

The Ninth Barrier: Retroactivity
of New Constitutional Rules

Retroactivity determines whether a later rule applies on collateral review to a conviction already final. Under the framework originating in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), a rule is new when precedent did not require its result when the conviction became final. Applying an existing rule does not itself create a new-rule restriction. The doctrine protects finality and reliance on the law governing the original proceedings.

Courts generally apply new substantive rules to convictions already final. Substantive rules narrow the conduct or persons the law may punish or prohibit specified punishments for a class of defendants. Procedural rules regulate how courts determine guilt or punishment. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), classified the transfer of capital-sentencing factfinding from judge to jury as procedural.

Welch held that invalidation of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause announced a substantive constitutional rule applicable retroactively. Eliminating that clause changed the statutory basis for punishment, rather than the procedure for finding facts. The Court vacated the denial of a COA and remanded. It did not order Welch’s sentence reduced. Another statutory basis for the enhancement remained unresolved.

A prisoner ordinarily cannot obtain collateral relief by invoking a new procedural rule announced after the conviction became final. Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021), eliminated the former exception for “watershed” procedural rules. Thus, a newly announced procedural rule cannot qualify for federal collateral retroactivity through that exception. Older descriptions of Teague recognizing that possibility no longer represent the governing rule.

Retroactivity and timely filing remain separate. Under § 2255(f)(3) and Dodd’s recognition-date rule, a later retroactivity ruling does not restart the year. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides a close state-prisoner analogue, expressly limited to a constitutional right.

Successive motions require an additional statutory showing. Section 2255(h)(2) requires a previously unavailable new constitutional rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001), construed the parallel state-prisoner language to require a Supreme Court holding or holdings that necessarily dictate retroactivity. A lower court’s independent conclusion that a rule should apply retroactively is insufficient.

Statutory interpretation requires separate analysis. Bousley distinguished substantive statutory interpretation from new procedural rules while enforcing procedural default. The Fourth Circuit applied the retroactivity framework under § 2255 and held Rehaif retroactive on initial collateral review. United States v. Waters, 64 F.4th 199 (4th Cir. 2023). That initial-motion holding cannot satisfy § 2255(h)(2)’s separate constitutional-rule requirement.

The innocence gateways concern whether a deadline or procedural default can be overcome. They do not replace the statutory showing required for a successive motion or convert a statutory interpretation into a constitutional rule.

K.’s Claims A and B invoke existing ineffective-assistance standards, so neither depends on a new constitutional rule. For his later Rehaif claim, the remaining question is whether another remedy permits adjudication.

After the Nine Barriers: Later Claims Without a Route to Merits Review

The difference between initial and successive review can determine whether a court ever reaches a later statutory claim. Cognizability under § 2255(a), timely filing under subsection (f), and an exception to procedural default cannot provide a missing authorization ground under subsection (h).

Hendrix answered that question for the later statutory claim at issue there. Exclusion by § 2255(h) did not make the motion remedy inadequate or ineffective and permit resort to § 2241.

The Hendrix majority reasoned that permitting the same claim under § 2241 would nullify Congress’ restrictions and its choice of finality over further error correction. It rejected the Suspension Clause challenge because founding-era habeas did not permit this reexamination of a conviction entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. The dissents read the saving clause to preserve review of qualifying statutory claims. Justice Jackson also argued that denying meaningful review to a potentially innocent prisoner raised constitutional concerns. The decision preserved § 2241 for genuine execution claims and unusual circumstances making sentencing-court relief impossible or impracticable but excluded the successive statutory attack on Jones’ conviction.

Compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not provide a substitute conviction-validity proceeding. In Fernandez, the prisoner originally received two consecutive life sentences. After the District Court vacated his § 924(j) firearm conviction, his life sentence for murder for hire remained. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate judgment reversing a compassionate-release reduction based on doubts about the conviction. The majority required that validity challenge to proceed under § 2255. Justice Jackson’s dissent distinguished discretionary mercy from invalidating a conviction. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan rejected the majority’s reasoning but concurred in the judgment because the motion depended on previously considered facts rather than changed circumstances.

