Before Barrier 1:
Correct federal remedy
§§ 2254(a), 2255

Is the prisoner challenging custody under a state-court judgment? Section 2254 ordinarily addresses a state conviction or sentence. A federal conviction proceeds under § 2255; conditions claims ordinarily belong in a civil-rights action.

Identify the judgment, the custody arising from it, and the custody-related relief requested. Determine separately the proper procedure for prison discipline, good-time, or parole claims.

Custody status does not make every dispute a § 2254 case. Rules governing state and federal prisoners are not interchangeable.

Before Barrier 1:
Cognizable federal claim
§ 2254(a); Estelle; Stone; Kimmelman

Does the ground allege custody in violation of the Constitution, federal law, or a treaty – rather than only an error of state law?

Identify the challenged state action, the federal right, the supporting facts, and the custody relief requested. State the federal connection directly.

A serious state-law error is not automatically federal. Stone may bar a direct Fourth Amendment exclusionary claim, while Kimmelman permits a distinct ineffective-assistance claim subject to its own elements.

Barrier 1:
Exhaustion
§ 2254(b); Rose; Boerckel; Rhines

Did the prisoner fairly present the same facts and federal legal basis through one complete round of the State’s required appellate process?

Present every claim expressly in federal terms at every required level. Preserve the briefs, petitions, and orders showing how it was presented.

Facts or a state-law claim alone are insufficient. A mixed petition ordinarily must be dismissed unless the prisoner deletes the unexhausted claims or a discretionary Rhines stay applies. An unexhausted claim may be denied, but not granted absent § 2254(b)(1)(B) or express waiver.

Barrier 2:
One-year filing period
§ 2244(d); Pace; Duncan v. Walker; Lawrence; Holland

Was the petition filed within one year of the applicable claim-specific starting date, excluding time during which a properly filed state collateral application was pending?

Create a written chronology for each claim: starting date, every state filing and decision, federal days used, and days remaining. Use a conservative target date.

State review pauses but does not restart the clock. An untimely state filing gives no tolling; a federal petition does not toll; and the certiorari period after state collateral review is not excluded. Check Chapter 154 separately in capital cases.

Barrier 3:
Procedural default
Sykes; Coleman; Martinez; Trevino; Schlup

Did a state court reject the claim under an independent and adequate state rule, or would state procedure now bar proper presentation?

Follow state preservation and filing rules. For a defaulted claim, establish cause tied to the actual default and prejudice, or satisfy the demanding actual-innocence gateway.

No available state remedy may mean default, not exhaustion. Martinez/Trevino supply cause only in narrow trial-counsel circumstances; they do not cure untimeliness, cover appellate-counsel claims, or make new proof usable.

Barrier 4:
§ 2254(d) deference
§ 2254(d); Williams; Richter; Wilson

Did the state court adjudicate the claim on the merits? If so, was the result contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, or based on an unreasonable factual determination?

Identify the controlling Supreme Court holding and the state ruling under review. Ordinarily address the last related reasoned decision; only if no related state-court decision gave reasons, address every reasonable theory that could support the result.

Wrong – even clearly wrong – is not enough. Circuit precedent cannot supply clearly established law. An unexplained denial is ordinarily treated as a merits adjudication; silence does not reduce the burden.

Barrier 5:
Federal evidentiary restrictions
§ 2254(e)(2); Pinholster; Michael Williams; Shinn; Twyford

What evidence may the federal court consider? Section 2254(d)(1) review is confined to the record presented to the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. When the prisoner failed to develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, § 2254(e)(2) generally bars a federal evidentiary hearing or other consideration of the new evidence.

Develop claims and evidence in state court. When state law permits, request discovery, a hearing, and expert or investigative assistance there; preserve each request and ruling as proof of diligence.

Martinez cause does not overcome Shinn. If § 2254(e)(2) applies, both subsection (A) and subsection (B) must be satisfied, and a hearing still is not mandatory. Evidence-gathering authority does not guarantee later use.

Barrier 6:
Harmless error
Brecht; Fry; Davenport; Kyles

After constitutional error is established, what prejudice rule governs? Ordinary trial error receives Brecht review; structural error does not. If the state court adjudicated Chapman harmlessness on the merits, both § 2254(d) and Brecht apply.

Identify the prejudice rule for the particular claim. For ordinary trial error, show a substantial and injurious effect or influence; when both standards apply, satisfy both.

