Ohio Supreme Court Announces Postconviction DNA-Testing Orders Need Only Identify Statutory Reason to Satisfy R.C. 2953.73(D) “Reasons” Requirement
by Douglas Ankney
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that R.C. 2953.73(D) is satisfied when a postconviction DNA-testing order identifies the statutory ground supporting acceptance or rejection. The statute does not additionally demand factual findings or an explanation of the trial court’s analysis. Because the order invoked the statutory term “outcome determinative” from R.C. 2953.71(L), the Court reversed the Eighth District’s contrary judgment and rejected the appellate rule requiring a fuller explanation.
Background
Following 2016 convictions for aggravated murder and related offenses, Daverrick Lash applied for postconviction DNA testing on August 3, 2021. The trial court denied the application in a short order. The order stated, “Defendant has not shown that DNA testing would be outcome determinative.”
Lash timely appealed. The Eighth District reversed and remanded for a fuller statement because the order failed to explain the reasoning for its decision. It consequently did not review the merits of the trial court’s statutory determination for abuse of discretion. The State appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court accepted review of whether R.C. 2953.73(D) requires more than identification of a statutory reason.
Analysis
The Court began its analysis by distinguishing statutory compliance, which presents a legal question reviewed de novo, from the decision to accept or reject testing, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Buehler, 863 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio 2007); State v. Logan, 267 N.E.3d 667 (Ohio 2025).
R.C. 2953.73(D) requires the judgment to state “the reasons for the acceptance or rejection as applied to the criteria and procedures” in R.C. 2953.71 to 2953.81. Under R.C. 2953.74(C)(4) and (5), an application may be accepted only if a result excluding the offender as a DNA contributor would be outcome determinative. R.C. 2953.71(L) asks whether results, if presented at trial and found relevant and admissible, would, when considered with all available admissible evidence, produce a “strong probability that no reasonable factfinder would have found the offender guilty” of the offense.
The Court applied the ordinary meaning of “reasons” because the statute leaves the term undefined. Under that meaning, a reason explains or justifies a decision. Lingle v. State, 172 N.E.3d 977 (Ohio 2020). Identifying the unmet statutory criterion provides the required connection between the ruling and the statutory scheme, the Court explained. An order that identifies no particular criterion, or gives a reason unrelated to the governing statutes, does not comply.
Because “outcome determinative” carries a statutory definition, the order invoked R.C. 2953.71(L)’s inquiry and resolved that criterion against Lash, the Court reasoned. R.C. 2953.73(D) demands no supporting findings or analysis. In contrast, R.C. 2953.21(D) expressly requires findings of fact and conclusions of law when a court dismisses a postconviction-relief petition. State v. Lester, 322 N.E.2d 656 (Ohio 1975). Thus, the Court held that the additional-explanation rule in the Eighth District’s precedents no longer governs.
The Court acknowledged that an order giving only a statutory reason may affect later abuse-of-discretion review without violating R.C. 2953.73(D). The Court declined to resolve the outcome-determinative question or determine whether the denial constituted an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Eighth District’s judgment and remanded for that court to review the denial of Lash’s application for an abuse of discretion. See: State v. Lash, 2026 Ohio LEXIS 1519 (2026).
As a digital subscriber to Criminal Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