Rutherford addressed a different restriction. The petitioners’ mandatory § 924(c) prison terms were 32 years for Rutherford and 57 for Carter. Congress subsequently restricted those enhanced penalties without extending the change to their sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments upholding denial of their motions because nonretroactive change could not establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release, alone or with other factors. The majority enforced Congress’ nonretroactivity choice. The Court also invalidated the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement insofar as it permitted that nonretroactive change to establish eligibility under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). The dissent defended the Sentencing Commission’s delegated authority to permit exceptional, individualized reductions rather than apply the amendment categorically.

Qualifying medical, age-related, and family circumstances can still support compassionate release, subject to the statute and applicable policy statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(3), (c) (2025). Once an independent extraordinary and compelling reason exists, subsection (c) permits consideration of a legal change when determining the reduction’s extent. Eligibility and the amount of any reduction remain separate determinations.

Rule 60(b) likewise cannot provide a new merits proceeding simply because § 2255(h) prevents one. The Barrier 8A Section explains the distinction between successive claims and genuine procedural challenges.

Coram nobis permits extraordinary review of a criminal judgment, commonly after the sentence has expired. Morgan requires fundamental error, no other available remedy, and sound reasons for failing to seek earlier relief. Circuit law controls additional limits. The Tenth Circuit explained that custody does not categorically prohibit the writ, while requiring diligence and enforcing restrictions against claims that could have been presented through another adequate remedy. United States v. Salgueido, No. 25-2088 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 2026).

The published filing tables show case activity but not how the preceding barriers affect adjudication, how often prisoners obtain relief, or how many claims lack a successive merits forum. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts recorded 3,218 cases commenced and, in a separate table, 3,492 cases terminated in the “Motions to Vacate Sentence” category during fiscal year 2025, ending September 30. The tables neither follow the same cases from filing to disposition nor identify grants, denials, evidentiary hearings, resentencing, or release. They measure activity, not a relief rate. Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Judicial Business 2025, tbls. C-2 & C-4.

In July 2024, the Justice Department transmitted draft legislation that would supply the missing authorization ground for qualifying statutory claims by adding § 2255(h)(3). It would permit successive motions based on a new, previously unavailable interpretation of a federal criminal statute. The Supreme Court would have to recognize the interpretation and make it retroactive. The interpretation would have to establish that the conduct of conviction was outside the statute, that the prison term exceeded the statutory maximum, or that it equaled a statutory minimum that should not have applied. That minimum category expressly excludes a term exceeding the minimum. The draft would allow filing within one year after enactment or within § 2255(f)’s periods. As of this writing, it remains a proposal; the operative statute contains no such third authorization ground.

In K.’s example, none of these alternatives authorizes adjudication of the later Rehaif claim. That absence of a forum does not determine whether his allegation is correct. The initial proceeding may be the prisoner’s only standard opportunity to assemble and present the available claims. Preparation therefore requires preserving the record and meeting each applicable procedural requirement, not merely identifying a possible legal error.

A Practical Guide to Federal Postconviction Procedure Under § 2255

Identifying the Correct Procedure and Grounds for Relief

For each claim, identify the challenged judgment or custody practice and the requested relief. A federal conviction-or-sentence challenge ordinarily belongs in a § 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court. A genuine sentence-execution claim ordinarily belongs under § 2241.

For an execution dispute, obtain the BOP’s calculations of sentence commencement, prior-custody credit, good-conduct time, or First Step Act credits, as relevant. Program Statement 1330.18, Administrative Remedy Program, sets out the BOP’s procedures for reviewing prisoners’ complaints about their confinement. Preserve copies of requests, appeals, and decisions from that process. The standard administrative process generally requires an attempt at informal resolution, a request to the warden on Form BP-9, and appeals to the Regional Director on Form BP-10 and General Counsel on Form BP-11. Some disputes follow different procedures. Discipline hearing officer appeals begin with the Regional Director. Consult 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13–.18 for the applicable filing requirements, exceptions, deadlines, and treatment of unanswered requests. Follow controlling exhaustion law and identify any claimed exception. Santiago-Lugo treats exhaustion as judge-made and nonjurisdictional in the Eleventh Circuit. Padilla typically requires the immediate custodian and confinement district for a core custody petition.

Do not treat an obstacle under § 2255 as authority to use a different remedy. Compare the substance of the claim and requested relief with the conditions of the proposed procedure, especially when considering § 2241, compassionate release, or coram nobis.

