Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed both the trial court and Court of Appeals’ decisions that the State’s multiple violations of the defendant’s rights under the United States Constitution as well as the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not deprive the defendant of the right to a fair trial, holding that the “cumulative-error doctrine” applied because the State’s actions went beyond acceptable trial tactics and resulted in “legal chaos.” 

Background

In 2019, two agents with the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics staked out a home in Natchez, Mississippi, where they expected the delivery of a package suspected of containing marijuana and edibles by the United States Postal Service with suspected narcotics inside. A pickup truck drove past the residence without stopping and exited the cul-de-sac. The package was subsequently delivered to the residence. Later, the same truck returned, and the driver, Mario Hartwell, exited to retrieve the package. The agents called out to Hartwell and identified themselves. He immediately dropped the package and fled on foot but was apprehended by the agents. 

Afterwards, the agents approached the idling truck, in which Zachary Minor sat in the passenger seat. Both agents claimed at trial that before Minor was able to lock his phone, they gleaned evidence from it during his rapid apprehension. Agent Jerry Stewart testified that he noticed the package’s tracking number on Minor’s phone, stating that he was familiar enough with the tracking number to recognize the number on Minor’s phone, apparently at a glance. Agent Martez Simpson testified that he observed a message on Minor’s phone that read: “Let me credit a gram, bro, to Friday,” a copy of the text message was entered into evidence. The package was addressed with a single name: “Minor.” Forensic testing determined that the package contained marijuana and THC edibles.

Procedural History

On March 16, 2021, Minor and Hartwell were indicted jointly on four counts including: (1) conspiracy to possess marijuana, (2) conspiracy to traffic THC, (3) possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and (4) trafficking THC. Minor filed a motion to sever, which the trial court granted on June 28, 2021.

During Minor’s trial, the State committed at least four errors. First, in its opening statement, the State impermissibly commented on Minor’s decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, saying “So they go and they talk to Mr. Minor who is sitting in the truck, and he doesn’t want to talk to them which is his right, but they looked at his phone and guess what was on his phone. The tracking information for the package.”

Second, the State elicited inflammatory testimony regarding the effect of edibles on children without any evidentiary basis. Agent Stewart stated that edibles are marketed to children, and he has seen children go to the hospital for imbibing edibles that they thought were candy. The defense objected as to relevance and that the line of questioning was more prejudicial than probative. The trial court sustained the objection, but it did not issue a curing instruction to the jury. 

Third, during redirect of Stewart, the State elicited an out-of-court statement regarding what Hartwell allegedly said about Minor that the defense was not able to challenge through cross-examination, i.e., hearsay. Over an objection by the defense, the State asked Stewart how Hartwell tied Minor to the case, saying, “Tell me how the co-defendant ties him [Minor] to the case.” Stewart answered, “The co-defendant indicated this was not the first time that himself and Mr. Minor had did this in the same means and manner.” The defense objected again to the hearsay statement. In response, the State advised, “I’ll move on, Your Honor. Now, in addition, the co-defendant said this wasn’t the first time; is that correct?” Stewart answered, “Yes, sir.”

Fourth, in its closing argument, the State referred once more to the inadmissible hearsay and argued that Hartwell’s guilt was evidence of Minor’s guilt in clear violation of the severance. Specifically, the State told the jury: “Mario Hartwell is criminally liable for what Mr. Minor did and likewise Mr. Minor is criminally liable…. Isn’t it amazing that as soon as [Agent Stewart] started saying what Mario said he objected. If you guys want to know what are you objecting to you guys knowing about it. He doesn’t want to know what Mario said because what Mario said was, hey. We’ve done this several times. That’s what he said and you heard Agent Stewart say he said that.” The defense objected, and the court stated that the “objection will [be] noted.”

After the State rested, Minor moved for a mistrial based on the admission of Hartwell’s hearsay statement over Minor’s objection. The court denied the motion, concluding that the statement “would not result in substantial irreparable prejudice” to Minor’s case. He then moved for a directed verdict on all counts. The court granted the motion with respect to counts one and two, determining that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove its prima facie case for conspiracy. 

The jury found Minor guilty of counts three and four. The court sentenced him to 10 years in prison on count three and to 20 years’ imprisonment on count four with 10 years suspended, and the sentences were to run concurrently. Minor timely appealed. 

