by Douglas Ankney

The Supreme Court of Montana unanimously held that a district court violates due process when it premises a criminal sentence on a defendant’s decision to exercise constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to remain silent, and the right against self-incrimination. The Court vacated the defendant’s 24-year prison sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge because the sentencing court’s oral pronouncement explicitly castigated the defendant for “wasting” the time of the court, jury, and taxpayers by pursuing a trial despite video evidence of the offense.

Background

Darrin William Matt was incarcerated in the detention facility of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes in September 2022. Matt suffers from severe mental health disorders requiring prescribed medications scheduled for administration at 9:00 a.m. Shortly before that time, detention guard Zane Bundy approached Matt’s cell to retrieve cleaning supplies. Matt threw water in Bundy’s face, triggering a physical confrontation during which multiple guards restrained Matt and deployed a taser. Guards then moved Matt to a solitary cell, where he began injuring himself by striking his head against the concrete wall.

Staff brought a restraint chair, the facility’s sole intervention for self-harming prisoners, and Matt initially cooperated as guards secured his arms, shoulders, and left leg. When Bundy attempted to secure Matt’s right leg, Matt kicked him in the face with his unrestrained leg. Bundy did not seek medical treatment but reported jaw pain and difficulty eating for several weeks.

The State charged Matt with felony assault on a peace officer and sought a persistent felony offender designation. Following a jury trial, Matt was convicted. At sentencing, Matt’s attorney requested five years, noting the average sentence for this offense was four-and-a-half years. The State recommended 24 years. Matt addressed the court, describing his participation in a tribal reentry program addressing his mental health and substance abuse needs, and apologized for past disrespect.

The district court pronounced the following in imposing sentence: “Mr. Matt, we had a jury trial in this matter, and you wasted everyone’s time. There was a video of this incident. It was very clear to everyone, including the jury, that you were guilty of assault on a peace officer.” The court continued that Matt “wasted jurors’ time,” the court’s time, the State’s time, his attorney’s time, and taxpayer money. The court further criticized Matt for stating in his presentence investigation report that the reason for the offense was guard abuse of a prisoner, declaring “there was no evidence of” such abuse. The court concluded: “So, you failed to take responsibility for what you did,” before imposing the 24-year sentence.

Analysis

The Court began by reaffirming that both the United States and Montana Constitutions guarantee due process and that a sentence violating these guarantees is illegal. Citing State v. Shreves, 60 P.3d 991 (Mont. 2002), the Court stated that punishing a person for exercising a constitutional right violates due process. The Court observed that Matt possessed an unequivocal right to remain silent and not incriminate himself under both constitutions and that this protection “extends beyond trial to those already convicted of crime and applies to punishment as well as the determination of guilt.” Shreves. Matt also held an indisputable constitutional right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court noted that Matt did not testify at trial and maintained throughout that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove bodily injury. At sentencing, he continued to assert his innocence. The written judgment omitted references to Matt’s decision not to testify and to seek a jury trial, but the Court reiterated that the oral pronouncement controls over written judgments. State v. Rennaker, 150 P.3d 960 (Mont. 2007).

Applying its precedents, the Court found the district court’s comments undermined the sentence’s legality. Shreves had vacated a sentence based “in large part” on the defendant’s refusal to explain his crime or express remorse while maintaining innocence. The Court explained that the narrow prohibition against inferring lack of remorse from a defendant’s silence protects against forcing a defendant to choose between abandoning the right to remain silent or receiving a harsher sentence, a choice the state Supreme Court has deemed “constitutionally impermissible.” Shreves. Similarly, in State v. Cesnik, 122 P.3d 456 (Mont. 2005), the state Supreme Court vacated a sentence premised partly on the defendant’s refusal to acknowledge the jury’s verdict, reasoning that requiring such an admission from someone maintaining innocence would undermine his constitutional rights and render any appeal meaningless.

The Court acknowledged that sentencing courts may consider lack of remorse when supported by affirmative evidence in the record. State v. Morris, 245 P.3d 512 (Mont. 2010). However, courts may not “draw a negative inference of lack of remorse as a result of a defendant’s invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent and refusal to admit guilt,” the Court stated. See Shreves. In the present case, the district court premised Matt’s sentence on his failure to accept responsibility despite his maintained innocence, violating this principle.

The Court also rejected the State’s attempt to distinguish the case based on the clarity of video evidence. The State cited a Georgia case, Fitzpatrick v. State, 733 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 2012), where a trial court made similar comments about wasting time. The Court found Fitzpatrick inapposite because that defendant had testified and presented a version of events the jury rejected, whereas Matt exercised his right to silence and challenged only the sufficiency of the State’s proof.

The Court was unpersuaded by the State’s argument that other legitimate sentencing factors, such as Matt’s unsuccessful prior rehabilitation efforts and the seriousness of the offense, cured the constitutional error. Although those considerations formed part of the district court’s rationale, the sentence remained tainted because the court prefaced its oral pronouncement by castigating Matt for “wasting” time and tax dollars by exercising his rights to a jury trial, to remain silent, and not to incriminate himself. The Court reiterated that the constitutional order depends on preserving those fundamental protections “regardless of past conduct of a defendant or volume of evidence presented by the prosecution.” State v. Lawrence, 385 P.3d 968 (Mont. 2016).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed Matt’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge. See: State v. Matt, 584 P.3d 84 (Mont. 2026).

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