by David Kim

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated a cocaine-importation conspiracy conviction, holding that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York erred in excluding undisputed evidence that the defendant’s coworker had twice previously provided information to the Colombian National Police (“CNP”) leading to successful drug seizures. The Court determined that this evidence was relevant because it tended to corroborate the defendant’s testimony about critical conversations with his coworker that bore directly on the defendant’s state of mind. Additionally, the Court concluded that the evidence did not constitute impermissible propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because its relevance stemmed from its corroborative function rather than any inference about the coworker’s character. Because intent was the central disputed issue at trial and the Government’s case on that element was not overwhelming, the Court ruled that the error was not harmless.

Background

Jey James Roldan Cardenas (“Roldan”), a patrol-level police officer in Colombia, was convicted following a jury trial in the District Court of conspiracy to import cocaine into the U.S. in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 960(b)(1)(B). The District Court sentenced him principally to 165 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.

Roldan did not dispute that he participated in communications with Isidro Vargas, a paid confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) posing as an international drug trafficker, about exporting cocaine to the U.S. However, his defense was that he lacked criminal intent because he believed he was assisting his CNP coworker, Jose Alfredo Aguas Oviedo (“Aguas”), in setting up a drug seizure by the CNP’s anti-narcotics unit rather than joining a drug-trafficking conspiracy.

At trial, Roldan testified that in April 2021, while working alongside Aguas, he noticed that Aguas appeared more affluent than other patrol officers. When Roldan inquired, Aguas explained that he worked at the anti-narcotics base and described a scheme whereby he provided drug information from civilian sources to his superiors, who coordinated with DEA agents to execute seizures, after which informants received reward money and shared a percentage with Aguas.

Aguas subsequently recruited Roldan to pose as Aguas’s boss, a CNP major, during meetings with Vargas, who had insisted on meeting a higher-ranking official before proceeding with a purported drug deal. Roldan testified that Aguas represented the scheme as an effort to lure Vargas into placing drugs in a warehouse controlled by CNP, where they would be seized. Roldan attended meetings in May and June 2021, during which he impersonated a major and discussed logistics for moving cocaine through the Cartagena airport. He received no portion of the $6,000 that Vargas provided at one meeting, instead passing the money to Aguas.

Before trial, both parties disputed the admissibility of statements from CNP Major Victor Alfonso Torres Valero, whose expected testimony was read to the jury by stipulation because he was unavailable. Two statements were contested. First, the defense sought to introduce Torres’ statement that Aguas had informed Torres about a civilian informant with information regarding a plane departing Cartagena with narcotics. The District Court admitted this evidence as relevant to Aguas’s state of mind, which in turn bore on Roldan’s state of mind.

Second, the defense sought to introduce Torres’ statement that Aguas had twice previously provided information to Torres’ subordinates leading to successful cocaine seizures. The District Court excluded this statement, adopting the Government’s argument that it constituted impermissible propensity evidence under Rule 404(b).

Analysis

The Court reviewed the District Court’s evidentiary rulings deferentially, explaining that a District Court exceeds its discretion when its ruling rests on “an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or if its decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Barret, 848 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2017). The Court noted that even erroneous evidentiary rulings remain subject to harmless-error analysis. United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2009).

Relevance Under Rule 401

The Court explained that evidence satisfies Rule 401 if it possesses any tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Roldan’s defense depended almost entirely on the jury crediting his testimony that Aguas told him the operation’s purpose was to arrange a law-enforcement seizure. According to the Court, the excluded evidence – that Aguas had in fact twice provided information leading to successful seizures – tended to corroborate Roldan’s testimony about Aguas’ representations concerning his past practices.

To illustrate this corroborative function, the Court relied on United States v. Detrich, 865 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1988). In that case, a defendant found with narcotics concealed in a wedding suit claimed he believed he was innocently delivering the suit for an acquaintance’s relative who was getting married. The Detrich Court had held admissible a statement from that relative confirming marriage plans because it corroborated the defendant’s account of his conversation with the acquaintance. Importantly, the Detrich Court specified that the statement was admissible “without regard to the truth” of whether the relative actually planned to marry because what mattered was whether the defendant believed it.

Applying this framework, the Court determined that the excluded evidence in the present case served an even stronger corroborative function because there was no dispute that Aguas had actually facilitated two prior seizures. The evidence therefore made it more probable that Aguas described such activities to Roldan, which in turn supported Roldan’s claimed belief that he was assisting a seizure operation rather than a trafficking conspiracy.