For a § 2255 claim, identify which category in subsection (a) authorizes it: (1) a constitutional or federal-law violation, (2) lack of jurisdiction, (3) a sentence exceeding the lawful maximum, or (4) another qualifying defect subject to collateral attack. Serious disagreement with a sentence does not itself constitute a cognizable error.

Prepare a separate account of each ground, its supporting facts, and its procedural history, as AO Form 243 requires. Analyze cognizability, waiver, timeliness, default, and prejudice separately.

Preserving the Plea, Sentencing, and Direct-Review Record

Read the plea agreement’s appeal and collateral-review waivers separately. Identify the agreement’s exceptions and any additional exception recognized by controlling circuit law, and explain how the alleged error fits. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N) requires the court, before accepting the plea, to inform the defendant of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or collaterally attack the sentence and determine that the defendant understands its terms. Identify inaccurate statements during the colloquy and preserve the agreement, judgment, transcripts, sentencing objections, and lawfully available statement of reasons. For a lost-offer claim, preserve the offer’s terms and expiration date, counsel’s communications, and evidence of the prisoner’s response.

Preserve proof of any instruction to appeal and counsel’s response, even when the agreement contains an appeal waiver. Counsel’s consultation and filing duties remain separate from the agreement’s restrictions on appellate issues. Promptly ask counsel for a copy of the filed notice and confirm its filing with the district clerk. Keep dated inquiries and responses. Those records can establish when reasonable diligence would have disclosed a failure to appeal.

Assess direct-review preservation without assuming adverse precedent will later establish cause. Bousley rejects futility alone. Massaro permits ineffective-assistance claims to begin under § 2255. For a defaulted claim, explain the basis for cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence under the Third Barrier Section’s rules.

Before filing a collateral motion during a direct appeal, check controlling circuit law on concurrent proceedings and calculate every applicable deadline. Do not assume the pending appeal authorizes simultaneous collateral adjudication.

Calculating the Filing Deadline and Assembling the Record

Calculate each claim’s one-year filing period from the latest applicable date under § 2255(f), whether that is finality, removal of an unlawful governmental impediment that prevented filing, initial Supreme Court recognition of a qualifying retroactive right, or the date supporting facts could have been discovered through due diligence. For subsection (f)(3), calendar the year from initial recognition, not a later retroactivity ruling. The Ninth Barrier Section explains the rules governing retroactivity on collateral review. Keep a dated log of diligence and any asserted basis for tolling as events occur. Identify an obstruction’s dates, duration, and effect on filing, and document efforts to prepare and submit the motion before, during, and after it. Retain requests for legal materials or records, responses, and available documentation of the obstruction.

Under Civil Rule 6(a), compute a period stated in days by excluding the triggering day and counting each subsequent day, including Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. For § 2255(f)’s one-year period, courts use the anniversary of the triggering date, ordinarily allowing until the same calendar date in the following year even when February 29 intervenes. United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000). If the calculated last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, continue to the next day that is none of them. For appellate and Supreme Court periods, use Appellate Rule 26(a) and Supreme Court Rule 30, respectively.

Use K.’s invented chronology as a calculation example, not as a substitute for the actual docket. His appellate judgment was entered September 1, 2015. With no rehearing or certiorari petition, the 90-day certiorari period expired November 30, 2015. The anniversary method placed his standard subsection (f)(1) deadline on November 30, 2016, despite the intervening leap day. His November 29 deposit was one day early. If direct review followed a different path, use the rehearing and certiorari rules explained in the Second Barrier Section. Do not substitute the mandate date or assume that requesting rehearing of a certiorari denial postpones finality.

A blank deadline worksheet should record [event], [source document], [event date], [governing rule], and [calculated deadline]. Neither a form nor a worksheet extends the time the governing law permits.

Obtain the records supporting each allegation and deadline. Send former counsel a dated written request identifying required file materials and retain the request and any response. Entitlement to particular materials depends on applicable law and professional rules. If necessary material remains unavailable, identify it and its relevance when requesting court assistance. For government-paid transcripts, identify the needed transcript, explain its relevance, and request in forma pauperis status and the judicial certification required by § 753(f). The Fifth Barrier Section explains those requirements. Before alleging ineffective assistance, identify the attorney-client communications the claim may place at issue and consider claim-specific protective relief under controlling law.

