The FBI’s Encrypted Phone Sting
by Michael Dean Thompson
A San Diego-based company called ANOM, often stylized as “ANØM,” distributed encrypted phones worldwide. These devices were stripped down, hardened against intrusion, and designed to allow messaging only between phones on the same closed network. Unbeknownst to users, the FBI intercepted every communication.
The FBI and federal prosecutors in San Diego, while investigating encrypted device companies like Phantom Secure and Sky Global, devised a novel strategy. As they disrupted rival networks, they launched their own operation, ANOM, embedding a backdoor that gave them access to all activity on the devices. Users worldwide unknowingly adopted these phones, and by June 2021, at least 9,500 active devices enabled law enforcement in Australia, New Zealand, Europe, and South America to raid suspects tied to biker gangs, cartels, the mafia, and other criminal groups. The operation, known as Trojan Shield, ultimately led to approximately 1,200 arrests globally.
Osemah Elhassen, a Lebanese-Australian citizen, was arrested in Colombia in June 2021, extradited to the United States, and sentenced in November 2024 to 63 months in prison. He pleaded guilty to participating in a racketeering conspiracy, though he was not a leader or organizer. U.S. District Judge Janis Sammartino characterized his role in distributing ANOM phones to the criminal underworld “incredibly serious” but found 63 months sufficient, rejecting the prosecution’s request for an 81-month term, as Elhassen followed directions from an FBI agent rather than supervising others.
Elhassen was among 17 foreign nationals indicted in San Diego in 2021 for their roles in the ANOM conspiracy. By April 2025, eight had been extradited, and all had pleaded guilty, with Elhassen the first sentenced. Joseph Hakan Ayik, a Turkish-Australian and the lead defendant, was charged with administering the ANOM network alongside two others, Domenico Catanzariti and Maximilian Rivkin. Ayik was arrested in Istanbul in November 2023, though his extradition to the U.S. remains uncertain. The other 14 defendants were primarily distributors.
Defendants, including Netherlands citizen Seyyed Hossein Hosseini and Finnish citizen Alexander Dmitrienko, filed motions to dismiss the charges, arguing ANOM was an illegal spying operation and that the U.S. lacked jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad. Hosseini’s attorney wrote, “It is antithetical to our constitution for the United States government to police the activities of non-citizens whose actions occur abroad.” Dmitrienko’s counsel added that the U.S. government engineered the phones, citing a Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision and noting the government “has repeatedly bragged about doing just that.” Prosecutors countered that some crimes occurred in San Diego, justifying jurisdiction, presumably because ANOM traffic was routed through U.S. servers. Judge Sammartino upheld the prosecution’s position in September 2024.
The ANOM operation marks a triumph for law enforcement, dismantling criminal networks with a cunning technological ruse. Yet, for those wary of government overreach, it raises chilling questions. If the FBI can engineer a global surveillance network under the guise of a private company, what prevents similar tactics from targeting everyday citizens? The defendants’ failed motions—dismissing charges as an unconstitutional overreach of U.S. power—underscore a legal reality: jurisdiction can be manufactured, servers rerouted, and privacy eroded, all with judicial approval. For privacy advocates, ANOM isn’t just a sting operation—it’s a warning that even encrypted messages, marketed as ultra secure, can be covertly monitored by governments.
Source: San Diego Union-Tribune; U.S. District Court for the District of Southern California
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