by David Kim

The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (“HRPP”) Rule 40 claims based on expert testimony later invalidated by scientific developments are governed by the constitutional false-evidence standard, not the newly discovered evidence test of State v. McNulty, 588 P.2d 438 (Haw. 1978). Under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution, a defendant need not prove that the prosecutor was aware of the testimony’s falsity; the inquiry is whether there is a “reasonable possibility that the false testimony could have contributed to … conviction.” State v. Stone, 465 P.3d 702 (Haw. 2020). The Court also took limited judicial notice of two authoritative scientific reports and determined that an FBI agent’s microscopic hair and fiber testimony exceeded scientific limits. Because that testimony materially supported the prosecution’s case, the Court vacated the denial of post-conviction relief and remanded for a new trial.

Background

In May 1989, Laura Price, a pseudonym for the complainant, alleged that Daniel R. Granillo abducted her from a shopping-center parking lot and sexually assaulted her after taking her to the Kahului breakwater. At Granillo’s July 1990 trial, Price identified him in court. The record contained no evidence of an earlier identification. Her account contained several inconsistencies relevant to credibility. Among other things, she told an emergency-room physician that the assault involved vaginal intercourse and denied fellatio or sodomy but testified that Granillo forced oral sex and did not penetrate her with his penis. She also gave conflicting accounts of her escape, and a responding officer reported that she repeatedly changed details of the assault.

FBI agent Wayne Oakes testified for the State after qualifying as an expert in hair and fiber analysis. He stated that a hair recovered from Granillo’s car shared the microscopic characteristics of Price’s hair and was “consistent with” originating from her. He also stated that fibers on Price’s underwear and pants were “consistent with” samples from Granillo’s seat cover, while carpet fibers on her pants were “consistent with” a sample from his car’s floor. Oakes agreed that the findings were “consistent with” the State’s theory that Price had been inside the car while her pants were off and her underwear was exposed. In closing, the prosecution described the physical evidence as uncontroverted, said the samples “matched,” and used it to corroborate Price’s disputed account. The jury convicted Granillo of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree sexual assault, and attempted first-degree sexual assault, and the circuit court imposed an aggregate 40-year sentence.

In October 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) informed Maui prosecutors that Oakes’ hair testimony had overstated the statistical significance of microscopic comparison and “exceed[ed] the limits of the science.” Granillo filed an HRPP Rule 40 petition challenging both the hair and fiber opinions. The circuit court accepted the State’s concession that the hair testimony was improper but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not decide the fiber issue. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”) affirmed under McNulty. It reasoned that the invalid hair analysis merely duplicated Oakes’ fiber opinions, which independently placed Price in the car. The ICA did not address whether the evidence probably would change a later trial’s result. The Hawaii Supreme Court accepted review and requested supplemental briefing on judicial notice, the fair-trial implications of invalid scientific evidence, and the governing post-conviction standard.

Analysis

Judicial Notice and
Scientific Limits

The Court began its analysis by addressing judicial notice under Hawaii Rules of Evidence (“HRE”) Rule 201(b), which permits notice of facts “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” It noted that Hawaii appellate courts have taken notice of scientific principles, accepted methods, and governmental materials. State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42 (Haw. 2001) (scientific principles and techniques); State v. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (appellate judicial notice); State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1992) (DNA principles); State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32 (Haw. 1997) (then-accepted hair-and-fiber methods); State v. Puaoi, 891 P.2d 272 (Haw. 1995) (facts demonstrable from indisputably accurate sources); Off. of Hawaiian Affs. v. State, 31 P.3d 901 (Haw. 2001) (governmental reports).

The Court took judicial notice of the 2009 National Research Council report (“NRC Report”) and the 2016 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology report (“PCAST Report”) but only with respect to the scientific basis and limitations of microscopic hair and fiber comparison and the permissible scope of feature-comparison testimony. The NRC Report explained that a microscopic hair association identifies only a class and cannot establish a unique source. Fiber comparison has the same limitation. It may associate a fiber with a class of textiles, but it cannot identify one item as the source. Fiber analysis also lacked uniform matching criteria, validation studies, quantified reliability, and known error rates. The PCAST Report explained that experience cannot replace empirical validation and that experts may not imply source identification or near-certainty without supporting data. The Court observed that courts have recognized the NRC Report as an authoritative scientific development. More v. State, 880 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 2016); State v. Brackett, No. WAS-24-231, 2026 WL 304999 (Me. Feb. 5, 2026).

The Court also reconsidered Fukusaku’s earlier acceptance of hair and fiber analysis as reliable. It explained that the NRC and PCAST reports had displaced that scientific consensus and required it to reverse course.