BOP policy generally prohibits prisoners serving their sentences from possessing copies of their presentence reports or statements of reasons. Request staff-supervised review of these documents in the central file. BOP, Program Statement No. 1351.05, Release of Information § 12(a)(2)(d)(1), (b) (Sept. 19, 2002), as amended Mar. 9, 2016. For court use, the optional BOP Form BP-A0757 may be attached to the pleading to request that the court obtain and consider the report or statement of reasons without requiring the prisoner to attach a copy of the document. Identify the relevant portions in the pleading.

Preparing and Filing the Motion: Recharacterization and Amendment

Use AO Form 243 or the prescribed local equivalent. Request the appropriate form from the sentencing court’s clerk, who must make forms available without charge under Rule 2(c) of the § 2255 Rules. Do not delay filing past the deadline while waiting for a form. State every available ground, its supporting facts, and the requested remedy. Sign under penalty of perjury. Continue preparing a timely motion while any request for more time is pending. Rule 2 of the § 2255 Rules requires separate motions for separate judgments. The national form requires no filing fee. Rule 3(a) specifies an original and two copies. Verify current local filing instructions.

Under Rule 3(b), the clerk must deliver or serve a copy of the filed motion and notice of its filing on the U.S. Attorney for that district. The prisoner need not arrange that initial service. Follow applicable rules and court orders for service of later papers.

For an omitted witness or investigation, include an available supporting sworn statement identifying the expected evidence. If a statement cannot be obtained before filing, explain the facts already known and the efforts to obtain it. A missing affidavit does not itself extend the deadline.

When a prison provides a legal-mail system, Rule 3(d) requires the prisoner to deposit the motion there. The rule permits proof of timely deposit through a § 1746 declaration or notarized statement identifying the deposit date and prepaid first-class postage. Keep the motion, declaration, postage evidence, and mailing records. A clerk’s later receipt is not a substitute for a properly established prison-deposit date.

For mailing proof, adapt a declaration to actual facts: “I declare under penalty of perjury that on [date] I deposited this motion in [institution]’s legal-mail system with first-class postage prepaid.” Date and sign it.

Read and respond to any notice proposing to recharacterize a filing as the first § 2255 motion. Consider the opportunity to withdraw or amend in light of the later successive-motion restrictions. Preserve any objection that the court omitted Castro’s required notice, warning, and opportunity to withdraw or amend.

Separate permission to amend under Civil Rule 15 from the added claim’s timeliness. For an otherwise untimely claim, identify the common core of operative facts shared with a timely claim. Challenging the same conviction is insufficient. A filing after denial or dismissal of the initial motion also requires determining whether successive-motion restrictions apply.

Requesting Discovery, Record Expansion, a Hearing, and Counsel

For discovery under Rule 6 of the § 2255 Rules, explain good cause, identify requested material, and state what it would prove about a pleaded claim. Rule 7 permits documentary expansion, including affidavits, subject to the opposing party’s opportunity to contest correctness. If former counsel furnishes an affidavit, identify each material disagreement, state the competing facts under penalty of perjury, and provide available supporting records or witness statements. Request authentication where needed.

For a hearing, identify material factual disputes the existing record does not conclusively resolve and explain how the facts, if established, would support relief. Apply § 2255(b)’s standard, which requires a hearing unless the motion, files, and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief.

Request counsel and establish financial eligibility. Identify the applicable basis, i.e., discretionary appointment under § 3006A(a)(2)(B) or mandatory appointment under Rules 6(a) or 8(c) or, when challenging a death sentence, § 3599. The Fifth Barrier Section explains the conditions for each.

Rule 8(b) sets 14 days after service for specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation. When the recommendation is served by mail under Civil Rule 5(b)(2)(C), service is complete on mailing, not receipt. First compute the 14-day period under Civil Rule 6(a), including any adjustment for its last day, then add three days under Rule 6(d). If the resulting last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, continue to the next day that is none of them. Rule 6(d) adds time for specified methods of service only when service starts the response period. Section 2255(f)’s filing period does not run from service, and the Rule 59(e) and ordinary notice-of-appeal periods run from entry of the judgment or order. Rule 6(d) therefore does not extend those periods. For filing objections from prison, follow the Rule 3(d) deposit and proof requirements described above. Check applicable local rules and court orders. Identify the disputed findings or legal conclusions and explain the errors. Inadequate objections can forfeit appellate review under controlling circuit law. The district judge must independently determine each properly objected-to portion.