If no state court adjudicated Chapman harmlessness on the merits, Brecht alone governs that harmlessness question – not necessarily the antecedent constitutional ruling. A proven Brady/Bagley violation receives no separate Brecht inquiry.

Barrier 7:
Certificate of appealability
§ 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11; Slack; Miller-El; Buck

May the prisoner appeal? After a merits denial, reasonable jurists must be able to debate the assessment. After a procedural denial, they must debate both the procedural ruling and the constitutional claim.

Explain why the rulings are debatable, preferably before the final adverse order if a developed District Court request is desired. File a separate, timely notice of appeal.

A certificate is not a merits ruling, notice of appeal, or authorization for a later application. None of those instruments substitutes for another.

Barrier 8A:
Is the filing second or successive?
Magwood; Banister; Gonzalez v. Crosby; Rivers

Does the later filing qualify as second or successive based on substance, timing, and the state judgment challenged?

Before final judgment, use Rule 15. After judgment, determine whether the filing (1) is the first challenge to a new state judgment, and which part of that judgment it challenges; (2) is a timely Rule 59(e) motion; or (3) is a true Rule 60(b) attack on a defect in the federal proceeding.

The caption and chronology alone do not control. A Rule 60(b) motion that adds a new ground for relief or attacks the prior merits ruling is successive; a true Rule 60(b) attack on a defect in the federal proceeding is not.

Barrier 8B:
Court of Appeals authorization
§ 2244(b)(1)–(4); Tyler

If the application is second or successive, did the Court of Appeals authorize it, and does the claim actually satisfy § 2244(b)?

Apply to the Court of Appeals before filing in District Court. Make the required prima facie showing; after authorization, prove statutory eligibility independently in District Court.

A claim presented in a prior application must be dismissed. A new-rule claim must satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(A). A new-fact claim requires a factual predicate that could not have been discovered earlier through due diligence and clear and convincing evidence that, absent the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the prisoner guilty. Authorization establishes neither eligibility nor relief. For a state-prisoner application, denial of authorization is not appealable and is not subject to rehearing or certiorari.

Barrier 9:
Retroactivity
Teague; Montgomery; Edwards; Tyler

Was the constitutional rule new when the conviction became final, and is it substantive or procedural? New substantive rules apply retroactively; new procedural rules do not on federal collateral review.

Fix the finality date and the rule’s announcement date, then classify the rule. For a successive new-rule claim, also address § 2244(b)(2)(A).

Teague/Edwards and § 2244(b)(2)(A) are independent. For a successive new-rule claim, the rule must have been previously unavailable, and the Supreme Court itself must have made it retroactive. State-law retroactivity does not control federal habeas.

Starting Date:
Ordinary finality
§ 2244(d)(1)(A); Gonzalez v. Thaler

Generally one year from the date the judgment becomes final by conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time for seeking it.

Use the dockets and orders from every court involved in direct review to determine finality before counting. Record whether review was sought in the State’s highest court and whether a petition for certiorari was filed.

Do not begin automatically with sentencing. If the prisoner did not seek available review in the State’s highest court, the additional 90-day certiorari period ordinarily does not apply.

Starting Date:
Claim-specific alternatives
§ 2244(d)(1)(B)–(D)

The one-year period for a claim may instead begin when a qualifying state impediment is removed, the Supreme Court recognizes a new retroactive right, or the factual predicate could have been discovered through due diligence.

Test all four statutory dates for each claim. Preserve proof of impediments, diligence, discovery, and any newly recognized right.

Different claims may have different dates. Under subsection (D), the question is when a diligent prisoner could have discovered the facts – not when this prisoner actually discovered them.

Tolling:
Properly filed state review
§ 2244(d)(2)

Time is excluded while a properly filed state postconviction or other collateral application is pending.

Record days used before filing and days remaining when state review ends. Keep file-stamped papers and every order.

Tolling pauses the clock. It does not restart it or restore days already used. State law may control whether the application was properly filed and pending.

Tolling:
Untimely state application
Pace v. DiGuglielmo

A state application rejected as untimely is not properly filed and provides no statutory tolling.

If state timeliness is reasonably uncertain, consider a protective federal petition filed before the federal deadline and request an appropriate stay.

Years spent litigating an untimely state application may count against the federal year. A protective stay is discretionary, not automatic.

