The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the Appellate Court’s denial of the defendant’s suppression motion, holding that contraband discovered by police inside a kitchen cabinet that was slightly ajar but secured with a chain and padlock should have been suppressed because police used a flashlight to peer into the slight opening after the reason authorizing their warrantless intrusion into the home was resolved.

Background

Casey Robert Hagestedt was living at his cousin’s house in October 2017 when Village of Roselle police officer Robert Liebich was dispatched to the home to assist the fire department, which had responded to a reported gas leak. Liebich entered the home and proceeded to the source of the gas leak—the kitchen. He examined the stove to ensure the gas was properly shut off because the smell of gas was still present. 

As he turned to exit the kitchen, he observed an upper cabinet across from the stove that was secured with a chain and padlock. Without touching the cabinet, Liebich observed that the cabinet was slightly ajar with a one-inch gap. He utilized his flashlight and repositioned himself at an angle in order to see inside the cabinet. He saw a green leafy substance, which he believed to be cannabis, as well as several syringes. 

Another officer, Kyle Stanish, responded to the gas leak after Liebich. Stanish was informed by the fire department that Hagestedt was inside the home and refused to leave to be evaluated by the paramedics. Stanish proceeded to check on Hagestedt in the bedroom. During their interaction, Liebich called out from the kitchen for Stanish to join him. Stanish testified that he arrived in the kitchen and observed a chained and padlocked cabinet, but one of the doors was ajar about an inch. He specifically stated that he could not see inside the cabinet from his viewing angle. Stanish proceeded to pull on the doors, which opened the cabinet another inch, straining the chain around the handles. After opening the cabinet wider, Stanish was able to see a plastic container with what he believed contained cannabis.

Stanish proceeded back to the bedroom and asked Hagestedt about the contents of the cabinet; Hagestedt denied any knowledge of the contents of the cabinet. Stanish escorted him out of the home. After the gas leak was resolved, Stanish reentered the home on his own, at which time he claimed to have detected a strong odor of cannabis. Stanish returned outside and discussed the need to obtain a search warrant with his superiors. A warrant was subsequently obtained based on the observations of both Stanish and Liebich, which was executed several hours later. The items in the cabinet were seized pursuant to the warrant.

Procedural History

The defense moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence seized from the cabinet, arguing that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not apply based on these facts. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the officers entered the home to aid the fire department in an emergency, and Liebich lawfully observed the contents of the cabinet while providing aid under the plain view doctrine. The trial court found the use of a flashlight by Liebich fell within the plain view doctrine, but the court found that Stanish’s physical opening of the cabinet another inch constituted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the violation was harmless because Liebich had already made his observations. 

During a stipulated bench trial on a charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, evidence presented included the observations and conduct of both officers, Hagestedt’s admission that he had access to the cabinet, was aware of its contents, and owned the seized bags. He was found guilty and sentenced to 180 days in jail and 30 months’ probation. 

On appeal to the Appellate Court, Second District, Hagestedt challenged the denial of his motion to suppress and his resulting conviction. He argued that Liebich’s physical actions to view the cabinet’s contents exceeded the scope of the community caretaking exception, and his actions fell outside the plain view doctrine. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that precedent of the United States Supreme Court holds that the use of artificial illumination to view objects does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and Liebich’s physical repositioning of himself to view inside the cabinet did not make his search unlawful. Notably, a dissenting opinion argued that the use of a flashlight to peer inside a clearly locked and imperfectly closed cabinet was indeed a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Analysis

The Court noted that ordinarily it applies a two-part standard of review when reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion. People v. McCavitt, 185 N.E.3d 1192 (Ill. 2021). Under that standard, deference is given to factual findings of the trial court and will reverse if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Luedemann, 857 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. 2006). However, because both parties stipulated to the underlying facts, the Court stated that only question at issue is a legal one—whether Liebich conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

When filing a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant bears the burden that there was both a search and that it was illegal. People v. Berg, 364 N.E.2d 880 (Ill. 1977). Both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution provide that the people have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other” effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court stated that under its “limited lockstep doctrine,” it construes the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution “in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment unless any of the narrow exceptions to lockstep interpretation apply.” People v. Holmes, 90 N.E.3d 412 (Ill. 2017). Neither party argued that a lockstep exception applied. 