Proving Prejudice and Requesting the Appropriate Remedy

Match the asserted violation to its own prejudice or harmless-error standard. An ineffective-assistance claim ordinarily requires proof of both deficient performance and prejudice. For an omitted appellate issue, identify the issue, explain why counsel should have presented it, and show how it could have changed the appeal’s result. Establishing counsel’s error alone does not establish entitlement to relief.

Specify the requested § 2255(b) remedy, viz., discharge, resentencing, a new trial, or sentence correction. Explain how that remedy would cure the alleged defect. Relief need not produce release or full resentencing. Before assuming vacatur will shorten custody, assess the remaining counts, their statutory ranges, and the authorized scope of resentencing. Resentencing can leave total imprisonment unchanged, and vacating a plea can permit reinstatement of dismissed charges under § 3296.

For a full resentencing, preserve records of rehabilitation, education, treatment, and work. Connect the evidence to the sentence requested and determine whether the authorized scope of resentencing permits its consideration. Rehabilitation does not guarantee a reduction.

Notices of Appeal and Postjudgment Deadlines

File the notice of appeal without waiting for a COA. Appellate Rule 4(a) ordinarily allows 60 days from entry of the appealable § 2255 judgment or order because the U.S. is a party. Rule 4(b) normally allows a defendant 14 days after entry to appeal a new criminal judgment. Identify the ruling challenged. Hadden’s treatment of remedy-choice appeals is circuit-specific.

Filing the initial § 2255 motion requires no fee. An appeal ordinarily requires payment to the district clerk of $605 in filing and docketing fees, increasing to $670 for notices of appeal filed on or after December 1, 2026. A prisoner unable to prepay may request in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and Appellate Rule 24. The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s mandatory installment-payment requirements do not apply to § 2255 appeals. File the notice of appeal on time even if payment or in forma pauperis status remains unresolved. Promptly comply with the court’s fee-related instructions. Failure to do so can result in dismissal. Appellate Rule 3(a)(2), (e).

Rule 24(a)(3) generally allows a prisoner to appeal without new in forma pauperis authorization if the prisoner received that status in the District Court or was found financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in the criminal case. Exceptions apply if the District Court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith, finds the prisoner otherwise ineligible, or a statute provides otherwise. An initial application under Rule 24(a)(1) must be filed in the District Court with an affidavit containing the financial information required by Appellate Form 4, identifying the proposed appellate issues, and asserting entitlement to relief. Obtain the current form when applying. A shorter Form 4 is scheduled to take effect on December 1, 2026.

If the District Court denies permission or rules that existing status does not continue, Rule 24(a)(5) typically allows 30 days after service of the clerk’s notice under Rule 24(a)(4) to request in forma pauperis status in the Court of Appeals. Include the District Court’s written reasons and the affidavit submitted there or the affidavit required by Rule 24(a)(1) if none was previously submitted. Calculate the period under Appellate Rule 26(a), including any additional time applicable under Rule 26(c).

Civil Rule 59(e) typically requires filing within 28 days after entry of the judgment in the § 2255 proceeding. A genuine Rule 60(b) procedural challenge of the kind described in the Barrier 8A Section must be filed within a reasonable time. The same limit applies to Rule 60(b)(4) motions asserting that a judgment is void. Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026). For grounds (1)–(3), which include mistake, newly discovered evidence, and an opposing party’s fraud, Rule 60(c)(1) ordinarily also imposes an outer limit of one year after entry of the challenged judgment or order, or the date of the proceeding. Filing within a year can still be unreasonably late.

Rule 60(b)(6) requires extraordinary circumstances and a basis for relief outside grounds (1)–(5). It provides no escape from the one-year limit when the asserted ground belongs under (1)–(3). In Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528 (2022), the Court treated a judge’s legal error as a “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1). Kemp had invoked Rule 60(b)(6) to challenge the dismissal of his § 2255 motion as untimely, but his reopening motion was itself untimely under the one-year limit.