Rule 404(b) Analysis

Turning to the Government’s argument that the evidence violated Rule 404(b)’s prohibition on propensity evidence, the Court disagreed. Rule 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts “is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show” conforming conduct on a particular occasion. However, such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, including proving intent, motive, plan, or knowledge under Rule 404(b)(2).

The Government contended that evidence of Aguas’ prior involvement in successful seizures would invite the jury to infer that Aguas acted consistently with that prior good conduct in this case. Rejecting this characterization, the Court stated that the theory of relevance did not rest on any inference about Aguas’ actual intent or plan. Rather, the evidence was relevant to corroborate Roldan’s testimony about a conversation he had with Aguas, testimony bearing directly on Roldan’s own state of mind. The Court stated that this corroborative function “is not a propensity-based inference, and Rule 404(b) does not bar the evidence.”

The Court declined the Government’s request to affirm the exclusion under Rule 403. The District Court did not conduct any Rule 403 balancing, and the Government’s pretrial motion seeking exclusion of this portion of the Torres statement relied solely on Rule 404(b). Because Rule 403 rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, the Court would not affirm on an alternative ground the Government did not raise below and the District Court did not address, particularly where there was no discretionary balancing for the Court to review. United States v. Figueroa, 548 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008).

Harmless-Error Analysis

The Court then assessed whether the erroneous exclusion was harmless. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), errors not affecting substantial rights must be disregarded. The Court explained that it would uphold a conviction notwithstanding an evidentiary error only if it is “highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict.” United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003). Relevant factors include the importance of the excluded evidence to the defense, whether the evidence was cumulative, and the overall strength of the Government’s case – with the Court characterizing the Government’s case strength as “the most critical factor.” United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2009). The Government bears the burden of proving harmlessness. United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536 (2d Cir. 2022).

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the Government failed to carry its burden. The Court first observed that, to prove Roldan guilty of the charged conspiracy, “the government must demonstrate that [he] possessed the specific intent to commit the offenses that were its objects.” United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014). Thus, if the jury concluded that Roldan truly believed he was participating in a scheme to identify and seize narcotics – rather than to distribute or export them to the U.S. – he would lack the criminal intent required for conviction, even if he was acting improperly, unethically, or illegally in some other respect, the Court explained. Against that backdrop, the excluded evidence was central to the defense because the main dispute at trial was whether Roldan intended to join a trafficking conspiracy or instead believed he was assisting a seizure. The Court determined that evidence that Aguas had actually provided information leading to successful seizures bore directly on the jury’s assessment of Roldan’s credibility and state of mind.

Second, the Government’s case on intent was not overwhelming, according to the Court. Roldan’s conduct, including his emphasis during meetings on depositing drugs in a warehouse, was arguably consistent with an intent to facilitate a seizure. Additionally, the Government offered no evidence that Roldan, a low-level patrol officer assigned to rural areas, possessed any experience at the Cartagena airport, connections there, or capability to move massive quantities of cocaine through that facility undetected.

Third, the evidence was not merely cumulative, the Court noted. Although the jury heard that Aguas approached Torres with information about a potential drug shipment, that same evidence established that the DEA declined to work with Aguas and instructed him against independent action. This evidence therefore reinforced the Government’s narrative that Aguas lacked authorization for any undercover operation, implicitly undermining Roldan’s testimony that Aguas represented he was acting with his unit’s blessing.

The excluded evidence served a distinct function: it would have enabled the jury to conclude that Roldan did not believe he was participating in an approved undercover operation but nonetheless believed he was helping arrange a CNP seizure to share in reward money. The Court observed that the Government had “capitalized on the evidentiary gap” by emphasizing in closing argument that neither Roldan nor Aguas had authorization for undercover work, an assertion that was accurate but “materially incomplete” because it obscured this alternative defense theory.

Conclusion

Because intent was the central disputed issue, and because the excluded evidence bore directly on Roldan’s credibility regarding his understanding of the operation, the Court ruled that a substantial possibility existed that the evidence would have changed the jury’s assessment. Under these circumstances, the Court could not conclude it was highly probable that the error did not affect the verdict.

Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. See: United States v. Cardenas, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 4747 (2d Cir. 2026).  

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login