by Richard Resch

Resolving a circuit split, the Supreme Court of the United States held that when Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the resulting disparity between old and new sentences cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), whether considered alone or in combination with other factors. The Court further ruled that the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement, which permits courts to consider nonretroactive changes in law when a prisoner serving an unusually long sentence faces a gross disparity, is invalid to the extent it counsels otherwise.

Background

Daniel Rutherford committed two armed robberies in 2003 and was convicted of two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The statute then mandated a 25-year sentence for a second § 924(c) count, “stacked” consecutively upon the first count’s penalty, producing a 32-year minimum and a total sentence exceeding 42 years. Johnnie Carter participated in a string of armed bank robberies in 2007, was convicted of three § 924(c) offenses, and received a 70-year sentence, 57 years of which were the result of stacked mandatory minimums.

The First Step Act of 2018 eliminated the stacking requirement for first-time offenders, reserving the 25-year consecutive penalty for violations occurring after a prior § 924(c) conviction becomes final. Sentenced today, Rutherford would face a 14-year minimum and Carter a 21-year minimum. Congress extended the reduced penalties only to offenders not yet sentenced as of enactment, so neither petitioner qualifies.

Each instead sought compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which permits a District Court to reduce a prison term, after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, upon finding that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that the reduction is consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements. Congress never defined the operative phrase, instead directing the Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) to describe qualifying reasons, subject to a single express limitation regarding rehabilitation. From 2007 until 2023, the Commission’s policy statements focused on terminal illness, medical condition, age, and family circumstances.

After the First Step Act allowed prisoners to file their own motions and the Commission lost its quorum, the Courts of Appeals divided over whether the disparity produced by a nonretroactive amendment could qualify. A majority answered no. See United States v. McMaryion, 2023 WL 4118015 (5th Cir. June 22, 2023); United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2022); United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021); United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021). A minority concluded such disparities could justify relief, at least combined with other factors. See United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14 (1st Cir. 2022); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020).

In 2023, the Commission regained a quorum and sided with the minority position, adding “Unusually Long Sentence” to its list of extraordinary and compelling reasons. Under that category, a change in law may be considered when the defendant received an unusually long sentence, has served at least 10 years, and faces a “gross disparity” between the sentence being served and the sentence likely today, after full consideration of individualized circumstances. The District Courts denied both petitioners’ motions, and the Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the amended policy statement “conflicts with the will of Congress” and “cannot be considered in determining a prisoner’s eligibility for compassionate release.” 120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to resolve the circuit split.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by examining the ordinary meaning of terms, consulting dictionaries to conclude that extraordinary and compelling reasons are those that are “especially unusual and convincing.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 807 (1976); see 5 Oxford English Dictionary 614 (2d ed. 1989). The disparity created by the § 924(c) amendment fails both halves of that definition, the Court determined. Nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm, not “extraordinary.” The Court explained that statutory changes ordinarily benefit only future offenders, and even when Congress deviates by including defendants not yet sentenced, the “ordinary practice” is to withhold the change from those already sentenced. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012). Every such line-drawing effort necessarily creates a disparity between prisoners who receive the benefit and those who do not. Id.

Nor is the disparity “compelling,” according to the Court. Congress deliberately applied the lower penalties to some § 924(c) violators and withheld them from others, a choice that “reinforced its interest in finality and avoided burdening district courts with additional litigation.” Hewitt v. United States, 606 U.S. 419 (2025) (plurality opinion). The Court reasoned that treating such legislative judgment as a convincing reason to reduce a sentence would undermine the very choice Congress made. Doing so also falls “well outside” what the Court described as the “heartland of compassionate release,” which has long been defined by a prisoner’s personal circumstances such as medical condition, age, and family situation. The Court declined to decide whether reasons beyond personal circumstances could ever qualify, commenting that until very recently no one thought nonretroactive sentencing amendments were among them.

Petitioners’ Counterarguments

Petitioners argued the statutory terms are comprehensive and flexible, inviting a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. The Court agreed the terms leave room for judgment while rejecting the notion that they encompass any consideration. A reason qualifies only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to “warrant” release. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); Fernandez v. United States, 2026 U.S. Lexis 2295 (2026). Petitioners also invoked negative implication, reasoning that because § 994(t) rules out only “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone,” Congress impliedly authorized everything else. Quoting NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. 288 (2017), the Court responded that the force of any negative implication depends on context, illustrating the point with a dietitian’s advice that “[p]asta alone is not an acceptable dinner,” which “does not license” fried chicken with funnel cakes. The Court explained that Congress singled out rehabilitation to mark its break from the parole-era system described in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), suggesting nothing about other reasons.

The Court likewise rejected the argument that sentencing courts’ traditionally broad discretion controls. Before reaching the § 3553(a) factors, a court must first ensure the movant belongs to the “limited class of prisoners” eligible for a reduction. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010). Eligibility turns exclusively on the gatekeeping finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons, a distinct analytical step imposing “independent and ascertainable limits.” The Court distinguished Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), by noting that eligibility there was conceded and the relevant provision contained no limiting language, whereas here Congress “expressly cabined district courts’ discretion.” Finally, the Court warned that petitioners’ combination approach has sweeping implications. Under its logic, a judge who deems a mandatory minimum unduly harsh could treat the sentence’s severity as a reason for release. The Court reaffirmed that the legislature defines crimes and ordains punishment, United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820), and it endorsed the Sixth Circuit’s observation that “adding a legally impermissible ground to three insufficient factual considerations does not entitle a defendant to a sentence reduction.” Jarvis.

The Commission’s
Policy Statement

The Court stated that Congress empowered the Commission to “give meaning” to the provision, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), but its policy statements must remain “consistent with” the statute under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), and courts retain the duty to independently interpret the statute. An agency definition inconsistent with the statute exceeds delegated authority. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977). The Court explained that the Commission’s interpretation “must land within the statutory goalposts, no matter how wide they might be.” Cf. Koons v. United States, 584 U.S. 700 (2018). Because the statutory text and structure foreclose treating the § 924(c) disparity as a basis for eligibility, the Court ruled that the policy statement is invalid to that extent.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgments of the Third Circuit. See: Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320 (2026).

Editor’s Note: Rutherford resolves the circuit split over whether First Step Act § 924(c) stacking disparities may serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for compassionate release. It rejects Chen, Ruvalcaba, McGee, and McCoy to that extent and invalidates U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) insofar as it treats a nonretroactive congressional sentencing amendment, alone or combined with other factors, as an eligibility ground. The ruling operates at the threshold. Defendants must identify extraordinary and compelling reasons independent of the nonretroactive change, although the dissent noted the Government’s concession that, once eligibility exists on independent grounds, a disparity may still be weighed under § 3553(a) in determining relief. The majority left unresolved whether nonpersonal postjudgment developments can qualify. Pending motions premised on § 924(c) stacking should therefore be recast around independent personal circumstances or preserved postjudgment-development theories, not § 1B1.13(b)(6) standing alone.  

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