Rule 6(b)(2) prohibits ordinary extensions of the Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) deadlines. Rule 87 permits a limited exception during a Judicial Conference-declared civil-rules emergency and by court order. A qualifying Rule 59 motion, or qualifying Rule 60 motion filed within the time allowed by Rule 59, makes the civil appeal period run from entry of the order disposing of the last qualifying motion under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4). A Rule 60(b) motion filed after the time allowed by Rule 59 may still satisfy its own time limits, but filing it does not reset the time to appeal the underlying judgment.

Keep the court informed of address changes and preserve envelopes and prison mail records showing when orders arrived. Delayed or missing notice of the judgment does not automatically postpone the appeal deadline. Civil Rule 77(d)(2).

For an appeal from the § 2255 decision, Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) permits a motion in the District Court for an extension based on excusable neglect or good cause. The motion may be filed before the standard appeal period expires or no later than 30 days afterward. Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits the extended deadline to the later of 30 days after the standard deadline or 14 days after entry of the order granting the extension. The court may allow less time. Filing the request does not itself extend the deadline.

When the prisoner did not receive notice under Civil Rule 77(d) within 21 days after entry of the judgment or order, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) permits reopening if no party would be prejudiced and the motion is timely. The motion must be filed in the District Court by the earlier of 180 days after entry or 14 days after receipt of that notice. Reopening provides 14 days from entry of the reopening order to appeal. If no notice of appeal has been filed, file one within that period. An otherwise adequate notice filed after the original deadline but before reopening need not be filed again. Parrish v. United States, 605 U.S. 376 (2025).

Independently check the statutory reopening deadline even when the court specifies a filing date. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because the prisoner filed after the statutory 14-day period, although within the 17 days the District Court mistakenly allowed.

For a direct appeal from a new criminal judgment, different rules apply. Rule 4(b)(4) permits an extension based on excusable neglect or good cause to no more than 30 days after the standard criminal-appeal deadline. Rule 4(b) contains no reopening provision comparable to Rule 4(a)(6).

Rule 4(c)(1) applies the prison-mailbox rule to either type of notice of appeal. Deposit the notice in the institution’s mail system by the deadline, using its designated legal-mail system if available. Include a signed, dated declaration under § 1746 stating the deposit date and that first-class postage is being prepaid, and retain the mailing records.

Certificates of Appealability and Supreme Court Review

Identify the constitutional right supporting the certificate request and frame the showing around reasonable debatability under Slack, Miller-El, and Buck. A procedural dismissal requires debatability of both the constitutional claim and the procedural ruling. A merits denial requires debatability of the constitutional assessment. Address every independently sufficient ground for denying the claim and request expansion under the circuit’s procedures if the certificate excludes an issue necessary to obtain relief. The certificate inquiry is not a full merits decision, and a certificate request does not extend the notice deadline.

After a circuit COA denial, check the circuit’s rules for any permitted reconsideration or rehearing and calendar the certiorari deadline under Supreme Court Rule 13. An unrepresented prisoner seeking to proceed in forma pauperis may file a single original certiorari petition and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Sup. Ct. R. 12.2. That exception reduces the copies filed with the Court. It does not excuse the required supporting papers or service. Sup. Ct. R. 12.3, 39.

Later Filings and Court of Appeals Authorization

Classify later filings by substance, judgment, and posture. Check whether the initial motion has been decided and on what grounds. An untimeliness or procedural-default disposition can count even without adjudication of the underlying claim, and a pending appeal by itself does not avoid successive-motion restrictions. Before withdrawing or refiling, examine the reasons for the proposed or completed disposition, the surrounding record, and controlling circuit law. Distinguish a genuine defect in the federal collateral proceeding from a new claim or challenge to a prior merits resolution.

Following § 2255 relief, examine the vacatur order and any amended criminal judgment before seeking authorization for another motion. Check controlling circuit law to determine whether the filing would be the first § 2255 challenge to a new judgment. In the Sixth Circuit, In re Augustin establishes that sentence correction following vacatur can create that new judgment even without full resentencing. The Barrier 8A Section explains the new-judgment rule, its circuit-specific application, and why a sentence reduction does not necessarily qualify.

Before filing a successive motion, obtain authorization from the appropriate Court of Appeals. Identify which § 2255(h) ground applies, i.e., qualifying newly discovered evidence or a previously unavailable new constitutional rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court. Authorization permits filing, not relief. For a new-rule application, check for any decision in Guerrero v. Johnson on the “previously unavailable” requirement. As of this writing, the matter is still pending. Calculate timeliness separately.