Tolling:
Federal petition or mixed petition
Duncan v. Walker; Rhines

A pending federal habeas petition does not provide § 2244(d)(2) tolling. A mixed-petition stay requires the Rhines showings.

If dismissal threatens timeliness, explain the good cause for nonexhaustion, why each unexhausted claim is not plainly meritless, and the absence of intentionally dilatory tactics; propose reasonable time limits for completing state review and returning to federal court.

A dismissal without prejudice can become a permanent time bar. Filing in federal court does not itself stop the federal clock.

Tolling:
End of state collateral review
Lawrence v. Florida

The time to seek certiorari after state collateral review, and the period while that petition is pending, are not excluded under § 2244(d)(2).

Determine precisely when state collateral review stopped being pending and resume the federal count from that date.

The possible 90-day certiorari period after direct review does not reappear after state collateral review.

Beyond statutory tolling:
Equitable tolling and actual-innocence gateway
Holland; Schlup; McQuiggin

Equitable tolling requires reasonable diligence and an extraordinary circumstance that prevented timely filing. The rare actual-innocence gateway requires new evidence showing that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted.

Preserve dated mail records, letters, grievances, lockdown notices, requests, counsel communications, institutional responses, and new innocence evidence.

Ordinary neglect or miscalculation is insufficient. Actual innocence permits review of an underlying constitutional claim; it does not itself establish habeas relief.

Capital Cases:
Possible Chapter 154 period
§§ 2261, 2263, 2265

When Chapter 154 applies, the federal period is 180 days after final state-court affirmance of the conviction and sentence on direct review, or expiration of the time for seeking that review. The period is tolled while a petition for certiorari is pending and during the first round of state collateral proceedings. On motion and a showing of good cause, the District Court may extend the period by no more than 30 days.

Check current DOJ certification records. Also determine whether § 2261(b)(2) is satisfied because counsel was appointed under the certified mechanism, the prisoner validly waived counsel, retained counsel, or was found not indigent. Calculate both the one-year and 180-day periods and act by the earlier date unless a court rules otherwise.

Statewide certification alone is insufficient. Certification may carry a retroactive effective date, and Chapter 154 provides no statutory grace period when retroactive certification shortens a period already in progress. Certification status can change, so do not rely on a stale list.

Petition:
Form and factual content
Habeas Rule 2(c)–(d)

Use the current AO 241 or authorized local equivalent; the clerk must provide the required form without charge. State every available ground and the supporting facts.

Include names, dates, statements, acts, omissions, and resulting harm. Identify how each claim was exhausted.

Labels and legal conclusions alone are insufficient. An omitted ground may be barred in a later application.

Petition:
Respondent and federal district
Habeas Rule 2(a)–(b); § 2241(d)

Current custody ordinarily requires naming the officer having custody; future custody requires the Rule 2(b) respondents. Section 2241(d) supplies venue choices in multi-district States.

Confirm custody status, the district of confinement, the district of conviction and sentence, and current local practice.

The Attorney General is not automatically the only respondent. A receiving court may transfer the case to the other authorized district.

Petition:
Fee or pauper application
§§ 1914(a), 1915; Habeas Rule 3(a)

Submit the $5 fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

Include the required affidavit and institutional-account certificate with any pauper application.

Address the fee at filing. The PLRA’s installment-payment and three-strikes provisions do not govern § 2254 petitions.

Filing:
Prison-mailbox rule
Habeas Rule 3(d); App. Rule 4(c)(1)

A covered paper is timely when deposited in the institution’s internal mail system no later than the deadline.

Use the legal-mail system when one exists. Preserve a § 1746 declaration or notarized statement giving the deposit date and confirming prepaid first-class postage.

The clerk’s later file stamp does not prove the deposit date. Failure to use or document the legal-mail system may forfeit mailbox-rule protection.

Federal Proceeding:
Discovery
Habeas Rule 6(a)–(b); Bracy

Discovery requires court authorization and good cause. Specific allegations must give the court reason to believe that fully developed facts may demonstrate entitlement to relief.

Tie each request to a particular claim. State the reasons for the request, include any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and specify the documents sought.

Authorization to conduct discovery does not make the resulting evidence available for merits review. Sections 2254(d) and 2254(e)(2) continue to apply.

