by Sagi Schwartzberg

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that, to support a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, the Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person subject to Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) knew of their obligation to register in the first instance.

Background

In 2005, William Roberts was convicted of one count each of statutory sexual assault, sexual assault, corruption of the morals of a minor, and indecent assault pursuant to a plea agreement. As a result, he was sentenced to prison and ordered to register as a “sexual offender” under the then-applicable sexual registration statute—Megan’s Law III—for the remainder of his life. Roberts’ registration status required him to appear in person before the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) to verify his address and personal information and be photographed, annually. He was also required to notify the PSP within 10 days if he moved to a different address.

Megan’s Law III was subsequently replaced with SORNA, which bifurcated the registration scheme into two distinct subchapters: Subchapter H, which governs offenders whose triggering offense occurred on or after December 20, 2012, and Subchapter I, which governs those whose offenses were committed prior to December 20, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.12 and 9799.53. Since Roberts’ offenses occurred in 2005, he was required to register under Subchapter I. Following his release from prison, Roberts complied with his SORNA obligations and consistently appeared in person as required.

On March 21, 2019, Roberts appeared at a PSP office in Mercer County and provided an address in Belle Vernon, Pennsylvania. On April 16, 2019, he appeared at a PSP facility in Washington County, advised the PSP he moved to a different address, and provided them with an address on Edith Street in Belle Vernon. He appeared at the Washington County PSP office on July 17, 2019, but did not change or update any of his information, so the Edith Street location was his last registered address.

Each time Roberts appeared at a PSP office, he received a six-page packet that outlined his specific obligations, including the requirements for registering with the PSP, providing the PSP with all necessary information, and submitting to being fingerprinted and photographed. This packet also included his obligations to update the PSP with any changes to his address, employment, and education, and included a notice that because he was a “TIER III” registrant, he was required to comply with his SORNA obligations for the rest of his life and that failure to comply with any aspect of SORNA would constitute a separate felony offense for failing to register.

In 2020, Roberts stopped reporting in connection with his SORNA obligations as required. In August 2020, after noticing Roberts failed to appear, the PSP dispatched a trooper to investigate whether Roberts still lived at the Edith Street address. When the trooper arrived at this address, the residence was empty of furnishings and unoccupied. Roberts was subsequently arrested and charged with two different violations of SORNA: (1) failing to register and (2) failing to verify his residence and be photographed.

At trial, Roberts argued that his 2005 plea agreement required him to register for only 10 years, he only agreed to registration requirements for 10 years, and despite signing multiple forms advising him of his lifetime registration obligations, no PSP trooper or representative ever informed him that he was a lifetime registrant or he had to register after his alleged 10-year period expired.

The jury convicted Roberts of both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to a 5-to-10-year term of imprisonment. Roberts timely appealed.

On appeal before the Superior Court, Roberts argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove both that he was a lifetime registrant and that he had “knowingly” failed to register, i.e., he “knew” that he was required to register for life. In affirming his sentence, the Superior Court rejected his interpretation of the mens rea required for a violation of SORNA. Instead, the court ruled that the Commonwealth does not have to prove that Roberts “knew” of this lifetime registration requirement. He committed the crime of “knowingly” failing to register for purposes of SORNA when he failed to verify his residence or be photographed, according to the Superior Court. Under the court’s interpretation of the required mens rea, a person knowingly violates the statute merely by failing to appear. Roberts timely appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Analysis

The issue before the Court was whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Roberts for failure to register under SORNA where the Commonwealth failed to prove that he knew of and was non-compliant with his registration obligations, or whether the Commonwealth only needed to prove Roberts knew that he failed to register, even if he had no knowledge that he was required to do so in the first place.

In order to resolve Roberts’ sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the Court analyzed the requirements of the failure to comply statute, § 4915.2, specifically focusing on the mens rea requirement, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) 
Offense defined.—An individual who is subject to registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(a), (a.1) or (b) (relating to registration) or who was subject to registration under former 42 Pa.C.S. § 9793 (relating to registration of certain offenders for ten years) commits an offense if the individual knowingly fails to [emphasis supplied]:

     (1) 
register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56 (relating to registration procedures and applicability); [or]

     (2) 
verify the individual’s residence or be photographed as required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.60 (relating to verification of residence).

The Court explained that each subsection contains two elements. The first element identifies the action the offender failed to perform (such as an offender “knowingly” failing to register or verify an address and be photographed). The second element provides the statutory sections that impose the registration and verification requirements. That is, the statute includes both the action the offender is required to perform and the statutory provision mandating that action. The Court stated that it is undisputed that the statute’s mens rea requirement applies to the first element of each subsection. Consequently, the legal question that must be answered is whether the mens rea requirement also applies to the second element of each subsection, according to the Court.

The Court observed that statutory interpretation requires avoiding any construction that renders any term “inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Ball v. Chapman, 289 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2003). The Superior Court’s interpretation that § 4915.2 does not require proof that the offender knew of their registration obligations violates “this fundamental tenet,” the Court stated. It explained that the Superior Court “effectively stopped reading” the statute after the first element of each subsection. But a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation requires that all provisions of the statute be given effect. Commonwealth v. McHugh, 178 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1962).

The Court reasoned that “the only interpretation of the failure to comply statute that gives effect to all of its provisions requires the Commonwealth to prove that the offender not only failed to register or verify, but also that the offender knew that he was required to do so.” Section 4915.2 provides notice to an offender of what they must do to avoid violating SORNA and being charged with a felony, viz., register or verify “as required under” the applicable subsection—the second element of each. But the offender can only comply with the required registration or verification if they know the requirements listed in the statutes referenced in the second element of the subsections. The Court stated that the statute cannot function without the offender having knowledge of both elements of the relevant subsection. Thus, the Court held that the mens rea requirement applies to the second element of each subsection—that is, the offender must know that they are required to register or verify under SORNA.

Conclusion

Nevertheless, the Court ruled that because Roberts signed all of the packets provided to him at the PSP offices and acknowledged he read and understood all of his obligations to comply with SORNA—including the notice that he was a lifetime registrant—the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was “required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56 to register for life and that he was required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.60 to verify his residence and be photographed for life.”

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See: Commonwealth v. Roberts, 329 A.3d 1129 (Pa. 2025).  

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