Filing Resources

Use the current § 2255 Rules and AO Form 243, the governing circuit’s authorization instructions, and the sentencing court’s local rules. The Tenth Circuit provides a dedicated successive-motion form. Do not assume it satisfies another circuit’s requirements. Importantly, treat CLN’s dated federal-habeas articles as research leads, not current legal authority.

This Cover Story addresses legal and procedural developments through September 30, 2026. Before taking any action, check subsequent decisions, the current statutory and rule texts, and the relevant court’s requirements.

Conclusion: What Finality Leaves Unresolved

Marcus DeAngelo Jones’ statutory claim was excluded from review, not rejected on its merits. The Supreme Court held that he could not use § 2241 to present the successive claim that § 2255(h) did not authorize.

Congress originally changed where federal prisoners could seek relief while preserving their substantive protection. Federal prisoners still avoid the state-prisoner exhaustion, deference, and evidentiary restrictions. However, they face their own accumulation of barriers and generally have no constitutional right to collateral counsel. Lack of legal training does not itself excuse a missed filing deadline. That is an extraordinary level of procedural competence to demand from prisoners litigating without counsel and with meager legal resources at their disposal.

The barriers have different legal effects. Some prevent adjudication; others govern what the prisoner must prove to obtain relief. K.’s initial proceeding illustrates the distinction. The court held a hearing on Claim A and denied it because he failed to establish the required plea prejudice. It enforced the waiver against Claim B without deciding the adequacy of counsel’s sentencing performance. The denial of a COA then prevented appellate merits adjudication. Treating these outcomes simply as unsuccessful motions obscures what the courts decided and what they left unresolved.

His later Rehaif claim encounters a further limit. On the facts given, it provides neither qualifying new evidence nor a new constitutional rule under § 2255(h). The inability to satisfy that statute does not authorize a different proceeding to decide the same claim. Nor does the absence of review prove K.’s innocence. Kafka provided our hypothetical prisoner’s name; Congress and the courts provided ample reason to use it.

Careful preparation can preserve an available claim and prevent an avoidable procedural loss. It cannot create an authorization ground Congress omitted. That is why the initial motion warrants close attention but also why the later absence of review cannot always be attributed to a prisoner’s failure to prepare. A statutory interpretation announced after the initial proceeding can present a question the successive-motion rules will not permit a court to answer.

Section 2255 remains capable of remedying unlawful detention where its demanding requirements are satisfied. Finality serves legitimate interests, but ending litigation does not establish that an unexamined claim is wrong. Congress should provide a route for qualifying later statutory claims, as the legislative proposal described above would do. It is hardly extravagant to ask a court whether the law criminalized the conduct for which a person remains imprisoned.

 

Sources: Docket, Maxwell v. Dinis, No. 25-5930 (U.S.) (last visited Sept. 17, 2026); U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2025 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl. 11 (2026); U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Manual § 9-16.330, Plea Agreements and Waivers of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (updated Jan. 2020); Sup. Ct. R. 13, 30 (2013); Sup. Ct. R. 30 (2026); Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., AO 243, Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (rev. Sept. 2017); Docket and Question Presented, Guerrero v. Johnson, No. 25-1003 (U.S.) (last visited Sept. 17, 2026); U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Legis. Affs., Jones v. Hendrix Bill Text §§ 2–3 (proposed legislation transmitted July 24, 2024); Letter from Carlos Felipe Uriarte, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Kamala D. Harris, President, U.S. Senate (July 24, 2024); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement No. 1330.18, Administrative Remedy Program (Jan. 6, 2014); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Form BP-A0757, Inmate Request for Certification or Judicial Notice of Presentence Report and/or Statement of Reasons (June 2010); Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Court Website Links (last visited Sept. 17, 2026); U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Tenth Cir., Motion for Authorization to File a Second or Successive Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a Prisoner in Federal Custody (rev. Dec. 2023); Dale Chappell, Federal Habeas Corpus: Filing Procedures, Crim. Legal News, May 2021; Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule item 1 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023); Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 10 (Mar. 10, 2026); U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Fourth Cir., Appellate Procedure Guide, Appeal Fees and Indigent Status (Mar. 2026); Franz Kafka, The Trial (Idris Parry trans., Penguin Modern Classics 2015) (1925).

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