The Court of Appeals ruled that Minor waived the inadmissible hearsay issue because counsel did not contemporaneously object to the State’s elicited testimony; did not move for a mistrial until the State rested; did not argue against the hearsay on Confrontation Clause grounds until his motion for mistrial; and did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial. In addition to its waiver determination, the Court of Appeals ruled that the admission of the hearsay was harmless and no reversible error occurred.

Turning to Minor’s prosecutorial misconduct argument, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no reversible error with respect to the State’s commenting on Minor exercising his right to remain silent and the testimony about the effect of edibles on children because (1) he did not object to the State’s comment, (2) the comment did not require the trial court to object on its own motion, and (3) the trial court sustained the objection to the edibles testimony. 

The Court of Appeals ruled that there was no reversible error, nor was there cumulative error.

Minor timely filed a certiorari petition, which the Mississippi Supreme Court granted. On appeal, Minor raised each error and argued that the cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. 

Analysis

The Court addressed each of the four claimed errors, starting with the State’s comment on Minor exercising his right to remain silent. The Court stated that by doing so, the State violated his Fifth Amendment rights, noting that it is error for the prosecution to comment on either a defendant’s right to remain silent or the right not to testify. Emery v. State, 869 So.2d 405 (Miss. 2004); see generally Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 

Next, the Court discussed the State eliciting the alleged effects of edibles on children without an evidentiary basis for doing so and concluded that it violated Minor’s right not to have the jury unjustly prejudiced against him. Stewart v. State, 263 So. 2d 754 (Miss. 1972). Prosecutors must refrain from vilifying defendants. Harris v. State, 537 So.2d 1325 (Miss. 1989). Yet, vilification of Minor was the sole purpose of the edibles testimony by suggesting “to the jury that Minor was affirmatively endangering children,” according to the Court. See Franklin v. State, 136 So.3d 1021 (Miss. 2014). Thus, the Court concluded that “the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting the testimony.”

Then, the Court addressed the hearsay statement purportedly made by Hartwell. Minor did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Hartwell, so he was not afforded his Confrontation Clause rights. Willis v. State, 352 So.3d 602 (Miss. 2022). Crucially, Minor was denied the opportunity “to cross-examine the man whose hearsay statement declared that Minor had previously committed the same crime for which he was on trial,” the Court explained. See Smith v. State, 986 So.2d 290 (Miss. 2008) (the “truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely threatened when an accomplice’s confession is sought to be introduced against a criminal defendant without the benefit of cross-examination”) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986)). Because none of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule apply to Hartwell’s hearsay statement, the Court concluded that it was inadmissible hearsay under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence 803 and 804. 

Finally, the Court discussed the State’s closing argument in which it asserted that Minor was guilty because Hartwell was guilty and because Minor objected to the admission into evidence of Hartwell’s hearsay statement. Under state case law, the State “is not permitted to use tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial and reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury.” Hiter v. State, 660 So.2d 961 (Miss. 1995). Additionally, the Court noted: “[t]he law is well settled in this state that where two or more persons are jointly indicted for the same offense but are separately tried, a judgment of conviction against one of them is not competent evidence on the trial of the other because such plea of guilty or conviction is no evidence of the guilt of the party being tried.” Quoting Buckley v. State, 223 So.2d 524 (Miss. 1969) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the Court concluded that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument. 

Based on the four serious errors, the Court applied the “cumulative-error doctrine.” The Court acknowledged that there are “applicable procedural bars sufficient to deny Minor relief from any of the individual errors.” However, it explained that “a line must be drawn, a line to dispel the notion that endless errors can be rectified on procedural grounds.” 

The State’s behavior in this case crosses that line. The State violated Minor’s rights under the U.S. Constitution twice as well as the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and it committed prosecutorial misconduct twice, according to the Court. Although none of these errors standing alone may constitute reversible error, these multiple errors “are precisely what the cumulative-error doctrine was crafted to remedy,” the Court stated. Ambrose v. State, 254 So.3d 77 (Miss. 2007) (“Under the cumulative-error doctrine, even if any specific error is insufficient for reversal, we may reverse if the cumulative effect of all the errors deprived the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.”). 

Conclusion

The Court stated that it “cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury’s verdict would remain guilty had the errors not occurred.” See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). While Minor’s own procedural errors “render the individual errors not reversible, his failures do not preclude application of the cumulative-error doctrine,” the Court concluded. Thus, the Court held that the cumulative-error doctrine applies in this case “to restore Minor’s right to a fair trial.” 

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for a new trial. See: Minor v. State, 2025 Miss. LEXIS 54 (2025) (en banc).  

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