The State argued that Liebich’s conduct did not amount to a search because he was investigating a gas leak, the contents within the locked cabinet were openly or plainly visible, and Hagestedt failed to prove he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the cabinet. Hagestedt argued that Liebich’s use of his flashlight to peer inside of a visibly chained and locked cabinet shows that the contents were not plainly visible, and thus, his conduct constituted a warrantless search.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

The Court briefly discussed U.S. Supreme Court and Illinois Supreme Court case law involving reasonable expectation of privacy, which the Court characterized as the “touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); People v. Lindsey, 181 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2020). The Court recited the non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place or a thing: “(1) property ownership; (2) whether the defendant was legitimately present in the area searched; (3) the defendant’s possessory interest in the area searched or the property seized; (4) prior use of the area searched or property seized; (5) the ability to control or exclude others’ use of the property; and (6) a subjective expectation in the property.” People v. McCavitt, 185 N.E.3d 1192 (Ill. 2021).

The State sought to challenge Hagestedt’s asserted privacy interest in the locked cabinet for the first time on appeal before the Court. However, the Court stated that the State forfeited the argument, explaining: “[i]f the State had objected to the allegation that the search occurred in defendant’s home during the suppression proceedings, defendant would have had the opportunity to provide evidence in support of his allegation that he possessed sufficient interest in the townhome, and the cabinet, to object to the warrantless search. The trial court would then have made factual findings regarding possession.” See People v. Holloway, 426 N.E.2d 871 (Ill. 1981). Nevertheless, the Court determined that Hagestedt “sufficiently established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the kitchen cabinet,” by chaining and locking it. See People v. Neal, 486 N.E.2d 898 (Ill. 1985) (by concealing items in a pouch, and concealing the pouch itself, defendant exhibited a subjective expectation that the items would remain private). 

What Constitutes a Search Under the Fourth Amendment?

The Court observed that a warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. People v. Aljohani, 211 N.E.3d 325 (Ill. 2022); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). Because reasonableness is the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,” the presumption is subject to certain recognized exceptions. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006). One recognized exception is when there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury,” which is known as the “emergency aid” exception. See King. Another recognized exception is the “community caretaking” or “public safety” exception. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (announced community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement for vehicles). Notably, however, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that community caretaking duties do not “create a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home.” Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021). 

Turning to the present case, Hagestedt conceded that it was reasonable for the police to enter the home in response to the gas leak. For its part, the State conceded that if Liebich’s actions constitute a search, then it was not reasonable because it was unrelated for his legitimate purpose for being in the home, i.e., checking on the gas leak. 

The Court noted that a “search” has consistently been defined as “prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.” Berg. But it is “not a search to observe that which is in open view.” Id.; see Katz; People v. Bombacino, 280 N.E.2d 697 (Ill. 1972). The Court quoted Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), in explaining the plain view doctrine to the warrant requirement: “if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point.”

The State argued that Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), supports its contention that Liebich did not conduct a search by shining a flashlight into the gap to see inside the cabinet and repositioning himself. In Hicks, police entered the defendant’s apartment to investigate a report of gunfire after a bullet was fired through the floor of the apartment and injured a person in the apartment below. An officer observed high-end stereo equipment that seemed out of place in the apartment, so he recorded the serial numbers by moving one of the components in order to view them. The Supreme Court ruled that moving the component to gain access to the serial numbers constituted a search unrelated to the purpose of the authorized warrantless intrusion. 

The State argued that Hicks stands for the principle that there is a difference between observing something that was already clearly visible and observing something only after applying physical force to reveal it. Liebich never applied any physical force to the cabinet, so his actions do not constitute a search, according to the State. Hagestedt countered that Hicks actually supports his position that Liebich’s actions of shining a flashlight at a small gap in a closed and locked cabinet to look inside were unrelated to his authorized purpose for being in the kitchen and thus constituted a new invasion of privacy—that is, a search. 

The Court agreed with Hagestedt. It explained that Hicks is “not specifically limited to whether the components were moved.” Instead, the Hicks Court determined that there was a new invasion of the defendant’s privacy when the officer undertook some action that was “unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.” Hicks. Similarly, in the present case, Liebich undertook some action to enable him to see inside the cabinet. The question then is whether his actions were related to investigating the gas leak, according to the Court. 