Federal Proceeding:
Appointed counsel and services
18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(a)(2)(B), 3599(a)(2), (f); Habeas Rules 6(a), 8(c)

In a noncapital case, counsel may be appointed for a financially eligible petitioner when the interests of justice require. Appointment is required when counsel is necessary for effective discovery or once the District Court determines that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. A financially eligible petitioner seeking relief from a death sentence is entitled to appointed counsel.

Establish financial eligibility and explain why the interests of justice require counsel. Renew the request if discovery is authorized or a hearing is warranted. In a capital case, request any reasonably necessary investigative, expert, or other services.

Appointment ordinarily remains discretionary in a noncapital case unless the discovery or hearing rule makes it mandatory.

New Claim:
Before final judgment
Civil Rule 15; Mayle

Rule 15 provides the route to add a claim to the existing case. If Rule 15(a)(1) no longer permits amendment as a matter of course, obtain the respondent’s written consent or move for leave to amend. If the limitations period has expired, address an alternative starting date, relation back, equitable tolling, or the McQuiggin gateway.

Act promptly. A claim added to the first petition before final judgment is not second or successive. Address exhaustion and any need for a Rhines stay separately.

Amendment does not cure nonexhaustion or untimeliness. Relation back requires a common core of operative facts, not merely the same conviction.

New Filing:
After final judgment
§ 2244(b); Magwood; Gonzalez v. Crosby

Classification comes first. A legally second or successive application requires Court of Appeals authorization before District Court filing.

Examine whether the filing adds a claim, attacks a merits ruling, challenges a defect in the federal proceeding, or follows a new state judgment.

The filing’s title does not control. Authorization is unnecessary only if the filing is not legally second or successive.

Appeal:
Certificate of appealability
§ 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11(a); Slack

The District Court must grant or deny a certificate with the final adverse order. A denied certificate may be requested from the Court of Appeals.

If developed District Court consideration is desired, submit the request before the final order and address the correct merits or procedural standard.

A certificate does not serve as a notice of appeal and does not authorize a later application.

Post-Judgment:
Rule 59(e) motion
Civil Rules 59(e), 6(b)(2); Banister

File within 28 days after entry of judgment. A timely motion remains part of the first case and runs the appeal period from entry of the order disposing of it.

Calendar the 28-day deadline from entry of judgment and file within it.

The deadline ordinarily cannot be extended. A motion to reconsider denial of a certificate does not extend the appeal period.

Appeal:
Notice of appeal
App. Rules 4(a)(1)(A), 4(c), 22(b)

Ordinarily file a separate notice in District Court within 30 days after entry of the appealable judgment or order, subject to a qualifying postjudgment motion.

Use the prison-mailbox procedure and preserve proof. If the District Court denied a certificate, seek one from the Court of Appeals.

A certificate never replaces the notice. A notice of appeal filed without a separate certificate request is treated as a request to the Court of Appeals, but the notice must still be timely.

Missed Appeal Date:
Extension
App. Rule 4(a)(5)

Move no later than 30 days after the ordinary appeal period expires and show excusable neglect or good cause.

File the motion in District Court immediately and support the required showing.

This is a deadline for requesting relief – not an automatic extra 30 days to appeal.

No Notice:
Reopening
App. Rule 4(a)(6); Civil Rule 77(d)

If notice was not received within 21 days after entry, move within 180 days after entry or 14 days after receiving notice, whichever is earlier.

Act immediately; establish lack of timely notice and absence of prejudice. If reopened, file the notice within the reopened 14-day period.

The earlier outside limit controls. Lack of notice does not create an open-ended right to appeal.

Stage

State-court disposition

Federal-habeas rule

Constitutional error

State court found no constitutional violation

Section 2254(d) governs that antecedent merits ruling.

Ordinary trial error – harmlessness

State court adjudicated Chapman harmlessness on the merits

The prisoner must satisfy both § 2254(d) and Brecht. Brown v. Davenport.

Ordinary trial error – harmlessness

No state court adjudicated Chapman harmlessness

Brecht alone governs that harmlessness question. Section 2254(d) may still govern an antecedent no-error ruling. Fry v. Pliler.

Brady/Bagley materiality

State court rejected materiality on the merits

Section 2254(d) governs that materiality ruling. If the federal court establishes a Brady/Bagley violation, it does not conduct a second Brecht inquiry. Kyles.

Structural error

The court establishes an error classified as structural

No harmless-error inquiry applies, but every other applicable habeas barrier remains.

