by David M. Reutter

In a unanimous decision resolving a certified conflict between the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f) does not permit a defendant to withdraw a plea on the basis of good cause during resentencing proceedings that follow the vacation of a sentence on direct appeal. The Court approved the Fourth District’s decision in Saffold v. State, 374 So. 3d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023), and disapproved the Second District’s contrary ruling in Scott v. State, 331 So. 3d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). Central to the Court’s reasoning was its clarification that Florida’s plea-withdrawal rules operate within a structured framework in which the permissible grounds for withdrawal progressively narrow as a case advances, reflecting finality interests embedded in the rules themselves. The Court further held that while de novo resentencing allows the parties to present new evidence and arguments regarding punishment, the conviction underlying the vacated sentence remains fully intact, and the resentencing process cannot serve as an indirect vehicle for attacking that final conviction.

Background

Jeromee Saffold picked up a young woman and, rather than driving her home as offered, took her to a parking lot where, while armed and threatening violence, he forced her to engage in multiple sexual acts. He subsequently drove her against her will to an apartment complex, where he demanded further sexual acts and struck her in the head with a firearm. The victim eventually escaped and alerted law enforcement, who arrested Saffold at the scene. The State charged him with five counts of armed sexual battery, one count of kidnapping with intent to facilitate a felony, and one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.

Saffold pleaded no contest to all seven counts. At sentencing, he requested a 25-year term, which constituted a downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence of approximately 51 years. The trial court declined to depart, citing the nature of the offenses, and imposed six life sentences (each carrying a 25-year minimum mandatory) plus one 15-year term of imprisonment.

On direct appeal, the Fourth District identified several sentencing errors and remanded for correction of the scoresheet, removal of certain designations and mandatory minimums, reconsideration of the departure request, and resentencing on two of the five armed sexual battery counts. Saffold v. State (“Saffold I”), 310 So. 3d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). Saffold did not appeal his underlying convictions, and those judgments became final.

On remand, Saffold moved to withdraw his pleas to all seven counts, invoking the good-cause standard of Rule 3.170(f), which provides that “[t]he court … shall on good cause, at any time before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty or no contest to be withdrawn.” The trial court denied the motion and reimposed the same overall prison terms with modified structure.

Saffold again appealed, but the Fourth District affirmed, disagreeing with the Second District’s contrary position in Scott. In Scott, the Second District had concluded that the word “a” before “sentence” in Rule 3.170(f) was indefinite, encompassing any sentencing proceeding – whether initial or subsequent – and that the good-cause standard therefore applied at resentencing. Scott. The Fourth District found the article “a” ambiguous, observing that the drafters could have chosen “any” but did not, and held that the rule applies only before the original sentence. The Fourth District certified conflict with Scott, and the Supreme Court accepted review.

Analysis

The Court began by discussing the escalating standards that govern plea withdrawal at each successive stage of a criminal case, a framework whose structure the Court identified as critical to the proper interpretation of Rule 3.170(f). Before formal acceptance of a plea, a defendant may withdraw it for any reason. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g). Once the court accepts the plea but before sentence is imposed, withdrawal requires a showing of “good cause.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(f). After the sentence is rendered, the standard becomes substantially more demanding. Withdrawal is limited to five enumerated grounds set forth in Rule 9.140 of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, a threshold the Court has described using the terms “manifest injustice” or “prejudice.” Campbell v. State, 125 So. 3d 733 (Fla. 2013); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(l). On collateral review, the only remaining basis for challenging a plea is involuntariness. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(5).

The Court stated that this progression demonstrates that finality interests are structurally embedded in the rules, including Rule 3.170(f). Early in the proceedings, defendants enjoy the greatest latitude to withdraw a plea, which is consistent with a preference for resolution on the merits, but those grounds contract as the case moves forward and the system’s investment in the outcome deepens. Notably, at the post-conviction stage, only a single narrow ground for withdrawal survives.

