by David M. Reutter

The Supreme Court of Louisiana, applying the state’s factual innocence statute for the first time, affirmed post-conviction relief vacating the first-degree murder conviction and death sentence of a prisoner whose trial rested on since-discredited bite mark and forensic pathology evidence. The Court held that La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2 prescribes a two-step inquiry and that, once a petitioner satisfies its threshold, the second step requires consideration of all relevant evidence, whether or not each item would independently qualify as new.

Background

Jimmie C. Duncan shared a West Monroe apartment with his girlfriend and her 23-month-old daughter, Haley Oliveaux. Haley’s drowning in Duncan’s care on December 18, 1993, has never been disputed. Duncan told police that Haley defecated in the bathtub, that he cleaned her, and that he later found her unresponsive there. The investigating detective found no blood and no evidence of a cleanup and recommended a negligent homicide charge. The charge became first-degree murder only after Dr. Stephen Hayne performed the autopsy, reported possible bite marks, and referred the case to Dr. Michael West.

At the 1998 trial, the State argued that Duncan bit Haley, raped her, drowned her, and staged the scene. The defense theorized a seizure in the bathtub. An odontologist testified that marks on Haley’s body matched Duncan’s teeth, and Hayne testified that her anal injuries showed rape and that the drowning was forcible. Duncan was convicted and sentenced to death. The state Supreme Court affirmed, observing that the bite mark evidence was the “only direct link” between Haley’s injuries and Duncan.

Duncan filed a pro se post-conviction application in 2002 that counsel supplemented in 2008 and 2022 to allege factual innocence under La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2 and ineffective assistance of counsel. At a six-day hearing in 2024, a law professor testified that investigations postdating the trial had linked Hayne and West to unethical practices and at least six wrongful convictions. Odontologists testified that West’s unapproved “direct comparison” method, which a video showed him performing with molds of Duncan’s teeth, created and destroyed evidence. Pathologists testified that the autopsy was inadequate and Haley’s death was accidental. The trial court vacated the conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court granted the State’s writ.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis with the standard of review. A ruling on a post-conviction application is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with credibility-based factual findings owed great deference and legal conclusions reviewed de novo. State ex rel. Robinson v. Vannoy, 397 So. 3d 333 (La. 2024); State v. Thompson, 93 So. 3d 553 (La. 2012).

The Court stated that the case presented its first opportunity to apply article 926.2, which places the burden of proof on the petitioner and prescribes two steps. At the first step, the petitioner must present “new, reliable, and noncumulative evidence that would be legally admissible at trial and that was not known or discoverable at or prior to trial” that is either scientific, forensic, physical, or nontestimonial documentary evidence or testimonial evidence corroborated by evidence of that kind. At the second step, that evidence, “when viewed in light of all of the relevant evidence,” must prove by clear and convincing evidence that, had it been presented at trial, no rational juror would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of either the offense of conviction or any felony offense that was a responsive verdict to the offense of conviction at the time of conviction. La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2(B)(1)(a), (b).

Threshold Showing Under Article 926.2(B)(1)(a)

The Court determined that Carrington’s testimony satisfied the threshold under the exceptional circumstances and unique record presented. Drawing on its new-trial jurisprudence under La. C.Cr.P. art. 851, the Court noted that evidence that is merely impeaching generally is not “new,” while recognizing an exception when the witness’ testimony is dispositive of guilt or innocence and the impeaching evidence likely would have caused the jury to reach a different result. State v. Ayo, 167 So. 3d 608 (La. 2015). Carrington’s testimony went beyond mere impeachment by supplying newly discovered context concerning Hayne’s and West’s relationship, methods, financial incentives, and documented history of unreliable forensic conclusions, all of which bore directly on the evidence central to the State’s case. Because article 926.2 does not define “nontestimonial,” the Court adopted the Sixth Amendment meaning, i.e., evidence “not procured for the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” State v. Koederitz, 166 So. 3d 981 (La. 2015). The published research, judicial findings, investigative materials, and documented exonerations underlying Carrington’s testimony qualified as nontestimonial documentary evidence and corroborated his testimony, the Court determined.

Review of All Relevant Evidence Under Article 926.2(B)(1)(b)

Turning to the second step, the Court held that its plain language directs consideration of “all of the relevant evidence” properly admitted at trial and in the post-conviction proceedings, “whether or not each additional item of relevant evidence would independently satisfy the threshold requirement” and not merely the evidence admitted at the first step. Post-trial developments in bite mark analysis and pediatric forensic pathology may not independently qualify as new but are properly considered at the second step, the Court explained. Clear and convincing proof requires that the disputed fact be “highly probable or much more probable than its nonexistence.” State in Interest of A.L.D., 263 So. 3d 860 (La. 2019).

The Court observed that the post-conviction evidence did not merely challenge isolated portions of the State’s case but undermined the premises on which it depended: that bite marks linked Duncan to a violent assault, that the anal injuries proved sexual abuse, and that Haley was forcibly drowned. The Court found the absence of blood significant. Every expert testified that the State’s theory entailed significant blood loss, yet none was documented medically or found at the residence. And the State’s timeline did not allow for any cleanup. A non-DNA factual innocence claim demands an “extraordinarily” high showing that “undermines the prosecution’s entire case,” State v. Conway, 816 So. 2d 290 (La. 2002), and this record met that standard, the Court concluded.

The Court expressly declined to find categorically that bite mark evidence is “junk science,” resting instead on the trial court’s discretion to credit the defense odontologist. It stated that “factual innocence” is a defined statutory term, that article 926.2(C)(1) permits the State to retry a petitioner, and that relief is “not a judicial declaration concerning whether Duncan is in fact ‘innocent’ in the ordinary sense of its meaning.”

Conclusion

Thus, the Court held that Duncan met his burden under La. C.Cr.P. art. 926.2 and is entitled to relief under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3(8).

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment vacating Duncan’s conviction and sentence. See: State v. Duncan, 2026 La. LEXIS 1014 (2026).  

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login