by David M. Reutter

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that a deferred disposition or adjudication is not a “sentence” within the meaning of an authorized appeal by the State under Tex. Crim. Code Proc. art. 44.01(b). The Court resolved a statewide split among the state’s Courts of Appeals.

Anthony Luke Cuarenta was ticketed for driving 82-mph in a 60-mph zone. The offense is a Class C misdemeanor punishable by fine only. Cuarenta pleaded no contest and was found guilty by the Justice Court for Precinct 1 of Brazos County, which assessed a fine and fees. After filing a de novo appeal in the County Court of Law Number 2 and pleading not guilty, the County Court found Cuarenta guilty, suspended his sentence, deferred the disposition, and placed him on probation for 180 days.

Pursuant to Article 44.01(b), the State timely appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals. The State argued that under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 45A.301(2)(A), the suspended sentence and deferred disposition constituted an illegal sentence because Cuarenta held a commercial driver’s license, which made him ineligible for community supervision. The Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts resulted in the appeal being transferred to the Seventh Court of Appeals.

The Seventh Court of Appeals questioned its jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The State pointed to the Tenth Court of Appeals’ holding in State v. Hollis, 327 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. App. 2010), which exercised jurisdiction over an order granting deferred disposition. The Seventh Court of Appeals previously criticized Hollis as “incorrectly decided.” In re State, 489 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. App. 2016) (the “State does not have the right to appeal an order of deferred adjudication; therefore, the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction”). The Seventh Court of Appeals further noted a split among the Courts of Appeals across the state on the issue.

Nevertheless, while the Seventh Court of Appeals maintained its stance on the issue, it was bound under Tex. R. App. P. 41.3 to follow the precedent of the transferor court, i.e., the Tenth Court of Appeals. The Seventh Court of Appeals, therefore, exercised jurisdiction, conducted a merits review, and reversed and remanded after finding Cuarenta was ineligible for a suspended sentence and deferred disposition. Cuarenta was granted discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Court noted that the issue for review presented a pure legal issue of statutory interpretation, i.e., “whether Article 44.01(b) provides for an order of deferred disposition to be appealable.” When interpreting a statute, courts first look to the statute’s plain language because the presumption is that “the Legislature intended for every word to have a purpose,” according to the Court. State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Words and phrases are read “according to the rules of grammar and usage.” Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). If the plain language of the statute leads to absurd results or if it is ambiguous, courts “consult extra-textual factors to discern the Legislature’s intent.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

Article 44.01(b) reads: “The state is entitled to appeal a sentence in a case on the ground that the sentence is illegal.” The Court stated that the statute is clear that the State may appeal an “allegedly illegal sentence, not an illegal judgment or illegal punishment.” It explained that the State is essentially arguing that the definition of “sentence” should be broadened to include “deferred disposition” and thereby “reject the plain text of Article 42.02.” The Court refused to do so.

It observed that under Article 42.02, a “sentence” is “that part of the judgment, or order revoking a suspension of the imposition of a sentence, that orders that the punishment be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law.” A deferred disposition does neither of the foregoing things, so it is not a sentence, the Court reasoned. A “judgment” is the written declaration of the sentencing court that shows the conviction or acquittal of the defendant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.01 Sec. 1. The Court explained that with a deferred disposition, “there is no judgment because there is no declaration of a conviction or acquittal. Without a judgment, there can be no sentence.” Thus, the Court stated that there is no need to look beyond the statute in question because it does not create any ambiguity nor lead to absurd results.

The State argued that “sentence” for purposes of Article 44.01(b) should be expanded to include any erroneous trial court ruling that leads to an illegal punishment, but the Court flatly rejected the State’s invitation to expand the interpretation of “sentence.”

The State agreed that “the logical order of proceedings requires an adjudication of guilt before a sentence can be imposed, so delaying the adjudication of guilt necessarily means no sentence is imposed under 44.01(b).” Thus, because a deferred disposition is not a “sentence” under Article 44.01(b), the Court held that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over the State’s appeal.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. See: State v. Cuarenta, 2025 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 34 (2025). 

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