The Court stressed that finality is not merely incidental to the plea-withdrawal framework but is foundational to the criminal justice system as a whole. The Court cited several authorities for this proposition, including the United States Supreme Court’s observation that “[w]ithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect,” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and that “[f]inality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law,” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998). The Court further noted that the Florida Constitution independently guarantees crime victims a “prompt and final conclusion of the case and any related postjudgment proceedings.” Art. I, § 16(b)(10), Fla. Const.

Against this backdrop, the Court rejected Saffold’s textual argument that the indefinite article “a” before “sentence” in Rule 3.170(f) encompasses resentencing proceedings. Although the Court acknowledged that the text does not explicitly limit the rule to the original sentence, it characterized this reading as “hyper-technical” and “at odds with the principles of law against which rule 3.170 was adopted.” Granting Saffold the remedy he sought would require inferring “an independent rules-based exception to longstanding principles of finality, scope of remand, and conviction validity,” an inference the Court declined to draw.

De Novo Resentencing
Does Not Extend to the
Underlying Conviction

The Court next addressed Saffold’s reliance on precedent establishing that resentencing is a de novo proceeding. The Court acknowledged this principle, noting that it had recognized a sentence vacatur as “nulli[fying]” the prior sentence and “wip[ing] the slate clean” as to punishment. State v. Okafor, 306 So. 3d 930 (Fla. 2020). Consequently, both parties may introduce new evidence and arguments regarding the proper sentence, and the resentencing judge is not bound by the prior judge’s findings or rationale. State v. Fleming, 61 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2011); Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1992).

Importantly, however, these de novo principles operate exclusively within the domain of sentencing and have no bearing on the validity of the underlying convictions, according to the Court. It stressed this distinction, citing Okafor, where it had noted that the slate-wiping concept applies to the sentence “though not [the] murder conviction.” Okafor. Any post-appeal alteration of the conviction itself would exceed the scope of a remand instruction limited to resentencing. Mosley v. State, 397 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 2024). Accordingly, the Court concluded that the de novo resentencing cases Saffold invoked did not support using the resentencing process as an indirect means of attacking final convictions.

Policy Concerns and
Construction Principles

The Court reinforced its holding by referencing Rule 3.020, which directs that all rules of criminal procedure be construed “to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration.” Saffold’s interpretation would accomplish neither objective and would instead produce several problematic outcomes, according to the Court.

First, defendants who obtained sentence vacatur years after their pleas could effectively get two opportunities to seek withdrawal, once before the original sentence and again before resentencing, relying on the same or new grounds without procedural bars. Alternatively, a defendant could raise a plea-withdrawal motion for the first time years later under the more lenient good-cause standard. Second, regardless of the ground offered, accepting Saffold’s position would result in the vacatur of convictions that had already been affirmed on appeal, forcing the State to retry cases long after the fact, at a time when “memories have faded, potential witnesses have died or otherwise become unavailable, and physical evidence has been lost.” Campbell.

The Court also identified an anomaly inherent in Saffold’s reading. Plea-based convictions that became final after an appeal would be less durable than convictions obtained at trial, since trial-based convictions remain intact despite sentence-related reversals. See Love v. State, 559 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1990). The Court could identify no principled basis for that disparity and observed that such a result would be inconsistent with “fairness” in administering the rules. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.020. Further, the Court noted that Saffold’s construction creates tension with Rule 3.170(b), which contemplates multi-case, multi-jurisdictional plea agreements, raising the prospect that withdrawal of a single plea could unravel an entire negotiated package.

While acknowledging that some courts in other jurisdictions have adopted positions comparable to Saffold’s, the Court declined to follow them, distinguishing Florida’s plea-withdrawal rules and its emphasis on finality.

Conclusion

The Court rejected Saffold’s interpretation of Rule 3.170(f), holding that the good-cause plea-withdrawal standard does not apply at post-appeal resentencing. In so doing, the Court approved the Fourth District’s decision and disapproved the Second District’s decision in Scott to the extent it is inconsistent with the opinion. See: Saffold v. State, 2026 Fla. LEXIS 467 (2026).  

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