by David Kim

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a taking of property does not qualify as robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), unless force or threatened force is employed before or during the taking itself. The Court ruled that because the defendant used deadly force only after his co-conspirator had already surreptitiously stolen marijuana and carried it away from the scene, the Government failed to establish a substantive Hobbs Act robbery. Consequently, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for interfering with commerce by robbery and vacated his conviction for using a firearm during a crime of violence, which was predicated on the robbery charge.

Background

In December 2020, Jy’Quale Grable and two associates, Elijah Bell and Aquavius Smith, agreed to steal marijuana from Bryer Bowling, whom Grable knew. The three men referred to this planned theft as a “buck” or “lick.” Beyond taking the marijuana, they developed no further plan, and Bell was unaware that Grable carried a firearm.

On the day of the incident, Bell drove Grable and Smith to Bowling’s apartment complex. Grable and Smith went upstairs while Bell remained in the vehicle. Bowling admitted them and led them to the balcony where the marijuana sat on a table. They were joined by Maverick Manuel, who was staying with Bowling. Smith requested a scale, and when Bowling went inside to retrieve one, Smith took the marijuana and departed. Smith later testified that once he had seized the marijuana and left, he had accomplished his objective.

Grable, unaware that Smith had left, remained in the apartment. When Bowling returned to the balcony and discovered the theft, he told Grable that he could not leave until Smith returned with the marijuana. Both Bowling and Manuel threatened Grable with harm if Smith failed to return. Realizing he was cornered, Grable drew his firearm and fatally shot both men – several minutes after Smith had departed with the marijuana.

A grand jury charged Grable with conspiracy to commit robbery under § 1951(a) and (b) (“Count 1”), substantive Hobbs Act robbery under §§ 1951(a) and (b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (“Count 2”), and using a firearm during a crime of violence resulting in murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), 924(j)(1) (“Count 3”). At trial, Grable moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the Government failed to prove force was used to accomplish the taking because Smith had completed the theft before any force occurred. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the motion, and the jury convicted Grable on all counts. He timely appealed.

Analysis

The Court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, examining all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Government. It also reviewed the District Court’s statutory interpretation de novo.

The Court noted that the Hobbs Act prohibits robbery affecting commerce and defines “robbery” as “the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property.” § 1951(b)(1). The Court explained that the critical phrase is “by means of,” which, as the Supreme Court has instructed, “typically indicates that the given result (the ‘end’) is achieved, at least in part, through the specified action, instrument, or method (the ‘means’), such that the connection between the two is something more than oblique, indirect, and incidental.” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014). Consequently, for a taking to constitute Hobbs Act robbery, the theft must have been achieved, at least partially, through actual or threatened force, according to the Court.

Application to Present Case

The Court stated that because Grable employed force against Bowling and Manuel only after Smith had surreptitiously taken the marijuana and departed, the theft was not achieved through force. The Court concluded that Grable’s subsequent shooting of the victims did not transform the earlier theft into a Hobbs Act robbery.

The Government argued that the theft remained incomplete at the time of the shooting because Grable himself had not yet obtained physical possession of the stolen marijuana. The Court rejected this contention, noting the absence of supporting authority and observing that under common-law principles, larceny is complete when the property owner is deprived of possession. The Court cited established precedent holding that “the felonious taking and carrying away of property … constitutes the common law offense of larceny.” Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1938).

Common-Law Understanding
at Enactment

The Court stated that its interpretation aligned with the well-settled meaning of robbery when Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in 1946. Invoking the principle that “Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses,” Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (2013), the Court examined historical sources. At common law, “robbery meant larceny plus force, violence, or putting in fear,” Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and the crime was complete once the perpetrator gained possession through force or intimidation. Importantly, force employed solely afterward – whether to retain property, carry it away, or facilitate escape – did not convert larceny into robbery under traditional doctrine. See: Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 20.3(e) (3d ed. 2018); Model Penal Code § 222.1, Part II Commentaries, cmt. 2(b) (A.L.I. 1980).

The Court noted that in 1946, Black’s Law Dictionary defined robbery as the “[f]elonious taking of personal property … accomplished by means of force or fear,” explaining that without prior or contemporaneous violence or threats, the conduct would constitute mere theft rather than robbery. The Court observed that this understanding was reiterated in Norris v. United States, 152 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1946), decided the same year the Hobbs Act was enacted, which stated that the “violence or putting in fear must be at the time of the act or immediately preceding it.”

Rejection of the Modern View

The Court acknowledged that many jurisdictions have since adopted a broader conception of robbery that encompasses force used before, during, or after the taking. The Model Penal Code, enacted in 1962, reflects this modern approach by including force occurring “in flight after the attempt or commission” of theft. However, the Court determined that this expanded view was not prevalent when Congress passed the Hobbs Act. The Model Penal Code commentary itself recognizes that “[p]rior law was in general narrower than the Model Code on this point and did not include force during flight within the offense of robbery.”

The Court found persuasive the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998), which granted a judgment of acquittal on a § 1951(a) conviction because force used during an escape attempt was insufficient to establish robbery, reasoning that injuries caused by a getaway vehicle did not support a finding that property was taken “by means of force.”

Government’s Additional Arguments

The Government attempted to analogize Hobbs Act robbery to bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), arguing that because bank robbery “continues throughout the escape for purposes of characterizing the involvement of additional parties who knowingly and willfully join only during the escape phase,” Grable’s shooting to facilitate escape should qualify as part of a robbery. The Court found this analogy unpersuasive, agreeing with the Tenth Circuit that force used only during escape does not satisfy the Hobbs Act’s requirements.

The Government also cited United States v. Garcia-Caraveo, 586 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2009), for the proposition that the modern view is not necessarily inconsistent with common-law theory. The Court distinguished that case, noting it did not involve Hobbs Act robbery and that the Tenth Circuit had expressly recognized common-law robbery required force before or during the taking itself.

Conclusion

Thus, the Court reversed Grable’s conviction on Count 2 and vacated his conviction on Count 3, which depended upon the robbery as its predicate offense. It noted that the aiding-and-abetting theory could not sustain Count 3 because the Government failed to prove anyone committed the underlying substantive offense. The conviction and 20-year sentence on Count 1 for Hobbs Act conspiracy remained undisturbed.

Accordingly, the Court remanded for entry of a corrected judgment. See: United States v. Grable, 162 F.4th 1321 (11th Cir. 2026). 

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