Rule A

Rule B

Decisive difference and importance

State-law error

Federal constitutional claim

Federal habeas does not correct state law. The petition must identify a federal violation; seriousness alone does not convert the claim. Authority: § 2254(a); Estelle.

Direct Fourth Amendment claim

Ineffective assistance for failing to litigate the search

Stone may bar the direct exclusionary claim after a full and fair state opportunity. Kimmelman permits a distinct Sixth Amendment claim, subject to deficient performance, a meritorious search issue, and prejudice.

Unexhausted claim

Procedurally defaulted claim

An unexhausted claim ordinarily still has an available state route. A defaulted claim was rejected, or would now be rejected, under an adequate and independent state rule. No available remedy may mean default, not exhaustion. Authority: Boerckel; Coleman.

Statutory tolling

Equitable tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) excludes the time during which a properly filed application for state postconviction or other collateral review is pending. The exclusion pauses but does not restart the clock. Equitable tolling separately requires reasonable diligence and an extraordinary circumstance that prevented timely filing. Authority: Pace; Holland.

Martinez/Trevino cause

Shinn evidence restriction

Qualifying postconviction-counsel error may supply cause for a defaulted substantial trial-counsel claim. The same lawyer’s failure to develop proof may still be attributed to the prisoner under § 2254(e)(2). The claim may be reviewable while the proof is not.

§ 2254(d)(1) and Pinholster

§ 2254(e)(2)

The first fixes the record for evaluating a state merits decision under § 2254(d)(1). The second restricts federal evidentiary development when the prisoner failed to develop the state record. Diligence can prevent (e)(2)’s opening bar from applying but does not expand the (d)(1) record.

Related reasoned decision below an unexplained higher-court order

No related state-court decision supplied reasons

Under Wilson, the federal court ordinarily looks through the unexplained higher-court order to the last related reasoned decision, subject to rebuttal. Under Richter, when no related state-court decision supplies reasons, the federal court considers theories that could have supported the unexplained merits result. Silence does not remove deference.

Certificate of appealability

Notice of appeal

The certificate permits appellate review; the notice initiates the appeal. A separate timely notice is required, ordinarily within 30 days. Neither substitutes for the other. Authority: § 2253(c); Habeas Rule 11; App. Rules 4, 22.

Certificate of appealability

Successive-application authorization

A certificate concerns appeal from the existing case. Section 2244(b)(3) authorization concerns a qualifying later application. Authorization is only a prima facie threshold; District Court eligibility remains undecided.

Adding a claim before judgment

Presenting a claim after judgment

Before judgment, Rule 15 supplies the route, but exhaustion and timeliness remain. After judgment, classify the filing under § 2244(b); a first challenge to a new state judgment may fall outside the bar. Authority: Mayle; Magwood; Rivers.

Timely Rule 59(e) motion

Rule 60(b) motion

A timely Rule 59(e) motion remains part of the first case and resets the appeal clock after disposition. A Rule 60(b) motion is classified by substance: a new claim or merits attack is successive; a true attack on the federal proceeding’s integrity is not. Authority: Banister; Gonzalez v. Crosby.

Actual innocence gateway

Freestanding innocence claim

The Schlup/McQuiggin gateway may allow review of a defaulted or untimely constitutional claim; it does not itself establish relief. Do not assume factual innocence alone is a recognized habeas ground; verify current Supreme Court law.

Schlup/McQuiggin gateway

Statutory innocence showings

The gateway asks whether new reliable evidence makes it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict. Sections 2254(e)(2)(B) and 2244(b)(2)(B) require clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the prisoner guilty, and each has separate statutory prerequisites. Do not substitute one standard for another.

Teague/Edwards retroactivity

§ 2244(b)(2)(A) authorization

Retroactivity asks whether a new rule applies on federal collateral review. When a new claim in a second or successive application relies on a new constitutional rule, § 2244(b)(2)(A) independently requires that the rule was previously unavailable and that the Supreme Court itself made it retroactive. The claim must satisfy both inquiries. New-fact claims are governed instead by § 2244(b)(2)(B). Authority: Tyler.

