by David M. Reutter

Sitting en banc, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a defendant must be competent before undergoing a mental-condition examination under C.R.S. § 16-8-107(3)(b) and that a trial court may not exclude expert mental-condition testimony based on a defendant’s failure to cooperate with such an examination conducted while she was incompetent. The Court reasoned that because cooperating with a mental-condition examination requires personal participation, and an incompetent defendant cannot meaningfully participate in her own defense, such an examination should not proceed until the defendant is competent. Applying this principle, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by citing the defendant’s noncooperation as grounds for exclusion when that noncooperation occurred during a period of adjudicated incompetency. The Court affirmed the appellate division’s reversal and remanded for a new trial.

Background

In July 2015, Maria Laida Day struck her boyfriend with her car as she pulled away after dropping him off at a business in Leadville, Colorado. He died from the resulting injuries. When police contacted Day after she turned herself in, they reported she appeared calm and possibly intoxicated. The prosecution charged Day with second degree murder and other offenses.

Day chose not to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) but filed notice of intent to introduce expert testimony regarding her mental condition at the time of the incident pursuant to § 16-8-107(3)(b). Dr. Karen Fukutaki conducted a sanity evaluation of Day in November 2015. Fukutaki opined that Day’s failure to take prescribed antipsychotic medication for two days before the incident may have caused thought disorganization that impaired her judgment and problem-solving abilities.

Attempts to complete a court-ordered mental-condition examination at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (“CMHHIP”) spanned several years. CMHHIP repeatedly requested extensions due to resource constraints and confusion about whether it was conducting a sanity evaluation or mental-condition examination. In June 2018, CMHHIP conducted a competency evaluation that found Day incompetent to proceed and noted that she met the criteria for a form of schizophrenia. The evaluator also indicated he could not complete the mental-condition examination because Day was uncooperative. Day underwent restoration treatment and was deemed competent in March 2019. Despite multiple court orders, no mental-condition examination was ever completed while Day was competent.

The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to exclude Fukutaki’s testimony, stating that because no court-ordered examination occurred due to Day’s noncooperation, “on this basis alone the Court can deny the introduction of the defendant’s mental condition.” The jury convicted Day as charged, and she was sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the trial court erred by faulting Day for failing to cooperate with an examination conducted while she was incompetent.

Analysis

The Court reviewed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, noting that such abuse occurs when a decision is “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,” or based on a misapplication of law. People v. West, 578 P.3d 832 (Colo. 2025). Because the exclusion implicated Day’s ability to present a complete defense, reversal was required unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Under § 16-8-107(3)(a), defendants generally cannot introduce evidence of insanity without entering an NGRI plea. However, § 16-8-107(3)(b) permits admission of expert opinion regarding a defendant’s mental condition, even absent an NGRI plea, provided two conditions are satisfied: (1) the defendant must notify the court and prosecution of intent to introduce such evidence and (2) the defendant must undergo a court-ordered examination under § 16-8-106. The Court noted that defendants must cooperate with examination personnel under § 16-8-106(2)(c), and failure to cooperate bars admission of defense expert testimony on mental condition.

The Court addressed whether a defendant may be faulted for noncooperation that occurred during incompetency. A defendant is incompetent to proceed if, due to a mental or developmental disability, she lacks “sufficient present ability to consult with the defendant’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or “does not have a rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings.” § 16-8.5-101(12). When a defendant is incompetent, the court may only proceed with matters “susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.” § 16-8.5-102(1).

The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ reliance on § 16-8.5-105(2), which addresses noncooperation during competency evaluations, because that provision governs only admissibility at competency and restoration hearings, not trial proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court reached the same result through different reasoning.

“A mental-condition examination requires a defendant’s personal participation,” the Court explained. “And if a defendant can’t meaningfully participate in her defense, she likely can’t meaningfully participate in such an examination either.” An incompetent defendant struggling to understand an examination’s purpose “can’t be expected to fulfill the purpose of the examination.” Because cooperation with the examination is essential to presenting expert mental-condition evidence as part of a defense, “the examination shouldn’t proceed until the defendant is competent to proceed,” the Court reasoned.

Applying these principles, the Court determined that after CMHHIP clarified the examination type in March 2017, the hospital “only attempted to conduct a mental-condition examination at times when Day was deemed incompetent.” Because Day could not reasonably participate while incompetent, the Court stated that “her lack of cooperation in any such examination shouldn’t be used against her to exclude expert mental-condition evidence. Her incompetence rendered any mental-condition examination, and her cooperation (or lack thereof) with such an examination, a nullity.”

The Court further noted that the trial court’s April 2018 order for examination remained pending when the prosecution moved to exclude testimony. Before excluding Day’s evidence, the trial court “should have enforced its order by directing CMHHIP to examine Day while she was competent.” Instead, the trial court granted the motion in limine based on noncooperation that occurred while Day was incompetent, constituting an abuse of discretion.

The Court addressed the Court of Appeals’ application of People v. Moore, 485 P.3d 1088 (Colo. 2021), which instructs trial courts to determine whether proposed mental-condition testimony, in whole or in part, is probative of statutory insanity, which is defined as “severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person’s perception or understanding of reality.” § 16-8-102(7). Evidence probative of insanity is inadmissible absent an NGRI plea; evidence that does not tend to prove insanity may be admitted if it otherwise conforms to statutory requirements and evidentiary rules.

The Court agreed the trial court’s ruling “swept too broadly” by rejecting all of Fukutaki’s testimony, failing “to distinguish what is probative of insanity under [the statute’s] exacting definition from what is not.”

Regarding CRE 403, the Court clarified a distinction between statutory and evidentiary analyses. While statutory analysis examines whether evidence relates to insanity without deferring to the defendant’s stated purpose, the CRE 403 analysis requires courts to consider the purposes for which testimony is offered when weighing probative value against unfair prejudice. Because the mental-condition examination may affect the CRE 403 analysis, the Court left that issue for the trial court to address on remand.

The Court concluded the exclusion was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the prosecution relied heavily on Day’s post-event demeanor to prove her culpable mental state, and the trial court’s ruling denied Day the opportunity to rebut that evidence.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate division’s reversal of Day’s conviction as to each count for which culpability was at issue and remanded for a new trial consistent with its opinion. See: People v. Day, 2026 CO 16 (2026).  

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