by Phillip Wasserman, J.D.

The Court of Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District, held that the prosecution’s statements during closing arguments—that the police failed to search the defendant’s home in part because he was a famous Black man and that a search of his home would have opened up “a storm of controversy” in the aftermath of the George Floyd protests—constituted “racially discriminatory language” in violation of the Racial Justice Act (“RJA”) and vacated his conviction and sentence for forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and false imprisonment.

Background

Dana William Stubblefield, a former NFL player, was accused of raping Jane Doe, an intellectually disabled woman, at gunpoint when she visited his Morgan Hill home to interview for a babysitting position. The police decided not to search Stubblefield’s home for the alleged firearm during the course of the investigation.

Stubblefield was charged with, among other offenses, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and false imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the first two offenses.

The trial began in March 2020, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was paused until July 2020. The defense reminded the jury that no gun was introduced into evidence at trial, and in fact, no gun was found at his residence. To explain why no gun was ever located, during closing arguments, the prosecutor alleged that the police decided not to search Stubblefield’s home for the alleged gun due in part to the fact that he was a famous Black man. The prosecutor stated that a search would have opened up “a storm of controversy,” adding, “Can you imagine in Morgan Hill when they search an African-American–.” At that point, defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection but failed to admonish or instruct the jury with respect to the prosecutor’s statements. The prosecutor added, “They had reasons for not doing the search,” before moving on to another topic.

The jury found him guilty of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and false imprisonment, determining that he personally used a firearm during the first two offenses. On October 22, 2020, he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. He timely appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s closing racial statements violated the RJA by implicitly and explicitly appealing to racial bias.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by noting that the Legislature passed the RJA for the purpose of eliminating “racial bias from California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” Stats. 2020, ch. 317 § 2(i). Section 745 of the Penal Code was added by the RJA, with an effective date of January 1, 2021. Upon a finding of a violation of the RJA, “the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with” the RJA. § 745(e)(2)(A).

Section 745(a) provides four categories that, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, establish a violation of the RJA. § 745(a)(1)-(4). The Court stated that at issue in this case is the use of “racially discriminatory language” provision set forth in § 745(a)(2), which states that the RJA is violated if: “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings … an attorney in the case … used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” The term “racially discriminatory language” means “language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language … or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” § 745(h)(4).

The Court observed that § 745 was amended to apply retroactively to “all cases in which judgment is not final,” with an effective date of January 1, 2023. § 745(j)(1). The RJA was further amended to allow claims based on the trial record to be raised on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence, including claims based on cases with judgments entered prior to January 1, 2021. People v. Lashon, 98 Cal. App. 5th 804 (2024).

Turning to the present case, the Court analyzed the two prosecutorial statements concerning Stubblefield’s race against the elements of § 745(a)(2), which states that the RJA is violated if “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings … an attorney in the case … used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” 

The Court stated that the trial record clearly establishes several elements of § 745(a)(2). First, the prosecutor was undoubtedly “an attorney in the case,” and he made statements in closing arguments, which were “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings.”

Second, the prosecutor’s statements about the defendant’s race were not simply “giving a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect,” § 745(a)(2), nor did the prosecutor use the defendant’s race as “an incidental fact that might make it relevant under a racially neutral theory,” e.g., as evidence supporting a witness’ identification of a suspect. Instead, the statements were made to suggest a racially motivated reason the police did not search the defendant’s house, meaning that the defendant’s race may have affected the state of the evidence, the Court reasoned. It further reasoned that the “storm of controversy” statement “enabled a potent appeal to racial bias in the context of the prosecution’s statement as a whole.”

Finally, the prosecutor used the term “African-American” specifically to describe the defendant, thereby leaving no doubt that it referenced his race.

The Court concluded that the prosecution used “racially discriminatory language” regarding the defendant’s race in violation of § 745(a)(2), and it occurred during “the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings.” Thus, the Court held that the defendant’s conviction was sought or obtained in violation of § 745(a)(2).

The Court then addressed the required remedy. Having concluded that the defendant’s conviction “was sought or obtained in violation of” § 745(a), the Court stated that under the statute, it “shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with” § 745(a). § 745(e)(2)(A).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment, found the conviction was legally invalid, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct new proceedings consistent with § 745(a). See: People v. Stubblefield, 107 Cal. App. 5th 896 (2024).  

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