Was the Use of the Flashlight
a Search?

The State argued that the use of a flashlight does not transform an otherwise lawful observation into a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. In support of its position, it cited Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (during traffic stop, use of flashlight to see inside vehicle did not transform plain view observation into Fourth Amendment search), and Bombacino (not a search where officer used flashlight to see inside vehicle and spotted bat while looking for a murder suspect). 

The Court flatly rejected the State’s argument, distinguishing those cases by noting that they involved police officers using a flashlight to illuminate objects inside vehicles that were lawfully stopped. Whereas, the present case involved the use of a flashlight inside a home, which the U.S. Supreme Court has declared “is first among equals” when it comes to the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013). The Court stated that it is well settled that there “is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers.” Quoting Brown; Luedemann (“It is well settled that the use of a flashlight to illuminate a vehicle located on a public way is not a fourth amendment search.”). 

The State next argued that other courts have held that using a flashlight while on the curtilage or inside the home does not transform a plain view observation into a search, citing People v. Echols, 2024 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 744 (2024) (gun was in plain view where an officer was in a home checking on a parolee and observed an object by shining his flashlight through an open bedroom door), and United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (holding that police officers’ use of flashlights to illuminate the inside a barn located outside the curtilage of a home through an open door with netting did not transform plain view observation into unreasonable search). 

Again, the Court rejected the State’s argument, explaining that there “is a difference between using a flashlight to illuminate appropriate areas pursuant to a warrant, or where probable cause has already been established, and using a flashlight to establish probable cause when an item is not identifiable without the flashlight.” Consequently, Echols is distinguishable because it involved a search pursuant to a parole compliance check for which the standard Fourth Amendment protections do not apply. 

The Court approvingly cited a North Carolina Supreme Court case in which that court distinguished Dunn from the case before it by noting the structure at issue had boarded windows, a padlocked solid-wood front door, and boarded and nailed-shut back doors, which required police to use a flashlight to peer through quarter-inch cracks. State v. Tarantino, 368 S.E.2d 588 (N.C. 1988). The Tarantino Court explained that the material factual difference between Dunn and the case before it was the nature of the opening through which the police made their observations. The defendant in Dunn forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn’s interior by leaving the door open and the use of netting thereby leaving the interior exposed. In contrast, the defendant in Tarantino took actions to conceal the interior of the building, and thus, he had a subjective, reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the building.

Turning to the present case, the Court agreed with the principle relied upon by the Tarantino Court that the “nature of the opening is an important consideration” in determining whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred and concluded that the current case is distinguishable from Dunn for essentially the same reasons as Tarantino is distinguishable—the cabinet was visibly secured with a chain and padlock thereby demonstrating Hagestedt’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the cabinet. The Court explained that Liebich “took deliberate action that was unrelated” to investigating the gas leak, and there is no indication in the record that the gas leak was potentially coming from the cabinet or that Liebich needed a flashlight to investigate the gas leak. Thus, the Court concluded that “Liebich’s actions amounted to a focused intrusion outside of the circumstances that authorized his presence,” that is, it was an unreasonable search in violation of Hagestedt’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Odor of Cannabis

Finally, the Court addressed the issue of Stanish allegedly detecting the odor of cannabis upon reentering the home after removing Hagestedt from the premises. The fact that he reentered the home after the gas leak was resolved but prior to the execution of the search warrant meant that he would not have been in a place he was authorized to be since the community caretaking function of investigating the gas leak was already concluded, the Court explained. Thus, the Court concluded that Stanish’s detection of the odor of cannabis was also pursuant to a warrantless search. 

Conclusion

The Court ruled that without the observations by Liebich and detection of the odor of cannabis by Stanish, which were both in violation of the Fourth Amendment, there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Hagestedt’s arrest and statements to police were the result of unreasonable warrantless searches, so all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful searches must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” People v. Henderson, 989 N.E.2d 192 (Ill. 2013). Thus, the Court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion to quash the arrest and suppress the evidence in the cabinet.

Accordingly, the Court reversed Hagestedt’s conviction and vacated his sentence. See: People v. Hagestedt, 2025 Ill. LEXIS 185 (2025). 

Editor’s note: Anyone interested in the plain view doctrine or the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment is encouraged to read the Court’s full opinion.  

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