Define and track each claim

c

Identify the state action or ruling, the federal constitutional or statutory right, the supporting facts, and the custody relief requested.

c

Identify the controlling Supreme Court holding, when one exists, and record its operative rule.

c

If the claim relies on a constitutional rule announced after the conviction became final, record both dates and classify the rule as substantive or procedural. If it is a successive new-rule claim, address § 2244(b)(2)(A) separately.

c

Map each material fact to transcript pages, exhibits, declarations, or other state-record evidence.

c

Record where the same facts and federal legal basis were presented in each state court and how each court resolved them.

c

Obtain every state decision and determine whether the claim was adjudicated on the merits. If so, identify the last related reasoned decision, if any, and any later unexplained order.

At trial and during direct review

c

Make the objection in the form state law requires and identify its federal basis.

c

Use available state procedures to develop the record; preserve transcripts, exhibits, motions, requests, and rulings.

c

Present the claim in federal terms through one complete round of required state appellate review, including discretionary review when required.

c

Put the federal basis in the petition or brief; do not rely on the reviewing court to find it elsewhere or infer it from the facts.

Calculate and protect the filing period

c

Prepare a written chronology for each claim under § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D), including every state collateral filing and decision.

c

Record federal days used before each properly filed state application and days remaining when state review ended.

c

Determine whether every state application was properly filed; do not assume it restored days already used.

c

Do not assume a federal petition stops the clock or add a certiorari period after state collateral review.

c

In a potentially qualifying capital case, check current Chapter 154 status and calculate both the one-year and 180-day periods.

c

Preserve dated documents proving diligence and any circumstance that actually prevented timely filing.

During state postconviction review

c

Include every available federal claim and the supporting evidence; keep the facts and federal legal basis consistent through required review.

c

When state law permits, request necessary discovery, a hearing, and investigative or expert funding.

c

Preserve every request, supporting paper, and ruling to show the effort made to develop the facts.

c

For a trial-counsel claim, attempt to obtain counsel’s declaration addressing the work performed and whether the challenged act reflected strategy or oversight.

Prepare and file the federal petition

c

Use the current AO 241 or authorized local equivalent; name the correct respondent and confirm an authorized district.

c

State every available ground with concrete facts, not constitutional labels alone.

c

Identify how each claim was exhausted and attach the state filings that show fair presentation.

c

Identify every unexhausted claim. If the petition is mixed, decide whether to delete the unexhausted claims or request a Rhines stay; for a stay, address good cause, whether each claim is not plainly meritless, the absence of intentionally dilatory tactics, and proposed time limits.

c

Identify any possible default and match the asserted cause to the reason the claim failed in state court. Do not use Martinez as a timeliness rule.

c

For a merits-adjudicated claim, identify the controlling Supreme Court holding, the state ruling, and the § 2254(d) defect.

c

Cite the state transcript and exhibits for each material fact; identify separately any evidence outside the state-court record and the asserted basis for considering it.

c

Identify the applicable prejudice or harmless-error rule. For ordinary trial error, determine whether Brecht alone governs harmlessness or whether both Brecht and § 2254(d) apply; do not conduct harmless-error review of structural error or add a separate Brecht inquiry after establishing a Brady/Bagley violation.

c

Submit the $5 fee or a complete motion to proceed in forma pauperis, including the required affidavit and institutional-account certificate.

c

Use the legal-mail system when one exists; preserve a § 1746 declaration or notarized statement giving the deposit date and confirming prepaid first-class postage.

During federal proceedings

c

Tie any discovery request to a specific claim, demonstrate good cause, state the reasons for the request, and include the proposed discovery required by Habeas Rule 6(b).

c

If financially eligible, determine whether to request appointed counsel. Counsel is required when necessary for effective authorized discovery and after the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is warranted; capital cases follow § 3599.

New claims and appellate review

c

Before final judgment, act promptly under Rule 15 and address exhaustion, timeliness, relation back, and any Rhines stay separately.

c

If possible, submit a developed certificate-of-appealability request before the final adverse order. Address both Slack components after a procedural denial.

c

After final judgment, classify any proposed filing before acting.

c

File any Rule 59(e) motion within 28 days after entry of judgment; do not assume that deadline can be extended.

c

If § 2244(b) requires authorization, apply to the Court of Appeals before filing in District Court.

c

File a separate notice of appeal in District Court – ordinarily within 30 days after entry of the appealable judgment or order, or after disposition of a qualifying postjudgment motion – and preserve mailbox proof.

c

If an appeal deadline may have been missed, act immediately; Rules 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6) provide only limited relief.