by Douglas Ankney

The Supreme Court of Michigan unanimously held that its prior decision in People v. Betts, 968 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. 2021), applies retroactively to defendants seeking relief on collateral review under both federal and state constitutional law. Betts declared the 2011 version of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (“SORA”) an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment in its entirety as applied to registrants whose offenses predated the 2011 amendments. Applying the federal retroactivity framework from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court concluded that Betts announced a new substantive rule of law because it prohibited “a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” The Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which had erroneously concluded that the Betts rule was neither substantive nor procedural.

Background

In 2004, Gary J. Shaver, Jr. was sentenced as a juvenile for three counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The version of SORA then in effect required him to register as a sex offender and report any address changes within 10 days. Shaver was convicted in 2010 of failing to comply with SORA’s registration requirements. The following year, the 2011 SORA took effect, shortening the reporting window from 10 days to three business days, requiring in-person reporting, establishing a three-tier offender classification system, and significantly expanding public access to registrant information. These amendments applied to all registrants, including those whose convictions predated their enactment.

In September 2015, Shaver notified law enforcement that he planned to move to a new address. The previous tenant was in the process of being evicted and continued to occupy the residence past the anticipated departure date, leaving Shaver unable to move in as planned. His registered address remained incorrect for 19 days. Shaver pleaded guilty to a second offense of failing to comply with the 2011 SORA’s registration requirements as a fourth-offense habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to six months in jail and five years of probation. After his release, Shaver violated probation and received a sentence of 40 months to 15 years’ imprisonment.

In 2021, the Michigan Supreme Court decided Betts, holding that the 2011 SORA in its entirety constituted unconstitutional ex post facto punishment when applied retroactively to registrants whose offenses predated the 2011 amendments. Analyzing the statute under the five-factor test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Betts Court concluded that while the Legislature intended the 2011 SORA to function as a civil regulation, its aggregate punitive effects negated that intent. Particularly concerning to the Betts Court were residency and employment restrictions that echoed traditional punishments of banishment and parole, extensive in-person reporting requirements, the shortened three-day reporting window, and the tiered classification system. Rather than sever the offending provisions or revive an earlier statutory version, the Betts Court concluded that the 2011 SORA could not be applied in any form to pre-2011 offenders. However, the decision did not address whether its holding applied to defendants seeking relief on collateral review.

Following Betts, Shaver moved for relief from judgment under MCR Subchapter 6.500, asking the trial court to vacate his 2015 conviction. The trial court granted the motion without affording the prosecution an opportunity to respond. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining both that the trial court erred procedurally and that Betts did not apply retroactively. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by observing that whether a judicial decision applies retroactively is a legal question that Michigan courts review de novo. People v. Maxson, 759 N.W.2d 817 (Mich. 2008). Because Betts was based on both federal and state constitutional provisions, both retroactivity frameworks would ordinarily apply. People v. Barnes, 917 N.W.2d 577 (Mich. 2018). However, the Court determined that analysis under the federal standard was dispositive, making a separate state-law inquiry unnecessary.

The Court stated that the Teague framework begins with a threshold question: did the decision at issue create a new rule of law? It explained that a rule is “new” when a reasonable jurist at the time the defendant’s conviction became final “would not have felt compelled by existing precedent” to reach the same result. Maxson. Judicial decisions announcing new rules “normally are not applied retroactively to other cases that have become final,” according to the Court. Barnes.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Betts satisfied this threshold. Before Betts, Michigan appellate courts had uniformly treated SORA as a civil regulatory measure, consistently rejecting ex post facto challenges on that basis. See People v. Golba, 729 N.W.2d 916 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007); People v. Pennington, 610 N.W.2d 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). No reasonable Michigan jurist would have felt compelled by that body of precedent to grant Shaver relief when his conviction became final. 

Procedural rules, defined as those that “regulate only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability,” do not apply retroactively on collateral review. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021). In contrast, substantive rules do apply retroactively. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined substantive rules as those “forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct or prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense” and has explained that such rules “set forth categorical constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to impose.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).

The Court of Appeals had reached what the Court characterized as a “confusing” result. The Court of Appeals determined the Betts rule was neither substantive nor procedural. It reasoned the rule was not substantive because it did not forbid certain conduct or prohibit a category of punishment for a particular class of defendants but simultaneously concluded the rule was not procedural because it did not constitute a “watershed” rule and did not alter the fairness of proceedings.

The Court rejected this analysis. Betts had nothing to do with the procedures governing convictions under the 2011 SORA; it instead prohibited “a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense,” the Court explained. Montgomery. Instead, Betts barred conviction for violating the 2011 SORA’s requirements, a defined category of punishment, as to registrants whose registrable offenses predated the 2011 amendments, a defined class of defendants. The Court explained that this result falls within Teague’s core exemption because finality considerations must yield when a judicial decision removes from the government the authority to punish a particular group in a particular way.

The Court also identified a critical flaw in the Court of Appeals’ reasoning. The Court of Appeals had concluded that Betts was not a substantive rule because Shaver would have been required to register under any version of SORA. The Court stated that this reasoning was erroneous because Betts expressly rejected both severability and revival as remedies, declaring the 2011 SORA unconstitutional in its entirety as applied to pre-2011 offenders.

Because the federal standard established retroactivity, a separate state constitutional analysis was unnecessary. The Court acknowledged that Michigan’s Constitution may at times afford broader protections than federal law but stated that it may never provide fewer. Thus, the Court held that Betts also applies retroactively under state law.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: People v. Shaver, 2026 Mich. LEXIS 1093 (2026).  

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