Applying those limits, the Court determined that Oakes’ fiber testimony departed from accepted science in five respects. He attributed the samples to specific parts of Granillo’s car, conveyed unsupported statistical certainty through terms such as “microscopically identical,” omitted the discipline’s class-only limitation, offered no supporting validation or error-rate research, and identified no distinctive environmental feature distinguishing the fibers from other products in the manufacturing batch. The DOJ letter’s silence about fibers did not establish reliability because the federal review arose from DNA exonerations and addressed only hair evidence. The Court stressed that not every later study warrants judicial notice. It further explained that properly qualified class-level testimony may remain admissible when it clearly disclaims individual-source identification and unsupported statistical significance.

False-Evidence Standard

The Court next addressed the standard governing HRPP Rule 40 relief. A conviction violates article I, section 5 when materially false evidence might reasonably have influenced the verdict. Stone; Birano v. State, 426 P.3d 387 (Haw. 2018); United States v. Butler, 955 F.3d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (applying a comparable materiality rule to invalid FBI hair testimony). Scientific reports that expose an expert opinion’s lack of empirical support do not create a new historical fact, the Court reasoned. They establish that the trial testimony was false when presented.

The McNulty test instead requires evidence discovered after trial that could not have been found before or at trial through due diligence, is material and neither cumulative nor offered solely for impeachment, and “would probably change the result of a later trial.” It is suited to evidence such as a newly located witness or later-developed factual proof, according to the Court. State v. Mabuti, 807 P.2d 1264 (Haw. 1991); State v. Caraballo, 615 P.2d 91 (Haw. 1980). Its diligence and probability requirements further the prudential finality interests reflected in Rule 40. Eason v. State, 576 P.3d 765 (Haw. 2025). However, scientifically invalid testimony presents a constitutional defect and requires a court to assess the effect of evidence that must be removed from the trial record, not add newly discovered facts to a hypothetical retrial.

Consequently, the Court rejected both the ICA’s McNulty analysis and the circuit court’s harmless-error approach. Stone had applied the four-part framework from State v. Teves, 679 P.2d 136 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984), to an HRPP Rule 33 motion involving a witness’ false testimony discovered after trial. The Court determined that importing only Teves’ harmless-error component into this Rule 40 context would conflate distinct standards. Stone provided the no-knowledge principle, not the governing materiality framework, the Court explained.

The Court also held that prosecution knowledge is not an element of a discredited-science claim under article I, section 5. Federal decisions address deliberate presentation of false evidence, impute one prosecutor’s knowledge to the office, and describe the resulting impairment of the trial’s truth-seeking function, but they do not decide whether a lack of prosecutorial awareness bars relief. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (perjured evidence); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (knowing use); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (imputed knowledge); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (knowing-use line). Under Stone, prosecutorial good faith does not determine whether the accused received a fair trial.

The Court stated that it interprets article I, section 5 independently of federal constitutional doctrine. See State v. Wilson, 543 P.3d 440 (Haw. 2024). It instructed that for Rule 40 claims based on scientifically invalidated testimony, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that the false evidence contributed to the conviction. “This standard requires neither due diligence nor a showing that acquittal was probable,” the Court explained. The materiality inquiry examines the false testimony’s possible effect on the verdict actually returned. The Court distinguished that inquiry from harmless-error review, which it described as focusing on the strength of the remaining evidence.

Materiality

The Court then applied the reasonable-possibility test. The standard is met when it is reasonably possible that one juror would have voted differently, but it does not require automatic reversal. Testimony carrying little weight may be immaterial, and overwhelming independent proof may defeat relief. State v. Hirata, 520 P.3d 225 (Haw. 2022); Teves; Butler.

Oakes’ opinions were material because the prosecution relied on them from opening through closing to answer attacks on Price’s credibility and to present its account as scientifically verified, according to the Court. His fiber opinion alone supported the assertion that Price’s pants had been removed inside Granillo’s car. The Hawaii Supreme Court has recognized that jurors may assign exceptional reliability to expert testimony and surrender independent assessment. State v. David, 494 P.3d 1202 (Haw. 2021); State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48 (Haw. 1990). Oakes’ position as an FBI supervisory agent, nearly 10 years of specialized work, and thousands of examinations intensified that risk. The Court also concluded that the false forensic evidence prevented Granillo from credibly arguing that Price had never entered his car, leaving the defense to challenge her account of events inside it. That constraint compromised his due process right to present a complete defense, the Court concluded. See David.

The remaining evidence showed that Price was at the shopping center, later appeared distressed and injured, and had been at the breakwater. It did not independently establish that Granillo returned after police directed him to leave, forced Price into his car, or assaulted her there. The hair and fiber evidence provided the only direct connection placing Price in the car, while the fibers were the only nontestimonial proof offered to show contact between her clothing and its seat and floor. Given the conflicts in Price’s accounts, the Court held that there was a reasonable possibility Oakes’ false testimony contributed to the verdict.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, the circuit court’s order denying Granillo’s HRPP Rule 40 petition, and the final judgment and remanded for a new trial. See: Granillo v. State, 593 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2026).  

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