by David Kim

The Supreme Court of Michigan held that mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for a pre-People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980), felony-murder conviction violates Michigan Constitution, art 1, § 16 when the defendant shows the jury lacked an Aaron-compliant malice instruction and the prosecution cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt from the trial evidence that a properly instructed jury would have found malice. If the prosecution fails, the no-parole component must be stricken. The Court ruled that Edwin Lamar Langston satisfied the first step, vacated in part the order denying relief, and remanded for an expedited determination of the second.

Background

A 1976 jury found Langston guilty of first-degree felony murder based on his assistance in an armed robbery during which Ronald Wilson fatally shot grocery-store owner Arretta Ingraham. Langston had entered the store before the robbery and reported the store’s occupancy to Wilson. He maintained that he opposed the robbery and moved the car farther along the street before Wilson entered. No party disputed that Langston remained outside the store when the robbery and killing occurred.

The trial court instructed that Langston could be convicted if he intended and assisted the robbery, a murder resulted, and the murder was “fairly within the scope of a criminal enterprise” and “might have been expected to happen” during a robbery with a pistol. The jury convicted him, and the trial court imposed mandatory LWOP. The Court of Appeals reversed because the instructions did not adequately require malice. While the prosecution’s appeal was pending, Aaron held that intent concerning the predicate felony could not, without more, establish the malice element of murder. Aaron defined malice as “the intention to kill, the intention to do great bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.”

However, the new rule articulated in Aaron applied only to the parties in the case, to trials still in progress, and to trials occurring after the opinion. Because Langston’s trial ended in 1976, Aaron did not apply to his case. Initially, the Michigan Supreme Court denied the prosecution’s application, but upon reconsideration, it reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Langston’s first-degree murder conviction, citing the portion of Aaron limiting the decision to prospective application.

In 2020, Langston moved for relief from judgment, challenging both the absence of an Aaron-compliant malice finding and his mandatory LWOP sentence. The trial court denied relief because Aaron was prospective and People v. Hall, 242 N.W.2d 377 (Mich. 1976), had upheld mandatory LWOP for felony murder. The Court of Appeals denied leave, and the Michigan Supreme Court granted review of the sentencing questions.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by addressing collateral review. MCR 6.508(D)(3) generally requires a defendant asserting a nonjurisdictional ground that could have been raised on direct appeal or in a prior motion for relief from judgment to establish good cause and actual prejudice. An invalid sentence establishes sentencing prejudice under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv). Good cause includes an external circumstance that made the legal basis unavailable. People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. 1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

Langston lacked a reasonably available basis for this claim during his direct appeal because Hall controlled and state constitutional sentencing law remained largely static, the Court stated. Later decisions moved away from mandatory LWOP untailored to culpability. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (barring juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (barring mandatory juvenile LWOP for homicide); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (applying Miller retroactively); People v. Parks, 987 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. 2022) (holding mandatory LWOP for offenders under 21 violates Michigan’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual” punishment). These developments provided good cause, the Court concluded.

Cruel-or-Unusual-Punishment Framework

The Court next reviewed Michigan Constitution, art 1, § 16, which prohibits “cruel or unusual” punishment and affords broader protection than the Eighth Amendment. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992). Under People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972), and Bullock, courts consider the sentence’s severity relative to the offense, Michigan penalties for other offenses, other jurisdictions’ penalties for the same offense, and rehabilitation.

Each factor supported the Court’s proportionality conclusion. First, LWOP is Michigan’s harshest punishment and is grossly disproportionate when a jury did not find Aaron malice and the prosecution cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it would have done so. Second, Michigan otherwise imposes mandatory LWOP in only limited circumstances, viz., first-degree murder, habitual first-degree criminal sexual conduct against a child younger than 13, and a few other offenses resulting in death, including crimes requiring intent akin to malice. A post-Aaron armed-robbery participant lacking malice could instead receive parolable life or a term of years under MCL 750.529. Third, at most 12 states, including Michigan, mandate LWOP for felony murder. Fourth, mandatory LWOP forecloses release and therefore does not advance rehabilitation. Parks; Graham.

Entitlement to Relief

The Court then announced the two-step procedure. The defendant first bears the burden under MCR 6.508(D) to show that the jury received no Aaron-compliant malice instruction. Individual review is necessary because pre-Aaron appellate decisions conflicted, the Court explained. Consequently, some juries may have received Aaron-consistent instructions.

After that showing, the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt from the trial evidence that a rational, properly instructed jury would have found Aaron malice. The Court explained that omitted-element harmless-error review provided the closest analogue. People v. Kowalski, 803 N.W.2d 200 (Mich. 2011); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Trial evidence is important because felony-murder participants may have materially different culpability. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), barred execution of a getaway driver who neither killed, attempted to kill, nor intended a killing, while Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), permitted capital punishment for “major participation in the felony” accompanied by “reckless indifference to human life.”

The Court rejected automatic relief. Unlike the age-based classes in Parks, People v. Stovall, 987 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. 2022), and People v. Taylor, 2025 Mich. LEXIS 603 (2025), pre-Aaron defendants do not share a characteristic establishing diminished culpability, the Court explained. It also rejected Langston’s Sixth Amendment objection. A jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact exposing a defendant to greater potential punishment. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Judicial fact-finding that can only preserve or reduce a sentence is permissible. People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. 2018). Because the original verdict authorized LWOP and the new inquiry can only preserve it or reduce it to parolable life, the framework complies with the Sixth Amendment, according to the Court.

Scope, Remedy, and Application

The Court left Hall undisturbed to the extent it permits mandatory LWOP for defendants convicted of first-degree murder who were at least 21 at the time of the offense and who fall outside the new framework, and it did not resolve a facial challenge to mandatory LWOP for felony murder. It also declined to reach the parallel Eighth Amendment claim. The Court vacated its grant of leave on Aaron’s prospective application, did not apply Aaron retroactively, and left Langston’s conviction intact.

Following Bullock, the Court held that the remedy is to strike parole ineligibility, not resentence on a lesser offense or impose a term of years without an applicable sentencing range. The remedy provides parole consideration, not release. The Court distinguished Stovall because it concerned a juvenile’s parolable-life sentence, and the Court declined a term-of-years remedy because pre-Aaron cases preceded sentencing guidelines.

Applying step one, the Court determined that Langston’s instruction required neither intent to kill nor intent to cause great bodily harm. The phrase “might have been expected to happen” allowed conviction without deciding whether Langston reasonably should have anticipated a killing and fell short of Aaron’s wanton-and-willful standard, which resembles criminal gross negligence. People v. Fredell, 516 Mich. 1 (2024); People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. 2010). The prosecution had not yet received an opportunity to satisfy step two.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated in part the trial court’s order denying sentencing relief and remanded for expedited proceedings under the new framework. See: People v. Langston, 2026 Mich. LEXIS 1472 (2026).  

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